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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAYSON MOTAROYACELI

(AC 39187)

Lavine, Sheldon and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant

appealed to this court. On appeal, he claimed that the trial court erred

in limiting his voir dire of the venire panel and improperly gave the jury

a Chip Smith instruction at an impermissibly coercive time. Held:

1. The defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel’s

line of questioning of prospective jurors regarding the finality of the

verdict was unavailing; that court properly determined that the questioning regarding finality was improper, as it concerned the understanding of legal concepts and awareness of legal proceedings, rather than

the probing of potential bias, and the defendant did not demonstrate

that he was prejudiced by the court’s ruling.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the Chip Smith charge

given by the trial court on a Friday afternoon was impermissibly coercive; the evidence did not suggest that the jury was misled or coerced

by the court’s giving of the Chip Smith charge on a Friday afternoon,

the charge was given in accordance with the language previously

approved by our Supreme Court, the verdict was not reached until after

the weekend on the following Monday, and the mere fact that one of

the jurors had asked about scheduling was not enough to suggest that

there was coercion.

Argued September 25—officially released December 18, 2018

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree and tampering with evidence, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury

before Kwak, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, from which the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, with whom, on the

brief, was Stephen A. Lebedevitch, assigned counsel,

for the appellant (defendant).

Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s

attorney, and Anthony Bochicchio, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. The defendant, Jayson Mota-Royaceli,

appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered after

a trial to the jury, on the charge of manslaughter in the

first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)

(1). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly

(1) limited his voir dire of the venire panel and (2) gave

the jury a Chip Smith instruction at an impermissibly

coercive time. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury was presented with evidence of the following

facts. The defendant and the victim worked together

and attended the wedding reception of one of their

coworkers. During the course of the night, the victim

touched the defendant’s buttocks, causing the defendant to get angry. The victim tried to fight the defendant,

but the defendant did not want to fight. After they separately left the reception, there was phone communication between the two, and they ultimately drove to and

met in a parking lot. After a discussion, the defendant

returned to his car, and after getting in, he thought that

he saw the victim with a firearm, and drove the car

into the victim, killing him. No gun was found on the

scene. Following the trial, the defendant was convicted

of one count of manslaughter in the first degree in

violation of § 53a-55 (a) (1) and acquitted of two counts

of tampering with evidence in violation of § 53a-155 (a)

(1).1 This appeal followed.

I

The defendant claims that the court erred in limiting

defense counsel’s line of questioning of prospective

jurors regarding the finality of their verdict. Specifically,

the defendant argues that without being allowed to

pursue this line of questioning, ‘‘there [was] an impermissible risk that one or more jurors entertained a belief

that the ultimate task of determining whether the defendant is guilty or not could be corrected in a higher

court.’’ We are unpersuaded.

Jury selection for the defendant’s trial began on October 22, 2015. During voir dire, defense counsel’s line of

questioning included inquiries regarding the finality of

a jury’s verdict.2 After the state objected, the court

allowed the line of questioning but ordered defense

counsel to reword the questions. The next day, however, upon reconsidering the state’s objection, the court

precluded defense counsel from asking venirepersons

whether they believed that their verdict as jurors would

be final. The defendant argues that the court erred in

precluding this line of questioning, and that in doing

so, the court deprived the defendant of his right to

inquire into potential bias. We disagree.

‘‘Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the

criminal defendant that his [or her] [s]ixth [a]mendment

right to an impartial jury will be honored. . . . Part of

the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury
is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors.

. . . Our constitutional and statutory law permit each

party, typically through his or her attorney, to question

each prospective juror individually, outside the presence of other prospective jurors, to determine [his or

her] fitness to serve on the jury. . . . Because the purpose of voir dire is to discover if there is any likelihood

that some prejudice is in the [prospective] juror’s mind

[that] will even subconsciously affect his [or her] decision of the case, the party who may be adversely

affected should be permitted [to ask] questions

designed to uncover that prejudice. This is particularly

true with reference to the defendant in a criminal case.

. . . The purpose of voir dire is to facilitate [the] intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges and to help

uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for

cause.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Edwards, 314 Conn. 465, 483, 102

A.3d 52 (2014).

It is well settled that ‘‘[t]he court has wide discretion

in conducting the voir dire . . . and the exercise of that

discretion will not constitute reversible error unless it

has clearly been abused or harmful prejudice appears

to have resulted.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Dahlgren, 200 Conn. 586, 601, 512 A.2d 906 (2009).

‘‘A defendant will not prevail on appeal just because

he might be correct in asserting that a prohibited line of

questioning would have exposed potential bias.’’ State

v. Thornton, 112 Conn. App. 694, 705, 963 A.2d 1099,

cert. denied, 291 Conn. 914, 970 A.2d 727 (2009). ‘‘We

have repeatedly stated that a juror’s knowledge or ignorance concerning questions of law is not a proper subject of inquiry on voir dire.’’ State v. Dahlgren, supra,

200 Conn. 601.

As an initial matter, we reject the defendant’s characterization of the prohibited inquiry as relating to ‘‘bias.’’

The term ‘‘bias,’’ as commonly used, refers to a predisposition or tendency to view a person or circumstance

in an unfair way. The trial court determined that the

questioning regarding finality was improper, as it concerned the understanding of legal concepts. We agree

with this determination, as the line of questioning by

defense counsel improperly inquired into legal knowledge. Although the defendant argues that the questions

were not improper questions of law, he emphasizes the

importance of gauging a venireperson’s ‘‘aware[ness]

of the possibility of post-conviction proceedings.’’ We

fail to see the distinction between improper questions

regarding a venireperson’s knowledge of law, and the

questions that the defendant sought to ask. These questions did not probe potential bias but, rather, inquired

into a venireperson’s awareness of legal proceedings.

Additionally, the defendant has failed to demonstrate

that he was prejudiced by the court’s ruling. The defendant argues that prejudice arose from the risk that a
juror might have believed that a higher court could

correct an improper verdict. This argument is speculative as there is no evidence in the record to support it.

We therefore reject the defendant’s claim.

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the Chip Smith3

charge, given at 4 p.m. on the Friday before Thanksgiving, was impermissibly coercive.4 Additionally, the

defendant argues that the charge was coercive as the

jury had questioned the schedule for the following week

and one of the jurors had a doctor’s appointment on

Monday. We are unpersuaded.

After the close of evidence and final arguments, the

court charged the jury on Tuesday, November 17, 2015.

On Friday, November 20, 2015, prior to lunch, the jury

sent a note to the court indicating that it was unable

to come to an agreement and requested instruction from

the court about the state’s burden of proof. The state

then requested that the Chip Smith charge be given at

once, providing the jurors the opportunity to think

about it over lunch, rather than giving them the charge

late on a Friday. Defense counsel, however, stated that

giving the Chip Smith charge at that time would be

‘‘putting the cart before the horse . . . .’’ After

explaining to the jury that the court would not give

further instruction, the court sent the jury back to deliberate further without giving them the Chip Smith

charge.

Later in the day, the jury sent out another note indicating it had reached a verdict on count two but was

deadlocked on the other two counts. Defense counsel

objected to giving the Chip Smith charge, noting that

it was 4 p.m. on a Friday, and asked that the court

accept the jury’s verdict on count two and declare a

mistrial on the other two counts or alternatively modify

the language in the Chip Smith charge. The court denied

the request and gave the standard Chip Smith charge.

Shortly after the charge was given, one of the jurors

spoke to the court’s clerk expressing concern about a

doctor’s appointment the juror had scheduled for 12:30

p.m. on Monday. The juror was told that ‘‘they [the

jury] would have to be [there in court] regardless.’’ On

Monday, November 23, 2015, at 11:07 a.m., the jury sent

out a note indicating that it had reached a verdict on

all three charges.

‘‘A jury that is coerced in its deliberations deprives

the defendant of his right to a fair trial under the sixth

and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution,

and article first, § 8, of the state constitution. Whether

a jury [was] coerced by statements of the trial judge is

to be determined by an examination of the record. . . .

The question is whether in the context and under the

circumstances in which the statements were made, the

jury [was], actually, or even probably, misled or
coerced. . . . The court must consider [the jury

instructions] from the standpoint of their effect upon

the jury in the context and under the circumstances

in which they were given.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daley, 161 Conn.

App. 861, 866, 129 A.3d 190 (2015), cert. denied, 320

Conn. 919, 132 A.3d 1093 (2016).

Upon review of the record, the evidence does not

suggest that the jury was misled or coerced by the

court’s giving of the Chip Smith charge on Friday afternoon. The charge was given in accordance with the

language approved by our Supreme Court. See State v.

O’Neil, 261 Conn. 49, 51, 801 A.2d 730 (2002). Furthermore, although the charge was given at 4 p.m. on a

Friday,5

the verdict was not reached until after the

weekend, at 11:07 a.m. on Monday. The mere fact that

a juror asked about scheduling is not enough to suggest

that there was coercion. We cannot conclude that, in

the context and under the circumstances in which the

charge was given, the jury was, actually or even probably, misled or coerced. We therefore reject the defendant’s claim and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The tampering charges arose from the defendant’s conduct in moving

the vehicles after hitting the victim with his car and the fact that his cell

phone was never recovered.

2 Defense counsel questioned the venireperson who was chosen as the

first juror as follows:

‘‘Q. Do you think that a jury’s decision in a criminal case is a final decision?

‘‘A. Please repeat that.

‘‘Q. Do you think that the jury’s verdict, I should say, their verdict is a

final decision? Meaning that it’s not going to change the judge having just

the responsibility of punishment in the event of conviction, he doesn’t sit

as a seventh juror. It’s up to the jury.

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. Do you agree that the jury’s verdict is final?

‘‘A. Well, as I understand, I mean, I’m not a lawyer, as I understand it,

the—if someone is convicted, they would have a right to appeal if something,

they didn’t think something was right, maybe it was something that the jury

didn’t get to hear and they want to bring that to the attention of the judge

or the court and say, wait, wait, I think this should have been allowed in

and it wasn’t.

‘‘Q. Here’s what I’m getting at: Do you think your decision, ultimately if

you get it wrong, as the jury, whichever way it is, that somehow that’ll be

corrected so you don’t have to worry about it. Or do you think, no, it’s going

to be given weight and effect, your decision is final?

***

‘‘Q. If the jury—you know that there’s an appeal process and in that.

‘‘A. Right.

‘‘Q. That’s not something that you can concern yourself with.

‘‘A. Right.

‘‘Q. What I’m really getting at is the jury’s decision is given weight and

effect by this judge and any other.

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. And it’s not going to be changed because someone disagrees with

the jury.

‘‘A. Correct.

***

‘‘Q. Because if the jury thinks, hey, look, if we get it wrong, someone will—

‘‘A. Let’s just do this now and someone else will fix it later?

‘‘Q. Right.

‘‘A. No, no, no, no. It’s the jury’s—otherwise, it’s a waste of our time.’’
3

‘‘A Chip Smith instruction reminds the jurors that they must act unanimously, while also encouraging a deadlocked jury to reach unanimity.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. O’Neil, 261 Conn. 49, 51 n.2,

801 A.2d 730 (2002). We note that the instruction given in the present case

followed the language as set forth and approved in O’Neil. Id., 74–75. The

defendant does not challenge the wording of the charge.

4 The defendant argues that this alleged impermissibly coercive timing of

the Chip Smith charge bolsters the alleged risk discussed in part I of this

opinion that a juror might have believed that a higher court could correct

an improper verdict. This argument is undermined by the fact that defense

counsel was able to freely question each member of the venire panel about

the pressure of holding a minority position in deliberations:

‘‘Q. Let’s suppose you’re chosen for the case. You go back into the deliberation room. You discuss the case, take a vote and ultimately whichever way

it is, you are in the minority. It’s five to one. How do you think you’d handle

that situation?

‘‘A. Yeah, I can only imagine how much pressure that would be, but if it

was truly five to one, I guess it would be five to one.

***

‘‘Q. And you mentioned the pressure. You know, let’s suppose it’s five o’

clock on a Friday afternoon and if you don’t return a verdict, you’ve got to

come back on Monday. Are you someone who thinks you might cave in and

change your mind simply to—

‘‘A. Not at all, no.

5 Notably, defense counsel objected to the state’s proposal to give the

Chip Smith charge after the jury sent its first note to avoid the charge being

given late on a Friday.