J-S43006-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JESSE D. BOND 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 939 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-2217781-1992

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2023

Appellant, Jesse D. Bond, appeals pro se from the February 22, 2022 

order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing

his petition for habeas corpus relief, which the PCRA court treated as a petition 

for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, and dismissed as untimely. After careful review, we 

affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On February 

8, 1993, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, robbery, 

possession of an instrument of crime, and conspiracy. Following a penalty 

hearing, the jury returned a sentence of death. On July 28, 1992, the trial 

court entered Appellant’s sentence. On January 12, 1995, the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, holding that 

Appellant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. See 
J-S43006-22

- 2 -

Commonwealth v. Bond, 652 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1995). Appellant did not seek 

further review. His sentence, thus, became final on April 12, 1995. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. S. Ct. R. 13.

In 2002, Appellant sought federal habeas relief. Six years later, the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing after finding that 

Appellant’s penalty-phase counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.1 See 

Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 2008 (Opinion filed August 20, 2008, 

Amended Opinion filed October 17, 2008). On November 15, 2012, the trial 

court resentenced Appellant to two concurrent terms of life without parole for 

his murder conviction.2

After his resentencing, Appellant filed numerous petitions and amended 

petitions for PCRA relief, none of which garnered relief. On March 12, 2020, 

Appellant filed a “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief [] and Statutory PostConviction Relief [].”

3

 On May 4, 2021, Appellant filed a “Supplemental 

Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief and Statutory Post-Conviction 

____________________________________________

1 The federal court did not overturn Appellant’s guilty verdict. 

2 The court also sentenced Appellant to concurrent terms of incarceration of 

ten to twenty years for robbery, two and one-half to five years for possession 

of an instrument of crime, and five to ten years for conspiracy.

3 Appellant raised claims of “newly discovered evidence of police corruption 

and police and prosecutorial misconduct and violation of Brady[ v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963)], actual innocence, newly discovered evidence of actual 

innocence . . . , and fraud upon the court by [the Commonwealth].” Petition, 

3/12/20, at 2.
J-S43006-22

- 3 -

Relief [] and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction”

asserting, relevant to the instant appeal, a claim that the trial court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction through all stages of the proceeding because the 

Commonwealth failed to file a criminal information stating the charges against 

Appellant.4 

On January 11, 2022, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intent to 

dismiss his petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 as 

untimely.

5

 

On February 22, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition. 

This appeal followed. 

Appellant raises the following issue in his pro se appeal:

Does the fact that the Commonwealth failed to prepare and 

present the charging document termed “information” to the court 

prior to Appellant’s trial deny the trial court [of] subject matter 

jurisdiction where Rules of Criminal Procedure dictate that it was 

____________________________________________

4 See Supplemental Amended Petition, 5/4/21, at 3. 

5 The certified record does not show that Appellant sought leave of court to 

file a supplemental amended petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 905. In 

general, if an appellant fails to seek leave of court, any claim raised in an 

unauthorized supplemental petition is waived. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 

99 A.3d 427, 437 (Pa. 2014). Nevertheless, the PCRA court implicitly 

permitted Appellant to amend his March 2020 “Petition for Habeas Corpus 

Relief [] and Statutory Post-Conviction Relief []” by considering the timeliness 

of the issues contained within Appellant’s May 4, 2021 “Supplemental 

Amended “Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief [] and Statutory Post-Conviction 

Relief [].” See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 816 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (finding that where the PCRA court does not strike an amended PCRA 

petition filed without leave of court and addresses the issues raised in the 

amended petition, the PCRA court implicitly permitted amendment pursuant 

to Rule 905(a)).
J-S43006-22

- 4 -

a must for an attorney for the Commonwealth to do so, as well as 

it is mandated in 22 Corpus Secundum, “Criminal Law,” § 324 p. 

390, that the want of a sufficient information goes to the 

jurisdiction of the court and renders all proceedings prior to its 

filing void ab initio?

Appellant’s Amended Brief at ix.6

Appellant asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

to render judgment against him because the Commonwealth failed to prepare 

and present a charging document to the court. Id. at 1-5. 

____________________________________________

6 Appellant filed an amended brief with leave of this Court. Appellant also filed 

a reply brief arguing that he timely raised his subject matter jurisdiction claim 

because “such a claim is viable under both [the PCRA and in a petition for 

habeas corpus relief] and at any time.” Reply Brief at 4 (emphasis omitted). 

However, Appellant did not include his subject matter jurisdiction claim in the 

Statement of Questions Involved in his amended brief, nor is it fairly 

suggested thereby. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (“No question will be considered 

unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested 

thereby.”). Thus, Appellant did not preserve it for our review. 

Moreover, even if Appellant had properly preserved a claim that the trial 

court erred in determining that Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s subject 

matter jurisdiction is cognizable under the PCRA, it would fail because the 

PCRA expressly encompasses jurisdictional challenges. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 

(providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief 

and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same 

purpose that exists when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus 

and coram nobis”); id. at § 9543(a)(2)(viii) (stating that to be eligible for 

relief under the PCRA, the petition must plead and prove that the conviction 

resulted from, inter alia, “[a] proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction”). 

As our Supreme Court has explained, “the General Assembly intended that 

claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under that 

Act. No other statutory or common law remedy ‘for the same purpose’ is 

intended to be available; instead, such remedies are explicitly ‘encompassed’ 

within the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) 

(emphasis in original). Because Appellant’s subject matter jurisdiction claim 

is cognizable under the PCRA, the trial court properly treated Appellant’s 

subject matter jurisdiction claim within the context of the PCRA.
J-S43006-22

- 5 -

As an initial matter, all PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent 

petitions, must be filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3). The timeliness of a petition for collateral relief is jurisdictional. 

See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). If a 

PCRA petition is untimely, a court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. 

Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 120-121 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(courts do not have jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA).

Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant on July 28, 1993. Our Supreme

Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on January 12, 1995. 

Because Appellant did not seek review with the United States Supreme Court,

his judgment of sentence became final 90 days later, on April 12, 1995.7 

Appellant had one year from that date, or until April 12, 1996, to file a timely 

PCRA petition. Therefore, Appellant’s supplemental amended petition, filed 

____________________________________________

7 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted 

appellant federal habeas corpus relief in the form of a new penalty hearing, 

that relief did not “reset the clock” for finality of appellant’s judgment of 

sentence when exercising post-conviction rights. See Commonwealth v. 

McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008) (reiterating that a successful 

collateral appeal does not “reset the clock” for calculation of the final judgment 

of sentence where such relief only affects the petitioner’s sentence and neither 

restores the petitioner’s direct appeal rights nor disturbs petitioner’s 

conviction).
J-S43006-22

- 6 -

on May 4, 2021, is facially untimely.8 As a result, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review Appellant’s supplemental amended petition, unless 

Appellant alleged and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the time-bar, 

as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). 

Those three narrow exceptions to the one-year time-bar are: when the 

government has interfered with the petitioner’s ability to present the claim, 

when the petitioner has recently discovered facts upon which his PCRA claim 

is predicated, or when either the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or the 

Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a new constitutional right 

and made that right retroactive. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii); see also 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012). The 

petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving the applicability of any 

exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner fails to invoke a valid 

exception to the PCRA time-bar, this court may not review the petition. See 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

Our review of Appellant’s supplemental amended petition and his Brief 

to this Court indicates that Appellant made no attempt to overcome the PCRA’s 

jurisdictional time-bar to his subject matter jurisdiction claim by pleading the 

applicability of any of the exceptions provided in Section 9545(b)(1). 

Accordingly, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review Appellant’s 

____________________________________________

8 We note that Appellant did not raise any claims of error in this appeal with 

respect to the issues raised in his likewise patently untimely, March 12, 2020 

petition. Thus, we need not consider here whether Appellant overcame the 

PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bars as to any of those issues.
J-S43006-22

- 7 -

supplemental amended petition, and we may not review it on appeal. We, 

thus, affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023