1

Filed 3/16/16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re A.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. A.S., Defendant and Appellant. A144487
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. SF J 14024003)

I.
INTRODUCTION In this appeal from a disposition order declaring her a ward of the juvenile court, A.S. ( appellant ) challenges two conditions of her probation . The f irst challenged
condition require d appellant to submit her “ electronics including passwords under [her]
control ” to warrantless searches by the probation department and law enforcement (electronic search condition ) . Second, appellant challenges a probatio n condition which prohibit ed her from unauthorized or unsupervised presence on school property (school grounds condition). Appellant is not the first minor to object to an electronic search condition . In fact
the juvenile court judge who imposed this con dition on appellant is the same beleaguered judge whose substantially identical electronic search condition was: stricken by Division
Two of this appellate district in In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907 ( Erica R. ) and
in In re Mark C. (2016) 244 Cal .App.4th 520 ( Mark C. ) ; not stricken but found to be
overbroad and modified by Division Three in In re Malik J . (2015 ) 240 Cal.App.4th 896,2

899

- 900 ( Malik J .) ; st ricken by that same division in In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749 ( J.B .) ; n ot stricken but found t o be overbroad and remanded to the juvenile court for modification by Division One in both I n re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 ( Ricardo P

. ) and In re Alejandro R . (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556 ; and not stricken but
found to be overbroad and mo dified by Division Five in In re Patrick F. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 104 ( Patrick F .) 1

U nder the particularized facts of this case , we conclude that the electronic search condition as applied to appellant is reasonable under the test established by People v

. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 ( Lent ) , and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly,
we affirm the imposition of this probation condition

. However, we agree with appellant that the school grounds condition is unconstitutionally vague because it does not incorporate a “ knowledge ” requirement so as to prohibit the unauthorized or unsupervised presence on property she knows is school property. We order that probation condition modified accordingly.
II.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTU AL BACKGROUNDS
A. The Wardsh ip Petition and Appellant ’ s Detention At Juvenile Hall On December 19, 2014, the Alameda County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Welfare and Institution s Code section 602 , 2 alleging that 17

- year

- old appellant commit ted a misdemea nor assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen

. Code
, § 245 , subd. (a)(4) )

. The alleged victim of the crime was appellant ’ s mother (mother).

1 On February 17, 2016, the Supreme Court granted review in both In re Ricardo P. (S230923) (2016 Cal.LEXIS 1016) and In re Patrick F. (S231428) (2016 Cal.LEXIS 972). In addition to t hese decisions, in the last nine months this appellate district has filed a host of nonpublished decisions relating to this same electronic search condition imposed by the Alameda County Juvenile Court.

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfa re and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.3

According to the p robation d epartment ’ s intake report
, on December 17, 2014,
Oakland p olice resp onded to a report of a family disturbance and batter y at mother ’ s home. When they arrived mother had visible swelling to her left eye. She reported that appellant had been away for several days but had returned home and cau sed a
disturbance

. When mother tried to stop appellant from taking property from the home that did not belong to her, appellant cursed at and threatened mother, saying “ I ’ m going to take these, get the fuck up out of my way, bitch. I ’ ll kill you! ” She then caused mother to slip and f

a ll, grabbed her, dragged her out of the house, and punched her in the
face multiple times with a closed fist. Neighbors tried to intervene without success.
Mother crawl ed back into the house
, but appellant continued to threaten her through the
window un til police arrived and arrested her

. Mother further claimed there were two prior unreported incidents when appellant assaulted her. In add ition, appellan t, who had been diagnosed at age 13 as having bi polar disorder , had not attended school for more than a year , came and went from the home as she please d , smok ed marijuana, and was out of control. The probation department recommended that
, despite appellant ’ s

“ minimal record
, ” the severity of the attack on mother and the need to protect mother ’ s safe ty wa rranted that appellant be d etained until disposition

. On December 22, 2014, t he juvenile court ordered appellant detained for her own protection and the protection of other s

. Crisis intervention was ordered and the matter was continued to the next day. On December 23, appellant admitted the allegation in the
section 602 petition and the juvenile court exercised jurisdiction over her. Pending disposition
, it was or dered that appellant remain in juvenile h all for the protection of
herself and others. A g uidance evaluation was ordered
, a s well as crisis intervention. The disposition hearing was set for January 8, 2015. 3

3 All further dates are in the calendar year 2015 unless otherwise indicated.4

B. Disposition 1. Reports The probation department ’ s disposition report included summari es of interviews with appellant, mother
, an d other fam ily members. Appellant reported having “ issues ”
with m other since she was 12 , and that her sister and grandmother also had poor relations
with mother

. Appellant ’ s fa ther died before she was born
, and she claimed that mother
had kicked her out of the home approximately four times since she was 14. Around that time, appellant was diagnosed with depression and was prescribed Prozac. But, she stopped taking it because she did not like the way it made her feel. She received counseling and had bee n see ing a therapist for about two years . Appellant admit ted that
she smoke d marijuana about two times per month to deal with her stress. She denied using alcohol or other drugs. Appellant told the interviewer that she no longer want ed to live w ith moth er. Appellant ’ s role models were her grandmother and sister. She noted
that she d id not have friends
, but “ associates ” she met through a youth program. She hope d to go to college like her sister. Mother reported that appellant had been having behaviora l problems since she was in the fourth grade when she started having fights with other students and refused to follow rules. She ran away fr om home four times since then. Mother also reported that appellant had been using marijuana and alcohol frequently
, and was involv ed romantically with a 23

- year

- old adult. Appellant ha d been diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. Mother was opposed to appellant going to live with
her grand mother
, who mother suspect ed was tak ing drugs, or wit h appellant ’ s 20

- year

old sister (sister)
, who was unable to look after appellant at night.
S ister was interviewed and reported that she ha d two jobs and was currently
enrolled i n college. Like appellant, sister left home at an early age because of confl ict with, and alleged physical abuse by
, mother. Sister stated she wanted appellant to live
with her
, and grandmother would share responsibility for appellant by looking after her
while sister worked her graveyard shifts.5

G randmother was also interviewed and agreed with sister that mother ’ s home was not good for appellant because of their poor r elationship. Grandmother reported that
mother “is a very violent person,” and that sister ’ s home would be a better placement for

ap pellant

. G randmother also said she would find a larger apartment if it was determined
that her home was the best placement for appellant.
A risk assessment conducted by the probation department concluded that appe llant
had a moderate risk of re offending with in a year. The primary con cerns were appellant ’ s poor relationship with mother, which had resulted in her living the life of a runaway for
relative ly long periods, and the fact that she had not attended school for more than one and one

- half years. The report concluded that appella nt was in immediate need of
services to help her resolve h er family and social problems. The department did not oppose a placement with either g randmother or s ister
, but expressed a preference for grandmother due to sister ’ s work schedule. Whatever place ment was made, the probation department recommended that appellant be “ intensely monitored, ” and provide d with therapy services to h elp her “ get back on track. ” Prior to disposition, the Alameda County Mental Heal th Department evaluated appellant and file d a report. 4 The mental health d epartment concluded that appellant had a moderate degree of emotional disturbance, exhibited in part by a long history of having difficulty with self

- regulation in school. It was noted that appellant also had a “ high poten tial for violence towards her mother, ” and a moderate degree of potential for violence in the community. T he report conclude d that appellant presented many challenges including mental health, social/behavioral
, and educational needs that would

4 The juvenile court referred a ppellant to the mental health department for a psycho

- diagnostic evaluation to determine to what extent appellant was “ emotionally disturbed; whether [ she ] had a potential for violence towards [ her ] self and others; identification of family dynamics that contributed to or caused [appellant] to have delinquent behavior; whether [appellant] has a s ubstance abuse problem; whether [appellant] needs mental health services; whether [appellant] needs psychological case management; and identification of what type of setting would be most beneficial for [her].”6

best be met by a coordinated, multi

- disciplinary team. She needed to be in a family setting where her daily activities could be monitored. She also needed intensive therapeutic services, such as day treatment, and a specialized school designed for emotionally distu rbed youths. If family placement resulted in inadequate supervision, then a higher level of care, such as a residential treatment facility, should be considered
for her.
2. The January 8 Hearing
A t the January 8 di sposition hearing
, the court stated t hat it had considered the relevant reports and then conducted a lengthy discussion about how to secure a placement for appellant outside juvenile h all that would afford her with the “ 24/7 ” supervision that
she needed. Ultimately, the court elected to make disposition findings and order that appellant be released for placement in sister ’ s home, but to continue the matter for a home visit and to ensure that appellant was going to rec eive the stability she needed. The court then adjudged appellant a ward of the court subject to the care, control and supervisio n of the probation department. As is pertinent here, the court included as
condition s of appellant ’ s probation that she not use or possess any drugs, that she submit to regular drug testing, that she no t associate with anyone who uses, possesses
, or sells drugs, and that she was subject to a “ four way search clause ” that included her ele ctronic devices and passwords. In addition, the court ordered the following condition of probation: “ Not be on the ca mpus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, accompanied by a parent or guardian or responsible adult, or authorized by the prior

perm ission of school authorities. ” When the juvenile court announced that appellant was subject to an electronic
search con dition, her trial counsel produced a legal brief opposing the condition and requested a hearing on the matter

. The brief discusse d a number of cases concerning the court’s power to impose conditions of probation, and decisions extant at the time that
deal t with electronic privacy generally, including the then

- recent United States Supreme
Court case of Riley v. California (2014) 134 S.Ct. 2473. However, the brief include d no information about how the electronic search clause might impact appellant’s privac y7

rights in particular, nor d id it suggest how the clause might be made more specific while still meeting the concerns of the juvenile court.
T he juvenile court continued the matter for a hearing so the People would have
time to respond in writing. In th e meantime, the court imposed the electronic search
condition

. It also referred appellant to anger management and pla ced her on “ home supervision. ”
3

. Progress Report
T he probation department filed a progress report on February 5. By that time appell ant had begun receiving therapeutic services through the West Oakland H ealth Center, and was enrolled in a STARS independ ent study high school program. The February 5 report noted too that appellant had tested positive for marijuana on January 30, althoug h she denied using th e drug. Sister reported no problems in the home,
but mother had reported that she had been receiving obscene telephone calls and she suspected appellant and sister were responsible. Both denied the allegations. Mother
also showed th e probation officer postings from Facebook
, which discussed appellant ’ s drug and alcohol use and her relation ship with a 23

- year

- old adult. A home visit to
sister ’ s residence revealed that it was well kept with no evidence of drugs or alcohol. It

appeare d that appellant had made a good adjustment to sister ’ s home.

4

. The February 27 Hearing
On February 27 , after conducting a hearing on appellant ’ s objection to the electronic search condition, the juvenile court affirmed that the condition would be
im posed on appellant

. The court began its ruling by summarizing factors which indicated that appellant was suffering from “ fairly substantial psychological issues, ” including the fissure between appellant and her mother, appellant ’ s romantic relationship wi th a 23

- year

- old adult , her smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol frequently, and her diagnoses of depression, bipolar disorder , and schizophrenia. The court found that appellant ’ s

“ [ d ] rug usage issues, issues with regards to her safety, also in the area of where she ’ s going to stay, and with the fact she at that time was not yet 1 8 years old and had been8

involved in a relationship with a 23

- year

- old adult shows clearly that she needs to be

mon itored as closely as possible. ” The juvenile court also made reference to the fact that appellant us ed Facebook
, which would provide a means for the court to monitor “ conduct which can endanger her, conduct which will be a violation of probation terms and conditions. ” In this reg ard, the court took particular notic e of the reality th at many minors on probation use electronics
and the I nternet as their primary form of communication. In light of that reality, the court concluded that monitoring appellant ’ s use of electronic devices was necessary to give the
court the kind of supervision that was needed to ensure app ellant ’ s success on probation. Indeed, i n light of th is broad range of issues
, the juvenile court expressed substantial
concern whether appellant ’ s wardship could be successfully supervised and the develop mental dangers appellant faced could be successfully monitored without electronic monitoring

. Appellant’s counsel was provided an opportunity to address the electronic search clause, and did so by stating there was no valid legal basis for its imposition. During his
brief argument counsel made a general reference to the fact that appellant used a cell phone and had access to social media. However, once again counsel did not specify how the clause would impact appellant’s particular privacy interest, nor did counsel offer any suggestion as to how the clause might be narrowed to minimize intrusion on appellant’s privacy while serving the interest of the juvenile court in preventing future criminality
and facilitating the superv ision of appellant’s probation

. After hearing from counsel
, the court denied the motion to strike the electronic
search condition

. III.
DISCUSSION
A

. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Section 730, subdivision (b) authorizes the juvenile court to “ impose and require any and al l reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabi litation of the ward enhanced. ”9

“ ‘ A juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for the purpo se of rehabilitation and may even impose a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to specifically meet the needs of the juvenile. ’ [Citation.] In In re Victor L . (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902

. . . , the court explained, ‘ “ The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents ” [citation], thereby occupying a “ unique role

. . . in caring for the minor ’ s well

- being. ” [Citation.]

. . . [¶] The permissible scope o f discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults. “ [E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms ‘ the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its autho rity over adults

. . . . ’ ” [Citation.] This is because juveniles are deemed to be “ more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor ’ s constitutional rights are more circumscribed. ” ’ ( Id . at
pp. 909

– 910.) The reasonableness an d propriety of the imposed condition is measured not just by the circumstances of the current offense, but by the minor ’ s entire social history. [Citation.] ” ( J.B. , supra , 2 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 753

- 754.) However, while the juvenile court ’ s discretion i s broad, it is not unlimited. “ A probation condition is invalid if it: ‘ “ (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not re asonably rel ated to future criminality. ” ’ ( [ Lent , supra , ] 15 Cal.3d [ at p.] 486

. . . .) In order to invalidate a condition of probation
under the Lent test, all three factors must be found to be present. [Citation s .] This three

part test applies equa lly to juvenile probation conditions. [Citation.] ” ( J .B. , su pra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 754.)

“ In addition, a juvenile court may not adopt probation conditions that are constitutionally vague or overbroad. [Citations.] ” ( Malik J.
, supra , 2 40 Cal.App.4t h at

p. 901.) “ A probation condition ‘ must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated, ’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness. [Citation.] A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person ’ s constitutional rights must10

closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. [Citation.] ” ( In re Sheena K . (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
890 ( Sheena K. ) .)

“ We review the juvenile court ’ s probation conditions for abuse of discretion, and such discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse. [Citation.] But

‘ [w]hile we generally review the court ’ s imposition of a probation condition for abuse of discretion, we review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo. ’ [Citation.] ” ( J. B. , supra , 2 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 754.)
B

. The Electronic Search C ondition Is Reasonable and Constitutio nal
1. The Lent Test As noted above, t he same electronic search clause challenged by appellant has been addressed in several recent First District Court of Appeal decisions. The analytical
touchstone for all of the cases referred to in our Introducti on, as well as others decided in
the rel atively short time that appella t e courts have been scrutinizing electronic search clauses as conditions of juvenile probation, are the three so

- called Lent factors
summarized above . In virtually all cases, it is the third factor, whether the condition is

“ ‘ reasonably related to future criminality ’ ” ( Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 486), that garners the m ost jurisprudential attention. And so it is here. The Attorney General does not argue forcefully or convincingly that the electronic search clause condition imposed in this case was related to the crime for which appellant was adjudicated to be a ward of the court

— that crime was a physical assault on appellant ’ s mother. 5 Nor does the Attorney General argue that the electronic
search clause related to conduct that is itself criminal. Like virtually all other cases involving challenges to this probation condition, it is the third Lent factor that is at issue.

5 The Attorney General does make reference in her brief to the unproven allegation by mother that appellant and her sister were the source of obscene telephone calls she had been receiving since the wardship petition was filed. However, this speculation does not satisfy the first Lent factor as ha ving a “relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted.’ ” ( Lent , supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)11

At the February 27 hearing on appellant ’ s objection to the electronic search
condition , the juvenile court spoke in detail about the circumstances that created a serious
challen ge to appellant remaining crime

- free while on probation:

“ Going back to the dispositional report dated January 8th, 2015, the report its elf on page 3 states that [appellant] stated that she no longer wants to live with her mother

. . . but has concerns that her mother will not allow her to see her brother, and that the mother on page 4 stated that [appellant] was involved in a romantic rel ationship with a
23

- year

- old female, that [appellant] was smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol frequently, and [appellant] has been diagnosed with depression, bipolar [disorder] , and schizophrenia, not inconsistent with the Guidance Clinic report, and th at she was hospitalized in November of 2014 due to smoking quote laced marijuana.

“ So there are clearly some fairly substantial psychological issues: Drug usage issues, issues with regards to her safety, also in the area of where she ’ s going to stay, and with the fact she at that time was not yet 18 years old and had been involved in a relationship with a 23

- year

- old adult shows clearly that she needs to be monitored as closely as possible. And this situation, as the cases do allow, the probation terms an d conditions designed to monitor such issues that we have, they ’ re designed in this particular case, I believe they ’ re designed to monitor the terms and conditions to be of good conduct, obey all laws, the drug conditions, school conditions, curfew, where she ’ s going to be, as well as her safety.

“ And this person who clearly uses Facebook, that ’ s one version of the various electronics that are available to her. And as the cases that are cited by [appellant ’ s counsel] do indicate, that these types of terms and conditions are reasonable, because

we ’ re clearly looking at future criminality, we ’ re clearly looking at conduct which can endanger her, conduct which will be a violation of probation terms and conditions. ”
After briefly discussing several cases upho lding the condition, the juvenile court
made additional reference s to the record evidence supporting imposition of the clause in
this case :12

“ And one of the things that we have in dealing with our minors here on probation is that they are very directly tie d to electronics. In so many ways it governs their life, but it certainly is the primary way they communicate. They communicate more by electronics than by face

- to

- face contact. And we can put them

— short of putting them in
the Hall when we have them out side, we can put them

— even on GPS, we can put them on our ankle bracelet for electronic monitoring. That ’ s still not going to give us the kind of supervision that we need, that being able to access their electronics using their passwords would provide to us. ” The juvenile court then recited record evidence concerning appellant ’ s tenuous home life and social choices that supported the need for close monitoring
, including electronic monitoring:

“ And in this particular case, she really has some criminality issues with regards to drugs. She has safety issues with regards to her behavior and her lack of relationship. She basically

— as you said, [minor ’ s counsel], I agree she has a dysfunctional relationship with her mother. She ’ s living now with her sister, who is very impressive.
She ’ s very, very solid. I ’ m so happy she ’ s been able to step forward. She has two jobs
herself. She ’ s only a couple years older. She ’ s 20 years old. Just turned 20 February 19th. As impressive as she is, there ’ s a lot to be e xpected of her. She ’ s not going to be able to have the kind of direct supervision we ’ re going to need because of her
own situation.

“ There ’ s a grandmother who is also there, and she ’ s

— she seems to be helpful, but
she ’ s on the periphery, and she ’ s going t o be able to supplement.

“ There ’ s going to be a lot of concerns about being able to supervise [appellant], and this prior relationship with this adult female circling, it obviously gives me great concerns with regards to what danger the female may pose to her and a lot of drugs.
There ’ s a lot of issues that [appellant] has, and without her ability, my ability, to monitor her with electronics and passwords, we ’ re not going to be able to appropriately help her be successful on probation.13

“ For those reasons , the motion to modify probation terms and conditions, to delete the search of electronics and passwords, is denied. ” These facts amply justify imposition of the electronic search c ondition in this instance. Other cases from this appellate district refer red to in our Introduction do not command otherwise. Indeed, Division Two specifically emphasized that its holding striking an electronic search clause in Erica R. , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th 907 was not intended to be a blanket precedent condemning such prob ation conditions under all
circumstances: “ Our holding is narrow. Of course, there can be cases where, based on a
defendant ’ s history and circumstances, an electronic search condition bears a reasonable connection to the risk of future criminality. ” ( Id

. at p. 914.) In this case, appellant ’ s history and circumstances mandate a degree of supervision which reasonabl y connect s the electronic search condition to the prevention of future criminality.
Our Supreme Court also has placed its imprimatur on the c oncept that conditions of probation that facilitate supervision of the probationer can justif y their imposition. In People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, the defendant challenged a condition of probation that required the probationer to “ notify his prob ation officer of the presence of any pets at [the] de fendant ’ s place of residence. ” The d efendant contended the challenged condition wa s not reasonably related to future criminality, limited his fundamental rights, and was unconstitutionally overbroad. ( Id . at p. 378.) The high court disagreed
, noting that “ [p]robation officers are charged with supervising probationers ’ compliance with the specific terms of their probation to ensure the safety of the public and the rehabilitation of probationers. Pets r esiding with probationers have the potential to distract, impede, and endanger probation officers in the exercise of their supervisory
duties. By mandating that probation officers be kept informed of the presence of such pets, this notification condition facilitates the effective supervision of probationers and, as such, is reasonably related to deterring future criminality. ” ( Ibid. ) We reach a parallel
conclusion under the se facts; the electronic search condition is reasonably r elated to deterring futur e criminality because it facilitates the type and level of supervision of appellant which is absolutely necessary fo r her to succeed on probation.14

People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170 ( Ebertowski ) provides additional support for our conclusion

. In that case, the defendant pleaded no contest to making criminal threats and resisting or deterring an officer and also admitted a gang allegation. ( Id . at p. 1172.) On appeal, he challenged a probation condition requiring him to submit passwords to all electronic devices and social media sites, and to submit to probationary searches of those devices and sites. T he Ebertowski court co ncluded that
the electronic search condition was reasonable under the Lent test, not only because it
was related to th e defendant ’ s crimes
, but because it “ was also necessarily related to his future criminality. ” Closely monitoring the defendant ’ s gang associations through his use
of social media was , the court found, the “ only way ” to safely allow him to remain in the

c ommunity without posing “ an extreme risk to public safety. ” ( Id . at p. 11 7 7.) By a parity of reasoning, the electronic search condition imposed on appellant is the best if not the only way to safely place her with sister without posing an extreme risk to the safety of herself, her mother and the public. Appellant is very troubled, t orn by serious mental illnesses, a dysfunctional family
life
, 6 a significant gap in her educational training, and poor social choices that, if not controlled, would doom her t o reoffend and to violate probation . The juvenile court did not simply impose the electronic search clause reflexively , but with acute awareness of the need for close supervision of appellant ’ s daily activities for there to be any hope of
her success on p robation. Not only was this the juvenile judge ’ s conclusion, but the social and mental health professionals advising the court likewise concluded that close, daily monitoring of appellant was essential to the success of her wardship, and the safety of app ellant, her estranged family member, and the community

. In fact, the department
warned that if sufficient supervision was not available for appellant, a higher level of care, such as a residential treatment f acility, should be considered.

6 Appellant’s biological father committed suicide by hanging and his body was discovered by mother when she herself was 18 years old.15

As did the juve nile court, we conclude that the electronic search condition in this case was not only warranted , but vital to ensure appellant ’ s compliance with the terms of her probation

. It also represent s perhaps the best means by which the panoply of social
and ment al challenges that appellant must confront and overcome c an be supervised and monitored. This was necessary, not only for appellant ’ s sake, but to protect the public. Thus, t he record here stands in stark contrast to Erica R

. a nd Mark C.
, which
concluded that under the facts of those cases, the risk of future criminality did not justify imposition of the electronic search clauses. For example, in Erica R. the court found
there was “ ‘ no reason to believe ’ ” that the electronic search condition would “ ‘ s erve the rehabilitative function of precluding [ the minor ] from any future criminal acts. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Erica R. , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913 .) Similarly, in Mark C . t he court found no reasonable connection between the minor’s criminal behavior (p ossession of a folding knife on school property), and the risk of future drug use, sufficient to justify imposition of the electronic search clause

. ( Mark C.
, supra , 244 Ca.App.4th at pp. 525, 535.) Nor is this a case, like J.B. , where the court rejected an electronic search clause because the asserted justification was only to “ facilitate general oversight of the
individual ’ s activities .” ( J.B

. , supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 758 .) Here, i mposition of an electronic search clause as a condition of appella nt ’ s probation was a reasonable means of imposing the level of supervision required to prevent future criminality and, therefore,
it was not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to include it.

2. The Overbreadth Doctrine Appellant alternative ly argues that if the electronic search condition is reasonably
related to preventing her future criminal conduct and the supervision of her probation , it nevertheless is unconstitutionally overbroad because it is not narrowly tailored to achieve
those obj ective s without unduly impairing her First Amendment rights. We disagree.
A ppellant ’ s broad array of problems mandate s intensive supervision in order for
her to have any cha nce of success on probation. Thus, a broader search condition is justified here

. Again, Ebertowski
, supra , 228 Cal.App.4th 1170 reinforces our
conclusion. The electronic search condition in that case was not unconstitutionally16

overbroad because the defendant ’ s gang affiliation was undisputed and the “ evident purpose of the password conditions was to permit the probation officer to implement the search, association, and gang insignia conditions that were designed to monitor and

suppress [the] defendant ’ s gang activity. Without passwords for [the] defendant ’ s devices and social media accounts, the probation officer would not be able to search them

. . . in order to assess [the] defendant ’ s compliance with the unchallenged association and gang insignia conditions. ” ( Id. at p. 1175.) In this case
, it was undisputed that appellant
need ed intensive superv ision if she was released from juvenile h all . A broad electronic
search con dition i s consistent with that level of supervision. Appellant now suggests that the electronic search condition imposed on her was not narrowly tailored in sev eral respects. She notes that the password disclosures required in Ebertowski were limited to social media accounts, but here the clause covers all of her electronic passwords “ including passwords [relating] to banking, health care,
educational and other accounts. ” We begin by pointing out that constitutional challenges to probation conditions that do not involve a pure question of law are subject to forfeiture if not raised in the trial

court. As our Supreme Court has stated, “we do not conclude that ‘a ll constitutional defects in conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on appeal, since there may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record develope d in the trial court.” [ C itation

. ] In those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection and waiver principles encourage development of the record and a proper exercise of discretion in the trial
court.” [ C itation

. ]’ [Citation.] ” ( In re Sheena K.
, supra , 4 0 Cal.4th at p. 889.)
Whether or not appellant’s particularized arguments regarding overbre a dth have been preserved, this principle serves to highlight the fact that there is nothing in the record supporting the supposition that 17

- year

- old appellant has applications relating to banking, health care, or educational W eb sites or accounts , nor does the record offer any17

information as to how appellant uses electronic devices and how the search clause might infringe on her daily privacy

. 7 Appellant also asser ts that the clause is overbroad because it creates a risk that probation department workers could “ control and modify her personal accounts. ” Again, there was no evidence presented below that appellant had access to any such accounts. This conjectural ri sk simply does not override the importance that the probation department have access to appellant’s passwords for legitimate rehabilitative and supervisorial purposes. Rather than assume such rogue probation supervision is likely to occur, or speculate as to how appellant’s individualized privacy could be impacted by the
electronic search clause
, we will simply point out that appellant is not without a remedy.
If she can articulate specific concerns as to how the electronic search clause actually impact s her privacy adversely
, that matter may be brought to the attention of the juvenile court in a motion to modify the terms of appellant ’ s probation. (§ 1203.3, subd

. (a) [ “ The court shall have authority at any time during the term of probation to revoke, mo dify, or change its order of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence. ” ] ; People v.
Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091 .) 8 To be sure, there are cases that have held electronic search clauses imposed as a condition of probation to be unconstitutional ly overbroad , given the circumstances of the particular case. But, it should be clear from the above recitation from the juvenile court record that we are reviewing a rather unique constellation of facts in this delinquency matter. Appellant does not need her electronic devices monitored simply because she is a

7 While there is a record reference to appellant having a cell phone, there is no information as to whether it is a smart phone that provides broader communication and Internet access. Also, it is unclear whether appellant’s access to Facebook as referenced in t he record was limited to computer access.

8 To preserve judicial resources and to protect the ward’s rights and to further the goals and purposes of the juvenile wardship structure, we think it is the better practice to have the particulars of electronic device access probation conditions raised by the minor’s counsel and addressed by the juvenile court in the first instance.18

drug and alcohol user, or a chronic truant, or a person suffering from significant mental health issues, or someone who is trying to adjust to a new home life with her young sister, or because she is a potential danger to mother and the public. The clause is justified here because appellant has all of these challenges and issues

. Under the circumstances, and on this record
, the court’s use of the most accessible tools available to supervise appellan t ’ s progress on probation furthers the juvenile court’s wardship responsibility and was not unconstitutionally overbroad

. “ The purposes of juvenile wardship proceedings are twofold: to treat and rehabilitate the delinquent minor, and to protect the public from criminal conduct. [Citations.] The preservation of th e safety and welfare of a state ’ s citizenry is foremost among its government ’ s interests, and it is squarely within the police power to seek to rehabilitate those who have committed
misdeeds whil e protecting the populace from further misconduct

. ” ( In re Jose C. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 534 , 555.) With these two purposes in mind, “ t he juvenile court has statutory authority to order delinquent wards to receive ‘ care, treatment, and guidance that is
consi stent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. ’ ” ( In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.) “ All dispositional orders in a wardship case must take into account th e best interests of the child and the rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile court law. [Citation.] ” ( In re S.S . (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 550.)

3. Penal Code section 632 Alternatively, appellant argues that the electronic search c ondition permits the intrusion on the privacy of third parties in violation of Penal Code section 632 (section 632)

. 9

9 Section 632, subdivision (a) provides: “ Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidentia l communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, tele phone, or other device, except a radio, [is subject to a fine, incarceration, or both]. ”19

First, appellant forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. ( People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862, 867

- 868

. ) Second, it is based solely on the privacy rights of third parties under Penal Code section 632. Therefore , appellant lacks standing
to raise the issue. “ Courts are created to resolve cases and controversies and not to render advisory opinions or resolve questions of purely academic interest. Accordingly, courts will not consider issues tendered by a person whose rights a nd interests are not affected. ” ( B.C. Cotton, Inc. v. Voss (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 929, 947

– 948.)
C

. The School Grounds Condition is Vague and Must Be Mod ified The disposition order also subjects appellant to a school grounds condition which requires that she “ [n]ot be on the campus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, accompanied by a parent or guardian or responsible adult, or authorized by the pri or permission of school authorities. ” She asserts this school grounds condition is unconstitutionally vague unless it is modified to include a “ knowledge ” requirement
, such that appellant can only be adjudged to violate her probation if she is on property she
knows is part of a school campus or grounds . Appellant reasons as follows:

“ While some school grounds are readily identified as such, that is not always the

case. The boundaries of school campuses can include, for example, athletic fields,
theaters , residence halls, restaurants and churches or other places of worship. Accordingly, the probation cond ition requiring that appellant ‘ not be on the campus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, accompanied by a parent or guardian or responsible adult, or authorized by prior p ermission of school authorities ’ must be modified to require proof of knowledge. [ C itation

. ] ” 10
This division recently had occasion to address the “ knowledge ” or “ scienter ” issue
in In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351 ( Kevin F. ) . The minor in that case sought to modify a condition of probation that prohibited him from possessing “ ‘ anything that

10 While appellant concedes that her trial counsel did not object to the school grounds condition, respondent acknowledges that a facial constitutional challenge to a probation condition is subject to de novo review and is not forfeited by the failure to object in the trial court. ( Sheena K
., supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.)20

you could use as a weapon or someone else might consider to be a weapon. ’ ” ( Id. at
p. 357.) We began our analysis of that issue with a review of the origin s of the
constitutional prohibition against vague probation conditions:

“ The prohibit ion on vagueness is rooted in ‘ “ ordinary notions of fair pla y and the settled rules of law, ” and a statute that flouts it “ violates the first essential of due

process. ” ’ [Citation.] This concern for fair warnin g is aimed at ensuring that a ‘ “ person of ordinary intelligence [has] a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, s o that he may act accordingly. ” ’ [Citat i on.] The fear is that vague laws will ‘ “ trap the
innocent. ” ’ [Citation.] Mo re b roadly, ‘ “ ‘ a law that is “ void for vagueness ”

. . . impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] ” ( Kevin F ., supra , 239 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 357

- 358.)
We went on to conclude that th e weapon use condition at issue in Kevin F

. was unconstitutional, holding that without a knowledge or scienter modifier the prohibition quoted above did not provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. ( Kevin F. , supra , 239 Cal.App.4th at pp. 360

- 361.) We pointed out that the language was broad enough to prohibit possession of an “ ord inary household object ” that could injure someone if used as a weapon, even if the minor did not have the intent to use it in that
fashion. ( Ibid .) Applying the rationale of Kevin F

. and others like it
, 11 we conclude the school grounds condition imposed h ere is unconstitutionally vague without a knowledge requirement. Appellant is correct that the clause goes far beyond prohibiting unauthorized presence in school buildings or other areas w h ere there can be no doubt the

11 Examples of cases in which the court modified conditions of probation to include a knowledge requirement include: Sheena K
., supra , 40 Cal.4th at pp. 891

- 892 [probation condition limiting association with anyone disapproved by probation department]; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 [firearm possession clause]; In re Victor L

. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912

- 913, 931 [weapon and ammunition possession].)21

area is part of a school campus (a g ymnasium, for example). Instead, i t covers any physical area that comprises part of a school “ ground ” or campus. Given the diverseness
and expansive ness of some school facilities
, it is easy to i magine appellant being present
i n an area that is part of a school ground, but where there is no indicia of that association. For this reason, the school grounds condition is modified to include a “ knowledge ” requirement, as set forth below.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The school grounds condition is modified to read: “ The minor shall not knowingly be on the campus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, accompanied by a parent or guardian or responsible adult, or authorized by the prior permission of school
authorities. ” As modified, the judgment is affirmed

.

_________________________ RUVOLO, P. J.

We concur:

_________________________ REARDON, J.

_________________________ RIVERA, J.22

Trial Court: Alameda County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Leopoldo E. Dorado
Counsel for Appellant: Stephanie M. Adraktas, by appointment of the Court of Appeal under the First District Appellate Project’s Assisted Case System
Counsel for Respondent: Kamala D. Harris Attorney Genera l of California
Gerald A. Engler Chief Assistant Attorney General
Jeffrey M. Laurence Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General

Seth K. Schalit Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Donna M. Provenzano Super vising Deputy Attorney General