1

Filed 8/30/21 In re L.G. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re L

. G ., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT , Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. J

. T ., Defendant and Appellant. A 16 1341
( Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. DEP 6104 )

L.G. , the minor, lives with her father, appellant J.T. 1 In the summer of 2019, a dentist diagnosed L.G. with six cavities and three teeth in need of extraction. Over the next year, L.G. saw multiple dentists but only had one tooth extracted and no cavities filled. By the time of the jurisdictional hearing, L.G. had 11 cavities and at least one infected t oo th in need of
extraction

— which placed her at risk of a more serious infection necessitating hospitalization. As a result, the juvenile court declared L.G. a dependent

1 Mother is estranged from the family and has had little or no contact with the father or L.G. She did not participate in these dependency proceedings.2

under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), 2 placed her in father’s custody, and gave the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) “exclusive authority” over L.G.’s dental care. Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order. We find the evidence sufficient to support the court’s findings that L.G. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness due to father’s unwillingness or inability to provide adequate dental care and affirm. FACTS A. The Dependency Petition , the Detention of L.G ., and Subsequent Hearings After receiv ing a referral about L.G

. in January 2020 when she was six years old , the Department met with L.K., father’s then live

- in girlfriend who helped take care of L.G. According to L.K. , father “has always been against institutions including doctors, dentists, schools, government, etc.” As a
result , he refused to take L.G. to see a dentist until she was five . At that
time , father allowed L.K. to take L.G. to a dentist , and in the summer of 2019, the dentist determined that L.G. had six cavities and three teeth in need of extraction. Rather than treat L.G.’s teeth , however, father “believed that the cavities would just get infected and fal l out on their own.” L.K. also informed the Department that L.G. recently had to have surgery to remove an earring from her ear lobe. On January 26, 2020, L.G. woke with a swollen cheek so father and
L.K. took her to a dentist. The dentist diagnosed L. G. with an abscessed tooth. Although the dentist wished to extract the tooth that day, L.G. was

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.3

given antibiotics, and an appointment for the extraction was scheduled for January 29. On that day, however, father fed L.G. cereal for breakfast, and
the ext raction had to be rescheduled for February 3.
F ather brought L.G. to the PDI Dental Surgery Center (PDI) on February 3, 2020 but became angry when PDI wanted to take x

- rays and
asked for consent to “any and all necessary treatment” after L.G. was “put under.” F ather then left with L.G. before she could have dental surgery. According to PDI , L.G. had three teeth in need of extraction and several in need of fillings and “could develop sepsis” if those teeth were not treated. After father refused to talk to the Department about L.G.’s dental care, the Department scheduled an Imminent Risk Team Decision Making Meeting for February 13, 2020 . The Department informed father about the meeting, but father did not attend. On February 18, 2020, the Department filed a dependency petition, alleging that L.G. has suffered or faces a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness du e to father’s failure to provide proper dental care. Based on the “immediate risk for sepsis, a life threatening condition”, the Department asked the juvenile court to detain L.G. in “ protective custody

. . . in order to ensure her safety.” The Court did so but authorized her return to father after further investigation and 72 hours notice to the parties

. Three days later , the Department submitted an informational memo to
the court. The memo stated that PDI would not treat L.G. until it obtained
author ization from its Board due to “ father’s past behavior. ” As a result, the Department could only obtain a tentative date of March 17 for L.G.’s dental

surgery

. In response, father requested the immediate return of L.G.4

At the February 27, 2020 hearing on father’s request , the Department informed the court that L.G. had been returned to father the day before.
Father reported that he had scheduled a dental appointment for L.G. with a different dentist for the next day

. After expressing its displ easure with the Department over its misrepresentation of L.G.’s condition as emergent, the

court ordered father to keep the dental appointment

. B. The Jurisdictional Hearing On March 5, 2020, the Department submitted another informational

memo to the juveni le court . According to the memo, the Department contacted father about the February 28 appointment. Father told the Department the dentist no longer “want[ed] to be involved” and would not
return his calls or texts due to its actions . As a result, he ha d scheduled another appointment “in about 2 weeks” with a different dentist. The dental office that allegedly refused to see L.G. , however, told the Department that father did not bring L.G. to the appointment and that the dentist “was [still] will ing to see” her

. T he Department then filed an amended petition, adding this new information.
In its Jurisdiction Report, the Department wrote that PDI was willing

to treat L.G. but had requested “ a stay

- away order for” father “as a pre

condition, due to father’s eruptive anger as previously displayed in their office.” The Department also reported that it was unable to meet with L.G. because father claim ed she had the flu

. Finally, the Report listed six allegations of neglect and emotional abuse against father from 2013 to
2020

— and detailed father’s criminal history

— which included a 2013 felony conviction for burglary, a 2017 misdemeanor conviction for use of a controlled
substance , and various older convictions for theft, possession of controlled substances, reckless driving, battery, and illegal possession of a firearm. The5

Department recommended that the court sustain the petition and order random drug testing and a psychological evaluation of fat her

. In response to the Report, father provided a receipt for dental
insurance

. He also claimed he sent an email canceling the February 28 appointment because L.G. had a cold and ask ing to reschedule . When he did not hear back, father scheduled an appo intment with another dentist for April. At a March 2020 hearing, L.G.’s attorney reported that she was a “happy little girl.” According to the attorney, L.G., who “was a little guarded , ” said that her mouth “hurt for a while” but it did not hurt “at that time.” F ather’s attorney told the court that father only wanted to provide the name of L.G.’s newest dentist to the court

. T he court , however, ordered father to provide the dentist’s inf ormation to the Department so it could
check up on L.G.’s dental care. The court then continued the hearing to give father “the chan c e to get” L.G.’s “teeth done.” In May 2020, the Department reported that L.G. had not received any
dental care yet becau se dental offices were closed due to the pandemic. It also reported that the social worker saw L.G.

— who appeared to be “in good spirits and in no apparent distress”

— in April but that father screamed at the social worker “saying that he was done with her.” L.G.’s attorney was able to speak with L.G. but only in father’s presence. The court expressed confusion over why L.G. had not received any treatment: “Here’s what I don’t
understand: How we went from this child might die four months ago to now she’s still doesn’t have her dental services, when I know that dentists are doing emergency services. And at some point, this was an emergency situation.” The court then set a jurisdictional he aring for June 1 9

.6

On June 12, 2020, the Department submitted an Addendum Report

— which attached a letter from Dr. Tanvi Shah of PDI. In the letter, Dr. Shah wrote that L.G. came to PDI for treatment on February 3 and “revealed that she was waking up at n ight repeatedly with pain and just wanted the pain to go away.” Dr. Shah determined that L.G. needed “at least three extractions, and several other fillings.” Father, however, was “rude and disruptive” and refused to consent to treatment. According to D r. Shah , “[i]t is in” L.G.’s “best interest to have her teeth worked on ASAP” because s he suffers from “unnecessary discomfort and swelling ,” and because her teeth, if left untreated, could “place her in the hospital for dental abscess/cellulitis ” and “aff ect her permanent teeth and other vital structures.” I n Dr. Shah’s “professional opinion , ” delaying treatment “would have adverse effect s on” L.G.’s “ dental and medical health.”
At the June 19 , 2020 hearing, father pr esent ed an “itemized treatment plan” for L.G. In response, the Department asked for a continuance so it
could contact Dr. Dana Yee, the dentist who prepared the plan. Father moved to dismiss the petition, but the court refused until the “dental work is done” and continued the hearing. Five days later , the Department reported that Dr. Yee was reluctant to provide any information. Father moved to dismiss the petition

. T he court refused and suggested that father sign a release authorizing Dr. Yee to provide i nformation to the Department.
F ather , however, never signed a release. Nonetheless, the Department
was able to subpoena Dr. Yee and learned that L.G. had “an emergency procedure on an infected tooth on July 13.” Father moved to dismiss the petition based on Dr. Yee’s statement that L.G. “was not experiencing dental pain

. ” The court refused because father had “not followe d through to the7

extent that” he “should” and had “tried to mislead the Court” and his attorney. When the court st ated that it was “considering taking custody back,” the social worker respond ed that father appeared to be “starting to follow through” and t hat it was not in L.G.’s “ best interest at this time to detain her.” The court then set a jurisdictional hearing for August.
At the jurisdictional hearing , t he Department introduced into evidence the social worker reports , the call service logs, and a l etter from Dr. Yee dated August 4, 2020

. In the letter, Dr. Yee stated that she saw L.G. on July 28 and discovered “11 teeth with cavities.” Dr. Yee provided L.G. with a “comprehensive exam, radiographs, dental cleaning with fluoride, prescription for antibiotics given and silver diamine fluori de application to appropriate teeth with dental caries.” She further stated that a follow

- up appointment for “ extraction of an infected tooth ” had been scheduled for August 10. Kara Jacobs, a social worker, testified that L.G. , who was now seven, had si x cavities in August 2019

. That number had increased to 11 by the
time Dr. Yee saw L.G. roughly one year later. Jacobs also testified that she transferred L.G.’s case to Melissa McKinney, another social worker, because father refused to allow Jacobs to s peak to L.G. and spoke to her “in an elevated voice” at their last meeting. According to Jacobs, the Department had difficulty getting “cooperation from father.” She had not, however, attempted to contact father by phone since mid

- April , and apologized t o father for failing to be more proactive from mid

- March to mid

- April. McKinney also had difficulty reaching father and was unable to see L.G. but was able to speak with father several times.
Jacobs further testified that she spoke with a nurse at PDI on February 24, 2020 who told her that L.G.’s condition was not life

- threatening if she8

took the prescribed antibiotics. According to Jacobs, L.G. seemed ha ppy and normal when she saw her in April and that a police officer who s aw L.G. i n June described her as “happy and healthy”

. Jac ob s also confirmed that dental offices were closed in May 2020 but stated that dentists could have seen L.G. “[u]p until mid

- March

. ” Father testified that he knew that L.G. had six cavities in Aug ust 2019. He claimed he scheduled an appointment with PDI “as soon as possible” in January 2020. F ather , however, was concerned that PDI might do unnecessary work and decided at the February 3 appointment to get a “second opinion” as suggested by PDI. That same day, father called Denti

Cal for options for a second opinion and learned they were limited. He then remembered a dentist, Dr. Gil Rodriguez, who had worked on his teeth in the past and scheduled an appointment with Dr. Rodriguez for February 2 8. According to father, he canceled th at appointment because L.G. was
sick and sent an email asking to reschedule

. He also claimed he called and texted Dr. Rodriguez but never heard back. Father then claimed he scheduled an appointment with Bright Now Dental in March. At th at appointment Bright Now Dental identified cavities “that needed to be addressed” and “one extraction that needed to happen” and created a treatment plan. Father scheduled a follow

- up appointment but the pandemic struck and the den tal office shut down. Although father eventually reschedule d the appointment for June 4, Bright Now Dental refused to treat L.G. at that time because it was not an emergency and because of HVAC
issues

. Father then testified that he scheduled an appointm ent with Dr. Yee for June 17 , 2020 . On July 13, L.G. had a tooth extracted. L.G. then had another appointment with Dr. Yee on July 28

— during which Dr. Yee treated9

her teeth with silver diamine fluoride. According to father, L.G. had an other appointment with Dr. Yee for an extraction on August 19

— which he intended to keep. Finally, f

ather explained that Dr. Yee was unable to do any fillings because of HVAC issues

. As to his failure to obtain treatment for L.G. ’s teeth earlier, Father testified that he deferred to the dentists and that the pandemic made it difficult to schedule appointments . He claimed there was no need to

“ immediately” treat L.G. “ to prevent any serious harm ” because he had “never once personally had a complaint from her about her teeth

. . . [¶]

. . . [¶]

. . . since she was alive.” He also claimed he never “noticed anything with her chewing or favoring anything

. ” Finally, father claimed no dentist ever “expressed any kind of concern of any harm or danger that she might be in, in any way, shape or form.” In particular , father denied
that PDI mention ed any risks to L.G.’s health at the February 3 appointment

. Father also denied being “rude and disruptive” at the February 3 appointment or uncooperative with the Department

. He claimed he never refused to allow the Department to see L.G and had been responsive to every request made by the Department. He, however, admitted that he refus ed to sign any releases because he felt “violated” by the Department.
T he juvenile court sustained the petition , citing, among other things, father’s “longstanding failure to cooperate with the” Department. C. The Disposition On August 28, 2020, the Department filed a Disposition Report, recommending that the court declare L.G. a dependent and order family
maintenance services. In support, the Department cited L.G.’s 11 cavities, including two abscessed teeth, and the serious health co nsequences to L.G.,10

including “pain, difficulty in eating, malformation of her adult teeth” and the possibility of “ death from sepsis , ” if these teeth remain untreated. O n March 2, L.G. told the social worker that father told her not to “ ‘talk to anyone unless he is there.’ ” At the social worker’s next meeting with L.G. in April , father “was very angry” and would not allow th e social worker to speak with L.G. This was the last time the Department saw L.G. despite multiple efforts
to schedule another me eting. As to L.G. ’s dental appointment on August 19, 2020, the Department reported that Dr. Yee was unable to treat L.G. because she was screaming and blocking her mouth with her hands despite the use of nitrous oxide.
Because Dr. Yee could not sedate L.G. any further , she referred L.G. “to UCSF and Oakland Children’s Hospital.” Although the Department did not blame father for this latest failure to treat L.G. ’s teeth, it stressed the need for father to cooperate with the Department to ensure that L.G. received the
dental c are she needed. Finally, the Department noted that father was “incredulous” about the court’s ruling at the jurisdictional hearing because he
had “ done everything ” he had been asked to do. At the disposition al hearing, father testified that he took L.G. for a dental appointment in Oakland on September 2, 2020. Father claimed he did not schedule the appointment himself because the court “stripped” him of his ability to do so. At the appointment , he advocated for the use of nitrous oxide
because it invol ved the “least risk” but r ecogniz ed that nitrous oxide may not be enough . He, however, expressed concern about the use of general
anesthesia. According to father , no treatment plan was made at that time , and another appointment was scheduled for Septembe r 25. Father also testified that he never prevented the Department from seeing L.G.11

Noreen Mendoza , a social worker, testified that she made many efforts to “engage with” father after she was assigned the case in August. When her offer to include father in the scheduling of another dental appointment was ignored , she scheduled the September 2 appointment herself and provided father with the information. After observing that father’s frustration was understandab le after L.G. had been erroneously removed from his custody at the detention hearing, the juvenile court order ed family maintenance services because L.G. still had not
received adequate dental care over “seven months” later

. T he court expressed “zero conf

idence” that father, “if left to his own devices,” would get L.G. the dental care that she need ed . The court also noted the worsening condition of L.G.’s teeth and father’s cavalier attitude toward her dental health . Although father appeared more coopera tive, the court stated it was “not enough” and gave the Department “exclusive authority to make all decisions regarding” L.G.’s “dental care.” DISCUSSION A. Motion to Augment the Record
In its motion to augment the record / request for judicial notice (motion), the Department asks the Court to consider the following postjudgment
evidence: (1) supplemental petition filed pursuant to section 387; (2) minute order noting that the supplemental petition had been served; and (3) minute
order sustaining the supplemental petition. We deferred ruling on the
motion pending our determination of the merits of the appeal , and we now deny it

. “Consideration of postjudgment evidence in dependency appeals violates generally applicable rules of appella te procedure as well as the specific statutes that govern termination of parental rights, and is contrary to12

the strong interest in finality of juvenile dependency proceedings.” ( In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58.) Although courts have recognized an exception to this general rule “when an event occurs that renders it impossible for the court to grant effective relief” ( i d. at p. 59) , that exception does not apply here ( see In re Travis C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225 [“If
the court was without jurisdiction to rule on the section 300 petition, it was also without jurisdiction to consider the section 387 petition”])

. Because we may not consider the section 387 petition or the juvenile court’s ruling on that petition in deciding this appea l , the motion is denied.
B. The Jurisdictional Finding s Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) at the time of the hearing. We disagree. “ ‘[W]e review bo th the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for substantial evidence. [Citation.] In doing so, we view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination s , drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the ju venile court’s findings and orders. Issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court and we neither reweigh the evidence nor exercise our independent judgment. [Citation.] But substantial evidence “is not synonymous with any evidenc e.” [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on appeal. [Citation.]

. . . The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.’ [Cita tion.] ” [Citation.]. ’ ” ( In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 560 ( Joaquin C. ).) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order.” ( In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)13

Under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), a child may be declared a dependent if th e juvenile court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

“ [t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of

. . . the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate

. . . medical treatment.” Specifically, the court must find: (1) “one or more of the statutorily

- specified omissions in providing care for the child”

— i.e., a failure to provide adequate medical care ( Joaquin C. , supra , 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 561); “ ‘ (2) causation; and (3) “ serious physical harm or illness ” to the minor, or a “ substantial risk ” of such harm or illness ’ ” ( ibid. ). “The third element ‘effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future

. ’ ” ( In r e James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135 , abrogated in part

on an other ground by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 ( R.T. ) .) The focus is

“ ‘on the child rather than the parent.’ ” ( R.T. , at p. 625.)

“ Although there must be a present risk of harm to the minor, the juvenile court may consider past events to determine whether the child is presently in need of juvenile court protection. ” ( In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289.) Indeed, a “past failure [may be] predictive of the future.” ( In re Jasm on O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 424.) However, “ ‘there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe ’ ” that serious physical
harm or illness will occur in the future. ( In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394, italics omitted , abrogated on another ground by R.T. , supra , 3 Cal.4th at p. 622 .)
In this case , there wa s ample evidence at the time of the jurisdictional hearing that the minor was at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to father’s unwillingness or inability to provide adequate dental care. In the14

summer of 2019, L.G. was diagnosed with six cavities and three teeth in need of extraction. Despite this diagnosis, fathe r did not take L.G. to see a dentist again until late January 2020 and only did so because she had a swollen cheek. At that time, L.G. was in “tremendous pain” and had “ at least ” three teeth in need of extraction. Despite this, father cancelled at least two dental appointments and cycled through four dentists over the next seven months. As a result, L.G. only had one of her teeth extracted and no cavities filled before the jurisdictional hearing in August 2020 . In the meantime, L.G. now
had 11 cavities and at least one infected tooth in need of extraction . The infections in her teeth, i f left untreated, “could potentially spread and place her in the hospital for dental abscess/cellulitis and in need of IV antibiotics.” Considered altogether, t hese fact s are more than sufficient to establish that L.G. faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm without adequate
dental care and that father was unwilling or unable to provide that care. 3 ( In re Hadley B. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1048 [“juvenile court adjudicating dependency jurisdiction must consider all the circumstances affecting the child, wherever they occur”].) Nonetheless, father contends the jurisdictional finding s should be reversed because there was no evidence th at L.G. had ever suffered serious physical harm at the time of the hearing. But father ignores evidence that L.G. was in “tremendous pain” and could not open her mouth widely in February 2020. In any event, section 300, subdivision (b)(1) does not require an “immedi ate medical necessity.” ( In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996,

3 After the jurisdictional hearing, Dr. Yee was unable to treat L.G. b ecause L.G. needed to be sedated and referred L.G. to another dental clinic

. Father, however, refused to work with the Department to schedule an appointment with that clinic . As a result, the Department schedule d the appointment. Although father took L. G. to the appointment, he left without a treatment plan.15

1003.) Instead, a “reasonable apprehension” of future harm is sufficient. ( Ibid. ) The letter from Dr. Shah

— which stated that it was “imperative” for L.G. to have her decaying teeth extracted or treated with “pulpotomie/crowns”

— is more than sufficient to establish such a reasonable apprehension. Father also argues that he provided L.G. with adequate dental care. But this argument is refuted by the simple fact that L.G. ’s cavities a nd infected teeth were left largely untreated for almost one year after the initial diagnosis and almost six months after the filing of the dependency petition.
Indeed , the condition of L.G.’s teeth actually worsened during that time period as evidenced b y the almost doubling of her teeth with cavities. Although the pandemic did cause some delay, it does not explain why L.G. failed to get any treatment during the eight months before the pandemic
struck or why her treatment was delayed after father was abl e to schedule dental appointments again in Ju ne 2020. Although father cites a litany of excuses for the delay, the juvenile court did not find those excuses credible, and we may not reweigh the evidence on appeal. ( Joaquin C. , supra , 15 Cal. App.5 th at p

. 560.) Finally, father’s claim that he was ready, willing, and able to provide L.G. with the dental care she needed at the time of the jurisdictional hearing is belied by the evidence in the record. According to his ex

- girlfriend, father distrusted medical professionals , did not allow L.G. to see a dentist until she

was five, and believed that L.G.’s infected teeth would simply fall out on their

own. Consistent with this cavalier attitude toward L.G.’s dental health , father downplayed the condition of L.G.’s teeth at the jurisdictional hearing

. Indeed, he testifi ed that L.G. never complained about any pain , that he never saw any sign that L.G.’s teeth were bothering her , and that no dentist had16

ever expressed any concern about L.G.’s heal th

. Evidence of f ather’s misleading statements to the Department and the court and his refusal to cooperate with the Department bolster s the conclusion that L.G. would not
receive adequate dental care absent court intervention. Thus , a reasonable trier of fact could conclude on this record that the “attitude” of father “posed a
then

- existing threat to” L.G.’s “well

- being.” ( In re Petra B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1170.) Accor dingly, we find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1). DISPOSITION
The order s dated August 14 , 2020, and September 15 , 2020 are

a ffirmed.17 _________________________ Chou, J. *

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________ Petrou, J.

A16 1341

* Judge of the Superior Court of San Mateo County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.