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Thank you for your assistance

Airpower against an Army Andrews

Challenge and Response in

CENTAF’s Duel with the

Republican Guard

COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Airpower against an Army

Challenge and Response in CENTAF’s

Duel with the Republican Guard

WILLIAM F. ANDREWS

Lt Col, USAF

CADRE Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6610

February 1998
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

ii
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iii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . 3

THE ADVERSARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

THE PLAN: 3 AUGUST 1990–

 15 JANUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

CLASH OF ARMS: 17–26 JANUARY 1991 . . . . . 28

CENTAF ADAPTS: 27 JANUARY–

 5 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

ATTRITION WAR: 6–23 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . 59

GROUND WAR: 24–28 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . 63

THE KEYS TO INNOVATION . . . . . . . . . . . 71

IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Appendix

A Primary USAF Units That Participated . . . . . . 101

B Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

C Location of Air Strikes during

Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

D Distribution of Strikes against

RGFC Heavy Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

v
Page

E Iraqi Prisoner of War Comments . . . . . . . . . 117

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Illustrations

Figure

1 Republican Guard Dispositions in

 CENTAF Kill Boxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2 Section of Tawakalna Division Template . . . . . 31

3 Numerous Revetments Confounded

 CENTAF Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4 Ground Offensive and RGFC Actions . . . . . . . 65

vi
Foreword

In January and February 1991, Central Command Air Forces

(CENTAF) conducted an air-to-ground onslaught against Iraq’s

Republican Guard. The requirements of this operation

conflicted in a number of respects with the US Air Force’s

extended preparations for conflict on a European

battleground. A major case in point involved the low-altitude

tactics CENTAF crews had practiced for the previous decade

and a half, tactics that were manifestly unsuited for the task

that confronted them in Iraq.

This paper was originally submitted as a thesis by Maj (now

lieutenant colonel) William F. Andrews to the faculty of Air

University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies for

completion of graduation requirements, academic year

1995–96. Colonel Andrews’s study, Airpower against an Army:

Challenge and Response in CENTAF’s Duel with the Republican

Guard, examines how CENTAF adjusted air operations against

the Republican Guard to meet the realities of combat.

Initial F-16 and B-52 attacks on the Republican Guard met

little success. In response, CENTAF instituted six significant

tactical innovations in the space of one week: A-10 deep

interdiction, A-10 reconnaissance, F-16 killer scout

operations, F-16 forward basing, F-111 and F-15E tank

plinking, and the use of cockpit videotape as a source for

bomb damage assessment. These innovations required

CENTAF aviators to create new tactics in the midst of combat

operations. Quickly devised and implemented, these new

tactics markedly improved CENTAF’s effectiveness against the

Republican Guard. Critically weakened by air attack, the two

guard divisions that stood and fought were annihilated during

the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm.

As Colonel Andrews makes clear, four factors proved

instrumental in facilitating CENTAF’s rapid adaptation to the

realities of war: (1) air superiority which created a permissive

environment for innovative tactics; (2) open-minded attitudes

vii
of senior commanders which nurtured the growth of new

methods of operation; (3) the faith of senior commanders in

highly motivated and well-trained subordinates which

permitted—and inspired—lower echelon units to find optimal

solutions to complex problems in minimum time; and (4) the

high degree of personal initiative—cultivated on training and

tactics ranges, in classrooms at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada,

and flight briefing rooms across the USAF—which served as

the ultimate sine qua non of the adaptation process. Colonel

Andrews’s study also serves to powerfully reaffirm the

fundamental truth of the old Air Force adage that “flexibility is

the key to airpower.” As we confront an uncertain

international security environment, a fundamental lesson of

Airpower against an Army is that we must encourage flexibility

in peacetime if we are to possess the physical, mental, and

organizational agility that will be required to master the

unforeseen realities of the next war.

I commend Airpower against an Army to anyone seeking to

better understand the capabilities of modern airpower and the

organizational dynamics that profoundly shape the

effectiveness with which it is employed.

MARK S. ORDESS, Col, USAF

Director, Airpower Research Institute

viii
About the Author

Lt Col William F. Andrews (BS, US Air Force Academy; MA,

University of Alabama), a senior pilot with more than 3,500

flying hours, is operations officer of the 389th Fighter

Squadron at Mountain Home Air Force Base (AFB), Idaho.

After receiving his wings at Columbus AFB, Mississippi, he

instructed primary jet training in the T-37. In 1984 he

converted to EF-111s at Mountain Home AFB and was an

EF-111A instructor pilot as well as the squadron chief of

weapons and tactics in the 390th Electronic Combat

Squadron. Colonel Andrews converted to the F-16 in 1989 at

Hahn Air Base (AB), Germany, and served as chief of

programming, flight commander, and assistant operations

officer. On 31 December 1990 he deployed with the 10th

Tactical Fighter Squadron to Al Dhafra AB, United Arab

Emirates, for operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

During Desert Storm, he was a mission commander and flew

35 combat missions over Kuwait and Iraq. On 27 February

1991, while attacking Iraqi ground troops, Colonel Andrews

was forced to eject from a damaged F-16C and was captured

by the Republican Guard. He was held as a prisoner of war

until the end of hostilities. After a three-month convalescence,

he returned to flying status and was reassigned to Luke AFB,

Arizona, where he served as an instructor pilot in F-16 night

attack using the low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared

for night system. In 1995 he was assigned to Headquarters Air

Combat Command (ACC) at Langley AFB, Virginia, where he

directed the ACC Commander’s Action Group. Colonel

Andrews is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and

the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. He is married to the

former Stacey Williams of Colorado Springs, Colorado. They

have three children, Sean, Shannon, and Patrick.

ix
Introduction

For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF)

oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and

training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the

inter-German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful

conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to

operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter

of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions

that had been developed over the previous decade and a half.

The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military

doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting

a fast-paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United

States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to

attack a large, well-fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force.

The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard

Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF’s mission dictated the

need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and

procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did

CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard

to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question

is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation

of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its

operational and tactical performance against the Republican

Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria

used for evaluating innovations.

Although CENTAF conducted operations against a variety of

Iraqi organizations—all requiring some degree of adaptation—

the operations against the Republican Guard are the subject

of this publication for three reasons. First, the Republican

Guard was the most important element of the Iraqi Army

because its defeat guaranteed the defeat of the remainder, and

it captured much of CENTAF’s efforts and attention. Second,

changes to operations against the RGFC provide a significant

case for analyzing wartime adaptation. USAF doctrine that

outlined operations against a land force was based on

assumptions different than those encountered during the

Persian Gulf War. As a result, air operations against the guard

units underwent several changes during the war, validating

1
the need to adapt preconceived tactics and procedures during

war. Third, evaluation of operations against the Republican

Guard is feasible within the limits of a study of this scope.

This study examines the extent to which USAF doctrine

prepared CENTAF for its mission against the Republican

Guard. How closely Air Force doctrine “fit” the situation at

hand provides a baseline for the amount of adaptation

required. This examination of CENTAF’s adaptation identifies

the main elements of the adaptive process, especially those

factors that helped and hindered the process, and the sources

of CENTAF’s innovations. This study is confined to USAF

operations against the Republican Guard within the Kuwaiti

theater of operations (KTO).1 The CENTAF commander (CC), Lt

Gen Charles A. Horner, directed USAF, Navy, Marine, and

allied air units, but the main weight of the air effort against

the RGFC was generated by the United States Air Force. 2

Most documentary evidence was obtained from the USAF

Historical Research Agency (HRA) at Maxwell Air Force Base

(AFB), Alabama. Its extensive collection of documents and

briefing slides was only partially usable due to the secret

classification assigned to most of the Gulf War materials.

Some declassified excerpts are reproduced in the Gulf War Air

Power Survey (GWAPS), which also provides important Gulf

War statistical data. Personal accounts in professional

military journals were useful additional sources. Much

business during the war was conducted via telephone, with

little documentation. Personal interviews, therefore, were an

important source of information. Because this study deals

with ideas and their origins, some uncertainty exists seven

years after the fact.

The discussion that follows examines the theoretical basis

for adaptation during war, definitions, and criteria to evaluate

innovations. The theory is followed by a description of the

combatants, their doctrines, and the USAF’s plan for defeating

the Republican Guard. The ensuing narrative of the first 10

days of air attacks on the RGFC suggests CENTAF saw the

need to adapt. The subsequent section describes several major

innovations that were incorporated into the air campaign. A

relatively static period followed, culminating in the ground war

CADRE PAPER

2
that subjected USAF efforts against the Republican Guard to a

final audit.

The conclusions—springing from one specific set of

conditions—may not apply to all situations in the future. One

other significant limitation is that a true measurement of

effectiveness against guard units cannot be known without

Iraqi assistance and, even with that, Iraqi knowledge of the

status of their own forces is questionable. Iraqi defector and

prisoner of war (POW) debriefings would help, but these

reports are classified and cannot be cited.

The Innovation Imperative

I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever

doctrine the armed forces are working on now, they have

got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not

matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is

their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment

arrives.

—Sir Michael Howard

Innovations bridge the gaps that separate doctrines

developed in peacetime from the realities of war. They range

from minor modifications of existing procedures to

fundamental changes that establish entirely new methods.

They should be evaluated in terms of timeliness and

effectiveness.

Military doctrines and practices established in peacetime

are designed to meet the anticipated challenges of war. Based

on past experiences and a vision of how future conflict should

be fought, a military organization’s doctrine is “a codified and

sanctioned body of propositions related to war and conflict”

that link theory and practice.3 By serving as a point of

departure for all of a service’s activities, doctrine defines how

that service intends to fight, how it will be organized, and with

what weapons it will fight.

A military organization’s practices are equal in importance

to its doctrine because methods exercised in peacetime result

in the formulation of common perceptions of how war should

and will be waged in the future by those who will do the

ANDREWS

3
fighting. Peacetime training forms patterns and establishes

standard operating procedures. Doctrine and practices have

an interactive relationship, each taking the lead at times and

producing change in the other.

The reality of war will differ from that which is anticipated

in peacetime. This realization stems from an inability to

predict adequately the continuing multitudinous changes that

influence the conduct of war.4 Technological changes are

especially problematic, as those who formulate doctrine may

not recognize technical opportunities or imperatives until it is

too late. Doctrines based on experience may fail due to altered

circumstances, while those based on theory may fail due to

lack of feedback.5 American military doctrine is especially

vulnerable to being undermined by invalidated assumptions

because we are hard-pressed to identify accurately our next

opponent.

Doctrine and practices must change to meet the demands of

the new realities encountered on the field of battle. Military

adaptation during war is the process by which a military

institution modifies its methods to meet the changing

requirements of the wartime environment. This process of

military adaptation involves a form of organizational learning

through which military institutions change in response to

experience and find more effective or efficient methods of

waging war. Success may be possible without adaptation but

will come at an increased cost in terms of time, treasure, or

blood.6 Conversely, useful adaptation does not guarantee

success. The German Army, for example, adapted well to the

realities of World War I and World War II battlefields, yet

Germany lost both wars. “First-rate operational and tactical

performance is a virtue to be sought by those responsible for

military forces,” stated Lt Gen John H. Cushman. 7 Adaptation

is required to achieve first-rate performance.

One product of adaptation in war is military innovation: a

change that deviates from doctrine or practices established in

peacetime. Stephen P. Rosen distinguishes between

peacetime, wartime, and technological innovations and the

unique challenges of each.8 By acknowledging the importance

of each, this study concentrates on tactical innovation during

war.

CADRE PAPER

4
The amount of innovation required is dependent on how

closely established doctrine and procedures match battlefield

realities. A wing trained and equipped to wage

intercontinental nuclear war sent to fight guerrillas is likely to

require more extensive innovations to succeed than a unit

trained to perform close air support (CAS). 9 Wartime

innovations can be categorized as minor, major, or

fundamental and are easily thought of in terms of modified

methods. Rosen, however, emphasizes the possibility of

adopting altered military objectives as an innovation. 10

Blending the two criteria, I consider a minor innovation to be

a modification of existing methods towards an anticipated

objective. Improving tactical formations to maximize visual

search within the context of an existing mission is an example

of a tactical innovation. A major innovation is the substitution

of existing or modified methods in unexpected combinations

towards an anticipated or modified objective. The use of the U S

Army (USA) Apache and USAF special operations helicopters

to attack the Iraqi early warning system the first night of

Operation Desert Storm is one such unexpected combination.

A fundamental innovation is the replacement of existing

methods with unprecedented methods or the replacement of

an existing objective with an entirely new objective. The

change in the objective of Eighth Air Force’s long-range

fighters from protecting the bombers to seeking out and

attacking Luftwaffe fighters as a means to enable strategic

bombing attacks is one such replacement of objective. 11

Innovations are judged in terms of effectiveness and

timeliness. An innovation is effective if it improves operational

progress towards the objective, while saving time, manpower,

or materiel, or if it produces enhanced results with an equal

expenditure of resources. An innovation that yields little

change in effectiveness is of limited value. An innovation is

timely if it takes effect within the planned campaign schedule.

Subjective consideration, however, must be given to

unnecessary losses of materiel, manpower, or time during the

interval required to implement the innovation. Because an

adversary’s adaptive process will attempt to negate one’s

actions, there are advantages of one’s own adaptive process

being faster than the enemy’s. “The advantage goes to the side

ANDREWS

5
which can most quickly adjust itself to the new and unfamiliar

environment and learn from its mistakes.”12

There appears to be a tension, however, between the

breadth and timeliness of an innovation. In order to limit

enemy ability to react to an innovation, delayed but

widespread implementation may be more beneficial than a

very rapid piecemeal change. One example of a premature

innovation was the first British tank attack at the Somme,

which allowed the Germans time to develop countermeasures

and sacrificed the potential surprise of a mass tank attack. 13

Attacks against command and control (C2) nodes may relieve

some of this scale-timeliness tension by decreasing the enemy

capability to detect, analyze, and react to innovations.

Because innovations are the offspring of unique

circumstances, they are unlikely to be of permanent value.

The process of adaptation, however, may yield insights that

could facilitate the formulation of future innovations.

Cushman divides military responses (adaptation) into insight

and execution; it appears beneficial to disaggregate the

process further in order to better identify the elements

necessary for successful adaptation.

An operable system of C2 is assumed to be a necessary

element of the adaptation process, otherwise adaptation takes

place randomly. There are several alternative models of C 2,

but the observe-orient-decide-act cycle (OODA loop) identified

by Col John R. Boyd is one of the most widely recognized, and

it does a credible job approximating reality. 14 The OODA

loop—which divides C2 into separate functions of observe,

orient, decide, act—appears to be useful for identifying

elements of adaptation.15 All four functions are normally

required for effective C2 and appear to be required for effective

adaptation. No function, however, is easily accomplished in

wartime. Each step of the process must surmount formidable

obstacles. If a step is obstructed, innovation is unlikely.

Likewise, a series of impediments could have a cumulative

effect on the entire system and prevent adaptation.

Observation describes the gathering of data regarding the

status of enemy and friendly forces, the battlefield, or other

significant areas of interest. Observation must be continuous.

Before battle is joined, it is needed for the formulation of

CADRE PAPER

6
plans; once fighting begins, observation is needed to detect

the new reality that results from the initial battle and enemy

reactions. It may also include surveillance by a variety of

sensors, subordinate units, or individuals and has often

included direct observation of the battle by the commander.

Observation is a necessary element of adaptation because it is

required to detect changed or unanticipated realities of the

battlefield. Observation is an indispensable precondition of

accurate orientation, the next step in the OODA process.

Helmuth von Moltke recognized the need for observation and

decreed that “the most precise possible knowledge of the

situation is an absolute prerequisite for giving correct and

appropriate orders.”16

There are considerable obstacles to effective observation

and, therefore, to adaptation. By labeling many intelligence

reports in war as contradictory, false, or uncertain, Carl von

Clausewitz adopts a pessimistic view of the commander’s

ability to penetrate the uncertainties of war. 17 Limitations of

intelligence collection systems can be compounded by active

measures employed by a thinking adversary to confound

accurate observation. If the enemy is successful, adaptation is

unlikely because the need to change is unlikely to be

perceived. Rosen shares Clausewitz’s pessimism on the ability

to gather needed information: “Intelligence relevant to

innovation very likely will not be available in wartime, and

wartime innovation is likely to be limited in its impact.” 18

Orientation describes the translation of data into useful

information; its product is the organization’s perception of

reality. Boyd considered orientation the most important part

of the OODA loop: “Orientation is the schwerpunkt. It shapes

the way we interact with the environment—hence orientation

shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we

act.”19 Analysis and synthesis of an organization’s

observations should contribute to the formulation of insights

into difficulties experienced on the battlefield.20 With the

formulation of these vital insights, the need to adapt can be

perceived. Orientation is a necessary element of adaptation

and must result in the perception that a need or opportunity

exists to improve performance. Adaptation can be expected as

a response to the challenges of war, but it may also spring

ANDREWS

7
from the realization that an opportunity to achieve enhanced

results exists. Chance events that improve performance may

be observed, and if perceived as favorable, the decision to

incorporate them can be made.

The synthesis of imperfect reports from a variety of sources

is difficult from both the organizational and the personal

perspectives. Martin van Creveld clearly illustrated the many

organizational obstacles faced by military staffs in handling

the increased information available (and required) to wage

war, thus labeling them information pathologies.21 Affirming

van Creveld’s findings is a 1992 article on Desert Storm that

noted organizational blind spots due to information overload

and undue attention given to particular forms of

information.22 Personal obstacles to accurate orientation are

equally formidable, including “superficial thinking . . . selfsatisfaction, complacency, and arrogance.”23 Emotions that

spring from war can cloud the mind in what Clausewitz

referred to as a “psychological fog” obstructing “clear and

complete insights.”24

Decision describes the formulation of courses of action

(COA) and their selection. At this point alternative solutions

are evaluated and optimal solutions selected. The formulation

of new solutions is contingent on the participant’s ability to

imagine and articulate new options. It is the role of the

organization to cultivate, encourage, and recognize valuable

solutions. It then falls on the commander to decide whether or

not to implement new solutions, or to delegate sufficient

freedom of action to make such decisions at lower levels. The

cultivation of ideas and the decisions to implement them are

necessary for adaptation. Intuition, creativity, and imagination

are all individual characteristics of the commander, his staff,

and subordinates that can lead to the initiation of an

innovation. For a proposed innovation to have an effect it

must be implemented, which hinges on the decision of

someone in a position of authority.

Obstacles to formulating or selecting appropriate COAs

include a lack of flexibility in the mind of the commander, lack

of flexibility in doctrine (dogma), or lack of organizational

flexibility. Commanders who believe they have all the answers

can be a tremendous obstacle to innovation: Sir Douglas Haig is

CADRE PAPER

8
widely viewed as the epitome of inflexible thinking. One

biographer notes that “before the war, Haig was quite sure he

had uncovered all the rules of war. He was equally certain

that these rules had to be accepted as dogma and not

weakened by debate.”25 Rigid military hierarchies or

organizations can restrict the flow of ideas either through many

levels of command or restricted means of communication. For

organizations with the requisite flexibility, anticipated costs of

implementation may give sufficient cause for rejection of a

potential innovation. All aspects of a potential innovation may

not be beneficial; a gain in one area may penalize anoth er.

Action describes the implementation of plans (i.e., combat

operations), although it may also entail changes to

organizations, procedures, or equipment. Although it may be

easy to concentrate attention to only the actions of one’s

military forces and the effects of their activities on the enemy,

there is another important dimension of action. Every decision

must be transmitted through the organization in order for it to

be implemented. Planning, coordination, training, and

execution are all part of the process.

If innovations are not successfully implemented, the

adaptive process fails. Ultimately, it is the output of the

process of adaptation, the modified method itself, that will

interact with the changing wartime environment. It is

here—when actions are implemented—that innovations affect

the system and should be graded for effectiveness and

timeliness. It should be noted, however, that innovations

cannot be graded without further observation and orientation.

The difficulties encountered while carrying out plans during

war constitute a considerable impediment to adaptation and

include poor communications, inadequate understanding of

orders, inflexible attitudes, or imperfect execution. Labeled

friction by Clausewitz, these myriad difficulties combine to

turn war into “a medium that impedes activity” which must be

overcome by “iron will-power.”26 There is also the danger that

an innovation may exceed the unit’s ability to carry it out.

Timothy T. Lupfer’s examination of the German tactical

adaptation in the First World War noted the Germans were

attentive to their army’s ability to perform because “ an army

that adopts tactical doctrine that it cannot apply will greatly

ANDREWS

9
multiply its misfortune.”27 Excessive caution, on the other

hand can be equally costly. Overly concerned with the ability

of its crews to execute complex tactics, Strategic Air Command

(SAC) headquarters dictated predictable tactics during the

first days of Operation Linebacker II, increasing risk to the

bomber crews and perhaps suffering unnecessary losses. 28

In a large military organization, numerous individuals and

subunits accomplish part or all of the functions described.

Discrete functions or the entire process may be accompl ished at

more than one echelon simultaneously. Since observation and

action responsibilities are normally clearly defined, this study

considers two questions: At what level are innovations

developed? At what level does the orientation and decision take

place?

There are three potential hypotheses: top-down, bottom-up,

or a combination of the two. A top-down process involves a

headquarters staff (at the theater or possibly national level)

that analyzes reports from the field, develops innovations

(possibly by refining suggestions from subunits) and

disseminates them to the command. This process was used by

the German Army to adapt tactical doctrine to realities of the

western front in World War I, and the Red Army to find a

suitable operational doctrine against the Wehrmacht during

World War II.29 Both involved orderly, centralized processes

that disseminated changes uniformly across the theater. The

drawbacks to centralized change are that it is potentially less

responsive to immediate requirements, nor is it well suited for

handling unique local conditions.

Bottom-up adaptation starts at the tactical unit level.

Innovations are developed quickly in response to immediate

problems and tactical units then advise headquarters.

Headquarters then advises other units of ideas and lessons

learned. During World War II, the US Army used bottom-up

adaptation to adjust tactics to conditions encountered in the

campaigns for France and Germany, capitalizing on “Yankee

ingenuity . . . a hallmark of U.S. commercial production and

manufacturing . . . that also accompanies [American] soldiers

to the battlefield.”30 Bottom-up adaptations, it is argued, are

more responsive to local conditions and better suited where

incremental changes are desirable.31 The decentralized

CADRE PAPER

10
approach, however, is not well suited when fundamental

changes are required or situations are beyond unit

capabilities to handle.32

There is the possibility of a third option, which is that

innovations originate from both sources and flow both

directions. Theoretically, this arrangement could permit

fundamental or widespread adaptations to be directed from

above, yet permit tactical units the flexibility to quickly adapt

to immediate needs. This possibility would require

organizational flexibility of the headquarters as it would be

required to perform both advisory and directive functions. A

means to resolve conflicting guidance might also be required.

To recapitulate, issues to consider in examining the attack

on the Republican Guard are what was USAF prewar doctrine;

how much adaptation was required to cope with the realities

of war; how effective and timely were CENTAF’s innovations,

what facilitated or hindered adaptation, and from where did

changes originate? Because Operation Desert Storm pitted the

USAF directly against the Republican Guard, it is important to

describe these opposing forces.

The Adversaries

On 3 August 1990, the Iraqi armed forces conducted an

overwhelming combined arms assault on Kuwait. Iraqi ground

units penetrated deep into Kuwait, reaching Kuwait City in

less than five hours. The Kuwaiti armed forces collapsed, the

government fled to Saudi Arabia, and the country was

completely overrun within two days.

The Iraqi units that conducted the assault were divisions of

Iraq’s Republican Guard Forces Command. The ground attack

was spearheaded by Iraq’s most capable combat formations:

the Hammurabi and Medinah Armored Divisions and the

Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division. Three heliborne

brigades of the RGFC Special Forces division supported the

armored onslaught with a vertical envelopment south of

Kuwait City. Behind the lead divisions, four Republican Guard

infantry divisions were committed to mop up remaining

Kuwaiti resistance.33

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The Republican Guard

The Republican Guard’s utility as a military force is evident

in its origins, equipment, functions, and doctrine. The RGFC

began as a brigade-sized praetorian guard formed shortly after

Saddam Hussein’s 1968 coup. The unit was formed by

combining the most loyal Baathists serving in the Iraqi Army

and was sustained by recruits from Saddam Hussein’s

hometown of Tikrit.34 Although not used in the September

1980 invasion of Iran, the Republican Guard was committed

to the bloody battle for Khorramshahr in October and

thereafter saw intermittent action as a “fire brigade” along the

southern front.35 By 1986 the Republican Guard had

expanded to five brigades, the bulk of which were committed

to an ill-fated counterattack on the Al-Faw peninsula. 36 This

Iraqi defeat has been convincingly described as the turning

point of the Iran-Iraq War, the catalyst for a shift from the

static defensive strategy to an offensive strategy that would

ultimately end the war.37 Guard recruiting was expanded to

include previously deferred university students, and guard

formations soon grew to 25 brigades.38 These units were

extensively trained in offensive combined arms tactics,

signifying a major departure from the static-defensive

mind-set gripping the rest of the Iraqi Army. Committed to a

series of well-planned, set-piece offensives from April to

August of 1988, these Republican Guard formations quickly

swept away depleted Iranian formations, helping to bring

decision to long-stalemated battlefields and a brief peace to

the northern Persian Gulf.

The Republican Guard formations were equipped with Iraq’s

best and most modern equipment. While regular heavy

divisions were primarily equipped with obsolescent T-55, type

59, and T-62 tanks, guard heavy divisions were equipped with

the “well-known and very capable” T-72.39 Reflecting their

offensive and mobile orientation, RGFC heavy divisions were

equipped with modern Soviet built self-propelled artillery in

addition to towed weapons that equipped the remainder of the

Iraqi Army. Air defense artillery units assigned to guard

divisions were more robust than regular army units, as some

operated radar-guided SA-6 batteries in addition to the

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normal infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and

antiaircraft artillery (AAA) systems.40 Additionally, the RGFC

maintained an independent supply system and enjoyed

priority for all supplies.41

Western impressions of the Republican Guard were shaped

by its offensive role in 1988, elevated reputation, and robust

tables of organization and equipment. Although rightly

acknowledging it as Iraq’s best, many writers overestimated

the abilities of the Republican Guard. Analogies have been

made in US military writings between the RGFC and

Napoleon’s Old Guard, or Hitler’s politico-military elite, the

Waffen SS. Oft-touted as an elite force hardened by years of

battle, proud of the “fire brigade” role, “possessing excellent

reactive abilities,” and “the world’s most seasoned [troops] in

carrying out assaults preceded by chemical attack,” guard

formations gained a fearsome reputation.42 Indeed, when

compared to the armed forces of Iraq’s neighbors, the

Republican Guard was the most powerful military

organization in the Persian Gulf region.

An evaluation of the Republican Guard must be balanced

by an examination of Iraqi military doctrine, which reveals

major shortcomings. Despite the guard’s offensive successes

of 1988 and 1990, some important limitations have been

illuminated by several authors. Republican Guard tactical

successes were largely set-piece affairs, hinging on extensive

planning, logistics stockpiling, and rehearsals. After 1987 all

guard offensives were conducted against vastly weaker forces:

Iranian formations encountered in 1988 were debilitated by

the failed Karbala offensives of 1987 and collapsing civilian

morale.43 Kuwaiti armed forces were taken by surprise in

1990, only one brigade of which opposed the RGFC as the

bulk of the Kuwaiti forces were overrun in garrison.

Republican Guard tactical doctrine was probably strongly

shaped by (if not identical to) regular army tactical doctrine.

The only significant tank battle the Iraqis fought was a static

defense against a grossly mishandled Iranian armored division

in January 1981. The Iranian division blundered into an Iraqi

antitank kill zone piecemeal (over the period of three days)

and was obliterated.44 An excellent analysis by Col Wallace

Franz, USA, Retired, further emphasized the likelihood of a

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static Iraqi strategy because the army had been molded by its

eight years of fighting a “war of position, tied to fortifications,

communications nets, against a low-tech enemy.” Iraqi officers

were inexperienced at handling large mechanized formations in

mobile operations and would be unable to “think rapidly” or

“improvise in the heat of battle” due to Iraqi political preferences

for loyalty over independent thought or initiative.45

Despite doctrinal shortcomings, the Republican Guard

contained the most potent and best equipped units in the

Iraqi Army, marking it as an important operational center of

gravity (COG) in the campaign to liberate Kuwait. As the

offensive arm of the Iraqi Army and the most potent military

force in the region, the Republican Guard was also a strategic

COG, a powerful military instrument of coercion or decision.

The Republican Guard also played an important political role.

Guard units were the most overt element of the Baath Party’s

control over the country. The superior equipment operated by

the Republican Guard units ensured that they would be well

equipped to defeat potentially rebellious regular army units.

An RGFC mechanized division was stationed in Baghdad

throughout the Gulf War, a visible and powerful deterrent to

potential mutineers. Additionally, four RGFC infantry

divisions, not committed to the KTO, were formed during the

war to provide internal security.46 Guard units were believed

to have been involved in the suppression of dissent before the

Gulf War, and surviving elements were reported to have

participated in the suppression of the Shia and Kurdish

revolts after the war. Top US military commanders, Gen Colin

L. Powell and Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf correctly perceived

the Republican Guard as operational and strategic COGs,

perceptions that profoundly affected US planning.

Although there were seven Republican Guard divisions

deployed in the KTO, the three guard heavy divisions that

spearheaded the Kuwait invasion captured the interest of the

theater commander in chief (CINC). These three divisions were

emplaced along the Kuwait-Iraq border as a theater reserve.

The remaining four divisions were infantry formations

entrenched in an east-west line between the heavy units and

the Euphrates River.

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The guard divisions used the five-month lull between the

invasion of Kuwait and the coalition counteroffensive to

prepare vast defensive positions. The units were widely

dispersed and deeply entrenched. Engineers prepared

thousands of horseshoe-shaped berms to protect individual

vehicles. Personnel were protected by shallow five- to 10-man

bunkers.47 Units were stocked with up to 30 days of

provisions, and the Guard Corps straddled a huge fortified

corps-sized depot and logistics area.48

Iraqi intentions for the use of the RGFC were unclear to

coalition commanders. Once the threat of an invasion of Saudi

Arabia subsided, it was widely believed the Republican Guard

divisions would be held in reserve and then committed to

repulse coalition ground units depleted by battles with the

first and second Iraqi echelons.49 This mission—counterattack—

would be similar to much of the guard’s experience in the

Iran-Iraq War; heavy air attack, however, would be a new

experience for a force that had always enjoyed air superiority.

The United States Air Force

The USAF waged an intense air-to-ground battle against the

Republican Guard for 43 days; its ability to conduct this

battle was shaped by prewar doctrine, training, and

equipment. Doctrine provided the basis for many USAF

weapons system acquisitions and, within the context of the

European NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario, shaped Air Force

tactics throughout the 1980s.

“The [US] Air Force has articulated aerospace doctrine at

different levels and depths of detail in the forms of basic,

operational, and tactical doctrine.”50 Basic USAF doctrine, as

established in Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace

Doctrine of the United States Air Force, anticipated the attack

on the Republican Guard in the broadest sense. Air operations

to “attack the enemy in depth” were considered an “imperative

of effectively employing aerospace forces” by the authors of the

1984 version of AFM 1-1.51 More explicitly, air commanders

were urged to exploit airpower’s “devastating firepower” to

disrupt enemy momentum and “place his surface forces at

risk” with attacks on enemy forces in “reserve or rear

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echelons.”52 Such attacks fell under the category of air

interdiction (AI), which was intended to “delay, disrupt, divert,

or destroy an enemy’s military potential before it [could] be

brought to bear broadly against friendly forces.” 53 Although

attacks on distant ground units have always been a subset of

interdiction, they are considered to be best accomplished

along lines of communication (LOC) when ground units are

moving and vulnerable to air attack.54

Official operational-level doctrine was completely unsuitable

for preparing USAF units for the attack on the Republican

Guard because it focused entirely on enemy LOC. Prescribing

attacks to disrupt the flow of “personnel, supplies, and

equipment . . . required to sustain the enemy’s war effort,”

AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations—Counter Air, Close Air

Support, and Air Interdiction, was written in 1969 and reflected

contemporary interdiction efforts being used in Southeast

Asia.55 Elusive enemy forces were not considered to be a

suitable target for interdiction. Instead, interdiction efforts

were directed against LOC, enemy concentration points,

supply stockpiles, and reconstitution facilities.56 AFM 2-1

described the protracted interdiction battle waged over the Ho

Chi Minh Trail. After Vietnam, however, the possibility of a

rapid Soviet blitzkrieg across Western Europe threatened to

render this mode of interdiction less than optimal.

Semiofficial operational doctrine developed in the early

1980s had a much more profound effect in shaping the Air

Force that would counter the Republican Guard in 1991.

Developed in response to political requirements for increased

conventional capability against growing Warsaw Pact

conventional capability, the USAF’s Tactical Air Command

(TAC) and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) developed the joint operational concept of joint

attack of the second echelon (J-SAK). Published in 1982,

J-SAK was an important adjunct to the US Army’s AirLand

Battle doctrine. J-SAK was semiofficial doctrine because its

approving official, Gen W. L. Creech, TAC commander, could

not speak for the entire USAF, nor was TAC a war-fighting

command: Its role was to provide forces for the theater

commanders in chief. TAC Pamphlet 50-26 (J-SAK) described

a deep battle against second echelon units that was intended

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to provide time and space for ground commanders to win the

close battle being waged with the first echelon.

J-SAK was designed against the specific threat of echeloned

attack posed by Soviet tactical doctrine. Echeloned attacks

would “attempt to retain the initiative by maintaining

momentum and rapidly exploiting the success of . . . first

echelon forces.”57 Although TAC Pamphlet 50-26 briefly noted

the possibility of countering a US-type reserve force vice a

Soviet-style second echelon, virtually all other discussion

focuses on defeating the Soviet model. Key elements of the

Soviet doctrine included a fast-paced attack by a numerically

superior enemy, continuous operations to sustain initiative and

momentum, and the reinforcement of success until the enemy is

defeated.58 Second echelon targets included “combat forces, their

support elements, as well as lines of communication.”59

Follow-on forces attack (FOFA) was a similar doctrine

approved by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Defense Planning Committee in November 1984.60 Beginning

in late 1979, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

(SHAPE) staff developed FOFA to bolster the alliance’s

conventional capability against Soviet offensive doctrine and a

“continuing massive Soviet conventional forces build-up.”61

Closely related to J-SAK, FOFA was more authoritative and

prescriptive, but geographically limited to NATO’s theater of

operations. FOFA was designed to attack enemy forces “from

just behind the troops in contact to as far into the enemy’s

rear as our target acquisition and conventional weapons

systems will permit.”62

The aim of J-SAK and FOFA (hereafter combined and

referred to as deep air attack) was to delay, disrupt, or destroy

second echelon mechanized units. This operational concept

optimized airpower’s ability to impose an “intractable

dilemma” on the enemy commander: if the second echelon

attempted to advance rapidly (as Soviet doctrine prescribed), it

would be vulnerable to air attack. If advancing forces took

defensive precautions against the air threat (through dispersal

and camouflage), they would be unable to maintain a rapid

rate of movement.63 Maximizing the advantages of

synchronized air and ground efforts, deep air attack principles

resonated with many airmen.

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17
Despite J-SAK’s authoritative limitation and FOFA’s

geographical limitation, the combination of the two had a

powerful impact on USAF equipment and tactics. Based in

part on emerging weapon and sensor technologies, deep air

attack generated the requirement to develop several weapons

systems that would eventually be used against the Republican

Guard. The most pressing need was to develop sensors

capable of looking deep behind enemy lines and detecting

advancing second echelon forces. Joint surveillance target

attack radar system (JSTARS) was the USA/USAF solution; its

powerful radar was capable of tracking moving vehicles over

wide areas of the battlefield or examining selected fixed sites

in a narrower mapping mode.64 Another capable radar,

advanced synthetic aperture radar system (ASARS) II, was

fielded on the TR-1 aircraft, and dedicated downlink and

command and control systems were deployed to take

advantage of the real-time imagery available.65

The USAF and the USA fielded several air-to-ground delivery

systems that enabled deep air attack, including the F-15E

long-range interdiction aircraft, F-16C fighter-bombers

equipped with radar capable of tracking moving vehicles, and

night navigation and targeting systems—low-altitude navigation

targeting and infrared for night (LANTIRN). Advanced

antiarmor weapons developed and deployed during the 1980s

included the imaging infrared (IIR) AGM-65D Maverick mi ssile,

an advanced cluster bomb—the CBU-87 combined effects

munition (CEM), and an air scattered antitank and antipersonnel mine—the CBU-89 Gator. Army systems included

the multiple launcher rocket system (MLRS), Army tactical

missile system (ATACMS), and Apache attack helicopter.

Employment of these weapons systems is described in

USAF tactical doctrine.66 Tactical doctrine outlines a broad

range of tactical considerations in the three-series multicommand manuals (MCM). There are separate volumes for

each type of combat aircraft, a general planning volume, and

an enemy threat volume.67 Standardized volume outlines and

chapter headings result in the consideration of a wide variety

of potential missions. Tactical considerations described in

these volumes are not prescriptive but are intended to

“stimulate thinking.”68 MCM manuals “consolidate tactical

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considerations learned from past armed conflicts, operational

evaluations, training exercises, tactics development programs,

and analyses of the threat.”69 Updated on a 24-month cycle,

MCM 3-1, Tactical Doctrine: Tactical Employment—F-16, is a

living document reflecting tactical thoughts of the combat air

forces. Each volume encourages “personal initiative and

innovative thinking . . . to improve our combat capability” and

challenges “all echelons of the combat air forces” to “build and

expand on these tactics.”70

MCM 3-1 discusses the best available thoughts on a variety

of potential missions. Its scope, however, is too wide to guide

Air Force training and preparations; finite training resources

and time limitations force tactical units to make choices and

establish training priorities within 3-1’s repertoire. Although

headquarters staffs determine minimum semiannual training

events for combat crews, the real tactical emphasis is

determined within a flying squadron by the combined efforts

of the commander, operations officer, flight commanders, and

weapons officer. Normally following general guidance provided

by the squadron commander, flight leaders conceive

hypothetical scenarios, determine tactics, and evaluate

performance during routine training missions. Although

Pacific-based squadrons had a Korean orientation, most other

TAC and United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) squadrons

were focused on the European scenario and prepared for it

throughout the 1980s. All but one of the USAF wings that

participated in Operation Desert Storm had formal tasking for

the European theater in the event of war. 71

The bulk of TAC’s tactical training was geared towards

executing deep air attack in the European environment. The

Air Force’s premier training program, Red Flag, emphasized

deep interdiction in large gorilla formations to counter highthreat environment.72 The exception was USAF CAS training,

for A-10 wings, which concentrated attention on high-threat,

low-altitude employment along the front lines to support an

Army pressured by large enemy mechanized units. Many

crews were exposed to flying in Europe during overseas

assignments or frequent training deployments to European

bases (Checkered Flag deployments). TAC’s only fighter wing

free from European tasking, the 363d Tactical Fighter Wing

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(TFW), shared the remainder of TAC’s tactical vision. Wing

training focused on low-altitude deep attacks against a Soviet

mechanized thrust into north Iran.73 Virtually all air-toground training throughout the tactical air forces (TAF)

involved low-level navigation and weapons deliveries, which

were required for survival on the high-threat battlefields of

central Europe and for target acquisition which could be

impaired by low European ceilings.74

Despite its Eurocentric orientation, the USAF’s philosophy

guiding weapons acquisition and training built in considerable

flexibility. Most of the USAF’s air-to-ground weapons systems

were designed to perform several missions in a variety of

environments (high- or low-altitude attack, in day or night).

The swing-role F-15E and F-16 are prime examples. They

were well equipped with highly capable radars able to function

in air-to-air or air-to-ground modes and the latest air-to-air

and air-to-ground munitions, and they comprised most of

CENTAF’s fighter force. CENTAF’s B-52 bombers had proven

their flexibility long before Desert Storm. Specialized fighter

aircraft were present in more limited numbers. The F-111 was

optimized for night low-altitude interdiction, and the A-10 was

designed for day low-level CAS. Both, however, proved

versatile enough to operate in unanticipated environments.

The major exception was the F-117 stealth fighter: with its

highly specialized role of night precision penetration and

limited bomb load, it had limited utility in other missions.

USAF munitions were another key to flexibility. Radar fuses

permitted all-altitude employment of cluster bombs, while

guidance kits of US laser-guided bombs permitted a wide

range of delivery options.75 Flexible USAF weapons and

munitions characteristics were of major significance because

they allowed a considerable margin for error in tactical

doctrine or practices.

Realistic and demanding training allowed USAF crews to

accomplish unanticipated tasks in unexpected situations.

Day-to-day training of aircrews emphasized tactical

employment in realistic scenarios developed by flight leaders.

Frequent multiunit exercises and composite force training

with dissimilar aircraft (such as that done at Red Flag) built

familiarity with other systems and enabled crews to solve

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different tactical problems. Nellis Air Force Base (AFB),

Nevada, home of the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center (TFWC),

played a key role in the training of these combat aircrews. Red

Flag is a recurring training exercise conducted at Nellis AFB to

expose crews to the most realistic combat environment

possible; it provides an opportunity to solve difficult tactical

problems in a controlled environment. Adversaries for Red

Flag exercises were often provided by the Aggressor

Squadrons, two specialized units that simulated Soviet

tactics. The Fighter Weapons School (FWS), also located at

Nellis, is a graduate-level tactics school that cultivates

aggressive problem solving in a select group of USAF crews.

FWS students are required to solve a wide variety of

demanding tactical problems throughout the course. Once

back in their squadrons, FWS graduates (called patch wearers

or target arms due to the distinctive patches awarded at

graduation) provide a foundation of tactical know-how and

problem solving within the unit. The thinking, teaching, and

flying conducted at this center would have a powerful

influence on USAF conduct in the Gulf War.

Both forces were products of their times and experiences:

the Iraqi Army was a product of the static war of attrition with

Iran, US forces were products of the cold war. Neither had

tactical doctrines that adequately anticipated the Gulf War.

USAF training, flexible weapons systems, and a core belief

that “flexibility is the key to airpower” provided a sizable

margin for errors in USAF doctrine.

The Plan

3 August 1990–15 January 1991

I want the Republican Guard bombed the very first day,

and I want them bombed every day after that. They’re the

heart and soul of this army and therefore they will pay the

price.

—Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf

The plan against the Republican Guard was the product of

several organizations that included elements of attrition, interdiction, and psychological operations (PSYOP). Three groups

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planned air operations involving the Republican Guard. The

Air Staff’s Checkmate branch provided support to planners in

the theater. CENTAF’s special planning group (commonly

called the Black Hole) concentrated on offensive operations to

eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, while CENTAF’s Combat Plans

staff made defensive preparations to stop an Iraqi invasion of

Saudi Arabia. The initial Air Force plan, developed by Col

John A. Warden’s III Checkmate staff, concentrated on

strategic targets deep in Iraq in an attempt to coerce the Iraqis

from Kuwait.76 Upon receiving the plan, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff Powell insisted that the USAF include

operations against Iraqi armored units, demanding “smoking

tanks as kilometer fence posts all the way to Baghdad.” 77

Days later the theater CINC, General Schwarzkopf, identified

the Republican Guard as an Iraqi COG and directed the air

planners to incorporate operations against them in a

four-phased theater air campaign plan.78 Operations against

the Republican Guard were concentrated in the third phase

(attacks on the Iraqi Army) that would follow strategic air efforts

(phase I) and a short operation to secure air superiority over

Kuwait (phase II). Phase IV, a ground attack into Iraq and

Kuwait, would hinge on the satisfactory completion of phas e III.

In the early stages of planning, there was no explicit

statement of phase III objectives. This void resulted in

confusion and varying expectations of what phase III would

accomplish. Draft briefing slides from late August list the

objectives as: “reduce Iraqi ground force capability, soften

ground forces to assure successful penetration and

exploitation . . . destroy Republican Guard capability to

reinforce into Kuwait.”79 Two months later, the objective of

phase III was listed in briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

president as simply “attrit [sic] enemy ground forces.”80 The

following month on 14 November, phase III was briefed by

General Schwarzkopf to his senior commanders as “battlefield

preparation.”81 The groups that planned the phase III

operations appear to have focused their thoughts on rendering

the Republican Guard “combat ineffective” through attacks on

several systems (infrastructure, logistics, C2) and direct

attrition of maneuver units.82 Encouraging calculations

regarding airpower’s potential to attrite the Iraqi Army led

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some planners to adopt “destroy” the Republican Guard as a

goal of phase III.83 This goal appears to have been overly

ambitious and did not serve airpower in the long run because

other positive aspects of airpower’s effects on ground forces

were eclipsed.

Air Staff planners developed early plans to destroy the

entire Iraqi Army in the KTO. Analysts studied the Iraqi Army

and planned to exploit the vulnerabilities of an army arrayed

in the desert. Operations would begin with attacks against key

systems that would affect all Iraqi forces in the theater

(command and control, logistics, air defense), continue with

attrition of the Republican Guard, then shift to the rest of the

Iraqi Army. Much of the planning was quantitative in nature,

using computer models and spreadsheets.84 The Checkmate

calculations considered multiple quantitative and qualitative

factors. Quantifications included munitions available in the

theater, aircraft numbers, sortie rates, target types, objectives,

and expected success per sortie (based on Saber Selector, an

advanced computer program modeling weapons deliveries).

The product of these calculations was a graph that predicted

an impressive and rapid attrition of the Iraqi forces in the KTO

when subjected to concentrated air attacks. These

calculations reportedly led Checkmate to conclude that the

attack on the Iraqi Army could negate the 15,000+ anticipated

US casualties of a ground war, particularly if the requirement

for the ground war could be obviated by air action. 85

Maj Roy Y. Sikes, a Checkmate analyst, considered the

probability of Iraqi adaptation to an air attack and devised

means to minimize the effects of Iraqi countermeasures. He

emphasized concentration and massive attacks on specific

ground units until the desired level of destruction was

achieved (estimated to be between 20 percent and 40 percent

of full strength). Under continuous attack and constant

scrutiny from airborne forward air controllers (FAC), units

would be unable to survive long enough to benefit from a

learning curve. Air attacks would then rapidly shift to another

unit, destroying it in turn. Coalition learning opportunities

could be maximized through the FAC, who would become

familiar with an area and ground units in that area until the

objectives were achieved. Major Sikes was in frequent contact

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with planners in the theater, and he suggested the desirability

to concentrate effort against units in turn, noting some

success as other individuals in the planning effort began to

advocate similar positions.

Maj Mark “Buck” Rogers, a key Black Hole planner, shared

some of Sikes’s concepts. In November Major Rogers and Brig

Gen Buster C. Glosson, chief of the Special Plans Group,

fleshed out a concept of operations for attacking the Iraqi

Army.86 Their plan called for attacks on Iraqi air defenses,

field headquarters, mechanized units and artillery, and

logistics infrastructure. The Republican Guard units held a

prominent place in their plans. Although C2 attacks were

designed to minimize Iraqi ability to react to air or ground

attack, Iraqi reactions were anticipated. Continuous presence

by FACs would be needed to identify targets as Iraqi units

began to “thin and displace.”87 FACs would maintain

“continuity” over designated sectors, maximizing coalition

learning by “precluding [attacks on] previously destroyed

targets,” and compensating for anticipated intelligence

limitations against transitory targets.88 Rogers also advocated

maintaining continuity between USAF combat wings and

specific Iraqi ground units to boost effectiveness. USAF wings

would enhance their learning by gaining experience with the

terrain and unit layout, and capitalize on awareness of

previous wing progress through attacks on the same division

for an extended period.

CENTAF planners in Riyadh, led by Glosson, eagerly used

the Checkmate analyses. Glosson adjusted some of the

assumptions, reducing, for example, the probability of locating

targets from the recommended value of 95 percent to 75

percent.89 He also adjusted the figures for increased aircraft

availability as forces flowed into the theater. The USAF’s

quantitative analysis led to the adoption of a subobjective that

quickly captured the attention of the CINC, ground

commanders, air commanders, and their staffs. The Air Force

agreed to destroy at least 50 percent of the Iraqi Army’s tanks

and artillery. This prospect was so riveting it nearly became

the only goal of concern in the minds of some. Several possible

attrition figures had been discussed during the planning. 90

General Glosson and the United States Central Command

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(CENTCOM) planner, Lt Col Joe Purvis, agreed on 50 percent

as an average point a ground unit could be considered combat

ineffective.91 Although the projections changed frequently,

Glosson briefed the CENTAF wing commanders on 18

December that the Republican Guard would require 600

sorties per day for four days to reach the 50 percent goal, and

that 90 percent could be achieved in nine days. 92 This figure

represented an unprecedented operational task for an air

force, and the USAF’s progress towards it would be subjected

to close scrutiny from many quarters during and after Desert

Storm.

Even though the Air Force’s planning was detailed and well

thought out, the numerical calculations of complex operations

are heavily dependent on many assumptions. These initial

assumptions are delicate and can be quickly altered by the fog

and friction of war.93 Unexpected and unanticipated events

are unavoidable in war and their cumulative effects can have

significant impact on the most scientific calculations. 94 In

spite of its fragility, the quantitative approach to war has an

almost irresistible appeal. With a number to strive for, the

goal assumes a crystal clarity. The innate uncertainty of war,

however, inhibits the planner’s ability to know if and when

such seemingly clear goals have in fact been obtained.

CENTAF’s Combat Plans staff led by Lt Col Samuel J.

Baptiste simultaneously developed a plan to counter an Iraqi

thrust into Saudi Arabia.95 Emphasizing continuous CAS and

interdiction, the D day plan was built on the assumption that

outnumbered coalition forces would be under heavy ground

attack requiring substantial amounts of CAS to survive. 96 The

D day plan also had some characteristics of deep air attack,

including interdiction of the Iraqi second echelon. Kill boxes

(based on a Saudi grid system) were established along likely

axes of Iraqi advance to direct coalition sorties against the

Iraqi Army.97 These boxes were eventually extended to cover

the entire KTO and would exercise a significant influence over

the entire course of the battle with the Iraqi Army. 98

The plans merged when the CENTAF Combat Plans staff

and the Black Hole were combined in a December staff

reorganization. General Glosson assumed responsibility for all

CENTAF planning functions, leading a group called the

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guidance apportionment and targeting (GAT) cell. Colonel

Baptiste assumed responsibility for planning against the KTO,

while the former Black Hole staff planned operations in Iraq.

At this late stage of the planning process, several key ideas

posed by Checkmate and the Black Hole (concentration,

sequential attacks on ground units, and FACs) appear to have

faded away.

Glosson was also given operational control of all CENTAF

fighter wings in December. A command reorganization

established separate air divisions to control electronic warfare,

command and control, and reconnaissance assets (15th Air

Division, commanded by Brig Gen Glenn A. Proffitt II) and

fighters (14th Air Division, commanded by General Glosson) to

match the air division controlling SAC assets (16th Air

Division, commanded by Brig Gen Patrick Caruana). 99 By

assuming planning and command responsibilities, Glosson

would play a pivotal role in the subsequent conduct of the

campaign.

Attacks against the Republican Guard were supported by

operations against the LOCs into the KTO. These operations

were identified by all three planning groups and were seen as

a means to affect the entire Iraqi Army. Destruction of the

bridges across the Euphrates appeared to be an ideal means

of restricting the army’s logistics flow. The Euphrates bridges

were doubly significant, however, as their destruction could

block an army withdrawal from the KTO. For a

counterlogistics effort to succeed, the considerable supply

depots south of the Euphrates would also have to be

neutralized, and B-52 raids were identified as an ideal means

of reducing Iraqi stockpiles. Historically, counterlogistics

operations conducted by air have been most effective if

synchronized with ground action to cause increased

consumption of supplies. Large Iraqi unit-level stockpiles

would be problematic, requiring considerable effort to destroy.

Iraq’s defensive doctrine posed additional problems because

static units consume fewer supplies.

In addition to direct attack and interdiction, the plan

against the Iraqi Army included a significant moral dimension.

Psychological operations were integrated in the plans early

when CENTCOM PSYOPs experts established liaisons with

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CENTAF’s planners.100 General Schwarzkopf appears to have

taken an early interest in PSYOPs and displayed a constant

interest in using B-52s against the Republican Guard, even

though the B-52 was a poor system for destroying dispersed

and entrenched armored formations.101 Leaflets, B-52 strikes,

and around-the-clock operations were intended to break down

the Iraqi Army’s morale.

Republican Guard corps and division headquarters figured

prominently in coalition air plans. As part of a broader

counter-C2 effort, planners anticipated that the attacks on

headquarters would reduce Iraqi capability to react. CENTAF

attempted to capitalize on the potential weaknesses of Iraq’s

highly centralized command structure by attacking key

communications and leadership nodes. Communications with

units in the field would be restricted (if not severed), hindering

Iraqi control.

As the execution date for Desert Storm approached, the

nature of the plans against the Republican Guard shifted as

they solidified. The separate phases of the air campaign

blended together, as targets from all phases were included in

the first three days’ air tasking orders (ATO) at the same time.

General Schwarzkopf, for example, demanded the Republican

Guard be hit on the very first day. Small F-16 and B-52 raids

against the RGFC were therefore blended into the master

attack plan for the first day of the campaign. 102 This gradual

effort negated the potential advantages of Checkmate’s

concentrated operations, which gave the Iraqis a chance to

adjust to early attacks before the main effort could shift to the

KTO. A gradual approach also sacrificed potential

psychological benefits by gradually conditioning the Iraqi

Army to air attack.103 Two other concepts, the use of airborne

FACs throughout the KTO, and the matching up of wings to

ground units appear to have fallen by the wayside. 104 The

friction inherent in pushing a complex plan through a large

diverse organization consumed some of its more significant

features.

The counterlogistics, psychological, and countercommand

operations were important elements of the attack on the

Republican Guard divisions, but were even harder to evaluate

than the attrition operation. Because there was little

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opportunity to monitor progress and scrutinize impacts, these

efforts received considerably less attention and generated far

less controversy than the highly contentious attrition effort.

CENTCOM virtually guaranteed a conflict over the attrition

figures when it made the initiation of the ground war

contingent on the accomplishment of 50 percent attrition, and

gave the responsibility for determining the level of destruction

to the ground components.

Clash of Arms

17–26 January 1991

Take apart the Republican Guard. Break their will! Keep

your eye on the target.

—Lt Gen Charles A. Horner

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the

first encounter with the enemy’s main strength. Only the

layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent

execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original

concept pursued consistently to the end.

—Helmuth von Moltke

The air offensive began on the night of 17 January with

attacks that struck across the depth and breadth of Iraq and

Kuwait. The main weight of effort was initially aimed at

disabling Iraq’s integrated air defenses, weakening its national

command and control, and eliminating its Scud missile force.

CENTAF missions struck the Republican Guard within the

first 24 hours and would continue for the next 43 days. Small

F-16 and B-52 raids struck at Republican Guard field

headquarters the first day; follow-up missions over the next

two days attacked other preplanned RGFC targets. With the

physical and intellectual energies of the air campaign focused

deep inside Iraq, the Iraqi Army felt only slight pressure from

the air. Air strikes (minus A-10 sorties which were

concentrated on the border) hovered at approximately 100

sorties per day against all Iraqi ground units until 23

January.105 During the first six days of the air campaign (17

to 23 January) approximately 92 F-16, 39 B-52, and six F-18

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strikes hit the Republican Guard. On the 23d, strikes against

all ground forces increased to 200–300 per day, indicating a

shift of effort to the KTO. 106 At the end of the tenth day (26

January), cumulative counts of Republican Guard strikes had

jumped to 569 F-16, 89 B-52, 48 F-15E, and 22 F-18

strikes.107 Even with an emphasis on the KTO, daily sortie

counts fell well short of the 600 missions called for in prewar

plans.

After 19 January KTO targeting became more decentralized.

Instead of assigning specific point targets and designating

desired mean point of impact (DMPI)—specific aim points,

CENTAF sent missions against large, area targets (e.g., an

armored battalion) that contained hundreds of discrete DMPIs

often spread over a square mile or more. Some strikes received

even less guidance, sent against generic target categories (e.g.,

armor) within specified kill boxes that covered 900 square

miles. Targeting shifted to decentralized methods because the

GAT cell and flying wings did not have the detailed targeting

materials typically used for controlling and planning attacks

Figure 1. Republican Guard Dispositions in CENTAF Kill Boxes

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against fixed targets. USAF crews preparing for missions

against fixed facilities (airfields, bridges, and other permanent

structures) used numerous planning aids including precise

target graphics and overhead imagery. Target photos are

critical to mission success for visual weapons deliveries, as

they compensate for navigational or imprecise target

coordinates by improving chances of accurate target

acquisition. Nonvisual deliveries also benefit from precise

target graphics to identify desired aim points. Without

accurate target acquisition, mission success is jeopardized.

Only a few, critical KTO targets such as corps headquarters

were identified, photographed, and targeted before the war.

Precision graphics were unavailable for the bulk of the Iraqi

Army, perhaps because the potential mobility of a ground unit

was assumed to render precision graphics irrelevant.

Little information was available at the unit level to plan

these missions, and pilots had difficulty identifying desired

ground units within the immense target arrays sprawling

across the KTO. Target information was seldom more than a

set of coordinates indicating the position of a battalion-sized

ground unit wedged among countless other identical units,

any of which could be mistaken for the desired target. 108

Target intelligence personnel were unable to obtain imagery of

the Iraqi positions from CENTAF intelligence because

headquarters was overwhelmed trying to sort out the

concurrent strategic, counterair, and anti-Scud operations.

Wing target intelligence staffs (“targeteers”) were intensely

frustrated because they were unable to provide sorely needed

target materials to the crews attacking the Iraqi Army. 109

Missions were launched to attack specific battalions with little

more than approximate locations of the parent divisions.

Materials that would have enhanced CENTAF’s ability to

plan, direct, and attack the Iraqi Army were present in the

theater but largely unknown to Air Force personnel. The Army

Intelligence Agency (AIA) had been studying the Iraqi Army’s

dispositions in the theater continuously since the August

invasion. Analysts in Washington mapped out Iraqi positions

in great detail and provided Army units in the theater with

detailed templates of each Iraqi division.110 The theater joint

imagery production complex (JIPC) integrated AIA’s templates

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and current imagery from RF-4s and U-2s onto 1–50,000 or

1–12,500 scale maps, producing up to 400 copies daily, with

the assistance of the 30th Engineer Battalion, for distribution

to US Army Central Command (ARCENT) “corps, division and

brigade commanders and staffs.”111 These products plotted

Iraqi positions down to the level of individual tanks and were

so accurate that ground combatants remarked after the

ground war that they were able to predict enemy contact and

open fire based on the information from the charts. 112 These

materials had the potential to help CENTAF orientation and

targeting dramatically. Although the JIPC was “designed to

support CENTAF,” ARCENT became its primary customer. 113

General Horner later remarked that ARCENT “overloaded” the

entire intelligence system with so many requests that the joint

force air component commander (JFACC) “couldn’t get [his]

foot in the door . . . [and] just said, ‘to he– – with it.’”114 It is

ironic that ARCENT monopolized these products for picking

potential targets while CENTAF went without as it tried to find

and attack many of those targets.115

Source: Brig Gen Robert H. Scales, USA, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1993), 378.

Figure 2. Section of Tawakalna Division Template

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The lack of target materials severely retarded Air Force unit

learning curves against the Republican Guard. Each crew

member formed individual perceptions of the battlefield, based

on what each had observed.116 Within combat wings, there

were hundreds of disjointed impressions of the battlefield, and

crews had a difficult time blending these images into a

coherent picture without a common framework to provide

orientation. Little meaningful target information could be

shared within the wing without a common reference. The

nature of air war demands some means of maintaining

continuity with the enemy. Each crew glimpses the enemy for

only a few minutes each mission and then returns to base.

Without a common reference, there is little potential for

learning within a wing or squadron. This slowed the learning

process because crews could not update a common image of

the battlefield, and aircrews had to build a picture from

scratch every mission. The problem was even more

pronounced when wings attempted to communicate with other

organizations.117

B-52 bombers and F-16 fighters conducted the bulk of the

initial attacks on the Republican Guard in the KTO. Bombers

conducted attacks from high altitude using radar aiming.

Without a visual weapons delivery capability, the bombers

needed precise coordinates to attack the guard units. The

CENTAF target database, however, had few Republican Guard

targets listed, and those listed were mostly division or

brigades that were deployed over many miles. Without detailed

target materials available, the GAT cell’s bomber planner,

Capt Steven Hawkins, developed an innovative targeting

technique during Desert Shield. A chance conversation with a

U-2 pilot revealed the U-2’s ASARS II radar to be capable of

determining accurate coordinates of ground units located by

radar.118 The U-2 radar was subsequently used throughout

the war to locate army units in the KTO and provide

coordinates to the bomber planner in Riyadh, which he then

relayed to bombers en route to the theater. 119 Although this

innovation gave the B-52s accurate coordinates in near real

time, it masked another significant problem. The B-52s were

attacking from high altitude and encountered system

accuracy problems that had not been noted in training due to

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the B-52’s previous low-altitude focus.120 Because target

coordinates were being passed as the bomber was en route,

few knew the exact desired points of impact; therefore,

poststrike analysis was slow to detect accuracy problems.

Fighter formations of four-to-eight fighters also attacked the

Republican Guard from high altitude. High-altitude tactics

had been considered a relic of the Vietnam era by the majority

of Air Force aviators and had been largely discarded after the

mid-1970s. Survival and target acquisition in a European

scenario appeared to require low flying, and training

throughout the 1980s had a clear low-altitude focus.

High-altitude training often met with resistance. The common

attitude was that low flying is more demanding; if one can fly

low, he can fly high. Although this may be so, a general lack of

high-altitude experience masked some significant problems

unique to high-altitude operations that would appear during

Desert Storm.121

The renaissance of high-altitude tactics was an innovation

generated at the unit level during Desert Shield. Individual

units gradually shifted from low- to high-altitude tactics

during the months before Desert Storm. Most wings began

Desert Shield with the belief that low flying would be required

to survive against the Iraqis. One wing commander attributed

this to a widespread overestimation of the Iraqis’

capabilities.122 Observation of the desert environment and

increased understanding of the Iraqi threat hinted at the need

for change.123 As familiarity with the desert increased, groups

within the combat wings began to question the wisdom of

low-altitude tactics.124 A series of low-altitude training

accidents (resulting in six fatalities) during Desert Shield

precipitated a 1,000-foot (ft) minimum altitude restriction

from CENTAF. Low-altitude advocates railed against the

restriction, arguing that training should be conducted as low

as 100 ft (most USAF crews were trained to fly as low as 300

ft).125 The accidents gave many units an opportunity to

reappraise their tactics and led to a gradual (but uneven) shift

to high-altitude operations.126

This adaptation to the anticipated conditions of war took

place before the outbreak of hostilities and was the result of

considerable internal debate (and in some units, strife). 127 The

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33
change, being bottom-up, was an uneven one. Observation

opportunities were limited; there were no Iraqis available to

test high-altitude propositions. Some units tested ideas by

conducting simulated high-altitude attacks against friendly

airfields and were encouraged because observers on the

ground found it nearly impossible to acquire the raiders

visually, even when attack times and directions were known

beforehand.128 The USAF units most reluctant to transition to

high altitude were the night interdiction wings equipped with

F-111s, F-15Es, and B-52s. These units saw low-altitude

night operations as their forte, and their mental orientation

was an obstacle to innovation. The low-flying ethos was so

powerful in these wings that all flew some missions at low

altitude the first days of the war. European units (British,

French, and Italians) were similarly oriented and worse off in

the sense that their aircraft were purpose-built for lowaltitude operations. The Tornado and Jaguar weapons delivery

systems were ill suited for high-altitude attacks. 129 Once the

shooting began, feedback (observation and orientation) was

instantaneous and all quickly and universally abandoned

their low-altitude orientation.130

A primary reason for the uneven shift to high altitude is

that CENTAF refused to dictate tactics, leaving those decisions

to the tacticians and commanders at the unit level. It is likely

that Generals Horner and Glosson shared the views of other

Vietnam War aviators—that Vietnam was “a war of fatal

oversupervision.”131 When General Glosson was queried by a

pilot whether he could use low-altitude tactics during Desert

Storm, his reply was “you can if that’s what the wing decides

to do. The mission commanders and smart captains should be

the ones deciding tactics, not higher headquarters.” 132

Generals Horner and Glosson preached a philosophy that

had a major influence on the command’s tactical conduct of

the war. The commanders’ philosophy that “there’s no target

worth dying for” influenced the attitudes of the crews who

fought the war and the commanders who led them into

battle.133 As long as there was no ground war taking place,

many missions could avoid high-threat environments and wait

for more advantageous circumstances. This is an advantage of

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a cumulative strategy, where discrete actions are not

contingent on other actions.134

USAF electronic superiority allowed air supremacy to be

quickly achieved above 10,000 ft, but the numerous Iraqi AAA

pieces and shoulder-launched SAMs denied low-risk

operations at lower altitudes. USAF and US Navy (USN)

jammers, antiradiation missiles, and the USAF’s direct attack

of critical Iraqi air defense nodes collapsed the Iraqi integrated

air defense system (IADS) in the first days of the war,

providing coalition airpower with a high-altitude sanctuary.

Thousands of Iraqi AAA units firing autonomously could not

be countered systematically and were best avoided by

remaining at higher altitudes.

Although high-altitude operations entailed lower risk, they

caused a variety of unanticipated problems. The most serious

problems stemmed from the lack of high-altitude weapons

delivery experience. High-altitude attacks revealed procedural

and hardware shortcomings. Fighter units used visual

deliveries that might have been appropriate for low-altitude

attacks but held very poor prospects of success from high

altitude.135 Lack of familiarity with high-altitude weapons

delivery characteristics led to misconceptions and mistakes.

Hardware and software problems revealed poor high-altitude

wind modeling. Wind modeling, critical to “dumb” bomb

accuracy, attempts to predict winds at lower altitudes that will

affect the weapons impact point. Limitations of wind models

resulted in impacts well short of the target during B-52 and

F-16 attacks.136 Difficulties were encountered by the A-10. Its

most fearsome weapon—the 30-millimeter (mm) cannon—had

to be fired at more than double its normal slant range and

suffered in accuracy and effectiveness.137 Increased distance

from fighter to target resulted from high-altitude ingress and

egress, leading to reduced effectiveness in target acquisition,

attack assessment, weapons effects, and weapons accuracy.

The problems of high-altitude tactics experienced by the

F-16 units were quickly aggravated by CENTAF headquarters

munitions decisions. A prewar weapons conference deprived

F-16 units of guided antiarmor munitions and a wartime

decision deprived them of their best unguided antiarmor

weapon. Checkmate plans assumed all Maverick missile

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(AGM-65) qualified units would fire these guided antiarmor

weapons against Iraqi tanks, but these tank-killing weapons

had been shifted to the A-10 wing during Desert Shield. The

decision made at a wing weapons officer conference in Riyadh

resulted in the transfer of the theater’s Mavericks to the A-10

wing, capitalizing on A-10 expertise with Mavericks. The F-16

squadrons, on the other hand, could capitalize on their

system’s compatibility with a superior antiarmor cluster

bomb, the CBU-87 CEM. Large lethal patterns of

submunitions generated by these area weapons minimized

high-altitude accuracy problems. CBU-87’s radar (ground

proximity) fuse allowed it to be used at all altitudes.

High-consumption rates of CBU-87 during the first two weeks

alarmed planners in Riyadh, and General Horner ordered

CENTAF’s best unguided antiarmor munition be saved for the

ground war.138 This decision was prudent if CENTAF believed

it would have to provide a great deal of close air support,

because many of CBU-87s features also made it CENTAF’s

best unguided CAS weapon. The tradeoff, however, was that

the conservation of CENTAF’s best unguided antiarmor

weapon might increase the necessity for CAS.

F-16 squadrons then began to prosecute their attacks

against the guards with suboptimal munitions for tank killing.

Mk-20 Rockeye, an older antiarmor cluster bomb, was not

well suited for high-altitude attack because its timer fuse led

to erratic, unpredictable trajectories, which was not a problem

at low altitude. Other cluster munitions, CBU-52, 58, and 72,

armed with fragmentation munitions were ineffective against

armor. Iron bombs (Mk-82 500 pounders and Mk-84 2,000

pounders) became the F-16’s primary weapon. These

munitions required a direct hit to kill a revetted tank, which

was highly improbable from high altitude. The diminished

accuracy of high-altitude tactics was aggravated by suboptimal

munitions. The detrimental impact of this decision was not

apparent because there was very little feedback on the state of

operations against the RGFC formations. CENTAF headquarters

knew little more than numbers of strikes flown. 139 Wings,

therefore, received no feedback from higher headquarters, and

wing impressions were formed by the highly individual (and

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often inaccurate) impressions of the aircrews returning from

strikes.

Successful orientation (and therefore adaptation) requires

knowledge of the enemy state and actions in addition to

knowledge of one’s own condition and actions. CENTAF

commanders were unable to perceive accurately the state of

the Republican Guard. Observation of the Republican Guard

formations was hindered by poor weather and the United

States’s highly centralized intelligence collection system.140

Frequent cloud cover (the worst on record for the region)

masked the Iraqi Army from overhead photography throughout

the first week.141

When imagery began to flow, the intelligence system was

overwhelmed by the target array, number of attack missions,

and decentralized targeting. The massive size of the target

array within the KTO (Iraqi positions covered more than 3,000

square miles) and the number of potential aim points (tens of

thousands) were well beyond CENTAF intelligence’s ability to

observe, analyze, and synthesize. Large target systems were

impossible to scrutinize because the entire theater intelligence

system was built around and dependent on the imagery of a

few centrally controlled surveillance systems. The intelligence

system established in peacetime had never been exercised to

the level required by Desert Storm and lacked the resources to

adapt.142

In the absence of direct knowledge of the enemy condition,

bomb damage assessment (BDA) was expected to provide

insight by assessing effects of air attack on the enemy forces.

CENTAF headquarters personnel attempted to synthesize the

reports from each mission and apply the sum to the last

estimated condition of the target system. This could help

estimate the enemy condition and progress of the campaign

for the commander. Two problems were quickly revealed with

the BDA system. First, the system was overwhelmed by the

number of BDA reports generated by CENTAF wings. Second,

quality of the wing’s reports was uneven; many reports did not

quantify results into tank or unit kills. 143 Quantifiable results

were hard to estimate, particularly when attack results were

observed from high altitude.

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Additional problems external to CENTAF arose in Desert

Storm because the CINC gave ARCENT and the US Marine

Corps, Central Command (MARCENT) responsibility to

determine the condition of enemy ground formations in their

areas. The rationale was that “if the ground campaign’s

initiation was to be determined by a point when air attacks

had reduced Iraqi armor and artillery by 50 percent, then

ARCENT should make that determination since the Army was

to conduct the main attack.”144 A lack of common BDA

guidelines led to interservice tensions and disagreements over

the results of coalition air attacks. ARCENT, whose area of

responsibility contained the Republican Guard, developed an

independent means of reporting and processing BDA: ground

liaison officers (GLO) reviewed mission results and reported

through Army channels to ARCENT intelligence (G-2) for

independent BDA processing.145

Although BDA was important to help headquarters orient

on the battlefield, BDA in the form of poststrike photography

was equally important for weapons delivery assessment at the

unit level. Poststrike imagery can aid units in determining

exact weapons impact points and helps the unit to judge

munitions effectiveness. With poststrike imagery, the unit can

accurately adjust weapons or tactics in response. 146 The

immense target array combined with the decentralized aim

point selection, however, rendered weapons delivery feedback

impossible. Combat wings had a nearly impossible time

obtaining imagery from overworked CENTAF intelligence. The

occasional photos that filtered down to the units were of little

use because they were photos of isolated formations that

could not be oriented to the larger framework of the

battlefield. Furthermore, with decentralized aim point

selection and hundreds of strikes flown each day, there was

no recognition of previous targets or attack parameters and

little information could be gleaned from the materials

presented.147

CENTAF had little more than a sortie count to measure its

efforts against the guards, although this was no valid

indication of effectiveness. The obstacles to observation and

orientation revealed shortcomings of peacetime doctrine and

training: large-scale target arrays were not practiced against,

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feedback to the wings was not exercised, and interservice BDA

principles were not agreed upon in peacetime. The

consequences of air operations without BDA are increased

uncertainty and a possible lack of insight into the true nature

of the situation which can lead to a lack of adaptation.

Faced with a lack of feedback from intelligence channels,

the GAT cell initiated a major innovation by creating a new

process to obtain feedback by using cockpit videotapes. 148

Cockpit videotapes were originally collected in Riyadh to

facilitate press conferences (General Horner’s first press

conference prominently featured footage of an F-117 attack on

his “counterpart’s headquarters”), but tapes of laser-guided

bomb (LGB) deliveries were quickly recognized as a potential

source of immediate feedback.149 General Glosson directed

wings to forward their videotapes to Riyadh where they were

used by the GAT to bypass inoperative intelligence

channels.150 Although gun camera film, the predecessor of

video tape recording (VTR) tapes, had been used in previous

conflicts at the wing and squadron level by unit

photointerpreters, most of those unit capabilities had been

eliminated in the 1970s and 1980s in the belief that satellites

could do all the collection centrally.151 GAT planners further

modified the process by communicating directly with the Air

Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which had more

manpower and access to data.152 Tapes of non-LGB attacks

had less ability to provide feedback for BDA purposes,

because heads-up display tapes only record weapons aiming,

not impacts. They did, however, provide important information

to Riyadh as to what the units were doing.

A “flat” organizational structure, multiple formal and

informal information channels, and the cockpit videotapes

allowed CENTAF headquarters to follow closely the condition

and activities of its own forces—an important element of

orientation. “Organizational flatness,” enabled the accurate

flow of information between those doing the fighting and

headquarters. Wing commanders and deputy commanders for

Operations (DO) were flying combat missions and

communicated routinely with Generals Glosson and Horner in

Riyadh.153 A parallel network of communications extended

between the unit weapons officers and mission planners to the

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planning and operations branches of CENTAF’s air operations

center. This linkage, via secure phones and fax lines, enabled

the majors and captains manning these sections to

communicate freely and often, fostering more effective

operations by both. Wings used these links to communicate

horizontally and coordinate actions.154 Without a common

perception of the KTO battlefield, however, operations against

the Iraqi Army could not be well coordinated.

As CENTAF attempted to penetrate the fog of war, the staff

and commanders knew they were experiencing major feedback

problems but suspected F-16 attacks were less effective than

anticipated. General Horner examined poststrike photos of

several strategic targets attacked by F-16s and observed many

misses.155 Although feedback was lacking from the KTO,

General Horner suspected that F-16s (carrying out most of the

attacks against the RGFC) might be encountering difficulties

there too. An F-16 pilot himself, Horner tasked an F-16 pilot,

Major Rogers, working in the Black Hole to investigate. Rogers

examined VTR tapes and observed F-16 units executing

attacks with tactics that carried little probability of success.

He shared his findings with an informal group of tactics

experts in the tactical air control center (TACC) at CENTAF

headquarters to help determine possible solutions.

Informal tactics discussions in Riyadh drew on the expertise

of many aviators. Senior officers including Maj Gen Thomas

Olsen, CENTAF/vice commander (CV), Maj Gen John A.

Corder (CENTAF/DO), General Proffitt (15th Air Division/CC)

and General Glosson (14th Air Division/CC) took an active

part in finding potential solutions to tactical problems. 156

Numerous contributions came from Black Hole and CENTAF’s

tactics experts, a group of Fighter Weapons School instructor

pilots brought into the TACC from Nellis AFB as the war

started. The FWS instructors flew missions with CENTAF

wings to gain a firsthand appreciation of the problems

experienced by the units. These individuals were able to use

their direct knowledge of the battlefield to assist planning and

execution from Riyadh. Like the Black Hole personnel, the

FWS instructors had numerous personal connections to the

wings and capitalized on these connections to find solutions

to CENTAF’s problems.

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Feedback on B-52 activities reinforced the prewar

perception that they were not well suited for the destruction of

point targets. When photos of the KTO became available, B-52

attacks were clearly distinguished from other attacks, and the

results were discouraging. Quarter-mile long strings of bomb

craters were observed in the vicinity of ground units, with very

few direct hits on the widely dispersed revetments. Dispersed,

fortified, and armored Iraqi positions were well suited to

minimize physical effects of B-52 “area fire.” 157 The

psychological value of B-52 attack, however, appears to have

been recognized in Riyadh. Leaflets preceded and

accompanied B-52 raids in an effort to demoralize Iraqi units,

with great effect as Iraqi POW debriefings later indicated.

At this point it is appropriate to address the issue regarding

how right USAF doctrines and practices were for the situation

at hand. CENTAF’s adversary was similarly equipped but

employed differently than the opponent around which USAF

doctrine was built. The Republican Guard defensive doctrine

was quite different from the high-tempo offensive doctrine

emphasized by the Soviets. The Iraqis did not present the

lucrative target concentrations expected from Soviet rapid

movement requirements. Defensive Iraqi doctrine led to

immobility, dispersal, and fortification and the battle acquired

the characteristics of an air-to-ground siege: a battle for which

airpower has not been historically well suited.

The objective was different from that envisioned by deep air

attack, reducing effectiveness and hindering measurement.

Deep air attack’s primary effects were delay and disrupt, with

destroy as a tertiary objective. Against a rapidly moving

opponent, delay and disruption may be accomplished

economically with attacks on key transportation, logistics, and

command nodes. Effectiveness can be measured by following

the enemy unit’s progress across a map and monitoring his

mobile communications. In the case of the RGFC attack, delay

became irrelevant (with the enemy immobile), disruption

became less significant, and destruction became the key

criterion of effectiveness. With destruction as the main

measure of effectiveness, key nodes faded in importance.

Thousands of discrete, hardened, and dispersed targets

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gained equal significance, posing incredible targeting and

measurement problems to CENTAF.

In spite of the problems posed by the altered objectives of

the operation, USAF planning groups developed useful plans

that called for attacks on important systems contributing to

the RGFC’s combat effectiveness. Several valuable ideas that

might have facilitated the attrition effort (FACs, mass and

concentration, matching wings to ground units) were lost in

the friction of planning complex operations.

The combat wings executing the attack did a good job

recognizing the opportunity to conduct operations at high

altitude with minimal risk (a unit level innovation), although

lack of high-altitude weapons delivery experience reduced

effectiveness. High-altitude problems were aggravated by

munitions choices that took away the F-16’s best antiarmor

weapons, marginalizing F-16 effectiveness towards the

destruction objective.

Feedback and analysis of early attacks on the guard were

unavailable, which led to a major innovation: the use of

cockpit video tape as a means for planners to obtain feedback.

Feedback (a combination of observation and orientation in the

OODA context) would be a necessary but not sufficient

condition for adaptation. Insights formed after the first 10

days of the war and additional feedback in the form of

ARCENT analysis would stimulate considerable adaptations.

CENTAF Adapts

27 January–5 February 1991

I think we are making significant improvements in our

targeting and execution against the Republican Guard.

That’s the result of a lot of good suggestions from a lot of

people. There are no new ideas, but there’s some that we

collectively haven’t been thinking about. So never hesitate

to come forward if you have a suggestion.

—Lt Gen Charles A. Horner

Between 27 January and 5 February, CENTAF implemented

or facilitated the adoption of at least six innovations in the

battle with the Republican Guard. These changes, conceived

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42
and implemented within a surprisingly brief 10-day period,

adjusted some operations and initiated other new operations

that considerably improved USAF’s efforts against the RGFC.

Several of CENTAF’s changes, as indicated by General

Horner’s comments above, were adaptations of tactics used at

some point in the Air Force’s experience. Although a previous

generation of Air Force aviators may have executed similar

tactics, the crews that fought Desert Storm had been schooled

in different techniques and had to create these unplanned,

unanticipated, and unfamiliar tactics as they went.

The first innovation improved effectiveness against the

Republican Guard with A-10 attacks on the Tawakalna

Division. General Glosson reversed a decision to concentrate

A-10s against the forward echelon by assigning this additional

weapons system against the Republican Guard, possibly in

response to unfavorable F-16 and B-52 feedback. 158 Use of

the A-10, the USAF’s prime CAS platform, on deep interdiction

constituted a major innovation because it was contrary to the

attack-pilot ethos. Deep, high-altitude interdiction by the A-10

had been discussed in some circles, mainly by weapons

officers, but ran contrary to accepted practices and culture. 159

Deep interdiction was seen by many as a mission unsuited for

the A-10: slow, and heavily armored, the A-10 would be

exposed to enemy ground fire for extended periods of time

during ingress and egress. If attacked, it would lack the

energy and maneuverability required to evade SAMs at high

altitude. Close air support was viewed as the A-10 raison

d’être, many pilots believed the proper use of their weapon

system should entail low-altitude Maverick attacks on enemy

positions “while standing on the shoulders of the lead

tankers.”160

Several A-10 missions hit Iraqi radars beyond the border on

the first day of the war, and A-10s were used deep over the

largely undefended west Iraqi desert in a search for Scuds,

but use of the A-10 deep behind the lines in the KTO was

unexpected. On 27 February the commanders of the A-10

wings at King Fahd Air Base were told by General Glosson to

prepare for attacks against the Tawakalna Division, located

more than 50 miles behind Iraqi lines. 161

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Approaching the new tasking with caution, the A-10

mission planners obtained target materials through unofficial

contacts and implemented innovative tactics to increase

effectiveness and minimize risk. The wing commander insisted

on additional target materials “to do this right” and assigned

the planning to a pair of weapons officers. 162 Unofficial

contacts with a reconnaissance unit allowed the wing to

obtain a series of overhead photographs that the planners

combined to form a mosaic of the entire division. 163 The GLO

was able to obtain a detailed map of the division, markedly

increasing mission effectiveness.164 Concerned with increased

risk and uncertainty of attacking deep behind the lines, wing

planners scheduled hour-long wing-sized attacks. Eight

aircraft formations hit the division in six waves, 10 minutes

apart. These large formations maximized A-10 mutual

support, simultaneously enhancing shock effect against the

Tawakalna Division. The big formations presented some

adjustment problems, as they were inconsistent with the A-10

pilot’s prior experiences. Accustomed to making many passes

over a target (due to the A-10’s large payload and loiter time)

in smaller and more manageable two-ship formations, some of

the attack formations bunched up over the Tawakalna

Division, and some flights had to leave the area due to the

danger of midair collision.165

Three days of wing-sized attacks on the Tawakalna Division

appeared to have had a powerful effect. The division offered

little further resistance and seemed to have begun digging in

deeper.166 The Iraqis began to dig deep inside their revetments

to decrease weapons effects and to use covers to mask the

contents of the many revetments. They increased their use of

deception tactics, including moving live vehicles to revetments

that were scorched by previous kills and use of decoys in

others.167 Active measures included the lighting of fires beside

vehicles when fighters were in the area to give the impression

that the vehicle had already been attacked. 168

The A-10 response was to fly lower to improve target

acquisition and discrimination. There had been a constant

grassroots pressure (frustration) to allow lower attack

altitudes to utilize the A-10’s superb cannon. 169 Reevaluating

the nature of the Iraqi threat (now perceived as manageable)

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and the problems with high-altitude attacks, the A-10 wing

commanders allowed flights to make a pass as low as 4,500

feet. In addition normal A-10 tactics involving small two-ship

elements were reinstated. The two-ship formations allowed

more weapons passes and flexibility in the target area. Small

formations operating over the battlefield allowed maximum

effectiveness of each individual weapons pass. Increased

familiarity with the deep interdiction environment and

diminished Iraqi defenses led to a reversion back to more

familiar operating procedures.

The A-10 attack on the Tawakalna Division is difficult to

assess with certainty, but it appears that A-10 deep

interdiction was an effective innovation. The tactics were left

to the wing planners, who devised a good plan to deal with the

uncertainty of a new situation. Personal efforts and

connections led to the fortunate acquisition of valuable target

planning materials. The wing was able to implement the

changed tasking in a timely manner, two days from first

tasking to execution. Inexperience with mass formations

posed problems, but their use was a prudent measure to cope

with uncertainty. Increased firepower allowed the formations

to cope with Iraqi air defenses better, and presence of other

aircraft helped the pilots to cope psychologically with a new,

intimidating environment. Against the Iraqis, the large

formations may have had enhanced psychological effects

(shock, lowered morale) and cognitive effects (lower ability to

react to massed raids), at some cost in terms of sheer physical

effect (fewer passes over the target per aircraft). After three

days, the perception of a decreased threat environment and

familiarity with the new environment permitted a reversion to

lower-threat tactical formations (two-ships) in order to

maximize the physical effect of every mission.

As the first missions struck the Tawakalna Division,

ARCENT estimated the strength of the Republican Guard to be

essentially unaffected by the air attacks, catalyzing several

other innovations within CENTAF. During the first two weeks

of Desert Storm, CENTAF categorized feedback from the KTO

as nonexistent.170 On 29 January General Schwarzkopf voiced

frustration with the lack of BDA from attacks on the

Republican Guard, exclaiming that vehicles “have to be on

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45
their backs like cockroaches for J-2 to assess a kill.” 171

ARCENT commander, Lt Gen John Yeosock responded two

days later with an assessment that the Republican Guard

were at 99 percent of full strength.172 Such poor results

indicated the requirement for CENTAF to initiate considerable

adaptation.

This ARCENT assessment was met with incredulity at

CENTAF headquarters. Particularly since the air effort on

29–30 January contained the heaviest attacks on the

Republican Guard of the entire war (458 and 408 air strikes

hit the RGFC those two days).173

In an effort to improve its myopic view of the battlefield,

CENTAF headquarters ordered A-10s to reconnoiter the

Tawakalna Division to verify levels of destruction.

Conventional reconnaissance (RF-4 photos) of the Tawakalna

Division resulted in inconclusive findings, and the

commanders in Riyadh decided to conduct close-in visual

observation.174 The substitution of this attack aircraft for

purpose-built observation systems constituted a major

innovation. The A-10’s slow speed, armor, and survivability

qualified it best to perform this mission. At great risk, two

flights of A-10s visually inspected the Tawakalna Division

from 2,000 ft on 1 February.

The pilots estimated the Tawakalna Division’s strength at

50 percent or less; but more significantly, extensive Iraqi

countermeasures to coalition bombing became apparent to the

low-flying pilots. The pilots noted roughly half of the

revetments were filled with targets and the rest with “old farm

equipment, plywood decoys, old pickups, and barrels of

oil.”175 From higher altitudes the decoys were

indistinguishable from the live targets. Reflecting these

findings, the A-10 wing commanders reported that “we’re

looking in the revetments from four to six thousand feet. It’s

nearly impossible to tell what’s in them. . . . Our general

impression is that we’re hitting revetments that may or not be

lucrative.”176

Iraqi deception tactics represented a major obstacle to the

coalition air effort. Camouflage and decoys denied any

certainty that air strikes would hit valid targets. With live and

false targets indistinguishable from altitude and only 50

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46
percent of the revetments with valid targets, the potential existed

for half of CENTAF’s blows to be deflected. If air attention could

be further drawn away from live targets by giving them the

appearance of destroyed targets (e.g., blackening with oil), the

probabilities become even worse. Iraqi movement between

revetments compounded the coalition problem because

“frequent movement compounds the enemy’s problem of

targeting in the absence of continuous observation.”177

The problems posed by Iraqi countermeasures were not

uniformly perceived throughout CENTAF. Units using

nonvisual deliveries had little awareness of a decoy problem.

Pilots performing visual attacks from high altitudes were

aware of their inability to determine live from dead targets, but

probably underestimated the Iraqi decoy effort. The following

excerpts are from an F-16 pilot’s war journal, illuminating the

problems with target discrimination.

Source: Col Owen E. Jensen, “Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War,” Airpower Journal 8, no. 4

(Winter 1994): 40.

Figure 3. Numerous Revetments Confounded CENTAF Targeting

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1-31-91: Hit the Hammurabis with rockeyes—no emotional

satisfaction from the ride . . . pick whatever target looks least

scorched.

2-16-91: The second sortie and . . . the 3rd sortie were hunt around

and blow up whatever you happen to see. It’s tough to discern what’s

worthwhile from 15–20[000 feet].

2-18-91: It’s tough finding a place to bomb that looks like it hasn’t

been hit yet. God help the Kuwaitis, that place is a ravaged wasteland.

We describe where our targets are from blown up things and bomb

marks and craters.178

It is unlikely Riyadh appreciated the extent of the Iraqi

deception effort.179 Postwar comments of an Army officer

assigned to CENTAF’s battlefield coordination element

indicate a complete lack of awareness of the deception

problem: “We faced totally exposed target arrays that didn’t

move. The Iraqi forces made few attempts to camouflage

themselves or deceive us.” (Emphasis added)180 CENTAF

headquarters was aware of a target acquisition problem, but

saw it on a larger scale: CENTAF was concerned that Iraqi

battalions and brigades were moving around the battlefield. At

one point CENTAF was misled by a few reports to believe

(briefly) that the entire Tawakalna Division had slipped

away.181 With the benefit of somewhat clearer hindsight, it

appears that the Iraqi Army remained relatively static

throughout the campaign.182 Misled by the fog of war and

false and misleading reports, CENTAF headquarters

overestimated the magnitude of the problem of large unit

movements and underestimated the magnitude of the target

discrimination problems.

The general underappreciation of the deception problem

appears to have inhibited innovations to deny its effects

(orientation on the problem is a necessary condition for

successful adaptation). Those most familiar with the Iraqi

deception efforts were the A-10s pilots. To counter Iraqi

deception, the wing commanders offered the following

suggestion. “We’re hurting him but feel we could be doing it

better through mass and concentration of effort. . . . We feel

we need to pick the most lucrative areas at least one day in

advance from all sources of intel (imagery immensely improves

effectiveness—reference A-10 SEAD results); preplan

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48
concentrated, multiple aircraft raids against those areas; strike

until those two or three are sanitized with the most penetrating

weapons available and then move on. In summary: Pick it.

Pound it. If it doesn’t explode move on. . . .” 183 CENTAF,

however, seemed either unaware of the scale of effort required

to sanitize an area, or it was unable or unwilling to achieve

the concentration required. Preplanned and well-supported

wing-size attacks were not repeated after the initial assault on

the Tawakalna Division, nor were additional planning

materials made available to increase effectiveness. Although

several areas received heavier attention than others, most

days saw airpower spread throughout the KTO.

Several groups appear to have been pushing for increased

concentration of air effort against the Republican Guard.

General Schwarzkopf wanted CENTAF to break one division to

serve as an example to the rest. 184 General Horner’s

comments repeatedly return to concentrating efforts on the

guard.185 The A-10 message called for concentration to

counter Iraqi deception tactics, but the required concentration

did not materialize. This may have been the innovation that

did not happen.

One possible explanation is that CENTAF attempts to

concentrate were unsuccessful due to the numerous competing

demands on airpower. Horner continually stressed the

importance of destroying the RGFC: “Do not lose focus on the

Republican Guard. Everything else is secondary other than

the defense of Saudi Arabia.”186 The command’s best day

against the guard was 29 January, in which the RGFC receive d

76 percent of the strikes within the KTO, but this figure still

amounted to only 50 percent of the coalition’s total strikes for

the day.187 The RGFC received less than half of the strikes in

the KTO for 39 of Desert Storm’s 43 days. From a theaterwide

perspective, the Republican Guard received less than one in

six of the coalition’s 41,309 air strikes. 188 Strategic,

counterair, interdiction, and Scud target sets required a

certain level of “maintenance sorties” that may constitute part

of theater airpower’s “overhead.” Demands for CAS from the

corps commanders continuously pulled the A-10s from

preplanned interdiction targets. Even the CINC confounded

concentration efforts by frequently specifying RGFC divisions

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as the “target of the day,” impeding efforts at persistence by

switching divisions each day.189 Although the 600 sorties per

day used by the planners may have seemed possible, the

friction of war as manifested in the competing demands for

airpower put this figure out of reach.

The bulk of the strikes against the Republican Guard were

carried out by CENTAF’s F-16 force, and the perception of

poor effectiveness troubled both the commanders in Riyadh

and the pilots in the wings.190 Tacticians and commanders at

both levels perceived problems and worked on solutions.

Concerned with the F-16’s poor accuracy from high altitude,

General Glosson instructed F-16 units to bomb from lower

altitudes.191 This order had an uneven effect. Wings still had

the Glosson/Horner “there’s no target worth dying for”

philosophy in mind, and altitudes were largely left to the

discretion of individual flight leaders. This highly subjective

determination concerned some members of Glosson’s staff

who believed directives were not being followed after reviewing

videotapes. Although this concern raised the issue of

enforcing directed changes, Riyadh in almost all cases

deferred final decisions on tactics to the wings.

Another means of achieving better results from the F-16

was developed in Riyadh. Nellis AFB tactics expert, Col Clyde

“Joe Bob” Phillips devised a plan to capitalize on the F-16’s

capacity for fast, short turnarounds on the ground to increase

daily sorties by creating an F-16 forward operating location

(FOL).192 Glosson ordered his largest “day-only” F-16 wing, 193

the 363d TFW(P), to deploy support elements and conduct

operations from the Saudi airfield at King Khalid Military City

(KKMC).194 A-10s had been operating from KKMC located only

60 miles from the Iraqi border. F-16s operating there were

able to exchange their drop-tanks for extra ordnance:

KKMC-based missions carried four Mk-84 2,000-pound

bombs (double the normal load). FOL operations allowed the

wing to fly more sorties per day. KKMC missions launched

from the 363d main base in Abu Dhabi to bomb the KTO,

landed and rearmed at KKMC for a second sortie to the KTO

(which did not require refueling), landed and rearmed at

KKMC for a third mission, and after attacking the KTO, air

refueled to return to Abu Dhabi.

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Colonel Phillips saw an opportunity to improve performance

by using the same pilots on the KKMC missions to build

familiarity with the terrain, mission, and timing. 195 An

increase in effectiveness was anticipated. This effort, however,

met with little success. CENTAF’s ATO production section

typically scheduled individual KKMC missions against two or

three different targets per day. Furthermore, 363d wing

planners do not appear to have received any guidance to use

the same crews.196 One aspect of this innovation was not

realized, due in part to the friction of forcing ideas through an

organization at war.

Although FOL operations were a minor innovation, the

implementation of the concept required considerable effort.

A-10s were already operating from KKMC, but work areas,

quarters, and F-16 specific logistics, support, and ordnance

had to be arranged prior to initiating FOL operations. 197 The

concept was implemented with startling speed; the wing

implemented a full-scale operation in four days. 198 Chief KTO

planner, Colonel Baptiste planned for a gradual spin-up in

sorties but was overruled. General Glosson and the 363d TFW

(P) commander, Col Raymond Hout, decided to schedule the

wing to launch 24 sorties from KKMC the first two days, but

then generate a full 48 sorties after 5 February. 199 KKMC

missions became “the cornerstone of the [363d] schedule,

accounting for over 40% of [the wing’s] combat sorties.” 200

Although the wing was putting more bombs on target,

effectiveness from a BDA standpoint was not improved

because ARCENT refused to accept F-16 pilot reports, causing

a conflict between ARCENT and CENTAF described later.

F-16 pilots perceived the requirement to increase targeting

effectiveness against the Republican Guard. Within the 388th

TFW (P), pilots saw poor weather and target identification as

obstacles to increased effectiveness because each flight did

not have a sufficient amount of time scheduled by Riyadh to

allow them to locate and attack their assigned target. 201 388th

TFW (P) mission planners discussed and tried a new tactic

(with their wing DO’s approval) to improve target acquisition.

The wing internally reallocated their time-over-target (TOT)

windows, launching one flight before the rest to reconnoiter

each of the wing’s targets. The lead four-ship formation

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reported back target status and weather conditions to the four

trailing flights which were able to use a reduced spacing of

only two minutes. The advance target and weather

information allowed the following flights to locate and attack

their targets quickly.202 Subsequently, the wing suggested to

Riyadh that “an airborne platform be stationed in the second

echelon area to validate Air Tasking Order targets and find

new targets if required.”203 This suggestion was well received

in Riyadh, where Colonel Phillips’s tactics group had been

considering the use of F-16s as FACs to control attacks on the

Republican Guard and provide BDA.204 The concept was

familiar to senior officers because it was similar to the

Fast-FAC missions flown in Southeast Asia two decades

earlier. General Horner approved the concept on 3 February

and the 388th TFW (P) flew its first killer scout missions the

next day.205 Eight pilots with previous FAC or A-10 experience

rotated between the Republican Guard positions and an

air-refueling track to maintain a continuous presence over the

Iraqi divisions for an eight-hour period.206 Increased

familiarity and continuity with the same area led to increased

perceptions and orientation on the Iraqi positions. The pilots

were able to note where Iraqi units had shifted overnight and

record newly discovered “assembly areas, ammunition storage

bunkers, trans-shipment points, artillery, and communications

sites.”207 The wing repeated the effort over the next few days,

and it was quickly expanded to cover four to six kill boxes

simultaneously.208 One of the 388th TFW (P)’s squadrons, the

4th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), quickly “checked out”

(through on-the-job training) all of its pilots, and by the end of

the first week it was flying 99 percent of its sorties as killer

scouts.209 This innovation took place at an impressive pace.

Once the requirement for the change was identified, CENTAF’s

senior leadership acted swiftly and demanded much of the

pilots who would execute the missions. The success of this

rapid change was based on the flexibility of the crews and an

active interchange of ideas within the unit to optimize

performance.

Although it began as a minor innovation within the unit, it

became a major innovation with theaterwide impact as the

entire squadron switched to the killer scout mission. The

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full-time diversion of one of CENTAF’s strike squadrons to

forward air control was unanticipated. Although some of the

pilots were fortunate enough to have had previous FAC

experience, none had anticipated the role and undergone

training for it in the F-16. Riyadh added responsibilities to the

mission. From the first missions the 4th TFS was directed to

collect BDA in addition to strike control, and as the ground

war approached, the unit was further tasked to monitor

friendly ground units to prevent fratricide on a fast-moving

battlefield.

Riyadh believed the killer scouts “increased the effectiveness

of the F-16 force . . . three or fourfold.” 210 Killer Scouts also

improved feedback to CENTAF headquarters. General Glosson

noted on 14 February that “F-16 (killer scouts) have more

than doubled the F-16 BDA per 24 hours.” 211 A more distant

appraisal reveals that this innovation clearly alleviated some

problems that affected operations in the KTO but not all of

them. The scouts definitely minimized large-scale target

acquisition for many flights of fighters. When weather affected

the theater, the scouts located areas suitable for operations

and directed fighters there. This function was particularly

important to the heavily armed F-16s flying missions from

KKMC; with less loiter time due to light fuel loads, these

missions needed to acquire the target quickly. The scouts may

have increased BDA flowing to CENTAF, but their BDA did not

affect ARCENT (or CENTCOM) figures because the ground

components refused to accept F-16 BDA. One critical problem

killer scouts did not normally resolve was that of precise

target discrimination. The Iraqi deception efforts were not

uniformly perceived within the squadron.212 Although the

scouts flew with binoculars and were the pilots most familiar

with the KTO, there were limits to what could be discerned,

and some Iraqi deception measures were very difficult to

penetrate.213 Even if decoys were detected, many of the killer

scouts believed that their primary purpose was to identify

lucrative target concentrations, not to provide close control. 214

CENTAF’s frustration and uncertainty with poor feedback

and questionable effectiveness led to a major innovation that

helped resolve both problems simultaneously. Two groups

within the headquarters in Riyadh independently concluded

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that the precision of LGBs coupled with the visual feedback

provided by videotape could improve progress towards

CENTAF’s 50 percent attrition goal.215

The idea that LGB attacks on the Republican Guard might

be practical had two foundations. Laser-guided bombs had

been used against tanks during the Vietnam War on several

occasions, and at least one member of General Glosson’s staff,

Lt Col Richard B. H. Lewis, was familiar with their potent ial.216

A Desert Shield training exercise, Night Camel, had revealed

that armored targets were visible at night when viewed

through infrared sensors such as the F-111’s Pave Tack laser

designator.217 Supported by these concepts, General Glosson

made preparations for LGB attacks on the RGFC. As the GAT

planners prepared to introduce F-111s to the KTO, TACC

operations personnel led by Generals Olsen and Corder

arrived at a similar conclusion regarding LGBs. 218

The F-111 wing commander, Col Tom Lennon, was reported

to have initially resisted the idea.219 Loitering over the

Republican Guard at high altitude ran contrary to the F-111

belief in the low-altitude, single pass, night attack as the key

to survival. Lennon appears to have quickly been won over to

the idea; he led a limited trial of two LGB-armed aircraft. The

crews successfully expended 500-pound GBU-12s on revetted

Iraqi positions on 5 February. With positive results from the

initial effort, the wing increased its effort to 44 sorties the next

night.220 Quickly labeled tank plinking, LGB attacks were

incorporated into the daily ATO, which scheduled roughly 50

F-111 sorties into the KTO per night.221 The innovation required

three days from conception to full-scale implementation and

illuminates the mental flexibility of commanders for seizing the

opportunity and the initiative of crews in working out the

tactics without training.

The wing’s GLO displayed commendable enthusiasm in

assisting the crews prepare for LGB missions. Demonstrating

personal initiative and using contacts with ARCENT, he

provided targeting information beyond what was available

through normal intelligence channels.222 The GLO’s ground

unit information increased the wing’s orientation on the

Republican Guard allowing F-111 crews to find target

concentrations quickly. This assistance was a necessary step

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for success because the infrared sensor used to designate aim

points for LGBs is poorly suited for autonomous search for

targets. Exact targeting information, however was beyond the

wing’s reach, and crews acknowledged many bad targets were

likely to have been struck with the good. 223

Additional weapons systems capable of employing LGBs

were quickly incorporated into the effort. Navy A-6Es equipped

with laser designators dropped some LGBs in the KTO but

were constrained by limited numbers of LGB guidance kits on

board the carriers.224 F-15E Strike Eagles, already dropping

CBU-87 and Mk-82 on KTO positions, were also tasked to

commence LGB operations once the system was certified to

carry the GBU-12 by aerodynamic engineers in the United

States.225 The F-15E wing was extremely limited in the

number of LGB attacks it could generate because only a

limited number of laser designator pods were available.

Deployed almost direct from the factory to the desert, the

targeting pod was new to F-15E crews and maintenance

personnel. Roughly six to eight targeting pods were available

each day, and crews with previous LGB experience (from

F-111 or F-4 assignments) flew the first missions. 226

F-15E crews showed considerable flexibility in developing

new tactics and incorporating new hardware.227 The lack of

targeting pods caused the unit to develop imaginative “buddy

lasing” tactics. This concept, founded partly on F-4 and F-111

laser tactics, allowed formations of F-15Es to use one

designator-equipped aircraft to illuminate targets for itself and

for a nonlaser equipped wingman. The problems of

coordinating attacks on unplanned aim points at night were

unique and considerable. In order to develop these tactics,

flight leaders took their best guess as to how to accomplish

the attacks and refined the tactics in careful postmission

debriefings.228 In the most successful instances, flights from

the squadron were able to attack 16 discrete aim points in a

single mission (dropping eight LGBs per aircraft). 229 The rapid

tactics development and smooth integration of new technology

without additional training reveals an impressive capacity for

adaptation by the USAF’s well-trained and highly motivated

crews. Furthermore, it demonstrates considerable faith on the

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part of Air Force leaders in allowing their crews to work out

the best tactics in combat.230

The effectiveness of the tank plinking missions was difficult

to argue with all weapons deliveries clearly recorded on a

three-fourth-inch videotape. Literally thousands of targets

were seen engulfed in flames as the bombs hit. In some

instances, pieces of metal were observed coming from the

explosion. However, these dramatic recordings did have

limitations, the rapid “blooming” of the infrared (IR) screen

that follows the explosion of a bomb can mask the actual

point of impact, and it certainly masks the effect on the

target.231 In spite of this potential limitation, the LGB

innovation appears to have been one of the most effective

changes by CENTAF.

CENTAF persuaded ARCENT and MARCENT to adopt a final

innovation by convincing them to accept videotapes of LGB

attacks as a source of valid BDA. With this modification of

existing procedures, the progress of the air attrition effort

began to show dramatic progress.232 ARCENT J-2 established

rules that permitted accounting of LGB kills recorded on

videotape (if verified by a ground liaison officer), A-10 kills,

and all kills confirmed by imagery.233 The contribution of all

other aircraft reports were disregarded in this process, leading

to emotional responses from CENTAF. ARCENT’s rules were,

in fact, no more than a model: a means to estimate progress.

This model, however, was used to judge CENTAF performance,

and therefore resulted in “ruffled feathers.” Any model has

limitations, but if ARCENT had not been persuaded to accept

VTR and A-10 BDA, the 50 percent destruction might not

have been perceived until D+100.234

CENTAF’s adaptation to the realities of war reveals an

unusually high degree of organizational flexibility. So many

changes were implemented quickly, effectively, and

simultaneously. These changes reflect favorably on the

organization. One is challenged to find a military organization

that was able to incorporate so many innovations in a similar

10-day period.

At this point it is possible to make some observations on

patterns common to CENTAF’s process of adaptation. First,

observation and analysis must lead to the perception that

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adaptation is desirable. The fog of war, however, impairs one’s

powers of observation and ability to correctly analyze. For this

reason, the most important adaptations by Riyadh were the

rapid establishment of alternate sources of information. The

additional information provided by cockpit videotapes, informal

connections to Washington, A-10 observations, and later, the

use of the killer scouts allowed the commanders and staff in

Riyadh to perceive battlefield realities more effectively. Feedback

from ARCENT (the 99 percent estimate) immediately provided a

strong perception that adaptation was required.

With the need to adapt apparent, CENTAF was able to make

adjustments to increase effectiveness. Ideas came from a

variety of sources, although three sources stand out: the

network of junior officers, many Fighter Weapons School

graduates, that linked the Black Hole, wing planning cells,

and flying squadrons. The second source, a small group of

FWS instructors, was brought to the TACC as troubleshooters.

These individuals, free from the ATO process, worked on

specific issues for the commanders. The third source was

CENTAF’s senior leaders. The general officers in Riyadh took

an energetic and helpful part in working out optimal solutions

to perceived problems.235 General Horner clearly expected his

headquarters staff to innovate, and he made this clear to them

from the start of the war: “If you have a good idea about

tactics or target selection or things of that nature, they are

always welcome. . . . [There are] no bad ideas in here. . . .

Everybody has experience in one form or another in tactical

aviation and we need to talk to one another about it.” 236 The

flexible mentality and receptivity to new ideas as displayed by

Generals Horner and Glosson were necessary for successful

generation of new ideas and their aggressive implementation.

Three innovations (FOL operations, killer scouts, and tank

plinking) reveal a common pattern noted by Fred L. Frostic in

Air Campaign against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of

Operations.237 Once innovative concepts were formulated,

selected crews conducted a limited trial. If successful, the

innovation was included in the next ATO. This pattern was

practical for CENTAF because the crews were adequately

trained and motivated to be able to handle the changes and

because CENTAF commanders trusted their crews and

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planners enough to relying on the initiative and ingenuity of

those who would carry out the changes. The A-10 case

differed only in that the wing committed all of its resources to

the first attack on the Tawakalna Division instead of

attempting a limited trial. The prudence of this course of

action is clearly explained by the uncertainty the A-10 wing

faced with this new and unfamiliar tasking.

The speed of these adaptations is surprising. Only two days

were required for the A-10, F-16, and F-111 mission changes,

and four days were required for the 363d wing to initiate

large-scale operations from an FOL. Flexible aircraft and

munitions facilitated the process.

There were, however, problems that could not be adequately

solved. The first was BDA. The BDA process was broken, and

all echelons within CENTAF were painfully aware of that fact.

Despite the strong desire to correct the system, certain

obstacles could not be overcome. The BDA system was

designed to operate from the top-down, with imagery providing

hard evidence of target conditions. This architecture was

dependent on a very few collection platforms; it was physically

impossible for those few systems to supply the volume of

information required by the process. Had a bottom-up

architecture been used, strike aircraft might have been

properly equipped to provide the information (e.g., equipped

with strike cameras) and procedures in place to properly use

that information.238 Although Riyadh forced through some

elements of bottom-up BDA through cockpit VTR tapes, it was

not enough to overcome the bureaucratic inertia existing

across several independent organizations. In short BDA was

mired in bureaucracy and fundamentally flawed in its

peacetime top-down centralized framework. For the process to

work, a massive technical solution was required, which still

has not occurred as of this writing.

The second problem not adequately solved was that of

target acquisition. Aircrews attacking the KTO saw hundreds

of indistinct ground units and thousands of hard targets with

little certainty regarding which were dead, alive, decoy, or real.

Lack of continuity (which might have improved with better

target information) led to thousands of individual pictures of

the battle. When continuity was established for the daylight

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missions through the killer scouts, uneven perceptions of the

nature of the problem remained. The Iraqi Army’s extensive

deception efforts lessened CENTAF’s blows, and this was not

clearly understood within the command.

Attrition War

6–23 February 1991

We just need to keep up what we’re doing. More of the

same. The harder we hit them the sooner it’s over. I think

we have to just stick to that strategy.

—Lt Gen Charles A. Horner

After the tumultuous first week of February, CENTAF began

to register positive progress towards the Republican Guard’s

destruction within the framework established by ARCENT.

The innovations adopted at the beginning of the month were

fine tuned throughout the middle of the month. As the ground

war approached at the end of the month, CENTAF’s

intellectual and physical energies shifted south to prepare for

the final phase of the campaign.

The tank plinking and killer scout missions built confidence

among the CENTAF commanders. Videotapes of LGB attacks

were proof of positive progress. General Horner jokingly

established a nightly quota.239 When the command reached

his 100-tank goal on 11 February, Horner remarked, “I think

we have to keep doing what we’re doing . . . They seem to be

getting very effective in finding and killing targets. It’s just a

question of time.”240 Although ARCENT BDA rules discounted

F-16 results, the killer scouts improved the commander’s

vision and control of the battlefield. Due to the time spent over

the Iraqi positions, the scout pilots had the best perception of

the actual condition of the Republican Guard. Generals

Glosson and Horner spoke with the killer scout pilots on the

telephone, questioning them, and fine-tuning their targeting

guidance.241

ARCENT briefing slides on 4 February estimated the

Tawakalna Division at 59 percent strength, Hammurabi at 95

percent, and the Medinah Division at 99 percent. 242 Reflecting

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CENTAF’s changes, the figures stood at 48 percent, 92 percent,

and 83 percent by 14 February.243 After a reassessment

conducted by DIA analysts in Washington using photographs

of the entire division area, Tawakalna’s estimated strength

rose from 49 percent to 74 percent while that of other

divisions decreased slightly to 88 percent and 74 percent. 244

In an attempt to adjust the BDA model to account for the

discrepancy, ARCENT G-2 began to count only 33 percent of

the A-10 claims and 50 percent of the F-111 LGB claims. 245

ARCENT’s rationale for accepting A-10 claims at the exclusion

of others reveals a lack of understanding of air operations.

A-10 claims were accepted on the basis that they “fly in

tandem, loiter longer, and A-10 pilots train in the close air

support role.”246 The fact of the matter is that virtually all of

CENTAF’s aircraft flew in formation, the killer scouts were

loitering two to three times longer than the A-10s, and the

A-10s were performing interdiction, not CAS. The G-2’s

readjustment sent shock waves through the theater.

Subordinate army echelons were distressed by the changes:

“By the middle of February, division intelligence personnel

had lost much credibility with the division command group

because of recurring inexplicable changes in BDA.”247

CENTAF was understandably unhappy with the altered rules.

General Horner had often expressed his frustration with rules

established by ARCENT: “If you look at some of the videotapes

of the F-111s . . . you’re glad you’re not one of the

‘non-statistics’ or one of the ‘partially operational tanks’ in

Kuwait.”248 Members of the CENTAF staff took issue with the

change, arguing that the DIA assessment was inaccurate

because it was only able to detect catastrophic kills. 249 The

CENTAF staff was concerned that the revised rules would

cause undue targeting of ground units.

The BDA guidelines imposed by ARCENT G-2 led to

dysfunctional behavior. On 12 February General Schwarzkopf

proscribed further attacks of Iraqi units already below 50

percent.250 Because A-10s and LGB missions were the only

sorties producing sanctioned BDA, they were assigned priority

targets, while other systems were flown against weakened

units.

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The A-10 wing was subsequently ordered deeper behind

Iraqi lines to attack the Medinah Division and suffered two

losses in the process. The Medinah Division straddled the

Iraq-Kuwait border roughly 70 miles from friendly territory.

The Medinah Division was more stoutly protected than most

other divisions, and the A-10’s first appearance evoked a

strong reception.251 Comfortable with their interdiction

mission, the A-10 wing did not deem as necessary the

wing-sized attack tactics used against the Tawakalna Division

17 days earlier. Pilots believed the Iraqi air defenses were a

“known quantity”; the wing emphasis had been “creeping

northward” throughout the month as crews became more

comfortable with the environment.252 As the tide of the wing’s

efforts reached the Medinah Division 15 February, a two-ship

element went down with one pilot killed and the other

captured; another aircraft (piloted by the wing commander)

suffered major battle damage.253 When queried about the

day’s losses, Col David Sawyer’s response noted that the

losses were due to constantly increasing risk in the wing’s

tasking and ended with “believe it or not, on the way home I

flew over a flight of F-16s working a target approximately 15

miles north of the Saudi border! A-10’s over the Republican

Guard and F-16s in the southern KTO doesn’t compute.” 254

Unfortunately, using the logic of ARCENT’s BDA rules, the

action did “compute.” The A-10s were attempting to achieve

the required RGFC 50 percent attrition to ARCENT’s

satisfaction. Now able to rely on the F-111s and F-15Es,

General Horner pulled the A-10s back from the Republican

Guard. In order to minimize further losses, he restricted them

to the kill boxes adjacent to the Saudi border. 255

F-111s then assumed the predominant role against the

guards. Tallies of destroyed Iraqi tanks climbed steadily,

confirmed by what CENTAF regarded as high-quality

feedback. After viewing one evening’s results, General Horner

exclaimed that the F-111 videotapes should be required

reading at the Army War College and the A-10 Weapons

School.256 F-16s continued to pound the Republican Guard

throughout the day, guided by the 4th TFS killer scouts. The

F-16 units pushed their jets, pilots, and support personnel

harder as the month progressed, gradually increasing wing

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sortie rates.257 Some of the F-16 focus shifted towards

interdicting LOCs, as the F-16 began to perform regular

armed reconnaissance missions along roads and rivers, called

road recce and river recce. River reconnaissance became an

important task because the Iraqis compensated for the

destruction of the Euphrates bridges with increased use of

ferries, pontoon bridges, and earthen causeways. F-16s

patrolled the Euphrates daily, identifying and attacking

numerous improvised river crossing sites.258

Likewise, the heavy bombers were pushed to targets more

suited to area bombing. In spite of the fact that the B-52s

were not producing BDA, the CENTAF staff noted a certain

ARCENT infatuation for B-52 strikes on ground units. 259 This

may have been due to a perception that the bomber attacks

were yielding greater psychological than physical effects.

ARCENT apparently reduced its demand for B-52 strikes after

the G-2 was shown a photograph of an artillery position that

had been subjected to a three-ship B-52 attack. The bomb

trains had walked directly through the dispersed position but

appeared to have destroyed only one gun. 260 B-52s began to

attack area targets such as logistics sites, a mission that

capitalized on the B-52’s large payload. The B-52s also began

preparing the breaching sites along the border. Feints were

conducted with heavy breaching operations conducted in front

of the Egyptian Corps but quickly terminated when they

became too successful—Iraqis were observed reinforcing the

area in front of the Egyptians.

As the ground war approached, CENTAF’s strikes shifted south

in order to weaken the first echelon of the Iraqi Army, particularly

those units in the vicinity of the breaching sites. CENTAF’s

intellectual energies were also able to move south. General Horner

directed his staff to think about “how . . . to work a difficult close

air support operation.” Displaying his characteristic appreciation

for the knowledge of those around him, he exhorted “nobody owns

the bank as far as good ideas or brilliance around here. Think

how we’re going to work Fire Support Coordination Lines for a

tank going 20 miles an hour.”261

With attrition figures steadily rising, commanders were

confident the goals would be reached before the ground war

commenced. The attitudes of Generals Horner and

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Schwarzkopf indicate the possibility that they considered the

job already accomplished because they believed the BDA

figures to be so contrived to be irrelevant and gradually gave

up chasing the numbers.262

CENTAF’s efforts against the Republican Guard were

subjected to a final audit with the beginning of phase IV, the

ground offensive.

Ground War

24–28 February 1991

 The way home is through the RGFC.

—Lt Gen Frederick Franks

On 24 February 1991 (G day) the US-led coalition ground

forces attacked along a 400-kilometer (km) front. Two powerful

US Army Corps, the XVIII and the VII, thrust deeply into the

Iraqi Army’s west flank as the US Marine Corps (USMC) and

Arab forces pushed directly into Kuwait. As ground forces

pushed into Iraq, a steady flow of coalition fighters

accompanied the leading ground elements providing

continuous CAS coverage. The rules changed for the air war;

crews were to accept risks they had been able to avoid before.

General Glosson instructed his wing commanders that

“effective immediately there will be no altitude restrictions or

weapons delivery parameters dictated to the flight leads. . . .

Flight lead control has always been and will continue to be,

the key to the greatness of American airpower.” 263 CENTAF

crews supporting the coalition ground forces were electrified

by this premission message from Riyadh.

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ALL WING

LEADERSHIP AND CREW MEMBERS ASAP:

THE GROUND WAR HAS STARTED. OUR NUMBER ONE JOB IS

SUPPORT OF THE GROUND FORCES. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND AIR

INTERDICTION MISSIONS ARE NOT WEATHER CANCELED BY SOME

DECISION MAKER REMOVED FROM THE SCENE. THE TIME HAS

COME FOR EVERY FLIGHT LEAD TO MAKE EVERY REASONABLE

EFFORT TO ATTACK THE TARGET AND GET HIS FLIGHT BACK HOME.

OUR GROUND GUYS ARE DEPENDING ON EVERY SORTIE. FROM

NOW ON, IT IS UP TO EVERY AVIATOR TO MAKE IT HAPPEN. 264

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Some ground units used the coalition fighters to locate enemy

forces or pin down the next echelon. 265 If close air support

was not required the fighters attacked secondary interdiction

targets, often under the direction of the killer scouts. Within

two days the two US corps had pivoted to the east, poised to

smash into the Republican Guard and pocket the Iraqi forces

remaining in Kuwait. As the US Army closed with the

Republican Guard, the character of the battle had been

shaped by CENTAF’s month long duel with the Iraqi Army.

As the first troops crossed the Iraqi border, the Republican

Guard heavy divisions were estimated by ARCENT to be down

to 54 percent (Medinah), 55 percent (Tawakalna) and 77

percent (Hammurabi) strength.266 CENTAF could have driven

the figures lower with more time, but the commanders seemed

to place less importance on the 50 percent figure as the

ground war approached. Iraqi desertions made it clear that

the Iraqi Army was disintegrating. Time for increased attrition

was not available as political pressures to launch the ground

war overrode military considerations.267

The US Army made quick work of the forward Iraqi echelons

devastated by coalition air. On 26 February the 2d Armored

Cavalry Regiment (ACR) of the VII US Corps met the elements of

the Tawakalna Division. Moving east towards Kuwait, the

cavalrymen overran Tawakalna observation posts and shortly

thereafter encountered elements of the Tawakalna’s two

southern brigades mixed with remnants of other Iraqi armored

units.268 The southern elements of the Tawakalna Division were

encountered in the same positions they had occupied

throughout most of the air campaign, while the northern half of

the division appears to have displaced west into blocking

positions.269 The ACR’s engagement, later named the Battle of

73 Easting, was an intense multibattalion melee that resulted in

heavy Iraqi losses at the cost of one US life. 270 The ACR’s role

subsided when the 1st Infantry Division conducted a passage of

lines, pressing its advance into Kuwait, and completing the

destruction of the Tawakalna Division’s southernmost elements.

The northern elements of the Tawakalna Division were

subsequently engaged and overrun by the 3d Armored Division

and 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division.

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The next day (27 February), the 1st Armored Division engaged

the Medinah Division and an infantry brigade, possibly from the

Adnan Division. After scattering the infantry, the 1st Armored

Division deployed in a linear formation and hammered the Iraqi

armored division in a head-on confrontation since called the

Battle of Medinah Ridge. The 1st Armored Division claimed more

than 300 Iraqi armored vehicles destroyed, marking the death of

the Medinah Division.271

As the Medinah Division was being destroyed, the 24th

Mechanized Infantry Division swept eastwards along the

Euphrates racing to seal the Iraqi’s escape route at Basrah.

Trailing the 1st Armored Division by approximately 25 km, the

24th Mechanized Infantry Division encountered uncoordinated

pockets of resistance but not the anticipated major contact with

the Republican Guard light infantry divisions. The infantry

comprising Iraqi’s northernmost echelon, however, fled the

battlefield as the Battle of Medinah Ridge was lost.

Subsequently the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division was

unable to close with those units. Much of these infantry

divisions’ heavy equipment appeared to have been abandoned

Figure 4. Ground Offensive and RGFC Actions

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on the field of battle. The Republican Guard’s remaining heavy

division, the Hammurabi, appears to have used the Battle of

Medinah Ridge as a rearguard action to escape to the

northeast in the direction of Basrah.

When the president declared a unilateral cessation of

hostilities on the morning of 28 February, elements of the

Hammurabi Division, several Republican Guard infantry

divisions, and remains of units able to flee from Kuwait were

trapped in a small enclave southwest of Basrah. Exit from the

Basrah pocket was severely restricted by damage to the

bridges and causeway across the Euphrates. A successful

defense of the pocket was improbable if the coalition forces

chose to attack. A plan was in place to conduct an air assault

north of Basrah, sealing any escape routes across the

Euphrates. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that

the disorganized Iraqi units in the pocket would have fared

any better than the rest of the army, particularly without the

benefit of prepared defensive positions. An attack into Basrah,

however, was not a low risk option for US forces due to the

likelihood of costly urban combat.

The Hammurabi Division attempted to flee the Basrah

pocket on 2 March by skirting the 24th Mechanized Infantry

Division positions to cross the Euphrates at Rumaylah. In the

process, however, shots were exchanged with the 24th

Mechanized Infantry Division, and in the ensuing Battle of

Rumaylah, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division claimed

187 armored vehicles, 34 guns, 16 rocket launchers, and 400

wheeled vehicles destroyed. US casualties included one soldier

wounded and one M-1 destroyed.272 The Iraqis fled back

towards Basrah and were not involved in any more

engagements with the coalition. It can be assumed the

remnants of the Republican Guard divisions reformed around

Basrah and gradually filtered across the Euphrates over the

next several weeks.

Major elements of the Republican Guard were destroyed as

an effective military force. Remnants may have been lashed

together to suppress internal unrest after the war, but the

guard was no longer the most intimidating military force in

the region.273 The guard’s potential as a strategic instrument

of coercion was immeasurably diminished when two of the

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Republican Guard’s finest divisions were crushed in Desert

Storm as the third fled. No longer referred to as Iraq’s

fearsome battle hardened elite, the guard was seen now as a

technologically inferior third world force unable to effectively

wage modern war.

Although General Powell would not be able to use “smoking

tanks as kilometer posts all the way to Baghdad,” he could

use them almost all the way to Nasseriyah or Basrah had he

wished. As the weeks after the war passed, attention

inevitably turned to determining how many of Iraq’s tanks

were indeed smoking. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

analysts used reconnaissance photographs taken of the

Basrah pocket days after the war to count the survivors.

Photointerpreters counted 842 tanks, 1,412 personnel

carriers, and 279 artillery pieces trapped against the

Euphrates.274 How much of Iraq’s Army these vehicles

represented is difficult to determine, as there is no agreed

upon baseline. The CIA credited the Iraqis in the KTO with

2,655 tanks, 2,624 personnel carriers, and 889 artillery piece s.

The DIA, however, counted 3,475 tanks, 3,080 armored

personnel carriers (APC), and 2,475 artillery in the KTO before

the war.275 If no Iraqi equipment escaped from the Basrah

pocket before coalition reconnaissance photographed the

remaining hardware, it may be concluded that the coalition

destroyed between two-thirds and three-quarters of the tanks

in the KTO. Similarly, the coalition may have killed two-thirds

of Iraq’s artillery or the figure might have been nine-tenths.276

With a range of authoritative sources available, many positions

are defensible; and few may be disproved. A consensus on how

many of Iraq’s tanks were killed in Desert Storm appears to be

as difficult to establish now as it was in the midst of a war.

Appreciating that most of Iraq’s military hardware was

destroyed or captured during this famous victory, accusations

and recriminations have rebounded between the services as

each service sought to stake a claim in the postwar

mechanized body count. At least two teams traveled to Kuwait

to autopsy destroyed Iraqi tanks and determine the cause of

death. Findings, however, were inconclusive for a variety of

reasons: some vehicles had experienced multiple killing shots

(possibly from land and air attack), many others were never

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inspected because an indeterminate number of vehicles had

already been removed and because many areas were

inaccessible due to transportation limitations and the danger

posed by unexploded munitions.

In an effort to use more subjective sources, each service,

branch, and weapon system has been able to find an Iraqi

prisoner debriefing that suggests that their weapon system,

branch, or service was predominant. Each Iraqi’s experience

was certainly unique, and the coalition’s air and land power

was not spread homogeneously throughout the theater. It may

therefore be possible to suggest that each system had a

significant but distinct effect on the enemy, and the sum of

these effects is more meaningful than their disaggregation.

CENTAF’s precise effect on the Republican Guard cannot be

determined, but an examination should consider what facts

we know about the RGFC in relation to what was attempted.

CENTAF used airpower in concert with CENTCOM

psychological operations to break the guard’s capability and

will. The results were mixed. The bulk of at least two

Republican Guard heavy divisions stood and fought VII Corps,

unlike most of the non-Republican Guard units which quickly

disintegrated at the approach of coalition ground units.

Republican Guard units encountered by the XVIII Corps,

however, were unable to fight as coherent units, and as noted

by the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division commander: “They

were shocked, they were horrified. They would attempt to

resist, fire back with tank Saggers, small arms, and then

mostly surrender.”277

CENTAF attacked Iraqi LOCs and supply areas to isolate the

Iraqi Army from its supplies and to prevent its retreat. The

bridge cuts inhibited the Iraqi retreat across the Euphrates. 278

The air interdiction operation did not deprive Republican

Guard divisions the supplies required to fight in one day of

combat against US ground forces. This task was not the goal

nor would it have been possible without forcing the Iraqis to

consume their supplies; the Iraqi rounds fired in the Battle of

73 Easting may have well been the rounds carried into battle

in August the previous year. Bridge interdiction reduced Iraqi

traffic across the Euphrates, but use of ferries and pontoon

bridges allowed some reduced amount of supplies across. The

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depots south of the Euphrates would have been largely

unaffected by the bridge effort, and they were subjected to

B-52 attack. The depots, however, were so hardened and vast

they were nearly invulnerable to air attack. Gen Barry R.

McCaffrey, USA, described one area as the largest

concentration of ammunition he had ever seen, spanning an

area of 100 km by 80 km, including underground bunkers,

hospitals, and command posts.279 CENTAF planes were able

to reduce substantially Iraqi access to their logistics sites by

continuous attacks of logistics vehicles. The Iraqis were forced

to shift from a large resupply efforts to very low-rate resupply

using few vehicles to avoid coalition air attack. 280 This

reaction limited Iraqi options.281 Deprived of a robust logistics

capability, the Iraqi forces were unable to wage a prolonged

battle or a battle of maneuver. 282 Degraded logistics put the

Iraqi Army on a short tether.

By wreaked havoc on the Iraqi command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structure, the air campaign

further denied the Iraqis the option to wage a coherent

defense. Coalition air strikes hit fixed Iraqi communications

links and intimidated the Iraqis into not switching on their

radios for fear they would be detected. Air supremacy

completely denied Iraqi airborne reconnaissance.283 Although

the Tawakalna and Medinah divisions appeared to have

received the order to defend to the west, the maneuver was

executed poorly and units became entangled and confused by

air attack.284 The course of the battle suggests disrupted C 3I

had a large impact; US forces generally knew where the Iraqis

were, but the Iraqis seldom knew where the coalition forces

were.285 A commander at 73 Easting attacking from the west

encountered an Iraqi battalion oriented towards the south. 286

One group of Iraqi soldiers at 73 Easting, unaware of the

presence of US forces reacted to an artillery barrage as if they

were under air attack by leaving their fighting vehicles and

taking cover.287 General McCaffrey’s arrival in the Euphrates

valley was a complete surprise to the Iraqis. One armored

battalion commander captured by the division was not aware

of the Americans 300 km in the Iraqi rear; when the division

artillery shelled an Iraqi airfield, the base responded with AAA,

unaware of the American’s ground presence.288 General

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McCaffrey labeled the RGFC infantry units divisions only “in

theory” and described the Iraqi operational level command

and control as “shattered.”289

At the tactical level, guard armor was no match for US

equipment, nor were Iraq’s top soldiers a match for the

soldiers of the VII or XVIII Corps. Iraqi T-72s were vulnerable

to coalition weapons, even many that were not expected to be

effective against armor.290 The American M-1A1, however,

proved impervious to most of Iraq’s weapons. Advantages in

American sights and ballistics computers gave them a decisive

edge at long range. At closer ranges individual American

initiative and superior training paid off. US soldiers were at a

peak when the ground war commenced, having adhered to a

heavy training schedule during the air campaign. Iraqi

soldiers, normally requiring extensive workup training, were

unable to prepare for the ground war under steady air attack.

Iraqi soldiers were, instead, trained by weeks of bombing to

flee their crew-serviced weapons and seek shelter.

Iraq’s respected long-range artillery that survived the air

campaign was ineffective. Denied air surveillance by coalition

air superiority, Iraqi artillery units lacked any meaningful

targeting capability.291 Intimidated by continuous air

presence, the Iraqis never turned on their counterbattery

radars.292 There is evidence that some Iraqi artillery positions

may not have been manned as US units approached. 293 Iraqi

fires were described as “erratic” and “completely ineffective.”294

The units that were able to fire were dealt with swiftly. US

units were able to use counterbattery radars continuously to

silence Iraqi fires with powerful rocket barrages. Fixed in place

by destruction of their prime movers, Iraqi artillerymen faced

a dilemma: stay and die or abandon the equipment and

live.295

Iraqi weapons systems were diminished by CENTAF attacks.

That there was ground fighting, and in some cases very

intense fighting, suggests the 50 percent attrition figu re

was not of primary importance. As Lt Gen Frederick Franks,

VII Corps commander remarked, “50 percent didn’t mean

much to Capt. McMaster” (a company commander at 73

Easting). Airpower’s value to the RGFC battle seems to reside

in the options it took away from the enemy commander.

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Constrained logistics meant he couldn’t go far or fight long;

damaged C2 meant he couldn’t coordinate his actions;

airpower blinded his artillery and pinned his units, setting the

Republican Guard for the coup de grâce to be administered by

combined air and ground forces during phase IV.

The Keys to Innovation

This analysis has found that USAF preparations in the

decade prior to Desert Storm did not adequately predict the

tactics needed to operate against the Republican Guard, but

CENTAF capitalized on the initiative and flexibility nurtured in

Air Force personnel to overcome obstacles to innovation and

make timely and effective changes to satisfy theater objectives.

USAF operational and tactical doctrines as practiced by Air

Force units prior to the Gulf War were not well suited to the

task at hand due to their predominantly European

orientation. USAF planners correctly identified many of the

new conditions CENTAF faced and crafted a promising plan to

defeat the Republican Guard. Some significant features of the

planners’ concept of operations, however, were lost in the

transition from war on paper to reality. As the war

approached, most of CENTAF’s combat wings recognized the

need to shift from low-altitude tactics and unevenly shifted to

high-altitude operations. When air operations commenced

against the Republican Guard, results quickly fell short of

expectations. Without hesitation CENTAF initiated six

innovations to improve results. Nearly simultaneously

CENTAF instituted A-10 deep interdiction and reconnaissance,

F-16 FOL operations, killer scouts, tank plinking, and the use

of VTR tape as BDA. These innovations increased CENTAF’s

effectiveness and enabled it to satisfy the theater objectives.

The experience of the Gulf War appears to corroborate

Michael Howard’s assertion that “whatever doctrine the armed

forces are working on now, they have got it wrong.” 296 Neither

side’s doctrine was right: the USAF’s air offensive against the

Republican Guard looked entirely different than what had

been envisioned in deep air attack doctrine. The objective

changed from delay and disruption of a rapidly advancing

ground force to destruction of a dug-in ground force, a task

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enormously harder to achieve and to measure. Likewise, the

tactics required in the Persian Gulf looked entirely different

than those designed for deep air attack in Europe. Confronted

with new realities of the Gulf War environment, CENTAF

wings set aside the tactics in which they were trained and

generated new ones.

Iraq’s static defense was completely unsuited against an

opponent who seized the initiative and was able and willing to

deliver telling blows in depth. The flaws in Iraq’s reliance on

ground-based air defenses (which might have been suitable

for deflecting most regional air forces) were quickly revealed

with the collapse of Iraq’s air defense system as the country

was laid bare to heavy air attack. Unstoppable air strikes on

an army that had enjoyed air superiority in its previous war

left it no choice but to disperse and dig in deeper. When that

Army attempted to change and seize the initiative at Khafji,

unimpeded air attacks drove it back. Iraqi doctrine, in

Howard’s words, “was too badly wrong.” The Iraqi Army was

unable to influence the course of events. Deprived of options,

it continued to decay under constant pressure from the air.

Critically weakened by air attack, the house of cards collapsed

when the coalition ground attack kicked in the door.

What sets CENTAF apart from other military organizations

is the speed of its adaptation process. Time frames of

successful wartime innovations are typically discussed in

terms of months and years, CENTAF transformed ideas into

reality in days. During the week between 27 January and 6

February, CENTAF changed the entire character of the air

battle with the Republican Guard. By streamlining the

feedback system (VTR generated BDA) the effects of tank

plinking were detected immediately. Likewise, daytime killer

scout operations provided another streamlined information

conduit to the commander so effects of the changes could be

quickly evaluated. These measures allowed CENTAF to realize

it had found a winning combination. Constant surveillance of

the Iraqi Army reduced its capability to react: killer scouts

monitored all Iraqi movements during the day, while JSTARS

watched the Iraqis at night. Although the theater time frame

for phase III of the campaign was left open-ended, air

objectives were essentially fulfilled by the time the ground

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preparations were complete by D+38.297 If CENTAF had not

been able to modify significantly its operations, the desired

attrition might not have been reached (or perceived) until

D+100, adversely impacting the campaign timetable.298

CENTAF’s innovations resulted in savings of time, material,

and manpower in the effort to reduce the Republican Guard to

50 percent strength. With the understanding that perceived

progress does not equal actual progress, use of VTR tapes

improved perceived progress towards the 50 percent goal. This

enhanced feedback certainly saved material and time that

would have been expended to satisfy the slower imagerydependent BDA process. A-10 deep interdiction saved time

and resources by applying additional systems against the

Republican Guard. The A-10’s munitions (Maverick and

30-mm cannon) made the probability of success higher on

each sortie. F-16 FOL operations saved time by increasing the

daily output of sorties, while the killer scouts made many of

these sorties more effective by directing them to the most

suitable targets. Tank plinking reduced expenditures of

ordnance by increasing the accuracy of each weapon

delivered, in addition to conserving the resources required to

carry that extra ordnance. The F-111, A-6, and F-15 tank

plinkers also saved time by attacking multiple targets with a

high chance of success. One tactical adaptation, however,

increased time and munitions expenditures. The shift to

high-altitude attacks increased time and expenditures in

order to conserve manpower. The potential material and

political costs of the heavy losses that would have occurred at

low altitude are likely to have offset potential savings in other

areas. The shift to high altitude appears to have been a

prudent decision in spite of increased time and munitions

required.

The adaptive process used by CENTAF appears to be well

modeled by the OODA loop. All four steps were present in

CENTAF’s successful adaptations.

• Observation yielding information on the state of enemy

forces and actions, friendly forces and actions, and the

environment.

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• Orientation resulting in the perception that change is

desirable (born from either opportunity or necessity).

• Decision incorporating mental and institutional flexibility

that promotes the development of new ideas and the

resolve to try them.

• Action capitalizing on the organizational and technical

abilities to implement the innovation.

Several conditions had a major impact on CENTAF’s ability

to adapt effectively to the requirements of the war.

Air Superiority. Air superiority created a permissive

environment for innovative tactics. CENTAF had near total

freedom of action above 10,000 ft in the KTO. This freedom of

action gave the combat wings the ability to experiment in as a

benign environment as possible in wartime. Nearly everybody

came back, allowing discussion and refinement of new tactics.

Low losses gave the CENTAF commanders a certain “cognitive

freedom of action.” Freed from undue concern about losses,

CENTAF was able to focus on how to defeat the Republican

Guard.

Open-Minded Attitudes of Senior Commanders. This

interaction of new ideas and flexible attitudes nurtured the

growth of new methods from all quadrants. General Horner

admitted to not having all the answers and encouraged his

staff to offer suggestions. Headquarters was responsive to the

inputs of the wings. Interaction occurred between

headquarters and the wings at several levels and the ATO,

easily misunderstood as a one-way demand, was described by

one Desert Storm wing commander as “a compromise between

the wing and the fraggers . . . a negotiated product.” 299 The

tolerance for new ideas and flexible attitudes of commanders

allowed subordinates to contribute to their fullest potential.

Faith in Motivated and Well-Trained Subordinates. This

condition of faith in subordinates allowed units to find optimal

solutions to complex problems in minimum time. Riyadh

devised new roles for several CENTAF wings but never told

them how to accomplish them. One wing commander said

“Riyadh never determined tactics.”300 Wing and squadron

commanders had a similar faith in their crews to be able to

improvise procedures and integrate new systems without

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guidance. Integral to this faith in subordinates were high

expectations. One senior Black Hole planner noted that “[Gen]

Glosson expected package and mission commanders to

exercise tactical initiative, that is, to find their own tankers

[when plans were changed at the last minute] or to make

major in-flight adjustments.”301

Personal Initiative. Personal initiative of the aircrews was

cultivated on US training and tactics ranges, in the classroo ms

at Nellis AFB, and in flight briefing rooms across the USAF

and was the bedrock of the adaptation process. The USAF’s

continuing commitment to training yielded immense dividends

in the Gulf War. The USAF Fighter Weapons School fostered

tactical excellence among its graduates, who then carried

these exacting standards throughout the Air Force. The

realistic, unscripted training conducted at Red Flag provided

aircrews with the opportunity to solve complex tactical

problems in the face of a live, reacting enemy. The personal

initiative of the USAF aircrews was enhanced by their

technical aptitudes. Aircrews displayed a striking capacity for

integrating and optimizing the use of new systems on the

battlefield without guidance.

This study does not suggest that adaptation in war is easy.

The obstacles are formidable. If any of the elements of the

adaptation process are missing or significantly impaired,

adaptation is unlikely. Impaired observation, orientation, and

action inhibited CENTAF’s adaptation process. Obstacles to

observation impaired adaptation by the night low-level

interdiction wings and CENTAF headquarters. During Desert

Storm, when most CENTAF wings transitioned from low- to

high-altitude tactics, the night low-level community was

unable to test (and observe) the utility of high-altitude attacks

and were therefore reluctant to change. CENTAF’s widespread

underappreciation of Iraqi deception reveals the difficulty

posed by an enemy attempting to hinder observation.

Suffering from vision impaired by Iraqi countermeasures,

Riyadh never appropriately addressed the problem posed by

Iraqi decoys.

Inappropriate orientation contributed to the delayed shift to

high altitude by the night low-level interdictors. The low flyers

were slow to perceive the need or opportunity to change

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75
tactics due to their “get as low and fast as possible and hide”

culture.

Organizational friction was an impediment to implementing

adaptations. The technologically intensive top-down

intelligence process could not be completely overcome.

Bottom-up BDA was accepted by ARCENT for only a few

weapons systems and only if verified by an Army GLO. The

competing demands on theater airpower prevented

implementation of the CINC’s desire to concentrate in order to

devastate one division. CENTAF’s tasks were many, and each

drew off strength from the main goal.

Several significant problems were never overcome. Most

stemmed from the objective of the air battle with the RGFC.

CENTAF’s task of attacking the Republican Guard included

operations against morale, command and control, logistics,

and artillery and armor. The effects of most of these actions

were not easily quantifiable, nor did they capture US senior

commanders’ attention as the 50 percent figure did. The

evidence suggests that the nonquantifiable efforts may have

been more significant to the ground offensive than pure

attrition of armor or artillery. If the enemy does not know

which way to orient his tanks, or where to target his artillery,

then they are all rendered potentially ineffective. If he cannot

respond to ground maneuver because his logistics are

restricted, or because he is under continuous aerial

observation and attack, then his combat potential falls off

dramatically. Means to measure these important areas were

never institutionalized and their contributions were

underappreciated. Frustration with the process used to

measure 50 percent attrition eventually led to its diminution

in importance to the American senior commanders. General

Schwarzkopf gradually reverted to weight of CENTAF effort as

his main measure of merit against the guards. A fundamental

change to the measures of merit used to judge effectiveness

seems to have been warranted but was never instituted.

Even the attrition goal proved to be devilishly hard to

measure. The efforts spent chasing it may not have been

justified. The problems created by an effort to destroy 50

percent of the hard targets in a large, dispersed, and mobile

target array exceeded Riyadh’s capabilities to guide strikes to

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the appropriate place. Targeting defaulted to the wings as

airpower with “airshaft accuracy” was sprinkled

indiscriminately over 900 square-mile kill boxes. Some of the

wing GLOs and intelligence personnel were able to procure

targeting materials outside normal channels to aid in

targeting, but this was not done uniformly. Killer scouts

helped sort out some of the targeting problems but had limited

success identifying individual aim points.

The other problem illuminated by the 50 percent figure was

the inability of intelligence to measure progress accurately.

The problem was beyond the intelligence system’s technical or

manpower capabilities. Staffs were never able to calculate

actual BDA. At best ARCENT devised an imperfect model that

never reconciled the contributions of several weapons

systems.

The innovations used against the Republican Guard came

from both the CENTAF staff in Riyadh and its combat wings.

These innovations circulated throughout a network of

connections between the staff and the units in the field.

Commanders and tactics experts in Riyadh conceived A-10

deep interdiction, A-10 reconnaissance, F-16 FOL operations,

and tank plinking. General Glosson then instructed his wings

to carry out those new missions. Riyadh, however, refrained

from informing wings on how to accomplish the new tasks.

Wing and squadron commanders, operations officers, and

weapons officers often decided how to implement the changes.

Success, however, rode squarely on the shoulders of the

mission planners, tacticians, and flight leaders.

The shift from low-altitude tactics to high altitude was

accomplished at the unit level, as tactics were considered a

matter best left for the wings to decide. In an effort to clarify

how much risk was acceptable, individual units and wings

instituted minimum weapons delivery altitudes, leading to a

variety of standards throughout the command. The seeds of

the killer scouts were sown by the 388th TFW (P) mission

planners when they used wing assets to validate targets for

follow-on formations. There is a degree of simultaneity in this

innovation, as Riyadh was considering a similar concept when

the wing brought up the matter. The concept was well received

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in Riyadh and was quickly institutionalized with commandwide impact.

Several innovations were internal to the echelon that

instituted them. The struggle to use VTR tape as BDA resided

and was handled at the headquarters level. Likewise, integration

of new systems such as the LANTIRN targeting pod were

internal to the wings and tactics to optimize employment (such

as F-15E buddy-lase tactics) were best decided at the wing.

In all cases and at all levels, networks of motivated

individuals stepped forward to take personal initiative and

solve the problems at hand as their ideas flowed freely

throughout the organization.

Implications

CENTAF’s struggle in the Persian Gulf War indicates

wartime and peacetime imperatives.

The United States Air Force must sustain in peacetime its

ability to adapt during war. The Air Force’s central maxim

states “flexibility is the key to airpower.” The Gulf War

validated this maxim and illuminated the need to perpetuate

it. There are four avenues that must be pursued to ensure the

organization is flexible enough to meet future demands. The

first quality that must be sustained is the mental capability

for flexibility. CENTAF personnel possessed the ability to solve

unexpected situations quickly because they were trained to do

so. The tough, realistic training accomplished at exercises

such as Red Flag nurtured mental flexibility. Aggressive

problem solving, like that encouraged at the USAF FWS, must

be perpetuated throughout the USAF. Hard training, without

“school solutions,” is the means that must be pursued.

The same requirement for mental flexibility applies towards

joint training. Increased familiarity with sister component

procedures and information is necessary to lessen

organizational friction. Increased awareness and

communications between component staffs, beyond that

conducted in formal meetings, may facilitate adaptation at the

operational level. The alternative, comprehensive and

prescriptive joint doctrine, is a two-edged sword. Strengthened

joint doctrine has the potential to smooth out some

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interservice frictions. Established BDA guidelines, for

example, might have eliminated some of the frictions that

arose from the ground component’s evaluation of air

operations. The risk of enhanced joint doctrine is that it may

not be worth the price if it institutionalizes fixed procedures

that result in school solutions.

Although mental agility can accomplish much, it must be

supported by physical capacity. If a large portion of the force

is based on single-purpose, specialized weapon systems, there

is the danger that no mental flexibility may be able to

compensate. High-quality, high-capacity, multirole systems

best enable the Air Force to adapt to the unanticipated

realities of war in the future. Physical limitations to

intelligence systems aggravated the contentious dispute over

BDA and restricted the availability of valuable targeting

materials, underscoring the continuing requirement to

improve intelligence collection and distribution. Enhanced

physical capability, however, may not be able to solve the

problems posed by an adversary determined to deny certain

information to us, making some uncertainty in war inevitable.

Institutional capability for adaptation must be built into the

organization. Frequent two-way communications between

headquarters and the field allowed for a collective approach

towards finding optimal solutions to tough problems.

Innovations originated from both the top and the bottom. The

system must allow for the incorporation of solutions from

either direction. Several important innovations originated from

a group of (tactical) experts at the headquarters; there seems

to be cause for establishing a permanent cell within each

numbered Air Force dedicated to adaptation and analysis. A

group of officers with wide educations and critical minds

should be trained to examine tactical and operational issues

to determine what is working, what is not, and what can be

improved. This cell should work directly for the air component

commander to assist the planning and operations sections of

the air operations center.

The most important quality that facilitates adaptation, the

ultimate arbiter, resides in the attitude of the commander.

Future commanders would be well advised to encourage

individual initiative and creative solutions from their

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subordinates. This flows from faith in one’s subordinates, and

encourages them to make decisions in the face of uncertainty.

Faith is manifested in the decentralization of decision making.

Such faith does not come easily. General Horner stated, “It’s

very difficult for military people to learn to let go. We want to

be in control.” Decentralization, however, is the “fundamental

way you release the initiative of thousands of people.” 302

The final implication of this study suggests that in wartime,

air component planners need to devise and articulate more

meaningful objectives for air operations against enemy land

forces. These objectives must closely reflect air’s multifaceted

effects on land forces. They should be expressed as degraded

capabilities of the enemy force that will facilitate

accomplishment of the theater objective in light of the overall

theater campaign plan. Development of more comprehensive

objectives should lead to the better understanding and

measurement of airpower’s contributions to a joint campaign.

Objectives that better represent what airpower does may

reduce the interservice frictions that sprang from the use of a

single criterion. This broader approach can not only clarify

airpower contributions but it can lead to a clearer picture of

the state of the adversary. This may help us avoid hammering

away at an enemy in pursuit of a fixed-attritional goal as his

soldiers surrender to newsmen and passing helicopters.

Broader criteria may also compensate for enemy tactical

deception, because he will be hard-pressed to mask all

indicators of the state of his forces. The Air Force needs to

think about and identify means to measure air operations

against land forces during peacetime because the press of war

does not provide time for reflection and analysis.

Notes

1. The KTO includes Kuwait and Iraqi territory south of 31 degrees

north latitude and east of 44 degrees, 30 minutes east longitude.

2. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), vol. 5, A Statistical Compendium

and Chronology (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO],

1993), pt. 1: 468. GWAPS data lists 6,047 USAF air strikes on kill boxes

AF7, AG7, and AE6 (main dispersal areas of the RGFC). Navy and Marine

aircraft reported 316 air strikes while other coalition aircraft reported 90.

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80
3. Harold R. Winton, “On Doctrine: Thinking about How to Think about

War,” lecture, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 26

August 1994.

4. The influence of political, social, economic, and technological changes

on the conduct of war are well described in Michael Howard, War in

European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

5. Sir Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Journal of

the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 119 (March 1974): 4.

6. The Russian victory over Finland came after great initial setbacks to

the Russians. The Russians exhibited little adaptation to the requirements

of the environment and prevailed through sheer mass, at great cost.

Richard W. Condon, The Winter War: Russia against Finland (New York:

Ballantine Books, 1972).

7. Lt Gen John H. Cushman, “Challenge and Response at the

Operational and Tactical Levels, 1914–1945,” in Military Effectiveness, eds.

Allan Millet and Williamson Murray (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

8. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern

Military (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).

9. USAF difficulties in Vietnam caused by its strategic nuclear focus is a

theme of Earl H. Tilford Jr. in Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and

Why (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991).

10. Rosen, 22–39.

11. James H. Doolittle with Bernie Lay Jr., “Daylight Precision

Bombing,” IMPACT: The Army Air Forces’ Confidential Picture History of

World War II, n. d., bk. 6, xv.

12. Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” 8.

13. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914–1918 (Boston: Little, Brown

and Co., 1930), 249–60.

14. The OODA loop is mentioned positively in the current Air Force

Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force ,

vol. 2, March 1992, 22 and was described as “the decision cycle” in an

article published by Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan. Gen Gordon R.

Sullivan and Col James M. Dubik, “War in the Information Age,” Military

Review, April 1994.

15. John R. Boyd, briefing slides, subject: A Discourse on Winning and

Losing, August 1987, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

16. Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, ed.

and trans. Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press,

1993), 185.

17. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), bk. 1, chap.

6.

18. Rosen, 38.

19. Boyd, slide 16.

20. Cushman, 334.

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81
21. Martin L. van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1985), 232–60.

22. Maj Michael R. Macedonia, USA, “Information Technology in Desert

Storm,” Military Review, October 1992, 37–38.

23. Cushman, 334.

24. Clausewitz, bk. 1, chap. 3.

25. “Haig was supported by the conviction that his strategical opinion,

based upon the ceaseless study of a lifetime, could not be wrong. He was, in

fact, the incarnation of Field Service Regulations in the 1909 edition. He

fought by a book of rules. His mind ran on rails.” J. F. C. Fuller ( Daily Mail

7-5-38) as quoted in Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment (New

York: Viking, 1991), 162–63.

26. Clausewitz, bk. 1, chap. 7.

27. Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in

German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War, Leavenworth Papers 4

(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute [CSI], 1981), 56.

28. Lt Col Leonard D. G. Teixeira, “Linebacker II: A Strategic and

Tactical Case Study” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1990), 7–26.

29. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep

Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991).

30. Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the

War in Europe, 1944–1945 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press,

1994), 282.

31. Ibid., 281.

32. Ibid.

33. Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of

the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 3–9; and Brig Gen

Robert H. Scales Jr., USA, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), 44–45.

34. Richard Jupa and James Dingeman, “The Republican Guards:

Loyal, Aggressive, Able,” Army 41, no. 3 (March 1991): 57.

35. Ibid., 58, 61.

36. Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum (New

York: Praeger, 1992), 93–109.

37. Stephen C. Pelletiere, Douglas V. Johnson II, and Leif R.

Rosenberger, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East (Carlisle

Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1990), 9–23.

38. Ibid.

39. Capt James M. Warford, USA, “The Tanks of Babylon: Main Battle

Tanks of the Iraqi Army,” Armor, November–December 1990. Warford, an

instructor at the Armor Officer Advanced Course, noted the T-72 was first

seen by the West when paraded by the Soviets in 1977. Iraqi gun and armor

modifications to the T-55 “may have effectively brought this 32-year-old

tank into the 1990s,” 23. A postwar evaluation of the T-72 in Military

Technology finds the entire armor design philosophy of the former Soviet

Union “fundamentally flawed” with its emphasis of quantity and small size

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over quality and sophistication. Enzo Bonsignore, “Tank Experience Raises

Tank Survivability Issues,” Military Technology, February 1992, 64–70.

40. National Training Center Handbook 100-91, The Iraqi Army:

Organization and Tactics, Fort Irwin, Calif., 3 January 1991, 25–31.

41. Ibid., 15.

42. Jupa and Dingeman, 61–62.

43. Pelletiere, Johnson, and Rosenberger, 23–36.

44. It is likely that this battle shaped the thoughts of Iraqi armor

commanders prior to the Desert Storm ground offensive. Capt Aaron Danis,

“A Military Analysis of Iraqi Army Operations,” Armor, November–December

1990, 14–15.

45. Col Wallace Franz, USA, Retired, “Defeating the Iraqis—Saddam’s

Troops Are Not Ready for a War of Maneuver,” Armor, January–February

1991, 8–9.

46. GWAPS, vol. 1, Planning and Command and Control (Washington,

D.C.: GPO, 1993), pt. 1:204.

47. Republican Guard positions were observed by the author from the

air and on the ground during Operation Desert Storm.

48. Described by Maj Gen Barry R. McCaffrey in Senate testimony as: “A

giant logistics complex . . . [with] 1300 or more places where there were 20

or more tons of ammunition and supplies—lots of underground bunkers

that would go for a kilometer or so; [with] underground fuel storage areas.”

US Senate, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Hearings before the

Committee on Armed Services, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991, 114.

49. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero

(New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 346. Schwarzkopf also believed that if a

counterattack appeared too risky the Republican Guard might attempt to

stay out of the battle by taking refuge inside the Iraqi border.

50. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 16

March 1984, v. A more recent version of AFM 1-1 was issued after the Gulf

War, but this study uses the 1984 version of AFM 1-1 because it was in

effect during the war.

51. Ibid., 2-11, 2-13.

52. Ibid., 1-1, 2-13.

53. Ibid., 3-3.

54. War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and

Employment of Air Power, 21 July 1943, 16–17. This manual illuminates the

difference in attack against lines of communication, versus small,

well-dispersed targets near the front. Attacks on moving formations and

lines of communications are emphasized in J. C. Slessor, Air Power and

Armies (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 92. The vulnerability of

moving forces is also underscored in Col John A. Warden III, The Air

Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s,

1989), 71–85.

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83
55. AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations—Counter Air, Close Air Support, and

Air Interdiction, 2 May 1969, 7-2. Surprisingly, this 26-year-old manual is

still the Air Force’s most current official statement of operational doctrine.

56. Ibid., 7-3, 7-4.

57. Tactical Air Command Pamphlet 50-26, Training and Doctrine

Command Pamphlet 525-16, US Redcom Pamphlet 5245-4, Joint

Operational Concept: Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK), 13

December 1982, 1-3.

58. Ibid., iii, 1-3.

59. Ibid., 1-2.

60. Gen Bernard W. Rogers, “Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths

and Realities,” NATO Review, December 1974, 1.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., 2.

63. Lt Col Price T. Bingham, Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the

Operational Art, CADRE Paper no. AU-ARI-CP-89-2 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

University Press, 1989).

64. Charles D. Lloyd, “A Technological Success Story: Joint Stars and

Operation Desert Storm,” Air Power History 38, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 27–35.

65. James Blackwell, “The Status of Follow-on Forces Attack

Technologies,” Military Technology, October 1988, 115–24. Glenn W.

Goodman, “New Airborne Sensors Look Deep, Allow Army/USAF to Strike

Deep,” Armed Forces Journal International, January 1989, 84–87.

66. “Tactical doctrine applies basic and operational doctrine to military

actions by describing the proper use of specific weapons systems to

accomplish detailed objectives.” AFM 1-1, 1984, vi.

67. These manuals (three dash series) are multicommand manuals

(MCM) because they apply to several Air Force commands, normally

including Air Combat Command (formerly TAC), United States Air Forces in

Europe, and Pacific Air Forces.

68. MCM 3-1, Mission Employment, vol. 1, Tactics, Tactical Employment,

General Planning and Employment Considerations, 11 November 1992, ii.

69. Ibid., 3-1, A 13-1.

70. MCM 3-1, Tactical Doctrine, vol. 5, Tactical Employment—F-16, 1

January 1995, i–ii.

71. All USAF wings that fought in Desert Storm had formal tasking for

Europe except the 363d TFW from Shaw AFB, S.C. GWAPS, vol. 4,

Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations (Washington, D.C.:

GPO, 1993), pt. 1.

72. Gorilla formations are strike packages of 20–50 fighters compressed

on the same route to maximize mutual support. They were widely believed

to be necessary for survival in Europe. These observations are based on the

author’s participation as a flyer, mission commander, and battle staff

member in more than 10 Red Flag exercises between 1984 and 1988.

73. Maj Larry Thompson, 363d TFW pilot, interviewed by author, 5 May

1995.

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74. The author participated in two Red Flag exercises that included a

“high-altitude day” (one of 10 flying days during a normal deployment) to

practice high-altitude tactics. These high-altitude days were met with great

resistance by the squadrons ordered to fly them; the consensus was that

this was not “realistic training.”

75. A sharp contrast is provided by the RAF Tornado: its performance

was designed for low-altitude flight, its weapons delivery software was

poorly suited for high-altitude attacks, and its premier weapon: the JP233

antirunway munition had to be delivered from extremely low altitude and

high speed.

76. Diane T. Putney, “From Instant Thunder to Desert Storm:

Developing the Gulf War Air Campaign’s Phases,” Air Power History 41, no.

3 (Fall 1994): 40–42.

77. Ibid., 42.

78. Schwarzkopf, 318–20.

79. Putney, 44.

80. Ibid., 45.

81. Ibid., 46.

82. Lt Col Roy Y. Sikes, “Targeting Iraqi Forces in the KTO,” lecture, Air

Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 28 January 1994; Lt Col

Roy Y. Sikes, Checkmate planner, telephone interview with the author, 16

May 1995; and Lt Col Mark B. “Buck” Rogers, Black Hole/GAT planner,

interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 22 and 23 February 1995.

83. A sign was reported posted in the Black Hole: “We are not preparing

the battlefield. We are destroying it.”

84. Sikes interview; and Sikes lecture.

85. Sikes interview; and Putney, 45.

86. “Concept of Operations for Phases II & III—Attacks on Iraqi Forces in

the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO)” (TS). Declassified by

declassification and review team HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 11 April 1995,

4.A.(3). Information extracted is unclassified; and Rogers interview.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid., appendix C.

89. Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, transcripts of Dadaelian Dinner Speech,

11 September 1991; and GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1: 172.

90. Sikes lecture—Checkmate initially used 60–80 percent; and Sikes

interview—90 percent attrition was also discussed as a possibility signifying

the destruction of a ground unit.

91. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1: 170; and Maj Michael J. Bodner and Maj

William W. Bruner III, “Tank Plinking,” Air Force Magazine, October 1993,

29.

92. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1: 11, 186; The 2,400 sorties were not reached

until 2 February, and 5,400 sorties were eventually reached on 19

February. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 462–511.

93. Barry D. Watts, The Foundations of US Air Doctrine: The Problem of

Friction in War (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1984), 43–95.

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94. General Horner felt modeling was useful, but eyed the figures with

caution. Before the war he advised Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney that

“here’s what the models show . . . I would suspect it’s twice that or more.”

Horner, “Dadaelian Dinner Speech,” Q+A, 3.

95. CENTAF Combat Operations and Combat Plans were independent of

General Glosson’s special planning cell referred to as the Black Hole.

Combat Plans was put under Glosson’s control in December.

96. Col Samuel J. Baptiste, “Headquarters United States Central

Command Air Forces in the Gulf: Reflections on Combat Planning and the

Air Tasking Order Process” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, May 1993),

11–20.

97. Col Samuel J. Baptiste, chief of KTO Plans, GAT cell, telephone

interview with the author, 28 April 1994.

98. Rogers interview; and Baptiste interview.

99. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2: 70.

100. Baptiste, “Headquarters United States Central Command Air

Forces in the Gulf,” 10.

101. Schwarzkopf, 318–20.

102. Three B-52s and 24 F-16s struck the Republican Guard during the

first 24 hours of the campaign. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 469.

103. Emotional adaptation to air raids is enhanced if there are relatively

few near misses typical of a small raid. Irving L. Janis, Air War and

Emotional Stress: Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense

(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), 98–125.

104. There were three squadrons trained and equipped to serve as FACs

available in the theater. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) operated

OV-10 Broncos and F-18Ds over their area of responsibility in Southeast

Kuwait, and the USAF’s OA-10 FACs defaulted to supporting their own A-10

wing along the front lines. There was no operative plan for FACs over the

breadth of the KTO, or over the RGFC as Desert Storm began.

105. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 463–539. Statistics of strikes against the

Republican Guard are derived from the Statistical Compendium of the Gulf

War Air Power Survey. The format of the data makes all figures rough

approximations. Data is presented as individual strikes, which are the

numbers of targets reported attacked. Some missions may have reported

more than one discrete target attacked per sortie. Strikes, therefore, have

the potential to have a higher number than the number of sorties reported.

It is also worth mentioning that sorties canceled will not show up as strikes,

since they did not attack targets. Republican Guard figures are approximate

because strikes are compiled by kill box. Kill boxes cover 900 square miles:

orders of magnitude greater than an Iraqi division. This author has

determined nearly all of the Republican Guard heavy divisions were

concentrated in three kill boxes AF6, AG7, and AH7. These locations were

derived from detailed ARCENT templates. Some of the Tawakalna Division

positions were in a fourth kill box (AF7), but 10 of the division’s 12

maneuver battalions were in AF6, as was all of the division’s support

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assets. GWAPS incorrectly reports part of the Tawakalna in AG6. AG6

contained the Jihad Corps, which was adjacent to the Tawakalna Division.

Other units were in some kill boxes. AF6 contained an armored brigade of

the 12th Armored Division, while AG7 and AH7 contained RGFC light

infantry. These units may have absorbed some of the blows intended for the

RGFC heavy divisions.

106. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 463–539.

107. Ibid.

108. Capt William F. Andrews, F-16 pilot, unpublished war diary.

109. “I know we utilized all possible channels—both in the system and

around it . . . it came down to a matter of who you knew or who could pull

strings. . . . We were all very frustrated about the imagery and unbelievable

dissemination problems.” Capt Catherine Dunham, 10th Tactical Fighter

Squadron (TFS) intelligence officer, letter to the author, subject: Target

Intelligence Dissemination in the Gulf War, 18 November 1994.

110. Ed Wagamon, analyst, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center,

FSU division, telephone interview with author, 14 December 1994; and Alan

D. Campen, The First Information War: The Story of Communications,

Computers, and Intelligence Systems in the Persian Gulf (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA

International Press, 1992), 75–81.

111. Maj Edward J. Wright, USA, “The Topographic Challenge of Desert

Shield and Desert Storm,” Military Review 72, no. 3 (March 1992): 28–38.

112. 24th Infantry Division intelligence officer testified she knew “where

the Iraqi divisions were . . . down to the battalion level, in six-digit grids.

And when we fired artillery prep on them, they were there, and we hit

them.” US Senate, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 129; and Brig Gen

John F. Stewart Jr., USA, Operation Desert Storm, The Military Intelligence

Story: A View from the G-2 3d US Army, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 27 April

1991, 13. General Stewart, ARCENT G-2, claims US soldiers were often able

to anticipate contact and open fire accurately at long range based on Iraqi

division templates.

113. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2: 286.

114. Quoted in ibid., 254.

115. Maj William Bruner, Black Hole planner, interviewed by author,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 21 April 1995; and Rogers interview. After the war

several USAF aircrews, intelligence personnel, and planners were shocked

by the existence of these target materials that might have made CENTAF’s

job easier.

116. According to one unit’s after-action report (AAR): “Pilots were lucky

to just get a verbal description of their target—quite often a target they had

destroyed the day before or conversely a target photo 6–7 months old which

had no reference points and which had on it nothing but a few dark spots.”

138th TFS/IN AAR, “CENTAF/IN After-Action Report,” (U) (Secret), 14-1.

Information extracted is unclassified.

117. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2: 302. To contrast, F-117 and F-111 wings

cooperated and deconflicted aim points on Iraqi airfields when faced with

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lack of precise targeting guidance from Riyadh, because excellent targeting

graphics were available.

118. Maj Jim Hawkins, Black Hole B-52 planner, telephone interview

with the author, 19 April 1995.

119. Ibid.

120. Strategic Air Command, “Desert Storm Bombing and Navigation

Conference 22–24 April 1991 After-Action Report,” 19 June 1991, pt. 1:

Summary.

121. Nonspecific Red Flag training and even specific CENTAF/CENTCOM

exercises such as Quick Force conducted through the 1980s often included

high altitude join-up and ingress but normally included a descent to low

altitude prior to entering the target area. Author’s experience as a

participant; and Thompson interview.

122. Brig Gen Ervin C. Sharpe, former commander of 354th Tactical

Fighter Wing (TFW), interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 24 and 27

April 1995.

123. Sharpe interview. The desert environment was poorly suited for low

altitude tactics. There was little terrain suitable for terrain masking, and

the atmospheric conditions at low altitude often obscured targets that were

visible from higher.

124. Sharpe interview; Thompson interview; and Bruner interview.

125. William L. Smallwood, Strike Eagle: Flying the F-15E in the Gulf War

(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1994), 21–44.

126. Sharpe interview.

127. A divisive struggle over altitudes is described in Smallwood, 21–44.

128. Author’s conversations with multiple 363d TFW pilots.

129. Author’s conversations with Royal Air Force (RAF) and French AF

pilots at the AAFCE Gulf War debriefing, Florennes Air Base (AB), Belgium,

April 1991.

130. RAF tornado pilot remarked to author at the AAFCE conference:

“The Queen will have to pay me a lot more to fly low over an enemy airfield

again.”

131. Jack Broughton, Going Downtown: The War against Hanoi and

Washington (New York: Orion Books, 1988), xv.

132. Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, 14th Armored Division commander,

Desert Storm campaign briefing to the pilots of the 363d TFW, Al Dhafra

AB, United Arab Emirates (UAE), 10 January 1991.

133. Ibid.

134. Rear Adm J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power

Control (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 14–27.

135. Rogers interview. Specifically Major Rogers examining videotapes

observed F-16 pilots conducting dive toss attacks and attacks with shallow

dive angles from extremely long slant ranges, that might have been suitable

for low altitude attacks but were ineffective from high altitudes.

136. This effect was soon detected by F-16 crews, because they were

able to visually observe weapons impacts. B-52 detection was delayed until

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good BDA became available weeks into the war. Author’s experience as F-16

pilot and see Strategic Air Command “Conference”; and for B-52 problems,

see GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1: 293.

137. The flight manual lacked gunsight settings for such long-range

attacks: they had never been thought of. Maj Arden Dahl, A-10 pilot,

telephone interview with author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 25 April 1995.

138. “CENTAF TACC/NCO Log, January–February 1991” (U), 30

January 1991, 21. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

139. “There is no available imagery from the attacks on the Republican

Guard, but we do know their lines of communication have been damaged.”

(U) 24 January 1991, 1930 hrs, 17th Air Division (P) Historian, “CENTAF

TACC/ NCO Log.” (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

140. Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, “Transcripted Comments from CENTAF

TACC January–February 1991” (U), 2 February 1991. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified. “It’s obvious that the national systems can’t

support the way we need to be supported. They’re superb against fixed

infrastructure type facilities but they’re not very accurate against forces in

the field.”

141. “CENTAF TACC/NCO Log” (U), 21 January 1991. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

142. “The USAF maxim is ‘train like your going to fight.’ Well, we never

did.” 9th Tactical Intelligence Squadron AAR. “CENTAF/IN After-Action

Report (U) Observation B. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

143. Lt Col Kevin W. Smith, USAF, Cockpit Video: A Low Cost BDA

Source (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, December 1993), 11. The

difficulty of evaluating mission reports is related in GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2:

32–39.

144. Stewart, 19.

145. Smith, 4–7; and Stewart, 17–21.

146. Smith, 19–28. The 363d TFW adopted a wide variety of solutions

from manually adjusting aim points to typing a variety of corrections into

their F-16 fire control computers. Lack of a viable combat weapons

assesment program precluded an accurate, uniform solution. Based on the

author’s observations.

147. In early February the 363d TFW GLO examined several intelligence

photos of Iraqi armor with the author. The isolated lines of vehicles held no

meaning because they could not be integrated into a larger framework of

where they were or what missions had flown there.

148. Videotape was used initially against strategic targets. Lt Col David

A. Deptula, “Lessons Learned: The Desert Storm Air Campaign,” lecture,

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., April

1991, 13.

149. Smith, xiii–xiv; Deptula lecture, 12–13; and Bruner interview.

150. Deptula lecture, 13. Glosson sent a C-21 to collect daily wing VTR

summaries.

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151. “If units are to be tasked to provide their own BDA they should be

given the appropriate materials and trained imagery analysts to do the job

properly.” Lieutenant Warn, “Battle Damage Assessment from LANTIRN

Videos.” (U) CENTAF/IN AAR. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified;

Lieutenant Warn, “LANTIRN Targeting Pod Imagery Interpretation.” (U)

CENTAF/IN AAR. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified; and

Smith, 19–29.

152. Deptula wrote, “Got BDA from Checkmate—Not CENTAF or

CENTCOM.” Lt Col David A. Deptula, “Wartime Significant Events Outline,”

2–3 March 1991.

153. Brig Gen Raymond P. Hout, 363d TFW (P) commander during

Desert Storm, telephone interview with author, 5 May 1995.

154. The author routinely coordinated 363d TFW activities with several

other wings as a mission commander and chief, 363d Wing Mission

Planning Cell.

155. Col Richard B. H. Lewis, interviewed by author, Fort Bliss, Texas, 5

May 1995; and Rogers interview.

156. Numerous conversations were recorded in the “CENTAF

TACC/CC/DO Log” and “CENTAF TACC/NCO Log.” (U) (Secret). Information

extracted is unclassified.

157. Building on Army theory, the Iraqis were already maximizing

dispersion and protection. The only other option versus area fire was

counterbattery fire, which had been denied when the coalition air forces

achieved air superiority over the KTO. “Tactical Responses to Concentrated

Artillery,” CSI Report 13 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: CSI, n.d.).

158. William L. Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War

(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993), 123–24. This constitutes a change

from the day prior, when General Horner, with General Glosson and Colonel

Deptula, sketched out a rough plan for the air war that envisioned using

“penetrators [F-16, F-18, F-15E] and heavy bombers” against the RGFC,

and “attack aircraft” (A-10, AV-8) against other KTO units. Lt Gen Charles

A. Horner, “Air Ops Summary of Air War,” 261100Z February 1991. On 27

January, General Glosson told the A-10 commanders they would have five

to six days to prepare for the mission. He decreased planning time to only

two days, possibly in response to other feedback.

159. Maj Michael W. Isherwood, A-10 mission planner and A-10 pilot,

telephone interview with the author, 17 April 1995; and Smallwood, 37–41.

160. Isherwood interview.

161. Smallwood, Warthog, 123–27.

162. Sharpe interview; and Smallwood, Warthog, 124.

163. Dunham letter; and Smallwood, Warthog, 124. “They [A-10

intelligence personnel] had a backdoor route. . . . One of the intel guys just

came from an assignment with the RF-4 unit that was over there. He called

a friend in the unit and told him what they needed. They worked out the

transportation and got what they needed.”

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164. Sharpe interview; and Dunham letter. Mission effectiveness

increased with improved planning materials: When the Tawakalna’s air

defenses attempted to oppose the wing’s first flights, pilots were able to

identify and immediately attack the division’s air defense locations. In

contrast, most missions lacking these materials often did not know where

to look to monitor air defense reactions and counterattack.

165. Dahl interview.

166. Horner, “Transcripted Comments” (U), 30 January 1991. (Secret)

Information extracted is unclassified. “We did get one report about the

Tawakalna that said the A-10s rolled in, but no one was at home; that they

weren’t even shooting back any more. I hope that means they are finished.

We have no way of knowing.”

167. Col Ervin C. Sharpe, commander of 354th TFW and Col David A.

Sawyer, commander of 23d TFW, to commander, 14th Air Division (P),

letter, subject: A-10 and Iraqi Tactics, 3 February 1991. (Secret)

Information extracted is unclassified.

168. This tactic noted in the “CENTAF TACC/NCO Log” and observed by

the author in an attack on a position in the vicinity of the Tawakalna

Division. The tactic was executed inexpertly, in that the fire was lit too late

(with the unit under observation), and too far from any previous bomb

impacts to be effective. In fact this vehicle became the flight’s primary target

until it was destroyed.

169. Sharpe interview.

170. Lewis interview; Rogers interview; and Baptiste interview.

171. Col Richard B. H. Lewis, “JFACC Problems Associated with

Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm,” Airpower Journal 8, no. 1 (Spring

1994): 9.

172. Ibid.

173. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 462–511.

174. Smallwood, Warthog, 137–40.

175. Ibid.

176. Sharpe and Sawyer letter.

177. “Tactical Responses to Concentrated Artillery.”

178. William F. Andrews, F-16 unpublished war diary, another F-16

pilot, from the 388th TFW was only aware of attacking decoys once; and

Maj Jay Lindell, killer scout pilot, interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,

20 April 1995.

179. The CENTAF/DO stated after the war: “They would hide in the

sand, put the tanks in the sand, push berms up around it, thinking they

would hide; you can’t hide from infrared.” Maj Gen John A. Corder, Oral

History Transcript: “Desert Storm: An Overview of Air Operations,” (U) 7

August and 4 September 1991, 58. (Secret) Information extracted is

unclassified.

180. Lt Col William G. Welch, “Notes from the BCE: Observations on

Joint Combat Operations at Echelons above Corps,” Field Artillery, June

1992, 18; Wagamon interview—In contrast an Army Intelligence Agency

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analyst involved in mapping Iraqi Army positions commented that “the

national pastime in Iraq must be decoy making”; and Maj Philip A.

Oppenheimer, 4th TFS flight commander and killer scout pilot, telephone

interview with the author, 23 May 1995. An F-16 killer scout commented

that “the Iraqis are masters of deception.” Several Army units noted heavy

deception efforts within occupied Iraqi garrison areas, based on multiple

conversations with author.

181. Corder transcript (U), 39. (Secret) Information extracted is

unclassified. “We would lose track of units for three or four days when they

were moving.”

182. Many Army units were able to successfully engage Iraqi units from

intelligence templates is evidence that the units moved little.

183. Sharpe and Sawyer letter. In addition to coping with the decoy

problem, the other main point of the letter was that the A-10s felt their

efforts were being diluted by the tactical air control system (a system

designed to provide responsive CAS), which was diverting them from

planned interdiction missions to “immediate” priority CAS targets, even

though there were no ground forces in contact. Sharpe interview.

184. “CENTAF TACC/NCO Log” (U), 31. (Secret) Information extracted is

unclassified.

185. Horner, “Transcripted Comments” (U), 21. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified. Horner’s comments frequently pushed the

Republican Guard to the forefront. Even during the battle of Khafji, Horner

exhorted, “Please keep your eye on the Republican Guard. Right now, it is

sort of the key to this campaign.”

186. Horner, “Transcripted Comments” (U), 16. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

187. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 462–511.

188. Ibid., 467.

189. Horner, “Transcripted Comments” (U), 11. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

190. Lt Col Mark A. Welsh, “Day of the Killer Scouts,” Air Force

Magazine 76, no. 4 (April 1993): 66–70. Andrews’s diary, 2-7-91: “We’re not

dropping ordnance of choice here—you have to shack the target with Mk-82

and the wingmen have to look for AAA since their CBU won’t hurt tanks”;

2-10-91: “he held us up for 20 minutes, then against a tank unit—all

misses—Dismal! I got down amongst them with my Mk-82 popcorn

bombs—risking my a–– to get better accuracy all for nought! We’re here for

tonnage!! [to make the slides in Riyadh look good].”

191. Lewis, “JFACC,” 10; Lewis interview; and Hout interview.

192. Rogers interview.

193. Two wings, the 363d and 388th TFWs, had three F-16 squadrons.

Two of the 388th squadrons were equipped with LANTIRN pods for night

operations. The 363d wing had three squadrons of non-LANTIRN (day)

F-16Cs.

194. Hout interview.

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195. 17th Air Division (P), TACC Log (U), 3 February 1991. (Secret)

Information extracted is unclassified.

196. From the author’s experience, when two sorties were flown to one

area, familiarity with the area was definitely increased. The author,

however, serving as chief of mission planning at times was not aware any

pressure to send formations to the same targets, and some opportunities

may have been missed.

197. Col Gary North, 363d TFW (P) planner and mission director,

telephone interview with author, 19 April 1985.

198. Ibid.

199. Hout interview. The wing commander believed the 363d would be

able to fly a full schedule from the second day.

200. 10th TFS, “Desert Shield/Desert Storm After-Action Report,” 9 May

1991, OPS-5.

201. Welsh, 67.

202. Maj Scott Goodfellow, 388th TFW (P) weapons officer and killer

scout pilot, telephone interview with author, 28 August 1995.

203. Welsh, 67.

204. Ibid.

205. Ibid., 68; and Lewis interview. The name was a creation of General

Glosson’s staff to avoid the Vietnam-era name of Fast FAC, even though the

concept was the same as fighter-controlled strikes over southern sections of

North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

206. Oppenheimer interview.

207. Welsh, 69.

208. Ibid.

209. Ibid.

210. Ibid., 70.

211. Lt Gen Buster C. Glosson, CENTAF director of plans, memorandum

to CENTCOM J-3 Plans, subject: Theater Campaign Strategy Assessment

(U), 14 February 1991. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

212. Maj Jay Lindell, chief, Wing Standardization Evaluation, 388th

TFW (P), Al Minhad AB, UAE, interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 20

April 1995; and Oppenheimer, interview.

213. Sharpe and Sawyer letter.

214. Goodfellow interview.

215. Deptula, “Wartime Significant Events Outline,” 2. Colonel Deptula

noted immediately after the war: “frustration over no BDA against RG.

Therefore need pictures of tanks dying.”

216. Lewis interview.

217. Night Camel was conducted versus the VII Corps as they began

their movement from the coast inland in December and January. Although

F-111s were able to detect the US Army vehicles, they did not simulate

laser-guided bomb attacks against them. At the time, unguided CBU-87

was believed to be the best weapon for the job. During the war, the old fire

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control computer in the F-111 was found not to be well suited for CBU-87

attacks.

218. “CENTAF TACC/CC/DO Log” (U), 1–5 February 1991. (Secret)

Information extracted is unclassified.

219. Bodner and Bruner; and Bruner interview.

220. Bodner and Bruner, 30.

221. Fred L. Frostic, Air Campaign against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti

Theater of Operations, Project Air Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994).

222. 48th TFW (P), “Operation Desert Storm: 48th TFW (P) Taif, Saudi

Arabia,” USAFE Desert Storm History Inputs, 26.

223. Maj John Taylor, F-111F pilot, telephone interview with the author,

5 June 1995; and Maj William Hopmier, 335th TFS weapons officer,

Operation Desert Storm, interviewed by the author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 21

April 1995. Hopmier believed the F-15Es may have been better able to

discriminate valid targets with their superb radar.

224. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: tables 188–89. USN A-6s delivered 149 PGM

strikes against Iraqi ground units. Navy expenditure of LGBs in Desert

Storm was 623 versus 8,456 USAF LGBs.

225. When it deployed to the desert, the F-15E weapons system was

brand new and not cleared for many weapons loads. Clearance by engineers

(called Seek Eagle) is required to ensure safe carriage, and separation of

ordnance will be possible under a range of conditions.

226. Hopmier interview.

227. Ibid.

228. Ibid.

229. Smallwood, Warthog, 177–83.

230. Hopmier interview. Adaptation in combat revealed much more

flexibility than what is normally permitted in peacetime. Commanders

bringing the F-15E on line had been very conservative in tactics

development and training.

231. During one controlled weapons system evaluation, the author

observed a Maverick missile explosion in a targeting pod display, convinced

the target had been destroyed when pieces of metal were seen flying from

the fireball. Ground inspection, however, revealed the missile hit a few feet

from the targeted tank, which was still in operable condition (the debris had

been a fender).

232. Lewis, “JFACC,” 12–13.

233. Ibid.

234. Ibid., 9.

235. Exemplifying the energetic approach toward problem solving,

General Horner worked out optimal timing for killer scout missions on a

scratch pad with Lt Col Phillips. 17th Air Division (P), “CENTAF TACC Log”

(U), 3 February 1991. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

236. Horner, “Transcripted Comments” (U), 3. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

237. Frostic.

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238. In Vietnam there was enough time (years) to identify the need and

procure the hardware.

239. Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, Reuter Transcript Report, “Address to

Business Executives for National Security Education Fund,” 8 May 1991,

B8.

240. Horner, “Transcripted Comments,” 37. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

241. Oppenheimer interview.

242. COMUSARCENT Briefing Slides, “Unit BDA: Theater Echelon” (U),

4 February 1991. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

243. Ibid.

244. Lewis, “JFACC,” 13.

245. Ibid.; and Stewart, 20.

246. Stewart, 20.

247. Col Steven A. Epkins, USA, “A Division G2’s Perspective on

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm” (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army

War College, 15 April 1992), 34.

248. Horner, “Transcripted Comments” (U), 32. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

249. Lewis, “JFACC,” 13.

250. Ibid., 12.

251. Oppenheimer interview. A killer scout with frequent responsibility

for the Medinah’s kill box noted that other divisional air defense units

would cease-fire when targeted. “The Medinah was different: its gunners

wouldn’t quit and it had vigorous AAA protection throughout.”

252. Sharpe interview; and Dahl interview.

253. A-10 combat recap, Sharpe interview; and Dahl interview.

254. Statement of General Horner before the Senate, Operation Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, 276; and Smallwood, Warthog, 182.

255. Sharpe interview.

256. “CENTAF TACC/CC/DO Log” (U), February 1991. (Secret)

Information extracted is unclassified.

257. GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 462–511.

258. The F-16s were not to attack permanent bridges, which were best

left for LGB attacks. Instead the F-16s were instructed to record and report

the locations of any permanent bridges observed in use. Based on author’s

experience as chief of 363d wing mission planning cell.

259. Lewis interview; and Baptiste interview.

260. Lewis interview.

261. Horner, “Transcripted Comments” (U), 30. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

262. Baptiste interview. According to Colonel Baptiste, Horner

laughingly dismissed attrition figures routinely during February TACC

briefings because he realized they didn’t reflect reality. Schwarzkopf began

to use air strikes as a primary measure of merit (Horner called it farmer

ANDREWS

95
logic) when problems with BDA appeared insurmountable; and Horner,

Reuter Transcript Report, B8–9.

263. CENTAF Message (U), 241600Z February 1991. (Secret)

Information extracted is unclassified.

264. TACC CC/DO Log (U), 24 February 1991. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified.

265. Maj Michael W. Isherwood, “Noise or Music? Orchestrating

Fixed-Wing Air in the Close-in Battle,” Field Artillery, October 1994, 9.

266. COMUSARCENT slides, Unit BDA (U), 23 February 1991. (Secret)

Information extracted is unclassified.

267. Schwarzkopf, 441–42.

268. 1st Lt John Hillen, “2d Armored Cavalry: The Campaign to Liberate

Kuwait,” Armor, July–August 1991, 10–11; and Lt Col Douglas A.

Macgregor, “Closing with the Enemy,” Military Review, February 1993, 65.

269. Lt Richard M. Bohannon, “Dragon’s Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle

of 73 Easting,” Armor, May–June 1992, 13.

270. The VII Corps historian recorded 108 armored fighting vehicles

destroyed, Lt Col Peter S. Kinsvatter, “VII Corps Goes to War: Ground

Offensive,” Military Review, February 1992, 35.

271. Richard M. Swain, in Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort

Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 264,

reported 186 Iraqi tanks, 127 armored personnel carriers, and 38 artillery

pieces destroyed by the 1st Armored Division on 27 February; and Lt Gen

Ronald H. Griffith, in “Mission Accomplished—In Full,” US Naval Institute

Proceedings, August 1993, 63, stated his division destroyed “more than 160

armored systems and two defending brigades of the . . . Medinah Division”

in two hours.

272. Maj Jason K. Kamiya, USA, A History of the 24th Mechanized

Infantry Division Combat Team during Operation Desert Storm: “The Attack to

Free Kuwait” (January through March 1991), (Fort Stewart, Ga.: 1991), 37,

55.

273. Those quick to condemn the United States for allowing the

fragmented units in the Basrah pocket to survive on the grounds that they

were subsequently used against the revolts in the north and south may

have forgotten that the Iraqis had substantial forces not committed to the

KTO including four Republican Guard infantry divisions intended to

“perform internal security duties.” GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1: 203–4.

274. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War: The

Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995),

430.

275. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1: 203.

276. Dividing which of the surviving hardware came from the

Republican Guard is an even tougher problem. A guess may be made if it is

assumed that only the Republican Guard were equipped with T-72s. In that

case, 375 of the tanks were identified as T-72s, CIA estimated the guard

started with 786, and the coalition destroyed 53 percent. ARCENT, credited

CADRE PAPER

96
the guard with 988, leading to the estimate that the coalition destroyed 62

percent. There is evidence that the original assumption (only the guard was

equipped with T-72s) is incorrect. At least one USMC armored unit reported

encountering at least a battalion of T-72s in south Kuwait where there were

no reported guard units. SSgt Jeffrey R. Dacus, “Bravo Company Goes to

War,” Armor, September–October 1991.

277. McCaffrey, testimony before the US Senate, 114.

278. Author was a prisoner of the Iraqis from 27 February to 6 March.

His captors were unable to cross the Euphrates in Basrah due to the

incredible traffic problems in the vicinity of a damaged bridge the evening of

28 February. They were able to cross with great difficulty on 1 March.

279. McCaffrey, testimony before the US Senate, 114

280. Oppenheimer interview.

281. ARCENT anticipated four possible Iraqi reactions: mobile

counterattack, mobile defense, static defense of key terrain, or static

defense in place. The Iraqis appear to have been unable to execute any but

the last.

282. McCaffrey, testimony before the US Senate, 166. The coalition

logistics units, enjoying complete freedom of action due to US air

supremacy were hard-pressed to sustain the US Army’s maneuver into the

Iraqi rear. The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), covering the greatest

amount of ground, projected 3,500 tons of supplies would be required from

G-Day to G+4. This quantity required 80 840-foot trailers and 75

5,000-gallon water tankers.

283. Capt T. Bell, “Analysis of the Enemy Threat to the Division’s Future

Battle,” 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat Team: Historical

Reference Book (Fort Stewart, Ga.: April 1991).

284. Vince Crawley, “Ghost Troop’s Battle of 73 Easting,” Armor,

May–June 1991, 10; and Macgregor, 66.

285. 24th Infantry Division intelligence officer testified she knew “where

the Iraqi divisions were . . . down to the battalion level, in six-digit grids.

And when we fired artillery prep on them, they were there, and we hit

them.” US Senate, 129; General Stewart, ARCENT G-2, claims US soldiers

were often able to anticipate contact and open fire accurately at long range

based on Iraqi division templates. Stewart, 13; Crawley, 8; and Capt A. A.

Puryear and Lt Gerald R. Haywood II, “Ar Rumaylah Airfield Succumbs to

Hasty Attack,” Armor, September–October 1991, 20.

286. Col Gregory Fontenot, “Fright Night: Task Force 2/34 Armor,”

Military Review, January 1993, 47.

287. Bohannon, 14.

288. McCaffrey, testimony before the US Senate, 148.

289. Ibid.

290. Maj Robert Bowman, interviewed by author, 16 May 1995, Maxwell

AFB, Ala. One Apache battalion of the 1st Armored Division discovered that

the Iraqi tanks were vulnerable to 30-mm fire. Subsequently that unit

emphasized 30 mm and achieved the most kills in the aviation brigade.

ANDREWS

97
291. Capt Richard A. Lacquement, Capt Joseph V. Pacileo, and Capt

Paul A. Gallo, “Targeting during Desert Storm,” Field Artillery, February

1992, 37; Col Robert H. Scales Jr., “Accuracy Defeated Range in Artillery

Duel,” International Defense Review, May 1991, 478. “In this century, more

than 90 percent of all distant fires were observed from the air.”

292. Scales, “Accuracy Defeated Range,” 478. “Curiously, the problem at

hand was not so much how to silence his guns, but rather how to induce

them to fire or to switch on his radars and radios so that US targeting

systems could locate him precisely.”

293. Scales, “Accuracy Defeated Range,” 478. One US artillery battalion

commander observed five of six Iraqi guns destroyed by US artillery but few

bodies around the position.

294. Lacquement, 37; and Hillen, 11.

295. Scales, “Accuracy Defeated Range,” 481; and Lacquement, 35.

296. Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” 7.

297. Schwarzkopf, 434 and 443.

298. Lewis, “JFACC,” 9.

299. Sharpe interview.

300. Ibid.

301. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2: 224.

302. Lt Gen Charles A. Horner, “New Age Warfare,” The War in the Air,

1914–1994: The Proceedings of a Conference Held by the Royal Australian

Air Force in Canberra, March 1994, ed. Alan Stephens (Canberra: RAAF Air

Power Studies Centre, 1994), 327.

CADRE PAPER

98
Appendix A

Primary USAF Units That Participated

F-16: 212 Aircraft (1 February)

4th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) (P) Seymour Johnson AFB,

N.C. Deployed to Al Karj Air Base (AB), Saudi Arabia

157th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) McEntire Air

National Guard Base (ANGB), S.C.

138th TFS Hancock Field ANGB, N.Y.

363d TFW (P) Shaw AFB, S.C. Deployed to Al Dhafra AB,

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

17th TFS Shaw AFB

33d TFS Shaw AFB

10th TFS Hahn AB, Germany

388th TFW (P) Hill AFB, Utah. Deployed to Al Minhad AB,

UAE

4th TFS Hill AFB killer scouts

421st TFS Hill AFB LANTIRN equipped

69th TFS Moody AFB, Ga. LANTIRN equipped

401st TFW (P) Deployed to Doha, Quatar

614th TFS Torrejon AB, Spain

A-10A: 144 Aircraft (1 February)

23d TFW (P) England AFB, La. and 354th TFW (P) Myrtle

Beach, S.C.

23d TASS Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. OA-10 FACs

74th TFS England AFB, La.

76th TFS England AFB, La.

353d TFS Myrtle Beach, S.C.

355th TFS Myrtle Beach, S.C.

511th TFS New Orleans, La.

706th TFS Alconbury AB, England

101
F-111F: 64 Aircraft (1 February)

48th TFW (P) Lakenheath AB, United Kingdom. Deployed to

Taif AB, Saudi Arabia

492d TFS Lakenheath AB

493d TFS Lakenheath AB

494th TFS Lakenheath AB

495th TFS Lakenheath AB

F-15E: 48 Aircraft (1 February)

4th TFW (P) Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C. Deployed to Al Karj

AB, Saudi Arabia

336th TFS Seymour Johnson AFB

335th TFS Seymour Johnson AFB

B-52: 36 Aircraft (1 February)

1708th BMW (P) location unavailable

4300th BMW (P) location unavailable

811th BMW (P) location unavailable

806th BW (P) deployed to Fairford AB, England

102
Appendix B

Chronology

Date Event

1987 Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC)

 expands to three heavy divisions, one infantry,

one Special Forces brigade, later expanded by

three infantry divisions for Kuwait invasion.

1988 RGFC spearheads final offensives into Iran.

8-3 Iraq invades Kuwait; RGFC divisions spearhead

 the attack.

8-8 Schwarzkopf asks for Air Staff assistance in

 campaign plan.

8-10 Warden briefs Schwarzkopf.

8-13 Warden briefs Powell—Powell demands Iraqi

armor as target.

Checkmate begins planning operations versus

Kuwait theater of operations.

8-17 Final Instant Thunder brief to Schwarzkopf.

 Glosson assigned to campaign planning.

8-? Late August the RGFC divisions pull back to

 Iraqi/Kuwait border/exchange positions with

infantry and assume reserve position.

12-30/31 Night Camel Exercise F-111s observe VII Corps

 armor with infrared systems.

1-16 Air campaign begins.

1-27 A-10s directed to plan RGFC attacks.

1-29 A-10 attacks on the Tawakalna Division.

Bomb damage assessment (BDA) labeled

“nonexistent” by Lt Col Richard B. H. Lewis,

United States Central Command Air Forces.

Schwarzkopf criticized J-2, “vehicles had to be

on their backs for J-2 to assess a kill.”

1-31 US Army Central Command (ARCENT) assesses

 RGFC at 99 percent strength.

105
2-1 Theater reconnaissance of Tawakalna Division

 inconclusive.

A-10s conduct visual recce.

2-3 388th Fighter Wing (FW) “frustrating missions”

versus RGFC lead to request for Fast FACs.

2-4 363d FW forward operating location operations

 begin.

Colonel Lewis researches ARCENT BDA

criteria.

First killer scout missions to increase F-1

effectiveness.

2-5 First tank plinking.

2-12 Commander in chief directs bombing stop

versus units less than 50 percent.

2-15 BDA rules changed based on the Defense

 Intelligence Agency survey of the Tawakalna

Division.

A-10s lost over Medinah Division, A-10s

pulled back.

2-24 Ground offensive begins.

2-26 Battle of 73d Easting Tawakalna Division

 destroyed.

2-27 Fire support coordination line moves north of

the RGFC.

Battle of Medinah Ridge, Medinah Division

destroyed.

2-28 Hostilities ended with remainder of RGFC in

Basrah pocket.

106
Appendix C

Location of Air Strikes

during Desert Storm

This chart represents coalition air strikes as reported by the

Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS). The RGFC line depicts

the number strikes against kill boxes AE6, AF7, and AG7. The

“Other KTO” line charts all other reported air strikes in the

KTO. The “All Other” line tracks air-to-ground strikes outside

the KTO, including missions against Scuds, counterair,

interdiction, and strategic targets.

Source: Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), vol. 5, A Statistical Compendium and Chronology (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt. 1: 462–511.

109

Appendix D

Distribution of Strikes against

RGFC Heavy Divisions

This chart depicts coalition air strikes as reported by the

Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) against kill boxes AE6,

AF7, and AG7. These three kill boxes contained the three

RGFC heavy divisions. The first week saw few strikes on the

RGFC units. The greatest weight of effort fell on the RGFC the

last days of January. Air strikes never reached the 600 per

day level used in the planning of Phase III.

Source: GWAPS, vol. 5, pt. 1: 462–511.

113

Appendix E

Iraqi Prisoner of War Comments

These conflicting accounts were used to support conflicting

claims in the aftermath of Desert Storm.

Airpower: “One Iraqi prisoner, a division commander, put it

bluntly. ‘Why did your men give up?’ his interrogator asked.

‘You know,’ he replied sullenly. ‘I don’t know. Why?’ the

interrogator persisted. ‘It was the airplanes!’ he responded.”

(Source: USAF Report, “Reaching Globally, Reaching

Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War.”)

A-10: “The single most recognizable, and feared, aircraft at low

level was the A-10/Thunderbolt II. This black-colored jet was

seen as deadly accurate, rarely missing its target. Seen

conducting bombing raids three or four times a day, the A-10

was a seemingly ubiquitous threat. Although the actual bomb

run was terrifying, the aircraft’s loitering around the target

area prior to target acquisition caused as much, if not, more

anxiety since the Iraqi soldiers were unsure of the chosen

target.”—36-year-old Iraqi captain (Source: A-10 Combat

Recap).

Tank plinking: “During the Iran War, my tank was my friend

because I could sleep in it and know I was safe . . . none of my

troops would get near a tank at night because they kept

blowing up.”—Iraqi general (Source: “Reaching Globally,

Reaching Powerfully.”)

B-52: “One troop commander, interrogated after the war,

stated he surrendered because of B-52 strikes. ‘But your

position was never attacked by B-52s,’ the interrogator

exclaimed. ‘That is true,’ he stated ‘but I had seen one that

had been attacked.’” (Source: “Reaching Globally, Reaching

Powerfully.”)

USAF versus artillery: “[An] Iraqi division commander on the

front lines when asked by interrogators ‘why didn’t you use

your artillery?’ He said, ‘It was 100% destroyed by air. . . there

was a division behind me and I asked for their artillery and it

was sent forward, and, it was 100% destroyed en route to my

117
position.’” (Source: General Horner, “Dadaelian Dinner

Speech.”)

US Army versus artillery as paraphrased by Colonel Scales,

USA: “A prisoner of war whose artillery unit . . . opposed VII

Corps . . . revealed that his 64 gun battalion group lost seven

pieces during the air phase and 46 to MLRS raids. . . . One

captured battalion commander stated that his unit fired only

once during the battle, and within moments, artillery

bomblets devastated his position. A third of his soldiers fled

the position and left most of his guns destroyed and the rest

of his soldiers dead.” (Source: Col Robert H. Scales Jr.,

“Accuracy Defeated Range in Artillery Duel,” International

Defense Review, May 1991.)

M1A1 Abrams: “On 17 January, I started with 39 tanks

(T-72M1). After 38 days of aerial attacks, I had 32, but in less

than 20 minutes with the M1A1, I had zero. . . .”—An Iraqi

battalion commander captured by 2d ACR as told to Colonel

Holder, 2d ACR on 16 April 1991.

118
Annotated Bibliography

I list here several Air Force Historical Research Agency (HRA),

Maxwell AFB, Alabama, sources indicating their identification

numbers.

Abdul-Moati, Dr. Youssef. “A Diary of an Iraqi Soldier.”

Kuwait: National Center for Documents against Iraqi

Aggression, 1992. HRA: NA-344.

Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United

States Air Force, 16 March 1984.

———. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force .

2 vols., March 1992.

Air Force Manual 2-1. Tactical Air Operations—Counter Air,

Close Air Support, and Air Interdiction, 2 May 1969.

Andrews, Capt William F. Unpublished War Diary. Captain

Andrews was an F-16 pilot and chief of mission planning

cell for the 363d TFW.

Baptiste, Col Samuel J. “Headquarters United States Central

Command Air Forces in the Gulf: Reflections on Combat

Planning and the Air Tasking Order Process.” Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: Air War College, May 1993. Colonel Baptiste

was the chief of the KTO cell within the Black Hole.

Bell, Capt T. “Analysis of the Enemy Threat to the Division’s

Future Battle.” 24th Mechanized Infantry Division Combat

Team: Historical Reference Book. Fort Stewart, Ga.: April

1991. This is a useful compilation of division orders and

documents. Captain Bell appears to have been a 24th

Division intelligence officer. HRA: K585.01-5.

Bennion, Maj Kelly P. “Snapping the Achilles’ Heel: The

Counterlogistics Fight.” Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School

of Advanced Military Studies, 1992.

Bigelow, Capt Michael E. “Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis.”

Military Intelligence 17, no. 2 (April–June 1991): 13–18.

Bingham, Lt Col Price T. Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction

in the Operational Art. CADRE Paper, no. AU-ARICP-89-2. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989.

Blackwell, James. “The Status of Follow-on Forces Attack

Technologies.” Military Technology, October 1988.

119
Bodner, Maj Michael J., and Maj William W. Bruner III. “Tank

Plinking.” Air Force Magazine, October 1993. Major

Bodner was an F-111 pilot, one of the first F-111F Tank

Plinkers. Major Bruner was a Black Hole planner.

Bohannon, Lt Richard M. “Dragon’s Roar: 1-37 Armor in the

Battle of 73 Easting.” Armor, May–June 1992. Firsthand,

ground level, account of the battle with the Tawakalna

Division.

Bonsignore, Enzo. “Tank Experience Raises Tank Survivability

Issues.” Military Technology, February 1992. An

examination of Soviet armor design that finds the entire

Soviet design philosophy flawed.

Boyd, Col John R. Briefing Slides. Subject: A Discourse on

Winning and Losing,” August 1987, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

Burton, Lt Col James G. “Pushing Them out the Back Door.”

US Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1993. This article

argues ARCENT allowed the RGFC to escape and

precipitated a series of lively replies that appeared several

months in the Proceedings.

Campen, Alan D. The First Information War: The Story of

Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Systems in

the Persian Gulf War. Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International

Press, 1992.

Carns, Gen Michael P., USAF vice chief of staff. Memorandum.

To Lt Gen Nelson, AF/XO. Subject: “Who Killed the Tanks

at Desert Storm?” 24 June 1991. HRA: TF6-23-350, pt. 9.

CENTAF DO/Event Schedule. “Night Republican Guard

CONOPS,” 17–23 December 1990. (Secret) Declassified by

HRA declassification and review team. Information

extracted is unclassified. HRA microfilm 23988 frames

478–81.

“CENTAF TACC/CC/DO Log,” (U), January–February 1991.

(Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. HRA: NA

215. This invaluable source includes notations by most of

CENTAF’s senior commanders.

“CENTAF TACC/NCO Log,” (U), January–February 1991.

(Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. HRA: TF6-

46-482. This log contains useful records of conversations

within the TACC on tactical problems.

120
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by

Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton University Press, 1976.

Clegg, Col Robert H. “Imagery Intelligence at Echelons above

Corps.” Military Intelligence, April–June 1992. Colonel

Clegg was the director of the Joint Imagery Processing

Complex (JIPC) in Desert Storm and paints an overly

optimistic view of the JIPC’s contributions.

COMUSARCENT Briefing Slide. Unit BDA: Theater Echelon

(U), 4 February, 14 February, 15 February, 17 February,

23 February, 26 February 1991. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified. Declassified copies of ARCENT

slides were obtained through the G-2s archives, III Corps,

November 1994.

———. “ARCENT’s Plan to Shape the Battlefield” (U), 25 January

1991. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

“Concept of Operations for Phases II & III—Attacks on Iraqi

Forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO),” 11

April 1995. (Top Secret) Declassified by declassification

and review team, HRA: Maxwell AFB, Ala. Information

extracted is unclassified. HRA: TF6-47-543. Only some

elements of this Black Hole plan against the Iraqi Army

made it from paper to reality.

Condon, Richard W. The Winter War: Russia against Finland.

New York: Ballantine Books, 1972.

Corder, Maj Gen John A. Oral History Transcript: “Desert

Storm: An Overview of Air Operations,” (U) 7 August and

4 September 1991. (Secret) Information extracted is

unclassified. General Corder comments as CENTAF DO

illuminate the major issues as later seen by a main

participant.

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Abraham R. Wagner. The

Lessons of Modern War, vol. 2: The Iran-Iraq War. Boulder,

Colo.: Westview Press, 1990.

Corn, Col Vollney B. Jr., and Capt Richard A. Lacquemont.

“Silver Bullets.” Field Artillery, October 1991. Colonel

Corn was the 1st Armored Division artillery commander,

and Captain Lacquemont was the assistant G3.

121
Crawley, Vince. “Ghost Troop’s Battle of 73 Easting.” Armor,

May–June 1991. Journalistic account of 73 Easting

reprinted from Stars and Stripes.

Cushman, Lt Gen John H. “Challenge and Response at the

Operational and Tactical Levels, 1914–1945.” Military

Effectiveness. Edited by Allan Millet and Williamson

Murray. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988.

———. “Desert Storm’s End Game.” US Naval Institiute Proceedings, October 1993. A reply to Colonel Burton’s June

1993 Proceedings article.

Daack, Col Martin T. “Sowing the Seams: Strategic Bombers

versus Follow-on Forces.” Airpower Journal 1, no. 3

(Winter 1987–88): 22–30. Advocacy piece on potential

SAC contributions to deep air attack.

Dacus, SSgt Jeffrey R. “Bravo Company Goes to War.” Armor,

September–October 1991. Firsthand account of the

USMC’s armored engagement with Iraqi T-72s in

southeast Kuwait (far from known RGFC positions).

Danis, Capt Aaron. “Iraqi Army Operations and Doctrine.”

Military Intelligence, April–June 1991. Captain Danis was

an armor officer and currently an analyst at the Army

Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center.

———. “A Military Analysis of Iraqi Army Operations.” Armor,

November–December 1990.

Department of the Air Force. White Paper: Air Force

Performance in Desert Storm, April 1991.

Department of Defense. Final Report to Congress on the

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office (GPO), 1993. The first

comprehensive official synopsis of the Gulf War.

Deptula, Lt Col David A. “Lessons Learned: The Desert Storm

Air Campaign.” Lecture. Center for Strategic and

International Studies. Washington, D.C., April 1991.

Colonel Deptula was a pivotal figure in the Black Hole,

this lecture underscores the operations-intelligence

division in Riyadh. HRA: TF6-47-539.

———. “Wartime Significant Events Outline,” 2–3 March 1991.

A useful personal précis of the war. HRA: TF6-47-544.

122
Dietrich, Lt Col Steve E. “From Valhalla with Pride.” US Naval

Institute Proceedings, August 1993. Rebuttal to Colonel

Burton’s June 1993 article.

Doolittle, James H. with Bernie Lay Jr. “Daylight Precision

Bombing.” IMPACT: The Army Air Forces’ Confidential

Picture History of World War II, n.d. bk. 6, xv.

Doubler, Michael D. Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought

the War in Europe, 1944–1945. Lawrence, Kans.:

University of Kansas Press, 1994. Important analysis of

bottom-up adaptation during World War II.

Dugan, Gen Michael J. “The Future of FOFA (follow-on forces

attack)—An Operational Perspective.” NATO’s Sixteen

Nations, September 1990.

Dunham, Capt Catherine, 10th Tactical Fighter Squadron

Intelligence officer. Letter. Subject: Target Intelligence

Dissemination in the Gulf War, 18 November 1994.

Epkins, Col Steven A., USA. “A Division G2’s Perspective on

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.” Carlisle

Barracks, Pa., Army War College, 15 April 1992.

Fontenot, Col Gregory. “Fright Night: Task Force 2/34 Armor.”

Military Review, January 1993. Colonel Fontenot was the

commander of the 2/34 Armor.

48th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) (P). “Operation Desert Storm:

48TFW Taif, Saudi Arabia.” USAFE Desert Storm History

Inputs. HRA: NA-339.

Franks, Gen Frederick. Memorandum of conversation. With

Eliot Cohen, Barry Watts, Tom Keaney, and Dick Gunkel,

7 September 1992. General Franks was the VII Corps

commander.

Franz, Col Wallace, USA, Retired. “Defeating the Iraqis—

Saddam’s Troops Are Not Ready for a War of Maneuver.”

Armor, January–February 1991. An insightful look at

Iraqi doctrinal shortcomings.

Frostic, Fred L. Air Campaign against the Iraqi Army in the

Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, Project Air Force. Santa

Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994. First balanced analysis of

KTO air operations.

Glantz, David M. Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of

Deep Battle. London: Frank Cass, 1991.

123
Glosson, Lt Gen Buster C. “Impact of Precision Weapons on

Air Combat Operations.” Airpower Journal 7, no. 2

(Summer 1993): 4–10. Advocacy piece for PGMs.

———. CENTAF director of plans. Memorandum. To CENTCOM

J-3 Plans. Subject: Theater Campaign Strategy

Assessment (U). Notes from Colonels Deptula and Purvis

are attached, 14 February 1991. (Secret) Declassified by

HRA declassification and review team. Information

extracted is unclassified. HRA: TF6-47-523-530.

———. 14th Air Division commander, Desert Storm campaign

briefing to the pilots of the 363d TFW Al Dhafra Air Base

(AB), United Arab Emirates, 10 January 1991. (Author

was present.)

Goodman, Glenn W. “New Airborne Sensors Look Deep, Allow

Army/USAF to Strike Deep.” Armed Forces Journal

International, January 1989.

Griffith, Lt Gen Ronald H. “Mission Accomplished—In Full.”

US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1993. General

Griffith was 1st Armored Division commander during

Desert Storm and wrote in response to Colonel Burton’s

June 1993 article. This is a unique look at the RGFC

ground battle from a division commander’s perspective.

Gulf War Air Power Study (GWAPS) Summary Report.

Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993.

———. Vol.1, 2 pts., Planning and Command and Control.

———. Vol. 2, 2 pts., Operations and Effects and Effectiveness.

———. Vol. 3, 2 pts., Logistics and Support.

———. Vol. 4, 2 pts., Weapons, Tactics, and Training and

Space Operations.

———. Vol. 5, 2 pts., A Statistical Compendium. The only

“user-friendly” source of Gulf War statistics, the strike

tabulations are particularly useful, although not always

clear in what they represent.

“The Gulf War: An Iraqi General’s Perspective,” 11 March

1991. HRA: NA-22.

Hallion, Richard P. Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf

War. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press,

1992.

124
Hammick, Murray. “Iraqi Obstacles and Defensive Positions.”

International Defense Review, September 1991. A

firsthand look at Iraqi fortifications in Kuwait, primarily

in the vicinity of Kuwait City.

Harris, Lt Col G. Chesley. “Operation Desert Storm: Armored

Brigade in Combat.” Infantry, May–June 1992. Colonel

Harris was the S-3 of 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division.

Herlik, Ed. Separated by War: An Oral History by Desert Storm

Fliers and Their Families. Blue Ridge Summit, Pa.:

McGraw-Hill, 1994.

Hertberg, Capt Rob. “Beyond the Fire Support Line (FSCL):

Contact the Killer Scouts.” USAF Fighter Weapons Review,

Spring 1992. Captain Hertberg was a weapons officer and

killer scout pilot. This article describes killer scout

procedures developed by the 4th TFS pilots.

Hillen, 1st Lt John. “2d Armored Cavalry: The Campaign to

Liberate Kuwait.” Armor, July–August 1991. Lieutentant

Hillen was assistant S3, 2/2 ACR.

Holley, I. B. Jr. “An Enduring Challenge: The Problem of Air

Force Doctrine.” The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military

History 1959–1987. Edited by Harry R. Borowski.

Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988.

Holthus, Capt Michael D., and Steven M. Chandler. “Myths

and Lessons of Iraqi Artillery.” Field Artillery, October

1991.

Horner, Lt Gen Charles A. “Air Ops Summary of Air War,” 26

February 1991, 1100Z. This copy of General Horner’s

notes on progress of the air war illuminates the JFACC’s

thinking on progress of the air war after eight days. HRA:

NA 215.

———. “New Age Warfare.” The War in The Air: 1914–1994.

Edited by Alan Stephens. Canberra: RAAF Air Power

Studies Centre, 1994. Clearly reveals Horner’s ideas on

the importance of decentralization to bring out the

contributions of all.

———. “Offensive Air Operations: Lessons for the Future.”

RUSI Journal, December 1993.

125
———. Reuter Transcript Report. “Address to Business

Execu-tives for National Security Education Fund,” 8 May

1991.

———. “Transcripted Comments from CENTAF TACC (U)

January–February 1991.” (Secret) Information extracted

is unclassified. Invaluable insight into how the JFACC

perceived the course of the air war. HRA: CHP 13B.

———. Transcripts of Dadaelian Dinner Speech, 11 September

1991. HRA: TF6-47-539.

Howard, Sir Michael. “Military Science in an Age of Peace.”

Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence

Studies 119, March 1974.

Isherwood, Maj Michael W. “Noise or Music? Orchestrating

Fixed-Wing Air in the Close-in Battle.” Field Artillery,

October 1994.

Jackson, Capt John D. “Battle Damage Assessment.” Military

Intelligence, October-December 1991. Captain Jackson

was a member of the CENTCOM BDA Cell and describes

the group’s BDA criteria.

Janis, Irving L. Air War and Emotional Stress: Psychological

Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense. Westport, Conn.:

Greenwood Press, 1976.

Jones, Col Jeffrey B. “Psychological Operations in Desert

Shield, Desert Storm, and Urban Freedom.” Special

Warfare, July 1994. Colonel Jones was the 8th PSYOP

battalion commander.

Jupa, Richard, and James Dingeman. “The Republican

Guards: Loyal, Aggressive, Able.” Army 41, no. 3 (March

1991): 54–58+.

Kamiya, Maj Jason K., USA. A History of the 24th Mechanized

Infantry Division Combat Team during Operation Desert

Storm: “The Attack to Free Kuwait” (January through

March 1991). Fort Stewart, Ga.: 1991. Useful divisional

official history.

Keaney, Thomas A. “Surveying Gulf War Airpower.” Joint Force

Quarterly, Autumn 1993.

Kinsvatter, Lt Col Peter S. “VII Corps Goes to War: Ground

Offensive.” Military Review, February 1992. Colonel

126
Kinsvatter was VII Corps historian in Desert Storm. The

maps in the article are particularly useful.

Kleiner, Col Martin S. “Joint STARS Goes to War.” Field Artillery,

February 1992. Colonel Kleiner was the commander of

the US Army’s JSTARS operational detachment in Desert

Storm.

Lacquement, Capt Richard A., Capt Joseph V. Pacileo, and

Capt Paul A. Gallo. “Targeting during Desert Storm.” Field

Artillery, February 1992. Captains Lacquement, Pacileo,

and Gallo were artillery officers in 1st Armored Division in

Desert Storm.

Lewis, Col Richard B. H. “JFACC Problems Associated with

Battlefield Preparation in Desert Storm.” Airpower Journal

8, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 4–21. Colonel Lewis describes the

impact of ARCENT BDA rules on CENTAF operations.

———. “Corps Air Support at Desert Storm,” 3 July 1991.

HRA: NA-23. This material is the source for the “JFACC”

article.

Liddell Hart, B. H. The Real War, 1914–1918. Boston: Little,

Brown and Co., 1930.

Lloyd, Charles D. “A Technological Success Story: Joint

STARS and Operation Desert Storm.” Air Power History

38, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 27–35.

Lupfer, Timothy T. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in

German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War.

Leavenworth Papers 4. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat

Studies Institute (CSI), 1981.

Macedonia, Maj Michael R., USA. “Information Technology in

Desert Storm.” Military Review, October 1992, 37–38.

Macgregor, Lt Col Douglas A. “Closing with the Enemy.”

Military Review, February 1993. Colonel Macgregor was

the S-3 for 2/2 ACR.

Maggart, Col Lon E. “A Leap of Faith.” Armor, January–

February 1992. Colonel Maggart commanded the 1st

Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in Desert Storm, and

describes the demise of the Tawakalna Division.

Maggart, Brig Gen Lon E., and Col Gregory Fontenot.

“Breaching Operations: Implications for Battle Command

and Battle Space.” Military Review, February 1994. Maps

127
of the breaching area reveal how much detailed

information of the Iraqi Army was present in theater but

not available to CENTAF.

Melton, Maj Gregory P. “XVIII Airborne Corps Desert Deception.”

Military Intelligence, October–December 1991. ARCENT

deception efforts were not perceived by the Iraqis due to

CENTAF’s C2I attacks.

Moltke, Helmuth von. Moltke on the Art of War: Selected

Writings. Edited and translated by Daniel J. Hughes and

Harry Bell. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1993.

Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1. Mission Employment, Vol.

1, Tactics, Tactical Employment, General Planning and

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MCM 3-1. Tactical Doctrine: Volume 5-Tactical Employment—

F-16, 1 January 1995.

National Training Center Handbook 100-91. The Iraqi Army:

Organization and Tactics, Fort Irwin, Calif., 3 January

1991. [355.30567 I65.] The best source for Iraqi tables of

organization and tactical doctrine.

9th Tactical Intelligence Squadron (TIS). “CENTAF/IN AfterAction Reports” (U). (Secret) Information extracted is

unclassified. The 9th TIS was CENTAF headquarters’

intelligence unit. HRA: K178.80-174.

138th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS)/IN After-Action Report.

“CENTAF/IN After-Action Report” (U). (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified. HRA: K178.80-174.

Paret, Peter. “Innovation and Reform in Warfare.” In The

Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History 1959–1987.

Edited by Harry R. Borowski. Washington, D.C.: Office of

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Rosenberger. Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle

East. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute,

1990.

Pelletiere, Stephen C. The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum.

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128
October 1991. A comprehensive account of the 4th

Brigade, 1st Armored Division’s activities in the war.

Puryear, Capt A. A., and Lt Gerald R. Haywood II. “Ar Ruma ylah

Airfield Succumbs to Hasty Attack.” Armor, September–

October 1991.

Putney, Diane T. “From Instant Thunder to Desert Storm:

Developing the Gulf War Air Campaign’s Phases.” Air

Power History 41, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 38–50. A useful

overview of the planning of Desert Storm. The footnotes

are invaluable.

“Riders on the Storm: A Narrative History of the 1-4 Cav’s

Campaign in Iraq and Kuwait.” Armor, May–June 1991.

Risner, Brig Gen Robinson. “Final Report, Red Flag I.” (U)

December 1995. (Secret) Information extracted is

unclassified.

Rogers, Gen Bernard W. “Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA):

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Rosen, Stephen P. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the

Modern Military. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

1991.

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Attack: Making Every Round Count. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

University Press, 1991.

Scales, Col Robert H., Jr. “Accuracy Defeated Range in

Artillery Duel.” International Defense Review, May 1991,

473–81. An overview of artillery lessons from the war.

Scales, Brig Gen Robert H., Jr., USA. Certain Victory: The US

Army in the Gulf War. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993.

Official Army account of the Gulf War emphasizing VII

Corps battle with the RGFC.

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman with Peter Petre. It Doesn’t Take a

Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

17th Air Division (P) Historian. “CENTAF TACC Notes” (U),

January–February 1991. (Secret) Information extracted is

unclassified. HRA: K-div-17-su-re.

Sharpe, Col Ervin C., commander of 354th TFW, and Col

David A. Sawyer, commander of 23d TFW. To

commander, 14th AD (P), Letter. Subject: A-10 and Iraqi

129
Tactics, 3 February 1991. (Secret) Declassified by HRA.

HRA: microfilm 23988 frames 411–12.

Sikes, Lt Col Roy Y. “Targeting Iraqi Forces in the KTO.” Lectu re.

Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 28

January 1994.

614th TFS. “614TFS Squadron History Desert Shield/Storm.”

29 August–29 March 1991. HRA: NA-379.

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Press, 1936.

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———. Warthog: Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War. Washington,

D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993.

Smith, Lt Col Kevin W., USAF. Cockpit Video: A Low Cost BDA

Source. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,

December 1993. A good discussion of Desert Storm BDA

problems and previous solutions (gun camera film).

Stewart, Brig Gen John F. Jr., USA. Operation Desert Storm,

The Military Intelligence Story: A View from the G-2 3D US

Army. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 27 April 1991.

Strategic Air Command. “Desert Storm Bombing and

Navigation Conference 22–24 April 1991 After-Action

Report,” 19 June 1991.

Sullivan, Gen Gordon R., and Col James M. Dubik. “War in

the Information Age.” Military Review, April 1994.

Swain, Richard M. Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm.

Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff

College (CGSC) Press, 1994.

———. “Compounding the Error.” US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1993. A response to Burton’s article.

Tactical Air Command Pamphlet 50-26, Pamphlet 525-16, US

Redcom Pamphlet 5245-4, Joint Operational Concept:

Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK), 13 December

1982.

“Tactical Responses to Concentrated Artillery.” CSI Report 13.

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valuable insights into the effects and responses to fires

against ground forces and has applicability to air-toground fires.

130
Talbot, Robert, and Gene Gibson. “SWA Armor Analysis” (U).

(Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. HRA:

NA-167.

Teixeira, Lt Col Leonard D. G. “Linebacker II: A Strategic and

Tactical Case Study.” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College,

1990. Colonel Teixeira was a participant in Linebacker II

as a B-52 crew member.

10th TFS. “Desert Shield/Storm After-Action Report” (U), 9

May 1991. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

Tilford, Earl H., Jr. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam

and Why. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, June

1991.

23d TFW (P) and 354th TFW (P). “Operation Desert Storm A-1 0

Combat Recap” (U), 5 April 1991. (Secret) Information

extracted is unclassified. HRA: NA-292.

US Senate. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Hearings

before the Committee on Armed Services. 102d Cong., 1st

sess., 1991. An account that includes the comments of

senior officers from all services.

Van Creveld, Martin L. Command in War. Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press, 1985.

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2 (Summer 1993): 24–38.

War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20. Command and

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Warden, Col John A., III. The Air Campaign: Planning for

Combat. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989.

Warford, Capt James M., USA. “Tanks of Babylon: Main Battle

Tanks of the Iraqi Army.” Armor, November–December

1990. Captain Warford was an armor school instructor.

Warn, Lieutenant. “Battle Damage Assessment From LANTIRN

Videos” (U). CENTAF/IN AAR. (Confidential) Information

extracted is unclassified. Lieutenant Warn was 4th TFW

intelligence officer during Desert Storm. HRA: K178.80-174.

———. “LANTIRN Targeting Pod Imagery Interpretation” (U).

CENTAF/IN AAR. (Confidential) Information extracted is

unclassified. HRA: K178.80-174.

131
Welch, Lt Col William G. “Notes from the BCE: Observations

on Joint Combat Operations at Echelons above Corps.”

Field Artillery, June 1992, 16–21. Colonel Welch was the

US Army plans officer, battlefield coordination element,

attached to CENTAF during Desert Storm.

Welsh, Lt Col Mark A. “Day of the Killer Scouts.” Air Force

Magazine 76, no. 4 (April 1993): 66–70. Colonel Welsh

was the squadron commander of the 4th TFS and an

original killer scout.

Winter, Denis. Haig’s Command: A Reassessment. New York:

Viking, 1991.

Winton, Harold R. “On Doctrine: Thinking about How to Think

about War.” Lecture. School of Advanced Airpower

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3 (March 1992): 28–38. Major Wright is a brigade

topographic officer, 20th Engineer Brigade, XVIII Corps,

Fort Bragg, N.C. He was chief of topographic technology

exploitation cell, 30th Battalion, Riyadh.

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132