IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JAMES MICHAEL MILLER,

Appellant.

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No. 38969-3-III

PUBLISHED OPINION

PENNELL, J. — RCW 77.15.080 authorizes Department of Fish and Wildlife 

(DFW) officers to perform a brief investigatory stop when “articulable facts” indicate 

a person is “engaged in . . . hunting activities.” Relying on this statute, DFW officers 

stopped James Miller’s sport-utility vehicle (SUV) in the Colockum Wildlife Area 

when they saw him wearing an orange sweatshirt and slowly driving down a bumpy

road during modern firearm deer and elk season. In the course of the stop, officers 

discovered a loaded shotgun and rifle on the passenger seat and Mr. Miller was charged 

with misdemeanor firearms violations. Prior to trial, Mr. Miller moved to suppress 

evidence of the loaded firearms, arguing they were discovered as a result of an illegal 

stop. The trial court denied the motion and Mr. Miller was convicted. We now reverse.

FILED

MARCH 28, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 38969-3-III

State v. Miller

2

By its plain terms, RCW 77.15.080 permits an investigative stop only when the 

totality of the circumstances demonstrates a substantial possibility that the target of the 

stop is actively engaged in hunting. Rarely, if ever, will a person in the act of driving 

a vehicle be “engaged in . . . hunting activities.” RCW 77.15.080. Hunting and driving 

are incompatible. To the extent this court’s prior opinion in Schlegel v. Department of 

Licensing, 137 Wn. App. 364, 153 P.3d 244 (2007) states otherwise, we respectfully 

disagree with that decision. 

Mr. Miller was doing nothing more than driving his SUV at the time DFW officers 

performed the stop. This was not a hunting activity. The stop therefore did not fall under 

the purview of RCW 77.15.080 and Mr. Miller’s motion to suppress should have been 

granted. We reverse Mr. Miller’s conviction and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

DFW officers were patrolling the Colockum Wildlife Area during modern firearm 

deer and elk season when they observed an SUV traveling slowly on a bumpy “green 

dot road.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 25. In partnership with the Department of Natural 

Resources and private landowners in Kittitas and Yakima counties, green dot roads are

cooperatively managed by DFW for use by a “wide variety of recreationalists” to access 

“camping, hunting, wildlife viewing, and ATV [all-terrain vehicle] and off-road vehicle 
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State v. Miller

3

riding, while protecting sensitive habitat from damage caused by motorized vehicles.”

Recreational Opportunities and Rules on Your WDFW Public Lands, WASH. DEP’T OF 

FISH & WILDLIFE, https://wdfw.wa.gov/about/wdfw-lands/public-conduct#green-dot

[https://perma.cc/H5TD-KNXN]. The DFW officers observed the driver of the SUV—

later identified as James Miller—was wearing an orange sweatshirt. The officers believed 

Mr. Miller was “engaged in . . . hunting activities.” RCW 77.15.080. As a result, they

stopped the SUV to inquire as to compliance with state game and licensing regulations.

During the stop, the officers observed a rifle and shotgun lying on the SUV’s

passenger seat. They asked to check the firearms to verify they were unloaded. Mr. Miller 

acquiesced and a live round was found in the chamber of the shotgun. Mr. Miller was 

cited for possessing a loaded shotgun in his vehicle in violation of RCW 77.15.460(1), 

a misdemeanor offense. The State subsequently charged Mr. Miller with that offense in

Kittitas County District Court.

1

During pretrial proceedings, Mr. Miller filed a motion to suppress the evidence

obtained by the DFW officers, arguing it was the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure, 

and to dismiss the charges. The district court denied the motion. The court found the 

 

1 The State initially charged Mr. Miller with a second violation of

RCW 77.15.460(1), for possessing a loaded rifle in his vehicle, but that charge 

was eventually dismissed during trial at the close of the State’s case-in-chief.
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DFW officers reasonably believed Mr. Miller was “engaged in . . . hunting activities”

and thus the stop was authorized under RCW 77.15.080. The case proceeded to a jury 

trial and Mr. Miller was convicted. 

Mr. Miller appealed his conviction to the superior court, arguing the district court 

erred by denying his motion to suppress. The superior court denied the appeal, relying 

on this court’s interpretation of RCW 77.15.080 in Schlegel. See 137 Wn. App. at 366, 

370-71. We granted discretionary review. 

ANALYSIS

Mr. Miller argues RCW 77.15.080 did not authorize DFW officers to stop his SUV

and, if it did, the stop violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

We may avoid reaching Mr. Miller’s constitutional argument if we can resolve his case 

on statutory grounds. See State v. Speaks, 119 Wn.2d 204, 207, 829 P.2d 1096 (1992). 

Thus, we begin by interpreting RCW 77.15.080. Our review is de novo. State v. 

Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).

When interpreting a statute, our “fundamental objective” is to effectuate the 

legislature’s intent. Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA, 188 Wn.2d 421, 

435, 395 P.3d 1031 (2017). If a statute’s plain text is unambiguous—that is, where it 

is subject to only one reasonable interpretation—this court’s task begins and ends with 
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State v. Miller

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that plain language. State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 726-27, 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

In pertinent part, RCW 77.15.080 reads:

Based upon articulable facts that a person is engaged in fishing, harvesting, 

or hunting activities, fish and wildlife officers and ex officio fish and 

wildlife officers have the authority to temporarily stop the person and 

check for valid licenses, tags, permits, stamps, or catch record cards, and 

to inspect all fish, shellfish, seaweed, and wildlife in possession as well as 

the equipment being used to ensure compliance with the requirements of 

this title.

(Emphasis added.) Three terms are pertinent to our statutory analysis: “articulable facts,” 

“is,” and “hunting activities.” We discuss each in turn.

RCW 77.15.080 requires law enforcement to have “articulable facts” indicating 

a regulated activity is underway in order to perform a stop. This term of art has been 

interpreted as referencing the familiar Terry 2 stop standard. See Schlegel, 137 Wn. App. 

at 369. Under Terry, officers must have more than a “mere hunch[]” to perform a stop. 

State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 63, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). “[A] traffic stop significantly 

curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of the driver and [any] passengers.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 

468 U.S. 420, 436, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984). Thus, to justify a stop, the 

totality of the circumstances known to law enforcement must demonstrate a “substantial 

possibility” that there is a basis for the stop. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d

 

2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
No. 38969-3-III

State v. Miller

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445 (1986). In the instant context, there must be a substantial possibility of “fishing, 

harvesting, or hunting activities” for a stop to be proper under RCW 77.15.080.

As relevant here, RCW 77.15.080 only permits the stop of a person who “is” 

engaged in hunting activities. The use of the word “is” carries legal significance. See 

In re Dependency of D.L.B., 188 Wn. App. 905, 917, 355 P.3d 345 (2015). By selecting 

“is”—the present tense of the verb “to be”—the legislature indicated its intent that the 

statute apply only to present, ongoing activities. Past or future conduct is not covered. 

Thus, it is not enough that an officer suspects a person has recently been engaged in 

hunting or may soon be so engaged. 

Finally, we examine the term “hunting activities.” Here, “‘[t]o hunt’” means

“an effort to kill, injure, harass, harvest, or capture a wild animal or wild bird.” 

RCW 77.08.010(33). Our Supreme Court has further explained that an individual begins 

to hunt “when they make an effort to kill or injure . . . game in an area where such 

animals may reasonably be expected.” State v. Walsh, 123 Wn.2d 741, 748, 870 P.2d 974 

(1994). And an “activity” is simply the “collective acts” of one or more people “engaged 

in a common enterprise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (11th ed. 2019).

Piecing the foregoing terms together, we interpret RCW 77.15.080 to limit stops 

based on suspicion of “hunting activities” to the following circumstances: officers must 
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be aware of facts creating a substantial possibility that a person to be stopped is presently 

engaged in an effort to kill, injure, harass, harvest, or capture wild animals or wild birds

in an area where such animals may reasonably be expected.

The State does not quibble with this interpretation; instead, it claims this standard 

has been met. The State points out that it was modern firearm deer and elk season and 

Mr. Miller was driving slowly in a wildlife area while wearing an orange sweatshirt.

According to the State, Mr. Miller might have been scouting out a potential hunting

location as he drove along the green dot road. See Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, 

State v. Miller, No. 38969-3-III (Mar. 5, 2024), at 24 min., 4 sec. through 27 min., 

17 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, 

http://tvw.org.

We doubt that the State’s scouting theory meets the statutory requirement of 

active engagement in hunting. According to DFW, scouting is best performed well 

in advance of an actual hunting trip. See How To Prepare for Hunting Season, WASH.

DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, https://wdfw.wa.gov/hunting/requirements/preparing-to-hunt

[https://perma.cc/25R8-E3CK]. Even if Mr. Miller was scouting out possible hunting 

locations, this does not mean that he was presently “engaged in . . . hunting activities.” 

RCW 77.15.080.
No. 38969-3-III

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But even if scouting qualified as “engag[ing] in . . . hunting activities,” id., 

the record before us would still fail to justify the stop of Mr. Miller’s vehicle. The 

information known to officers at the time of the stop failed to indicate Mr. Miller was

likely engaged in hunting, as opposed to some other type of recreational activity. The 

green dot road utilized by Mr. Miller is open to nonhunters and provides “access for 

camping, hunting, wildlife viewing, and ATV and off-road vehicle riding.” See

Recreational Opportunities and Rules on Your WDFW Public Lands, supra. Here, a 

DFW officer described the road where Mr. Miller was stopped as “bumpy.” CP at 25.

Thus, Mr. Miller’s cautious pace on this road was advisable and unremarkable. And while 

Mr. Miller was wearing an orange sweatshirt, this type of attire is recommended for

anyone recreating in an area that is open for hunting during hunting season. See Staying 

Safe During Hunting Season, WASH. TRAILS ASS’N, https://www.wta.org/gooutside/seasonal-hikes/fall-destinations/staying-safe-during-hunting-season

[https://perma.cc/7DFW-UVHB] (recommending that hikers “[w]ear bright clothing” 

and “[c]hoose colors that stand out, like pink, red and orange”).

The State points to our decision in Schlegel to support its claim that Mr. Miller 

reasonably appeared to be engaged in hunting activities. In Schlegel, a majority of this 

court held that DFW officers had sufficient “articulable facts” to perform a vehicle stop 
No. 38969-3-III

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under RCW 77.15.080 based on circumstances similar to the ones here. See 137 Wn. App. 

at 370. Mr. Schlegel was driving a truck on a dirt road in a wildlife area on the opening 

day of elk hunting season while wearing warm clothing. Id. at 367. According to DFW 

officers, these circumstances were consistent with hunting. Id. at 370. Our court deferred 

to the officers’ characterization and held there was a “substantial possibility” that 

Mr. Schlegel was engaged in hunting activities when he was stopped. Id.

Were we bound by Schlegel, we would agree with the State that the stop was 

justified under RCW 77.15.080. But stare decisis does not exist “between or among 

the divisions of the Court of Appeals.” In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold, 190 Wn.2d 136, 

148-49, 410 P.3d 1133 (2018). We ordinarily strive to follow our prior decisions because 

we value consistency, and we must give our prior decisions “respectful consideration.” 

Id. at 154; see id. at 150-51. However, if we conclude one of our prior opinions was 

incorrect, we are free to depart from it. See Grisby v. Herzog, 190 Wn. App. 786, 810-11, 

362 P.3d 763 (2015).

The decision in Schlegel was not unanimous. A detailed dissent reasoned that 

the authority to “‘temporarily stop [a] person’” under RCW 77.15.080 “does not extend 

to stopping a motor vehicle.” Schlegel, 137 Wn. App. at 373 (Schultheis, J., dissenting). 

This is because “[t]raveling in a motor vehicle is not, nor can it be, engaging in hunting 
No. 38969-3-III

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activities.” Id. at 373-74. Should an effort to kill or injure game take place from inside 

a moving vehicle, “it constitutes a crime.” 3 Id. at 374; see RCW 77.15.460(1), (2)(b); 

see also WAC 220-413-070(2), (3). 

As recognized by the dissent in Schlegel, the legislature has adopted specific 

provisions pertaining to the search and seizure of vehicles by DFW officers. See 137 

Wn. App. at 374-75 (Schultheis, J., dissenting). For instance, RCW 77.15.094 allows 

officers to perform warrantless searches of “vehicles” based on reasonable suspicion 

that a vehicle contains evidence of a hunting and fishing violation. And RCW 77.12.620 

allows DFW officers to conduct vehicle inspections at clearly marked “check stations.”

The fact that two statutes specifically reference vehicle inspections, but RCW 77.15.080 

does not, indicates the legislature’s intent that RCW 77.15.080 does not ordinarily extend 

to vehicle stops. When the legislature intends to authorize vehicle stops by DFW officers, 

it has shown that it knows how to do so. Cf. Bassett v. Dep’t of Ecology, 8 Wn. App. 2d 

284, 305, 438 P.3d 563 (2019). 

 

3 Because hunting from a moving vehicle is a crime, a DFW officer who actually 

witnesses someone hunting from a moving vehicle could arrest that person without 

recourse to RCW 77.15.080. See RCW 10.31.100 (authorizing warrantless arrests for 

misdemeanors if the officer witnesses the crime).
No. 38969-3-III

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We find the dissent’s interpretation of RCW 77.15.080 in Schlegel more 

persuasive than that set forth in the majority opinion. Therefore, we respectfully decline 

to follow the holding in Schlegel. 4

The Schlegel dissent makes a persuasive case for concluding that RCW 77.15.080

never authorizes the stop of a moving vehicle. But we need not go that far to resolve 

Mr. Miller’s appeal. Even if RCW 77.15.080 might sometimes justify stopping a moving 

vehicle based on a substantial possibility that an occupant is presently engaged in hunting

activities, the facts here do not meet the requisite standard. The record here shows the 

only activity engaged in by Mr. Miller at the time he encountered the DFW officers 

was operation of his SUV. There was no indication to the officers that Mr. Miller 

was presently making an effort to kill, harvest, or capture a wild animal or bird. Merely 

driving a vehicle is inconsistent with the act of hunting. Thus, the stop was not justified

under RCW 77.15.080. 

 

4 To be clear, we may not “overrule” one of our prior decisions; only the Supreme 

Court may resolve conflicts between panels of this court. See Grisby, 190 Wn. App. at 

808-09; Arnold, 190 Wn.2d at 150. Should some future trial court confront an issue where 

our opinion today “irreconcilabl[y] conflict[s]” with Schlegel, that court should “predict 

what the Washington Supreme Court is likely to do.” Mark DeForrest, In the Groove or 

in a Rut? Resolving Conflicts Between the Divisions of the Washington State Court of 

Appeals at the Trial Court Level, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 455, 511 (2012/13); see, e.g., Union 

Bank, N.A. v. Vanderhoek Assocs., LLC, 191 Wn. App. 836, 848, 365 P.3d 223 (2015) 

(adopting Professor DeForrest’s approach).
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Because law enforcement stopped Mr. Miller’s vehicle without legal justification, 

he is entitled to a favorable ruling on his suppression motion. We need not reach 

Mr. Miller’s constitutional claims.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Miller’s conviction is reversed. This matter is remanded with instructions 

to grant Mr. Miller’s motion to suppress. See State v. Walker, 129 Wn. App. 572, 575, 

119 P.3d 399 (2005) (noting, where an “initial stop” was unlawful, evidence discovered 

through the stop must be excluded as “fruits of the poisonous tree”).5

_________________________________

Pennell, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________ _________________________________

Fearing, C.J. Lawrence-Berrey, J.

 

5 We note that the district court and superior court did not err. Unlike the Court 

of Appeals, district and superior courts are bound to follow published decisions from 

the Court of Appeals. See Marley v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 326, 330, 864 

P.2d 960 (1993), aff’d, 125 Wn.2d 533, 886 P.3d 189 (1994). Until today, there was no 

Washington decision disagreeing with Schlegel. The district court and superior court 

were required to follow Schlegel and, under Schlegel, Mr. Miller was not entitled to

suppression.