NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

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Nos. 09-2971 and 09-3996 

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

JORGE LUIS CANALS-SANTOS 

JORGE LUIS CANALS-SANTOS 

a/k/a ANGEL LUIS CRUZ, JR., 

Appellant 

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Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-07-cr-00428-001) 

District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

September 21, 2010 

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed September 30, 2010) 

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OPINION 

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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
 Jorge Luis Canals-Santos, also known as Angel Cruz, was convicted in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of making a false statement 

in a passport application, 18 U.S.C. § 1542, possessing an identification document with 

intent to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4), and making a false claim of 

United States citizenship, 18 U.S.C. § 911. He now challenges his convictions.1

 We 

affirm. 

I. Background 

 Defendant2

 was charged under the name “Jorge Luis Canals-Santos” with 

attempting to obtain a United States passport by falsely representing that he was an 

American citizen. His defense was that he was not Canals-Santos (a citizen of the 

Dominican Republic), but rather Angel Cruz (an American). His counsel explained this 

mistaken-identity defense at the start of the trial, and Defendant also testified that he was 

Angel Cruz, not Canals-Santos. Nonetheless, the District Court referred to Defendant as 

Mr. Canals-Santos at least five times during the trial, and never referred to him as Angel 

Cruz. The prosecutor also called him Canals-Santos. Defense counsel did not object to 

any of these references and, in fact, once responded to the District Court’s question about 

whether it was proper to refer to Defendant as Canals-Santos or Santos by saying 

“Canals-Santos would be fine.” 

 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

2

 Because the first issue on appeal centers on whether the District Court erred by referring 

to Defendant as Canals-Santos, we will use “Defendant” hereafter. 

2 
 The prosecution presented evidence that Defendant’s fingerprints matched those 

of Jorge Luis Canals-Santos, who was caught entering the United States as a stowaway 

on a Panamanian ship. Additionally, the prosecution presented testimony of another 

individual named Angel Cruz, who testified that he had previously lost his Social 

Security card and that some (but not all) of the biographical information that Defendant 

provided on his passport application matched Cruz’s biographical information. 

After all the evidence was presented, the District Court instructed the jury on the 

reasonable doubt standard as follows: 

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced 

of the defendant's guilt. The expression reasonable doubt means a doubt 

which is founded upon a good reason. 

A reasonable doubt is not a doubt that arises from a merciful disposition or 

a kindly or sympathetic feeling or a desire to avoid performing a 

disagreeable or unpleasant duty. 

If a reasonable doubt arises, it must either be from the evidence produced or 

from the lack of evidence. It must not be a mere whim or speculation or a 

vague or hypothetical conjecture or a misgiving founded upon mere 

possibilities. 

It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act 

in matters of importance in his or her own affairs. Mere suspicion of guilt 

is not enough to satisfy this burden of proof. 

The government is not required, however, to prove guilt beyond all possible 

doubt or to a mathematical certainty. It is not necessary that you be 

convinced of an absolute certainty that the defendant is guilty. If that were 

the rule, few persons however guilty they may be would be convicted. 

However, unless the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Jorge Luis Canals-Santos has committed each and every element of the 

offenses charged in the indictment, you must find him not guilty of the 

offenses. 

3 
Defendant, through counsel, objected to this instruction. 

 The jury found Defendant guilty of all charges, and the District Court imposed a 

sentence of 33 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and a fine and 

special assessment. 

 On appeal, Defendant argues that the District Court violated his due process rights 

and his right to trial by jury by referring to him as Canals-Santos even though his identity 

was an issue to be decided by the jury. Defendant also argues that the District Court’s 

reasonable doubt instruction fell short of constitutional requirements. 

II. Discussion 

A. The District Court’s references to “Canals-Santos” 

 Because Defendant did not object contemporaneously to the District Court’s 

references to him as Canals-Santos, we review the District Court’s actions for plain 

error.3

 See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 193 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under plain error 

review, the appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial if there is (1) an error, 

(2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Jones, 

471 F.3d 478, 480 (3d Cir. 2006). 

 “There is no bright line separating remarks that are appropriate from remarks that 

may unduly influence a jury.” United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 1984). 

Rather, this Court has articulated a four-factor balancing test to determine whether a trial 

 

3

 The Government argues that Defendant may have waived this argument altogether. 

Because we conclude that the Court’s statements were not plain error, we do not decide 

whether Defendant’s argument was waived. 

4 
judge’s remark is error. The factors are the “materiality of the challenged comment,” the 

“strength of the challenged comment,” the “efficacy of any curative instruction,” and the 

“prejudicial effect of the comments in light of the jury instruction as a whole.” Id. at 269. 

The theme is that the District Judge must make it “clear in his charge that the jury 

remains the sole determiner of credibility and fact.” United States v. Gaines, 450 F.2d 

186, 189 (3d Cir. 1971). 

 While perhaps the District Court could have been more clear, we cannot conclude 

that the handful of instances in which it referred to Defendant as Canals-Santos are plain 

error. While Defendant’s identity was material to the case, the Court’s references to 

“Canals-Santos,” taken in context, were not expressions of its opinion about Defendant’s 

guilt. Further, the Court made clear at multiple points in the course of its instruction that 

the jury was to decide each aspect of the case for itself, regardless of any of the Court’s 

statements or actions. And of course there was no specific curative instruction because 

the Defendant did not object; instead, when asked what the Court should call his client, 

Defendant’s counsel replied “Canals-Santos would be fine.” 

 This conclusion is consistent with our prior cases. We have held that even a 

district court’s characterization of an important part of a defendant’s testimony as 

“spurious” was not reversible error (much less plain error), when the court made it clear 

that the jury was not bound by the “spurious” remark and was free to decide the case on 

its own. Olgin, 745 F.2d at 270-71; see also Gaines, 450 F.2d at 191 & n.9 (court’s 

statement to jury that “you should not permit yourselves to be fooled by stories that 

simply don’t make sense” was not reversible error when court also informed jury that it 

5 
was to determine “the questions of credibility of the witnesses”). In this case, the District 

Court’s statements were less troubling than those in either Olgin or Gaines, and the 

standard of review is plain error. We thus conclude that there was no reversible error. 

B. The District Court’s Reasonable Doubt Instruction 

 Defendant next argues that the District Court’s reasonable doubt instruction could 

have misled the jury regarding the applicable burden of proof. “We review legal 

challenges to a district court’s jury charge de novo. . . . Where an alleged charging error 

goes to the burden of proof, we will reverse a conviction if there is a ‘reasonable 

likelihood’ that the jury understood the instructions to permit a guilty verdict based on 

less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Shamsideen, 511 F.3d 340, 

345 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 728 (3d Cir. 

1999) (same). 

 Specifically, Defendant at trial objected to the District Court’s statement that “[i]t 

is not necessary that you be convinced of an absolute certainty that the defendant is 

guilty. If that were the rule, few persons[,] however guilty they may be[,] would be 

convicted.” However, reading the instruction as a whole, we cannot conclude that there 

is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have misunderstood the burden of proof 

based on that statement.4

 Even if the reference to “however guilty” could have led jurors 

 

4

 On appeal, Defendant argues that the District Court’s error was compounded by its 

statements that “reasonable doubt means a doubt which is founded on good reason” and 

“the law simply requires that before convicting any defendant, the jury must not return a 

verdict of guilty unless and until it is satisfied of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Even if the Defendant had objected to these statements at trial, they 

would not be sufficient to create reversible error. 

6 
7 

to focus improperly on guilt, the rest of the sentence—and indeed the rest of the 

instruction—makes clear the meaning of reasonable doubt. 

* * * * * 

 For these reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions.