[Cite as Crew v. Advics Mfg. Ohio, Inc. , 2020-Ohio-328.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

WARREN COUNTY

DONALD CREW, Appellant,

- vs -

ADVICS MANUFACTURING OHIO, INC., et al., Appellees. :

:

:

:

:

: CASE NO. CA2019-05-051

O P I N I O N 2/3/2020

CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN C OUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 18CV090620

O'Connor Acciani & Levy L.P.A., Ronald T. Bella, 600 Vine Stree t, Suite 1600, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for appellant Cooke Demers, LLC, David J. Demers, Adam Bennett, 260 Market St reet, Suite F, New Albany, Ohio 43054, for appellee

HENDRICKSON, P.J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Donald Crew, appeals the decision of the Warren Coun ty Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to appellee, Advics Manu facturing Ohio, Inc. ("AMO"), on his negligence claim. 1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of

1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we sua sponte remove this case fro m the accelerated calendar for purposes of issuing this opinion.Warren CA2019-05-051

- 2 - the trial court. {¶ 2} AMO is an automotive component parts manufacturing business loc ated in Lebanon, Ohio. In addition to hiring its own employees, AMO co ntracted with Accurate Personal LLC ("Accurate") to hire temporary workers. Pursuant to a June 2015 Fee & Terms Agreement, AMO "agree[ed] that they ha[d] sole responsibi lity for assigning Temporary Associates after they are presented by Accurate Perso nal LLC at [AMO]. [AMO] also agrees to train and supervise Temporary Associates in the conduct of their work

duties." {¶ 3} The Fee & Terms Agreement between AMO and Accurate was updated on November 25, 2015 to more specifically define the parties' resp onsibilities. The November 25, 2015 Agreement provided that Accurate was responsible for ( 1) recruiting, screening, and providing temporary employees for assignment at AMO's site in accordance with job requirements and job descriptions provided by AMO; (2) providin g drug screening and background checks; (3) ensuring t hat every temporary worker com pleted an Employment Verification Form (I-9), which would be retained by Accurate; ( 4) maintaining files and records for temporary employees; and (5) withholding, paying, a nd reporting taxes for each temporary worker Accurate provided to AMO. {¶ 4} Under the November 25, 2015 Agreement, AMO was responsible for (1) providing Accurate with a job description specifying job duties and the scope of assignment for each temporary worker; (2) not requiring a worker to perfor m duties beyond those described in the job description and notifying Accurate if and when there was a change in the duties or responsibilities required of the worker; (3) prov iding written authorization of a worker's hours to Accurate; (4) complying with all applicable s tate and federal wage and hour laws related to employees staffed at AMO; and (5) providin g a safe work environment for employees, which included providing employees with personal protective equipment andWarren CA2019-05-051

- 3 - clothing as required by law or as deemed necessary by Accurate. Under the agreement, Accurate reserved the right to inspect AMO's work site at any t ime to ensure a safe and healthy work environment for its employees. However, the Agree ment specifically provided that AMO was "solely responsible for management relating to the day-to-day supervision of Accurate Associates. [AMO] will provide safety and job specifi c training to Accurate Associates assigned to [AMO's] site. * * * [AMO] will notify A ccurate immediately in the event of an injury or accident at [AMO's] site." {¶ 5} Pursuant to the November 25, 2015 Agreement, "Accurate will be responsible for providing workers compensation insurance coverage for all a ssigned Accurate Personnel employees. Both parties agree to immediately notify each other in case of any injury or accident or any claim for workers compensation benefi ts involving Accurate employees." The parties agreed that "Accurate's bill rate shal l be adjusted according to federal and state laws, where applicable" and that "Accurate re serves the right to adjust bill rates to compensate for mandatory adjustments to FICA, FUTA, SU I, Workers' Compensation, and any federal or state mandated programs or ben efits." {¶ 6} On December 21, 2016, AMO advised Accurate that it needed a fir st shift associate who could operate a stand-up forklift. That same day , Crew walked into Accurate's office looking for a job. After filling out an appl ication, Crew met with an Accurate employee who discussed the forklift position at AMO. Crew info rmed the Accurate employee that he had no experience operating a stand-up forklif t, and he was advised that he would receive the necessary training by AMO. After passing a drug test, Crew was instructed to report to AMO to begin work on January 3, 2017. {¶ 7} Crew arrived on time for his first day of work and was met by T ony Woods, a lead operator for AMO. Woods began working with Crew on the op eration of the stand-up forklift. Later that day, Crew was assigned to work with anoth er AMO employee, PeteWarren CA2019-05-051

- 4 - O'Reilly, who was responsible for showing Crew his work duties and training him on how it should be completed. All of Crew's training was completed by A MO. Accurate did not have an office at AMO and no one from Accurate was present at AMO's facility on January 3,

2017. {¶ 8} With O'Reilly directing Crew's activities on January 3, 2017, C rew worked without incident for a brief period of time. However, after re turning from a 15-minute break, Crew was injured in his operation of the forklift. While attem pting to follow O'Reilly in the forklift, Crew "slipped out of the machine" and was ultimately pinned between the forklift and a concrete bollard. As a result of the accident, Crew sust ained serious and traumatic injury to his left leg. {¶ 9} On January 3, 2018, Crew filed a negligence complaint against A MO, arguing that AMO "carelessly and negligently failed to provide adequate training [to him] on how to safely operate" a stand-up forklift and "carelessly, negligentl y, and recklessly exposed [him] to a dangerous condition," thereby proximately causing him seri ous and permanent bodily injury. 2 Crew named the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("OBWC") as a party to the lawsuit, as OBWC had a subrogation interest in the action a s a result of paying certain medical expenses or benefits to him. {¶ 10} AMO filed an answer denying the allegations set forth in Crew's complaint and asserting as an affirmative defense that Crew was an employee o f AMO whose claims were preempted by the Ohio's Workers' Compensation Act, R.C. Chapter s 4121 and 4123. AMO asserted that Crew had already requested and received benefits for his injuries under the Workers' Compensation Act. The parties engaged in discovery, w ith a number of depositions being taken.

2. Crew's complaint also set forth a second cause of action ag ainst AMO for intentional tort. This cause of action was later dismissed without prejudice by agreement of th e parties.Warren CA2019-05-051

- 5 - {¶ 11} On November 11, 2018, AMO moved for summary judgment, arguing t hat at the time of the accident, Crew was a loaned servant acting in t he course and scope of his employment with AMO. AMO therefore argued that Crew's exclusiv e remedy for redress of his injuries was under the Workers' Compensation Act. In suppo rt of its motion for summary judgment, AMO relied on deposition testimony taken from Crew, R enee Bowlin, a business development specialist at Accurate, Amanda Nichols, a senior ac count manager for Accurate, and Michelle Snow, a senior manager at AMO, as well a s AMO's and Accurate's June 2015 Fee & Terms Agreement and November 25, 2015 Agreement , email correspondence between Accurate and AMO, and a training evaluat ion form completed by

Woods. {¶ 12} Crew filed a memorandum in opposition to AMO's summary judgment motion, arguing that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whet her the loaned servant doctrine applied given that Accurate retained "significant righ ts to supervision and control over their associates." Crew further argued that summary judgm ent was inappropriate as AMO failed to establish it had paid premiums into the state ins urance fund to provide coverage for Crew, thereby denying it the right to immunity und er Ohio's Workers' Compensation Act. {¶ 13} The trial court granted summary judgment to AMO, finding that [AMO] controlled and directed Mr. Crew's activities while he wa s on the job the day of the accident and, as a result, the Court finds that Mr. Crew was a loaned servant to [AMO]. Based on this finding that [AMO] was also Mr. Crew's employer under this doctrine, [AMO] is entitled to immunity from common law negligence actions under R.C. 4123.35 and summary judgment is appropriate. {¶ 14} Crew timely appealed the trial court's decision and raised the following as his sole assignment of error: {¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING [AMO'S] MOTION FORWarren CA2019-05-051

- 6 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT. {¶ 16} In his sole assignment of error, Crew argues that the trial cou rt erred in granting AMO's summary judgment motion as genuine issues of mat erial fact exist as to (1) whether AMO was his employer at the time of the injury, as cont emplated by the loanedservant doctrine, and (2) whether AMO paid into the workers' co mpensation fund and was entitled to immunity under R.C. 4123.35 and 4123.74 on Crew's n egligence claim. {¶ 17} An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo, independently and without deference to the de cision of the trial court. Tankersley v. Ohio Fair Plan Underwriting Assn. , 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-01-003, 2018-Ohio-4386, ¶ 45. Summary judgment is proper when the plea dings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, tra nscripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, show that (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) the evidence submitted can only lead reasonable minds to a conclusion that i s adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ.R. 56(C); Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. , 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978). {¶ 18} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and demonstrating the abs ence of genuine issues of

material fact. Anderson v. Jancoa Janitorial Servs. , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-01-018, 2019-Ohio-3617, ¶ 23, citing Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). Once this initial burden is met, the nonmoving party "must then rebut the moving party's evidence with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine triable issue ; it may not rest on the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings." Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Sexton , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-11-288, 2010-Ohio-4802, ¶ 7, citing Civ.R. 56 (E). Summary judgment is proper if the nonmoving party fails to set forth such facts. Taylor v. Atrium Med. Ctr. , 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2018-07-074, 2019-Ohio-447, ¶ 10. "In deter mining whether a genuineWarren CA2019-05-051

- 7 - issue of material fact exists, the evidence must be construed i n favor of the nonmoving party." Id. {¶ 19} Claims arising from injuries sustained in the course of employm ent are typically addressed exclusively by Ohio's workers' compensation statutes. See Brewster v. Prestige Packaging, Inc. , 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-05-085, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 649 , *5 (Feb. 12, 2001); R.C. 4123.74; Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. The workers' compensation system "operates as a balance of mutual c ompromise between the interests of the employer and employee whereby employees relinq uish their common law remedy and accept lower benefit levels coupled with the greater assurance of recovery and employers give up their common law defenses and are protected f rom unlimited liability." Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals , 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 614 (1982). {¶ 20} R.C. 4123.35 mandates that every private employer participate i n the workers' compensation system. Hornyak v. Reserve Alloys, L.L.C. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104302, 2016-Ohio-8489, ¶ 17. "Most employers participate in the syste m by paying into a state insurance fund that administers and pays out claims." Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors , 155 Ohio St.3d 567, 2018-Ohio-5088, ¶ 8, citing R.C. 4123.35(A). H owever, the workers' compensation system "also allows certain employers who possess 'sufficient financial and administrative ability' to self-i nsure their wo rkers' compensat ion obligations." Id. , quoting R.C. 4123.35(B). Self-insuring employers "have the same immuni ty from liability as other employers but pay claims directly to injured employees and the dependents of deceased employees." Id. The immunity for employers is set forth in R.C. 4123.74, whic h provides

that [e]mployers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, or occupational disease, or bodil y condition, received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment, or for any death resultingWarren CA2019-05-051

- 8 - from such injury, occupational disease, or bodily condition occurring during the period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the interval the emplo yer is a self-insuring employer, whether or not such injury, occupational disease, bodily condition, or death is compensable under this chapter. {¶ 21} In Daniels v. MacGregor Co. , 2 Ohio St.2d 89 (1965), syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that where an employer employs an employee with the understanding that the employee is to be paid only by the employer and at a certain hourly rate to work for a customer of the employer and where it is understood that the customer is to have the right to control the manner or means of performing the work, such employee in doing that work is an employee of the customer within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act; and, where such customer has complied with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, he will not be liable to respond in damages for any injury received by such employee in the course of or arising out of that work for such customer. {¶ 22} This court must, therefore, determine whether AMO presented evi dence establishing that it was Crew's employer at the time of the acc ident and that workers' compensation premiums where paid on behalf of Crew. Employee Under the Loaned-Servant Doctrine {¶ 23} "Under the loaned servant doctrine, when one party lends his em ployee to another for a particular employment, the employee, for anything done in that employment, is treated as the employee of the party to whom he is loaned." Rogan v. Brown , 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2005-10-025, 2006-Ohio-5508, ¶ 32. This doctrine is based on the premise that an employee may have more than one employer while doing a specific act. Id. See also Sellers v. Liebert Corp. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1200, 2006-Ohio-4111, ¶ 7 (recognizing that "for purposes of workers' compensation immuni ty, an employee may have more than one employer"). "Though the employee remains the gen eral servant of the party who has loaned him, 'since the question of liability is always predicated upon some specificWarren CA2019-05-051

- 9 - act of the servant, it is not important whether he remains the servant of the general employer as to matters generally, but whether, in performing the act in question, he is acting in the business of and under the direction of the general employer or that of the temporary employer.'" Medina v. Harold J. Becker Co. , 163 Ohio App.3d 832, 2005-Ohio-5438, ¶ 57 (1st Dist.), quoting Halkias v. Wilkoff Co. , 141 Ohio St. 139, 152-153 (1943). {¶ 24} "In determining whether an employee became a loaned servant, th e inquiry should focus on the question of control." Rogan at ¶ 33. The focus is "whether the general employer has retained direction and control over the employee, or whether, with respect to the particular act or acts resul ting in tort liability, the con trol of the employee has passed to the borrowing employer with reference not only to the result re ached but to the method of reaching it." Id. , citing Ferguson v. Dyer , 149 Ohio App.3d 380, 2002-Ohio-1442, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). {¶ 25} Crew argues that the loaned-servant doctrine does not apply as Accurate, not AMO, was his employer. Relying on Accurate's contract with AMO , which gave Accurate the right to maintain control of administrative acts relating t o his employment, such as the retention of all government documents relating to his employmen t, withholding and paying all state, local and federal taxes, determining his pay and ben efits, and maintaining workers' compensation insurance for him, as well as Accurate's right to inspect AMO's facilities to ensure a safe work environment, to specify protective equipment and clothing to be worn at AMO's facilities, and to appr ove any changes in the previous ly-agreed-to job duties, Crew argues a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ac curate retained control over his employment. In support of his argument, Crew relies on Sellers v. Liebert Corp. , 2006-

Ohio-4111. {¶ 26} In Sellers , the plaintiff was employed by Tailored Management, a professi onal employment organization, and was assigned to work at Liebert Co rporation. Id . at ¶ 1. TheWarren CA2019-05-051

- 10 - plaintiff was injured when a metal flight bar fell on his head, and he sued Liebert for negligence. Id. The trial court granted Liebert summary judgment based upon the loanedservant doctrine. Id. On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, find ing an issue of fact existed as to who had the right to control and su pervision of the plaintiff given the express language of the contract between Tailored and Liebe rt. Id. at ¶ 16. The language in that contract expressly provided that "Tailored ret ain[ed] all rights of supervision

and control of Tailored Associates" and that "Tailored Associat es shall at all times be under the supervision and control of Tailored, and shall not be under the direct control of Client [Liebert]." Id. at ¶ 9. {¶ 27} The contract in Sellers is diametrically different than the contract between

Accurate and AMO. Unlike in Sellers , the November 25, 2015 Agreement executed by Accurate and AMO provided that AMO was "solely responsible for management relating to the day-to-day supervision of Accurate Associates," including C rew. The contract further specified that AMO was responsible for providing "safety and jo b specific training" of Accurate Associates, which included Crew. The fact that the co ntract provided that Accurate retained responsibility for administrative human resou rces functions related to Crew's employment does not mean Crew was acting under Accurate' s control at the time of his injury. See Cowan v. Interdyne Corp. , 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-12-26, 2013-Ohio-642, ¶ 17. "Whether a loaned servant is a customer's employee depends on who had the right to manage the manner or means of day-to-day control over the emplo yee, not who was responsible for administrative human resource matters." Id. Accurate's right to perform safety inspections, require the use of certain safety gear, man age workers' compensation claims, and keep tax and payroll records did not involve day-to -day control over the manner

or means in which Crew completed his tasks. See id. at ¶ 26. {¶ 28} The November 25, 2015 Agreement unambiguously placed the respon sibilityWarren CA2019-05-051

- 11 - for the day-to-day control of Crew upon AMO. Additionally, dep osition testimony established that AMO trained, directed, and controlled Crew's a ctivities as they related to his operation of the stand-up forklift. Therefore, for purpose s of workers' compensation law, Crew was a loaned servant and employee of AMO at the time of hi s injury. Workers' Compensation Premiums Paid {¶ 29} Crew argues that even if he is considered an employee of AMO, A MO is not entitled to the immunity provided by R.C. 4123.74 because AMO f ailed to present evidence that it paid premiums into the state insurance fund to provide coverage for him, as a temporary employee. Rather, Crew contends AMO is a "self-insur ing employer" who only provides workers' compensation benefits for its own full-time e mployees, and not for temporary employees retained through AMO's contract with Accura te. {¶ 30} Crew's arguments were recently addressed and rejected in Thomas v. PSC Metals, Inc. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106084, 2018-Ohio-1630. There, the co urt considered whether a temporary employer, PSC, was entitled to immunity fro m a negligence suit brought by an injured "loaned" employee, Thomas, under R.C. 412 3.74 where the workers' compensation insurance was provided by the general employer, Ca llos. Id. at ¶ 21-33. The Eighth District determined that the temporary employer was enti tled to immunity, holding that "[a]n employer can show compliance with Ohio's workers' co mpensation statutes by obtaining certification from the Industrial Commission or by showing that the injured employee received workers' compensation benefits. " (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 21. "A customer of a staffing agency may pay the workers' compensation premiums either directly or indirectly to qualify for immunity under R.C. 4123.74." Id. , citing Foran v. Fisher Foods,

Inc. , 17 Ohio St.3d 193, 194 (1985). {¶ 31} In rejecting the argument that the temporary employer had to se parately provide the temporary employee with workers' compensation cover age to be entitled toWarren CA2019-05-051

- 12 - immunity, the court stated, in relevant part, as follows: Thomas argues that to obtain immunity, PSC had to pay workers' compensation premiums separate from those paid by Callos. Ohio appellate decisions, however, show that forpurposes of immunity, it does not matter who – the customeremployer or the temporary staffing agency – pays the workers' compensation premiums . * * * "[F]or an employer of a temporary agency to obtain immunity from a negligence suit, someone must pay the workers' compensation premiums and some evidence of that must be before the court. * * * [ Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc. , 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 306 (6th Dist.1999)]. * * * [B]ecause it was "undisputed that appellant obtained workers' compensation benefits[,]" it was "reasonable to infer that someone * * * paid workers'' compensation premiums for appellant[.]" Id. (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 22. The court recognized that "'both the employer and temporary agency are entitled to immunity when the workers' com pensation premiums are paid.'" Id. at ¶ 23, quoting Hornyak , 2016-Ohio-8489 at ¶ 18. {¶ 32} In the present case, Crew does not deny that his injury was cov ered by workers' compensation or that he received workers' compensation benefits from OBWC. The November 25, 2015 Agreement between Accurate and AMO specif ied that Accurate was responsible for providing workers' compensation coverage fo r all assigned Accurate employees. AMO indirectly paid for the workers' compensation c overage, as evidenced by both Snow's and Bowlin's testimony that workers' compensation w as included within the "markup" fee AMO paid to Accurate for obtaining the services of temporary employees. 3 {¶ 33} Accordingly, given the evidence submitted by AMO in support of its motion for summary judgment, we find that AMO has demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matte r of law. Based on the evidence

3. Snow specifically testified that AMO "through markups, pay[ s] for Workers' Compensation insurance through that agency [Accurate]. And in that situation, the inj ured team member would contact the agency for direction on their medical bills or the status of their claim." Bowlin's testimony corroborated Snow's testimony. Bowlin indicated that the "markup" charge pays for "background checks, the drug screens, insurance, Workers' Comp, [and] taxes."Warren CA2019-05-051

- 13 - submitted, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could only c ome to one conclusion: for purposes of workers' compensation under R.C. 4123.35 and 4123.7 4, Crew was an employee of AMO and AMO is immune from Crew's negligence suit a s workers' compensation premiums where paid on behalf of Crew. The trial court did not err in granting AMO summary judgment. Accordingly, we overrule Crew's sole ass ignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court. {¶ 34} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.