# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 21 , 2016

Decided December 21 , 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD

, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER

, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM

, Circuit Judge

No. 16

- 2 96 0

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

, Plaintiff

- Appel lee

,

v

.

WILLIAM MOSS

, Defendant

- Appell ant

. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois

.

No. 00

- CR

- 40101

- JPG

- 2

J. Phil Gilbert

, Judge

.

O R D E R

William Moss was found guilty by a jury in 2001 of conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute powder and crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, 841(a)(1), distribution of

both

, id. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a weapon during a drug trafficking offense,

18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced in 2001 to a total of 377 months’ imprisonment and

8 years’ supervised release . In 2009 the prison sentence was reduced to 272 months after a pair of retroactive amendment s to § 2D1.1 of the sentencing guidelines

. See U.S.S.G. § 1B.10(d) & App. C., amend s . 706 , 715

. A further reduction to 204 months occurred in

2014 after an other retroactive amendment. See id. at § 1B1.10(d) & Supp. App. C

., amend. 782

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 16

- 2960 Page 2

Moss was released from prison in 2015 and began serving his term of supervised

release. Six months later, the government sought revocation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (3 ),

on the ground that Moss had violated the conditions of his release by driving above the speed limit , fail ing to tell his probation officer about the resulting ticket , committ ing domestic battery, and possess ing marijuana

. After Moss admitted the drug possession, the district court revoked his supervised released and imposed a term of

re imprisonment of 12 months and 1 day to be followed by another 60 months’ supervised release.

Moss filed a notice of appeal after the revocation , but his appointed attorney

asserts th at th e appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California

, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the type of potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. United States v. Bey , 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014);

United States v. Wagner , 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). We invited Moss to comment, but he has not responded. See C IR . R. 51(b).

Moss has told counsel that he does not wish to challenge his admission s to the alleged violations of the conditions of release

. Thus counsel properly refrains from discussing whether Moss’s admissio ns were knowing and voluntary. See United States v.

Wheaton , 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010).

The attorney does consider whether Moss could argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to revoke his supervised release. But Moss admitted possessing marijuana, a controlled substance, making revocation mandatory.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), (g)(1); United States v. Jones , 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014).

Counsel then rightly concludes tha t Moss could not argue that the district court imposed a plainly unreasonable term of reimprisonment. See United States v. Kizeart

, 505 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 2007). Moss admitted possess ing marijuana, an offense punishable by a ter m of imprisonment greater than one year because he had prior

con victions under 21 U.S.C. § 841

. S ee 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Moss thus committed a Grade B violation of his supervise d release. S ee U.S.S.G. § 7B.1.1(a)(2). The district court correctly

established a reimprisonment range of 18 to 24 months based on that violati on and the Category V criminal history calculated at Moss’s original sentencing

. S ee id. at § 7B1.4(a). Twelve months and a day is substantially below this range, so we agree with counsel

that it would be frivolous f or Moss to argue that the term i s plainly unreasonable.No. 16

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Lastly, counsel considers whether Moss could raise a claim that his lawyer rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. We note that a defendant facing revocation of supervised release does not have a constitutional right to coun sel if he admits violating the conditions of his supervision and neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation n or asserts substantial and complex grounds in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778, 790 ( 1973); United States v. Eskridge

, 4 45 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 2006). Yet we need not resolve whether or not Moss’s constitutional right attached

. A claim of i neffective assistance generally should be reserved for collateral review, where the defendant may develop a full record, and

s hould n ot be addressed in a case like this one where counsel on appeal also represented

the defendant in the district court

. Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 504

– 05 (2003);

United States v. Rezin , 322 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2003).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.