In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS 

No. 15-0404V 

Filed: July 29, 2016 

Unpublished 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

DVORA GHITZA, * 

 * 

 Petitioner, * 

 v. * 

 * Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) 

AND HUMAN SERVICES, * 

 * 

 Respondent. * 

 * 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Ronald Craig Homer, Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, P.C., Boston, MA, for petitioner. 

Amy Paula Kokot, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. 

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Dorsey, Chief Special Master: 

 

 On April 22, 2015, petitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National 

Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,2 (the “Vaccine 

Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered a neurological injury as a result of a tetanus 

diphtheria [“Td”] vaccination on May 17, 2012. (ECF No. 1 at 1). On July 14, 2015, a 

ruling on entitlement was issued, finding petitioner entitled to compensation for the 

Vaccine Table Injury of brachial neuritis. (ECF No. 14 at 1-2). On January 6, 2016, a 

decision was issued awarding compensation to petitioner based on respondent’s 

proffer. (ECF No. 25). 

 

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the 

undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance with 

the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to 

identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an 

unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits 

within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012). 
2 

 On May 19, 2016, petitioner filed an application for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

(ECF No. 29). Petitioner requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $19,264.00, 

attorneys’ costs in the amount of $659.12, and petitioner’s out-of-pocket costs in the 

amount of $400.00,

3 for a total amount of $20,323.12. Id. at 1. 

On May 25, 2016, respondent filed a response to petitioner’s application. (ECF 

No. 31). Respondent argues that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 

contemplates any role for respondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an 

award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1. Respondent adds, however, that she “is 

satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in 

this case.” Id. at 2. Additionally, she “asserts that a reasonable amount for fees and 

costs in the present case would fall between $13,000.00 and $15,000.00,” citing five 

“similarly-postured” SIRVA cases where the stipulated award of attorneys’ fees and 

costs fell within the given range. Id. at 3-4. 

On June 6, 2016, petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 32). Petitioner argues that 

respondent has “selectively” cited stipulated attorneys’ fees and costs awards in past 

cases “attempt[ing] to create a self-serving range that is in fact not representative of fee 

awards in many SIRVA cases.” Id. at 4-5. Petitioner asserts that “respondent’s range 

for fees and costs is clearly intended to suggest a ‘cap’ on attorneys’ fees and costs” 

and “provides no helpful or substantive information” for the undersigned to use in 

making her determination. Id. at 5. Petitioner further argues that respondent has 

provided “no specific objections to petitioners’ application for attorneys’ fees and costs” 

and instead offers only a “‘blanket’ objection based upon a vague and unhelpful survey.” 

Id. at 8. 

Respondent filed a sur-reply to petitioner’s application on June 15, 2016. (ECF 

No. 34). Respondent asserts that the decision in McCulloch4 awarded rates to 

petitioner’s counsel “that are contrary to the evidence respondent presented in that 

case” and respondent cannot “agree to a fee award based on hourly rates that 

respondent believes lack evidentiary support.” Id. at 2. Respondent further states that 

she has “made the very practical decision to stop providing detailed objections to fee 

applications, based on the recognition that it was counterproductive and not achieving 

the purpose for which it was intended.” Id. at 4. Respondent argues in favor of her 

“approach of providing ranges [for attorneys’ fees and costs awards] based on the 

nature and scope of the litigation at issue” and notes that the proposed range in the 

instant claim provides for $1000.00 in costs, 20-25 hours of attorney time at “$400.00 

per hour and 32 hours of paralegal time at $125.00 an hour.” Id. at 5-6. Respondent 

 

3 In compliance with General Order #9, petitioner filed a signed statement indicating she incurred $400.00 

in out-of-pocket expenses. (ECF No. 30). 

4 McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. 

Sept. 1, 2015) 
3 

asserts this “is a generous number of hours for resolving a straight-forward, conceded 

brachial neuritis case . . . where judgement entered less than nine months after the 

petition was filed.” Id. 

Petitioner filed a sur-reply to respondent’s sur-reply on June 22, 2016 addressing 

the arguments raised by respondent in her sur-reply. (ECF No. 36). 

The undersigned notes that while she has only summarized the arguments 

presented by the parties in their briefing, the undersigned has fully reviewed and 

considered both parties’ briefs. 

The undersigned fully agrees with the McCulloch analysis regarding appropriate 

hourly rates for the attorneys in the Conway, Homer, and Chin-Caplan law firm and 

adopts the same reasoning in this case. Furthermore, the undersigned has reviewed 

the billing records submitted with petitioner’s request. In the undersigned’s experience, 

the request appears reasonable, and the undersigned finds no cause to reduce the 

requested hours or rates. 

Petitioner requests supplemental attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,711.50 for 

preparing the reply brief. (ECF. No. 33). The undersigned notes petitioner requested 

no supplemental attorneys’ fees for preparing her sur-reply. The undersigned has 

reviewed the submitted billing records and finds the request for additional fees to be 

reasonable; the full amount requested, $1,711.50, is awarded.5 Thus, the total amount 

awarded for attorneys’ fees and costs is $22,034.62. 

 The Vaccine Act permits an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

§ 15(e). Based on the reasonableness of petitioner’s request, the undersigned 

GRANTS petitioner’s application and supplemental application for attorneys’ fees and 

costs. 

Accordingly, the undersigned awards the total of $22,034.626 as follows: 

 

5 The undersigned notes that portions of petitioner’s reply are similar to a reply filed in another claim by 

petitioner’s counsel that was before the undersigned. However, as portions of the reply are unique from 

the other claim, and petitioner has not billed for her attorneys’ work on petitioner’s sur-reply, petitioner’s 

request for attorneys’ fees for her work on the reply is not reduced. However, the undersigned may 

reduce the attorneys’ fees sought for additional filings of a similar reply in other cases. 

6 This amount is intended to cover all legal expenses incurred in this matter. This award encompasses all 

charges by the attorney against a client, “advanced costs” as well as fees for legal services rendered. 

Furthermore, § 15(e)(3) prevents an attorney from charging or collecting fees (including costs) that would 

be in addition to the amount awarded herein. See generally Beck v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

924 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir.1991). 
4 

(1) A lump sum of $21,634.62, representing reimbursement for attorneys’ 

fees and costs, in the form of a check payable jointly to petitioner and 

petitioner’s counsel, Conway, Homer & Chin-Caplan, P.C.; and

(2) A lump sum of $400.00, representing reimbursement for petitioner’s 

costs, in the form of a check payable to petitioner, Dvora Ghitza.

 The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance herewith.7

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

s/Nora Beth Dorsey 

 Nora Beth Dorsey 

 Chief Special Master 

 

7 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), entry of judgment can be expedited by the parties’ joint filing of notice 

renouncing the right to seek review.