Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards:

Appendix Volume II, Part Two

June 1977

OTA-BP-ENV-177

NTIS order #PB-275843

GPO stock #052-003-01360-6
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II. Production of Nuclear Weapons Materials . . . . . . . . . . . .

111. Plutonium-Producing Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Iv. Recovery of Plutonium from Reactor Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . .

v. Uranium Enrichment by Gas Centrifuges . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Annexes

A. Plutonium Production Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Parameters of the BGRR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

c. Foreign, Non-Communist Resources of Uranium . . . . . . . .

D. Separative Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Selected References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

3

6

27

43

56

60

61

63

66
TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME 11 - APPENDIXES

PART TWO

VI. Dedicated Facilities

VII. Purchase and Theft

VIII. Description of Safeguards Technology and Procedures

IX. International Controls
Appendix VI. Dedicated Facilities
Appendix VI

Dedicated Facilities

Table of Contents

Page

VI.

A. Dedicated Facilities for the Production of Nuclear

Weapons in Small and/or Developing Nations . . . . . . . . 1

B. Level II Dedicated Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

c. Electromagnetic Separation of Isotopes . . . . . . . . . . 93

D. Uranium Laser Isotope Separation and Nuclear

weapons Proliferation (Unclassified Version) . . . . . . . 109

i
APPENDIX VI-A

by

John R. Lamarsh

]~~rr~: portions of this report are based on material

prepared earlier for the Congressional Research Service Of the Library of Congress.
VI -1

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to other

nations has been a-major policy objective of the United

States Government since the end of World War II. This

objective has found expression in domestic legislation

restricting the export of nuclear technology and materials,

and, on the international front, in the establishment of

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in the

negotiation of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT).

With the increasing pace in the construction of

nuclear power plants abroad, considerable attention has

been given to the problem of assuring that none of the

plutonium produced in these plants is diverted for use

in weapons. Indeed, the NPT requires continuing IAEA

inspection of nuclear power plants in signatory nations

that currently do not have nuclear weapons.

However, the NPT alone cannot prevent the proliferation

of nuclear weapons if these weapons can be produced outside

the mainstream of the nuclear industry in facilities

specifically dedicated to their manufacture. It appears

that this, in fact, is the case. As shown in this report,
VI -2

many nations in the world today, in particular, many small

and/or developing nations, are capable of undertaking

nuclear weapons programs that can provide them with a

small number of weapons in a period of five to ten years.

It is reasonable to assume that any nation which

embarked on a program to procure nuclear weapons would

attempt to keep this fact a secret as long as possible.

A nation that can suddenly demonstrate a nuclear capability has an obvious advantage over an

unsuspecting adversary. At the same time, a clandestine

weapons program avoids the recriminations and international

political pressures that the nation might encounter if it

pursued the program openly.

Throughout the present report, therefore, it will be

assumed that any nuclear weapons program must be kept

secret. As will be seen, this severely restricts the kind

Of weapons producing facilities that can be built, their

size, rate of production, and location.
VI - 3

II PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS

The explosive material in an fission nuclear weapon

(as opposed to a hydrogen bomb) can be either plutonium-239

or uranium that has been enriched in the isotope uranium-235,

or uranium-233. In order to make a nuclear weapon it is necessary,

therefore, to procure one or the other of these substances in

the necessary amounts. About 5 to 10 kilograms are required

for a plutonium bomb; about 15 to 30 kilograms for a U-235

explosive.

Plutonium-239 is not a naturally-occurring substance.

It is manufactured from the isotope uranium-238 in an

operating nuclear reactor. The newly-produced plutonium239 is then separated chemically from the uranium. Virtually all power reactors operating in the world today

contain large amounts of uranium-238, so that these

reactors are automatic producers of plutonium-239. A

typical American light water reactor in a nuclear power

plant generating 1000 megawatts of electricity produces

about 250 kilograms of plutonium-239 per year.

Plutonium-239 was first obtained for use in nuclear

weapons in the United States during the Manhattan Project

of World War II from specially-designed plutonium production

reactors. It appears entirely possible for many small and/or

developing nations to obtain plutonium in a similar way, by
VI -4

building a small plutonium producing reactor and associated

plutonium recovery plant.

These

matters are covered in Sections 111 and IV.

The enriching of uranium by such a nation would seem

to be a more difficult undertaking than the production

of plutonium in a small reactor. There are several methods

that might be considered for enriching uranium. To date,

the most successful method is the gaseous diffusion process,

also

which was A developed by the Manhattan Project in World War II.

This has remained essentially the only source of enriched

uranium for military and civilian nuclear programs since

that time, both in the United States and abroad. However,

gaseous diffusion plants are inherently large Structures

that utilize a relatively sophisticated technology, much

of which remains classified, they require an enormous investment of capital, and consume large amounts of electric

power . And, of course, they cannot be concealed. ‘She

gaseous diffusion route to nuclear explosives is simply

out of the question for all but a handful of the largest

and developed countries, and will not be considered

further in this report.

The use of high-speed centrifuges to separate the

isotopes of uranium, a method that was explored during the

Manhattan Project but later abandoned, has re-emerged in
VI -5

the last few years and appears to be more economical than

gaseous diffusion. This method is discussed in Section V

of this report.

Another method for enriching uranium is the Becker

nozzle process. A variation of this method is

being used in the Union of South Africa.

However, this method requires a large number of stages

(see discussion of stages in Section V) and consumes two

and one-half times as much electric power as gaseous

diffusion and about thirty times as much as centrifuges.

About the only attractive feature of the Becker method

is that it is totally unclassified. In any case, this

method does not appear to be a reasonable choice for a

small and/or developing nation.

A number of other processes for separating

uranium are under development that promise to

reduce substantially the cost of enriching uranium.

Since these have not been demonstrated in practice, they

are not available options for small and/or developing

nations in the near future.
VI - 6

III PLUTONIUM-PRODUCING REACTORS

As noted earlier, plutonium-239 is produced in any

operating nuclear reactor containing uranium-238. The

first problem therefore facing any nation embarking upon

an illicit nuclear weapons program based on plutonium is

to obtain the necessary nuclear reactor. India received

a research reactor from Canada, and by introducing their

own uranium-238 into that reactor, the Indians were able

to produce enough plutonium to make a bomb. The fact

that Indian uranium was used to produce the plutonium

presumably circumvented in a legal way the safeguards

provisions in the Canadian-Indian reactor agreement. In

much the same way, Israel procured a small research

reactor from France, and according to some reports this

reactor has provided the Israelis over the years with

enough plutonium for between 10 and 20 bombs.

No doubt, the Indian and Israeli experience will make

it more difficult for other nations to obtain reactors

in the future, outside of the provisions of the NPT. The

question remains, then, how difficult would it be for a
VI - 7

nation, lacking a major technological base, to construct

a plutonium-producing reactor on its own.

The problems which must be solved by such a nation

in building a production reactor closely parallel those

faced by the United States and her allies in the Manhattan

Project - with two important exceptions: (1) the

necessary reactor technology is highly developed and

readily accessible in the open literature, and (2) important materials unavailable at the beginning of World War II

can now be purchased on the free market.

The first issue that the nation's leaders would have

to settle is the number of bombs that they felt the nation

must acquire and the time scale for getting them. These

factors determine the size of the reactor - assuming for

the moment that only a single reactor is under consideration.

It is shown in Annex A that the rate of plutonium production is proportional to the reactor power level. For

example, a reactor operating at 25 megawatts (MW) will

produce between 9 and 10 kilograms of plutonium per year,

enough for one or two bombs. As outlined below, such a

reactor can be built and operated at nominal cost, in a

relatively short time, with a small number of personnel,

and there is at least a fair chance that its existence

could be concealed for several years.

A more ambitious program, one which would yield, say,
VI-8

between 10 and 20 bombs per year would require a reactor

operating at 200 to 500 MW. The construction of a

reactor of this size would be a major undertaking. It

would necessitate a large investment

a long time to complete, and involve

engineers and construction workers. .

in capital, take

a large number Of

There is no chance

that the project could be kept secret, either during

construction or in operation. What is more, while the

25 MW reactor could be built according to plans of a

reactor that was actually operated for many years, a

good deal of design and engineering would have to be

done on the larger reactor, and there could be no guarantee

beforehand that the reactor would operate successfully.

Finally, there is the question as to what a small and/or

developing nation could possibly do with so many bombs.

After 10 years of operation the nation could have as many

as 200 weapons, far more than needed to obliterate any

other small and/or developing country. Yet, even then,

it would be difficult to abandon such an enormous

reactor and its associated plutonium recovery plant

into which the nation had poured so much wealth.

In short, it does not appear reasonable to assume

that the nation in question would attempt to build a large
reactor, and if they elected to do so there is little reason

to expect that they would achieve their objective.

One additional factor should be mentioned. If the

nation were successful in constructing: the smaller reactor

and required a higher plutonium production rate, there

is nothing to prevent it from building a second or third

reactor of ‘the same type. Having built one reactor, it

would be an easy matter to build carbon copies.

Since the nation in question would not have access

to enriched uranium- if they were able to produce enriched

uranium the y would never “bother to Produce plutonium -

the reactor would have to be fueled with natural uranium.

This automatically places restrictions on the type of

reactor that can be built. I t either has to be moderated

with graphite o r with heavy water- t hes e are the on 1 y

practical moderators that can be used in a natural uranium

fueled reactor.

However, heavy water has drawbacks. It is expensive

and obtainable from only a handful of countries. Attempts

to purchase it would immediately reveal an intention to

undertake a nuclear program, since the necessary amounts

of heavy water could have no other possible application.

The construction of a heavy water production plant requires

relatively sophisticated technology, and would be a
VI - 10

difficult task for a small and/or developing nation. At

the same time, the technical problems of designing,

building, and operating a heavy water reactor are somewhat more formidable than for a graphite reactor with

the same plutonium production capacity. For one thing,

the reactor vessel, with its many piping connections

and instrumentation and control penetrations, must be

leak tight to prevent the loss of heavy water. This

requires high-(grade manufacturing skills presumably

not present in the nation in question. While the Indian

and Israeli reactors are Of the heavy water type, both

were obtained from nations having long experience in

fabricating heavy water reactor systems. It may be

concluded, therefore, that the plutonium producing

reactor would be graphite moderated.

It must be next decided how the reactor would be

cooled. Amens several possibilities, only air and water

are practical choices for the reactor coolant. Other

coolants, such as CO2 or helium require closed cycle

operation, an unnecessary complication for a reactor

operating at low power levels. Water-cooled reactors

are capable of higher plutonium production rates than

air-cooled reactors of the same size, because water has

better cooling properties than air. However, a watercooled reactor is more difficult to design, construct,
VI - 11

and maintain. Water is more corrosive than air so the

fuel elements must be carefully fabricated. The safety

analysis of such a reactor is also more involved than

for a comparable air-cooled reactor. Both the United

States and the U.S.S.R. use water cooling in their production reactors, but these are, after all, major technological nations. On the other hand, Great Britain and

France used air, at least initially, in their reactors.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that a small

and/or developing nation would base its plutonium production program on the construction of at least one

natural uranium fueled, graphite-moderated, air-cooled

reactor. Another factor favoring this choice of reactor

is that the design parameters for successful reactors of

this type are freely available in the open literature.

The first natural uranium, graphite reactor was the

so-called CP-1 pile, built by Enrico Fermi and his associates

in Chicago in 1942. This was also the world's first

reactor.* The CP-l was dismantled after only 4 months of

operation and reconstructed as the CP-2 reactor, another

experimental system of Fermi design. The first reactor

to operate at a significant power level - about 2 MW -

was the X-10 reactor at Oak Ridge. The purpose of this

reactor was to provide plutonium for the startup phase

of the plutonium chemical separation plant at Hanford,

*ExCept for the naturally occuring Oklo Reactor.
VI - 12

Washington, prior ‘

0

. . to the operation of the Hanford production

r e a c tors .

The X-10 reactor also served as the basis for the

design of the original Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor

(BGRR), which operated at Brookhaven National Laboratory

from 1948 until 1957, when its natural uranium fuel was

replaced by enriched uranium. The reactor was shut down

in 1969 and decommissioned shortly thereafter. While

the BGRR was used primarily for research, about 9 kilograms

Of plutonium-239 were produced per year in the reactor -

sufficient for the fabrication of one or two bombs per

year, when process losses are taken into consideration.

The construction of either an enlarged X-10 reactor

or a simplified version of the BGRR would appear to be

the most logical way for a small and/or developing nation

to initiate the production Of plutonium. Since the

BGRR has been more widely discussed in the open literature,

only this reactor will be considered in the present report.

Before doing so, however, it should be pointed out

that the plutonium produced in a BGRR in the first few

years Of operation is almost entirely pure plutonium-239.

Very little of the plutonium-239 is converted into the

heavier isotope plutonium-240. After one year of operation,

for example, less than one-half of one percent of the
VI - 13

plutonium in the BGRR is plutonium-240. This is in

marked contrast to the plutonium produced in power

reactors. Because these reactors operate at much

higher neutron fluxes, a substantial amount of the

plutonium-239 is converted to plutonium-240. The

plutonium in the fuel discharged from a power reactor

following a year of operation is typically 10 to 20

percent plutonium-240.

The plutonium-240 content is an important consideration

when plutonium is to be used for the manufacturing of

nuclear weapons. This is because the spontaneous fission

rate of plutonium-240 is so high. The neutrons emitted

in spontaneous fissions can lead to the preinitiation of

the explosion. In short, the plutonium produced in the

BGRR is excellent bomb material; the plutonium produced

in an ordinary power reactor is not as good. (See Chapter

VI of Vol. I “Nuclear Fission Explosive Weapons".)

Years ago, when the BGRR was in operation at Brookhaven,

the AEC was always pleased to learn that one of the

reactor’s fuel elements had sprung a leak, for this was

the only time that the BGRR fuel was removed from the

reactor for reprocessing. Leaking fuel meant high grade

plutonium for the AEC'S weapons program.
VI - 14

The Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor

The BGRR consisted of a 25 foot cube of graphite,

penetrated by a square, 37 x 37 array of 1368 three inch

diameter air channels that contained the fuel assembles.*

For efficiency in cooling the fuel, the graphite cube was

split in the middle, and the two halves were separated

by a 7 cm air gap. Cool air entered the reactor via this

gap, passed through the air channels in both directions

to the opposite surfaces of the reactor, and was then

exhausted via fans to a 320 foot stack. By introducing

the air at the center of the reactor, the pumping power

required to move the air was reduced by a factor of eight.

This feature of the BGRR was one of the principal design

improvements over the X-10 reactor.

The air left the reactor at a temperature of up to

220°C, depending on the reactor power level. Since it

is difficult to pump heated, low density air, the air

leaving the reactor was passed through a cooler, where

its temperature was reduced about a hundred centigrade

degrees and its density increased. This saved on the

size and operating costs of the fans.

*The central channel contained a removable plug for experimen-tal purposes. The number of channels was therefore 1368,

not 1369.
VI - 15

The fuel for the BGRR was in the form of cylindrical

uranium slugs 1.1 inches in diameter and 4 inches long.

These slugs were loaded into hollow aluminum cartridges,

33 to a cartridge, to make the fuel assemblies. The

cartridges had six aluminum fins running their full

length that supported the fuel in the center of the

air channels and increased the heat transfer area from

the fuel to the air. One fuel assembly was used per

air channel on either side Of the central air gap.

It was not necessary, however, to load all 1368 fuel

channels in order to operate the reactor. The BGRR

actually went critical with only about 870 loaded channels.

The other channels were available to provide additional

reactivity when neutron-absorbing experiments were

introduced into the core.

Control of the BGRR was accomplished by the motion

of horizontal control rods that entered the reactor from

two adjacent corners. Supplementary emergency shutdown

control could be obtained by the mechanical dumping of

boron shot into holes provided for this purpose at the

top of the reactor. The BGRR was equipped with an array

of radiation detectors and system monitoring devices that

provided operating data to a central control room.

The BGRR was housed in a large and attractive brick
VI - 16

building that also contained a number of offices,

laboratories and seminar rooms. Since the BGRR was

built primarily for research, heavy platforms were

erected at several levels a cross the face of the reactor

to supper t experiment a J. equipment. The overall cost of

the BGRR facility was $25.5 million when it was built

in 1948. Of that total, only $16.7 million was attributed to the reactor and reactor-related equipment.

A tabulation of the principal characteristics of the

BGRR is given in Annex B.

It is not necessary to duplicate the BGRR in detail

in order to produce plutonium at the same rate as it was

produced in that reactor. Simplifications in the BGRR

design would permit the building of a plutonium production

reactor that would be cheap and reasonably reliable, and

a reactor whose engineering would require the talents

of only a small cadre of conventionally trained engineers.

The procurement or fabrication of certain key components

would be the most difficult problems that a small and/or

developing nation would have to solve. These components

are as follows:

Fuel. The

would be needed

order of 75 tons of natural uranium metal

to fuel the reactor. The actual amount
VI - 17

of fuel would depend on the design of the reactor and the

nature of the materials used to build it. Refined uranium

directly suitable for reactor fuel apparently is available only from highly industrialized nations, where it

is a controlled substance and not easily obtained on

the open market. It cannot be exported from the United

States, for example, without a license from the nuclear

Regulatory Commission.

Nevertheless, a great many nations in the world

possess indigenous sources of uranium ore. A table of

1975 estimates of non-U.S. uranium resources is given

in Annex C. As seen in the table, nations such as

Algeria and Argentina have estimated resources in excess

of 30,000 tons of U308 recoverable at up to $30 per

pound. Only the order of 100 tons of U308 is needed

to obtain 75 tons of uranium metal.

The processing of uranium ore and its reduction to

metallic uranium is not a difficult undertaking for a

trained metallurgist. The necessary directions are in

the open literature. It would require learning experience

for a metallurgist who was a novice in uranium metallurgy.

The problem would be much simplified if the nation in

question were already a producer of U308. In any event,

a well-trained metallurgist should be capable of designing and setting up a small uranium mill in 12 to
VI - 18

18 months which would produce 75 tons of satisfactory

uranium metal in another year. The required equipment

and supplies are generally available on the world market.

The cost of producing 75 tons of uranium metal is

difficult to estimate, since labor, raw material, and

capital costs vary so widely from nation to nation.

There is no market in natural uranium in the United

States at the present time. The Federal Register price

of natural uranium hexafluoride is $25.39 per kilogram.

The cost of uranium metal in this country is therefore

about $25 per kilogram, which is not a free market

price. U308 for future delivery is now being quoted as

high as $40 per pound, - which would give the uranium a

value of over $100 per kilogram excluding processing

costs. Using the nominal value of $25 per kilogram, the

total cost of 75 tons of uranium comes to about $1.7

million.

Fuel Assemblies. The fabrication of fuel cartridges

similar to those used in the BGRR, with their six aluminum

fins running the length of each cartridge, might well

pose a serious manufacturing problem to a small and/or

developing nation. However, the fins are not entirely

necessary for the operation of the reactor. A satisfactory and far simpler fuel assembly could be made

by merely inserting uranium metal slugs into a hollow
VI - 19

aluminum tube sealed at both ends. These tubes could

then simply be placed along the bottom of the air

channels in direct contact with the graphite, a procedure followed in the x-10 reactor, or supported in

the center of the channels on suitably machined pieces

of graphite (which is easily machined), as was done in

the British Windscale plutonium production reactor. The

use of this type of fuel assembly would require modifications in the rate Of air flow through the reactor, the

operating temperature of the fuel, or the reactor power

level from the values of these parameters in the BGRR.

The necessary adjustments could easily be determined

however. The fabrication of the fuel assemblies would

require about 6 months, starting with raw uranium metal.

Graphite. The graphite used in nuclear reactors must

be of high purity. In particular, the concentration of

the impurity boron must be as low as possible. The

procurement of reactor -grade graphite was one of the

first problems that had to be solved in the Manhattan

Project. Although graphite occurs abundantly in nature,

all commercial graphite is manufactured artificially from

petroleum coke or coal tar pitch.

Graphite of the type used in the BGRR is currently

available from a number of companies here and abroad,

although the Department of Commerce licenses the export
VI -20

of reactor grade graphite from the United States.

One U.S. manufacturer recently entertained inquiries

from Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S.S.R.

The Union Carbide Corporation sells reactor grade

graphite for approximately $2 per pound. If the full

700 tons of graphite required to duplicate the BGRR

were purchased from this company, the total cost would

be $2.8 million.

However, as a already noted, a production reactor

does not have to be as large as the BGRR. Instead of

building a 25 ft cube, a somewhat smaller cube, say

21 ft on a side, would probably do just as well. The

total amount of graphite required in this case could

be as little as 415 tons and cost $1.7 million.

It should be mentioned that the processes for manufacturing reactor-grade graphite and electrode graphite

are essentially the same. Facilities used for producing

electrode graphite can easily be converted to the

production of reactor-grade graphite. To obtain reactorgrade graphite it is most important to start with clean

raw materials and to use somewhat higher temperatures.

Electrode graphite manufacturing plants are located

throughout the world. Union Carbide Corporation, to

name but one organization, has subsidiaries manufacturing
VI -21

electrode graphite in Brazil, Canada, Italy, Japan,

Mexico, Puerto Rico, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden.

Graphite is easily machined. Its sizing and

fabrication for use in a reactor presents no problems.

Air-Moving Equipment.

type are suitable for moving the air through a BGRR

system. This equipment is readily available throughout

the world. If purchased from American manufacturers,

the fans and motors required to provide a flow of 300,000

cubic feet per minute would cost about $180,000 at today’s

prices. The associated ducting, and intake and exhaust

structures would present problems. However, all necessary

materials are available and could be fitted or fabricated

with patience and skill.

Controls. The control of a natural uranium graphite

reactor is extremely simple. There is very little excess

reactivity in such a reactor so that whatever transients

do occur in the reactor have long periods and are easily

controlled. The control rods and their drives need not

have the short response times required Of other types of

reactors, e.g., water-cooled power reactors. The rods

and drives could be fabricated from materials on

the open market.
VI - 22

Instrumentation. The elaborate instrumentation found

in American reactors would not be necessary for a small

production reactor. A few neutron and y-ray detectors,

a large variety of which can be purchased in many

different countries, would suffice for the

reactor. Monitors for air, graphite, and fuel temperatures are equally available.

Balance of Plant. As noted earlier, the BGRR

reactor building was a well-built and attractive

structure. The building for a production reactor need

not be so ambitious. A simple industrial structure,

steel-framed with corrugated siding could be built at

3

no more than $3 per ft . A modest cubical building

55 ft on a side would then cost about $0.5 million.

This is the cost if built in the United States. Overseas

costs could well be much less.

The floor of the building would have to support

2

about 5000 tons over an area of 2000 ft , for a loading

2 on the order of 2 tons per ft . This is not an especially

large floor loading and could be satisfied with a slab

of reinforced concrete between 2 and 3 feet thick. At

$100 per cubic yard, a square slab 55 ft on a side could

be built for less than $35,000, U.S. prices. Presumably

. a deep water pool would have to be added along one side

of the reactor to receive and store spent fuel until it

could be processed for plutonium recovery.
VI -23

Overall Costs. Estimated costs of the principal

materials and structures required for a small production

These costs react or are given in the following table.

a r e based. on current U.S. prices, and as such they ma y

have only the roughest applicability to another nation.

1 ter n

uranium

graphite

Table 1

Costs of Production Reactor Components

air equipment and ducts

contro1

instrumentation

building and foundation

Approximate Cost ($ million )

1.7

0.6

Total 6.0

-—

Table 1 does not include the labor costs associated

with fabricating the fuel assemblies from the raw uranium

meta1, Constructing the reactor within the building, connecting the

the control

to estimate

ducts and air-moving equipment, and introducing

and monitoring systems.

since the cost of labor

country to country. If 100 workers

Such costs are difficult

varies so widely from

(not producing uranium
VI - 24

or erecting the building - this labor is included in the

components costs) worked for 3 years at $10,000 per year,

their total wages would amount to $3 million. Using this

as a rough estimate, the reactor could be built for about

$10 million - probably correct within a factor of 2.

Personnel Requirements. As pointed out repeatedly

in this report, it is not necessary to design the reactor

from scratch. All of the essential design parameters

are in the open literature. High-level

development personnel are not required.

of professional e ngineers would suffice

research and

Onlyy a handful

to design and

oversee the construction of the facility. The following

is a list of mininum professional personnel requirements.

Table 2

Type Of Engineer Number

civil-structural

electrical

metallurgist

nuclear

1

1

2

1

3

Utilization

structures, reactor building

control ,instrumentation,

circuitry

heat transfer, mechanical

devices

uranium production

design theory, nuclear measurements, reactor heat transfer
VI - 25

Time Schedule. In any major project, the proper

scheduling of design, procurement, and construction

activities permits the simultaneous accomplishment of

the required tasks. In the case of the reactor under

discussion, the reactor plant parameters could be

finalized and purchase orders placed while the uranium

mill is being prepared. The reactor could then be

erected a t the same time as the fuel assemblies are

being fabricated. This phase of the project would

probably take about 2 or 3 years, depending on the

availability and skill of the work force. The reactor

could be r e ad y for production operation 4 years from

the beginning of the project.

This is probably an overestimate of the time

required for the project. The X-10 reactor in Oak

Ridge went into operation in November 1943, less than

one year after the world's first reactor went critical

in December 1942, and it was opera ted a t almost 2 MW

in nay 1944. The entire BGRR project, which was not a

military project, took only about 3 years.

In any case, sufficient plutonium for at least one

bomb would be

A simplified

page.

present in the reactor fuel one year later.

scheduling diagram is shown on the next
VI - 26

reactor

, design I reactor construction reactor operation T

uranium mill uran prod

k I

fuel assem

b 1 0 1 2 3 4

“~

5

time- years

Figure 1. Schedule for design, construction, and

operation of simplified BGRR.
VI - 27

If it is desired to fabricate weapons as quickly

as possible, then the fuel from the production reactor

would probably be removed for reprocessing after it had

been in the reactor for a period Of approximately one year.

The concentration of plutonium would then be about 9 kilograms in 75 tons of fuel or about 120 grams per ton. The

problems associated with extracting this plutonium from

the fuel and preparing it for fabrication in a weapon are

the subject of the present section.

These problems are not insurmountable, even for a small

and/or developing nation. Indeed, such a nation could

build a small reprocessing plant and recover essentially all of the plutonium-239 produced in a BGRR-type

reactor. The final step of preparing this material for a

weapon can also be readily accomplished, as has been

amply discussed in the literature.

Some Problems in Fuel Reprocessing

In any case, a plutonium recovery plant must be

designed and operated with some care. The raw fuel, when

it is first discharged from the reactor, is highly radioactive, largely due to the activity of the fission products.

Even if the fuel is allowed to cool for a nominal period of

120 days, during which time the activity decays by a factor

of 100 or more, the total radioactivity is still about 45,000

curies per ton or 0.05 curies per gram of fuel. This means
VI - 28

that the chemical processing of the fuel must be carried

out remotely, in a shielded cell, at least up to the point

where the fission products are removed.

It should be noted, however, that the radioactivity of

the BGRR fuel is much smaller than that Of a typical power

reactor. The activity of power reactor fuel after a coolingoff period of 120 days runs between 2 and 3 million curies per

ton, a factor of about 50 times

siderably more precautions must

cessing power reactor fuel than

Nevertheless, the chemical

vide almost complete separation

higher than BGRR fuel. Contherefore be taken in reprofuel from a BGRR.

methods described below proof the fission product activity

from the plutonium and the uranium remaining in the fuel. It

is a remarkable fact that where these methods are used to recover the uranium as well as the plutonium, the activity of

the recovered uranium is no greater than that of ordinary,

natural uranium, which can safely be held in the bare hands.

The separated plutonium is also free of fission products

and it is only mildly radioactive itself, so that it too

could be handled like uranium were it not for the possibility

of inhaling plutonium-bearing particles. Such airborne

particles are extremely dangerous. It is approved practice,

therefore, at least in the United States, for all manipulations

of plutonium to” be carried out in a protected atmosphere. While

such an elaborate precaution is not entirely necessary, as
VI -29

indicated below, it is not difficult to arrange.

Finally, there is the danger of an accidental criticality, that is, the possibility that a critical mass of

plutonium may accidentally be assembled. Only a few hundred

grams of plutonium can become critical in the proper liquid

environment. However, the methods for calculating critical

concentrations are given in all nuclear engineering textbooks and these concentrations are widely tabulated (see

especially Wick in the References). Procedures for avoiding accidental criticalities can easily be adopted.

Plutonium Recovery Processes

Several processes have been developed over the

years to remove the fission products and recover the

plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel. These processes are thoroughly described in journals, textbooks,

and in other open literature. The first to be perfected

was the so-called bismuth phosphate process, which was

the source of plutonium at the beginning of the U.S. nuclear

weapons program. This process was later replaced by a

solvent extraction process, first using the chemical

methyl isobutyl ketone as solvent - this was the socalled Redox process - and somewhat later with the solvent

n-tributyl phosphate (TBP), which is the basis of the

Purex process. So far as is known, virtually all reprocessing plants that have been built in the world
VI - 30

sin c e the 1950's are based on the Purex process.

Solvent extraction processes rely on the following

experimental facts. Uranium and plutonium can exist in

a number of valence (oxidation) states, and because of

differences in their oxidation and reduction potentials

it is possible to oxidize or reduce one of these

elements without disturbing the other. Furthermore,

compounds of these elements in different states have

different solubilities in organic solvents. For

+

instance, in their 4+ and 6 states the nitrates of

both uranium and plutonium are soluble in certain solvents, while in the 3+

state these compounds are

virtually insoluble in these same solvents.

Solvent extraction therefore involves three critical

steps: (1) separating the uranium and plutonium from

the fission products by extracting the first two into the

appropriate solvent, leaving the latter in aqueous solution;

(2) reducing the oxidation state of the plutonium to 3+

so that it is no longer soluble in the solvent; and (3)

back-extracting the plutonium into aqueous solution.

A simplified flow diagram for the Purex process is

shown in Figure 2. The batch of fuel to be processed is

first dissolved in a concentrated solution of nitric

acid. The fission product gases, especially the noble
VI - 31

I

1,

r 1

— . . . .- -. .-— —-J

-.. . . . -- .- - .-.. --—

1

4

—..

m
VI -32

gases, that had been trapped in the fuel, come out of

solution at this point. The release of these gases

is the major source of radioactive effluent from a

reprocessing plant. The aqueous solution of uranium,

plutonium, and fission products, after passing through

a filter to remove undissolved remnants of the fuel

assemblies, then enters at the middle of the first

extraction column. As the organic solvent, TBP diluted

in kerosene, flows up the column, it absorbs the

uranium and plutonium out of the solution. At the

same time, more nitric acid enters from the top of the

column to scrub the rising solvent of any fission

products it may have picked up. The organic solution

which leaves the top of the column contains essentially

all of the uranium and plutonium and a trace of fission

products, whereas the aqueous solution at the

bottom has most of the fission products and very little

uranium and plutonium.

The Organic solution passes next into a second

column where it counterflows against a dilute solution

of chemical reducing agent (a ferrous compound is often

used) which reduces the plutonium to the 3+ state, while

leaving the uranium in the 6+ state. Since the plutonium

is now no longer soluble in the TBP, it passes into the

aqueous solution before it leaves the column.
VI - 33

The uranium is stripped from the organic solvent in

a third column, where the uranium passes into a counterflowing stream of dilute nitric acid. The solvent

leaving the top of the column, from which most of the

plutonium, uranium, and fission products have now been

removed, is piped to a recovery plant for purification

and reuse. The uranium exits the column in aqueous

solution.

At this point, the designs of fuel reprocessing

plants tend to diverge. If the uranium is enriched in

uranium-235, as it is in all American power reactor fuel,

then the uranium solution is passed through additional

cycles of the Purex process for the purpose of reclaiming

the uranium in a highly purified state. With the

natural uranium fuel of the BGRR, it is questionable

whether recovery of the uranium makes sense, because

the spent fuel is somewhat depleted in uranium-235.

Whether or not the uranium would be recovered would

depend on how long the fuel had been in the reactor

and the extent and reliability of the uranium supplies

available.

The plutonium solution can either be put through

further Purex cycles or, what is preferable, the plutonium

can be purified and concentrated through the use of

the process of ion exchange. This process involves

passing the solution into an ion exchange resin and then
VI -34

eluting the plutonium with dilute nitric acid. The

concentration of the purified Plutonium can then be

increased by partially evaporating the solution, care

being taken not to approach criticality conditions.

This is the usual form of the plutonium output from a , ,,

fuel reprocessing plant - a highly purified solution of

plutonium nitrate.

I t is not a difficult problem to reduce the plutonium

nitrate solution to a form for making nuclear weapons.

Both metallic plutonium and plutonium oxide can be used

in a weapon, although the metal is preferable. To

obtain the oxide, sodium oxalate, a common chemical, is

added to the nitrate solution. This forms plutonium

oxalate which is insoluble and precipitates from the

solution. The plutonium oxalate, separated from the

solution by filtration, is then heated in an oven which

yields the oxide Pu02.

To produce metallic plutonium, the oxide is heated

in the presence of hydrogen fluoride and oxygen which

gives plutonium tetrafluoride. This is then reduced by

calcium to yield the metal. The procedures for producing

the metal and fabricating i t into desired forms are

fully described in the references (see especially Wick) .
VI -35

A Small Plutonium Recovery Plant

It is clear from the foregoing remarks that the

chemical engineering required for the recovery of plutonium from spent uranium fuel is relatively simple.

The facts, mentioned earlier, that the fuel is radioactive, that plutonium is some forms is highly toxic

and capable of going critical leads to some, but not

insurmountable problems in the design of a recovery plant.

In any event, designs of such plants can be found

in the open literature. For example, the plans and

specifications for the Allied General Nuclear Services

(AGNS) plant in Barnwell, South Carolina, have been

widely distributed to the public in connection with the

licensing of this plant and are available in NRC Public

Document Rooms.* Furthermore, they can also be purchased

*All the plans and specifications for the AGNS plant have

been made public except for the details of three devices:

the electrochemical plutonium purifiers, the fuel dissolvers,

and the mechanical shear. These plans were retained by the

AGNS designers as company confidential and provided to the

NRC as black box submittals. Nothing about this plant has

been classified on the grounds of national security.
VI - 36

from the National Technical Information Service.

AGNS is a large plant with a through capacity of 5 tons

of fuel per day. Considerable scaling down of this plant

would be necessary for the purpose of reprocessing BGRR

fuel.

The Phillips Plant. Plans and specifications for

a more appropriate, smaller plant are also available,

however. In the late 1950's the Phillips Petroleum

Company undertook a feasibility study of a small reprocessing plant designed to handle spent fuel from Commonwealth Edison's Dresden-1 plant, then scheduled for

operation in 1960. Phillips issued a report on this

study in 1961 (see References), and it was later discussed in an article appearing in Nucleonics Magazine.

Although some chemical/nuclear engineers have expressed

skepticism about the workability of the Phillips plant,

because of its compact design and high degree of automation, it nevertheless can be viewed as an excellent

starting point for the design of a reprocessing facility

in a small and/or developing nation.

The Phillips report contains detailed drawings of

every component of this plant. One of the striking

features of the plant is its small size. With the

exception of storage areas for raw materials and radioactive wastes, the whole plant is enclosed by a 65 ft x

65 ft building of standard construction. The main process
VI - 37

equipment is so small - for instance, the first extraction

column is a pipe only 2 1/2 inches in diameter and 12 feet

long - that all this equipment can be fitted into a single

underground cell 12 ft square. The tail end of the plutonium recovery is carried out in a simply-constructed hood

3 1/2 ft wide, 12 ft long, and 12 ft high which contains

three ion exchange columns, several small holding tanks,

and an area for loading and weighing the product.

The plutonium output from this plant is in the form

of plutonium nitrate solution. No provision is made

for converting the nitrate to metallic plutonium, since

this was not the purpose of the Phillips plant. The

plant was designed primarily to recover enriched uranium

from the fuel and separate out the fission products for

disposal. Equipment to produce the metal would have to

be added.

Simplifying the Phillips Plant. A number of simplifications in the Phillips plant are possible when the

plant is designed for the sole purpose of recovering

plutonium from BGRR fuel. In particular, the so-called

head end of the plant, that portion of the plant where

the fuel is dissolved into solution, need not be as

complicated as in the Phillips plant. Head-end

according to the Phillips report, were the most

dable in designing that plant. This is because

problems,

formithe
VI - 38

Dresden fuel consists of bundles Of fuel rods, each rod

being a hollow zircaloy tube filled with uranium dioxide

pellets. The pellets fit so tightly in the tubes that

they do not fall out on their own when the tube is

opened and turned upside down. It was necessary, therefore, to design an elaborate mechanical/chemical procedure

for dissolving the uranium - a procedure, incidentally,

that is similar to that used in the AGNS plant.

Head-end preparation of BGRR fuel is much less

complicated. Since the fuel will be removed so much

sooner, in terms of fuel burnup, from the BGRR than

it is from Dresden, the uranium will not have had an

opportunity to swell within its aluminum cladding. The

uranium slugs can simply be dumped (remotely) into the

dissolving tank.

As noted earlier, when the fuel dissolves in nitric

acid, radioactive fission product gases which had been

trapped in the fuel are released and bubble to the top

of the dissolving tank. In the Phillips plant, it was

proposed to separate out the rare gases and store these

permanently underground. With the BGRR fuel, however,

the activity of these gases is so small that they can be

exhausted directly to the atmosphere - a practice followed

in all currently operating reprocessing plants. For

example, the total activity of krypton-85 in a full load
VI - 39

of BGRR fuel which has been in the reactor for one year

is only 4000 curies, which in the course of reprocessing

the fuel would be released from the dissolving tank over

a period of a year. This is not an excessively high

release rate for this isotope.

There are other simplifications to the Phillips

plant. For one thing, as already mentioned, the BGRR

fuel is less radioactive by a factor of 50 than typical

(e.g., Dresden) power reactor fuel. This means that

the concrete shielding wherever it is called for in the

Phillips plans can be reduced in thickness. Provision

for the storage of fission products need not be as

elaborate, since their activity is so much smaller.

Finally, all of the process equipment for purifying the

uranium can be omitted if the uranium is not recovered

and recycled.

Availability of Materials. All of the equipment and

supplies required to build and operate a plutonium recovery

plant are generally available on world markets. There

is no single component which is so exotic that it can

only be obtained from a single source. The solvent extraction columns can either be purchased on the open market

or fabricated from standard piping. So can the ion exchangers. The resins used in these columns are standard

Dow-Chemical type resins that are used for water treatment

and other purposes. Automatic valves, ventilation equipment,
VI - 40

flow meters, television monitors, are all standard.

None of the necessary chemicals are out of the ordinary.

The hood for purifying the plutonium would probably have

to be homemade, but this is not a major undertaking. In

short, many small and/or developing nations can procure

the materials necessary to construct and operate a small

plutonium recovery plant.

Economics. The estimated base plant cost (labor

and materials) of the Phillips plant was estimated to

be $2,245,200 in 1960 dollars. When fees, taxes, and

startup costs were included, the total price tag came

to slightly over $4 million.

This figure cannot be taken seriously, however,

based on experience with reprocessing plants that have

actually been built. The General Electric plant in

Morris, Illinois, a one ton throughput per day plant,

was estimated at $17 million. The cost of the completed

plant

plant

to be

was $64 million. When it was found that the

did not work, another $120 million was estimated

required to put it in order. The 5 ton per day

AGNS plant was originally costed out at $70 million.

The actual cost (with an output of plutonium nitrate, as

planned) was $200 million, and additions (e.g., nitrate

to oxide conversion facility and waste solidification

facility) that may be required because of new licensing

regulations may add $300 or $400 million to the price.
VI - 41

Thus , it is exceedingly difficult to estimate the cost

of a reprocessing plant. It is interesting to note,

however, that in the breakdown of costs given in the

Phillips report the major cost of that plant was in the ,

concrete (and its pouring), which was present in abundance

because of the high activity of the Dresden fuel. This

fact has been confirmed by officials responsible for

the design of the AGNS plant - concrete is the nest

expensive single item in the plant. Since the BGRR

processing plant would have so much less concrete, the

cost would be significantly reduced. The other

simplifying; features of the plant described earlier

also lead to reductions in plant cost.

It would appear, without making a detailed cost

analysis, that a plutonium recovery plant of the type

discussed in the present report could be built in the

United States for a cost of well under $25 million,

1977 dollars. Cost in other countries would vary and

conceivable could be much less. However, whether the

actual cost turned out to be $25 million or twice that

amount (there is no

amount - that would

plant in the world)

chance it would be ten times this

be the cost of AGNS, the biggest

the fact is that this is a relatively

low figure, even when combined with the cost of the

reactor, compared to the usual military budget of most

nations.
Personnel Requirements. As in the construction of

the BGRR described earlier, high-level research and

development personnel are not required to build a plutonium recovery plant, since what is necessary is largely

a matter of following and/or modifying established

designs. Many of the same technical personnel involved

in the reactor project could be utilized for the

plutonium plant. This would make good sense, because

the plant would necessarily be located adjacent to

the reactor, and would undoubtedly be built during

the same time frame. The following is a list of

minimum professional personnel requirements.

Table 3

Professional Engineering Requirements

Type of Engineer

chemical

civil-structural

electrical

mechanical

metallurgist

nuclear

Number

2

1

1

1

1

Utilization

process design, construction

structures

control, instrumentation

circuitry

mechanical devices

plutonium preparation

shielding, criticality
VI - 43

V URANIUM ENRICHMENT BY GAS CENTRIFUGES

A standard method for separating particles of

different masses is by centrifuging. This procedure

has been used routinely for decades in biology and

medicine to fractionate blood and other biological

materials. The material to be separated is placed in

a suitable vessel and this is rotated at great speed.

The rotation creates what, in effect, is a strong

gravitational field, and, as a result, the heavier

particles tend to move to the periphery of the vessel

while the lighter ones remain near the center.

The fact that gravitational or centrifugal fields

could be used to separate isotopes was first pointed

out by Lindemann and Aston in 1919. It was twenty years,

however, before such separation was successfully obtained.

This was achieved by J. W. Beams and his coworkers at

the University of Virginia, using a specially-designed

centrifuge

The possibility of obtaining highly enriched uranium

for nuclear weapons by centrifuging was recognized by

Beams immediately after the discovery of fission. Indeed,

according to the Smyth Report on the Manhattan Project,

"for a long time in the early days of the project, the

gaseous diffusion method and the centrifuge method were
considered the two separation methods most likely to

succeed with uranium." 

The first attempt by Beams to separate the isotopes

of uranium, which was held up until late in 1940 because

of the unavailability of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), was

an immediate success. Subsequently, it was decided to

build a small pilot plant at the Bayway, New Jersey,

laboratory of the Standard Oil Development Company

using 24 centrifuges designed and built by the Westinghouse Electric Company. However, only two machines

were actually delivered to Bayway before the entire

centrifuge project was scrapped at the end of January

1944. Nevertheless, one of these machines was operated

successfully for a period of 99 days, and it yielded

the degree of separation that had been predicted

theoretically.

Figure 3 shows a diagram of the Westinghouse shortbowl centrifuge. The bowl or rotor was 42 inches long

and 7.2 inches in diameter and rotated at a rate of

28,200 rpm. This was above the critical speed for the

vibration of the rotor. A model of a machine with a

132 inch rotor was also built and tested in 1943.

During the decade following World War II, the

centrifuge method for separating isotopes was largely
VI - 4 5

I

1

/

I

Figure 3. Manhattan Project centrifuge. (From

J. W. Beams, see References. )
VI - 46

forgotten in the United States, except for a small project

at the University of Virginia. However, work on centrifuges was continued in Germany and also in the Soviet

Union. The Soviet team included a number of German

scientists that had been captured at the end of the

war. Prominent among this group was G. Zippe, who

made a number of significant improvements on centrifuge

design. Shortly after Zippe had been repatriated from

the Soviet Union, he was invited to the University of

Virginia to repeat the experiments he had carried out

with the Soviets. He began work on a new centrifuge

in August 1958 and it was completed in June 1960, when

he was repatriated for the second time.

The Zippe machine has evidently been the basis for

many of the recent developments in centrifuge technology.

A schematic drawing Of the Zippe short bowl centrifuge

is shown in Figure 4. The centrifuge rotor, 0, is 3

inches in diameter and 13 inches long. It spins on a

thin, flexible steel needle, which is centered in a

depression in a hard metal plate, P, whose lateral

motion is damped in oil. Rotational motive power is

obtained from the electric motor, M, the armature of

which is the steel plate, N, fastened rigidly to the

bottom of the rotor. The upper bearing, B, consists of

a hollow cylindrical permanent magnet that attracts a
VI - 47

t

0

Figure 4. Zippe short bowl centrifuge.

(From J.W. Beams, see References. )
s tee 1

is no

VI - 48

tube, D, mounted on the rotor. In this way, there

mechanical contact between the axis of the rotor

and the frame. The volume within the protective jacket,

J, is evacuated so that the rotor spins in a vacuum.

Even this small machine, which operated at subcritical

speeds, was capable of producing separative work (see

Annex D) at a rate of 0.45 kg per year.

With the successful demonstrating of the Zippe

machine, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission recognized

that the centrifuge might possibly be developed into an

economic method of separating:: the isotopes of uranium.

Furthermore, since centrifuges apparently could be fabricated with relatively little difficulty and consumed very

little power, the possibility existed that centrifuging

might provide a mechanism for many small and/or developing

nations to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Accordingly, in 1960 the AEC declared that all work on centrifuges, which was unclassified at that time, would henceforth be classified.

Thereupon the AEC evidently undertook an accelerated

program to develop the centrifuge for isotope separation.
VI - 49

Today the centrifuge process has reached a high level

of sophistication, both in this country and abroad.

According to authorities in the field, centrifuging is

unquestionably cheaper than any other developed (this

excludes laser separation) method of enriching uranium.

An Anglo-Dutch-German enrichment group, Urenco, has

successfully demonstrated the first cascades of two small

centrifuge plants each with a planned capacity of about

200,000 kg SWU per year at Capenhurst, England, and

Almelo, Holland. A small pilot plant is in operation,

or about to go into operation, in Oak Ridge. One American

firm has proposed building a major uranium enrichment

plant to provide fuel for the nation’s nuclear power

plants.

Principles of Centrifuge Separation

In an isotope separation plant the basic unit that

separates the isotopes is called a separating unit. In

a gaseous diffusion plant this is a single diffusion

barrier; in a centrifuge plant it is a single centrifuge

machine. To provide the necessary material flow through

a plant, Several Separating units are usually connected

in parallel, that is, side by side. Such a group of

parallel-connected units is referred to as a stage.

Since only a certain amount of separation can be

obtained from a single stage, it is always necessary to

connect a number of stages in series. An arrangement of
VI - 50

this type is called a cascade.

The degree

separating unit

of separation which is possible in one

or one stage is determined by the separation

the cascade can be. In the gaseous diffusion process, a

is given by the square root of the ratio of the masses of

the process gases, 238U F6 and 235U F6, and has the value

1.00429. Since this number is only slightly greater than

unity, a great many (about 3000) stages are required in

a gaseous diffusion cascade to produce weapons grade

uranium, about 90 percent 235U

● By contrast, in the centrifuge method for isotope separation, a is determined by

the difference in mass between the heavy ( 238UF6) and light

(

235

UF6) component, and increases with the length and the

peripheral speed of the centrifuge rotor. It is possible,

therefore, by operating a centrifuge with a long rotor

at a sufficiently high speed to obtain values of a which

are substantially larger than for the corresponding case

with the diffusion process. The cascade for a separation

plant based on the centrifuge process is then shorter

than for the equivalent plant using gaseous diffusion.

With a separation factor of 2, for example, apparently not

an unreasonable value, only about 20 stages would be

required to produce 90 percent uranium. This short

cascade is one of the attractive features of isotope

separation by centrifuge.
VI -51

The rate a t which a given separative unit or a

cascade is actually capable of separating isotopes is

measured in terms of separative work units, SWU, per

unit time. For a single centrifuge, it has been shown

that this rate is proportional to the length of the

centrifuge and increases rapidly with its peripheral

speed. To obtain large amounts of separative work per

machine, it is therefore desirable to make the rotors

of the machines as long as possible and operate at exceedingly high speed, which, as already noted, also

reduces the length of the cascade.

However, this immediately leads to a difficult

problem. As the speed of a rotor is increased, the rotor

passes through a succession of vibration resonances

which place the structure under great stress. At these

so-called critical speeds the rotor has a tendency to

fly apart, before the centrifuge has had an opportunity

to reach its operating speed.

Evidently, the centrifuges used in the European pilot

plants do not operate at supercritical speeds. Each is

capable of producing somewhere in the neighborhood of 2

to 5 kg of SWU per year. In an unclassified remark,

Dixie Lee Ray, former chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy

Commission, was reported to have said that 10,000 centrifuges of American design would do the same job as 100,000
VI - 52

European centrifuges. Since no exotic materials development could possibly account for an improvement by a factor

of 10 in the performance of a subcritical centrifuge,

it must be concluded that U.S. engineers have solved the

problem of substantial supercritical operation. (It

may be observed that the early machines of the Manhattan

Project also operated at supercritical speeds.) If, in

fact, Dr. Ray's statement is an accurate account of

American centrifuge technology, then each centrifuge must

be capable of producing somewhere between 20 and 50 kg

of SWU per year.

As shown in Annex D, a plant with a capacity of

between 2000 and 2300 kg of SWU per year, depending on

tails assay, is necessary to produce 10 kg of weapons

grade uranium per year. This means that a total of between

400 and 1200 centrifuges of European design would be

required, depending on their individual capacities, or perhaps

only 40 to 115 centrifuges of American design.

It should be pointed out that the electrical power

required to operate a centrifuge separation plant is estimated to be only one-thirteenth the power for a gaseous

diffusion plant. Since a diffusion plant requires an

installed capacity of approximately 0.25 kW per kg of SWU

per year, the corresponding centrifuge plant would need

about 0.020 kW per kg of SWU per year or a total of only
VI - 53

46 kW for a 2300 kg SWU per year facility.

Another striking advantage of the centrifuge method,

especially to a small and/or developing nation embarking

on a weapons program, is that a small number of units

or groups of centrifuges can be placed in operation as

soon as they are built and tested. There is no necessity,

as there is in the gaseous diffusion process, to wait

upon the completion of an enormous facility before beginning separative operations. Production of weapons grade

uranium can begin at a small level of SWU per year and

gradually be increased as additional centrifuges come off

the assembly line.

Problems with Centrifuge Technology

Having discussed the advantages of the centrifuge

method over other methods of separating isotopes, it is

appropriate to ask whether a small and/or developing

nation can reasonably be expected to attempt to produce

nuclear weapons by this method. For several reasons, it

would appear doubtful that centrifuge separation would

be the process of choice for obtaining such weapons.

To begin with, centrifuge separation is a highly

sophisticated technology that has only recently been

developed by a few of the most advanced nations in the

world. The technical problems are formidable. The
VI - 54

centrifuges must spin in a vacuum at high speeds, magnetically supported at one end and on a special bearing

a t the other. The rotors must be fabricated from

special materials of high tensile strength and the

interior Of the rotors, the process vessel, must be

immune to attack by uranium hexafluoride, the process

gas, which is extremely corrosive, hydroscopic and

dangerous to work with. Arrangements must be made to

carry the processed gas into and out of each centrifuge,

from stage to stage, and, of course, the entire cascade

must be controlled. Finally, unless the critical speed

problem is solved, a large number of machines must be

used for a comparatively small output.

While the major powers have solved most or all of

these problems, their technology is classified and likely

to remain so. This means that a new nation that elects

to pursue centrifuge separation must undertake what can

be expected to be a lengthy research and development

program with uncertain results. This is in marked

contrast to the situation such a nation would face in

producing plutonium in small reactors, in which case, as

pointed out in Section III, the technology is not only

unclassified, but complete facility plans are readily

available. Also, since centrifuge separation technology

is new, the project personnel would have to be trained
VI -55

from scratch within the nation’s borders, whereas

nuclear reactor engineering is taught openly around

the world. Lastly, the fact that a centrifuge program

would take so long to produce results would deter a

small and/or developing nation from beginning such a project. Ideally, nuclear weapons should be acquired over

a short time span to avert detection, and with a large

degree of certainty of success.

It should be added, however, that if a nation were

willing to scale down its nuclear weapons program to a

level where only one bomb was produced every five or ten

years, then in this case the centrifuge method might

appear attractive. Nevertheless, it would also seem

extremely doubtful that such a long term program

could remain secret until a militarily significant

number of weapons could be produced.
VI - 56

ANNEX A

PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION RATES

Plutonium-239 is produced in a thermal reactor as

the result of the absorption of thermal and resonance

238U

239

neutrons by . The rate of Pu production in atoms

per second in the entire reactor is given by

(1)

where N 238U

28 and N25 are, respectively, the number of

and 235U atoms per cm3

and ~a28 and ~~25 are their average

thermal absorption cross sections; p is the resonance

escape probability; &is the fast fission factor; 25 is

?

the average number of neutrons emitted by 235U per neutron

absorbed in that nucleus; PF is the probability that a

fission neutron will not escape from the reactor while

slowing down; @T is the average thermal flux in the

reactor; and V is the reactor volume. In Eq. (1),

fissions in 239PU and 241Pu have been ignored, since

the concentrations of both these nuclides are small in

a natural-uranium, graphite-moderated reactor. The

first term in Eq. (1) is due to thermal neutron

absorption; the second is due to resonance

The number of atoms of 239Pu produced

235U consumed in the reactor is called the

absorption.

per atom of

conversion ratio
VI - 57

or sometimes the breeding ratio and is denoted by the

symbol C. Since 235U is consumed at the rate of

- @ V atoms per second, it follows that ‘25°a25 T

c =

R

(2)

The values of the parameters in Eq. (2) are as

follows:

‘28/N25 = 99.27/0.72

and for the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor,

P = 0.8783

g = 1.03

PF u 1.

Introducing these parameters into Eq. (2) gives C = 0.806.

Incidentally, the first term in Eq. (2) is about twice

as large as the second term, which means that for reactors

239 of the Brookhaven type twice as much Pu is produced

by thermal neutron absorption as by resonance neutron

capture.
VI - 58

A thermal reactor opera ting at a power level Of one

235 megawatt (MW) consumes 1.23 grams of U per day or

1.23 x 365.25 = 449.26 grams per year. Such a reactor

produces 23”‘pu at the rate Of 449.26 x 0.806 X (239/235) =

. .

368.27 grams per year. If the reactor operates at a

power of P MW, it follows that

239Pu production rate = 368.27P grams per year. (3)

Since 239Pu absorbs neutrons, it is consumed as well

as produced in an operating reactor. If n

49 is the total

number of 239Pu atoms in the reactor at any time, then 

’49 is determined by the equation

The solution to this equation is

(4)

(5)

239 Equation (s) shows that the amount of Pu rises

1 0-

22 

c m

2

. In the BGRR the maximum thermal flux was

5 x 1012 neutrons/cm 2-see and so the average thermal flux

was approximately 5 x 1012/3.88 = 1.29 X 1012

, where the
VI - 59

factor 3.88 is the maximum-to-average flux ratio for a

cubical reactor. The time constant in Eq. (5) is then

This result means that for times short compared with 19

years, the amount of 239Pu in the reactor can be computed

by multiplying the production rate in Eq. (3) by the

length of time that the fuel is left in the reactor at

the power of P MW. In the case of the Brookhaven reactor,

F varied between 22 MW and 30 MW. Using the nominal value

of 25 MW gives an annual production of 368.27 x 25 = 9207

239Pu.

grams or 9.2 kilograms of

This plutonium is not produced uniformly throughout

the reactor. Because the neutron flux is highest at the

239 center of the reactor, the Pu concentration is also

highest in that region. The average concentration of the

239Pu in the fuel is 9207/75 =123 grams per ton. Near

the center, the concentration is on the order of 3.88 x

153 = 476 or about 500 grams per ton. From a practical

standpoint, this is the fuel that should be withdrawn

from the reactor first, and this is the concentration

for which the plutonium extraction facility should be

designed.
]VI - 60

ANNEX B

PARAMETERS OF THE BROOKHAVEN GRAPHITE

RESEARCH REACTOR

Power: up to 30 MW.

Neutron flux: 5 x 10 12 maximum, 1.3 x 1012

average.

Fuel: natural uranium slugs 4 in. long, 1.1 in. in diameter,

in finned aluminum cartridges 11 ft. long; tot a 1 uranium

fully loaded 116 tons, normal loading 75-90 tons.

Fuel arrangement: 37 x 37 square lattice, 8 in. pitch.

Moderator: graphite, 700 tons.

Coolant: Air, 300,000 cubic ft per minute, exit temperature

330°F, fan power 5 MW.

Reflector: graphite, 4.5 ft.

Shielding: iron plate plus 4.25 ft. concrete.

Control: 16-2 in. square by 12.5 ft. long steel rods

Containing 1.75 percent boron, in 2 banks entering

horizontally from 2 corners of reactor.

Additional features: (1) fuel cartridges pressurized with

helium for leak detection; (2) reactor split in middle

by 7 cm gap through which air enters.
VI - 61 

(in

Country

Australia

>S and SW Africa

Canada

Niger

France

Algeria

Gabon

Spain

Argentina

Other

Sweden

Australia

Total

S and SW Africa

Canada

Spain

France

Niger

thousands of short tons)

Reasonably Estimated

assured additional Total

up to $15/lb. U308

316

240

187

52

36

26

13

986

Up to $30/lb. U308

390

316

357

216

30

71

65

100

8

421

26

33

6

11

18

26

649

100

96

545

55

53

39

416

248

608

78

81

36

32

24

30

82

1635

390

416

453

761

85

124

l04
VI - 62

Country

Reasonably Estimated

assured additional Total

36 36

27 51 78

.~. y\.+-

152 111 263

Total 1660 1050 2710
VI - 63

ANNEX D

SEPARATIVE WORK

The overall process of isotope separation is shown

schematically in Figure D.1. Over some time period, MF kg

of uranium feed, that is, uranium to be enriched, contain235 ing U at a concentration of

the separating device or plant

emerges with the enrichment Xp

‘F weight percent, enters

and Mp kg of product

along with MT kg of

residue (tails) at the depleted enrichment xT-J.

4!?, %)=

L

Figure D.1. Schematic representation of isotope

separation.

Since the separation of isotopes requires, in effect,

an unmixing of two gases, the entropy of the gases decreases

in the process. As a result, work must be done on the gases

by whatever device is performing the separation. This work

is normally measured in Separative Work Units (SWU), which

have units of mass (kg). The rate at which a device or an
VI - 64

entire separation plant is separating isotopes is measured

in SWU per unit time, e.g., kg of SWU per year.

The separative work can also be expressed as the

increase in the value of the enriched product and the

depleted tails, taken together, less the value of the

feed. Specifically, this is

where V(x) is the value function

In view of the conservation of mass,

(2)

(3)

Eq. (1) can also be written as

From the conservation of 235U, it follows that

Combining Eqs. (3) and (5) gives

(5)

(6)
VI - 65

Introducing Eq. (6) into Eq. (4) yields finally

(7)

The assay or enrichment of natural uranium feed is

fixed at O.711 weight percent. According to Eq. (7), the

amount of separative work required to produce Mp kg of

product depends both on the enrichment of the product and

on the residual enrichment of the tails.

Suppose it is desired to produce 10 kg of 90 percent

235 uranium (90 w/o U) at a tails assay of 0.2 w/o. Then

from Eq. (2), V(O.90) = 1.758, V(0.00711) = 4.869, and

V(O.002) = 6.188. Equation (7) then gives SWU = 2274 kg.

On the other hand, if a tails assay of 0.3 w/o is acceptable,

then 11(0.003) = 5.771 and Eq. (7) gives SWU = 2009 kg.

It should be noted from Eq. (6) that as the tails

assay is increased, the amount of feed material also increases. Thus to produce 1Okg of 90w/o at 0.2 w/o

tails requires 1757 kg of natural uranium or about 2600 kg

of UF6. At 0.3 w/o tails the amount of UF6 increases to

3230 kg.
VI - 66

SELECTED REFERENCES

Nuclear Materials

Coffinberry, A., S., and W.N. Miner, Editors, The Metal

Plutonium. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

Currie, L.M., V.C. Hamister, and H.G. McPherson, The

Production and P~operties of Graphite for Reactors. New

York: Union Carbide Corporation.

Glasstone, S., and A* Sesonske, Nuclear Reactor Engineering.

New York: Van Nostrand, 1967.

Barrington, C.D., and A.E. Ruehle, Uranium production

Technology. New York: Van Nostrand, 1959.

Smith, C.O., Nuclear Reactor Materials. Reading, Mass:

Addison-Wesley, 1967.

Tipton, C.R., Jr., Editor, The Reactor Handbook, 2nd cd.,

VO1. 1. New York: Interscience, 1962.

Wick, O.J., Editor, The Plutonium Handbook. New York:

Gordon and Breach, 1967.

Wi.llrich, M., and T.El. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and

Safeguards. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1974.
VI - 67

Nuclear Reactor Desi@

E1-Wakil, M.M., Nuclear Heat Transport. Scranton, Pa.:

International, 1971.

Glasstone, S., and A. Sesonske, Nuclear Reactor En~.

New York: van Nostrand, 1967.

Lamarsh, J.R., Introduction to Nuclear Engineering. keading,

Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Lamarsh, J~R., Introduction to Nuclear Reactor Theory.

Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1966.

Sesonske, A., Nuclear Power Plant Analysis. U.S. Atomic

~nergy Comission Report TID-26241, 1973.

The Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor

Etherington, H., Editor, Nuclear Engineering Handbook.

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958.

Kaplan, I., and J. Chernick, me Brookhaven Nuclear Reactor:

Theory and Nuclear Design Calculations, Broo~aven National

Laboratory Report BNL-152, January 1952.

The Reactor Handbook, vol. 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955.

Reference? Material on Atomic Energy, Volume 1, Research

Reactors. U.S. Atomic Energy commission, 1955.
VI - 68

Fuel Reprocessing

Benedict, M., and T.H. Pigford, Nuclear ~emical Engineering.

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957. (The second edition of this

text is scheduled to appear in 1977.)

Coffinberry, A.S., and W.N. Miner, ~.cit.

Etherington, H., ~.cit.

Flagg, J.F., Chemical processing of Reactor Fuels. New

York: Academic Press, 1961.

GlasStonC, se, and A. Sesonske , OQeCit.

Reference Material on Atomic Energy, Volume 6, Chemical

Processing and Equipment. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,

1955.

Schneider, H., et al, A Study of the Feasibility of a Small

Scale Reprocessing Plant for the Dresden Nuclear Power

Station. Phillips Petroleum Company Report IDO-14521,

April 28, 1961.

Slansky, C.M~, and J.A. McBride, The Case for Small

Reprocessing g Plants. Nucleonics 20, 43, September 1962.

Wick, O.J., ~.cit.
VI - 69

Centrifuges and Isotope Separation

ABC Gaseous Diffusion Plant Operations. U.S. Atomic Energy

Commission Report ORO-658, February 1968.

Beams, J.W., Early History of the Gas Centrifuge Work in

the U.S.A. University of Virginia Charlottesville Report,

May 1975.

Benedict, M., and TOH. Pigford, ~.cit.

Cohen, K., The Theory of Isotope Separation as App lied to

235 the Lar~e-Scale Production of U . New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951.

A Feasibility Study of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities,

Electro Nucleonics, Inc., Tennessee Valley Authority, and

Burns and Roe Corp., 1975.

Fishman, A.M., ??The C-WAR Gas centrifuge Enrichment projeCt:

Economic and Engineering Considerations,ww paper presented

at the Sixty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Institute

of ~emical Engineers, December 1, 1976.

Smyth, H.D., Atomic Rnergy for Military Purposes. Princeton,

N.J.: Princeton University, 1947.

Satellites

Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age, Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute. Atlantic Highlands,

N.J.: Humanities Press, L976.
VI - 7 0

Infield, G.B., Unarmed and Unafraid. New York: Macmillan,

1970.

Klass, P.J., Secret Sentries in Space. New York: Random

House, 1971.

Taylor, J.W.R.., and D. Mondey,

Scribners, 1972.

Radioactive Plumes

Spies in the Sky. New York:

Beck, H.L., et al, ~tNew perspectives on Low Level Environmental Radiation Monitoring Around Nuclear Facilities,**

Nuclear Technology, 14, 232 (1972).

Lamarsh, J.R. op.cit.

May, M.J., and I.F. Stuart, ~t~mparison Of Calculated and

Measured Long Term Gamma Doses from a Stack Effluent of

Radioactive Gases,t’ Chapter 29 in Environmental Surveillance

in the Vicinity of Nuclear Facilities. Springfield, 111.:

Thomas, 1970.

Slade, D.H., Editor, Meteorology and Atomic Energy - 1968.

USAEC Report TID-24190, 1968.

Strom, G.H., Air Pollution, 3rd cd., vol. 1, Chapter 90

New York: Academic Press, 1976.
VI - 71

APPENDIX VI-B

LEVEL II DEDICATED FACILITIES

by

John R. Lamarsh
VI -72

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Magnitude of Program - Plutonium Production Rate

Reactor Options. . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . .

Heavy water moderated reactors. . . . . . . .

Graphite moderated reactors .

Small Hanford-Type Reactors. . .

Annex - Calculations of Small

References . . . . . . ● . . . .

●

●

●

●

e

9

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Hanford-Type Reactors .

● ☛☛☛✎☛✎☛☛☛ ☛

73

74

75

76

78

81

85

92
VI - 73

Introduction

If, for military or political reasons, a nation

embarking on a nuclear weapons program via dedicated

plutonium production facilities must keep the existence

of the program secret, then the individual components

of the program - the reactor, the plutonium recovery

plant, and so on - must be restricted in size and

capacity. This effectively limits the reactor power

level to the order of 25 megawatts (MW). While such

a small reactor might be concealed, a much larger

reactor could not. A small 25 MW reactor producing

about 10 kg of plutonium annually is called a level

I facility.

On the other hand, if the nation openly undertakes

a nuclear weapons program, there are no such restrictions.

Like any other military program, it is limited only by

the availability of funds, personnel, and critical
VI -74

materials. Facilities capable of producing about 100 kg

of plutonium per year, enough for between 10 and 20

nuclear weapons, are termed level II facilities. In this

report, some of the more reasonable options are considered

for the construction of these types of facilities.

Magnitude of Program - Plutonium Production Rate

It is safe to assume that any dedicated plutonium

production reactor would be fueled with natural uranium,

since if facilities for the enriching of uranium were available, it would be more logical to base a weapons program

entirely on enriched uranium rather than reactor-produced

plutonium. The conversion ratios of most practical

natural-uranium fueled reactors are approximately the

same, namely, about 0.8. With this conversion ratio,

Pu-239 is produced at a rate of o.368 kg per year per

megawatt of operating power.

Some of this Pu-239 is consumed within the reactor,

either in fission or by conversion to Pu-240 and Pu-241,

at a rate that depends on the thermal flux in the reactor.

At a flux of 10 12 2 neutrons/cm -see the exponential time

constant (mean life) for the depletion of the Pu-239 is

35.3 years; at a flux of 10 13 it is 3.53 years. Except

for reactors operating at a flux much in excess of 1013
VI - 75

2

neutrons/cm -see the net production rate of Pu-239 can

therefore be taken to be roughly 0.37 kg/MW-year.

In order to produce 100 kg of Pu-239 per year would

require a reactor operating at a power of about 100/0.37 =

270 MW, provided that the reactor operated continuously

throughout the year. While small reactors can, in fact,

be operated continuously over long periods of time, it

has been found by experience that larger reactors are

ordinarily shut down the order of 30 percent of the time.

This means that in order to produce 100 kg of Pu-239 per

year, the reactor must actually operate at a power of

almost 400 MW. This is the power level that will be

assumed for level II facilities in the present report.

Reactor Options

The distinguishing features of a plutonium production

reactor, once the type of fuel has been determined, are

its moderator and coolant. Several different choices are

possible. For a natural-uranium fueled reactor, the

moderator can be either heavy water or graphite. No other

practical moderating material will provide a critical

system with natural uranium as fuel. The coolant, however,

can be either ordinary or heavy water, or any one of a

number of gases. Presumably a nation would opt to construct
VI - 76

that type of reactor which is the cheapest and easiest

to build. As shown below, this would most likely be a

graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactor.

Heavy water moderated reactors. As a moderator,

heavy water is far superior to graphite. Fission neutrons

slow down more rapidly in heavy water than in graphite

because of its lower atomic/molecular weight, and once

thermalized, the neutrons are not as readily absorbed

in heavy water as in graphite because of its lower

absorption cross section. A heavy water moderated reactor

therefore has a higher multiplication factor than a comparable graphite moderated reactor, and, as a result, a

heavy water reactor more easily goes critical - that is,

a smaller amount of fuel and moderator is required than

for a similarly fueled graphite reactor.

These facts notwithstanding, it does not appear

likely that any small and/or developing nation would be

successful, certainly at an early date, in producing

plutonium in” a heavy water moderated reactor. The reason

is simply that heavy water would be exceedingly difficult

to obtain. There are only two major producers of heavy

water in the world today - the United States and Canada,

and both of these countries control its export. Under

current regulations, heavy water is not exported except to
VI - 77

signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and presumably

only for the use in recognized power reactors.

With heavy water not generally available on the

world market, a nation would be forced to produce it on

its own. Approximately 300 kg of heavy water moderator

are required per MW of reactor power. A 400 MW reactor

would therefore require a total of about 120 Te of heavy

water. The production of this amount of heavy water

presents a formidable problem. The production of heavy

water is not a simple undertaking. Wile in principle it

can be made in a number of different ways, the presently

universally adopted process for producing heavy water

involves chemical exchange reactions between hydrogen

sulfide (H S) and water. 2

A gas, H2S is both corrosive

and lethal. Successful heavy water plants therefore

require a high level of technical sophistication in

their design and operation. Indeed, one plant built

in Canada of American design simply did not work. In

the opinion of experts in heavy water technology, only

a nation with a major chemical industry and high-trained

personnel could possibly produce the heavy water required

for a level II plutonium production reactor.
VI - 78

For the above reasons, heavy water moderated reactors

for level II plutonium production can be largely ruled

out.

Graphite moderated reactors. These types of reactors

were the first to be built, and they do not require a

high level of technology for their design or construction.

While graphite is not as good a moderator as heavy water,

it is relatively cheap and readily available on the world

markets. Should graphite ever become a nationally controlled substance, it can readily be produced domestically.

Graphite is easily machined and structurally sound, it

can be stacked to necessary heights, it maintains its

dimensions, and it is essentially inert at normal temperatures.

While a small level I graphite reactor can be cooled

with air in a once-through system, at the more elevated

power levels of a level II reactor air is not the advisable
VI - 79

coolant. in order to compensate for the poorer heat

transfer properties of a gas, gas-cooled reactors are

normally opera ted at high temperatures, and at high

temperatures air reacts with graphite. A more chemically

inert gas, such as helium or CO2

9 must therefore be used

to cool graphite reactors, but these coolants create

other problems. For one thing, for obvious reasons,

the y can only be used in closed loops, which means that

heat exchangers and secondary coolants must be used to

remove the reactor heat. This is an entirely reasonable

procedure for a reactor used to produce electrical power,

since steam can be generated in the secondary loop, but

it introduces needless complications in a plutonium

production reactor. A closed primary loop requires that

either the entire core -a large structure when the fue l

is natural uranium - must be enclosed in a gas-tight

pressure vessel or the individual coolant channels must

be enclosed in gas-tight tubes.

Another negative feature of gas-cooled reactors of

the natural uranium type is that again because of the

poor heat transfer properties of gases, a significant

fraction, upwards of 10 percent, of the reactor power is

required to provide the necessary flow of coolant through

the reactor to cool the core. Finally, with regard to
VI - 80

helium as a coolant, this gas has only limited availability

in the market places of the world, and its use poses unique

technological problems of its own. It should also be

mentioned that any closed cycle cooling system introduces

serious difficulties in the loading and unloading of fuel -

difficulties that should be avoided if possible, especially

in a production reactor.

In contrast to closed cycle gas cooling, once- through

water cooling is simplicity itself. Water, obtained from a

suitable natural source such as a river, is passed

along the fuel rods, collected at the far end, and

returned to the source. However, water does absorb thermal

neutrons, so that the introduction of water into a thermal

reactor tends to reduce the multiplication of the system.

Indeed, during the Manhattan Project when the Hanford

plutonium production reactors were being designed, it

was not clear that a natural-uranium fueled, graphite -

moderated reactor containing the amount of water necessary

for cooling and constructed with graphite of uncertain

purity would ever go critical. Until early in 1943, in

fact, it was generally assumed that the plutonium production reactors would have to be helium cooled. Water

also has other problems, especially the fact that it is

highly corrosive. Special care must be taken to assure
VI - 81

that the proper materials are used throughout a watercooled reactor in order to reduce corrosion to a minimum.

Small Hanford-Type Reactors

In view of the foregoing discussion, it would appear that a

logical choice for a level II production facility would be a oncethrough, water-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uraniumfueled reactor. Such a reactor would be similar to the

first reactors built at Hanford, Washington in the Manhattan Project. A total of nine such reactors were built

at Hanford during and subsequent to World War II. The

first reactors operated at a power level of between 1800

and 2500 MW; later reactors operated at 4000 to 4400 MW.

The total power of all the Hanford reactors taken together

was about 21,000 MW. At this power level, and with an

average plant availability factor of 70 percent, the

Hanford facility was capable of producing the order of

5000 kg Of plutonium per year. One by one, the Hanford

reactors were shut down during the 1950's and 1960's

as the nation’s need for additional plutonium diminished,

and production shifted to the more modern heavy water

reactors at Savannah River, South Carolina. Only one

reactor, the so-called N Reactor, is still in operation
VI - 82

at Hanford, having been converted into a dual plutoniumproducing and electricity-producing (860 MWe ) system.

Th e first Hanford reactors, of necessity, were

fueled with natural uranium. However, the excess

reactivity of these reactors was inconveniently small.

Early in the Hanford program, therefore, about 15 percent of the fuel was replaced with slightly enriched

uranium (0.947 weight percent). Most of the excess

reactivity of the Hanford reactors was required to

compensate for equilibrium Xenon. The high power levels

of these reactors requires a high thermal neutron flux,

and this, in turn, leads to xenon reactivity levels on

the order of two percent. A somewhat smaller amount of

reactivity was needed because of the negative temperature

coefficient. Almost no reactivity was included for

burnup, since one-fifth of the fuel was removed for

reprocessing every 5 to 6 weeks.

While a nominal 400 MW level II reactor would

operate at only about one-fifth the power of an early

Hanford reactor, the nuclear designs of the two systems

would be very similar. In particular, it would be

reasonable to construct the new reactor with the same

fuel-coolant-moderator lattice as a Hanford reactor.

The overall dimensions of the lower-power reactor would
VI - 83

be smaller, however, because the reactor, operating at

lower neutron flux and temperature, would require less

excess reactivity.

Rough calculations given in the Appendix indicate

that a 400 MW Hanford-type reactor would be a cubical

pile, the core of which would be about 33 ft on a side.

The total amount of natural uranium in the reactor would

be 387 metric tons. At a nominal cost of $25 per kilogram,

this would cost about $10 million. The total amount of

graphite, including the reflectors would be 2250 metric

tons , and at $2 a pound the graphite would also be about $10

Beyond the costs of the fuel and moderator, it is

very difficult to make meaningfuel estimates of the cost

of a Hanford-type reactor. COOling water must be brought

to the face of the reactor, pumped through the 2200

channels, collected, a n d returned to t h e source. This

obviously involves costly problems of a plumbing nature.

Mechanisms must b e provided for the loading and unloading of fuel - mechanisms that must work smoothly in view

of the short intervals between fuel changes. Massive

shielding must be erected around the reactor which does

not interfere with either the coolant piping or the

fuel handling equipment. The structural framework and
VI - 84

foundation supporting the reactor must be designed with

some care in view of the large floor loadings and the

need to maintain the system motion free. Finally, the

reactor must be instrumented and controlled.

It is clear that the construction of a 400 MW

production reactor would be a difficult undertaking for most nations. Most nations would

be far better advised to construct a number of smaller

air-cooled reactors, which can be built one by one, tested

and operated to prove their design. In view of the time

and effort required and the risks involved to realize

significant amounts of plutonium from a larger reactor

project, the gradual buildup of plutonium production

capacity with small reactors would seem to be a much more

reasonable strategy.
VI - 85

ANNEX

Calculations of Small Hanford-Type Reactors

Reactor calculations can be divided into two parts:

those concerned with reactor physics and those pertaining

to the engineering of the system. In the actual design

of a reactor there is considerable interplay between these

two areas, especially in connection with any effort to

optimize the design. No such optimization is attempted

in the calculations which follow. They are intended

merely to indicate the types of calculations which would

be involved in the design of a small Hanford-type reactor.

1. The Hanford lattice.

The fuel for the early Hanford reactors was in the

form Of natural uranium slugs

about 8 in. long (their exact

present purposes), which were

thick. These clad slugs were

tube 0.072 in. thick that had

shown schematically in Figure

1.359 in. in diameter and

length is unimportant for

clad in aluminum, 0.0405 in.

loaded into an aluminum

two supporting ribs as

1. These fuel elements

were placed in aluminum process tubes (later replaced

with zircaloy) also approximately 0.072 in. thick, which

passed through the horizontal holes in the graphite.

This provided an 0.086 in. thick annulus for cooling
Fig. 1. Cross section of fuel, cladding, and coolant.

channel of Hanford reactor.

Fig. 2. Dimensions in cm of Hanford process

channel.
VI - 87

water around the fuel. The fuel rods were arranged in a

square lattice with a spacing Of 8.375 in. between the

axes of nearest rods. The relevant dimensions are shown

in Figure 2.

2. Infinite multiplication factor.

The infinite multiplication factor of the lattice is

given by the usual four factor formula:*

(1)

where

(3)

(4)
VI - 88

The formula for $ is complicated, but E was computed

during the design of the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor

for a lattice of the Hanford type and is reported in

BNL - 152. Its value is 1.035.

Using the following values:

3. Excess reactivity.

The negative reactivity introduced into a reactor due

to equilibrium xenon-135 is given by the formula

(5)

where $T ‘s

the average thermal flux and ~ is the constant

0.77 x 1013

. If it is assumed (this can be checked and
VI - 89

iterated upon later) that ~,r %@x, then with YX + Y1 =

U.0663, ~ = 2.42, p = 0.8685, and ~= 1.035, it is found

that

7

= 0.0152 or about 1.5 percent.

The reactivity also decreases as the temperature

increases due to the negative temperature coefficient.

A reasonable value of reactivity to compensate for this

temperature defect is about 1 percent.

A nominal excess reactivity is therefore about 2.5

percent. For conservatism, it is probably a good idea

to add about 0.5 percent, perhaps less, for miscellaneous

Other negative reactivity effects - control rod sheaths,

fuel and moderator impurities, instrumentation, and so

on. With a total of 3 percent required excess reactivity,

the corresponding value of the multiplication constant

for the reactor is then

o@~3 = 1.0309.

4. Reactor dimensions.

The reactor buckling is

(6)

(7)

where
VI - 90

(8)

With the Values W.r = 368 cm

2

, f = 0.8826, and LTt, = 49.3 cm,

M

2 2

= 653 cm . Introducing this value of M2 and the earlier

2

obtained values of kW and k into Eq. (7) yields B = 2.421 X

-5 10 cm-2

.

For a bare cubical reactor of side ~ ,

(9)

Inserting the above value of B2 and solving for~ gives

~ = 1106 cm = 36.3 ft.

By surrounding the core of the reactor with a reflector,

the size of the core can be reduced. The reflected length

of the core becomes

(10)

where $ is the reflector savings. For the present reactor,

CC 49.3 cm so that /ref = 1007 cm = 33 ft. This was

the actual dimension of some of the smaller Hanford reactors.

5. Fuel and moderator masses.

With the reactor 33 f t on a side, there would be

33 x 12/8. 375 = 47 fuel channels per side or a total of

(47)2= 2209 channels altogether. The total mass of uranium
VI - 91

is then 387 Te. The mass of U-235 is 0.00711 x 387 = 2.75 Te.

The moderator mass, assuming a reflector 2.5 ft thick

around the entire reactor except the bottom, is then

6

2.25 X IQ kg.
VI -92

REFERENCES

Information on the Hanford reactors has been

declassified only for the last one and a half to two

years. There apparently is no single report which

describes these reactors. A description of the lattice

for the earliest Hanford reactors is given in

Etherington, 1{., Bditor, Nuclear Engineering Handbook.

New York: h!cGraw-H311~ 1958, Section 13-5.

Engineering design calculations for reactors of the

l{anford type will be found in

E1-1’lakil, M.}!., IJuclear Heat Transport. Scranton, Pa.:

International, 1971.

Lamarsh, J.R., IJuclear Reactor ‘rheory. Reading, }Iass.:

Addison-Wesley, 1966, Chapters 9, 11, and 13.

Lamarsh, J.R., Introduction to Nuclear Engineering. Reading,

Jlass.: Addison-lfesley, 1975, Chapters 6,7, and 8.
VI - 93

APPENDIX VI-C

ELECTROMAGNETIC SEPARATION OF ISOTOPES

by

O. F. Schuette
VI - 94

ELECTROMAGNETIC SEPARATION OF ISOTOPES

Abstract

Since World War II there have been many advances in technology which

are relevant to the development of electromagnetic separation of uranium

on a large scale. These include magnets, pumps, controls and apparatus

for carrying out the related chemical operations.

A significant contribution may be the techniques

have been developed for ion propulsion of spacecraft.

ever , to modify the systems to provide very intense

and hardware which

It is necessary, howfocused beams of singly

charged uranium ions instead of broad diffuse beams of elements such as cesium.

Some progress has been made in the development of electrohydrodynamic sources

in which ions are extracted directly from the surface of a liquid metal. A

low accelerating potential may permit the use of smaller intensity magnetic

fields of limited size.

If the many scientific and engineering problems can be solved, it seems

possible that an electromagnetic isotope separator based on this new

technology can efficiently produce enriched uranium. Because individual units

are small and are able to effect a rather high degree of separation of isotopes

this process may be suitable for the production of kilogram quantities of

weapons grade uranium.
VI -95

Introduction

The electromagnetic method for enrichment of uranium was found during

World War II to be uneconomical as compared with gaseous diffusion. All of

its components have been declassified and many are now available from

commercial sources. Many advances have been made during the past thirty

years which are relevant to this process. In this paper the possible

effect of these advances on the efficiency of the system is assessed. Also,

the difficulty of assembling and operating such a system by a small country

with modest technical resources is estimated.

History

The electromagnetic method for separation of uranium isotopes on a large

scale was developed by the United States during World War II. Nearly 500

million dollars were spent for equipment and operation. (This is nearly

one-quarter the total cost of the Manhattan project and is about the same

amount as was used for each of the other two major efforts, gaseous diffusion

and reactors for the production of plutonium.) The Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge

included 850 first-stage “Alpha” units (Calutrons) and 72 units in the second

“Beta” stage. When it was shut down in December 1945 because of its low

efficiency, 7000 persons were needed to keep it in operation. ~

After the war, scientists in the United States, the United Kingdom, and

the Soviet Union used electromagnetic separators developed in wartime for

the protection of highly enriched samples of practically all of the elements.

Electromagnetic separators for scientific research have also been developed

in Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Austria. They

are

and

are

now available commercially and are widely used as sources of both stable

radioactive isotopes. For these applications, milligram or gram quantities

usually sufficient.
VI -96

Development Objectives

In order to make this method suitable for large-scale isotope separation

it was necessary:

1. To develop focusing magnetic fields with small aberrations for

large angle ion beams.

2. To design large well regulated power supplies for the source,

accelerating electrodes and the magnet.

3. To develop large pumping systems to maintain a high vacuum in

large volumes in which a considerable quantity of gas is released.

4. The determination of the effect of space-charge repulsion on the

ion trajectories in dense ion beams.

5. The production of relatively large ion currents (about one hundred

milliamperes).

6. The development of methods for the efficient collection of the

enriched material.

7. The training of personnel and the development of techniques

necessary for the operation of the system. The steps include:

a. Preparation of charge material

b. Assembly of sources and receivers

c. Operation of the separator

d. Extraction of the separated material

e. Chemical refining

f. Measurement of isotopic abundance

g. Cleaning of source and liner

Output

Faraday’s Law tells us that a 100 milliampere current of singly ionized

uranium atoms corresponds to a flow from the source of 24 grams during 24

hours of operation. In case of uranium, this corresponds to 0.17 grams of

U-235 per day or

practice many of

This is because:

charged; 2) many

0.06 kg. per year at continuous operation. In actual

the ions which leave the source do not reach the collector.

1) not all of the ions which leave the source are singly

ions are lost from the beam in passage through the separator;
VI - 97

3) not all the ions which reach the collector are collected.

Overall the source-to-receiver efficiency is found to be under 10

percent for well defined foci such as are required for separation of the

heaviest masses although figures of around 20 percent have been quoted for

the production separators in the Oak Ridge plants. ~

A 100 milliampere uranium isotope separator with an efficiency of 20

percent will have an output of about 5 grams of uranium a day or 0.035 grams

of U-235 per day.

Space Charge Compensation

In the beam itself mutual repulsion of the positive ions would spread

out their trajectories were it not for the production by collisions with gas

molecules of electrons which neutralize the space-charge forces. This

phenomenon has been the subject of intense investigation. It is essential

for the operation of the calutron separator.

At the beginning of their trajectory, slow ions and electrons are

formed in the beam. The slow moving ions drift from the beam while the

electrons concentrate in the potential well at the axis of the beam. With

increasing density of negative particles the potential well is gradually

smoothed out while electrons and ions of sufficient energy continuously leave

the beam. Finally, an “electron gas” of “thermal energies” will be concentrated in the beam. The “temperature” of this gas and the depth of the

remaining potential well is defined by equilibrium between the production

and loss of charged particles. Y

Ion-Ion Scattering

1. Alexeff has found a fundamental limit to the throughput of U-235 in

an electromagnetic isotope separator. y Although all ions are extracted
VI - 98

with equal energies the lighter ones move faster than the heavier ones

because of the mass difference. In addition to the azimuthal drift there

is a slow radial drift in the magnetic field which is responsible for the

isotope separation. Both drifts are of the same order of magnitude.

When one charged particle drifts very slowly through an environment of

other charged particles it is susceptible to multiple scattering. Thus,

the directed relative velocity is easily lost.

Reducing the beam voltage reduces this relative velocity and increases

the undesired scattering. Increasing the beam current increases the number

of scattering centers and also increases the undesired scattering. It can

be shown that mass spectrograph isotope separators have a limit on V2/j, the

ratio of the square of the beam voltage to the current density, due to-the

scattering of U-235 ions by collisions with U-238 ions. A crude approximation

by Alexeff suggests that calutron isotope separators operate within a factor

of 100 of this limit.

Enrichment

The operation of an electromagnetic isotope separator is characterized

by a very large isotopic separation constant (ratio of the isotopic concentration of the enriched product to that of the feed material).

It depends on the shape of the two beams, their separation and the size

of the receiver slits. As beam current is increased) ion-ion scattering

reduces the separation achieved, In large-scale electromagnetic separators

(Alpha calutrons) the enrichment factor per cycle is usually 20 to 40. With

an enrichment factor of 20 the concentration can be increased in one stage

from 0.7 percent to about 13 percent U-235. (In March 1944, 200 grams of

material enriched to about 12 percent U-235 had been produced by Alpha 2.) ~
VI - 99

An Alpha Calutron isotopic separator which

of uranium per day will produce about 0.3 grams

per day. (This is consistent with the estimate

processes a total of 5 grams

enriched to 12 percent U-235

made in the fall of 1942

that 2000 sources and collectors were expected to be required to separate

100 grams of U-235 per day. ) ~

Tails

An advantage of the electromagnetic separator is the very low concentration

of U-235 in the waste, or tails. This results in a significant saving in

the quantity of uranium required as feed as compared to gas diffusion

or the centrifuge which normally operate with a tails concentration of

0.2 percent U-235. Stated another way, approximately 30 percent of the

U-235 contained in the feed to a gaseous diffusion plant comes out in the tails.

Apparatus

A single calutron-type separator requires a one hundred ton electromagnet

with a rated power of 45 kilowatts. Two large capacity multiple stage oil diffusion

pumps (rated power about 5 kilowatts each) are required to maintain the

vacuum of 10-5 Torr. A 100 milliampere uranium tetrachloride arc ion source

and a 40 kilovolt power supply are used to provide the

180° in a semi-circle with a radius of 120 centimeters

before it enters the collector. The cost of each such

beam which is deflected

by the magnetic field

separator is several

hundred thousand dollars. More than a thousand of these units would be

required to produce enough highly enriched uranium for one explosive per year.

Even with the installation of more than one source and receiver per unit

and the assembly of many units in a single magnet (Racetrack), a system based

on the, calutron is simultaneously capital, labor, and energy intensive.

In the form described, it would not only be the process chosen
VI - 100

by a country seeking to produce material for a nuclear weapon.

Prospects for Development

Advances have been made during the past 30 years in many aspects of

the technology relevant to electromagnetic separators. These include ion

sources, magnets, vacuum pumps, power supplies and controls. Although

quantitative improvements have been made in the performance of all the

components, additional development is required to make the process attractive

to a country wishing to produce material for an explosive.

Ion Sources

An increase in the beam

in the rate of production of

1. Arc Source

current will result in a corresponding increase

separated material.

After several years of intensive wartime development the uranium

tetrachloride arc source was selected as superior to other candidates.

It produces a large current with a relatively large percentage of

singly charged uranium ions. Independent studies of sideband efficiencies from uranium tetrachloride arc sources in 180° separators

at Oak Ridge and at Amsterdam show that the singly ionized uranium

ions constitute 60 to 70 percent of all uranium containing ions. 7/

This compound seems better in this respect than the other uranium

tetrahalides.

The beam current for these sources has up to now been limited to about

200 milliamperes because of instabilities which develop at greater values.

Of course, an increase in beam current will result in an increase in the

generation of chlorine which in turn requires vacuum pumps of greater capacity.

High speed turbine pumps are available which may be suitable. Another problem
VI - 101

is the increased spread of each of the separated beams which may increase

losses and decrease the degree of enrichment achieved. Some form of space

charge compensation or other technique for neutralization of the beam will

be necessary.

2. Electrohydrodynamic Source

During the past twenty years an intensive research and development

effort has been” carried out on systems intended for ion propulsion of spacecraft. One goal of this research has been the production of large currents

of metal ions.

These sources are now used in microprobe for analysis. One variation

uses a hypodermic needle filled with liquid metal. A meniscus at the tip is

formed into a cone by an applied electric field (“Taylor Cone” with a

theoretically predicted half angle of 49°). A very large local field is

developed a the tip which extracts ions from the surface. The maximum ion

current from a 0.005 inch diameter needle is about one hundred microampere

into a large solid angle. Metals used have included cesium and gallium.

Nearly all the ions produced from these sources are singly charged. ~/

R. Clampitt, Culham Laboratory, United Kingdom, has described an

Electrodynamics Ion Source which uses cesium in a tube with an axial wire,

at a recent conference on electric propulsion. 9J If these sources could

be developed to function as a line source (from a slit) rather than as a

point large currents might be achieved, perhaps many hundreds of milliamperes.

Such sources if developed for uranium metal have several advantages as

compared to the halide arc. These include:

1. Source feed would be uranium metal.

2. No filaments are needed (a continuous problem in the arc source).
VI - 102

3.

4.

5.

6.

Very small down time is required to add feed material or to

remove product.

pumping requirement would be relatively small because no gas is

evolved from source.

If uranium behaves in a manner similar to cesium or gallium all

of the ions will be singly charged (no side band losses).

Since a lower pressure could be maintained in the separator, there

may be less loss of ions from the beam. A higher source-to-collector

efficiency might result.

There are also problems to be solved:

1. Achievement of a large uranium ion beam current in a high vacuum

chamber will result in a spread of the beam due to mutual repulsion

of the ions. Some technique for neutralization must be developed.

Also the maximum current will be limited by ion-ion scattering.

2. Suitable materials for fabrication of the source must be found. It

will be necessary to have molten uranium (1300°C) maintained at a

constant temperature.

3. Techniques for maintaining stability of the beam must be developed.

4. Extracting and accelerating electrode structures must be designed.

In order to have a smaller magnet it would be desirable to have lower

accelerating voltages. (The 40 kilowatt accelerating potential used

in the Calutron is necessary in part to optimize space charge

compensation.)

Magnet

The hundred-ton forty-kilowatt magnets were required for the 180°,

centimeter radius Calutron in order to give an adequate spacing between

120

the

U-235 beams and U-238 beams. This resulted in a system with a separation

factor of 20 to 40.

A modern approach to this problem might use a half-toroid tank with the

field provided by small permanent magnets or electromagnets.

If a system were designed for lower velocity ions (accelerated by 10

kilovolts instead of 40 kilovolts) a much less intense magnetic field would
VI - 103

suffice. For a constant radius of deflection, reducing the voltage by a

factor of four will result in a reduction in the required field by a factor

of two.

Another approach which has been successfully used in mass separators

for scientific applications is to use a 90° deflection. A 90° sector

machine is arranged with the source, the center of curvature of the ion path,

and the collector on a straight line. In this geometry both the source and

the collector are one beam radius from the edge of the magnetic field. This

arrangement permits the use of a

Manpower Requirements

The procedures required for

smaller magnet.

operation of a systems such as this which

involves a “batch” process is intrinsically labor intensive. An essential

part of the development will be the training of technicians to service the

sources and receivers, to operate the separator and to carry out the

necessary chemical procedures on the output. In order to provide one person

per unit in three shift operation, about three trained personnel will be

required for each unit. Approximately one half the work force will supervise

the actual operation of the separators, the rest will provide the other

essential services.

Possibility of Proliferation

Two scenarios will be considered, the first to assemble an electromagnetic

isotope separation plant large enough to produce material for a single explosive

each year (15 kilograms of fully enriched material) with a minimum of development and a maximum use of off-the-shelf items. The second is to develop the

necessary components and to build a plant of the source capacity which might
VI - 104

produce enriched uranium at a cost comparable to that of the centrifuge

or gaseous diffusion processes.

1. “State-of-the-art” Plant

In order to initiate the program several 90° sector electromagnetic

separators would be obtained through commercial channels. Possible suppliers

include companies in the United States, United Kingdom, Switzerland, the

Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Germany. These units which cost about two

hundred and fifty thousand dollars apiece should have a sector radius of

about 60 centimeters, more than 10 centimeter gap, and a magnetic field of

more than 8000 Oersted. Ion sources, pump collectors and power supplies

would be purchased with each unit. Several high capacity turbine vacuum

pumps should be ordered at the same time.

Prototype uranium tetrachloride arc courses and receivers must be

fabricated. Published designs are available and would be the basis for

this essential development. The first models would be designed to be used

with the commercial isotope separators. These tasks must be carried out in

a well equipped machine shop.

At the same time that the research isotope separators are ordered, design

and construction of a prototype production unit must be started. Nearly all

of the features have been described in the scientific literature. Some of the

components can be obtained commercially. Others can be copied from the

purchased units. For example, it is possible that suitable electromagnets

could be fabricated in a plant which manufactures large transformers. The

ion source, receiver and the tank might be produced by a factory which produces

major electrical appliances.
VI - 105

At least two years will be required to fabricate the sources and

receivers and develop techniques for their operation with the purchased

separators. It is likely-that the prototype of the production unit

designed during this period will also be a 90° sector machine. Another

year of development will be required before the performance of this unit

can be evaluated. It seems probable that this unit would have a few

hundred milliampere beam and an efficiency of about 20 percent.

A cost estimate for the Calutron Process was a part of a review of

methods for uranium isotope separation which was made by an ad hoc committee

in 1972. ~ Using up-to-date costs and incorporating known improvements

they predicted costs per gram of U-235 ranging from $160 (for a beam

of 600 milliamperes reached with minimum development) to $9 for a unit with

beam current of the maximum value permitted by ion-ion scattering (40 amperes).

The lower cost is more than that for enrichment to weapons grade material

by gaseous diffusion. It is likely at the largest beam currents that the

enrichment would, in fact, be very low. Also the development costs to achieve

the high currents were estimated to be very high.

A minimum total cost of 100 million dollars is estimated for the

construction of a plant based on calutron separator technology. It could

not be attempted by a country which does not have considerable scientific

and industrial resources. The size of the country and the large number

of persons involved would make it very difficult to conceal.

2. Advanced Design

In order to make this isotope separation process more attractive than

gaseous diffusion or centrifuge it is necessary to develop relatively cheap,
VI - 106

small units which can handle large ion currents. It also will be essential

to reduce the cost and complexity of the auxillary operations.

In

pumping

for the

dynamic

ionized

order to get away from the corrosion, chemical processing and

associated with chlorine it may be desirable to develop a substitute

uranium tetrachloride arc source. A possibility is an electrohydroion source which

uranium beam of

to develop a system with

would operate with liquid uranium metal. A singly

more than one ampere is needed. It is also important

low accelerating voltage so the required magnetic

field will be significantly reduced. This may make feasible the use of

permanent magnets in a small 90° sector machine. Improved vacuum and geometry

of the receiver may result in a rather high source to receiver efficiency.

The commercial development of a unit of this type has been

Although they have apparently done little laboratory work,

a four-year development at a cost of 30 million dollars of

produce annually 30,000 kg of uranium enriched to 3%. n_/

proposed by PHRASOR.

they estimate

a plant to

In order to attempt this development a staff of at least twenty research

physicists and chemists and an equal number of electrical, mechanical and

chemical engineers with design experience will be needed. It will be

essential to recruit at least one person who has been working on the relevant

technology in ion

If the goals

a one-half ampere

propulsion.

described above are met, a unit would result which has

beam, efficiency of as much as eighty percent and a separation factor of about 4. It would produce approximately 15 grams per day of

a product containing 3 percent U-235. The cost of such a unit might be as

low as $50,000, not counting the research and development costs.
VI - 107

A plant based on units with this performance would require 33,000

separator days to produce 15 kilograms a year of U-235 in 3 percent

material. (This is 500 kilograms of enriched uranium. ) Assuming 333 days

of operation per year about 100 Alpha separators will be needed. An

additional 50 units would be required for additional stages needed to

produce weapons grade material.

The development program will require at least five years and might

cost in the neighborhood of several tens of millions of dollars. A

minimum cost for a two hundred unit plant might be about fifteen million

dollars. It could be built in about two years after development of the

prototype enrichment unit.

This development could only be accomplished by industrialized

countries with an established scientific and engineering infrastructure.
VI - 108

References

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Hewlett, R. G. and Anderson, O. E., The New World 1939/1946,

Pennsylvania State University Press 1962. p. 646.

Harmatz, B., Googin, J. M., Livingston, R. S. and Sprague, T. P.,

Beta Calutron Performance and the Effects of Recovery Methods,

Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division, Y-12 Plant, July 1,

1948 (Y-720).

Koch, J. (Editor), Electromagnetic Isotope Separators and Applications

of Electromagnetical y Enriched Isotopes, North Holland Publishing

Company, Amsterdam, “958, p. 287.

Alexeff, I., Throughput Limit in Mass Spectrograph-type Isotope

Separators, Journal of Appl~ed Physics 44, 4592 (1973).

Reference 1, p. 166.

Reference 1, p. 147.

Reference 3, p. 137, also

USAE T. I .D. 5218 (1949).

Sources and Collectors for Use in Calutrons,

Krohn, V. E. and Ringo, G. R., Ion Source of High Brightness Using

Liquid Metal, Applied Physics Letters 27, 479 (1975).

Clampitt, R., Harrison, M. F. A., Hotson, E. S., Aitken, K. L., and

Jefferies, D. K., Mechanisms of Electrostatic Spraying Colloids and

Liquid Caesium, European Electric Propulsion Conference, 3rd.,

Hinterzarten, West Germany, October 14-18, 1974, Proceedings, p. 118

Deutsche Gesellschaff fur Luft and Raumfahrt, Cologne, 1975.

Benedict, Manson; Berman, Abraham S.; Biegeleisen, Jacob; Powell,

Jack L.; Shacter, John and Vanstram, Paul R., Report of Uranium

Isotope Separation Review Ad Hoc Comnittee, Oak Ridge Operations

Office, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission 1972 (ORO-694).

PHRASOR TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED, 110 South Euclid Avenue, Pasadena,

California, 91101.
VI -109

APPENDIX VI-D

URANIUM LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION

AND

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

(UNCLASSIFIED VERSION)

Prepared for the Office

of Technology Assessment

by the

United States Energy Research

and Development Administration
VI -110

URANIUM LASER ISOTOPE SEPARATION

AND

NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

This paper has been prepared in response to a request from the

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) for ERDA assistance in evaluating

the proliferation implications of laser isotope separation (LIS). OTA

will use this paper in the preparation of its assessment of Nuclear

Proliferation and Safeguards which it is performing for the Senate

Committee on Government Operations.

The OTA has requested that ERDA address the following specific

topics:

1. A description of the technology.

2. Informed judgments on the proliferation implications of the

technology five to 20 years hence

a) with respect to the LDCs (Less Developed Countries)

b) with respect to non-state organizations (i.e., terrorist

or criminal).

The case to be considered would be a laser isotope separation

plant producing the order of magnitude of 100 kg of > 50%

U-235 per year.

c) an assessment of the feasibility of modifying an LIS

process, which has been designed for low enrichment only,

to yield high enrichments.

3. The possible indicators (personnel, equipment, etc.) in international or domestic trade that would provide an “early warning”

of the construction of a clandestine LIS plant.
VI - 111

2

4. The possibility of detecting a clandestine LIS plant by physical

surveillance (e.g., from satellite, aircraft, or other means).

5. An estimate of the efficacy of classification and export

controls in delaying spread of the technology (i.e., how much

time classification and export controls can buy).

6. An assessment of the problems and prospects of safeguarding

an LIS facility.
3 VI - 112

1. Description of the Technology*

A. Introduction

The existence of differing atomic and molecular isotopic

band lasers. A generalized two-step process for Laser Isotope Separation

(LIS) is illustrated in Figure 1. In the first step, the photons of a

particular energy, hvl are absorbed by isotope “A” of an atomic or

molecular mixture but not by isotope “B”. The excited “A” atoms, or

molecules, are then ionized or dissociated by photons of energy hv2.

product of the reaction would then be separated to yield the enriched

isotope.

which are

also

able

well

have

The

The lasers required for isotope separation must have wavelengths

narrow enough to take advantage of the isotope effect and must

a sufficient power and repetition rate to react with a reasonquantity of the desired isotope. These requirements are currently

beyond the present state-of-the-art.

Two LIS processes are currently under intensive development

by ERDA; one is based on the excitation and dissociation of uranium

hexafloride and the second based on the excitation and ionization of

atomic uranium vapor.

B. Molecular Process

The molecular process being developed at the Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory. This method uses the isotonically selective

* A few classified sentences and phrases have been deleted from

Section I.
VI - 113

4

laser irradiation and dissociation of gaseous UF6 molecules. The action

of the lasers causes one isotopic form (either 235U or 238U) to break

action of the lasers is to preferentially convert a gas to a solid of

the desired isotope. The solid UF5 particles which are produced are

then removed from the UF6 process stream.

The molecular LIS process will not work at

ordinary gas temperatures under ordinary gas flow conditions, but

unique operating conditions have been devised for successful exploitation

of this process. At ordinary temperatures the spectrum of UF6 does not

exhibit distinct isotopic characteristic features. Due to complex

vibrational motions of the molecules, a single light frequency would

excite both 235U and 238U. However, it has been demonstrated that

if the UF6 gas is cooled to very low temperatures (approximately

50 degrees K), these interferences are removed and distinct isotopic

characteristics are obtained. To achieve the low temperature, UF6

gas is mixed with a carrier gas and expanded through a nozzle to supersonic velocities. The nozzles are built with long slits for the expansion

throat in order to facilitate passage of laser beams through the

fast moving flow. Upon exiting the nozzle throat, either 2 3 5

U 6 o r

238 U6 can be selectively irradiated using appropriately chosen infrared

lasers.

Once a particular isotope has been vibrationally excited by

a tuned infrared laser, light from a selected ultraviolet laser then
VI - 114

5

adds sufficient energy to

species mutually condense

the enriched product. At

cause dissociation into UF5+ F. The UF5

to form solid particles to be collected as

the present time the research effort is

devoted to analyzing various process options, investigating possible

scrambling effects which may interfere with efficient collection of

the isotopic products, and developing the lasers required for the

separation.

c. Atomic Vapor Process

Lawrence Liver-more Laboratory is developing an LIS process

based on the isotopically selective photoexcitation of atomic uranium

vapor. The atomic vapor process uses uranium metal as a feed material

rather than UF6. The atomic vapor process consists of three main subsystems: (a) a source of uranium vapor, (b) a laser system capable of

selectively exciting/ionizing the particular isotope desired, and (c) a

technique for extracting the excited isotope from the isotonically

mixed vapor and a collection system for handling the depleted tails and

enriched product. Uranium vapor producing concepts considered to date

are high temperature (equilibrium) sources of pure uranium and nonequilibrated sources of pure uranium vapor (electron beam bombardment).

Many lasers for the enrichment of atomic uranium vapor have

been proposed. Because of the complex electronic structure of the

uranium atom, and the distribution of the electrons among various energy

levels at the working temperature, selective excitation and ionization
6

VI - 115

can be attained by a variety of routes. The simplest one involves the

use of two ultraviolet photons for the excitation and ionization steps.

If an N-photon (“N” designating three or more photons) system is used,

more lasers of differing frequencies may be required; however, such

systems may be operated at wavelengths where dye lasers are more

efficient. In variations of the N-photon scheme, the more efficient

CO2 infrared laser may be used to provide the final energy to ionize

the excited uranium 235 atom.
VI - 116

c’)

CA

m

g

l-n

“a

(“

● ✍

0

ti -s -0

0

-1

23”

o..-
8

VI - 117

II. Proliferation Implications

This section examines the potential impact of LIS technology on the

possible spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. The various

LIS efforts are only in an early state of development and will take some

time to bring to production scale. Because it is difficult to judge the

magnitude of threat from the standpoint of proliferation, statements

concerning the possible impact of LIS are largely hypothetical. The

effect of LIS technology on nuclear proliferation will depend to no

small degree on the specific nature, cost, and the timing of the

technology that ultimately emerges as the most feasible. In this

connection, it should be noted that even though commercial feasibility

is estimated to be at least 10 years away with additional time required to

build a full-scale plant, use of LIS for small weapons programs could

occur sooner.

111⁄2 pages of classified material have been

deleted here.
VI - 118

9

Although the development of LIS would increase the risk of

proliferation, it would not in and of itself necessarily lead to the spread

of nuclear weapons. The availability and cost of LIS technology are not the

only considerations which may lead a country to acquire nuclear explosives

or to select LIS as the preferred route to a nuclear explosives capability.

A decision by a nonnuclear-weapon state to acquire a nuclear-weapons or other

nuclear-explosives capability would depend on a number of complex political,

diplomatic and military considerations. Many countries which already have

the capability to develop nuclear weapons have decided for foreign policy

or other reasons to foreswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In

the final analysis, a country’s perception of its national security

needs will probably be the most important factor in any decision to develop

nuclear weapons. However, even in a case where the national security

situation may warrant the acquisition of nuclear weapons, a combination

of political constraints may tip the balance against acquiring them.

A lack of resources could also prevent a country which might otherwise

wish to embark on a nuclear weapons program for doing so or, at least,

greatly inhibit its efforts. Special nuclear material could be a key

factor insofar as it would ordinarily be the limiting resource in the

case of most non-nuclear countries which seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

If such countries could not obtain nuclear weapons or special nuclear

material directly from an external source, i.e., through theft or purchase,

their basic options would be either to use fissionable material produced
10 VI - 119

through their peaceful nuclear power or research programs or to initiate

a new program to produce special nuclear material.

Most special nuclear material used in peaceful nuclear programs is

presently subject to safeguards applied by the International Atomic

Energy Agency and is also subject to some sort of peaceful uses guarantee

by the consumer country. Non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have undertaken to accept

international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities and

have agreed not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices.

Any country considering diverting material for use in a nuclear

weapons or nuclear explosives program would have to consider the

significant political, legal and other costs associated with such an

act. In the case of U.S.-supplied materials or equipment, such an act

would be an abrogation of a legal agreement with the United States not

to use U.S.-provided material or equipment for military purposes which

we have construed as including development or use of any nuclear explosive

device. Similar considerations would apply to the diversion of materials

or equipment supplied by other nuclear exporting countries. Parties to

the NPT would, moreover, be abrogating a commitment to all their treaty

partners. The potential diverting country would have to assess the

reactions of the United States and the international community, .

particularly its immediate neighbors, who might feel threatened by

such an action. Such an assessment would have to be made in a decision

to divert material from any facility, whether LIS, gas centrifuge or a

plutonium production or utilization facility that is subject to

international safeguards and peaceful use guarantees.
11

VI - 120

NO such abrogations have occurred to date. However, it is impossible

to determine whether these considerations would outweigh a given country’s

perceived need to acquire a nuclear explosives capability.

A country could-also decide to develop a nuclear explosive using

unsafeguarded, undeclared or military facilities. One option would be

the use of such facilities to produce plutonium. Although few non-nuclear

countries have unsafeguarded plutonium available, many already have or could

develop the capability to produce plutonium indigenously. Unclassified

technology for constructing the needed facilities is readily available and

generally well understood. Countries with advanced nuclear programs would

be in an especially good position to carry out such a program. Given a

supply of plutonium, many of these countries could then manufacture

nuclear weapons of a crude implosion design. In fact, less plutonium

would be required per weapon than in the case of enriched uranium.

The time required to build unsafeguarded reactors, fabrication plants,

and reprocessing plants to generate plutonium, and eventually to manufacture a few rudimentary weapons, would take perhaps four to six or more

years for the more advanced countries to 10 years or more for lessdeveloped countries. If the means of delivery of such rudimentary weapons

were of secondary importance, even a rather unsophisticated means of

delivery might prove adequate. More advanced non-nuclear countries might,

of course, wish to develop a modern nuclear strike force including a

moderately sized stockpile, which would undoubtedly take more time than

the four to six years required for rudimentary weapons.

If on the other hand, LIS technology were generally available,

countries going nuclear may be more apt to select the uranium route
VI - 121

12

since, other things being equal, it would present fewer problems than

the plutonium route. In contrast to uranium, the radiotoxicity of plutonium would create a handling problem. In addition, the costs and

technological requirements of constructing and operating a moderately

advanced, small-scale (but militarily useful) centrifuge plant could be

less than a large reactor-plutonium facility. These points would probably

apply to LIS plants as well.

Moreover, natural uranium, the basic source for feed for LIS plants,

is widely available, and a number of countries have significant,

reasonably assured deposits of uranium ore. Even countries without

deposits of uranium ore, however, could probably find a source willing

to sell them the material. The other parts of the uranium cycle would

present no insurmountable problems for many non-nuclear weapon

countries.

In the final analysis, the question of whether a given country would

decide to utilize LIS technology rather than some other means to acquire

a nuclear explosives capability depends on a number of imponderable

factors; the availability and economic cost of LIS technology vis-a-vis

other technologies; the nature and urgency of its political and military

objectives; its ability to acquire the necessary equipment and technology

without any “strings attached”, and its willingness to abrogate solemn

international commitments.
VI - 122

13

The Threat from Non-state, i.e., Subnational Organizations

The widespread development of LIS technology might also result

in the increased availability of special nuclear material to terrorist

or other subnational groups. This danger has two sources: (1) the

possibility of using the technology directly to obtain special nuclear

material, and (2) the likelihood of significant stockpiles of this material

in many locations thus increasing opportunities for theft.

However, capabilities of non-state organizations in the near term are

believed to be extremely low.
14 VI - 123

111. Foreign LIS Program Intelligence Indicators

a. Difficulty of Identification

It is difficult to positively identify a definite ongoing program or

research in areas leading to such a program in most foreign countries.

The several separation techniques and processes are in their infancy

and in many cases, as stated, information for analysis of these

processes is severely limited. Certainly, no large easily-identified

complex such as with gaseous diffusion separation is necessary for a

research program in LIS. Also research in areas which may touch upon

one or two of the critical indicators of a laser isotope separation

(LIS) program does not necessarily mean the existence of one. The

research may apply to some other technology. Therefore, a matrix

of critical intelligence indicators taken together is the only reasonable means of identification.

b. Intelligence Indicators

An attempt has ken made to establish what are the individual technologyrelated intelligence indicators. The following list of critical areas

and indicators leans toward the LASL approach. As

more research and information become available, additional items should

be included. Not included is the obvious need to identify scientists

and assess their potential.

In general, one would be interested in analyzing research, interest,

or stated goals in photochemistry, high resolution spectroscopy, and

high power tunable lasers. Other information would include that
15 VI - 124

related to (1) semiconductor diode, gas, and/or dye lasers; (2) wavelengths (or frequencies), power levels, pulse repetition rates, or constituents of lasers; (3) concern with high purity feed material, or

fluorine corrosion of equipment, especially compressors; and (4) research

and lasing-related equipment compatible with specific infrared and

ultraviolet wavelengths of 235U 238U UF and carrier gases. 6

’

Intelligence Indicators for Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) Research

The ** indicates the most important indicators, a single * indicates next in

importance, etc.

A. High Resolution, Laser Spectroscopy

1. Study of absorption spectrum of uranium, as well as other possible

elements in combination with uranium.

** 2. Study of the exact frequencies of uranium isotope absorption lines.

(7.7, 8.6, 12.1, 16μm in the ir and around 0.4μm in the UV)

3. Low power tunable lasers to operate over a narrow range around those

wavelengths. (μ joule/pulse sufficient)

a. Semiconductor diode lasers for spectroscopy tunable to the ir

frequencies in question. (Atomic ratios specified)

b. Dye laser for uv spectroscopy (LASL uses N2 pumped dye laser

of p-quaterphenyl)

c. No particular requirement for pulsing.
VI - 125

16

B. High Power Irradiation Laser Systems

1. Infrared-range lasers

** a. Capable of high energy outputs

** b. High pulse rates

** c. Tunable over narrow ir range in question.

d. Gas Lasers

* (1) Physically large (e. g., TEA lasers for few mJ/pulse is

4 x 4 cm by 150 cm long)

(2) Use of TEA (Transverse Electric Atmospheric-pressure) laser

for high energy output at high pulse rate.

(3) Use of

(e. ., 9

(4) Use of‘ .

gases which can lase at or near 7.7-16μm wavelengths.

CO, CO2, OCS, CF4, CS2, C2H2, CHBR3, C2HD)

non-linear optical techniques to “downshift” frequencies

of laser beams to regions of program interest.

2. Ultraviolet Range Lasers

** a. Capable of high energy outputs.

** b. High pulse rates

** c. Tunable over narrow range in the 0.2 to 0.4 μm wavelength region

d. Organic Dye Lasers

* (g

* (2)

** (3)

(4)

(5)

Physically large

Use of dyes with spectrum which brackets that of interest.

Solvents in which dyes dispersed must be optical (UV)

grade and used in quantity.

May have optical device for fine tuning.

Work on high repetition rate dye laser systems.
.17 VI - 126

c. Components -for Tuning Lasers

1.

2.

3.

4.

** 5.

** 6.

Superconducting air core magnets (perhaps 50-100 KGauss)

Crystals

Use of Raman Spin Flip (RSF) process to downshift emerging beams

from crystals.

Optical gratings other frequency selective devices.

High reflectivity mirrors used to manage laser beams, made

for wavelength of light to be reflected.

AM-reflective coatings, wavelength specific

D. Feed Material and Processing (The Atomic beam process would not be

concerned with fluorine problems.)

‘ * 1. Use of rapid cooling of UF6 through spersonic expansion nozzle

in order to collapse absorption spectrum.

* 2. Process for separating solid from gas. (UF6

,

2 3 5U F6

)

3. Concern with fluorine corrosion.

a. Extensive use of nickel or Monel to avoid fluorine attack.

c. Teflon-coated elastomeric O-rings. (Solid teflon tends to

creep and other elastomers are chemically unstable)

** c. Contamination-free fluorine-compatible gas compressors.

E. Diagnostic Equipment

1. HF chemical lasers - tool for analyzing for traces of HF impurities

in gas samples. \

2. Modification of mass spectrometer for analysis of fluorine-related .

gaseous compounds.
3. Plasma diagnostics with lasers (e. g., cw He Ne, low power CO2,

high power pulsed CO2 and ruby) done in single pulse mode,

probably no fine tuning.

F. Electrical Equipment and Requirements

* 1. Energy storage and pulsing apparatus.

(1) Capacitors to store 10-100 times electrical energy as

laser will deliver per pulse.

2. Switching Equipment. (large scale)

** 3. Electric Power into laboratory appropriate to serve a laser.

** 4. Electrical noise on telephone or power lines serving a laser

lab, indicating pulse rates.
19 VI - 128

IV. DETECTION OF CLANDESTINE LIS PLANTS BY SURVEILLANCE

LIS technology would likely have small space and electrical power

requirements. Hence, significant amounts of enriched uranium production could be carried out with little chance of detection. With

the possible exception of some covert means, current detection

systems would be of limited use. Thus the process would lend itself

readily to the establishment of a clandestine facility.

Tracking feed material would not necessarily facilitate detection of

a clandestine LIS facility. First, uranium ore production can be a

by-product operation associated with other mineral mining activities,

e.g., gold mining in South Africa, phosphate mining in Brazil, Israel

and the US, and copper production in the US. In such a situation, not

only would uranium mining become less costly, but the uranium mining

operations could be more easily concealed. Second, uranium milling
VI - 129

20

operations usually take place near the site of the mine so that, even

though it may take 2000 metric tons of uranium ore to provide enough

U-235 for a critical mass quantity (about 50 kgs bare sphere or about

20 kgs if reflected), the equivalent uranium ore concentrate actually

shipped from the mill to the conversion plant would only be about 4 metric

tons. The associated feed, metals processing and even the weapons fabrication facilities could be relatively small operations, which could easily

be performed within the enrichment facility itself. To illustrate, a

supply of ten metric tons of purified UF6 or elemental U per month to

a clandestine LIS plant could be delivered by one large truck, and could

enable the plant to produce about 30 critical masses per year if

complete separation of U-235 were achieved.
21 VI - 130

V. Efficacy of Classification and Export Controls in Delaying Spread

of LIS Technology

A. Current U.S. Classification Policy

Section lly. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, define

Restricted Data to include:

“all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or

utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of

special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special

nuclear material in the production of energy”

except data which have been removed from the Restricted Data category

or declassified upon determination pursuant to Section 142, that such

data could be published without undue risk to the common defense and

security.

In the area of isotope separation as with other atomic energy

information, classification of information in the Restricted Data category

is designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of technology and equipment

which would be detrimental to the common defense and security of the

U.S.

Current ERDA policy provides that “research and development work

on any method of isotope separation . . . would be unclassified as long

as the Administrator is satisfied that the method does not have a

reasonable potential for the separation of practical quantities of

special nuclear materials.” Methods judged as having such potential are

classified as Restricted Data.
VI - 131

22

In the area of LIS, both processes described in this report

(LASL and LLL) have been determined to fall into the category requiring

classification under this policy. However, since the principles of

LIS are not novel and many of the concepts involved in the development

of LIS technology have been described in the open literature, it is

not reasonable to attempt to classify everything about the U.S. LIS

processes. Rather, our classification policy requires protection of

process details such as unique design and engineering features and

operating parameters, which appear critical to achieving a successful

process.

Classification of Isotope Separation .Technology in the Private Sector

The definition of Restricted Data set forth in the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, as amended, encompasses information generated in the private

sector as well as information developed by or on behalf of the U.S.

Government.

Any privately generated information classified as Restricted

Data under the Act must be protected in accordance with the various

requirements of the Act and ERDA’s implementing regulations, including

the requirements for physical security of facilities, the requirement

for security clearances for all individuals having access to the information

and the prohibition against communication of that data to any other

nation.

In order to help assure that the U.S. Government is aware of all private work in areas which could come within the Restricted Data (RD)

definition and therefore require classification, section 151c of the
VI - 132

23

Atomic Energy Act requires that any discovery useful in the production

or utilization of SNM must be reported to ERDA or to the Commissioner

of Patents:

In addition, regarding isotope separation work, ERDA has issued notices

in the Federal Register providing information on what areas of development

may come within the definition

of the status of such work, so

under proper security controls

of RD and when ERDA should be informed

that classified work is performed only

and restrictions. The following is the

text of the latest such Federal Register Notice dated August 1, 1972

regarding advanced methods of isotope separation, which includes work

in the area of LIS.
24 VI - 133

B. Efficacy of Classification

Classification of unique features or details of any new process, such

as LIS, can make it more difficult for non-nuclear weapon states or

non-state organizations to acquire enrichment process information

which potentially may offer a relatively inexpensive means of acquiring

SNM.

Our experience with older isotope separation processes should be

noted here. Certain U.S. gaseous diffusion technology has remained

classified for over 30 years and, while this has not prevented some

other advanced industrial nations” from independently developing
VI - 134

25

similar capabilities, classification has been a factor in preventing wide

proliferation of this technology to many countries. Gas centrifuge is an

example which applies even more directly to the LIS question. In this

area, classification has been applied to significant features of U.S.

work since 1960 and experience has indicated that this policy has been

very effective in protecting unique U.S. developments. Again, classification by the U.S. cannot prevent other countries from developing

indigenous capabilities through independent invention of the technologies.

In the area of gas centrifuge, however, the U.S. was successful in

arriving at an informal quadripartite agreement in 1960 with those Governments doing major development work, i.e., the UK, the FRG and the Netherlands, regarding classification of gas centrifuge technology. While

other countries such as Italy, France and Japan continue to pursue some

gas centrifuge work without an agreement to classify it, these countries

do not have major programs and furthermore have not published their work.

Similarly, in the LIS area, classification of technology by

the highly industrialized nations should serve to retard the progress of

other countries in developing this method. However, it will be important

to involve as many nations as possible in a common classification policy,

starting with potential suppliers, and extending if possible to all

nations with active LIS programs.

As a goal, an agreement should be reached with all nations working

on any isotope separation methods to protect significant technology.

Initial steps toward this goal are currently being pursued by ERDA

in conjunction with the State Department.
26 VI - 135

It must be understood that national or even international classification provides only transitory protection for technology. It cannot

guarantee that similar LIS processes may not be developed independently

by other nations. Since LIS is a highly sophisticated technology, however, if classification is applied uniformly by all industrialized nations

involved in development work, it could prove to be effective in delaying

the spread of the technology. If other industrialized nations are not

willing to classify their LIS developments, classification by the U.S.

of our own work will still have some retarding effect on proliferation

of the technology, but since many other countries are already working on

LIS processes, the overall effectiveness of U.S. classification will

depend on the significance of U.S. advances versus developments in other

countries.
27 VI - 136

Export Controls

Special nuclear materials as well as Restricted Data can

only be exported under a government-to-government agreement

made pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Therefore, the

U.S. has the mechanism for adequately reviewing proposed exports of

classified items.

The U.S. Government also has extensive export controls over unclassified equipment, technology and materials in the uranium isotope

separation area.

The principal restriction on the export of U.S. unclassified information and equipment is set forth in Section 57.b. of the Act*,

which states it shall be unlawful for any U.S. citizen to directly or

indirectly engage in the production of any special nuclear material

outside of the United States except (1) under the Agreement for Cooperation, or (2) upon authorization by the ERDA after a determination that

such activity will not be inimical to the U.S. interest.

The implementing ERDA regulation, 10 CFR 810, requires a specific

authorization from the Administrator of ERDA for any U.S. person or

company to engage in activities outside of the U.S. pertaining to

designing, constructing, fabricating, furnishing, or operating facilities

for the separation of isotopes of uranium or equipment or components

specially designed for such facilities. The same requirement includes

*There are some items of equf~rnent and materials useful in nuclear facilities

that are controlled by the Department of Commerce. Some of these iteqs can

be exported under general authorizations; however, those items requlrlng

a specific Commerce license are referred to the ERDA for recommendations=
28 VI - 137

the training of foreign personnel or furnishing of information not

available to the public in published form.

Present export controls are comprehensive and should be adequate

to control newly developing technologies or specially designed equipment.

However, these export controls are effective only if significant items

are identified and regulated through U.S. export control regulations.

Since the LIS process is still at the R&D laboratory stage of development, it is not yet possible to identify all the significant items and

know-how that should be controlled for national security reasons. As

these items are identified, export licensing controls can be extended to

cover them.

At present, the U.S. Government exercises export controls

lasers and laser systems and specially designed components and parts of

such systems, including amplification stages, and any equipment containing, or which is designed to contain, lasers. Controls are not applied,

however, to low-power lasers and to certain specified civil equipment

containing lasers, such as those commonly used in medical applications,

educational devices, and clearly civil commercial applications.

Export controls cannot prevent another nation from independently

developing a uranium isotope separation capability. At best, they could

retard development and increase costs of the foreign process, if the

U.S. has unilateral control over certain important technologies,

equipment and material used in the process.
29 VI - 138

VI. Safeguards

The impact of LIS on the current system of international safeguards

is potentially complex and far reaching. It should be recognized that

the application of safeguards to existing enrichment plants is already

a complicated problem.

1/ which have been developed to ‘ate by The international safeguards– w

the IAEA appear to be reasonably complete and adequate for all phases of

the nuclear fuel cycle from the chemical conversion stage onward except

with respect to isotope separation plants. The reason international

safeguards on such plants have not yet been fully developed stems from

two factors. First, international safeguards tend to conflict with the

requirement to protect the classified and proprietary information of

such plants from dissemination to international inspectors. The IAEA,

under U.S. and European pressure, seems to be arriving at a system of

perimeter safeguards to achieve such protection, although many details

relating to this system have yet to be worked out. Second, the need for

such safeguards is only now arising, i.e., at the Almelo centrifuge

facility in The Netherlands.

Apart from the possible calling into question of the basic validity

of the current international safeguards system, the major implication for

safeguards of LIS technologies is that, by making it much easier and

~Comprised mainly of nuclear material accountability augmented by

containment surveillance techniques. Physical security is applied

by individual governments with guidance in the fo~ of IAEA-sponsored

reconunenda~ions.
30 VI - 139

cheaper to enrich uranium, they would increase the importance of

material containing low concentrations of U-235 (i.e., source material

and depleted uranium), by substantially reducing the cost of enrichment.

The potential of LIS to achieve high separation in a few steps is

particularly noteworthy in this regard. Thus, these technologies would

have the effect of increasing the significance of uranium mining, milling,

refining, and conversion facilities, from the safeguards standpoint.

Extension of IAEA inspections to cover these processes as well as locations containing quantities of depleted uranium from present enrichment

plants, would tend to alleviate the problem, but the political and

administrative feasibility of such extensions is questionable. In any

case, as noted earlier, there are other sources of natural uranium which

cannot be controlled.

Apart from the question of the increased significance of

material containing low concentrations of U-235, there is the problem of

devising national and international safeguards for prevention or deterrence

of diversions of highly-enriched material from declared national LIS

facilities. On the one hand, if the LIS techniques were widely utilized,

the enrichment plants would be much more numerous; perhaps of such a

nature that each constantly produced weapons-usable material which

might be diverted during any brief lapse in inspection coverage. On the

other hand, the necessary surveillance could be performed by IAEA

inspectors or possibly by unattended instrumentation. Surveillance by

IAEA inspectors might tax IAEA capabilities if many countries built

such plants.
another

In addition to safeguards problems related directly to LIS plants,

problem stems from the possibility that such plants might lead

to a large increase in the presence of highly-enriched uranium in other

parts of the fuel cycle. This situation would increase possibilities

for diversion and hence increase the required intensity of domestic

physical security measures and international safeguards.

The most complicating feature of the LIS technologies with

respect to safeguards is their potential for clandestine production of

weapons-grade material. International safeguards as they now exist apply

only to declared facilities and do not include procedures for seeking

out clandestine facilities. Nor is it likely that international safeguards

could feasibly be broadened to include such procedures.
VI - 141

Following receipt and review of this report, a series of questions

requesting clarifications and addition to the report, focusing mainly

on the classified portion, was submitted to ERDA. ERDA then prepared

written answers to these questions. The ERDA response remain classified.

In addition, a classified meeting was held with ERDA, LLL, and

LASL representatives to discuss all the material prepared by ERDA for

OTA.
Appendix VIl. Purchase and Theft

This appendix is largely based on a report to OTA

from The Hudson Institute, “Routes to Nuclear Weapons:

Aspects of Purchase or Theft,” by Lewis A. Dunn,

Paul Bracken, and Barry J. Smernoff, November 12, 1976.
1. Black Market . . . .

a. Commodities . .

b. Participants . .

c. Characteristics

d. Conclusions .

2. Gray Market . . .

a. Definition . .

b. Participants .

●

✎

●

●

c. Characteristics

d. Conclusions . .

●

●

●

✎

●

●

✎

✎

●

✎

.

.

●

✎

●

✎

●

●

●

●

3. Countermeasures to Black

a. Detectability . . .

b. Responses . . . . .

4. Theft of Nuclear Weapons

a. Potential Attackers

Appendix VII

Purchase and Theft

Table of Contents

●

●

●

●

●

9

●

●

8

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

and

● *

9*

● s

● O

b. Theft of U.S. Weapons .

c. Theft from Other Present

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

4

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Gray Market

●

●

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

✎

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

●

●

Nuclear States

d. Theft from Nth Countries . . . . . . . .

●

●

●

✎

●

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

●

●

9

●

.

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

●

9

.

●

●

●

●

9

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

●

✎

✎

●

●

✎

●

●

●

✎

●

✎

●

✎

●

●

●

✎

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

.

.

.

.

.

●

✎

●

●

✎

●

●

●

●

✎

✎

✎

✎

●

✎

●

●

✎

✎

✎

●

●

✎

✎

✎

●

✎

●

●

✎

●

●

✎

●

●

●

✎

●

●

✎

✎

✎

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

✎

✎

✎

✎

●

✎

✎

●

●

●

●

✎

✎

✎

●

✎

●

Page

1

1

2

4

13

14

14

14

16

22

23

23

25

26

26

27

31

32

i
VII - 1

INTRODUCTION

A potential route to proliferation is by the direct acquisition of weapons

or fissile material from abroad. This could involve purchase from an illegal

black market, covert purchase or barter from a friendly nation in what is called

grey market, or theft of another country’s weapons. Each bypasses the need for

the expensive and demanding technologies entailed by commercial power and

dedicated facilities. Thus, if this type of transaction emerges, the scope of

proliferation could be extended to technologically limited nations that otherwise

have found the task difficult and risky. The pace of proliferation could be

further accelerated by the relative ease of obtaining weapons, a general sense

that the non-proliferation regime was crumbling and a specific concern that one’s

enemies were covertly obtaining weapons. In addition, this is almost certainly

the route which non-state adversaries (NSA's) would have to follow. Hence

this route has grave implications for the hopes of limiting proliferation.

1. Black Market

a. Commodities

A nuclear black market would center on the illicit exchange of

fissile material, weapons designs or actual weapons.

has focused on plutonium because under present plans

recycle, only a very small fraction would have to be

Most attention

for plutonium

diverted to fuel

a very large market. As described in Section IV, the construction

of a plutonium bomb is well within the capabilities of many nations and

possibly some NSA’s. An equally attractive commodity would be highly enriched

uranium, as in the fresh fuel for high temperature gas cooled reactors. Other

potential commodities such as low enrichment uranium used as fresh fuel for LWR’s

or spent fuel from almost any reactor would require much greater efforts to convert to
VII - 2

weapons material.

A black market might also involve a detailed design of an efficient

bomb, which would reduce the time and risk to develop a weapon. NSA’s

capabilities and credibility would be particularly enhanced by a clever

explosives design tailored to NSA construction capability.

Nuclear black marketeering could also entail the exchange of stolen nuclear

weapons or fissile materials “mined” from such weapons. Particularly vulnerable

targets of such thefts might be nations who have only recently acquired nuclear

weapons. For political and technical reasons such countries may lack adequate

command and control procedures for their nuclear forces and stockpiles.

b. Participants

Prospective buyers could include countries; subnational terrorist groups,

and political or military factions; criminal groups; and perhaps even individuals.

Each could have reasons for seeking access to nuclear weapons or their critical

components.

Technologically limited but internationally ambitious countries might become

active seekers of black market nuclear materials or bombs. Colonel Qaddafi's

repeated efforts to purchase a nuclear weapon for Libya are well known. 1 Less

well known, however, were the earlier comparable efforts of former President

Sukarno to purchase a nuclear weapon for Indonesia from China.2 A sudden crisis

could also precipitate a desire for nuclear weapons without leaving time for

their more conventional development. For example, if Israel reveals a nuclear

arsenal, Egypt would be under great pressure to match it, but would not have

the facilities or expertise to do so independently with sufficient speed.

Subnational groups of varying types also could emerge as buyers of stolen

or diverted fissile materials or nuclear weapons if these became black market

commodities. Much speculation has focused upon possible future efforts to gain
VII - 3

access to nuclear weapons by organizations such as the Irish Republican Army

or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which consider terror a legitimate

weapon. Appendix III deals with such subnational groups.

In a non-nuclear weapon state a faction of high-ranking military men or even

a militaristic private army such as Yukio Mishima’s now defunct group could engage

in black marketing to acquire a nuclear weapon or its critical components to

facilitate a coup. 3 Alternatively, such a group could conclude that their

ability to unveil one or more nuclear weapons--whose acquisition

would have been barred to the legitimate government perhaps due to

external pressure-- could turn out to be critical for national

survival in a future crisis. The perpetrators might be largely motivated by a

vision of their eventual emergence as national saviors.

Criminal groups--conceivably even individuals--might wish to acquire nuclear

arms, most probably for extortion. Interest might be stimulated by the hoaxes

in this vein that have been attempted (none successfully), as described in Appendix

111. A genuine explosive would not be hard to prove, and the ransom for its

return could be sizable.

Corresponding to this variety of customers is a variety of potential

suppliers whose identity depends on the commodity being marketed. Nuclear

material might be diverted by a nuclear facility employee who is motivated by

money, coercion, or ideology. This diversion could be gradual to avoid detection

by safeguards measures or rapid and overt to permit escape. Terrorist and

criminal groups could acquire fissile material by armed attack, especially on

shipments of plutonium.

Nuclear weapons might be procured by theft, but the risk would be high

even with insiders bribed or coerced to help. The tight physical security

protection probably makes theft of weapons more difficult than that of commercial

plutonium would be. The absence of attempts against American nuclear stockpiles
VII - 4

suggests that criminal organizations might shy away from such theft. Terrorist

groups, however, might have greater motivation. If Nth country nuclear stockpiles

prove somewhat easier targets or if the trade-offs among the risks and payoffs of

such theft changed in the future, theft of weapons may occur. A more likely

supplier of black market weapons-- as opposed to gray market ones, where the

government itself would be engaged-- could be financially ambitious and dissatisfied

officers within new nuclear-weapons states. These factors are discussed below.

A weapons design would most logically be supplied by someone in an existing

weapons program. Relatively few designers have a comprehensive grasp of the

entire design, however, and very few if any of these would be receptive to black

market offers. Only if they were coerced or changed their ideology would they

be likely to sell a weapons design illicitly.

If a transaction required an intermediary, likely candidates would be criminal

groups (fences) or international terrorist groups. A distinction should be

made between the emergence of intermittent transactions and the development of

a full-blown market. intermediaries could be highly instrumental in the latter.

c* Characteristics

1. Factors Affecting Supply

Clearly no nuclear black market will develop unless material is available

for diversion or theft and subsequent purchase via illicit channels. If fissile

materials were freely traded in international commerce, scarcity would not be a

significant constraint upon the possible emergence of such illicit transactions.

More specifically, the extent to which various nations reprocess

spent fuel and recycle plutonium will be the primary determinant of

the magnitude of this international commerce. If, for example, plutonium

is nowhere separated from spent nuclear fuel and recycled into light-water

reactor fuel

onto a black

has become a

or stockpiled for breeder reactors, possibilities for its leakage

market would be drastically reduced. Alternatively, if plutonium

normal international commodity in the sense that many countries
VII - 5

separate it from spent fuel for near-term recycle or future utilization in

breeder reactors, the development of an illicit plutonium market, perhaps

using some of the sources, distribution channels, and human resources of

the legal plutonium market, would be more likely.

Projections for the amount of plutonium that could be reprocessed

in the future are shown in Appendix IV. Large quantities are anticipated

to be moving in international commerce in the 1980’s. It is quite impossible to estimate accurately how much might be diverted or stolen, but

a small fraction (e.g., 1%) would be adequate for a significant number of

weapons and might sustain a continuous market rather than intermittent

transactions.

Although plutonium, if recycled, would be the most tempting target,

black marketeers might steal spent fuel and subsequently extract plutonium

from it. This reprocessing would be done in clandestine national reprocessing

facilities or hotcell laboratories run by sub-national or criminal groups.

Once the fuel has cooled for 150-200 days in reactor spent fuel pools,
VII - 6

it can be handled with caution and could be diverted into illicit

channels as a source of black market plutonium. Alternatively,

if advanced uranium enrichment technologies such as gas centrifuge

and laser isotope separation become widespread, low-enriched uranium could

become a more attractive target for nuclear black marketeers.

Both these alternatives would be limited to very sophisticated and

well financed black marketeers

The potential supply of material for a black market depends upon the

viability and effectiveness of safeguards and physical security measures for

nuclear materials. Should a major safeguards agreement violation occur

and not be met by an adequate response sufficient to prevent an

erosion of the morale and effectiveness of International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, the safeguards system could erode

markedly. Countries might become less ready to cooperate with the

IAEA, inspectors might become less willing to challenge possibly suspect

activities, material accounting requirements might be followed less

rigorously, and so on. Such a deterioration of the safeguards

system’s viability then not only might facilitate covert diversion by

governments for their own purposes, but also could facilitate diversion

by nuclear facility employees for black market sale. Conversely, an

increase in the effectiveness of existing safeguards procedures and

systems, reducing the level of material unaccounted for (MUF) in the

nuclear fuel cycle and otherwise restricting unauthorized access to

nuclear materials, would increase the obstacles to successful slow

diversion and increase the risks of attempting it. Concomitantly,
VII - 7

new fuel-cycle protection systems - emphasizing, for example, better

containment concepts, limited personnel access, and discrete storage

of only small quantities of material - would have a similar dampening

impact upon potential supply. Such increased safeguards’ effectiveness

would reduce the feasibility of “trickle theft” as a source of supply,

just as enhanced physical security measures and high guard morale can

reduce large-scale facility break-ins and hijackings.

The adequacy of physical security measures for

nuclear weapons, of course, would be an important determinant of black

market supply. Those measures are discussed below in the context of

a consideration of nuclear-weapon theft. Suffice it to suggest here

that it appears that sufficient supply to fuel a continuing market

in stolen weapons - even Nth country ones - as opposed to one-shot

ad hoc exchanges appears lacking.

2. Demand-Related

A second set of factors influencing the emergence and extent of

marketeering would be the level of demand for illicit nuclear weapons

or their critical components. The price buyers would be willing to pay

--both financially and in terms of risks assumed--would vary, of course,

with the perceived utility of the black market nuclear commodity, as

described in Appendices I and III. As more customers are willing to

pay higher prices, more sellers will run greater risks to meet demand.

Specifically, the possible impact of regional warfare, or even its

prospect, might generate sufficient demand to induce widespread nuclear

black marketing. Because the buyer would be anxious to build a large

arsenal in a short time. The result could be the emergence of many
VII - 8

individual diversion activities, continuing networks and criminal

organizations providing necessary middleman services. If Egypt, for

example, suddenly needed an arsenal of about 20 bombs, the required

250 to 500 pounds of plutonium would in itself be a major factor.

Plutonium is not freely traded at present, but its approximate value

might be estimated at $9,000/lb. ($20/gram)*,indicating a total

transaction of $2,000,000.

and the black market price

still feel this is a small

if financial assistance is

The future price may well be much higher,

could be several times that. Egypt may

price under the circumstances, especially

obtained from the richer Arab countries.

The future scope and pace of nuclear proliferation could also be a

major factor affecting demand for a nuclear black market. If in the

1980s-1990s a growing number of countries have begun to acquire

nuclear weapons, proliferation momentum-- the belief that widespread

proliferation was becoming inevitable--would increase. Low-technology

countries, who believe that their neighbors would “go nuclear” but are

unable to develop a matching capability, might seek to redress the

balance by black market purchases. Whether such countries actually

pursued this course of action, however, also would depend upon the

perceived risks and existence of alternatives.

Non-state adversaries are unlikely to be rich or powerful enough

to generate a sufficiently large demand to foster more than intermittent

black marketing even if the supply is sufficient. Nevertheless, only

one successful application of a nuclear weapon by a NSA would encourage

others to follow suit. The emergence of this demand is, however, even

more conjectural than that by nations. As suggested in Appendix III,

*
VII - 9

groups that have both the will and the ability tO use nuclear Weapons

evidently do not yet exist.

3. Initiation

Transactions could be initiated by buyers, sellers or middlemen.

Because participants are generally quite disparate groups, both

contact and trust would be difficult to establish. A country seeking

to purchase fissile material or weapons would probably first approach

a friendly nation as Indonesia did with China (unsuccessfully) in the

example above. Such a government-government deal would have been

typical of a gray market transaction described below. If it fails,

a government might try Colonel Qaddafi’s approach of publicly announcing

that it wanted to buy fissile material and waiting for a supplier to

show up. (This method apparently has not worked yet either.) Alternatively, a country might try to make contact directly with potential

suppliers or criminal middlemen. This method is quite risky if secrecy

is required, however, as North Korea recently demonstrated in Scandinavia

by its inept attempts to act as a black market supplier of liquor

and tobacco.

Suppliers would probably more easily initiate contact since the

buyers are fairly obvious. An employee of a nuclear facility who believed

he could divert material might contact a foreign government or nationals

or a criminal group which might be interested. To establish his

credibility, a supplier might have to produce an initial sample.

Terrorist and criminal groups might easily

their counterparts who would procure or use the

international links and appear to be relatively

surveillance.

make contact with

material. Both have

secure against

The participants will weigh the risks and costs against the

potential gain before entering into black market transactions. The risk
VII - 10

that a nation might be detected while purchasing the material is fairly

high, but the costs are very low. Libya seems no worse off

for Colonel Qaddafi’s nuclear efforts. NSA's run lower risks of

detection of attempted purchase, and if an analogy with the illicit

drug trade is valid, they probably would not face serious consequences unless

caught with a substantial amount of material after the purchase. A seller

may be able to arrange the transaction relatively easily, but he runs a

substantial risk of detection in the diversion and very high consequences

if caught.

Weighed against these risks are substantial gains. If an

employee of a reprocessing plant smuggled out one gram of plutonium per

day (an amount invisible to most accounting systems and difficult for present

portal monitors to detect), he should realize at least $5,000 per year

and maybe much more. An attack on a stockpile or transport of plutonium

could net several million dollars worth of material.

The initial incidence of nuclear black marketeering might be

quite unpredictable and localized--both in terms of supply and demand--

but once several successful black market transactions had been

consummated, the demonstration effect could produce a slow broadening

of the black market. Thus, a global black market to which potential

proliferators and subnational groups might turn for illicit nuclear

materials and expertise ultimately could result. Hence, one of the

most important factors affecting the emergence of a black market is

the perceptions of the potential participants of the likelihood and

severity of the alternative responses which could range, for example,

from pursuit and capture of organizations and individuals serving as

suppliers to invoking severe punitive sanctions against a country that

purchased stolen nuclear material or weapons.
VII - 11

4. Operation

The distinction between intermittent transactions and a sustained

black market is essentially the difference between amateur and professional operations. The latter is far more dangerous, not just because

it involves a greater material flow, but because it seeks to expand

itself. Despite its size, detection and control of a sustained market

might be more difficult because of the greater expertise of the participants, especially the suppliers and middlemen.

The level of potential activity clearly is bounded initially by

supply availability, and most importantly by whether or not plutonium

emerges as a standard international commodity. Within that constraint,

the extent of nuclear black marketeering would be influenced by the

interaction of demand and response factors. In particular, the only

customers who would be likely to sustain a market are LDC’s with

strong incentives, especially security. Some of these might continue

arming indefinitely.

These regular customers together with occasional purchases by

other nations and NSA’s could support a market of several hundred

pounds of fissile material worth millions of dollars per year.

Although small by comparison to the drug market, these transactions

would have a large impact on proliferation. The market might

consist of a number of suppliers possibly in different countries

working through one or more central exchanges. Because fissile material

is easily concealed and smuggled across national borders, all countries

must carefully protect their supplies and respond strongly when they

detect a loss . An efficient black market will select the weakest

link as its target.
VII - 12

d. Conclusions

At present, the supply of fissile materials is highly limited but

would increase with widespread plutonium recycle. The inherent lack

of prestige of nuclear weapons attained by this route may inhibit

some nations, but those with intense security concerns will feel few

compunctions. A continuing pattern of proliferation could lead some

countries to the conclusion that they too shall have a few nuclear

weapons “just in case”. Safeguards and

perfect. Some diversions will succeed,

physical security cannot be

and early successes will

breed more attempts, particularly if the response is limited. Thus,

if supply is not controlled, the outcome is likely to be at the very

least intermittent black market transactions.
VII - 13

2. Gray Market

a. Definition

A gray market differs from a black market in that the transaction

may be technically legal but is nevertheless covert because it would

be unacceptable if known publicly. The main reasons for the secrecy

would be to avoid alerting an enemy or to forestall international

stigma from furthering proliferation in violation of the NPT. Some

countries may also wish to bypass domestic opposition. If the nonproliferation regime crumbles so that secrecy is not necessary, the

transactions described here could become normal commercial ventures.

The transactions could involve weapons or fissile material as

in a black market or technical assistance. Examples of the latter

are help with the construction of facilities for weapons production

(e.g., plutonium reprocessing plant), transfer of critical weapon

components, or exchange of information (designs) or trained manpower.

b. Participants

The buyer in a nuclear gray market could only be a government

because purchase by any non-national group would be illegal and,

therefore, by definition, a black market activity. The supplier

could be an allied government, a corporation or an individual.

There would probably be no intermediaries.

A future new nuclear-weapon state might send several of its own

engineers and technicians to another prospective proliferator to assist

the latter in developing, for example, a production reactor or hot-cell

reprocessing capability; or it might supply needed components or raw

materials for building or operating either facility. New nuclearweapon states might find the reduction of the size and weight

of their early generation nuclear warheads to be critical to improve

deliverability. More advanced proliferators could assist others in
VII - 14

doing so by transferring design information and test results.

The direct transfer of fissile material (accompanied again by

weapon-design assistance) or actual weapons is possible if the

motivation is high. In some cases, unsafeguarded fissile material,

derived from indigenously built production reactors could be

exchanged. Another possible source of supply is material from

power reactors unsafeguarded following abrogation of the NPT.

The use of material diverted from safeguarded facilities is less

likely as the risk is higher and the motivation for supplying

another country substantially less than one’s own.

Companies in the international nuclear industry are also

capable of rendering considerable covert assistance. They would probably not offer fissile material but important proprietary information,

such as details of plutonium reprocessing, would be of use to a potential

proliferator. Alternatively, corporate-to-country transactions

might involve the covert supply of necessary technical manpower, loaned

to a proliferator’s program and hidden within the framework of a continuing

commercial presence in the recipient country.

Technically trained individuals could participate in a nuclear

gray market by becoming scientific mercenaries, i.e., selling their

services to a foreign government. Such individuals might be skilled

either in plutonium reprocessing, weapons design or even in general

explosives or metallurgical work.
VII - 15

c. Characteristics

1. Government-Government

No nation yet has shown a willingness to transfer nuclear weapons

directly to another, but some might reconsider under some circumstances.

A weapons state would feel great pressure to covertly release a few

bombs to a close and valued ally which was on the verge of annihilation.

Under less dramatic conditions, few governments would be willing to take

a step potentially risky to themselves and so flagrantly in violation

of international agreements. A country would be more likely to deal

with fissile materials than bombs, because it could rationalize the

exchange as being for scientific purposes.

Technical assistance is the most probable transaction. Most

importing nations would prefer to have their own production facilities

and thus a guaranteed continuous supply. Many circumstances can be

envisioned that make it seem plausible. The supplier of a vital resource

such as oil might demand assistance as part of a trade. If proliferation

becomes commonplace, a nation might view its nuclear expertise as a

“service good,” as do the suppliers of conventional arms. Economic

pressures and manpower constraints could also suggest a cooperative

development program, which would have the added advantage of being less

apparent to third party intelligence since neither nation need have the

complete requisite set of facilities.

Pursuit of narrow political advantage also might lead a state to

engage in gray marketing. For a hypothetical example, a future nucleararmed Pakistan might see provision of technical assistance or sale of

a nuclear weapon as one means of acquiring or solidifying Arab,

or perhaps Iranian, political support in its confrontation with India.
VII - 16

Conversely, India might find itself ready to trade such assistance

for Arab or Iranian non-support of Pakistan. Reciprocal fears

in India and Pakistan that the other might be thinking about how

to use its nascent nuclear-weapon potential as an export commodity

would increase the pressure on each to do so first. “Preemptive

gray marketeering” could be the result.

Broader international trends also could either increase or engender

pressures for gray marketeering. If current developments continue, Israel,

South Africa, and Taiwan may become increasingly isolated within

the international community. Should they truly become threatened as

international outcasts, they might join together in a “pariah international.”

Building upon and transforming existing linkages among them--e.g., South

African-Israeli cooperation in the fields of advanced scientific technology,

conventional arms, and perhaps nuclear undertakings and Taiwanese purchase

of uranium from South Africa4

--this group might give serious consideration

to nuclear-weapon cooperation and transactions. If such a “pariah international “emerged, moreover, its existence and cooperation in nuclear

matters might stimulate other countries to think about comparable gray market

activities.

Some nations might see a need to acquire covertly a small stockpile

as a deterrent before risking detection as a producer. For instances,

a marked erosion of American alliance credibility could significantly

increase West Germany incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. 5 Fear of the

Soviets, however, might constrain that decision and perhaps lead first

to West German efforts to develop a covert nuclear-weapon capability before

launching a full weapons program. Such a capability to be unveiled suddenly

might be though necessary and sufficient to preclude a Soviet preemptive

attack. One possibility would involve a covert gray market joint
VII - 17

venture with either Brazil or South Africa. The extensive existing

contacts between these countries might be used to hide the presence of

illicit activities.

At least in the early stages of nuclear gray marketeering, the

most likely sources of government-to-government technical assistance,

fissile materials, or weapon-design information are likely to be the new

nuclear- and candidate nuclear-weapon states themselves. Not only are

the above discussed pressures likely to emerge, but countervailing

pressures operating on the major nuclear suppliers as evidenced by the

Suppliers Conferences are likely to be only weak constraints. Taken together,

Tables 1-6 suggest the growing, if still limited

prospective capability of such new nuclear- and candidate nuclearweapon states to enter into gray market transactions among themselves

or with even weaker candidate nuclear countries. More specifically,

for many prospective early proliferators these tables depict: increasing

potential access to separable plutonium; a growth of trained elite manpower

represented by their students studying within the United States; a greater

capability for indigenous training of technical manpower; the start of exports

of engineering products by some of them; a shifting international market for

engineering products which again includes the emergence of some LDCs

as not insignificant engineering exporters; and a growing consumption

of engineering products, itself indicative of growing momentum behind

the development of a technological infrastructure in many of these

countries.
VII - 18

The pattern of engineering and industrial activity within less

developed countries is indicative of their capability to utilize gray

market transactions. Many have demonstrated a marked capability to adapt

used machinery to specific purposes, to make do with what is available,

and more generally to fabricate "jerry-built" operations that highly

industrialized countries would consider totally inadequate for the task

at hand. The Indian plutonium reprocessing plant was just such a

jerry-built affair, adapting and combining equipment available from

disparate sectors of the Indian economy. 6

2. Corporation-Government

International nuclear corporations are less probable participants.

Recent revelations of corporate bribing of foreign officials6 give rise

to speculation that this form of gray market assistance could occur, but

it must be noted that only an exceptionally unscrupulous executive

would authorize such a transaction. Not only would most find the idea

abhorrent, but exposure of the transaction would have a devastating

impact on the company. If a company has a large investment in another

country, however, it could be placed under considerable pressure

to provide assistance. If this could be done in such a way that the

assistance appeared directed towards peaceful purposes, the initiation

would be easier.
VII - 19

It is also not inconceivable that some companies could eventually

use their expertise in pursuit of commercial advantage or even as an

article of commerce. The likelihood of this happening would be

enhanced if the nuclear activities of international corporations are

constrained in their home countries.

The major nuclear companies are described in Appendix VIII.

In general, the types that might be considered are reactor manufacturers,

architect-engineers and consulting companies. If peaceful nuclear

explosions are commercialized, companies dealing with them might be

technically appropriate.

3. Individual-Government

Scientific mercenaries could emerge from the growing pool of

nuclear industry and weapons personnel. The global nuclear

industry by itself will require approximately 115,000 trained

engineers in 1980.8

Thus, a sizable pool of scientific

and technical manpower, some of whom would be conversant with plutonium

reprocessing, materials handling, and related fuel cycle technologies,

can be expected to exist. Within the major industrialized nuclear

suppliers there exists a group of professional nuclear scientists and

engineers whose careers have been tied to the prospect of future plutonium

reprocessing. If reprocessing is banned or severely limited in these

countries, the combination of career shock and economic necessity might

tempt or force some of these people to seek plutonium-related employment in

other countries. Nuclear moratoria or even just lagging sales could add appreciably to the number of potential mercenaries. Precedents for the migration of

\
VII - 20

skilled manpower to nations with higher demand exist in

brain drain of earlier decades as shown in Table 7 .

to an LDC may seem less attractive than to a developed

the

Migration

country and

most individuals would feel a strong aversion to contributing to

proliferation, but even a very low percentage of the whole pool could

have a substantial impact on the rapidity of a weapons development

program.

Of even greater value to a fledgling Nth country’s weapon program

would be individuals who had worked within the nuclear-weapon program

of one of the existing nuclear-weapon

persons’ level of expertise and prior

potential nuclear mercenaries could

countries. Depending upon such

responsibilities, this pool of

number from tens to thousands.

Even though virtually all of these persons would likely refuse any

offers to sign on as scientific mercenaries, some might do so,

especially under duress. Even one or two expert weapons designers

can be crucial to some countries.

One factor that will work against these transactions is the desire

of nations to keep their program a secret. The loyalty of foreigners

in this situation is somewhat questionable, and the duration would

generally be too long to keep a team sequestered voluntarily.

4. Precursors to Gray Market Activities

In the Fall of 1975, several European newspapers and magazines

published “secret” documents supplied by the African National Congress

and alleged to have been stolen from West German ministries and

from the South African Embassy in Bonn, suggesting covert semi-official

and private West German involvement in South Africa’s development of

uranium enrichment technology. These documents revealed the growth
VII - 21

after 1958 of extensive contacts between various West German semi-official

bodies, e.g., the state-controlled fuel company STEAG, West German

ministry members, and private West German companies and both the South

African Atomic Energy Board and the South African Uranium Enrichment

Corporation. Of particular interest was a letter dated July 12, 1972,

from the West German State Secretary at the Ministry of Education to the

president of the South African Atomic Energy Board referring to the

secrecy of any West German participation in South African atomic energy

matters. The Bonn Government maintains that “all speculation about

9

cooperation between the two governments is unfounded," but both

the fact that West Germany’s representative to the NATO Military Affairs

Committee, Lieutenant General Gunther Rail, was forced to resign in 1975

after these documents revealed he had clandestinely visited South Africa

as a guest of its Defense Ministry in October 1974 and the similarity

between the West German “Becker nozzle” uranium enrichment process and

the South African “jet nozzle” process suggest that some,

10 perhaps extensive, cooperation may have occurred.

Other possible precursors of government-to-government gray marketeering

include the training of Egyptian scientists at the Indian Bhaba Atomic

Research Center at Trombay, 11 and reports of South African-Israeli

nuclear cooperation, including the purported existence of a secret

nuclear test center in South Africa at which technicians and scientists

from Israel are supposedly working. 12

d. Conclusions

Gray market transactions appear to be at least as likely as black

market transactions. There are already potential suppliers for at least

some types of assistance, and it is entirely possible that some examples
VII - 22

have

gray

already occurred.

Thus potential supply may be a less critical impediment to nuclear

marketeering than to black marketeering. In particular, the

increasing accumulation of plutonium-bearing spent fuel and the growing

technological and manpower base of many prospective proliferators probably

would suffice to permit them to enter into gray market transactions

with other countries. At the same time, a growing pool of potential

nuclear mercenaries, comprised of former nuclear weapons designers and

technicians, surplus engineering manpower, and unemployed nuclear

engineers, is not unlikely.

A major constraint is the difficulty of establishing trust. A

criminal group might sell to anyone who could pay, but a nation would

only assist a country whose political outlook and interests were

compatible with its own. Thus a formal structure such as postulated

for the black market is unlikely, and transactions would be on an

individually negotiated basis.

Some black market characteristics, however, do have relevance. The

demand motivations are approximately the same, but most nations would

certainly prefer dealing with other nations and legitimate sources than

black market operators. Both markets become far more likely if

proliferation continues, and both will be encouraged if the international

response to initial examples is weak. Finally, both would even further

accelerate the pace of proliferation.

3. Countermeasures to Black and Gray Markets

a. Detectability

The first step in combating black and gray markets is to detect

them. There are two general focal points: the participants and the
VII - 23

material. Intelligence gathering operations can serve to indicate who

is participating in such transactions. The greatest difficulty will be

to distinguish these from legitimate transactions. By way of illustration,

the inflow of engineering talent to the oil-producing countries, the

growth of world trade in engineering products, and the even faster growth

of multinational corporations stimulate migration of highly trained

technical manpower to a vastly greater degree than would any gray market.

Penetrating this noise is nevertheless one of the keys to controlling

the problem, and success will depend largely on the quality of the

effort applied.

One potential difficulty with such intelligence gathering and

storage, however, should be noted and ways of reducing its impact sought.

Some of these measures, e.g. , computer-storage of dossiers on former

nuclear-weapon designers or nuclear engineers with critical skills,

as well as efforts to track their movements, probably would conflict

with important civil liberties. Additional detailed analysis of the

potential civil liberties spillover of different intelligence measures

and of the relative weighting of each

The second focal point basically

material has been diverted. The same

case would appear warranted.

means safeguards to detect when

considerations apply as for
VII - 24

national diversions, except that the function of the person who actually

diverts and the route by which the material leaves the authorized

location is likely to be different.

Both these methods can be enhanced and reoriented towards this

threat. Increased effectiveness in detection would be a potent

deterrent to potential participants.

b. Responses

Once an effective intelligence program is established, the information

would be useful for adopting preventive measures, for taking prior counteraction in the case of unconsummated transactions or plans, and for responding

afterwards in an attempt to limit the damage already done. To the extent

feasible, intelligence data should be pooled among countries committed to

non-proliferation.

A second realm of responses, particularly in relation to possible

black market theft or diversion of fissile materials or nuclear weapons,

would entail target-hardening. Recent and projected efforts to increase

the rigorousness of physical security systems within the nuclear industry

would fall under this category. So would measures designed to increase

safeguards viability and effectiveness. As suggested earlier, however,

such measures, taken alone, appear unlikely to be able to preclude the

emergence of at least some instances of nuclear black marketeering.

Perhaps most important, a broad range of politico-military responses

can be identified. Possible responses might include a readiness to

adopt sanctions against countries engaged in nuclear gray marketing
VII - 25

police work to capture black marketeers, control of the activities of

potential nuclear mercenaries and corporations abroad.

In addition, serious consideration should be given to reducing

more directly the potential supply of black or gray market nuclear

materials. Arrangements to limit national proliferation would generally

be effective against black and gray markets. In particular, measures

to avoid the emergence of plutonium as a freely-traded international

commodity could be pursued. Some of these measures, such as multinational fuel cycle facilities, would be more effective against gray than

black market diversion.

There is obviously no certainty that these transactions will emerge,

but plausible situations have been described. Strong responses could

reduce their likelihood and limit their growth past initial sporadic

examples.

4. Theft of Nuclear Weapons

a. Potential Attackers

The range of groups that could consider an attack on a nation’s

nuclear weapons stockpile or transport is much narrower than that of black

market suppliers described above. Only highly motivated and well

organized and armed groups could have much chance of overcoming effective

military security precautions surrounding the weapons. Potential attachers

include low technology nations, military factions and terrorist groups. Criminal

groups probably have as great a capability as terrorist groups, but the near

certain violent resistance and post facto reactions to a theft are strong

deterrents. Criminals’ motivation is financial rather than ideological, and

equally profitable but less risky ventures are available to them.

The prospect of a successful theft is a powerful incentive. Theft iS the

most direct route to a nuclear weapon, and would probably result in a more

sophisticated and effective weapon than obtainable by other routes,
VII - 26

b. Theft of U.S. Weapons

1. Description

It has been publicly reported that the U.S. has several tens of

thousands of nuclear warheads with approximately 7,000 of these

13 in Europe and a classified number in the Pacific Ocean area. U.S. naval vessels

also carry them. The warheads are used in bombs, missiles (land,

air and sea launched), artillery shells, depth charges, torpedoes,

and demolition charges. Some

are small enough to be easily

can be carried by two people,

which require four. Others,

weapons, are much larger.

All nuclear weapons have

of these, such as demolition charges

carried by one person. Artillery shells

but are normally stored in packing cases

particularly those used in strategic

built-in protection against unauthorized

use. A weapon must be armed manually with a coded key before it can be

fired. Even then some can be fired only under certain conditions. For

example, nuclear artillery rounds might contain built-in accelerometers

that fully arm the shell only after detecting the

that would accompany. normal firing. Such devices

eventually. Hence, Permissive Action Links (PAL)

very high acceleration

can be bypassed

were developed. These

devices permanently but nonexplosively disable a weapon if it is tampered

with. This key element of the physical security system is incorporated

in all newer U.S. weapons abroad. The weapon may, of course, be rebuilt

following activation of the PAL, but the delay would enhance the chances of

recovery, and the rebuilt weapon would probably suffer a loss in efficiency.

It could still be a highly effective weapon, however.
VII - 27

Whatever the technical value of these safety devices, however, the

political value may be small. Informed that a terrorist group had stolen

an A-bomb, the public would be hard to convince that the problem was

minimal because

model. Even if

characteristics

of certain technical control devices of the particular

political leaders are convinced that these technical

would prevent detonation, public pressure could

induce political leaders to capitulate to the terrorist demands.

2. Physical Security

Weapons are generally kept at special storage sites except for

naval weapons on board ships at sea. The number and location of storage

sites are not publicly reported, but there has been a trend to consolidate

them to improve physical security. During 1974 and 1975, there was a net

closure of 97 nuclear sites. A countervailing pressure, however, is the

14

need to maintain security against destruction by a military attack.

The sites are usually on military installations, isolated and

surrounded by fences. The perimeters are monitored automatically and

patrolled continually. Backup forces are available on short notice. The

weapons themselves are kept in vaults.

These measures are significantly more stringent that is required for

commercial fissile material, but they are recognized by the Department

of Defense as being inadequate in light of the increasing threat from

terrorists. Approximately $230 million is budgeted for FY76-77 to upgrade

security at storage sites. This is being spent in part on training of
VII - 28

security personnel, improved perimeter sensors and lighting, additional

guards, hardening of facilities and better communications. A psychiatric

evaluation program (Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program) has

also been instituted to identify and disqualify troubled personnel who

might be receptive to approaches by would-be attackers seeking inside

help. 15

Transport is a weak link in the physical security system.

It is, however, relatively infrequent except during alerts. Transport

is generally accomplished by an escorted armed helicopter. Flights

are unannounced and do

is maintained with the

Some transport is

not follow regular routes. Continual radio contact

base and a contingency response is on alert. 16

intrinsic in the mode of use. Ships and submarines

regularly carry many warheads. Bombers fly with the weapons only during alerts.

3. Attacks

No determined attacks on nuclear storage sites have been revealed

to date. Several other examples, however, do show the difficulty of

defending against well trained commando raids. Otto Skorzeny in 1943

led an assault party of only ten to fifteen in gliders on a mountain

fortress to free Mussolini. In this case, the subject of the raid was

eager to be liberated and the defenders mostly fled at the sight

of the attackers, but in 1944 Skorzeny led another raid which is

even more pertinent. He kidnapped Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian

regent, by penetrating the Hungarian presidential palace which was

surrounded by tanks and infantry.17 More recently, the Black September
VII - 29

penetration of the 1972 Munich olympic compound, the North Korean

capture of the Pueblo and Israeli raid on Entebbe are examples of the

types of attacks to be considered.

Conclusions can be drawn from a study of such cases, as described

in Appendix III. In attacks on nuclear storage sites, very small groups

(l-4) are unlikely to gain entrance. Groups of 5-8 attackers may have

a chance of gaining control of the site, but would have considerably more

trouble removing the weapons. Larger groups (8-20) would more likely

be effective in achieving their objectives. An imaginative approach,

diversionary tactics and the cooperation of one or more insiders naturally

increases the probability of success. Intelligence activities, however,

are more likely to detect such large groups in time for reinforcement

18

of defenses.

Massive attacks such as the Entebbe raid, which are essentially acts

of war, are least likely to be resisted successfully, but neither can they

be accomplished anonymously. Consequently, political and military responses,

if activated, should be expected to ensure return or destruction of stolen

weapons. An appropriate military response was unavailable when the Pueblo

was seized because of the ship’s isolation. This should not be a factor

in attacks on storage sites.

Attacks on transports would be hard to plan because the opportunity

is not presented often. Insiders would almost certainly be required to

provide information as to when opportunities will occur. Both air and ground

forces would probably be needed. Thus in terms of manpower, financial

backing and skill, this is probably equivalent to the groups of 8-20

above. The probability of success, however, may be higher.
VII - 30

Attacks on bombers, ships and submarines are the least possible.

Nuclear weapons are no longer carried by planes on routine missions,

but only on alerts. Naval vessels are heavily armed and difficult to

approach unless aground or suffering mechanical difficulties. Thus

assuming reasonable precautions are taken regarding routes and distance

from assistance, only a large amount of luck would put these weapons

within reach of attackers.

Some U.S. nuclear weapons are for the use of other NATO countries.

These weapons are guarded by the host country although custody is

maintained by small U.S. detachments. A sudden change in governments

could leave these weapons highly vulnerable. Even U.S. storage sites

in foreign countries would be much less secure following a sudden

violent change in government. These weapons would have to be rapidly

removed, a process which in itself would increase their vulnerability

because of the predictability of the flights, the difficulty of mounting

an effective response to an attack and the probable loss of most

intelligence sources.

c. Theft from Other Present Nuclear States

The USSR and the People’s Republic of China are probably relatively

immune to externally mounted attack because of the nature of these

societies. An Entebbe type of attack on the PRC might be considered

by its neighbors, but the risks and problems would be great.

The United Kingdom and Franc probably have far fewer nuclear

weapons than the U.S. has in Europe. Most or all of these are kept on

national territory, further reducing the risk. There appears to be

no reasons to think that security over these weapons is less stringent

than that of the U.S. since their safeguards on commercial fissile

material seem to be comparable to that in the U.S. Security sources
VII - 31

have suggested, however, that some of the hardware such as PAL’s

and perimeter sensors may not be as sophisticated as those of the

U.S. forces.

do Theft from Nth Countries

If proliferation continues, opportunities for theft will arise

in the new nuclear states. It is, of course, impossible to predict with

a high degree of confidence, how tight the security would be in these Nth

countries. Some potential Nth countries have experienced turbulent domestic

politics, including military interventions. This will increase the

pressure for tight control to avoid losing the weapons to military factions

and other non-state adversaries, and thus as a side effect to external

attackers. Some nations, however, may lack the sophistication to develop

devices such as PAL’s. Their control mechanisms would consist of means

such as leaving the weapons disassembled and the parts separately protected.

This will decrease operational readiness and, therefore, military effectiveness

Insecure nations may prefer, therefore, to risk unauthorized access. Another

problem, though less likely, could be a general unwillingness to worry about

physical security. The U.S. has gradually upgraded its protection level as

appreciation of the magnitude of the growing threat increased. Nth

countries may be slower in coming to this view, especially since good

security is expensive.

One other potential threat is that of a military faction stealing

their own weapons and black marketeering them. If security is lax and

control not strictly organized, this could be fairly easy to do.
VII - 32

TABLE 1

ANNUAL PRODUCTION (KG)

SEPARABLE PLUTONIUM

1984 1989 1994 1999

COUNTRY ACCUMULATED (KG) OF

SEPARABLE PLUTONIUM

1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 1974 1979

ARGENTINA

AUSTRALIA

BELGIUM

BRAZIL

CHILE

CUBA

DENMARK

EGYPT

GREECE

INDIA

INDONESIA

IRAN

ISRAEL

ITALY

JAPAN

LIBYA

NIGERIA

NORTH KOREA

NORWAY

PAKISTANM

PHILIPPINES

RUMANIA

SAUDI ARABIA

SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH KOREA

SPAIN

SWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

SYRIA

TAIWAN

TURKEY

VENEZUELA

WEST GERMANY

YUGOSLAVIA

ZAIRE

334

.7

. 2

329

598

.7

. 2

1,715

.7

324

361

522

756

108

3,981

3,42 4

1.8

160

226

295

342

1,36 6

2,69 3

1,98 7

1,190

856

108

3,98 3

291

.7

0 0 108

---------------- -

402 1,032

0 0

0 0

18.7 27.2

935 1,941

1,460 10,126

216 1,836 3,4S6 5,076

2,42 4

216

1,242

33. 7

6,09 9

26,58 5

4,20 4 6,00 9 7,81 4

2,59 2 5,20 2 7,81 2

5,02 2 29,50 2 53,98 2

648 1,188 1,72 8

26,02 4 45,92 9 65,83 4

43,70 5 60,85 5 77,94 5

361

108

594

1 . 7

931

3,42 4

----------------- ------------.----

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26.5 35.2

64 201

0 0

0 0

---------------- -

0 0

0 281

588 2,61 3

212 3,16 9

622 1,61 7

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 . 3 206

0 0

43.9

605

226

316

52. 6 61. 3 70. 0

1,40 5 2,20 5 3,00 5

1,35 6 5,00 6 12,07 6

I ,791 3,26 6 4,74 1

1.8

160

226

79

513

1,951

12,19 2

10,65 4

6,36 6

2,22 0 3,93 0 5,64o

8,45 7 15,28 7 22,11 7

18,63 6 32,10 1 66,44 6

20,58 9 30,52 4 40,45 9

12,271 18,22I 24,17 1

6,24 1

540 1,08 0 1,62 0

342

650

2,33 3

1,98 7

1,011

1,961

0

856

o

21,6$3

915

1,657 7,621

9.9 13. 2

----..-------.-- -

42,78 2 62,69 7 82,61 2

2,37 0 3,82 5 5,28 0

376 2,067

0 . 7 0 . 7

-.-.-----------. -

3,21 2

291

SOURCES: DERIVED FROH PAN HEURISTICS, IIOVING TOVARD LIFE IN A NUCLEAR AIMED

CROWD?, PREPARED FOR THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,

_AB-263, APRIL 22, 1976 ANo ATmlc INDUSTRIAL FORUHNEUS R EL E A S E,

“NUCLEAR POWER-PLANT COM41TNENTS OUTSIDE THE U.S. CLIMB 17X IN YEAR,”

WASHINGTON, JUNE 2, 1976.
VII - 3 3

TABLE 2

FOREIGN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975

COUNTRY TOTAL

TOTAL ENGINEERING TOTAL ENGINEERING NON-IMMIGRANT

ARGENTINA 7 0 2 77 703 67 56o

BRAZIL 1,560 266 1,713 258 1,970

CHILE 870 154 997 150 950

EGYPT 1,148 335 1,163 302 980

INDIA 10,656 4,615 10,168 3,912 9,660

INDONESIA 695 151 768 139 1,080

IRAN 7,838 3,744 9,623 4,393 13,780

IRAQ 361 103 376 93 420

ISRAEL 2,113 486 2,070 488 2,390

LIBYA 573 187 690 242 980

PAKISTAN 2,690 1,291 3,301 1,339 3,140

SAUDI ARABIA 943 297 1,074 300 1,540

SOUTH AFRICA 418 43 403 39 510

SOUTH KOREA 3,730 757 3,612 669 3,390

SPAIN 6 1 2 9 8 630 79 580

TAIWAN 9,633 2,676 8,416 2,018 10,250

SOURCE: OPEN DOORS, 1973,1974, 1975; INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL

EDUCATION.

(1) ESTIMATES FOR 1972-1973 AND 1973-1974 INCLUDE IMMIGRANT STUDENTS.

(2) COUNTING PROCEDURE SIGNIFICANTLY MODIFIED FOR 1974-1975 ESTIMATES

PROVIDING A MUCH GREATER ACCURACY IN COUNT; EARLIER YEARS INCLUDED

FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES.
VII - 34

TABLE 3

POTENTIAL NTH COUNTRIES

Algeri a

Argentin a

Australi a

Brazi I

Chil e

Cuba

Egyp t

Greec e

Indi a

Indonesi a

i ran

Ira q

Israe I

Ital y

Japan

Liby a

Nigeri a

North Kore a

Pakista n

Phillippine s

Rumania

Saudi Arabi a

South Afric a

South Korea

Spain

Sweden

Switzerlan d

Syri a

Taiwan

Turke y

Venezuel a

West Germany

Yugoslavi a

Zaire

Total

ANNUAL OUTPUT (OF EARLY 1970s)

NATURAL SCIENCE

3 1 5

6 1 7

4,70 4

6,09 2

189

3 5 0

7,62 7

1,91 9

67,54 6

140

2,69 3

‘1,30 5

1,37 8

8,21 4

11,03 1

73

156

NA

5,74 6

1,43 1

2,70 5

73

NA

2,96 8

2,65 7

1,97 1

1,01 5

4 3 8

MA

2,08 1

71

5,19 9

1,61 4

7 8

142,39 6

ENGINEERS

9 4

2,48 6

3,28 8

8,12 9

1,84 0

6 4 6

1,08 5

8 2 5

18,09 0

1,12 0

3,73 4

1,06 9

1,00 3

5,72 7

79,63 8

8 8

6 0

NA

1,16 9

4,25 6

7,74 3

8 2

NA

10,08 0

6,33 2

1,94 4

7 8 4

3 0 0

NA

3,79 7

6 6 4

20,77 1

6,67 9

71

193,59 4

1TOTAL

409i

7,99 2

14,221 [

2,02 9

9 9 6

8,71 2

2,74 4

85,63 6

1,26 0

6,42 7

2,37 4

2,38 1

13,94 1

90,66 9

161

2 1 6

-.

6,91 5

5,68 7

10,448

155 I

--

13,04 8

8,98 9

3,91 5

1,79 9

7 3 8

.-

s,878

735

25,97 0

8,29 3

149

335,99 0

i

SOURCE: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1974, Table 5.3.

(1) THIS DATA REPRESENTS PRODUCTION OF COLLEGE

LEVEL ENGINEERS. IT NEGLECTS INDIGENOUS EDUCATION OF TECHNICIANS AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT

PERSONNEL.
VII - 35

Table 4

TRADE IN ENGINEERING PRODUCTS

(IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

BRAZIL SOUTH AFRICA

LIBYA

ARGENTINA

CHILE

IRAN

ISRAEL

SAUDI ARABIA

INDONESIA

SOUTH KOREA

PAKISTAN

SPAIN

TURKEY

SOUTH KOREA SOUTH AFRICA

LIBYA

ARGENTINA

BRAZIL

CHILE

IRAN

SPAIN

TURKEY

YUGOSLAVIA

INDIA

ISRAEL

SOUTH AFRICA

LIBYA

IRAN

SAUDI ARABIA

INDONESIA

SOUTH KOREA

YUGOSLAVIA

SOUTH AFRICA

ARGENTINA

BRAZIL

IRAN

SOUTH KOREA

SPAIN

YUGOSLAVIA
VII - 36

Table 5

GROWTH IN THE WORLD TRADE OF

ENGINEERING PRODUCTS

(IN CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS)

REGIONS OF ORIGIN

DEVELOPED MARKET DEVELOPING

ECONOMIES COUNTRIES

1963 $ 31.0 BILLION .2 BILLION

1965 39.2 ● 3

1970 78.4 1 . 0

1971 91.1 1.3

1972 108.4 1.9

1973 142.0 3,2

1974 179.0 3.4

SOURCE: BULLETIN OF STATISTICS ON WORLD

TRADE IN ENGINEERING PRODUCTS,

Economic COMMISSION FOR EUROPE,

UNITED NATIONS, E/F/R.T6.11.E.T,

1976. TABLE 1A, PAGE 20.
VII - 37
VII - 38

Table 7

PRECEDENTS FOR THE MIGRATION AND

MOBILITY OF TECHNICAL MANPOWER

TO UNITED STATES, 1962-

1966, FROM DEVELOPING

NATIONS

TO UNITED STATES, 1972,

FROM TAIWAN; INDIA,

PAKISTAN, AND SOUTH KOREA

TO ISRAEL, 1967-1968,

FROM UNITED STATES*

ENGINEERS NATURAL SCIENTISTS

19,055 7,793

3,71 6 1,37 1

~3,000

*OF WHICH THE NEW YORK TIMES [FEBRUARY 28, 1972, pAGE 2 ]

SAID “.. . IS QUIETLY EMERGING AS ONE OF ISRAEL’S MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL ASSETS FOR DEVELOPING THE COUNTRY’S LONGRANGE POTENTIAL.”

SOURCE: BRAIN DRAIN: A STUDY OF THE PERSISTENT ISSUE OF

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC MOBILITY. PREPARED FOR

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND

SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN

AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 1974.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17*

18.

VII - 39

REFERENCES

Steven J. Rosen, “Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East,”

in Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries, Onkar Marwah

and Ann Schulz (eds.) (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing

Company, 1975), page 178.

William H. Overholt, personal communication to authors.

Lewis A. Dunn, “Military Politics, Nuclear Proliferation, and the

‘Nuclear Coup d’Etat’,” (Hudson Institute, HI-2392/2-P, April 20, 1976).

The New York Times, April 18, 1976; The Economist, April 17, 1976,

and August 28, 1976; The Far Eastern Economic Review, September 10, 1976;

The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 1976.

Lewis A. Dunn and Herman Kahn, Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975-1995

(Hudson Institute, HI-2336/3-RR, May 15, 1976) . Report prepared for the

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Parts I and 11.

The New York Times, “The Week in Review,” November 14, 1976

Personal communication with Ted Taylor.

IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 17 (4), “Manpower Requirements for Future Nuclear

Power Programmes~’ August 1975.

The Observer (London), October 5, 1975.

‘Ibid.

Lawrence Ziring, “Recent Trends in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy,” Asian

Survey, Volume 2, Number 5 (May/June 1975), p. 302.

Far Eastern Economic Review, September 10, 1976.

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, ‘development, Use and Control of Nuclear

Energy for the Common Defense and Security and for Peaceful Purposes,”

Second Annual Report, July 19, 1976.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Personal communication with LTC. Richard W. Martin (DNA).

William L. Shirer, “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Simon and

Schuster, New York City, 1960.

Briefing by Defense Nuclear Agency, December 7, 1976.
Appendix VIII. Description of Safeguards Technology

and Procedures

First Draft by Science Applications, Inc.

Revised and Expanded by OTA Consultants
Appendix VIII

Description of Safeguards Technology and Procedures

Table of Contents

Page

1. Introduction

2. Domestic Safeguards in the Mid 1970’s

2.1. Purposes and Objectives and Their Application in the U.S.

2.2. Elements of the U.S. Safeguards Systems

2.3. Current U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safeguards

2.4. Physical Protection for SNM in Transit

2.5. Domestic Safeguards Outside the U.S.

3. International Safeguards and Physical Security in the

Context of U.S. Exports

3.1. Material Control and Accounting Requirements Applicable

to Export Licensing Review

3.2. Physical Security Requirements in Licensing Review

4. Safeguards Research and Future Safeguards

4.1. The ERDA Safeguards R&D Program

4.2. Integrated Safeguards, a Summary

4.3. Improved Material Balance Accounting for Monitoring

Covert Diversion

4.4. Real-Time-Material Control

4.5. Hardened Facilities

4.6. Transportation Safeguards

4.7. Reducing the “Attractiveness of Nuclear Material in

the Fuel Cycle

4.8. Reducing the Risk of National Diversion - Multinational

Fuel Centers

1

7

7

9

12

22

24

25

26

29

33

34

39

42

47

52

55

59

64

4.9. The Costs of Safeguards 70

i
Table of Contents, Cont.

4.10. Design and Evaluation

4.11. IAEA Safeguards Research

Annex A How Large a Theft is Possible Within the LEMUF?

References

Page

73

77

81

85

ii
VIII - 1

1. Introduction

This report supports OTA’s ongoing assessment of nuclear

proliferation and safeguards (1)* by providing a technical background on the systems and procedures which exist in the U.S.

today and on the U.S. program to provide improved methods and

procedures. Although the focus of the OTA study is on the

international proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and

nuclear weapons, domestic safeguards systems are relevant

because each nation must protect its nuclear materials from

non-national groups which might use such materials to threaten

that nations society or threaten other nations. The U.S.

safeguards programs are relevant insofar as they may contribute

to the reliability of safeguards systems in other nations and

provide direct or indirect support to the IAEA.

In the U.S., there are three major nuclear programs and

three agencies having safeguards responsibilities. The three

programs are: military, nuclear power, and nuclear research.

The Department of Defense provides the safeguards for the nuclear

weapons in its possession. The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) operates production facilities for the nuclear

military programs and conducts research on nuclear power and

other non-military nuclear applications. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for applying safeguards

to privately owned nuclear facilities and to a few ERDA-owned

facilities (waste storage and power reactors feeding public

electric power grids) . Major ERDA and NRC facilities are

listed in Tables 1 and 2.

Some idea of the types and amounts of nuclear materials

presently possessed by private organizations and under NRC safeguards may be derived from the following.

For uranium (2)*:

Dec. 31, 1975 Licensee Ending Inventory by Enrichment Range

Isotope

Enrichment # of Element Weight

Range Locations Weight (U-235)

less than

5% 133 8,541,225 kg 166,282 kg

5% to 20% 72 2,168 226

20% to 80% 42 1,660 1,054

“over 80% 138 34,379 33,435

* Ref. 1: ( See Reference List at end of Appendix VIII. )

* Ref. 2: ( J. Inst. Nuc. Mat. Management, Special Report, Aug., 1976,

p. 44)
VIII - 2

4J

I I
VIII - 3

&

I -1

x

o

“A I.@

tn

5

“d

!-l

G

a

● F

m

s

w2
VIII - 4

Notes on Table 1.1:

LASL, LLL, Sandia, Rocky Flats, Y-12, Mason and Hanger have

substantial amounts of HEU*, Pu or both.

Mound Lab. processes Pu-238.

The Nevada Test Site has weapons occasionally, for Tests.

Knolls and Bettis have modest amounts of HEU for R&D.

The OR and Padukah GDP’s produce only LEU.*

Goodyear GDP produces HEU for HTGR’s, research reactors

and military applications.

Atlantic Richfield, Hanford processes and stores Pu.

The Savannah River reactors produce Pu, Pu-238, etc.

The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, reprocesses HEU fuels

from research and naval reactors.

Argonne National Lab., West (Idaho) should be added to the

list of research facilities. The SSNM at research facilities is

primarily for or in reactors.

Note on Table 1.2:

As of 6/30/76, 59 power

57 power

73 power

79 power

*HEIJ: Highly-enriched uranium

*LEIJ: Low enriched uranium

reactors

reactors

reactors

reactors

had been built

were operable

were under construction

were planned
VIII - 5

(3)*. For uranium and plutonium .

"There are sixteen licensees in the private sector who

are authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium and high-enriched uranium. These kinds of special

nuclear material, if stolen in sufficient quantities,

could be fashioned into a crude nuclear explosive, if the

thieves had the requisite technical skill and equipment.

The greatest percentage of this high-enriched uranium is

government-owned and is being processed in licensed facilities for national security programs. High-enriched

uranium for commercial purposes (about six percent of the

total quantity in the private sector) is mostly in storage

vaults and is likely to stay there unless additional high

temperature gas-cooled reactors are built and operated. A

small amount of high-enriched uranium is being used to fabricate research reactor fuel.

About half of the plutonium in commercial plants is governmentowned. Certain licensed facilities process plutonium for development programs related to the liquid metal fast breeder

reactor. Otherwise, the material is being used in small

quantities for R&D purposes or is in vault storage. Thus,

the amount of special nuclear material, plutonium and highenriched uranium, being used outside national security

programs is very small and at this time is largely in vault

storage.”

*(Ref. 3: Kenneth R. Chapman, Director Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards, NRC to Natural Resources Defense Council,

Mar. 22, 1976. )

The total amount of plutonium in the private facilities is

probably less than 1,000 kg at this time. There are between

1,000 and 1,500 shipments per year of significant amounts of

high enriched uranium, plutonium or U-233. Less than 100 of

these are shipments of privately owned nuclear materials.

In view of the several Government and private nuclear programs, it is useful to identify those which relate to national

defense and those which pertain to civil applications. The

former activities are classified in the interest of national

security; the latter, generally, are not. The overall assessment of the benefits of a national military nuclear program

relative to the safeguards risks of theft or diversion is

different from such an assessment for non-military nuclear

programs. From the point of view of proliferation, it is the

nuclear power program and the R&D programs of both ERDA and

NRC that are relevant.
VIII - 6

The future course of nuclear power in the U.S. is being

reviewed. The questions being publicly debated are whether

or not to authorize private construction of uranium enrichment plants, private reprocessing plants, fabrication of

mixed uranium-plutonium fuels for recycle in light water

reactors and whether or not to proceed with the liquid metal

cooled fast plutonium breeder program.

In view of this situation, the present safeguards

systems described below are designed principally to protect

Government owned nuclear materials. These systems have been

significantly upgraded in recent years and are still in the

process of review and improvement. The safeguards programs

of ERDA and NRC are especially important for assessing the

future safeguards risks which future nuclear energy choices

might involve.
VIII -7

2. Domestic Safeguards in the Mid 1970’s

2.1 Purposes and Objectives and their Application in the U.S.

In the international sense, "Safeguards” has heretofore

implied the use of inspection and material accounting techniques to provide assurance that nuclear material has not been

diverted to weapons programs; physical protection of the material is treated as a separate issue. In the domestic context “safeguards” are more broadly defined as “all measures

designed to detect, deter, prevent, or respond to the unauthorized possession or use of significant quantities of nuclear

materials through theft or diversion; and sabotage of nuclear

facilities.” Hence domestic safeguards covers both physical

protection and material control and accounting. Thus, the

overall international and domestic ‘safeguards” systems are

concerned with comparable elements to attain similar but not

identical objectives. A discussion of safeguards modes of

operation and likely effectiveness is most usefully started

with a consideration of purposes, implementation and regulation of safeguards in the U.S. In this chapter, we will be

concerned with today’s approach.

Note: IAEA safeguards pertain to ‘control of and accounting

for nuclear materials” supplemented by measures of containment

and surveillance. Although the IAEA cannot assume responsibility

for physical protection, it does recommend physical protection

methods to member states.

The objectives of safeguards have been stated in several

ways, for example:

“Safeguards measures are designed to deter, prevent, or

respond to (1) the unauthorized possession or use of significant amounts of nuclear materials through theft or diversion;

and (2) sabotage of nuclear facilities. The safeguards program has as its objective achieving a level of protection

against such acts (as) to insure against significant increase

in the overall risk of death, injury, or property damage to

the public from other causes beyond the control of the

individual-’’(4)*

* Ref. 4: ( Draft GESMO, WASH-1327, Aug. 1974, p. V-6)

An ERDA statement(5)* is:

‘Specifically, the objectives of ERDA’s integrated Safeguards and Security plan are to:

“1. Prevent successful malevolent acts involving nuclear

materials or facilities, so as to protect the public against

risk of death, injury, and property damage that could arise

from such acts;

* Ref. 5: ( See next page.)
‘2, Protect classified

disclosure; and,

“3, Protect Government

lence."

(Ref. 5: Master Plan , ERDA

VIII -8

information from authorized

property from Theft or malevoERDA-76/122 (Sept. ‘76], p.~,

Div. of Safeguards and Security, el

Reference 6*, a report of a group of NRC consultants, expands

on these generic statements and indicates how the safeguards system

may be defined:

 "It is clear, at least within the context Of Civil order,

that safeguards should be designed to prevent major

disasters involving the use of nuclear materials and facilities. In addition, they should provide protection

against serious incidents having adverse societal impacts.

The requirements for safeguards become less clear at the

lower levels of consequences, where misuse of nuclear material or facilities may constitute only a bothersome

incident. Safeguards should protect the public from harm,

but not necessarily prevent every conceivable incident.

Lower thresholds of consequences, in terms of the significance of potential damage or the amounts and quantities

of materials involved, can be used to identify one limit

on the scope of safeguards.”

‘Limitations on the upper levels of threat, with which the

safeguards system must cope, can be derived from the presumption of civil order. Within any given context of

time, place and societal behavior, responsible police

and intelligence organizations should be able to assist

in defining the size and quality of threats that might

emerge, with and without warning, to perpetrate malevolent

acts involving nuclear materials and facilities. In the

case of external threats, this definition might be of

numbers of people and the quality of their arms and material and their training and tactics. In the case of

internal threats, it might be of numbers of conspirators

and their level of authority within the industry. Thus,

the scope of both internal and external safeguards can be

bounded-on the lower side in terms of the consequences of

of the acts involved and on the upper side in terms of the

credible threats that can be postulated within a context

of .civil order. This defines the breadth of the safeguards

program. “

*Ref. 6: ( A Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conwnission on a

“Conceptual Approach to Safeguards,n 31 October 1975. Prepared by a

group of NRC-sponsored consultants for the Division of Safeguards.

U.S. NRC)
2.2

ERDA

VII I-9

‘Both physical protection and material accounting and

control must be configured so that, at and above the

consequence level at which disasters can occur, the combination of an active safeguards program (within the

bounds of a credible threat) and contingency planning

(extending beyond credible threats toward the realm

of civil disorder) is sufficient to preclude any major

disaster.”

Elements of the U.S. Safeguards Systems

The sub-objectives of U.S. safeguards systems (of NRC,

and the Dept. of Defense) are: (1) to deter hostile

acts, (2) to prevent attempts to steal nuclear materials or

to commit acts of nuclear sabotage, and (3) to minimize the

consequences if the previous efforts should fail. The following discussion relates primarily to the second item, to the

safeguards measures intended to block adversary attempts. An

obviously strong preventive system will serve to deter most

potential adversaries. Legal penalties for misuse of nuclear

materials, also may serve as a deterrent. An example of a

measure to minimize consequences would be the use of radiation

detectors to detect the presence of plutonium, where it might

be dispersed after having been stolen, so that people could

be evacuated from a building or an area before they have

inhaled damaging amounts.

Deter: Persuade potential adversaries that attempts

to sabotage nuclear materials will not be successful

achieving their ends. Deterrent activities include:

to steal or

or useful in

(1) A system

of safeguards in-depth that appears to offer little chance of

success to the adversary, (2) condign punishment, if apprehended,

(3) rewards for, information leading to conviction for attempted

hostile acts.

and threatens

This offers a counter incentive to accepting bribes,

to reveal conspiracies, (4)

resolve to prevent development of

who might steal nuclear materials

acts.

a black

have no

a public and government

market, so that individuals

way to benefit from such

Prevent: Ideally a safeguards system should absolutely prevent

theft or sabotage. No system is perfect. But safeguards can and
VIII-10

should be designed to interrupt any conceivable adversary action

plan at a number of points so that the chance of completing his

mission is vanishingly small. Since certain skills, knowledge and

resources are required to steal nuclear materials, to fabricate a

nuclear explosive, to disperse plutonium or to sabotage, e.g. a

nuclear power plant,

aim to interrupt the

initial planning and

a properly designed safeguards system would

sequence of adversary steps starting with the

going all of the way to minimizing the consequences, should the scenario proceed to the final stage. For

analysis, it is useful to treat the recovery and response stages

separate from those which are normally considered as preventive

measures.

In as much as there are many conceivable action plans for outsider adversaries,

insiders, and combinations thereof, the strategies for interrupting them should also

be varied. In general, the earlier steps should aim at anticipating an adversary

action. Intelligence agencies could be alert to discover nuclear conspiracies.

Personnel reliability programs could aim to identify authorized personnel

who may require special attention. Information which might reveal just where

nuclear materials are accessible or the specifics of plant physical protection systems

could be withheld from the public-at-large. The material control,

material accounting

the Code of Federal

barriers in the way

and physical protection measures outlined in

Regulations are intended to place multiple

of potential adversaries.

Recover: Even if nuclear materials should be stolen, it might still

be possible to locate the thieves before they could make use of

them. Experts do not agree on how long it might take to fabricate

and to place a nuclear explosive, but it would take from days to
many weeks. ERDA and

strumentation to make

DOD have developed

area and localized

and weapon materials (there is some more

Plan). If the theft were announced, one

VIII -11

radiation detection insearches for stolen weapons

information in the Master

could count on the public

to report suspicious activities for investigations. Plans could be

made to search for inadvertent leaks of radioactivity or for deliberate dispersal.

Minimize consequences: This subject should be a part of national plans

to respond to serious threats to the public health and safety.

Equally serious threats could arise from natural causes, industrial accidents, or terrorist acts involving non-nuclear materials or facilities. It is

are many conceivable emergencies.

Disease, it was not clear whether

whether it was a chance occurrance

a complicated subject because there

For example, in the case of the Legionnaires

the agent was a virus, a chemical, or

or a deliberate act. Credible hoaxes,

nuclear or otherwise, present especially difficult problems. A panic reaction

could cause as much death and destruction as the threatened event itself.

The general structure of national safeguards systems are

described in two pamphlets which were written by experts from

member nations for The International Atomic Energy Agency,

These are: “States System for Physical Protection of

Nuclear Materialsw (INF/CIRC-225) , and "States system for

Control of and Accounting for Nuclear Materials" (IAEA-AG-26).

The three basic elements are: physical protection, control

of the nuclear materials and accounting procedures. “The

general composition of each of these is as follows: (1) physical Protection comprises personnel reliability determinations

and all of those measures related to access controls, physical

barriers, penetration alarms and to armed protective response

and recovery forces; (2) material control procedures are those ● .

which are provided to maintain continuous surveillance of the

nuclear materials and of the personnel who have access to them;

and (3) accountability procedures involve the measurement of

materials received or shipped out of a facility and of materials transferred within a facility; the maintenance of books

and records giving the location of nuclear materials and the

amounts; and the taking of complete physical inventories at

intervals in order to determine whether or not the book inventories are correct.”*

* ( Ref.: ERDA DSS Master Plan ERDA-76/122 (Sept. ’76), p. 9)
VIII - 12

The physical protection sub-system should prevent access

to the materials in a plant or shipment by force, by stealth

or false identity. It should prevent surreptitious-removal

of nuclear materials and respond to internal attempts to divert

or to sabotage equipment. The physical protection-sub-system

overlaps the material control sub-system designed to detect

any unauthorized or suspicious activity involving the nuclear

materials. Present day accountability systems provide primarily

for a determination, after some period of time, that the other

two sub-systems have been effective or to provide information

as to where and how they may have failed. Additionally, such

information may detect continuing small diversions and-provide information useful for recovery operations. Highly

automated semi-continuous measurement systems are under

development which will provide prompt information that something may be missing.

The system, as a whole, should be an optimum combination

of these facility sub-systems together with intelligence activities to help to anticipate adversary attempts and plans for a

national response to hoaxes or to an actual theft or act of

sabotage. The responsibility for intelligence gathering is

assigned to the FBI and to other law enforcement agencies.

NRC and ERDA have a primary role in assessing threats and hoaxes.

Many Federal, state and local agencies would be involved in

responding to credible nuclear threats.

2.3 Current US-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safeguards

The basic documents defining the nature and extent of nuclear

safeguards are in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR). The first, Part 70 of 10 CFR, describes procedures and

methods of material control for SNM. Similarly 10 CFR Part 73 covers

the physical security requirements for protecting special nuclear

material and related facilities and activities. Together, these

two regulations form the regulatory framework for all safeguards.

Complementing these two regulations are a series of Regulatory

Guides. Here the focus tends to be more specific with an emphasis

on how regulations can and should be implemented.

The regulatory requirements are different for reactors,

for facilities that process low enriched uranium, and for facilities that process high enriched uranium or plutonium.

Material control and accounting requirements for reactors

are minimal. Reactor management is required to submit a

physical security plan for NRC approval which satisfies the
VIII - 13

requirements described-in Regulatory Guide 1.17 (on-site

armed guards, alarms and redundant communications with local

police). More extensive requirements for physical protection

have been issued for comment, but not yet put into effect.

Both low enriched and high enriched uranium production

facilities are required to meet the material control and accounting requirements discussed more fully below. No special

physical protection requirements are placed on the low enriched

uranium facilities. However, detailed physical protection

requirements are given in 10CFR73 for shipments of strategically

significant amounts of nuclear material and for production facilities having high enriched uranium and plutonium in more

than threshold amounts.

The reasons for the difference in treatment are that low

enriched uranium is not very radioactive nor can it be used

as a nuclear explosive. Plutonium is produced in reactors

but the hot spent fuel from reactors is extremely radioactive

and hardly an attractive target for subnational subversives.

It is important to maintain accountability of low enriched

uranium in the interest of international control of nuclear

materials and because quantitative measurement of the lowenriched fuel fed to a reactor provides one part of the data

needed to determine how much plutonium is produced as the

fuel is burned-up. Reactors need physical protection because

they might be targets for sabotage. Facilities that process

high-enriched uranium or plutonium obviously require both

physical protection and material controls.

There are two papers on material accounting for low-enriched uranium:

(1) A study that the Brookhaven Technical Support Organization made for

NRC-MCSS and (2) A study by a special committee of the Institute of

Nuclear Materials Management.*

U.S. industry maintains that the detailed material control

and accounting requirements of 10CFR7O are unnecessarily burdensome for facilities with LEU, because LEU is not very radioactive

(i.e., not a target for dispersal), and because it is not

credible that U.S. terrorists would enrich LEU or use it to

make Pu in a secret reactor. There are some crude estimates of

the economic costs which could be saved by a relaxation of

these requirements in Ref. 1.

Neither reference presents an adequate analysis of the

international considerations. The IAEA is supposed to monitor

all of the activities of a "state"” It starts with U308 prepared to enter the fuel cycle. IAEA will need reasonably good

data on low-enriched fuel fabrication facilities in order to

do an overall analysis of all of the nuclear materials flowing

within a state. Accurate data on the uranium content and

isotopic composition of the fresh fuel shipped to reactors

is especially important to confirm the burnup-data from reactors and the amount of plutonium that should be recovered by

reprocessing.

*Ref. ( 1: “A Review of The Regulations Concerning The Control and Accounting

of Nuclear Material” BNL-TSO, July 16, 1976)

* Ref. 2: ( INMM - August 1976)
VIII - 14

Actually, the conclusion of these references does not appear to be

inconsistent with the needs of the IAEA.

The Brookhaven study concluded that MC&A requirements for facilities

fabricating LEU fuel could be relaxed somewhat. It also concluded that

MC&A for natural uranium should be increased.

The following discussion relates to the material control

and accounting and the physical protection requirements now

applied by NRC to the facilities that process high-enriched

uranium or plutonium, i.e., spent fuel reprocessing plants

and plants that manufacture fuels containing high-enriched

uranium, plutonium, or U-233.

The regulations require that an organization establish a

safeguards department which is independent of the production

department, in order to obtain a license to possess and process

special nuclear materials (enriched uranium, plutonium, etc.).

The independent safeguards line organization is responsible

for establishing material control and physical protection procedures and for enforcing them. NRC inspects the facilities

to insure that the organizational structure and the procedures

conducted comply with the requirements of the regulations and

the specific safeguards conditions attached to each license.
VIII - 15

Physical Protection at Fixed Sites

Regulation 10 CFR Part 73 treats physical protection in

terms of 3 major groups of safeguards measures.

1.

2.

3.

Barriers, intrusion alarms, portal controls, and

surveillance to detect, and possible delay, (a)

entry of unauthorized personnel and contraband

and (b) unauthorized removal of SNM.

Alarm station, command post and communications to

coordinate and direct the armed facility guard

force and, when appropriate, to call for assistance

from local law enforcement authorities.

Armed facility guard force to neutralize threats.

For example, fence, wall, floor and ceiling barriers are

separately defined in terms of minimum dimensions and materials,

guards are required to be uniformed and armed (guides recommend

how they be trained) , the acceptable qualities of locks are

specified as are materials for vaults.

Any facility is assumed divided into a hierarchy of zones,

corresponding to the material, equipment or activities contained in each viz:

● Protected Areas: The overall plant region

enclosed by barriers and having its access

controlled.

● Vital Areas: Regions where equipment whose

failure could endanger the public health

(e.g., standby power supplies) is housed.

● Material Access Areas: Parts of a facility containing SNM.

Figure 2.1 shows in a schematic fashion the major components

of a physical protection system for a fixed site.

The function of the fixed site physical protection elements

described in the regulations are:

1. At least two physical barriers protect vital equipment and the special nuclear material (SNM) .

2* Access to the protected area is controlled by a

system of coded badges. Access to the vital areas

and material access area is by means of special

authorization. Vehicles used primarily for the

conveyance of personnel are not allowed in the

protected area.
Figure 2.1 Physical Protection Requirements

f
VIII - 17

3.

4 .

5.

6.

At the protected area entrance, personnel and

vehicles are searched for firearms, explosives or

incendiary devices. All hand carried packages

are searched. Other packages entering the protected area are searched at random.

Upon exiting a material access area, all personnel,

Vehicles and packages are to be searched for

concealed SNM.

Emergency exits of material access and vital areas

are alarmed. Isolation zones and protected area

barriers are monitored. All alarms annunciate in

a continuously manned central alarm station within

the protected area. A redundant continuously

manned alarm station is also required.

Licensees must establish liaison with local law

enforcement authorities, and be prepared to take

immediate action to neutralize threats to this

facility, either directly or by calling for local

law enforcement authorities.

Material Control and Accounting

The physical protection systems, described above are

designed to control the materials and the personnel entering

or leaving the sensitive areas within nuclear facilities

where vital equipment is located and where nuclear materials

are stored or utilized. The material control and accounting

systems are designed to detect diversion of SNM or sabotage

attempts by personnel who have been authorized to enter the

vital and material access areas. The ‘material control” subsystem is intended to detect attempted diversion or sabotage

promptly, so that such attempts can be interrupted. up to

this time, the material accounting operation has been employed

primarily to determine, after the fact, whether or not all

the materials which should be on hand are still there - the

classical role of accounting. In the future it will be

possible to measure material in vaults and material being

processed on an essentially continuous basis, so that any

theft or diversion should be detected in time to take remedial

action. This highly automated, measurement and accounting

system is described in Section 4.4 of this Appendix.

The material control subsystem is intended to prevent any

single individual from diverting nuclear materials from storage

or from processing by requiring that at least two individuals

observe any transfer of SNM. Operations personnel will request

that SNM be transferred from storage to a process, from one
VIII - 18

process to another and to storage. Each such internal transfer must be authorized by responsible management personnel and

approved and witnessed by safeguards personnel. Every internal

transfer is recorded on internal transfer documents, with

copies for safeguards and for operations. These two independent sets of records should be compared frequently so as to

insure that the records have not been compromised. A second

level of control is applied at the perimeter of the material

access areas by the physical protection system described above.

Individuals entering or leaving must pass through radiation

detectors (personnel monitors) which can detect small quantities of SNM; packages are searched and authorized SNM removals

are to be certified by guards and health physicists, as well

as by operating and MC&A personnel. The system is intended to

prevent diversion from the facility by two “insiders” in collusion.

The material accounting system is presently similar to

that employed for any type of highly valuable material. It

is based on measurements of the amounts of material received,

material shipped off-site and of all internal transfers (material may be sealed in containers, so that repeated measurements are not required unless a seal shows signs of tampering) .

All measured amounts are recorded in ledgers and on transfer

documents (frequently the records system employs computers).

At intervals, specified in the regulations, the plant is shut

down, the processing equipment cleaned out, and a physical

inventory is taken. The materials found on inventory are

compared to the amounts expected to be on hand and any significant discrepancy is investigated.

The materials involved at a processing plant may be in

many different forms: liquid solutions, powders, pellets,

rods, contaminated liquids or powders, pellets rejected for

not meeting specifications, and low-level disposable wastes,

such as contaminated clothing, equipment or cleaning solutions.

A variety of measurement techniques are employed. Unlike most

other industries, it is necessary to measure the isotopic

composition of the SNM as well as the amount of uranium or

plutonium.

The licensee is required to determine by measurement,

the nuclear material content of all receipts, shipments,

discards, and material on inventory. A description of the

various measurements and measurement uncertainties that are

used in nuclear material control must be provided. Error

models based on statistical methodology and techniques are

required to demonstrate the licensee’s capability to meet

adequate material balance criteria.
VIII-19

This description of MC&A is based on a BNL-TSO paper*

prepared for the NRC Special Safeguards Study.

It is probably an overstatement to say that “the system

is intended to prevent diversion by two insiders.” It would

be more honest to say that the

might prevent diversion by two

not presently clear. Although

potential to require collusion

degree to which this system

or more authorized personnel is

it would appear to have the

by three for diversion, its

effectiveness depends on the interpretation of the regulations

by NRC licensing and inspection and by facility operators.

Until this system

by diversion path

the effectiveness

for modifying it.

is submitted to rigorous assessment, e.g.,

analysis, as operated at actual facilities,

will remain unknown, as would suggestions

*REF: Limitations on Personnel Access to SNM Records,

NRC-Special Safeguards Study ‘by Brookhaven

National Lab. , Technical Support Organization.

Nov. 10, 1975.
VIII - 20

Adequacy criteria and frequency for material balances

are established by regulation and specify that the uncertainty

in the material unaccounted for (LEMUF)* does not generally**

exceed the limits in Table 2.1 for the frequency given. The

ability to detect diversion via a material balance cannot,

however, be inferred directly from these criteria because of

a dependence on plant flow or throughput and the statistical

nature of the test. For example, the criteria in Table 2.1

means a material balance uncertainty of approximately 0.5 kilograms of plutonium for present day plutonium fabrication plants

with a throughput of 600 kg per year but an uncertainty of

75 kilograms of plutonium for a large reprocessing plant with

a throughput of 15,000 kg per year. More specifically, a

material balance discrepancy is called when a larger quantity

of material appears to be missing than can reasonably be

expected when the measurement uncertainties are taken into

account. Current procedures are to call a discrepancy in such

a way that in the absence of any diversion or procedural error,

the normal uncertainty in measurement will give rise to a

false alarm in one occasion in 20. Some small fraction of the

LEMUF could obviously be removed without a significant increase

in the probability of calling a discrepancy and an analysis

of this issue is given in Annex A. For fixing ideas on

how large a theft might be feasible it is useful to think in

terms of:

a. A theft of 25% of the LEMUF being hard to detect.

The probability of a discrepancy being called is

one chance in ten.

b, A theft of 50% of the LEMUF being an upper bound

of the credible “theft within the LEMUF". There

is (approximately) one chance in five of its being

called.

In this light the diversion of only 0.12 to 0.25 kg of plutonium

per accounting period is credible in the example 600 kg/yr

fabrication plant, while 20 to 40 kg Pu could possibly be

diverted without detection in the 15,000 kg/yr reprocessing

*The material unaccounted for (MUF) is the measure of a material

balance and is equal to the (beginning inventory plus receipts]

minus the (ending inventory plus shipments]. The uncertainty in

MUF is given in terms of a quantity called the limit of error

of MUF or LEMUF and in the U.S. is twice the standard deviation

in the measured MUF.

**These limits may not apply to small facilities with LEMUF less

than 200 grams of plutonium or 300 grams of high enriched

uranium, nor to facilities that can demonstrate inability to

meet these limits after reasonable efforts have been made.
VIII - 21

a)

c)

w

“d

a

G- o

u

w

d

d

cd
VIII - 22

plant. * Thus, regulatory limits on material balance uncertainty and frequency may translate into a capability to

detect a weapon quantity of material diversion for present

day plants but a significant improvement will be required to

achieve this same detection ability for future large facilities.

NRC & ERDA support R&D to improve this situation. In

the meantime the primary safeguards measures to prevent or

to detect diversion are those of physical protection and of

material control. Although accounting may not be very useful

for prompt detection at large throughput facilities, it serves

the following important functions: (1) it can provide information on whether or not the material control and physical protection have been effective; (2) in case they have not, accounting by material balance area should indicate where weakness exists and controls should be improved; (3) if some materials should appear to be missing, the type, amount, location and responsible individuals could be identified, and

(4) good material accounting procedures may be the best way

to detect continuing, low-level diversion.

Material accounting is an essential element of the overall

safeguards system which is of special interest to plant management and to NRC inspectors for monitoring safeguards performance,

as well as for manufacturing process control and company financial purposes. The combination of material control, material

accounting and internal and external physical protection must

be considered in designing and evaluating safeguards for SNM

at actual facilities.

2.4 Physical Protection for SNM in Transit

Presently NRC & ERDA require physical protection of shipments of

“strategically" significant amounts of SNM, i.e., more than 5

kilograms (kg of high-enriched uranium, or 2 kg of plutonium or

U-233. Until recently, ERDA-owned materials, as well as privately owned, were

transported by private transport companies which met the then existing

security requirements. In 1976, ERDA decided to provide a

secure transportation system for its nuclear materials, including high enriched uranium fuels for Naval reactors and

research and plutonium fuels for the test breeder

program. In consequence, all ERDA shipments of such significant

amounts of nuclear materials between its facilities, private

contractors licensed by NRC, and ERDA and private facilities,

are now protected by the ERDA system, while the relatively few

shipments of such privately owned materials are subject to

NRC regulations.

*Note, this discussion is only relative to material accounting and

not to physical protection or material control.
VIII-23

The NRC regulations, published in 10CFR73, place

responsibility for protection of shipments on the licensed

facility which makes the shipment, whether in its own vehicles

or by contract with commercial shippers. The regulations

require that shipments by truck must be dedicated, in the

sense that the shipment should be door-to-door with no intermediate stops to transfer other packages. The truck should

have a driver and a guard and the truck must be accompanied

by an escort vehicle with two armed guards or the truck must

be especially designed to resist penetration, etc. The truck,

and/or escort, must be equipped with radio telephones for

frequent communications or the convoy must phone-in every

2 hours.

Shipments of this size are now no longer allowed on

passenger aircraft. Shipments of plutonium in cargo aircraft

are forbidden until NRC has determined that safe shipping

containers have been developed and proven. Any transfer from

one mode of transport to another must be monitored by an armed

guard. There are similar provisions regarding shipment by rail

or ship (the subject of export, import and of foreign shipments

which cross U.S. territory, is under review at this time) .

The ERDA secure transportation system was developed

several years ago to transport nuclear weapons and weapon

materials. Its principal elements are secure vehicles (tractortrailers and railroad cars) , escort guards and a nationwide

communications system. The tractor cabs are securely built to

provide protection to the drivers/guards. The trailer, which

carries the nuclear materials is designed to delay penetration

by sophisticated adversaries for an hour or more. The tractortrailer can be immobilized so that hi-jackers can’t tow it away.

The tractor and the escort vehicle maintain continuous communication by short range radio and one or both are connected to

the ERDA Transportation communications network, based in

Albuquerque. The Albuquerque station monitors all shipments

on the road, advises the vehicles as to weather and other

hazards, and has an up-to-date list of state and local lawenforcement agencies along the routes. Similar protection

and communications are provided for ERDA shipments by rail.
VIII - 24

2.5 DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS OUTSIDE THE U . S ,

During the performance of the present work, literature

on safeguards of other countries was reviewed, and informal

contacts were made. The countries included Canada, West

Germany, the UK, France, Sweden and the USSR. Very little

specific information was obtainable from the published

literature. informal contacts may be summarized as follows:

1.

2.

Material Accounting: All countries claim capabilities

to meet at least IAEA accuracies; there are also

several developments (W. Germany and France) on

real time accounting.

Physical Protection: No details of any system

are available (on security grounds?). There are

verbal claims that local experience (e.g., in

France during the Algerian war) has stimulated

the development of highly effective systems.
VIII - 25

3. INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY IN THE

CONTEXT OF U . S . EXPORTS

The basis for the licensing of exports of nuclear material

and nuclear fuel facilities to any given country is normally

a tripartite “Agreement of Co-operation” that has been negotiated by the State Department and ERDA, the country in question,

and the

ranging

general

IAEA. Such agreements have been written for terms

from 10 to 50 years and cover a broad span, including

conditions for co-operation, fuel trade framework where

applicable, and safeguards conditions. These “Agreements for

(5, 6, 7)* for the NRC to issue Co-operation” set the framework

general export licenses for commercial organizations to trade

in both “source material” (natural uranium and thorium and their

ores) and in special nuclear material (plutonium, U-233 and

uranium enrichment) .

The process of export trade in nuclear materials

begins with an application from the commercial vendor

for a license to proceed with a proposed transaction.

in turn asks the Executive Branch for “information to

a determination of whether issuance of the license in

consistent with U.S. national security”.

* (See

Quoting from Ref. 8*(GAO’s 1976 report)

and facilities

to the NRC

The NRC

assist in

question is

“The NRC then considers this information, together with

data developed by its staff, in deciding whether to

issue a license. NRC independently verifies some, but

not all, of the information provided. For example, an

NRC official told us that agreements for cooperation

are examined to ensure that the export will be under

appropriate safeguards and that on occasion additional

information on physical security precautions had been

requested.

“NRC believes that, although it must rely heavily on

the information provided in the Executive branch

position paper, this is a proper procedure since those

involved agencies are able to make integrated policy

evaluations concerning international relations and

Reference List at the end of this Appendix.)
VIII - 26

national defense. NRC officials believe it is impractical for them to develop an independent capability for

collecting and validating similar information solely for

nuclear exports.”

According to ERDA’s recent Statement on U.S. Nuclear Power

Export Activities (ERDA 1542, Ref. 7,) minimum requirements

set by the Executive branch are now:

3.1

IAEA

ERDA

1.

2.

3.

4.

That recipients apply IAEA safeguards on nuclear

exports from the U.S. This includes facilities

and certain equipment as well as special material.

Extract assurances from recipients not to use

these exports to make nuclear explosives for any

purpose.

Application by recipients of adequate physical

security to exports to deter theft and sabotage,

(which supplements existing policy requirements

regarding significance of sensitive materials)

Assurances from recipients that they will also

require the above conditions on any-retransfer

of these exports of transfers of material or

equipment derived from the original transfer.

MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO

EXPORT LICENSING REVIEW

As noted in the above requirements, the application of

safeguards standards is now mandatory, and according to

1542 has been called out in all agreements concluded

since 1968. Hence much of the safeguards information reviewed

by the NRC will be that of the agreement between the receiving

nation and the IAEA; this information will normally conform to

the guidelines set forth in IAEA publication INFCIRC153 (9)

The present IAEA system is summarized below:

1. Design Review - Nations supply the IAEA with design

characteristics, specifically material flow and

handling and material control and statistics. The

IAEA reviews these characteristics.

This information is submitted

in a standard format prescribed by the IAEA.
VIII - 27

2.

3.

4.

The

Records - The plant operator maintains records to

account for all transactions with nuclear material

based on measurements. These records are open to

review.

of 

Reports- The nation reports to the IAEA the amount

nuclear material at each plant and transactions

that have occurred since the last report. The IAEA

maintains its own accounting records of national

inventories.

Inspection - The IAEA performs on-site inspections

based on independent measurements to verify that

records and reports are correct.

IAEA system is therefore based entirely on verification of plant material control and accounting systems. The

IAEA is concerned with two questions regarding material control

and accounting:

1. Is the material control and accounting system

adequate?

2. Do the records and reports adequately represent

plant’s material status?

The first of these questions are asked during the

design review performed by the IAEA, where

plant characteristics, material handling procedures, and

the

the

measurement and accounting system are checked for adequacy.

The second question can only be addressed through site visits

by IAEA inspectors. Here the inspectors first verify that all

records and reports are correct or estimate proper corrections,

and second evaluate the material control status, i.e., the

material inventories and the material balance uncertainties.

The step-by-step approach

as follows:

1. Verification of item

and reports supplied

used by the inspector is grouped

identification (using records

by the facility as a reference)

Semi-quantitative measurement to detect:

a. Gross defects (complete removal from an item)

:: b. Medium sized defects (partial removal from an

item)
VIII - 28

3.

4.

Item

to locate

Accurate quantitative measurement to detect:

a. Inflated random error variance

b. Induced artificial bias

Statistical tests to evaluate material control:

a. Operators MUF*

b.MUF* adjusted for bias

identification consists of a 100% inspection effort

every item in the plant. included in “items” are

the in-process bulk storage vessels that are not cleaned out

for inventory. The qualitative and quantitative measurements are based on a random sampling plan which for each facility

usually results in a measurement of 50 to 100% of the material

order to meet IAEA detection criteria. The major quantity

of material to be verified is normally contained in items

received or shipped and in storage vessels.

in

An indication of the quality of material control and accounting at facilities satisfying IAEA criteria for adequacy can be

obtained by comparing material balance accuracy in these

facilities with requirements in the U.S. Table 3.1 shows the

IAEA expected accuracies of material balances relative to

throughput.

TABLE 3.1. IAEA EXPECTED ACCURACY (STANDARD DEVIATION

OF A MATERIAL

OF THROUGHPUT

Facility Type

Uranium Isotope Enrichment

BALANCE EXPRESSED AS PERCENT

OR INVENTORY)

Expected Operators Accuracy

&o.2%

Uranium Fuel Fabrication *0.3%

Plutonium Fuel Fabrication ko.5%

Uranium in Power Reactors *0.2%

Reprocessing, Uranium Line kO.8%

Reprocessing, Plutonium Line” *loo%

7i

Material unaccounted for.
VIII - 29

A comparison with the U.S. regulatory requirements on measurement accuracy (see Table 2.1) shows that U.S. standards are

somewhat more demanding than those of the IAEA.

The IAEA, under INFCIRC/153, utilizes containment and surveillance measures to establish the material balance areas and

define key measurement points used in the accounting verification. These safeguards measures are designed to guard against

material being diverted into unmeasured flow or inventory and against tampering

with the IAEA measurements or inventory procedure by the facility.

This approach has been exercised in joint programs between the IAEA

and the Brookhaven National Laboratory which included a three-month

exercise by up to 16 inspectors at the Nuclear Fuel Services, West

Valley, New York, reprocessing plant during 1969.(10) For the past five years,

the IAEA has been developing automated instrumentation for containment and surveillance such as optical surveillance cameras, (11)

gamma sensors or thermocouples to detect unauthorized transfers

(12)

of

of

to

of

material, unattended radiation monitors for surveillance

(13) and nuclear detectors personnel and packages at portals,

monitor isotope concentrations and verify operators reports

flow (13) The application of seals to discrete containers of ●

SNM is now a conventional safeguards measure in routine use by

the IAEA.(11)

● In addition, the Agency is investigating improved

sealing devices such as random fibre optical finger-printing

seals that are field readable.

3.2 PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN LICENSING REVIEW

In a presidential message dated May 1975, (6) it is stated

that the U.S. has adopted a policy that no future license will

be issued for the export or re-transfer of more than 5 kg of

highly enriched uranium or of more than 2 kg of plutonium or
VIII - 30

U-233 unless the government of the recipient country

“has an established system of physical security measures acceptable to the United States.” We are unaware of any detailed

standards of acceptability beyond a statement that they should

be “comparable to those imposed domestically.” In any case,

there may be reasons for classifying the details of methods

and, indeed, we are unsure of whether absolute standards can

be usefully applied.

The following ERDA statement, drawn from Ref. 7 (page 6-35)

provides an account of the current position:

“It is impossible to define in a concise recipe what physical

standards are “adequate,” due to the vast differences in

the nuclear facilities of the various nations. What the U.S.

does is review the foreign nation’s physical-security standards in comparison to analogous U.S. standards and evaluate

the purpose of each foreign regulation, relating it to its

American counterpart. The determination of adequacy must

consider such factors as the nature of the installation or

facility, the differing levels of protection required, the

technical sophistication of the nation involved, cost

aspects, and manpower considerations. If the security

measures, as enforced in the country, meet the goals of the

American standards, then the foreign nation’s standards are

considered “adequate,” because they are deemed to be “comparable.” Various factors are thus considered in evaluating

the viability of the standards of another nation. In some

nations, for example, labor costs are minimal. ●anpower is

so abundant that primary reliance on human protection is both

feasible and desirable from a monetary standpoint. Thus

such compensating features as large numbers of trained

guards or active and well-coordinated response forces are

factors considered when making an overall assessment. In

contrast, the U.S. , labor costs are extremely high and mixed

security systems employing both manpower and high-technology

systems incorporating detection devices, etc. , are in much

wider use.

“During visits to countries in question, U.S. experts review

the nation’s standards for physical security, the measures

being employed, and the enforcement of the regulations and

make suggestions on the upgrading and improvement of existing systems. The specific procedures followed in determining

the adequacy of a nation’s physical security measures are
VIII - 31

1.

2.

3.

4.

Review of the nation’s established requirements for

physical security.

Comparison of the nation’s physical security with current U.S. measures and guides, and any future modifications thereto, taking into account factors that may be

peculiar to a particular nation.

When appropriate, a direct request of the recipient government for specific information on

matters relevant to the entire area of physicalsecurity.

When appropriate, visits to facilities involved

with such material by a physical-security review team in order to ascertain that the procedures followed are adequate to the situation in

that particular nation.

“In implementing this policy, U.S. physical-security review

teams have visited 18 countries during the past year, and

visits to some 21 additional nations are planned for 1976.

By the end of the year, the U.S. will have made reviews of

the physical-security measures of all the major recipients

of strategic quantities of U.S. nuclear materials and

intends to cover all nations with whom it has Agreements for

Cooperation, as well as other nations that might receive

trigger-quantities through the U.S.-IAEA Agreement.

“The national-security* policies of the foreign state prevent

the U.S. from disclosing such information to the general

public. Such unpermitted disclosure would result in an improper breach of confidence and would create at least a

stress, if not a rupture, in the nations’ relations with

the U.S.

“In addition, valid nondiplomatic reasons exist for not

divulging information on the status of physical-security

in a nation. Public disclosure would have the immediate

effect of broadcasting to the world at large, including

interested terrorist organizations, the details of the

security system of the various nations. This could be extremely useful information on the hands of subnational

groups or terrorists bent on taking advantage of such

intelligence.

"Thus most foreign states continue to keep their specific

physical-security measures classified and/or under proprietary restrictions. The results of the U.S. visits

are therefore classified, at the request of the nations

involved, and the U.S. cannot divulge results of the reviews.
VII I - 32

Furthermore, the laws and regulations of the various recipient

nations as well as the factors peculiar to each recipient

nation make it difficult to present even general observations.

“However, foreign nations are actively committed to developing and maintaining adequate physical-security systems. All

the countries visited by U.S. physical-security review teams

were familiar with the IAEA guidelines on physical protection. Some nations actively participated in the development of the IAEA guidelines. All of these nations have

generally accepted them as the basis for their own physicalsecurity systems. However, in many cases, the visits by

U.S. physical-security review teams apparently constituted

a real impetus to prepare formal regulations and upgrade

the physical-security systems, seemingly acting as a catalyst

to subsequent security improvements.

“The U.S. physical-security review teams have been uniformly

impressed with the positive attitudes of the authorities

in each nation visited. Other countries recognize the

importance of having a system of adequate physical-security

measures and have a strong incentive of their own to assure

protection of their own materials and facilities.”
VIII - 33

4. Safeguards Research and Future Safeguards

Both NRC and ERDA have safeguards R&D programs. ERDA has

a responsibility to develop safeguards for the new energy systems

that it develops and also to insure that the safeguards for its

military and research programs will meet future safeguards goals.

On the other hand, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 assigned

NRC the responsibility for “confirmatory research.” So far

this has been interpreted to mean that ERDA would support the

bulk of the ‘hardware research,” the technology development,

and the demonstration and Testing of safeguards systems in

actual facilities, while NRC has put emphasis on systems studies,

on the development of analytical techniques, and on programs

which should help it to: (1) define safeguards requirements

for the facilities that it regulates, and (2) assess not only

compliance of these licensees but also the effectiveness of

its role in protecting and advancing the interests of the

U.S. public. Before attempting to describe this R&D program,

it might be useful to briefly review the past.

Safeguards, as such, began to attract official attention in

1957, when the UN voted to establish The International Atomic

Energy Agency. Several R & D studies were funded by the Atomic

Energy Commission in 1958 and 59, which were primarily addressed

to international control or to certain arms control agreements

then under consideration. An outstanding safeguards study,

which is all but forgotten, was done by Westinghouse for- the

AEC for one million dollars in 1959. It outlined a system for

us safeguards, explored the then available methods for measurement of nuclear materials, developed some new methods, and looked

into techniques for physical protection including tamper-resistant

recorders and communications. At that point, the AEC lost interest.

It supported work on better chemical measurements of nuclear

materials and some productive studies of material accounting for

nuclear facilities at Battelle in Hanford, Washington. But it

was not until 1967, after the big loss of high enriched uranium

at Numec and after the US and USSR had agreed on the nuclear

non-proliferation treaty, that the AEC finally set up a consistent

program of R & D on safeguards.

Until recently, safeguards has not been a matter of high

priority to the public or the Congress or the AEC. In the past

several years, there has been a greatly renewed interest in the

subject of safeguards, and funds to match. But the public and the

Congress should not expect that a sudden renewal of interest and

money will quickly make up for years of neglect.

The NRC program, as noted above, emphasizes systems studies

and the development of methodology to assess safeguards systems and

components. The ERDA research, test, and evaluation program will

be summarized next. The most important subject for study, which

both NRC and ERDA are emphasizing, is that of how to assess and evaluate
VIII - 34

safeguards systems and subsystems, of how to make cost-benefit

analyses involving imagined threats, untested systems (no significant incidents so far) and consequences ranging from zero to very

serious.

4.1 The ERDA Safeguards R&D Program

The ERDA R&D program is described in ERDA 76/122, referenced

on p. 8 . The subject to be pursued and the estimated costs for

fiscal years 1977 and 1978-81 are reproduced in Table 4-1. Items

I-IV are relevant here (V relates to ERDA inspections, VII is an

NRC-ERDA central computer data system, VIII is international safeguards support, IX is the ERDA/NRC analytical laboratory, and VI,

missing from the Table, is the ERDA personnel clearance program) .

The following is a summary of the program described in the ERDA

Master Plan document:

Task 1 - Characterize Threat:

‘The product of this task will be the characterization of the

capabilities of adversaries, an assessment of probable threats,

and the development of a rational way for dealing with them,

recognizing that potential human actions cannot be quantified to

the same degree as for design failures (reactor safety or reliability). Furthermore, lacking a history of serious hostile acts

involving nuclear materials, one has to extrapolate from other

experiences of society.”

The task includes studies of adversary activities in other

areas which may provide insight into possible nuclear threats;

detailed analysis of the possible consequences of successful acts

of diversion, theft, or sabotage to threaten or to cause dispersion

of radioactivity or detonation of a nuclear explosive; assessment

of the resources that an adversary group would need to undertake

and to complete such adversary actions; and careful analysis of all

of the conceivable ways that an adversary might pursue to gain her or

his objectives.

This set of studies is intended to define design threats for

the system designer and to identify all of the possible “adversary

action sequences” which the safeguards systems should block. It is

recognized that society and technology undergo changes with time

that affect the nature of the threats. Consequently, the products

of this task are to be reviewed periodically.

Task II - Conceptual Design, Development and Analysis:

"Conceptual design, the evaluation of cost and effectiveness

of safeguards systems, and the development of new procedures for such

evaluations is performed to assure that safeguards funds are allocated

for maximum benefit and possible trade-off alternatives are examined.

This task is divided into: (1) the development of effectiveness

evaluation techniques and, (2) the development of generic concept

definitions for fuel cycle facilities."
VIII -35

SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

FOR FY-1977 AND FY 1978-81

(Outlays in Millions)

Table 4.1

TASK

Operating

I. Characterize Threat

II. Conceptual Design, Development

and Analysis

111. Technology, Equipment, & Modular

System Development & Test and

Evaluation

IV. Integrated System Design (Plant

Specific)/Installation & Test

and Evaluation in Operating

Environment

V. Assessments and Inspections

VII. Nuclear Materials Management

and Safeguards System (NMMSS)

VIII. International Activities

IX. Safeguards Analytical Laboratory

ESTIMATED RESOURCES

FY-77 REQUEST FOR FY 78-81*

$ 0,2 $ 005

2.8 4.0

9.7 33.0

6.3 38.9

0.5 7.2

0.8 903

0.7 3.8

1.3 5.3

Sub-Total $ 22.3 102. (P**

Capital Equipment 2.5 14.5

Construction

VI. Personnel

2,5 2.4

Sub-Total $ 27.3 118.9

Clearance Program 10.0 40.0***

TOTAL** $ 37.3 $ 158.9

*FY 1977 dollars - no escalation reflected in these figures.

**It is imPortant to note that these figures do not include safeguards implementation costs, i.e., the cost of implementing safeguards systems at operating

facilities. Such costs are borne by the sponsoring ERDA divisions, and are

reflected in their budgets.

***These totals represent the FY 1977 Presidential Budget Commitment Projection.

Taken from ERDA-76/122 (p. 32), $~feguards Master Plan
VIII - 36

Effectiveness evaluation techniques are necessary in order

to assess generic conceptual designs, specific safeguards system

designs, and subsystems. Task II lists the following projects

and

1.

2.

3.

*See

schedules:

Effectiveness evaluation models for physical

protection of facilities and shipments against

overt or covert -threats. Preliminary computer

based models have been developed by Brookhaven

National Laboratory and the Sandia Laboratories

for this purpose. They are being used to assess

the effectiveness of physical protection facilities

at ERDA facilities and to evaluate safeguards systems

being developed by ERDA laboratories. The schedule

calls for improvement of these analytical tools as

experience is gained (references 1, 2)*.

During the last several years, a technique has been

developed by a group at the National Bureau of

Standards to asses the vulnerability of safeguard

systems to adversary actions on the part of facility

employees or others permitted access to nuclear

facilities. It is known as “Diversion Path Analysis"

(reference 3)*. This is a more difficult

task for analysis than that described above. The

method is being applied to a number of ERDA facilities

in order to determine its utility and how it could be

improved. The schedule calls for an effective analytical tool, in use, by 1978-80.

NRC has supported studies of the vulnerability of

nuclear power plants to sabotage, at Sandia, and is

supporting the development of an effectiveness evaluation, computer-based, model at Sandia for protection

of reactors (reference 4)*.

The generic safeguards systems designs, described in

the Master Plan, are for future privately-owned,

nuclear facilities which would process substantial

amounts of special nuclear materials, e.g., reprocessing plants, plants to convert plutonium-nitrate

to plutonium-oxide, mixed-oxide fuel fabrication

facilities, breeder reactors, etc. Although identified

as ‘generic” designs, the designs are, in fact, quite

plant specific and are generated with participation of

the commercial plant designers in order to insure that

the safeguards features are compatible with operations

and to obtain realistic estimates of the costs. Specific

facilities which are being or will be studied are: the

Allied-General Reprocessing Plant at Barnwell, S.C., the

Westinghouse mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant intended

to be located at Anderson, N.C., the “high-performance

fuel laboratory” being constructed by ERDA contractors

at Richland, Washington, to fabricate breeder-reactor

fuel, and the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, proposed for

Oak Ridge, Tennessee (reference 5)*.

next page for references 1-5.
VIII - 37

References:

1. “Simulating Physical Protection Against Overt Attacks

at Facilities Using, Processing, or Storing Nuclear Materials.”

W. Marcuse and J. P. Indusi, Journal of the Institute of Nuclear

Materials Management, IV, No. III, 1975.

2. “Safeguards System Effectiveness Modeling,” H. A. Bennett,

et al. (Sandia), J. Inst. Nuc. Mat. Man. V, No. III, 239, 1976.

3. “Diversion Path Analysis Handbook” (2 VOIS.), by Nat.

Bureau of Standards, Center for Radiation Research. Prepared for

US-ERDA Div. of Safeguards and Security, October 1976.

4. “Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Reactors to Acts of

Sabotage,” D. J. McCloskey, Sandia Lab. report SAND-74-O069.

5. References 54, 55 and 56.* Unclassified papers on safeguards for a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility should be issued

soon. The general concepts are described in: “Design of Integrated

Systems for New Fuel Cycle Plants,” J. M. de Montmollin and R. B.

Walton, J. Inst. Nuc. Mat. Man., V, No. III, 317, 1976.

*see Reference List at end of this Appendix.
VIII - 38

Task II also includes R & D on nuclear materials information

systems and on inspection strategies.

Task III- Technology, Equipment and Modular Systems,

Development, Test and Evaluation:

"The effort is directed toward the development and test and

evaluation of. recommended improvements in technology, equipment,

and/or modular subsystems for:

● physical protection;

•material control and accountability; and,

● detection and recovery.

These improvements, when tested and evaluated, are then applied in

developing safeguards systems designs for specific types of

facilities under Task IV (Figure 4.8, page 45). Specific equipment

and subsystems being developed, tested, and evaluated are shown in

Figure 4.7, page 44. A comprehensive research, development, test

and evaluation implementation plan is contained in Appendix I.”

This category includes the large number of safeguards projects

concerned with hardware items and techniques. Some of these are

relatively highly developed, due to past R & D programs, others

will require substantially more research and testing. The general

nature and scope of these activities is suggested in the following

list of items: In support of physical protection: (1) intrusion

detectors and entry control, computer security, effectiveness of

barriers, guard equipment and training.

In support of material control and accountability:

measurement methods,

(1) improved

on-line measurement technology, automated sampling and analysis, (2) better standards for analytical and nont

destructive assay measurements, (3) improved techniques for measurement quality con rol, (4) development of measurement systems for

advanced, large-scale nuclear facilities.

In support of detection and recovery: (1) mobile diagnostic

equipment, and (2) high-resolution detection arrays.

Task IV - Integrated System Design, Installation, Test and

Evaluation in Operating Environment:

‘Concurrent with the development, test and evaluation

discussed in Task III, effort is directed toward the concept

definition, development, acquisition*, installation*, and

evaluation* of integrated safeguards systems for selected generic

classes of facilities. In an operating environment, conceptual

systems are then modified to adapt to real work economic and

operational constraints~ and then serve as working-model guidelines

for the implementation of alternative systems."

*in coordination with other ERDA progr~ divisions
VIII - 39

In addition to the whole-plant designs described above,

ERDA is supporting the design, construction, and testing of a

number of subsystems which will be components of such systems.

These include: (1) development and implementation of automatic,

on-line measurements equipment at the plutonium processing facility

at Los Alamos. Items have been installed and tested in the existing,

old facility. The new facility, to be operational in 1978, will

have a complete system which should provide for material control

and accounting on an essentially continuous basis so that material

balances can be performed after each shift rather than once every

two months, as is presently the case. (2) Design and demonstration

of rugged physical protection and tight item control of containers

of nuclear materials in vaults (Sandia and Los Alamos), and (3)

installation and testing of physical protection techniques at

the Sandia Laboratories research reactor.

4.2 Integrated Safeguards, a Summary

The integration of the previously separate safeguards functions

of physical protection, and material control and accounting has

received major attention during the past years (e.g., References

47, 48, 49)*; and a major ERDA program is now directed to the

definition of a systems solution to the Safeguard problem. The

program envisages a plantwide system having advanced physical

protection mechanisms for deterring and defeating outside attack,

comprehensive management of personnel entry and access to sensitive

areas, explicit controls on plant procedures to provide the basis

for techniques for detecting internal discrepancies, and the use

of DYMAC-related accounting procedures. A description of the

approach is excerpted from an ERDA paper (Ref. 55)* in the

following paragraphs:

Current program objectives have been established as follows:

1.

2*

3.

Develop, assess, and assure the availability of costeffective safeguards systems for application of ERDA

facilities and the commercial fuel cycles.

Assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

in its safeguards role in guarding against the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices and defining

effective safeguards internal control and physical

protection systems, in conduction with efforts of

foreign nations, for guarding against domestic threats

to nuclear materials and facilities.

Develop, assess, and assure implementation of effective

safeguards and information control systems for the protection of special nuclear material, classified information and property at ERDA, selected other US Government

and privately-owned facilities.

*see Reference List at the end of this Appendix.
VIII - 40

"ERDA's Division of Safeguards and Security (DSS), with the

assistance of Sandia Laboratories, Los Alamos Scientific

Laboratory (LASL), and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL)

is developing design concepts for an integrated and balanced

facility engineered safeguards system (ESS). The concepts

are directed at application to LWR and LMFBR fuel cycle

facilities and enrichment facilities. These safeguards systems

would make use of the work being conducted under R & D programs

to develop methodology, equipment, subsystems, and systems for

better protection of SNM and facilities containing SNM.

“The objective of the ESS is cost-effective protection against a

wide range of threats, both overt and covert, without causing an

unreasonable impact of facility cost or operation. The ESS will

interact closely with all aspects of plant operation. The system

requires the computer to monitor and verify the integrity of the

materials control and physical protection elements before operation

can be initiated or to allow further processing to continue.

The ESS contains three interacting components, or centers:

.Personnel control system (PCS).

•Item operations control system (IOCS). ●

.Material accountability system (MAS).

"The ESS works, conceptually, by plant or production management

assigning a production task to the operations people. The

specifics of the task - number of people, names of people, quantities

of SNM, material access areas, time windows, etc., are included in

the management-authorized work “order. The MAS then interacts with

the other two centers and monitors production operations on the basis

of the work order information. The MAS verifies location and status

of the SNM. The PCS would verify the identity of the workers and

permit entry into the work area. Closed-loop control insures all

steps in the operation are followed in the authorized sequence and

by approved personnel. If an off-normal or unauthorized condition

takes place, an alarm is initiated or other appropriate response

action is taken. The response is not arbitrary but is determined

in advance. Integration with the facility - and the safeguards

actions of the ESS - are established by plant management after

consulting with the facility designer, processing people, the

safeguards staff, and others.”

Thus, in addition to providing for advanced management of

physical protection and materials control, the system provides an

automated management function which may have a major impact on the

pervasive problem of detecting and determining thefts by insiders.

For example, one main concern is to define in broad terms how the

automatic system of safeguards shall handle prevention of theft

during non-routine events such as fire, criticality incident,

evacuation of injured employee, equipment breakdown, maintenance,

etc. Another is the definition of means by which the broad class

of administrative thefts by those in responsible positions in a
VIII-41

plant can be protected against without substantial interference with plant procedures and without oppressive surveillance.
VIII - 42

4.3 IMPROVED MATERIAL BALANCE ACCOUNTING FOR MONITORING

COVERT DIVERSION

Improvements in material balance accounting for detecting

covert diversion can be achieved in two ways: improving

measurement system accuracy and reducing the amount of material

in the balance by more frequent inventories. In the following

discussion of these improvements the material balance is

formed by periodically measuring SNM after it has been removed

from the process. Section 4.4 discusses concepts for realtime material control in which the SNM is measured while it is

in the process.

improved Measurement System Accuracy

Measurement system accuracy can be improved

accurate measurements and by reducing the amount

by

of

more

material

that is difficult to measure. These difficult-to-measure

materials are scrap, waste, and residue remaining in equipment

most material has been removed from the process for inventory.

In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s heavy emphasis was placed

after

on the development of nondestructive assay (NDA) for scrap

waste measurement because in many existing facilities no

accurate measurement techniques existed. ERDA support for

development of improved NDA has continued at Los Alamos

Laboratory (LASL) Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) and f{c\*

and

Mound Laboratoryf~4]” on scrap and waste assay and on the optimization of NDA’s potential for prompt, on-line measurement in

a real time accounting system. The result has been a significant

(16 , 17)This improvement in ability to measure scrap and waste.

improvement combined with improved process design for higher yields

means that scrap and waste measurements are not expected to

contribute significantly to material balance uncertainty in

(18) The dominant future large commercial nuclear facilities.

uncertainties in material balance accounting in these facilities

*See Reference List at the end of this Appendix*
VIII - 43

will be the measurement of feed and product by laboratory

analytical measurements and, for more frequent material

balances, the measurement of equipment residue. This is the

case even though laboratory analytical measurements are the

*

most precise and accurate techniques available.

ERDA is supporting the development of improved and automated analytical measurements at New Brunswick Laboratory

(NBL) , LLL, and LASL.(15) However, a recent survey (16) of

measurement accuracy shows a significant difference in the

accuracies achievable in production facilities compared to

those achieved in research and development laboratories.

Improvement of production accuracy to best R&D laboratory

accuracy would reduce material balance uncertainty by

approximately a factor of three to five, i.e., from 0.5% to 0.2%

or 0.1% of flow for non-reprocessing plants and from 1%

to 0.3% or 0.2% for reprocessing plants. To put these

accuracies in perspective, the standard reference materials

provided by the National Bureau of Standards and against

which all measurements are ultimately calibrated have an

uncertainty of approximately fO.06%. (20) Thus, to achieve

these improvements in production facilities would mean elimination

of nearly all other sources of measurement error, such as errors arising

from non-homogeneity of the sampled material, vessel volume uncertainties

and actual sampling errors.

Improved analytical

reducing the uncertainty

measurements would not be useful in

in frequent material balances unless

a Parallel gain were made in measuring equipment residue. NRC

has supported work at Argonne National Laboratory that resulted

in guidance on equipment design to minimize this problem. (21,22)

. *

‘These laboratory techniques such as gravimetry, electrochemistry, and mass spectrometry have one standard deviation

accuracies from 0.05% to .5% whereas NDA of scrap and waste

is only accurate to 1% to 5% and 5% to 15%, respectively.

However, feed and product account for greater than 90% of the

material in the balance whereas scrap and waste account for

only 1% to 5% and 0.25% to 1%, respectively.
VIII - 44

However, in large plutonium facilities approximately five

kilograms of the material in a material balance may be residue

remaining after clean-out for inventory. Recent NDA measurements of plutonium equipment residue (23 ,24 )made in accordance with

NRC guides (25) have demonstrated uncertainties from 10% up to 50%.

The best accuracy might reduce the residue contribution

to the material balance uncertainty to approximately 0.5

kilograms for large facilities.

Increased Material Balance Frequency

The absolute uncertainty in a measured material balance is

proportional to the amount of material measured and this, in turn,

is proportional to the time interval between material balances.

Thus, the more frequent the material balance, the lower the

absolute uncertainty in each inventory period. In addition, reducing the

time between material balances improves the timeliness of accounting and,

in the limit of real-time accounting, means that information would be avail

to detect diversion in time to permit more prompt remedial action. Calculations

of frequent material balance uncertainties for future large commercial

plutonium facilities were performed as part of the NRC Special Safeguards

Studies (26) The theoretical calculations indicated that considerable ●

reduction in material balance uncertainty could be achieved for both

fuel fabrication plants and reprocessing plants through taking frequent

inventories. However, these material balances are based on inventories

requiring the shut-down and clean-out of the process and therefore result

in considerable lost production. In the fabrication plant, inventories

conducted in a dynamic sequential manner(27) around batches of material

would fit naturally in with normal operation. In the reprocessing

plant approximately two weeks would be lost per inventory plus
VIII - 45

one or two weeks during which the process would not operate at

peak efficiency due to shut-down and start-up. Dynamic inventory

techniques for reprocessing plants based on introduction of

a tracer isotope to separate the continuous stream into batches

of material have been studied theoretically at Argonne National

Laboratory. (28) This technique would not require shut-down

of the process and could be used for material balances around

batches of material that would naturally exist in a reprocessing

facility. However, there has been no demonstration of such

dynamic inventories of liquid processes.

Conclusions on improving the Accuracy Of Accounting

Improvements in material balance accounting can be

achieved by improving the accuracy of laboratory analytical

techniques and NDA of equipment residue (assuming waste and

scrap generation are minimized). Further improvement will

result from increased material balance frequency. However, frequent

material balances could have an unacceptably severe impact on plant operation

and plant economics. Computer based accounting systems that could process

data in real-time for these frequent material balances have been studied. (29)

The necessary

frequency can only

detection has been

improvements in measurement accuracy and material balance

be determined once an absolute threshold for diversion

established. NRC postulates that an accounting system having

a LEMUF of 2 kg plutonium could give assurance that material

for even a single weapon had not been diverted. The Appendix

suggests that the risk of removing more than a kilogram at this

LEMUF is significant. improved nuclear materials accounting

systems could be configured to detect approximately two kilogram

thefts of plutonium for large mixed oxide fuel fabrication

plants. Equally effective accounting in large reprocessing
VIII - 46

plants such as the still unlicensed AGNS plant at Barnwell, S.C.

appear infeasible, unless real-time material control can be achieved.

Material accountancy thus cannot be relied upon, now or in the

future, as the sole safeguards measure, either in national or international safeguards. For IAEA safeguards, containment and surveillance

must come to play more than a supplementary role (see Volume I,

Chapter VIII, especially pages 206-207 and 209-211); for U.S. domestic

safeguards, physical security and material control must continue to

play vital roles.
VIII -47

4.4 REAL-TIME MATERIAL CONTROL

RETIMAC

In the preceding section on improved

accounting, material balances which might

material balance

be performed monthly,

biweekly or even weekly were discussed. These might be performed using on-line computers to acquire, process and store

much of the measured data on material quantities. Real-time

material control would include performing material balances

even more rapidly (daily, end of shift, or nearly instantaneously) ,

and it would involve even more extensive use of on-line computers.

In addition, real-time material control offers the possibility of

generating a variety of diversion indicators which are derived,

not from material balances, but rather from data on the material

processes.

To obtain material balances more rapidly, it is necessary

to maintain running accounts of material transfers and to perform rapid inventories of materials in process* and in storage.

These materials include the mainstream feed and product materials

as well as the sidestreams of clean scrap, dirty scrap, solid

waste, liquid waste and analytical sample materials. The

accuracy of more timely determinations of material transfers and

inventories varies considerably depending on the method and on

the material. There are two general methods for obtaining such

determinations: direct on-line assay measurements and the use

of indirect on-line measurements together with process models

to estimate material quantities.

The most general concept of real-time material control has

evolved in a series of four papers (30) by T. E. Shea of NRC.

Shea’s concept, which in his first three papers is called

RETIMAC (REal-TIme MAterial Control) has evolved to consist

of the following four elements:

,

Here in-process materials refer to all materials not in storage

and include residual holdup or heels, and materials in transit

to, from and between processes.
VIII -48

● Material Isolation - use of barriers to limit

operator contact with material to only non-routine

operations which would be performed under intensified

surveillance.

● Inventory Control - use of process control for

unit processes to detect anomolous operations which may

indicate diversions; use of storage control for vaults

and buffer storages to restrict access to stored materials;

and use of internal transfer control to protect materials

being transferred between unit processes as well as into

and out of storage.

● Inventory Characterization - use of on-line instrumentation to assay material flow streams into and out of

unit processes; use of on-line instrumentation to monitor

process parameters together with appropriate process models

to estimate in-process inventories; and use of on-line

instrumentation to perform in situ assay of residual

holdup in process equipment after runout or cleanout.

● Inventory Containment Analysis - use of an appropriate hierarchy of computers and detailed models to perform

real-time analysis of all data acquired to detect diversions

as promptly and as credibly as possible.

As part of the NRC’s Special Safeguards Study, Lawrence

.Livermore Laboratory(31) and Science Applications, Inc.(32)

examined how the RETIMAC concept might be implemented in a

future high-throughput mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant like

the one planned by Westinghouse for construction near Anderson,

South Carolina. Based on these two studies, researchers concluded(30) that "timely, localized detection systems can be

designed to substantially improve the detection sensitivity for

covert theft over the systems currently required in U.S. licensed
VIII - 49

processing facilities. Further, this capability can be costeffective and provide many corollary benefits to other plant

operational systems.”

Science Applications, Inc. later performed a similar, but

less extensive, study for a high-throughput spent-fuel reprocessing plant similar to the one being built by Allied-General

Nuclear Services near Barnwell, South Carolina. The results (33,34)

of this study showed that the diversion detection sensitivity

associated with rapid material accounting is less for the

reprocessing plant than for the fabrication plant.

One of the key components of real-time material control as

envisioned for RETIMAC is the use of process models together with

certain limited measurements to estimate quantities of interest,

such as in-process inventories. Related modeling work has been

(35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42) Fur- reported in a number of recent papers .

ther development of the concepts is presently underway at

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

Another real-time material control concept, called DYMAC

(for DYnamic MAterials Control), is being developed and imple-

(43) (LASL) . DYMAC mented at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

is a system of in-plant nondestructive assay (NDA) instrumentation

coupled with automated data processing equipment to provide

essentially real-time accounting and material control on a

unit process basis. DYMAC consists of four subsystems.

● NDA Instrumentation - on-line NDA instrumentation

to assay a variety of materials, with design emphasis on

automation to minimize operator action, built-in calibration capability, improved precision and accuracy,

operational compatibility, reliability and maintainability.
VIII - 50

● Data Acquisition - NDA instrumentation coupled

directly or through minicomputers or microprocessors to

a central computer; operator inputs to the central

computer using a variety of terminals ranging from a few

control buttons to a fully interactive video display with

hard copy capability.

● Data Base Management - central computer hardware

and software to organize incoming data into a file structure

for retrieval in an efficient manner.

● Real-Tine Accountability - using the data base,

performs unit process accounting for all material in plant

by calculating current inventories for each area, MUF and

LEMUF by unit process area and by material batch, and

control limits; monitors for deviations outside control

limits and for incomplete internal material transfers;

maintains the standards and measurement control program;

and generates printed reports.

DYMAC is being implemented at LASL in three phases. In

phase 1, the present LASL plutonium facility at the

DP site is being used as a test bed for component development

and operator training. This work includes evaluation of online NDA instrument performance, upgrading of off-line NDA

instruments and operation of a prototype four-terminal accountability system for one unit process accounting area. Phase 11

is the design and installation of a DYMAC system for the new

plutonium processing facility (TA-55) which is presently under

construction at LASL. This system, designated DYMAC/TA-55,

tentatively consists of 15 unit process accounting areas with

20 to 30 terminals, 25 weighing devices and 20 to 30 NDA

instruments. Installation of DYMAC/TA-55 is scheduled for June

1978. Phase 111 is a program to evaluate the performance of
VIII - 51

DYMAC/TA- 55. Operation of DYMAC/TA-55 in the new LASL

plutonium processing facility is intended to demonstrate:

●

●

●

●

●

In

reliability and operational feasibility of online NDA instrumentation in a production environment,

accurate and efficient data collection,

common data base management,

timely sensitivity to missing nuclear material, and

capability for production control, quality assurance,

and financial management.

addition to the above work, the concept of real-time

material control has been examined (44) in some detail by

J. E. Lovett of IAEA. More recently, Lovett has discussed

the international safeguards aspects of real-time material

control.

In summary, considerable development

tion is required before the effectiveness

control can be fully assessed.

work and in-plant demonstra-

(45)

of real-time material
VIII - 52

4.5 HARDENED FACILITIES

Hardening the physical protection

facilities against outsider attacks can

system of nuclear

be accomplished by

making three general types of improvements.

● Use of more and/or better protective

● Better integration of the protective

mechanisms,

mechanisms,

The

● Upgrading quality assurance for the protective

mechanisms and the integrated system.

protective mechanisms referred to are the security force,

security procedures, and security hardware and software. In

addition, certain aspects of facility design such as the physical layout, the construction of walls, doors and roofs, the

extent to which the facility is underground, and some facility

procedures like emergency plans can have direct impact on

the overall effectiveness of the physical protection system

against outsider attack. The design and evaluation of such

systems is addressed in a later section. Here, some of the

recent developments in improved protective mechanisms for

physical protection are summarized. Much of the information presented here is from four recent review papers by

O.E. Jones (50,51) of Sandia Laboratories, H.J.C. Kouts (52)

(53) of Westinghouse. of NRC*, and J.J. Bastin and E.A. Conrads

Development of advanced security devices and systems is

sponsored by a number of federal agencies such as ERDA, Air Force,

Army, Navy, Defense Nuclear Agency and Federal Aviation Administration. Probably the largest program with direct applicability

*

Now at Brookhaven National Laboratory.
VIII - 53

to nuclear safeguards is at Sandia Laboratories under the

primary sponsorship of ERDA. Some of this work was documented

(54 ,55, 56)

recently for NRC’s Special Safeguards Study.

Many of the protective mechanisms which have been under

study are listed below by functional category.

●

●

Portal Control (verification of personnel identity):

devices based on unique human characteristics,

including fingerprints, handwriting and voice prints–

photograph retrieval from facility storage for comparison with appearance.

Portal Control (search for SNM and explosives):

detectors for SNM--search-dogs or other animals,

and devices which examine individual absorption lines

in the ultraviolet region for explosives search.

Intrusion Alarms: CCTV with automatic motion detection alarm -- buried line sensors (magnetic, seismic,

and pressure) -- free-standing sensors (infrared,

microwave and radar) -- fence-mounted sensors

(vibration and tilt) -- sensors in coincidence to

reduce false alarm rate -- reduced vulnerability

to tampering.

Surveillance and Assessment: CCTV with alarm-actuated

video tape recorder -- low-light level CCTV -- movingtarget radar.

Passive Barriers: explosion resistant doors --

vehicle barriers -- alarm-actuated closing and locking

of doors.

Active Barriers: dispersal of foam,smoke, tear gas

or other such agents to delay attackers.

Guards: motivation -- training -- deployment plans.

Communication and Control Center: protected and

supervised data lines -- message authentication --

hardened area -- computerized preprogrammed response

to alarms, with manual override.
VIII - 54

In addition to the above items, several systems, such as an

advanced item control system for a SNM storage vault (51) and

an integrated portal control system, (57) have been developed.

Also recent studies were performed which focused on special

topics, such as security forces (58) and psychological

deterrents. (59)
VIII - 55

4.6 TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS

Most of the SSNM transported today (excluding shipments

of nuclear weapons) involves government-owned materials moving

between contractor/licensee plants. The majority of these

shipments had been carried out by commercial transportation

companies* operating under Interstate Commerce Commission

authority and in accordance with the transportation requirements specified in 1OCFR73(6O). The present traffic level is

of the order of hundreds of shipments per year. As the nuclear

industry matures, this picture may change in the following

ways:

● An order of magnitude increase in the traffic

level could occur by the year 2000. (61)

● A significant fraction of the future traffic level

could involve commercially owned SSNM for nuclear

power applications.

In preparation for this possible expansion in transportation activity involving commercially owned SSNM, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission has supported efforts to

assess the effectiveness of existing and future transportation

safeguards. In addition, ERDA has an active development

program underway at Sandia and other laboratories to develop

new safeguards technologies for transportation links. NRC

and ERDA are coordinating their research in this area; they

are also monitoring efforts by agencies within the Department

of Defense that are working on related problems. (62)

Efforts to improve the effectiveness of transportation

safeguards include the following:(61,62,63)

*A federally owned and operated transportation system for government-owned materials is scheduled to go into full operation by

late 1976.
VIII - 56

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Immobilization system to bring cargo vehicles to

a controlled stop and prevent further vehicle

movement.

Cargo access denial measures to impede penetration

of the vehicle and the possible use of devices

which would affect an intruder’s senses.

Driver protection during attack.

Effective communications between vehicle and control center during shipment.

Use denial techniques to despoil SNM and convert

it to a form which requires additional processing

for use as an explosive.

Develop evaluation methods to determine the nature

and extent of the resources and tactics required

to successfully defend against an attack on a

shipment.

Research on transportation safeguards has already produced results, some of which are described in the technical

literature. Much of it concerns hardened cargo vehicle

design and improved communications. Portions of the work are

classified. Some of the new technology will be introduced

into the ERDA Safe-Secure Transportation System for tests under

actual operating conditions. (51,64)

An obvious means of reducing the risk of diversion of

SSNM during shipment is to minimize or eliminate transportation of SSNM by collocation plants. This concept has been

studied by NRC. The results are published in the “Nuclear Energy

Center Site Survey--1975 ."(65)

NRC’s conclusions relating to transportation are summarized

in the following statement:

“Collocation, by eliminating some transportation

links or shortening others, can thus have beneficial

effects on safeguards. This is not to say, however,

that collocation is necessary in order to achieve an

adequate level of security. The analysis performed

in the Special Safeguards Study shows that transportation of SSNM can be made secure with bearable costs." (65)
VIII - 57

The following is taken directly from Reference 65:

1. “Collocation’s principal consequence for safeguards

is that it minimizes transportation. The question

of whether collocation is desirable from the safeguards point of view initially becomes one of comparing the effectiveness and costs of fixed-site

and in-transit safeguards.”

2.

3.

4.

“Fixed sites have the advantage of being able to

utilize a sequence of barriers and detection

systems. Also, a fixed site typically can depend

on a local response force of known size and capability. A major disadvantage of fixed sites is

that some personnel must be authorized to have

access to both SSNM and vital areas. This compounds the security problem with respect to both

the disaffected insider and the outside attacker

(who may have inside cooperation) . The need to

provide emergency exits to insure the safety of

personnel again complicates security and adds to..

the cost of providing barrier integrity adequate

against an outside attack.”

“The primary advantage of an in-transit security

system is that the adversary may not know where

the shipment will be at any given time, Also, an

in-transit system does not suffer from any requirement for personnel access to SSNM. The in-transit

security system has the disadvantages that there

are fewer opportunities for using multiple barriers

or adversary detection systems and that the availability and characteristics of an immediate response

force are less well defined. It should be noted,

however, that technologies are being developed

which will allow transporter systems to impose

reasonable delay times on adversary force by

applying sophisticated barrier and- delay techniques

to either or both the transporter and the SSNM container. The in-transit system has somewhat greater

exposure to sabotage attempts.”

“The element of a security system which offers the

greatest degree of flexibility is the guard, or,

in an in-transit “system, the escort force. The size

and structure of this force can be altered to meet

the needs of the security systems. The in-transit
VIII -58

security force can be structured to react to a

threat in either of two ways: by calling for

assistance and delaying the adversary forces until

assistance arrives, or by attempting by itself to

defeat the adversary. In the first case, the amount

of delay required from the escorts must be equal

to’ or greater than the time required for a response

force to arrive. If there is no planned response

force, as in the latter case, then the escort force

must be strengthened so it can win an engagement

with the adversary group.”

5. "It is concluded that collocation might have a

beneficial effect on safeguards effectiveness;

however, transportation safeguards considerations

do not preclude dispersed siting.”

6. “The cost of safeguards in SSNM transportation would

be decreased by collocations.”

“A model for the year 1990 which compares collocated

and dispersed facilities having total capacities

corresponding to 342 MWe and 80% plutonium recycle

projects a total (country-wide) annual cost saving

from collocation of $1.7 million (in 1975 dollars).

(Cf. total annual fuel cycle facility operating

costs of $440 million.)”

7. “With respect to safeguards for the fixed facilities,

no significant cost differences between dispersed

and

The basis of

collocated models are estimated to exist.”

the NRC’s conclusions is not regarded as persuasive

by many observers. These

the costs and benefits of

been done.

observers hold that a systematic study of

collocating fuel cycle facilities has not yet
VIII - 59

4.7 REDUCING THE “ATTRACTIVENESS” OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THE FUEL CYCLE

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, one of the more alluring

ideas to safeguard nuclear material has been to denature it. Conceptually, the ideal denaturing agent renders the fissile material

useless for nuclear weapons without significantly impairing its

performance as a reactor fuel. This is practically achievable with

uranium by keeping the U-235 (or U-233) concentration sufficiently

low in mixtures with U-238. Weapons grade uranium can then only be

attained by isotopic enrichment -- a non-trivial undertaking.

An analogous situation does not exist for the other possible

weapon material constituent, plutonium-239. There are minor fraction

concentrations of other isotopes of plutonium (Pu-240, Pu-242)

naturally occuring in reactor produced plutonium. These isotopes

do not however, prevent the use of the plutonium as a nuclear explosive.

(See Volume 1, Chapter VI. )

plutonium (as well as highly enriched uranium) can, however, be made less attractive radioactively and/or chemically

(66 ,67, 68) . The two generic possibilities are often termed:

1. Spiking - the plutonium bearing material is made

more radioactive, possibly requiring remote

handling and massive shielding.*

2. Blending - the plutonium concentration is lowered

by mixing with uranium.

*233U typically has a natural spike with the inclusion o

parts per million quantities of the highly radioactive 232U

and daughter products.
VIII - 60

Either one of these possibilities are primarily deterrants

against a subnational threat. A national entity could

easily provide the necessary remote handling,

shielding, and chemical separation that might be required.

There are a number of possible methods of making plutonium bearing material radioactively lethal or at least very

dangerous. Four spiking techniques are listed in Table 4.3

along with a listing of some specific advantages and disadvantages for each.

Spiking has some additional general assets along

at least three major liabilities. The general assets

may be negated by countermeasures) include:

with

(which

●

The

1.

2.

3.

4.

Facilitates detection of Pu in

monitors, etc.)

Assists in recovery operations

liabilities are:

plant

if Pu

(by portal

is stolen

The

the

additional costs and potential accident hazards for

required normal handling of spiked nuclear material.

The legal aspects associated

potentially lethal substance

property.

The violation of the “as low

radiation safety philosophy.

with adding a

to protect

as practical”

The increased risk associated with possible sabotage

particularly for very high spiking levels.

Although definitive studies have not been performed to

accurately pinpoint how much all the additional costs would

be for each of the spiking techniques listed in Table 4.3

it is clear that in some cases they may be extensive, particularly if remote maintenance is required. Reference 68 concluded
VIII - 61

td

u-l

o

.

u

u o

u

u

o

G

u

-4

.

N

.

m
VIII - 62

that a major cost increase (fabricating spiked fuel) might

amount to as much as approximately 2% of the power cost for

LWRs and nearly 4% of power costs for HTGRs. The AIF study (66)

concluded that the spiking liabilities outweighed the possible

safeguards gains.

Spiking does not appear to be cost-effective compared to massive

containment and stringent physical security.

Blending alternatives to reduce material attractiveness

have received more industrial support than the spiking option (66 , 69).

Basically, the blending of uranium with plutonium accomplishes

what eventually occurs within every fuel fabrication plant.

The technique for blending, i.e. , wet blending, dry blending,

and the degree of blending, are all possible variables. The

net safeguard result is that a larger total quantity of material

would have to be diverted to obtain a strategic quantity of

plutonium. To utilize the strategic quantity of plutonium in

a nuclear explosive would require a chemical separation of the

plutonium from the uranium. This may be a substantial barrier

for a subnational group. For a national entity with available

resources, blended material might cause some delay in the construction of a weapon, but would not constitute a serious

barrier.

Various degrees of blending, all accomplished at a

reprocessing plant, have received consideration.

1. Dilute Blend

All light water reactor recycle fuel would contain

from O.2 to 0.6% plutonium: This could be accomplished by

never separating the plutonium and uranium in the

reprocessed spent fuel. An inherent advantage of this

proposal is the most effective utilization of the plutonium. On the other hand, significant cost and safety

liabilities accrue at the fuel fabrication plant,

particularly if the plant were originally built to handle

only uranium.
VIII - 63

2. Custom Blend

In this case the blend contains from 2 to 5% plutonium that could in principle be directly utilized by

the recycle fuel fabrication in the manufacture of the

recycle fuel. A problem here is that the blended

material would have to meet the individual fuel manufacturers specifications and quality assurance tests.

This is not a practical option if custom blends have to

be

3.

as

be

prepared for a number of recycle fuel manufacturers.

Master Blend

Here the blend might vary from 30% down to possibly

low as 7%(69) plutonium. The master blend would then

shipped to the fuel fabricator and further diluted

and processed as the fabricator requires to suit his

manufacturing process. A 20% to 30% master blend concept

has received the endorsement of the AIF study group (66)

as providing “the best balance between risk reduction and

economics in these steps in the fuel cycle.”
VIII - 64

4.8 REDUCING THE RISK OF NATIONAL DIVERSION--MULTINATIONAL

FUEL CENTERS

The concept of regional fuel cycle centers (RFCC) has been

developed and advocated in the context of several world issues:

how to provide the institutional structure for smaller nations

to obtain the presumed benefits of fuel recycling, how to assure

the security of sensitive nuclear material, and how to efficiently dispose of nuclear waste. The most recent and thorough

review of the RFCC concept is being made by the IAEA. (70) Other literature dedicated to this subject has typically been directed to a policy

level rather than enumerating the practical aspects of initiating

a program. It is felt that the final IAEA report*will serve as the

backbone of operational RFCC’s, should they be implemented, largely

because it relies on experience gained in previous international ventures

such as EUROCHEMIC, URENCO and EURODIF for practical understanding,

The study says the RFCC concept envisages countries joining together for the purpose of constructing and operating

facilities which are required for the following activities:

●

●

●

●

●

Transport of spent fuel from reactor sites to the

RFCC

Storage of spent fuel

Reprocessing of spent fuel

Storage of resulting waste products and re-usable

fissionable material

Treatment of waste

Conversion and fabrication of fissionable materials

into new fuel elements

Transport of new elements to reactor operators

Long-term waste management.

The RFCC concept is not dependent on regional groupings in a

narrow geographical sense. If the fuel enters or leaves the

* Ref.: ( Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers, Vol. 1, Sumnary 1977 Report

of the IAEA Study Project, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna,

1977, sT1/PuB/445)
VIII - 65

RFCC in a secure form, transport distance per se should not

dictate service only to contiguous or nearby countries, Nor

is the concept necessarily dependent on establishment of entirely new

facilities; centers like Windscale (U.K.), La Hague (France)

and Barnwell NFP (U.S.A.) could serve as the core of RFCC’s.

The processes listed above may be provided at an RFCC as demand arises.

The RFCC concept is one of concentrating facilities and

does not imply the introduction of new processes. Typical

basic criteria of an RFCC are shown in Table 4.4 and illustrated in Figure 4.1. The criteria are essentially comparable,

from the standpoint of safeguards and security of the physical

processes involved, to any other fuel cycle center. Therefore,

implementation of RFCC’s depends primarily on international

acceptance of the need for reprocessing, international cooperation given a decision to reprocess, and the economies (and disadvantages) of scale.

The RFCC Study has identified these main topics for

international discussions:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Legal status and structures

Governmental/non-governmental roles

Internal administrative structure

Commercial/service roles

Industrial arrangements

Technology (use, control, etc.)

Financial (basic policy considerations)

Privileges and guarantees

Membership, duration, etc.

International agreements

Assuming that institutional agreements can be successfully

arrived at, there is good reason to expect RFCC’s will reduce

the risk of national misuse of fuel cycle centers. Clearly,

the RFCC must work well enough for all concerned parties so that

no recourse to national facilities is deemed necessary. Several

other points for U.S. consideration are raised in this connection:
VIII - 66

Table 4.4. Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center

Basic Criteria--Phase 1 Study

CONSIDERATION SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS

10

2.

3.

Time Period

Capacity of Reprocessing

Plants

Forecast of reactor capacity

based on mixed oxide fuel

Size of reactors

No. of reactors

4. Types of Reactors

5. Fuel cycle Characteristics

6. No. of Reprocessing Plants

7. Fuel Fabrication:

U02 fuel

- Mixed Oxide Fuel

Manufacturing capacity

8. Fuel requirements:

- Uranium

- Enrichment plant

1985 to 2000

750 to 3000 Tonnes/yr

200 MWe to 1200 MWe

200 MWe to 1200 MWe

Determined by reprocessing

plant capacity, and reactor

size

LWR--8O to 100% of total

installed capacity

HWR--O to 20% of total

installed capacity

Pu recycle to be considered.

Also deferred fuel reprocessing.

1 to 3 per region initially

outside of center as well as

at the center

only at center

Determined by the installed

electrical generating capacity.

Annual requirement

Integrated total requirement

Capacity based on:

Pu recycle

Deferred reprocessing
VIII - 67

Table 4.4. Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center

Basic Criteria--Phase 1 Study (Contd.)

CONSIDERATION

9. Spent Fuel Storage

- At reactor site

- At the center

10. Pu Storage

11. Radioactive waste management

- From reprocessing plant

- From fuel refabrication

plant

- From power reactors

12. Waste storage or disposal

13. Transport

- For spent fuel

- For radioactive waste

and H.L.

14. Discount rate

SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS

1 to 10 years

1 to 10 years

Adequate to satisfy optimal

fuel reprocessing plant

capacity. Alternately, when

breeder requirement for Pu

demands reprocessing of spent

fuel, say 1995 (i. e. , 10

years storage)

Up to 1995 if no Pu

occurs. Thereafter

Pu storage capacity

sary because of its

breeders.

recycle

additional

not necesuse in

Waste solidification at center

Waste solidification at center

Processing at reactor site,

hence not to be considered.

Retrievable storage at center

or elsewhere after solidification

for long term

For short term up to 10 years,

most economical method

Ultimate disposal at center

or at remote location

In casks according to regulations recommended by IAEA.

By road, rail and sea.

According to regulations

recommended by IAEA

By road, rail and sea.

10%
VIII - 68

Fuel Cycle Concept

~

c,

SFS

I N, I

I

I

1

1 I I -

++

Transport

I

Retrievable

Storage I

T

T

Uranium

supply

Figure 4.1
VIII - 69

●

●

Sponsors should proceed on the premise that the

nature of the RFCC operations will require a substantial degree of governmental involvement.

Definite matters of government discretion are

(a) the nature of services available to nonpartners, (b) the extent to which partners shall

fund an RFCC and (c) the disposal of radioactive

waste.

Who shall construct and maintain the plant(s)?

Are standardized components an issue?

Suppliers and/or partners may wish to have

technical information remain proprietary or

classified.

Thus, the potential benefits of the RFCC concept are that

it is a rational use of scarce (and sometimes insufficient)

technological and financial resources, that collocation and

multi-party interest in the plant could provide a new dimension of safeguards and physical protection of materials wit-h

the interest of all partner States in mind, and that the RFCC

provides an avenue for effective and safe management of radioactive waste.

There remains much work to be done before these benefits can

be weighed against the counterbalancing concerns. A partial list

of the latter would include the procedures for management and

control among a group of users with common but not identical

interests, the acceptability of the waste and effluent liabilities by potential host countries, and (implicit in the whole

concept), the need to formulate the institutions in such a way

that it would be apparent to the partners that future fuel

supplies are assured.
VIII - 70

4.9 THE COSTS OF SAFEGUARDS

The costs of safeguards have

organizations during the past two

The primary breakdown is in: (a)

been estimated by several

years (Refs. (71, 72, 51).

the incremental capital costs

of industrial facilities above those for the case where plants

are built to normal unsafeguarded standards, and (b) the additional operating costs (e.g., guards) associated with safeguards implementation.

As a general thesis, since

is only a small fraction of the

and since safeguards should not

the cost of the primary fuel

cost of delivered electricity

increase fuel costs by more

than a fraction, we should expect that safeguards will increase

the overall cost of electricity by only a small margin. The three

studies referenced above all indicate that given a mature

nuclear industry, the fractional increase in the cost of

delivered electricity due to safeguards is of the order of 1%.

However, the absolute annual cost of safeguards is estimated

in the range of hundreds of millions to more than a billion

dollars. Furthermore, there is a considerable spread in the

estimates of the cost of safeguards given by the three

referenced sources. As an example of physical protection costs

alone, we reproduce results from Ref. 51 in Table 4.5.

These results were developed by Sandia Laboratories for

NRC: a mathematical interpolation (based on assuming the

industry works at 60% load factor] leads to the conclusion that

in 1990 a little over $1 billion out of a $70 billion electrical

utility income could be spent on safeguards.

The report of Ref. 71 by E.R. Johnson Associates

develops a somewhat lower figure for costs. Given a 500 GWe

nuclear power component (at that time projected for the early

1990’s, according to Table 4.5.1)* they estimate an annual safeguards

*present projections are lower. See Volume I, Chapter X.
VIII - 71

Table

Year

1980

1985

1990

2000

4.5. Projected Costs* of Physical Protection Safeguards

for U.S. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Utilizing 80% Pu

Recycle

*Includes all amortized capital, personnel, and Maintenance costs, and

assumes a base electricity cost of 13 mils/kwh.

tBased on Case A projections of Nuclear Power for Growth 1974-2000.

WASH-1139(74), USERDA, Office of Planning and Analysis, February

1974. Present projections are considerably lower. See Volume I

Chapter X.

~ Compares to 1975 local law enforcement agency total of 505,011.

~ Transportation cost represent an upper bound due to inclusion of

HTGR HEU shipments.
VIII - 72

cost of $580 million for a plutonium recycle LWR system

or an approximately 1% increment on the total cost of all

electricity in this time-frame. The same report estimates

that in the absence of plutonium recycle, annual costs would

be 25% less at $430 million.

Thus, there is no evidence that economic impact of

safeguards on the consumer will be substantial. However,

the impact on selected portions of the nuclear industry,

such as reprocessing plants and recycle fuel fabrication

plants, may reconsiderable. The accuracy of an estimate of

this impact is fraught with uncertainties such as the

specific process employed and the specific safeguards

techniques deployed in protecting the SSNM.

68
VIII - 73

4.10 DESIGN AND EVALUATION

Safeguards system designs in the U.S. are presently

developed to meet the NRC regulations that are published in

Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. The

implementation of these regulations for specific facilities

is assisted by the use of U.S. NRC Regulatory Guides. The

licensee or applicant submits a plan for compliance with the

regulations which is then evaluated by the NRC staff. Except

in those cases in which the applicant or licensee proposes an

alternative method, the NRC staff utilizes the methods described

in the guides in evaluating an applicant’s or licensee’s capability

for and performance in complying with specified portions of the

Commission’s regulations. The Regulatory Guides are not, however, substitutes for regulations and a literal compliance with

them is not required. Judgment by the NRC staff is

the basis for resolving detailed licensing issues.

The future nuclear regulatory base in the U.S. is expected

to be oriented toward a performance objective approach rather

than a set of procedural requirements (4,74)

● Consequently,

a licensee will be judged not on the narrow basis of strict

compliance with written regulations but on a demonstrable

ability to control materials and protect his facility. This

new approach to Safeguards of “performance requirements plus

demonstrable capabilities equals adequacy” has received the

support of industry . Regulation by performance objectives

allows a facility operator the freedom of specifying the

methods and approaches that will be applied to his possibly

unique situation. On the other hand, the licensee must prove

that his material is safeguarded and not just behind an 8 ft.
VIII - 74

high fence with three strands of barbed wire, etc. Thus, onsite performance as rated by analysis, operational (black hat)

evaluations, and on-site review will most likely be the key to

(4) operating licenses . The performance objectives of (1) preventing with high confidence a civil disaster; (2) providing

substantial protection against serious civil damage; and (3)

providing timely and accurate information on the status of

nuclear material and facilities must be shown to have been

achieved in the operational sense.

Design of Integrated Systems

Recent studies on up-graded material accounting in model

high-throughput fuel-cycle facilities (i.e. , reprocessing

plant and mixed-oxide fuel fabrications plants) have shown that

material accounting alone is not likely to meet all safeguards

(26) performance objectives at all areas of the model plants . In

a similar vein, a fortress concept of physical protection is

not totally adequate since the amounts and locations of the

material inside the facility would not be known. Thus fuel

cycle facilities handling a high throughput of strategic

special nuclear material will most likely require an integrated

safeguards system design to meet performance objectives. The

term “integrated” implies that overlaps, gaps, and interfaces

between customary subdivisions of safeguards control and

responsibility (accounting, access control, containment,

physical protection, etc.) would be taken into account. Consequently, an effective prevention, deterrence, or detection of

the total spectrum of threats involving the malevolent use of

nuclear materials employs all aspects of safeguards systems.

A design concept for an integrated safeguards system can

be summarized by the following procedures: identify all the

perceived threats leading to theft and sabotage; identify the
VIII - 75

necessary protective measures to counter these threats in

accordance with system performance criteria; organize these

protective measures into major subsystems for effective

(75) management and operation . Information and data resources

required to accomplish the design include system performance

criteria, available protective measures and plant design

features. The perceived threat, however, is the major driving

force in developing an integrated safeguards systems design.

The threat, since it is central to determine the adequacy

of safeguards, has received considerable attention at NRC ’76)

.

No simple, fixed, single answer appears to be appropriate for

the question “What is the Threat?” A response that changes

with time and accommodates the inherent uncertainty associated

with the threat appears to be the only defendable response for

the definition of this complex multi-dimensional parameter.

The safeguards system design must behave well in the range of

this uncertainty and not degrade catastrophically

against larger and larger threats.

A

wholly

Evaluation

necessary attribute of a regulatory operation based

or partly on performance objectives is a capability of

consistently evaluating a safeguards system effectiveness. A

recent ERDA report(77) has developed a general framework for

evaluating safeguard system effectiveness in terms of the

*

societal risk. There are problems in quantifying all aspects

of the societal risk, Particularly in determining the expected

frequency of attempts (

78) of deliberate destructive acts on

nuclear facilities, however, the general structure and definition of terms has placed a clearer perspective and delineation

of the over-all safeguards problem. The thrust of the developing

evaluation methods is to place less reliance on an individual

expert review to a more systematic/engineering approach.

*

Societal risk is a concept that evolves from a generalization of

reliability theory which has frequently been used in nuclear power

safety studies. Societal risk describes the risk in terms of the

frequency of attempts, times the probability of events occurring,

times the consequences if they do occur.
VIII - 76

The development of safeguards effectiveness methodology (79)

has logically separated into two rather distinct phases:

2. Quantification techniques to evaluate the

probability of success of the identified adversary action sequences(79,80,82)

.

A successful development of these methodologies will aid

the safeguards system designer in developing a truly effective

safeguards system, will assist the facility operator in the

conduct of trade-off studies such as

● costs versus security level

● guards versus hardware

● security versus operating flexibility

and would assist the regulatory agency in the evaluation of

the adequacy of a proposed safeguards system.

NRC is supporting several research programs that

“involves, mainly, the development of the methods, models and

data necessary for assessing the effectiveness of existing and

potential systems of safeguards.” “The research to develop

these methods of evaluating effectiveness involves definitions

of objectives and of the related performance parameters --

for the safeguards system as a whole and for the various sub-

(52)

systems of which it is comprised."

72
4.11 IAEA SAFEGUARDS RESEARCH

Until very recently, the Department of Safeguards and Inspections

(DSI) of the IAEA consisted of an Operations Division and a Division

of Development at which time a Division of Information Treatment was

formed. The present Division of Development has a staff of approximately

twenty-five people divided into the following three sections: System

Studies; Methods and Techniques; Field Operations. In addition to

staff salaries, the Division’s actual 1975 obligations included approximately $144,000 in scientific and technical contracts, a relatively

modest level of support that had remained almost constant for a number

of years. Approximately $400,000 was committed for the purchase of

scientific supplies and equipment, a significant portion of these funds

being used in commissioning the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory at

Sibersdorf, near Vienna.

For 1976 the adjusted budget for the Division of Development

includes for scientific and technical contracts, $490,000 and for scientific supplies and equipment, $510,000. For 1977 the estimated budget

for these items are $486,000 and $578,000 respectively. The substantial

increase in funds available for contract research in safeguards reflects

an effort to remedy both the low level of expenditures available in the

past and an effort to place the IAEA in a stronger position in the

critical years ahead.

Since its founding in 1957, the IAEA has benefited from technical

experts from states with active nuclear power or research programs. These

experts have assisted both the operations and development staff of

DSI through meetings and advisory groups in the formulation of its own

safeguards procedures and research projects and in the identification

of new problems and areas for safeguards research and development. At
VIII - 78

these Technical Working Group and committee meetings the Agency has

addressed the procedures, instruments and techniques that it might

use in safeguarding reactors, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication

plants and enrichment plants. In December of 1975, the first meeting

of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI)

was held. The group was formed to provide IAEA with technical advice

on safeguards and is composed of one senior scientist from the UK,

FRG, Canada, India, Japan, the USSR, and the U.S.

In an effort to implement the preambulatory paragraph of the NPT,

“Expressing their support for research, development and

to further the application of the IAEA Safeguards System

of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic

other efforts

● . by use

points”, the

United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, undertook safeguards research programs related to international safeguards.

In the United States, the AEC/ERDA made available the technical spinoff from its domestic safeguards research and development program

and provided the Agency with technical expertise. In support of the

IAEA, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency initiated in 1967

a safeguards research program that rose to an average funding level

of approximately $500,000 per year. Initially, the funding for

the German safeguards program was substantial but unfortunately it was

severely reduced in 1971, apparently in response to criticism from

German industry. Finally, in 1975 Canada undertook a major effort

with the IAEA to improve the safeguards Instrumentation for the onpower refueled CANDU reactor.

With the growing public awareness of the dangers of nuclear

weapons proliferation, Congressional support for improvements in

IAEA safeguards has rapidly increased. This very substantial additional

U.S. financial support as Gifts-in-Kind is now coordinated in the
VIII - 79

International Safeguards Project Office, Brookhaven National Laboratory.

The Program Plan for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards reflects

many of the urgent needs of the Agency and the direction which safeguards research will take in the next five years. The major task areas

outlined in the January 26, 1977, draft report include:

1. Measurement technology

2. Training

3. System Studies

4. Information processing

5. Surveillance and containment

6. Support for field operations

For many of these tasks, funding has been approved and a schedule

FY 76 and FY 77.

for FY 78 Congress is considering appropriations

,000 to support and to strengthen IAEA safefor completion of the work set. These programs will commit a total of

over $2,000,000 for both

It is reported that

of approximately $10,000

guards. The need for strong support for the Agency’s international

inspection effort is almost universally acknowledged. However, this

very large increase in funds on top of the large increases in funds

authorized in FY 76 and FY 77 will place an especially heavy burden

on ERDA’s International Safeguards Project Office to make certain that

these new monies will be wisely spent. This level of support will make

possible the use of advanced technologies in attacking such problems

as “timely detection” when timely may mean hours rather than weeks or

months; the use of dynamic methods of inventory and control and the

development of highly portable, versatile, non-destructive assay

instrumentation for the precise measurement of uranium and plutonium

in the field. These and equally difficult problems in the area of sur-
VIII - 80

veillance and containment can be attacked on a scale not considered

possible until now. As has been noted, money is essential, but

outstanding technical competence and the highest levels of organizational skills will be required to ensure that this kind of support

is effective. It is particularly important that the U.S. make every

effort to convince all of the remaining nuclear supplier states that

there is both a need and a role for their contributions.
VIII -81

ANNEX A

HOW LARGE A THEFT IS POSSIBLE WITHIN THE LEMUF? —.

The statistical notion of material accounting implies that

when a theft is perpetrated, there is never an absolute certainty

that it will be detected. The procedures used in the nuclear

industry to generate a material balance involve an accounting

based on measurements where the statistical variations in the

measurement error are frequently comparable with the small discrepancies that it is desired to detect. Thus, when an operator

or inspector “calls” that a material discrepancy exists, he is

saying implicitly only that there is a chance that material has

been removed, and is admitting that there is a finite expectation

of a false alarm.

In order to estimate how large a theft might be perpetrated

without significant chance of detection it is necessary to

review the current formalism for calling accounting discrepancies.

Given perfect procedures and measurements, and assuming no diversion, the material balance:

Inven tory

- removals

s . .

(BI) at beginning of period + Additions (A)

(R) - Inventory (EI) at the end of period

is zero. In practice,

sometimes human) error

departs from zero, and

because there are instrumental (and

in measuring BI, A, R and EI, the balance

this deviation is designated “MUF” or

“material unaccounted for”. Current NRC control procedures

require that a discrepancy be called when the MUF exceeds a

threshold of twice the expected standard deviation (2u) of the

6
VIII - 82

MUF. This threshold is called the LEMUF (limit of error of

the MUF) and is computed using statistical techniques to combine the individual measurement errors to form the total error

in MUF. If measurement errors are distributed normally with

zero mean, the probability of a MUF being greater than this

LEMUF threshold when no material is missing is approximately

5%*. The currently acceptable value of LEMUF (for the domestic

case) or the overall standard deviation (for IAEA) are given in

Tables 2.1 and 3.1 of the main text.

insight into how large a theft relative to the LEMUF is

possible without substantial risk of detection can be obtained

by again making the (not-unreasonable) approximation that the

uncertainty in the MUF is distributed according to a “normal”

error distribution as in the top illustration of Figure Al. In

the absence of thefts** the expected value of MUF will be zero.

Given a theft the expected MUF will be biased, so that the probability of the theft leading to a discrepancy call is increased.

The lower graph of Figure Al shows how this probability increases

with the magnitude of the theft (normalized to the standard deviation or LEMUF) for different decision criteria. Curve A

shows the call probability based on application of the current

NRC criteria (a discrepancy being noted when the MUF exceeds

the LEMUF, which implies a .025 probability of a false call when

no loss exists). Curves B and C show how the chance of detection .

might be increased by accepting higher (.05 and 0.1) probabilities

of falsely calling a discrepancy in the absence of a theft. We

should note that while more sophisticated data processing is in

the exploratory phase, there are also more sophisticated ways

of removing material. Nevertheless it seems that the risk of

detection following the diversion of 0.25 of the LEMUF in a

*

Half of the time the MUF will be positive, indicating a loss

of materials and the other half of the time it will be negative, indicating a gaino Thus, the probability of falsely

calling a loss discrepancy is only one-half of 5% or 2.5%.

**This discussion assumes the absence of unmeasured losses or

gains. r
DISTRIBUTION

MUF FOR NO

DE ‘ING

O T-

+

LOSS

CALLED

HERE

-

-

-

0

0

/

0

-0

1.0 2.0 3.0

THEFT IN STANDARD DEVIATIONS

OF MEASUREMENT T/o

Figure A1. Capability of Accounting System for Detecting Theft

at Various Levels of Confidence
VIII - 84

single accounting period is small enough so that no authority

would have confidence in making an accusation of theft based

on accounting alone. A theft of one half the LEMUF stands a

chance of one in four or five of detection; enough to give

pause to the diverter who plans a long series of thefts, but

probably insufficient to deter the one-time-only thief.

The above discussion has not taken account of efforts to resolve

a discrepancy prior to “calling” a material discrepancy. Because the

“calling” would

operator, there

This raises the

undoubtedly entail added cost and inconvenience to the

would likely be an effort to resolve the discrepancy.

possibility of introducing an unsuspected bias. The

varying degree of scrutiny applied to favorable and unfavorable numbers

can introduce significant bias.
VIII - 85

REFERENCES

1.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Pre limin

Saf eguar

1976.

ary Working P

ds “ . Off ice

aper:

of Te

“iNuclear Prolifera

chnology Assessment

References 2 and 3 have been deleted.

tion and

August 17,

Kenneth R. Chapman “NRC Perspectives on Fuel Cycle ana

Safeguards”. Journal of the institute of Nuclear

Materials and Management (INMM) Vol. V No. 111 Fall 1976.

Victor Gilinski (NRC Commissioner). Testimony Before

the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment.

July 22, 1975.

Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report on the adequacy of domestic and international Safeguards, etc. House Document 94-131 May 6,

1975.

ERDA 1542: “Final Environmental Statement on U.S. Nuclear

Power Export Activities”, April 1976. U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency.

“Assessment of U.S. and 1ntemational Controls for the

Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy”, Report to the Congress

by the Comptroller General of the United States, Sept. 14,

1976.

MEA INFCIRC/153. The structure and content of agreements

between the Agency and States required in connection with

the NPT.

Sylvester C. Suda, “Evaluation of IAEA Safeguards inspection at Nuclear Fuel Services, West Valley, N.Y.”.

Brookhaven National Laboratory Report BNL 50228,

March 1970.
VIII -86

REFERENCES (cent)

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

E. Lopez-Menchero and A.J. Waligura, “The IAEA Programme

for the Development of Safeguards Techniques and instrumentation”, IAEA-SM-201/101, presented at the

international Symposium on Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,

Viema, October 1975.

T. Dragnev, et al., “Some IAEA Contributions to the

Development ~se of instrumental Techniques in Safeguards”, IAEA-SM-201/96, presented at the international

Symposium on Safeguarding Nuclear Materials, Vienna,

October 1975.

Glenn Hammond and Lorin Stieff, “Development of a Safeguards System ~or Contain~nt and Surveillance at

Uranium Enrichment Plants”, IAEA-SM-201/11, presented

at the international Symposium on Safeguarding Nuclear

Materials, Vienna, October 1975.

Warren H. Donnelly “indications of Congressional interest

and Concern Over Proliferation of the Ability to Make

Nuclear Weapons”. Paper presented at AIF Conference on

Nuclear Safeguards Orlando, Florida, April 11-14, 1976.

H. E. Lyon, “The Role of Material Control and Development

in ERDA’s Safeguards Program”, 17th Annual Meeting of

institute of Nuclear Materials Management, INMM Journal

Vol. V, /}3, Fall 1976.

L. A. Kull, “Catalogue of Nuclear Materials Safeguards

Instruments”, Brookhaven National Laboratory Report

(unnumbered) , August 1972.

Progress Reports of the Los Alamos Laboratory Nuclear

Safeguards Research Group, R-1 (formerly A-1) and

Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the institute of

Nuclear Materials Management.

U.S.N.R.C. Special Safeguards Study Reports:

“Evaluation of the Real-Time Material Control Concept

for Safeguards in Highly Enriched Uranium Fuel Cycles”,

Aerojet INEL, September 1975.

“Improved Material Accounting for Plutonium Recycle

Facilities and a 235U - HTGR Fuel Fabrication Facility”,

Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Report,

October 1975.
19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

REFERENCES (cont)

“An Evaluation of Real-Time Material Control and

Accountability on a Model Mixed-Oxide Fuel Plant”,

Science Applications, Inc. , SA1-75-648-LJ, September

1975.

“Material Control and Accounting for Plutonium Recycle

Facilities”, Science Applications, inc. , SA1-76-539-LJ,

March 1976.

D. Rundquist, et al., “Material Control for a Reprocessing

Plant”, Science Applications, inc. Report SAI-76-747-LJ,

August 1976.

Certificate of Analysis - Plutonium and Uranium Standard

Reference Materials, U.S. Department of Commerce, National

Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C.

U.S.N.R.C. Regulatory Guide 5.8, “Design Considerations

for Minimizing Residual Hold-up of Special Nuclear Material

in Drying and Fluidized Bed Operations”.

U.S.N.R.C. Regulatory Guide 5.25, “Minimization of Residual

Hold-up in Wet Process Operations”.

“Measurement of Plutonium in Processing Equipment at KenMcGee Plutonium Fuels Fabrication Facility”, A draft

report to the Director of inspection and Enforcement of

of the U.S.N.R.C. by the Division of Safeguards and Security

of the U.S. ERDA, June 1976.

A.R. Anderson, et al. , “Hidden inventory and Safety Considerations”, aniiW. Tape, et al., “Total Room Hold-up

of Plutonium Measured with a ~-Area Neutron Detector”,

17th Annual Meeting of the institute of Nuclear Materials

Management, INMM Journal Vol. V, #3, Fall 1976.

U.S. N. RfC. Regulatory Guide 5.23, “M Situ Assay of

Plutonium Residual Hold-up”.

G. Dan Smith, “U.S.N.R.C. Special Safeguards Study on

Nuclear Material Control and Accounting”, 17th Annual

Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Material Management,

INMM Journal Vol. V, #3, Fall 1976.
VIII - 88

REFERENCES (cont)

27.

28.

29.

30•

31.

32.

U. S. N. R.C. Regulatory Guide 5.13, “Conduct of Nuelsar

Material Physical Inventories” and W.B. Seefeldt “Some

Considerations .Enabling Dynamic Inventory in Fuel

Cycle Facilities”, 14th Annual Meeting of the Institute

of Nuclear Material Management, INMM Journal Vol. 11,

#3, Fall 1973.

S.M. Zivi and W.B. Seefeldt, “Temporal Response Methods

for Dynamic Measurement of In-Process Inventory of

Dissolved Nuclear Materials”, Journal of institute of

Nuclear Materials Management, Vol. V, #l, Spring 1976.

J. P. Sarich, “Real-Tim Plutonium Accountability and

inventory Control System”, and H. Akutsu, et al., “A

Real-Time Accounting and Control System at~onium Fuel

Facility of PNC”, and M. Batson and T.C. Bishop, “The

Application of Real-Time Data Processing to Mound Laboratory’s SS Accountability System”, papers presented at

the 16th Annual Meeting of institute of Nuclear Materials

Managemnt, INMM Journal Vol. IV, #}3, Fall 1975.

T. E. Shea, “instrumentation for Real-Time Materials

Control”, iEEE Trans. on Nuclear Science, NS-22, 752

(1975).

“RETIMAC - A Real-Time Material Control Concept for Strategic

Special Nuclear Material” Working Paper B, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (1975) .

T.E. Shea, “RETIMAC - A Real-Time Material Control Concept

for Strategic Special Nuclear Material”, Nuclear Material

Manage=nt, ~, No. 3, 376 (1975) .

T.E. Shea, “A Real-Time Material Control Concept for Safeguarding Special Nuclear Matetial in U.S. Licensed Processing Facilities”, Proceedings of the IAEA international

Symposium on the Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials, Vienna

Austria, October 1975.

C.L. Pomernacki, et al. , “Technical Appendix for the

Special Safeguards Study on Material Control and Accounting Systems”; Unnumbered Report, Lawrence Livermore

Laboratory (1975) ,

E.E. Bain, Jr. , et al., “An Evaluation of Real-Time Material Control and~untability in a Model Mixed-Oxide

Plant”.. SA1-75-648-IJ. Science . Amlications, . . Inc. (1975).
VIII -89

REFERENCES (cont)

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

G.R. Bray, et al. , “Material Control and Accounting for

Plutonium R-e Facilities,” SAI-76-539-M, Science

Applications, Inc. (1976).

L. Harris, Jr. , et al., “Material Balance Accounting

and Nondestructi=say Systems for Plutonium Recycle

Facilities,” Nuclear Materials Management, 5-, No. 3,

501 (1976) .

D.W. Wilson, “Dynamic Inventory: Dream or Necessity?,”

Nuclear Materials Management, ~, No. 3, 30 (1972).

C.L. Pomemacki, et al., “Modeling, Simulation, and

Estimation for Re=me Materials Control,” Nuclear

Materials Management, ~, No. 3, 308 (1974).

K.E. Sanders, “Physical Protection, Accountability, and

Process Modeling,” Nuclear Materials Management, ~,

No. 3, 256 (1975) .

K.E. Sanders, “Simulation of Nuclear Fuel Manufacture= as

a Safeguard Tool,” Proceedings of the 1975 Summer Computer

Simulation Conference, San Francisco, California, July

1975.

E.B. McCutcheon, “Simulation and Control Synthesis for a

Pulse Column Separation System for Plutonium-Uranium

Recovery,” Doctoral Dissertation, 1owa State University

(1975).

R.B. Hollstien and C.L. Pomernacki, “MHSS-A Material

Handling System Simulator,” Proceedings of the 1976

Summer Computer Simulation Conference, Washington, D.C. ,

July 1976.

.

R.H. Sanborn, “MD200: A Model for Evaluating Safeguards

through Material Accountability for 2 200 Tonne per Year

Mixed-Oxide Fuel-Rod Fabrication Plant,” Proceedings of

the 1976 Summer Computer Simulation Conference, Washington,

D.C., July 1976.

D.L. Alspach and T.L. Greenlee, “Dynamic Safeguards

Accountin 9

and Material Control via Modern Estimation

Methods, ‘Proceedings,of the 1976 S ummer Computer Simulation Conference, Washington, D.C., JUIY 1976.
VIII - 90

REFERENCES (cont)

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

G. R. Keepin and W. J. Maraman, “Nondestructive Assay

Technology and In-Plant Dynamic Materials Control -

DYMAC , “ Proceedings of the IAEA international Symposium

on the Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials, Vienna, Austria,

October 1975.

R.H. A~guston, “Development of in-Plant Real-Time Materials Control: The DYMAC Program,” Nuclear Materials

Management, S_, No. 3, 302 (1976) .

J.E. Lovett, “Concepts of Real-Time and Semi-Rea~ Time

Material Control,” Nuclear Materials Management, ~,

i~o. 4, 24 (1975) .

J.E. Lovett, “ln- Plant Dynamic Material Controls--An

international Perspective,” Nuclear P!kterials Management,

~, No. 3, 342 (1976) .

R. F . Lumb , “Nuclear Material Accounting,” Proceedings

of the Atomic industrial Forum, Conference on Nuclear

Safeguards, Orlando, Florida, April 1976.

J.M. de Montmollin, R.B. Walton, “The Design of 1ntegrated Safeguards Systems for Nuclear Facilities,”

institute of Nuclear Materials Mana ement, inc., Vol. V,

No. 111, Seattle, Washington, Fall 976. f

LeonD. Chapman, etal., “Development of an Engineered

Safeguards System Concept for a Mixed-Oxide Fuel

Fabrication Facility,” Sandia Laboratories, August 1976.

L.M. Brenner and S.C.T. McDowell: “ERDA’s Integrated

Safeguards System Program.” institute of Nuclear Materials Managemnt Vol. V, No. 111, Fall 1976.

O.E. Jones, “Advanced Physical Protection Systems for

Nuclear Materials, “Proceedings of the IAEA international

Symposium on the Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials, Vienna,

Austria, October 1975.

O.E. Jones, “Advanced Physical Protection Systems for

Facilities and Transportation,” Nuclear Materials Management, ~, No. 3, 211 (1976) .

Herbert J.C. Kouts, “NRC Safeguards Research Program”,

paper given at the AIF Conference on Nuclear Safeguards,

Orlando, Florida, April 11-14, 1976.
VIII - 91

REFERENCES (cont)

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

J.J. Bastin and E.A. Conrads, “Advances in Physical Prot e ct i on, ” Proceedings of the Atomic Industrial Forum

Conference on Nuclear Safeguards, Orlando, Florida, April

1976.

“Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in the

Commercial Fuel Cycle - Volume 1 - Executive Summary,”

SAND 75-0457, Sandia Laboratories (1976) .

F.I-I. Bemett, et al., “Physical Protection of Special

Nuclear Materi~ the Commercial Fuel Cycle - Volume II -

Fixed-Site Physical Protection, Systems (U),” SAIJD 75-

0457, Sandia Laboratories (1976) . Confidential

B. Sewell, et al., “Physical Protection of Special Nuclear

Material in=Commercial Fuel Cycle - Volume 111 -

Elements of Physical Protection f~r Fixed Sites (U) ,”

SAND 75-0457, Sandia Laboratories (1976) . Secret

H. Miller, “Nuclear Security Enclosure,” Nuclear Materials

Management, ~, ~10. 3, 274 (1976) .

“Security Agency Study,” NUREG-0015 and iH.REG-0015, ES

(Executive Summary) , U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(1976).

P.G. Meguire and J.J. Kramer, “Psychological Deterrents

to Nuclear Theft: A Preliminary Literature Review and

Bibliography,” NBSIR 76-1007, National Bureau of Standards

(1976).

J. Edlow and D. Rudolph, “Physical Security During

Transportation-- 1976,” INMM Proceedings, Vol. 5, No. 3

(1976) p 258.

J. deMontmollin and T. Sellers, “A System for Communication

with Commercial Special Nuclear Material Shipments,”

Nuclear’Technology, Vol. 23 (1974) p 117.

H. Kouts, “Remarks on Nuclear Regulatory Research,” Program Report --AIF Conference in Nuclear Safeguards,

Orlando, Florida, Vol. 3, No. 5. .

R. Reed, “Design Concepts Study of a Special Nuclear

Material Cargo Vehicle,” Nuclear Technology, Vol. 23

(1974) p. 112.
VIII -92

REFERENCES (cont)

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

“72 .

73.

74.

D. Dickason, “The ERDA Transportation Safeguards Communications System, ” Program Report --AIF Conference

on Nuclear Safeguards, Orlando, Florida, vol. 3, No. 5.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Energy Center

Site Survey-- 1975, NECSS-75 (1976) .

“Technical Options for Plutonium Safeguards”, a report

of the Atomic industrial Forum Study Group on Fuel

Cycle Safeguards, Fall 1975.

Bruce A. Hutchins, et al., “Denatured Plutonium -- A Study

of Deterrent Actionn

, report prepared for the Electric

Power Research Institute, EPRI 310, July 1975.

E.V. Weinstock, Study Coordinator, “The Spiking of Special

Nuclear Materials as a Safeguards Measure”, report prepared by the Technical Support Organization of the Brookhaven National Laboratory for the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, September 19, 1975.

R.L. Dickeman, “Safeguards Perspectives -- An Expression

of industry’s Responsibilities and Views”, paper presented

at the AIF Conference on Nuclear Safeguards, Orlando,

Florida, April 11-14, 1976.

“Regional Nuclear Fuei Cycle Centre Study: institutional

Legai Framework Aspect.” IAEA-RFCC/ 2. Vienna, Austria.

July 1976.

E.R. Johnson Associates, “Costs for Extended Safeguards”,

Study sponsored by the Atomic Industrial Forum July 1975

and Paper presented by Russell P. Wischow AIF Conference

on Nuclear Safeguards, Orlando, Florida, April 11-14, 1976.

“Draft Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide

Fuel”. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission WASH 1327, August

1974.

R.G. Page, “Features and Requirements of the U.S. Nuclear

Material Control System”, paper given at the 1ntemational

Symposium on the Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials, IAEASM-20V52, Vienna, October 20-24, 1975.

Kenneth R. Chapman, “NRC Approach to Safeguards”. Paper

given at the AIF Nuclear Fuel Cycle Conference, Phoenix,

Arizona, March 21-24, 1976.
VII - 93

REFERENCES (cont)

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

L.A. Kull and W.P. Melling, “The Design of Integrated

Safeguards Systems for New Fuel Cycle Plants”, INMM

Proceedings 18th Annual Meeting, Seattle, Washington,

~me 22.24, 1976, PP. 333-341”

Carl H. Builder, “Safeguards Perspectives: The Threat”.

Paper delivered at the AIF Conference on Nuclear

Safeguards, Orlando, Florida, April 12, 1976.

Carl A. Bennett, William M. Murphey, Theodore S. Sherr,

“Societal Risk Approach to Safeguards Design and Evaluation”, ERDA- 7, June 1975.

Norman C. Rasmussen, “Probabilistic Risk Analysis -

Its Possible Use in Safeguards Problems”, 18th Annual

Meeting INMM, Seattle, Washington, June 22-24, 1976,

pp ● 66-88.

H. Kendrick, E. Lofgren, D. Rundquist, R. Fullwood, “An

Approach to the Evaluation of Safeguards Systems Effectiveness”, 18th Annual INMM meeting, Seattle, Washington,

June 22-24, 1976, pp. 226-238.

W.M. Murphey, J.C. Schleter, “Practicality of Diversion

Path Analysis”, Nuclear Material Management ~, 3 (1974)

236.

H.A. Bennett, D.D. Boozer, L.D. Chapman, S.L. Daniel,

D. Engi, B.L. Hulme, and G.B. Vamado, “Safeguards System

Effectiveness Modeling”, 18th Annual INMM meeting proceedings, Seattle, Washington, June 22-24, 1976, pp. 239-247.

William Marcusi and Joseph P. 1ndusi, “Simulating Physical

Protection Against Overt Attacks at Facilities Using

Processing or Storing Nuclear Materials”, Nuclear Material

Managenwmt Vol. IV, No. 3, Fall 1975.
Appendix IX. International Controls
Appendix IX

International Controls

Table of Contents

Page

Ix.

A. Purpose and Scope of the Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

c* The IAEA and International Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The Statute, The Legal Framework

Membership, Organization, and Finance

Non-NPT or Facility Safeguards

NPT or Full Fuel Cycle Safeguards

IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual and Safeguards

Implementation Procedures

The Management and Analysis of Safeguards Data

The Confidentiality of Safeguards Information

Determination of Non-Compliance and the Agency’s Response

The Role of the Board of Governors

Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Agency Safeguards

The IAEA’s Role in Physical Protection

The IAEA’s Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center Study

D. Euratom and Regional Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

The Treaty of Rome

Regulation No. 7 and No. 8

The EURATOM Safeguard System

IAEA/EURATOM Safeguards Agreement

The New Regulation

E. Nuclear Suppliers Consultations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Suppliers Consultations - 1

Suppliers Consultations - 2

F. Multinational and International Fuel Cycle Facilities . . . . 121

G. Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . ● . ● . . . . . ● . ● ● . ● ● ● ● 158

i
Figure #1

Figure #2

Figure #3

LIST OF FIGURES

Organization Chart of the International Atomic Energy

Agency, IAEA, GC(XX)/567

Organization and Staff of the Department of Safeguards

and Inspections

Project Elements of the Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center

Study, IAEA-RFCC/2

i i
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE I. Safeguards Costs in Relation to Total Agency Expenditures

Under the Agency’s Budget

TABLE II. Importance of Diversion

TABLE III. Accuracy of Material Balance and Frequency of Inventory

Taking Expected by the IAEA

TABLE IV. Total Number of Installations in Categories in January 1975

(EURATOM)

TABLE V. Amounts of Nuclear Material Under EURATOM Control

i i i
IX - 1

APPENDIX 1X-A

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE REPORT

by

Stieff Research and Development Co., Inc.
IX- 2

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE REPORT.

The Stieff Research and Development Company has been directed by the Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) to revise a draft report prepared earlier under a

subcontract with the Stanford Research Institute on the roles which can be played

by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy

Community (EURATOM), and the Nuclear Suppliers Conference, in limiting the future

proliferation of nuclear weapons. In view of the short deadline under which OTA

must operate, it was recognized that this report could not possibly analyze these

subjects in depth. It was hoped, however, that the current status of these international initiatives could be summarized, and that some aspects of their nonproliferation roles not previously treated could be developed.

Within the last nine months there have

hensive government publications (1, 2,

covered in this report. They are:

appeared in the United States three compre3) dealing directly with many of the issues

—Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the International Atomic ——

Energy Agency.

International Proliferation of Nuclear Technology.

Assessment of U. S. and International Controls Over the Peaceful Uses

of Nuclear Energy.

During this period the IAEA has issued two documents (4 and 5) on subject matter

treated in this report. They are:

4/ IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual Introduction, Part A, Safeguards

Objectives, Criteria and Requirements.

5/ Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center Study, Institutional-legal

framework aspects.
Ix- 3

Purpose and Scope of Work

Also, the Commission of the European Communities issued on 22 September 1976

a new Commission Regulation (6) “concerning the application of the provision on

EURATOM safeguards.” This regulation codifies the safeguards regulations required

to implement the IAEA-EURATOM Agreement which was concluded on 5 April 1973 as

required by Article 3 (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons. Finally, there is the White House statement by the President on nuclear

pOlicy (8) which was released on October 28, 1976. These recent references and

the other documents and reports used in this review are cited under the List of

References at the end of the report. In addition material has been obtained in the

course of discussions with U. S. officials of the Energy Research and Development

Ministration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State, the

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and officials of the U. S. Missions to the

IAEA and EURATOM. Detailed discussions have also been held with officials of

EURATOM in Brussels, and Luxembourg and with officials of the IAEA in Vienna.
IX - 4

APPENDIX IX-B

INTRODUCTION

by

Stieff Research and Development Co., Inc.
IX - 5

INTRODUCTION

Since the closing days of World War II the proliferation of nuclear weapons has

been widely recognized as perhaps the most serious threat to the survival of mankind and the effort to limit this proliferation as a task which would test the

wisdom, ingenuity, and statesmanship of the world’s leaders. As governments and

men have grappled with this problem, their concerns have enlarged to include not

only what is now called “vertical proliferation” - i.e. , the continued testing,

manufacture, and growth of evermore sophisticated arsenals of nuclear weapons by

the five principal nuclear weapon states (NWS), but also the seriously destabilizing

potential of “horizontal proliferation” by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), and,

much more recently, the growing nuclear threat posed by terrorist or other non-state

adversaries not operating under the authority of any established national government.

Although this

has or may be

tion” and, to

report is concerned primarily with the international framework that

constructed to deal with the problem of limiting “horizontal proliferaa much lesser extent, with the international response to the non-state

adversary threat, the importance cannot be overemphasized of the impact of “vertical

proliferation” on our non-proliferation efforts. Failure of the NWS’s to reduce the

immense present danger embodied in the continuing growth of their nuclear weapons

arsenals will as surely impede our non-proliferation objectives as would the failure

of the world community to promptly challenge the test of any nuclear device or the

diversion of safeguarded nuclear materials by a non-nuclear weapon state. The bitter

reaction of the NNWS during the 1975 non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference

and the threat of Yugoslavia to withdraw from this Treaty because, in its view the

United States and the Soviet Union in particular,

obligations under Article 6 of the NPT, are clear

states do not take lightly their understanding of

by all parties to the NPT.

had not fulfilled their solemn

evidence that the non-nuclear weapon

the balance of obligations undertaken
IX - 6

Introduction

The threat of “horizontal proliferation” has, of course, been recognized since

the beginning of the Nuclear Era and was the object of the joint Declaration of

November 15, 1945 by the President of the United States and the Prime Ministers

of Canada and the United Kingdom. In this policy statement, the word, “safeguards”

was used for the first time to describe international measures intended to prevent

the use of nuclear materials and equipment from furthering any military purpose.

The Declaration further proposed that the United Nations should set up a commission

to make a number of specific proposals including “safeguards” to reassure states

complying with a ban on nuclear weapons that violations or evasions of the ban

had not occurred. The word “safeguards” is generally understood to be “a collective

term that comprises those measures designed to guard against the diversion of

material such as source and special nuclear material from uses permitted by law

or treaty and to give timely indication of possible diversion or credible assurance

that no diversion has occurred.” (9) For the IAEA, the use of material accountancy

is considered to be the safeguard measure of fundamental importance, with containment

and surveillance as important complimentary measures. (10) In the United States,

the word “safeguards” has been broadened to include physical protection measures

and penal provisions to deter theft and diversion.

Early U. S. nuclear policy was directed at the elimination of “vertical proliferation”

and the prevention of “horizontal proliferation”. Unfortunately, efforts to establish the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) and an International

Atomic Development Authority (IADA) as proposed by Bernard M. Baruch, the United

States Representative, were ultimately unsuccessful. The United States then turned

to a policy of strict secrecy as the best means of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

By the end of 1953, however, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had joined the
Introduction

group of nuclear weapon states and many countries were establishing nuclear

research programs. These developments led to a major shift in U. S. policy and

in December of 1953 President Eisenhower proposed his “Atoms for Peace” program

in an address before the United Nations General Assembly. Through this approach

it was hoped that the United States, by assisting foreign nuclear programs might

not only influence the nuclear policies of other nations but also guarantee that,

by the application of safeguards, the transfer of nuclear material and technology

would be used only for peaceful purposes. With this address and with the enactment

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2011) establishing the basis of U. S.

participation in international nuclear cooperative programs the necessity to

address both aspects of nuclear proliferation became urgent matters of national

policy.

The task of resolving “the Dilemma of the Fissionable Atom” - the unavoidable

production in the peaceful application of the fission process of new fissionable

material which could be diverted for weapons use - had not been ignored in the

earlier efforts to establish the UNAEC and the IADA. The United Nations General

Assembly Resolution laid down two principles:

1. “the fruits of scientific research should be made available

to all nations and that the freedom of investigation and the

free interchange of ideas are essential to the progress of knowledge.”

2. “effective safeguards by way of inspections and other means to protect

complying states against the hazard of violation and evasions,” are

essential.
IX - 8

Introduction

In its first report to the United Nations made almost thirty years ago the UNAEC

included the findings on safeguards of its Scientific and Technical Committee.

This report considered in more detail the problems of safeguarding declared nuclear

activities, the detection of clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities, the seizure

of nuclear materials, and the broad rights and privileges which an international

control agency would require in order to implement effective safeguards. These

principal policy areas still occupy those government officials and technical experts

concerned with the problem of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. With regard

to safeguards, the UNAEC concluded that safeguards were scientifically, technologically,

and practically feasible to the extent necessary to insure that atomic energy is

used only for peaceful purposes. In addition, it was the Commission’s belief that

effective control of peaceful uses of atomic energy was dependent on the effective

control of the production and use of uranium, thorium and their fissionable derivatives.

On the specific need for international safeguards the UNAEC concluded that:

“Only by such an international system of control and inspection

can the development and use of atomic energy be free from nationalistic

rivalries with the consequent risk to the safety of all people. Only

by such a system can the benefits of widespread exchange of scientific

knowledge and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy be assured. Only

such a system of control and inspection would merit and enjoy the confidence

of the people of all nations.”

The issue of “horizontal proliferation” inherent in the decision to greatly expand the

peaceful uses of atomic energy was squarely joined. The right of each nation to

fully benefit from this potential source of almost limitless energy should be assured,

but, at the same time, the essential conditions had to be established that each nation

should foreswear the military uses of atomic energy, and that each nation must relinquish
IX - 9

Introduction

at least those minimum sovereign rights necessary to assure its neighbors and the

world that its non-proliferation pledge had not been violated.

On many occasions in the past twenty years, the concern felt for non-proliferation

has yielded to potentially more dangerous

With the detonation of the Indian nuclear

the rapid growth of nuclear power in many

problems requiring immediate attention.

device in May of 1974, however, and with

countries, the issue of non-proliferation

has re-immerged

not only in the

but also in the

as a prime topic of international policy. This fact is attested

Legislative and Executive Branches of the United States Government,

legislatures and foreign offices of many of the other capitals

of the world. These events, the rising threat of nuclear terrorism and sabotage,

major unanswered questions of an environmental nature, and challenges to the safety of

nuclear facilities have all called into question the viability and feasibility of continued nuclear power development. Questions are now being raised in many quarters concerning the effectiveness of the international institutions that were put into place

in the late 50’s and the 60’s to deal with the problem of “horizontal proliferation.”

Many alternative approaches are now being considered to these questions ranging from

moratoriums on nuclear exports and the construction of nuclear power stations to

multinational fuel centers. The complexity of the social, economic, political,

military, and technological issues which surround the proliferation problem absolutely

guarantees that a simple solution to this matter will not be found.

A broadly based non-proliferation policy must contain many elements and should

start with the recognition that for some countries there does not seem to be a

reasonable alternative to nuclear power. This means that whether or not the United

States withdraws from the nuclear export market or whether the United States chooses

alternate sources of power, our national security will be directly affected by the
IX - 10

Introduction

decisions and actions taken by other countries in the nuclear area. The United

States already has contractual commitments with many countries to provide nuclear

fuel and these countries must be assured that their economies will not be disrupted

by the withdrawal of U. S. enriched uranium. Our allies, in particular, and all nonnuclear weapon states, must be assured of strong alliances which will protect them

from military or nuclear threat, The nuclear weapon states must acknowledge the

necessity for real progress in the negotiations to limit the testing and growth

of nuclear weapons. Sustained efforts should be made to increase the number of

countries which are parties to the non-Proliferation Treaty and positive incentives

should be offered to those countries which are party to the Treaty. There should

he a clear understanding that abrogation of the Treaty or attempts at the diversion

of nuclear material will be met with immediate world disapproval and strong sanctions.

The intelligence agencies, particularly those of the nuclear weapon states, should

significantly increase their efforts to insure that if clandestine nuclear facilities

are constructed, they will be detected. Cooperation in the intelligence field

even between our closest allies presents difficult problems but this subject should be

carefully examined, and, if possible, formal procedures established to ensure the timely

exchange of essential information. A strong effort should be made to persuade all

countries that the limiting of the spread of nuclear weapons is in their best interests,

for any country may be held hostage by a diversion or theft which occurred on the

opposite side of the world. The international institutions which have been established

to monitor compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the non-nuclear

weapon states should be strengthened and the member states of these organizations should

insist on effective and credible, not minimal safeguards. Finally, our determination to

contain the spread of nuclear weapons must not weaken even if another non-nuclear weapon

state should successfully test a nuclear device. Nor, should the inability of our

international institutions and initiatives to meet unrealistic expectations lead us to

abandon them as failures, but rather, we must set reasonable goals and then make certain

that they are met.
IX - 11

APPENDIX IX-C

THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

by

Stieff Research and Development Co. , Inc.
IX - 12

THE IAEA AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

A. THE STATUTE, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK.

On the 23rd of October 1956 the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(11) was approved by the Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy

Agency at the headquarters of the United Nations. The Statute was opened for signature on the 26th of October 1956 and came into force on the 29th of July 1957. In

order to clearly understand the Agency’s safeguards objectives, its authorized safeguards functions, and the legal framework for the Agency’s safeguards, responsibilities

and rights, some familiarity with the Statute is necessary. The appropriate safeguards

related Articles from the Statute are summarized below and in full in Annex A.

The entire statute has been reprinted in “FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, A HANDBOOK”

(12).

The objectives of the Agency are defined in the Statute under Article II which provides

that the Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy

to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and that so far as it is able,

that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control

is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

The Safeguards functions are defined in the Statute under Articles III, AS and B2

which authorize the Agency to establish and administer safeguards on special fissionable

and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by

the Agency, and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to bilateral or

multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities

in the field of atomic energy. Thus, this Article provides for the application of

safeguards to declared nuclear facilities as opposed to the full fuel cycle safeguards

of the NPT and permits a State to operate an indigenous, undeclared nuclear facility

without IAEA safeguards. For example, the Indian nuclear facilities used to
IX - 13

IAEA and International Safeguards

produce the plutonium used in their first nuclear test were not under IAEA safeguards

although other facilities had been declared and were safeguarded by the IAEA.

Article III B-2 provides for Agency control over the use of special fissionable

materials which has been received by the Agency, for its own projects or projects with

other states in order to ensure that these materials are used only for peaceful purposes.

Article XI F-4 requires that such projects shall be subject to the safeguards provided

for in Article XII, the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement.

The Agency’s safeguards, responsibilities and rights are specified in the Statute

under Article XII. This very important Article should be examined closely. However,

in summary, it provides for the following:

XII Al.- Design review of facilities and equipment to permit effective

application of the safeguards.

XII A2.- Observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by

the Agency.

XII A3.- Maintenance and production of operating records.

XII A4.- Submission of progress reports.

XII A5.- Approval of the means to be used for the chemical processing

of irradiated materials, the requirement that the special fissionable

materials recovered or produced. as a by-product under continuing Agency

safeguards, and the deposit with the Agency of any excess of any special

fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what is

needed for the above-stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of these

materials. This unused Article has recently received considerable attention
IX - 14

IAEA and International Safeguards

in connection with the establishment of Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Centers. The provisions of this article have assumed particular significance

in view of the enormous amounts of plutonium that will be produced by

nuclear power reactors in the 80’s and the danger that would follow from the

diversion of even a relatively small amount of this stockpile for weapons

purposes. These “approval” and “deposit” provisions of the Statute when

coupled with the concept of a Multinational or Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Center (RNCC) should offer an acceptable solution to what is otherwise a

very difficult and potentially dangerous problem.

XII A6.- Dispatch of Agency Inspectors into the territory of the recipient

State who shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any

person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or

facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded, and the

determination of compliance with the undertaking between the Agency and

the State against use in furtherance of any military purpose.

XII A7.- The recipient State or States to take requested corrective

steps within a reasonable time, suspension or termination of assistance

and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or

a member in furtherance of the project in the event of non-compliance.

XII B.- Establishment of a staff of inspectors.

XII C.- Verification of records and reports. This Article also provides

that the inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General

who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. If the

State or States fail to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds

to have occurred, the Board is required to report the non-compliance to all

members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.
IX - 15

IAEA and International Safeguards

The Board may also direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being

provided by the Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials

and equipment made available to the recipient member or group of members.

Finally, the Agency may also, in accordance with Article XIX, suspend any

non-complying member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of

membership. The actions noted above represent the range of sanctions permitted by the Statute in the event of a non-compliance and failure by a

member State to take the requested corrective action. The need for stronger

sanctions by the nuclear supplier states, at least, is obvious.

The safeguards activities of the IAEA are explicitly directed at the problem of

“horizontal proliferation”, i.e., a decision by a non-nuclear weapon State to divert

special fissionable materials to further a military purpose. Diversion is defined

in the first document approved by the Board of Governors on the 31st of January 1961

describing the Agency’s safeguards (13) to mean:

II ...the use by a recipient State of fissionable or other materials,

facilities or equipment supplied by the Agency so as to further any

military purpose or in violation of any other condition prescribed in

the Agreement between the Agency and the State concerning the use of

such materials, facilities or equipment.”

It is clear from the Statute, from this description of the Agency’s Safeguards

System and all subsequent Agency safeguards documents, that the Agency is not

legally authorized to address the problem of the terrorist or the non-state

adversary nor, of course, the question of “vertical proliferation”- Those functions

not explicitly authorized by the Statute are reserved to the State. The IAEA does not
IX - 16

IAEA and International Safeguards

have police powers and it cannot prevent a diversion of nuclear materials to

some military purpose. The Statute is also silent on the closely related problem

of physical security. The Agency’s activities in this area will be treated separately

in this review but it should be stressed here that the Agency does not have the

statutory authority to make even a recommendation in the area of physical protection.

In the Agency document entitled “THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS” (14) it

is noted under Section 2. Objectives, that:

“The Agency has no responsibility either for the provision of a

State’s physical protection system or for the supervision, control

or implementation of such a system. The Agency may informally advise

the State on the results of observations made during its normal safeguards

activities. Further assistance by the Agency will be provided only when

so requested by the State.”

Finally, it is important to note that the Statute does not address the problem of

the detection of clandestine facilities; a very important matter, as has been noted,

which was included in the 1946 Report of the Findings of the Scientific and Technical

Committee of the UNAEC. This decision would appear to reflect the conscious omission

by the States of this activity because, of necessity, any intelligence activity would

constitute an unacceptable infringement of the sovereign rights of the State. Therefore,

this essential element of any comprehensive non-proliferation policy must remain the

responsibility of the intelligence agencies of the individual States, although cooperation in this sensitive area would clearly enhance the deterrent aspect of such efforts.
IX - 17

IAEA and International Safeguards

Although many States now accept the arrival of an international inspector at

their borders as a routine matter it should be remembered that the safeguards

Provision of Article XII, less than twenty years old, represents a watershed

event in the field of international treaty verification and a major first step

in the relinquishment of a State’s sovereign rights to a higher need and authority.

The very broad inspection rights of Article XII, A-6 which provided for “access

at all times to all places and data and to any person” have not been repeated even

in INFCIRC/26. This description of the Agency’s Safeguards System includes a table

of frequency of routine inspections; a response both to the concerns of the State

and the practical problems of staffing and inspecting research reactors. The

acceptance of the principle of international inspection extends well-beyond the

proliferation of nuclear weapons and suggests that the treaty verification problems

of other arms control agreements might yield to similar approaches.

There have been a number of suggestions in the past that, if the Agency is unable

to undertake important new duties or responsibilities which are not authorized in

the Statute, then the Statute should be amended to provide the legal basis for

these new functions. This course of action, however, will not necessarily produce

the desired results. Officials familiar with the operation of international organizations and with recent world political developments caution that the opening of the

Statute to amendment can result in major changes which are not desirable and which may

reduce rather than enhance the role of the organization. The establishment of a

well-developed consensus and a carefully prepared agenda should precede any decision

to amend the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
IX - 18

IAEA and International Safeguards-B.

B. MEMBERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, AND FINANCE

Membership. The Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, in his

report to the Twentieth Session of the General Conference of the International

Atomic Energy Agency in Rio de Janeiro, September 1976, stated that:

“Since 1957 the number of member States has grown from 60 to

109 with a corresponding increase in attendance at the General

Conference. The Agency’s executive body, the Board of Governors,

now has 34 members compared with 23 in 1957 and 25 in 1963. The

regular budget has increased as a result of growing activities, inflation and exchange rates from just over $4,000,000 in 1958 to

$37,000,000 in 1976. The staff of the Agency has increased from

400 in 1958 to 1200 now.”

The list of the Member States, which now totals 110, is given in Annex B.

Organization. The Organization Chart shown in Figure 1. for the International

Atomic Energy Agency is taken from “The Agency’s Program for 1977 - 82 and Budget

for 1977 (15). Not shown in the Organization Chart is the Scientific Advisory Committee

which reports to the Director General and the recently established Standing Advisory

Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) which also reports to the Director General.

SAGSI is currently considering the problem of more effective reporting to the Board

of Governors and to the Member States of the results of the Agency’s safeguards operation.

In Figure 1, it may be seen that the Department of Safeguards and Inspections (DSI)

is currently divided into the Division of Development, the Division of Operations and

a group for Information Treatment. These three subdivisions report directly to the

Inspector General, Dr. Rudolph Rometsch. The Director General is now considering a
IX - 19

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

I

DIRECTOR GENERAL

I

1’

i

Getrud Services

-1 Lmgueqeo

F

I

DEPARTMENT OF

SAFEGUARDS ANO

INSPECTION

F
IX - 20

.

r

I H. Seitl

B.

N.

M.

E.

A.

Ye

s.

G.

Me

.

1. Unar

Scct>on for Field

H. Garbsch

C. F!!gerty

.

Figure 2.

1

J. Beranek

(Head)

R.

I.

D.

G.

R.

R.

K.

s*

co

co

G. Reset schniq

W. Wenzel

(Head)

A.

co

I.

H.

J.

B,

c.

v.

w.

o,

A.

Jo

1.

B.

.

V. Fortakov

(Head)

E,

3).

c.

P.

1.10

A.

T.

W.

u.

H.

N.

E.

I,

A.

R.

Cost free trainee
IX - 21

IAEA and International. Safeguards-B.

re-organization of DSI which will result in four divisions: Development, two

Operational Divisions, and a Division of Information. Pending approval of this reorganization by the Board of Governors a new EURATOM section which will form the nucleus

of the second operational division was established on the 15th of October 1976.

A more detailed presentation of the organization of the Department of Safeguards and

Inspections is shown in Figure 2. In the Manning Tables of the 1977 Agency Budget,

DSI has a total of 138 authorized positions for the year 1976 of which 102 are professional and 36 are GS Ratings or subprofessional. The number of established posts for

1977 show a total of 161 positions of which 111 are professional and 50 are GS. The

preliminary estimate for 1978 is a total staff of 179 with 122 professionals and 57 GS

positions. These changes in staffing reflect the anticipated increase in inspection

activity resulting from the implementation under NPT of the IAEA-EURATOM and Japanese

Safeguards Agreement as well as the United States and United Kingdom safeguards offer.

A recent internal analysis of the distribution of nationalities in DSI as of 1 March 1976

shows that of a total of 43 inspectors, in the Division of Operations, only 3 were U.S.

nationals, whereas in the Division of Development 6 of the 20 professionals were U. S.

citizens. In general, the IAEA personnel policy attempts to balance the available positions

within the Agency among the different nationalities of the States of which it is composed.

Information on the name, nationality and grade of each professional and support staff

by department and division is published annually in the Agency publication INFCIRC/22. (16)

An analysis of the information included in INFCIRC/22/REV.15 published in June of 1975

shows that approximately 18% or 68 of the total professional staff of 378 were U. S.

nationals. It can be seen from this that the ratio of U. S. nationals in DSI is reasonably close to the overall ratio for the Agency, although for the Operations Division
IX - 22

IAEA and International Safeguards-B.

it is approximately 6%; a figure considerably below the norm. The relatively low number of U. S. nationals in the Operations Division is a source of concern because, in

general, U. S. nationals have performed very well and the Division needs staff with high

technical competence, strong motivation and a commitment to painstaking and difficult

work. An additional source of concern is the refusal of many countries to accept as

inspectors nationals from other countries because of language or political consideration.

The Director General specifically addressed this issue in his speech to the General

Conference in September of this year when he said:

“I wish to make an appeal to the States which have accepted our

Safeguards System: Please accept also our inspectors irrespective

of their nationality. We are now sometimes facing a situation where

Country ‘A’ may accept an inspector from Country ‘B’ but ‘B’ not from ‘A’.”

The effective use of Agency inspectors is materially influenced by this type of action

on the part of the member States.

desire of the member States to do

refers to the list of inspectors,

A remedy could be rapidly effected if it was the

so. The problem can be more fully appreciated if one

the countries to which they are accredited, and the

inspectors designated as Country Officers which is regularly published by the Department

of Safeguards and Inspections.

In the evaluation of the effectiveness of international safeguards those issues which

involve the inspectors are often overlooked in favor of legal, technical, or financial

matters. In practice, the inspector will probably determine the success or failure of

the safeguards effort. For example, special policies

and retention of the inspection staff. After a fixed

should have the option to encourage a career decision

might be established for the hiring

probationary period the Department

in the field of safeguards inspection
IX - 23

IAEA and International Safeguards-B.

by offering a long-term contract. The Department should also be free to terminate

an inspector at the conclusion of the probationary period should his performance not

meet Department standards without the political pressure which is often brought to bear

in these matters when an international organization is involved. As part of the career

development of

proficiency by

the inspector, it is essential not only to maintain but to improve his

attendance at both established and special training programs. The

Department is also faced with special problems of promotion and salary scales when

compared with the professional requirements and duties of the staff members of other

departments of the Agency.

Finally, and perhaps the most intangible, is the question of maintaining inspector

morale when faced with difficult and sometimes dangerous working conditions, long and

arduous periods of travel away from the Headquarters and his family, and the uncertainty that the work to be done is, as he has been told, really a matter of vital

importance to the peace and security of the world. The responsibility for sustaining

the inspector’s morale does not stop at the desk of the Inspector General, but involves

political and personal relationships at many levels within the Agency. The Agency’

morale can in fact be profoundly affected by events which occur in other parts of the

world. For example, the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to take

strong and unequivocal positions following the test of the Indian nuclear device in

May of 1974 deeply affected the staff and the silence which followed that explosion

still haunts the halls and offices of the IAEA.

Finances. Of the adjusted budget for 1976 of $37,002,000 the Department of

Safeguards and Inspections required $6,443,000. Of this amount, $3,180,000 was

obligated to salaries and wages; of the remaining $3,263,000 common staff costs accounted

for $917,000; travel $410,700; scientific and technical contracts $490,000; scientific

supplies and equipment $510,000; laboratory services $496,000 and supporting ’services,
IX-2 4

IAEA and International Safeguards-B.

meetings and miscellaneous $440,000. The detailed costs of the safeguards program

is given in Annex C. Table I shows the safeguards cost in relation to total Agency

expenditures under the Agency’s budget 1971 through 1976. The estimated budget for

DSI in 1977 is $7,951,000. The preliminary estimate for 1978 is $9,111,000. (15)

TABLE I

SAFEGUARDS COSTS

IN RELATION TO TOTAL AGENCY EXPENDITURE

UNDER THE AGENCY’S BUDGET 1971-76

Safeguards Total Safeguards Costs

Year costs Budget in percent of

(us $ 000) (us $ 000) Regular Budget

1971 1 636 14 010 11.7%

1972 2 035 16 532 12.3%

1973 2 564 19 881 12.9%

1974 3 441 25 064 13.7%

1975 04 802 29 675 16.2%

1976 6 443 34 702 18.6%
IX - 25

IAEA and International Safeguards-B.

In 1971 it was decided that the safeguards costs should be adjusted in order to take

account of the position of the countries with lower per capita incomes. Developing

Member States whose base rate of assessment for 1971 was 0.04% of the Agency’s budget

pay an annual share of safeguards expenses of about $750.00. The 34 industrialized

Member States bear 95% of the safeguards cost, while the remaining 72 members contribute 5%. The Board of Governors has recommended and the General Conference has

adopted this year a resolution that will freeze at their present levels the contributions of the developing countries to the safeguards budget. The freeze will

last from 1977 to 1980. The Director General in his speech before the General

Conference suggested that:

“this period should be used to re-examine the basic principals for

financing the costs of safeguards and to establish a sound system that

takes into account both the principals that every member state should

contribute towards safeguards expenses and the recommendations of the

NPT Review Conference to lighten the burden on the developing member states.”

In response to the growth of nuclear power throughout the world and the greatly increased safeguards responsibilities of the Agency, the Department of Safeguards and

Inspection has in the last ten years grown faster than any other department. With the

implementation of the IAEA-EURATOM and Japanese Safeguards Agreement and the implementation of the United States and the United Kingdom offers to place their nuclear facilities not related to military uses under IAEA Safeguards, this trend can be expected to

continue. In the opinion of some officials the limitations on the Agency’s ability to

implement its safeguards responsibilities will not be due to financial constraints but,

rather, the limitations will be of a political nature and will reflect the attitudes and

the determination of the member states, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to support credible

effective safeguards.
IX - 26

IAEA and International Safeguards-B.

In addition to the assessed contributions to the Agency budget the United States

has, beginning in 1974, undertaken a program to strengthen Agency safeguards by the

provision of gifts-in-kind. In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1975 approximately

$200,000 was identified for support of Agency safeguards. Initially, in FY 1976 an

additional $300,000 was made available through the gifts-in-kind and that amount was

subsequently increased by $1,000,000 (the Glenn Amendment) as Congressional concern

for the effectiveness of Agency safeguards has grown. In FY 1977, $1,600,000 has been

authorized including the first increment in a $5,000,000-five-year-program has also

been authorized. Officials of the United States Government and the IAEA met during the

first two weeks of November to coordinate a long-term program to strengthen the Agency’s

program including; major improvements in the Agency’s safeguards data management and

data analysis programs, substantial increases in the in-training programs for Agency

inspectors, the provision of technical experts in many areas, the development of

improved instrumentation for the non-destructive nuclear measurements, and the

development of improved

It is reported that the

surveillance and containment devices.

Federal Republic of Germany has also made an offer of giftsin-kind to the Agency of approximately $300,000 for the coming year. It is important

that the other nuclear suppliers and the Soviet Union also join in this effort to meet

the technical and financial needs of the Agency’s safeguards program in the critical

period ahead. If the principle of international inspection is to be widely accepted,

the Agency’s Safeguards System must not be a creature of United States Policy nor should

it even appear to be so.
IX - 27

IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

c. NON-NPT OR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS.

Information Circular/26. The safeguards described in Article XII of the

Agency’s Statute were intended by the drafters to be only a framework for the actual

IAEA’s Safeguards System. (17) The fleshing out of that

elaboration of safeguards procedures and techniques that

the past twenty years has been accomplished by the joint

Safeguards and Inspections and a large number of experts

framework and the detailed

have been developed over

efforts of the Division of

from the Member States who

have participated in both formal and informal technical meetings held at the Agency

and elsewhere. In the early stages of the evolution of the IAEA Safeguard System

the Agency was concerned only with the safeguarding of research, tests and power

reactors with less than 100 (MWT) megawatts thermal output, the source and special

fissionable materials used and produced in these reactors, and the small research and

development facilities.

The first document outlining the Agency’s Safeguards System for use with research

reactors was approved

been published by the

produced in Annex D.

on the 31st of January 1961 by the Board of Governors and has

Agency as Information Circular/26 (18). This document is reINFCIRC/26 is of interest historically because it established

a pattern for the

The Introduction,

“Agency

organization and content of subsequent Agency safeguard documents.

Paragraph 3 specified:

Safeguards will be applied to materials and facilities

voluntarily placed under Agency safeguards by a State or States.

Where two or more States request the Agency to administer the safeguards provisions of an agreement between those States, the Agency

will apply those provisions provided that they are consistent with the

procedures laid down in this document. The administration of safeguards
IX - 28

IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

by the Agency under this Paragraph shall be governed by an

agreement pursuant to the Statute between the Agency and the State

or States concerned which shall be made for a specific period.”

In Paragraph 4 of the Introduction it is stated that:

“procedures covering other types of nuclear facilities will be

developed as the probable need for them becomes evident. In regard

to produced material the safeguards provided for this document relate

only to the first generation of produced material.”

From the Statute as well as the Introduction of INFCIRC/26 it is clear that the

Agency’s intent was to develop a facility specific safeguard system, that safeguards

were to be applied to both materials and facilities voluntarily placed under the

Agency’s System, that the Agency’s facility safeguard would evolve as the need

developed, that the agreements would be made for a specific period, that an agreement

between the State and the Agency would govern the safeguards applied by the Agency

and, finally, the Agency’s Safeguards System was to be reviewed after a period of two

years in order to evaluate the experience gained by the Agency as well as the

technological developments which had taken place during the interval.

Two of the items in this list, in particular, those relating to pursuit of produced

fissionable material past the first generation and a specific date for the termination

of a safeguards agreement have become sources of difficulty in the last few years.

As understanding of the problems involved in safeguarding a fully developed nuclear

fuel cycle have increased, it has become clear that both of these weaknesses offered

a legal route for the acquisition of unsafeguarded fissionable material. The final
IX - 29

IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

item is also significant because it reflected an awareness on the part of the Agency

even then that their safeguards procedure would continue to evolve in the response

to technological change and that they should be continuously reviewed in the light of

actual experience. Some of the criticism of the Agency’s safeguards procedures, while

well founded, does not take into consideration this evolutionary aspect. Because,

practice may fall far short of expectations in the early stages, disillusionment

sets in and leads to the conclusion that because safeguards at some point are inadequate they cannot be made to succeed either in theory or in practice.

Information Circular/66/Rev.2.

The first major change in facility specific safeguards occurred in 1964 when

the Agency Safeguards System was extended to include large power reactors.

INFCIRC/26 and Add. 1. (19) Subsequently, following a review of the Agency’s System,

a revised document, THE AGENCY’S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, INFCIRC/66, which describes the

IAEA Safeguards System now in use for those States which have not ratified the NPT,

was approved by the Board of Governors. This document was provisionally extended in

1966 to include Annex I, “Provisions for Reprocessing Plants”, (21) The final

extension occurred in 1968 with the addition of Annex 11, “Provisions for Safeguarding

Nuclear Material in Conversion Plants and Fabrication Plants”. (22) This document has

been reprinted in full as Annex II in the Government Publication (1; op.cit.)

“NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY”. Some of

the more important provisions are reproduced in Annex E.

In the Introduction to INFCIRC 66/Rev. 2 can be seen a continuation of those trends

which first appeared in INFCIRC/26. Concern for the impact of safeguards on the

States’ nuclear industry becomes even more explicit. For example, under B. General

Principles of the Agency’s Safeguards, The Agency’s Obligations include the following:
IX - 30

IAEA and International Safeguards-C. ’

9.

10.

11.

13.

“17 ●

Safeguards shall avoid hampering a State’s economic or technological

development.

Safeguards must be consistent with prudent management practices

required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

The Agency may not request a State to stop the construction or operation of any principal nuclear facility except by explicit decision of

the Board.

The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and

industrial secrets and no member of the Agency’s staff shall disclose,

except to the Director General and to such other members of the staff

as the Director General may authorize.

The principal factors to be considered by the Board in determining

the relevance of particular provisions of this document to various

types of materials and facilities shall be the form, scope and amount

of the assistance supplied, the character of each individual project

and the degree to which such assistance could further any military

purpose. The related safeguards agreement shall take account of all

pertinent circumstances at the time of its conclusion.”

Part III. Safeguards Procedures, still provides in Paragraph 29 for safeguards

procedures which are to be applied to nuclear materials as well as the facilities

containing or to contain such materials.”

The States’ concerns that information provided in the design review might compromise

their industrial secrets or unnecessarily infringe on their sovereignty is reflected

in the revisions which appear in Paragraph 30 and 32 where the sole purpose of such

a review is the effective application of safeguards.
IX - 31

IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

The Agency is enjoined not to publish or communicate to any State, organization

or person information obtained in connection with the implementation of safeguards.

Specific information, however, may be given to the Board or to such Agency staff

members as required by reason of their official duties. In addition, upon

decision of the Board, summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency

may be published and if all States directly concerned agree, additional information may be published.

Under Part B. Principles of Implementation there appear two qualifications, one

related to the pursuit of produced fissionable material and the other related to factors

to be considered by the Board when considering the content of Agency safeguards

agreements with the State.

“16. In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, it is desirable

that safeguards agreements should provide for the continuation of safeguards,

subject to the provisions of this document, with respect to produced special

fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefor.”

And where the Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data

consistent with carrying out its responsibility under this section.

In general, these revisions address the preoccupation of some of the States whose

nuclear industries were experiencing rapid growth that international safeguards would

prove to be a serious economic burden and could possibly seriously jeopardize the

competitive position of their industries, as they began to compete for international

markets with the United States. As can be seen from the paragraphs which have been
IX - 32

IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

reproduced in Annex E when compared with Information Circular/26 there now appear

specific Agency obligations to minimize the impact of safeguards on a State’s

economic or technological development, the implementation of safeguards should be

consistent with prudent management practices, the Agency may not oppose or delay

construction of principal nuclear facilities, and the matter of protection of commercial

and industrial secrets as well as the protection of any data obtained in the course

of the implementation of Agency safeguards have become formalized. The latter point

has been noted by many of the Agency’s critics as a principal source of the inability

of any outside group or State to properly evaluate the effectiveness of Agency

safeguards. It is interesting to note, however, that at least in Paragraph 14A a

provision is included for making available specific information relating to such

implementation in a State to the Board of Governors; and a provision which does not

appear in Paragraph 41 of Information Circular/26.

Paragraph 16 of INFCIRC/66 does acknowledge the desirability of providing for the

continuation of safeguards on special fissionable materials produced in a facility

to which Agency safeguards have been applied or to any material substituted therefore.

Agency

at all

It can only be observed that the provisions of Paragraph 17 of the Revised

Safeguard System represents a considerable departure from the “.. .access

times to all places and data.. .“ of Article XII, A-6 of the Statute.

A comparison of the sections on Design Review in INFCIRC/22 and INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2

reflects, as has been noted, the concern of the States about the possible disclosure of industrial secrets and the need to minimize the impact of the Agency’s

activities in the exercise of this function. It is important, when considering

the effectiveness of Agency safeguards, to keep in mind that no nuclear facility

presently under international safeguards inspection included as one of the initial
IX - 33

IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

design requirements of the facility the necessity to optimize safeguards inspection

activities. In fact, the safeguards procedures which have been developed have

suffered from the fact that even simple provisions which could have been incorporated during the construction of the facility at a relatively modest additional

cost were not included. As a result, desirable and sometimes essential modifications could not be made for structural reasons or because the costs would be

prohibitively expensive. In this section there is no suggestion that the Agency

and the State might at the earliest stages in the design of a nuclear facility

review the safeguards requirements in order to ensure that cost effective safeguards might be applied.

One of the earliest applications of Agency safeguards under INFCIRC/26-66 began in

1962 following the completion of negotiations between the IAEA and the AEC for

the implementation of safeguards to four U. S. reactors. This was followed by the

entry into force on November 1, 1963 of the first Agency trilateral safeguards

agreement, an agreement between the United States, Japan and the International

Atomic Energy Agency. This Agreement covered any nuclear material, equipment

and/or facilities supplied to Japan by the United States. In addition, the

Agreement also included the important provision that Agency safeguards would apply

to any fissionable material produced in the Japanese facilities even if this

material should be returned to the United States for processing unless the United

States substituted an equivalent quantity of like material in Japan. This latter

feature permitted a supplier country such as the United States, the United Kingdom

or the Soviet Union to avoid IAEA inspection of third party fissionable material

if the principal of substitution was employed. By the end of 1965 three additional

trilateral agreements were in effect, two between the IAEA, Japan, and Canada

and the United Kingdom respectively and the remaining between the IAEA, Denmark

and the United Kingdom. In the ten succeeding years agreements have been completed
IX - 34

IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

which permit safeguards to be applied in twenty States, under eleven project

agreements, twenty-one safeguards transfer agreements, and eight unilateral submission agreements. During 1975 the Agency carried out 299 inspections under these

agreements. A list of the agreements providing for safeguards other than those in

connection with NPT approved by the Board of Governors as of 31 December 1975 is

shown in Annex F.

In 1975 the United States had 30 Agreements for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of

Atomic Energy. Of these, 20 were for cooperation in nuclear research and power,

2 involved only nuclear power stations and 8 agreements were for research only.

In addition, the United States had bilateral agreements for cooperation with

EURATOM and with the IAEA. A list of our Bilateral agreements for cooperation is

given in Annex G.

The safeguards provisions of many of these agreements have been suspended and

in favor of United States-IAEA Trilateral Safeguards Agreements for the

application of safeguards to U. S. supplied material. Annex H contains a list of

these U. S.-IAEA Trilateral Safeguards Agreements. A number of these Agreements

have been suspended in turn, as a result of negotiations between these countries

and the IAEA in fulfillment of the safeguards obligations undertaken in the NonProliferation Treaty.
IX - 35

D. NPT OR FULL FUEL CYCLE SAFEGUARDS.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. On July 1, 1968 the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (7, 12, op.cit.) was opened for

signature and the Treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970. These events represented the culmination of a major initiative on the part of the United States, the

United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union supported by a number of the major non-nuclear

industrialized States to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons. In the

negotiations on the draft of the NPT, the possibility of including a safeguards

article was a subject of extended discussion. With the resolution of the issue in

favor of incorporating such an article, the debate turned to the means and methods

to be used. The Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, took the position

that the formulation of the safeguards principles as expressed in INFCIRC/66

would have to be replaced by a less intrusive and intensive safeguards system

which would be applied to all fissionable material in the State, i.e., full fuel

cycle safeguard. This new safeguards concept which was included in the

preambulatory paragraph to the NPT stated that :

“Expressing their support for research, development and

other efforts to further the application, within the framework

of the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System,

of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source

and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other

techniques at certain strategic points.”

The emphasis was on the flow of material at certain strategic points. The

safeguarding of facilities had disappeared. The political undertakings designed

to halt the spread of nuclear weapons were embodied in Articles I and 11 of

the Treaty which provided that both the nuclear weapon States and the nonnuclear weapon States would not transfer or receive whatsoever nuclear weapons

or any other nuclear explosive devices. The verification provisions of these
IX - 36

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

obligations were enumerated in Article III, the Safeguards Article. Article 111

provides that:

“1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes

to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated

and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in

accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of

verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under

this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy

from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article

shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable

material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any

principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The

safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all

source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear

activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

“2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide:

(a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment

or material especially designed or prepared for the processing,

use or production of special fissionable material, to any nonnuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source

or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
IX - 37

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

"3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented

in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty,

and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development

of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of

peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange

of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or

production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance

with the provisions of this article and the principle of

safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

“4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude

agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the

requirements of this article either individually or together with

other States in accordance with the Statute of the International

Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence

within 180 days from the original entry into force of the Treaty.

For States depositing their instruments of ratification or

accession after the 180 day period, negotiation of such agreements

shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such

agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months

after the date of initiation of negotiations.”

The significant features of Article III-2 are that (1) the IAEA is assigned the

responsibility for implementing NPT safeguards as set forth in agreements to be

negotiated between the States and the International Atomic Energy in accordance

with the Statute of the Agency and the Agency’s Safeguards System, (2) the exclusive

purpose of the verification is the fulfillment of the States Treaty obligations with

a view to preventing the diversion of “nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
IX - 38

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

weapon or other nuclear explosive devices” - a significant departure from the

initial objective in the IAEA Statute to ensure that atomic energy “is not used

in such a way as to further any military purpose,” and, (3) of great importance,

the provision that safeguards would be required on all source or special fissionable

material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, i.e.,

full fuel cycle safeguards, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

This last provision marks a major advance over the facility specific safeguards

system which the Agency had developed under INFCIR 66/Rev. 2.

Information Circular/153. In order to adapt the IAEA’s Facility Safeguards System

to the new requirements for NPT safeguard on all the fissionable material within a

State, the Board of Governors of the IAEA established a committee shortly after the

NPT came into force to advise it on the agreements which would be required between

the Agency and the NPT Nations. This Safeguards Committee began negotiations in

June of 1970. Delegates from 48 Member States of the IAEA participated under the

chairmanship of the present Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Kurt Waldhein

and Prof. Bruno Straub from Hungary. By March of 1971 the negotiations had been

completed and in May of

entitled “THE STRUCTURE

1971 the Agency issued Information Circular/153 (10, op.cit.)

AND CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND STATES

REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS”.

The full text of INFCIRC/153 also has been reprinted as Appendix 4 in ‘NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROLIFERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY”, (1.

Nine months after INFCIRC/153 was issued, a “model agreement

embodied

designed

however,

the principles and safeguards procedures detailed in

for safeguarding

that in 1968 the

the full nuclear fuel cycle. It is

9 Op.cite)

had been drafted which

this Circular especially

interesting to note,

first country to take the step of unilaterally submitting
IX - 39

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

all of its nuclear activity to the IAEA was Mexico. This action was undertaken in

fulfillment of its obligation under Article XIII of the “Treaty for the Prohibition

of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America” (THE TLATELOLCO Treaty), (23) which entered into

force April 22, 1968. At the end of 1975 the Agency had safeguards agreements in

force with 64 states of which 44 were with states party to the NPT (24).

Some of the important provisions of INFCIRC/153 are summarized below and reproduced

in Annex 1. As required by the NPT the basic undertaking of INFCIRC/153 (Paragraph 1)

requires states party to the Treaty to accept safeguards on all source or special

fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory for the

exclusive purpose of verifying that this material has not been diverted to nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Thus the State is obligated to accept

full fuel cycle safeguards, the emphasis is on the diversion of material and the concern is with the use of such material for any nuclear explosive device even if its

stated application is for peaceful uses only, i.e., Peaceful Nuclear Explosive (PNE).

Under the Section on Implementation of Safeguards, Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, the document

repeats the provision included in INFCIRC/66 Rev. 2 concerning the protection of

commercial interests and industrial secrets and in Paragraph 5 repeats the prohibition

that the Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person

any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of the Agreement.

Paragraph 6 was drafted in response to the preambulatory paragraph to the NPT which,

as has been noted above, introduced the concepts of safeguarding the flow of materials

at certain strategic points. The need for cost effective safeguards is stressed and

the Agency is enjoined to take full advantage of all technological developments in

the field of safeguards. Finally, this paragraph directs that the Agency’s safeguards procedures should be concentrated on those stages in the fuel cycle where
IX - 40

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

nuclear material suitable for weapons purposes is available.

Paragraph 7 is of particular significance and described the establishment of a

national system of accounting for the control of nuclear materials. It is this

national system that provides the nuclear material accountancy’ data and the many

reports on which the INFCIRC/153 safeguards system depends. This paragraph also

contains the crucial right of Agency inspectors to make independent measurements

and observations in the course of verifying that there has been no diversion of

nuclear materials from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices.

Paragraph 8 is concerned with the provision of design information to the Agency.

In order to further protect the proprietary rights of the nuclear facilities the

Agency is directed, at the request of the State to examine the design information

on the premises of the State and such information need not be physically transmitted

to the Agency as long as it is available for examination on the premises of the State.

In Part 2 of INFCIRC/153 the objectives of safeguards are defined in paragraphs 28,

29 and 30. These important paragraphs state that: (1) the objective is the timely

detection of significant quantities of nuclear material to the manufacture of nuclear

weapons or for purposes unknown and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of

early detection, (2) material accountancy is

importance with containment and surveillance

(3) the technical conclusion of the Agency’s

the safeguards measure of fundamental

as important complementary measures and,

verification activities shall be a

statement in respect of each material balance area of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts

stated.
IX - 41

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

Compared with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 the Section on Design Information in INFCIRC/153,

Paragraphs 42 through 46, represents a considerable elaboration.

Paragraph 43 specifies that Design Information should be made available to the

Agency primarily to assist the Agency to monitor the flow of nuclear material,

those features relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance, and

those features which will assist in establishing material balance areas, the measurement of flow, and the procedures for physical inventory taking.

For the first time in Paragraph 46 the purpose of examination of Design Information

is specified in great detail . For example: to determine material balance areas

(MBAs), to establishing timing and procedures for taking physical inventories, to

establish research and reports requirements. Of particular interest is the provision that special material balance areas may be established around a process step

involving commercially sensitive information, such as the centrifuge cascade of an

uranium isotope separation plant. In such an arrangement Agency inspectors would not

have access to the cascade area.

The responsibilities of the national systems of accounting and control of nuclear

material with respect to the maintenance of records and the submission of reports

are elaborated in the sections on Record Systems, Paragraphs 51-58, and the Reports

Systems, Paragraphs 59-69. It is clear that NPT or full fuel cycle safeguards is

critically dependent on the effective operation of national systems of the States.

The purposes of the three different types of safeguards inspections, ad hoc, routine,

and special, are detailed in Paragraphs 71, 72 and 73. Routine inspections are, of

course, the most common and Paragraph 72 provides that these inspections are to be

made in order to (1) verify the consistency between records and reports, (2) verify the
IX - 42

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to

safeguards, and (3) verify the possible causes of material unaccounted for, etc.

In a significant change related to access for inspections, Paragraph 76 C and D provide for inspectors to have access only to the strategic points specified in the

subsidiary arrangements and the State may conclude that unusual circumstances require

extended limitation on access by the Agency. In this latter event the State and

Agency shall make arrangements which will enable the Agency to fully discharge its

safeguards responsibilities.

Finally, and of major importance are the Paragraphs 78 through 81, which are concerned with the frequency and intensity of routine inspections. The emphasis in these

paragraphs is on reducing to a minimum the number, intensity, duration and timing

of routine inspections consistent with effective implementation of safeguards, cost

effectiveness, and optimum use of inspection resources. Formulae are developed for

the maximum routine

reactors is limited

Facilities handling

inspection effect (MRIE). For example, the inspection effort for

to one sixth

plutonium or

of a man-year for each such facility in the State.

uranium enriched to more than 5% shall be allowed

30 /E man-days where, E is the inventory or throughput, whichever is greater, expressed

in effective kilograms. All other facilities are allowed a maximum of 1/3 + 0.4E

man-days where E is again the inventory or throughput in effective kilograms.

The Agency is required to duly consider in its safeguards the farm of the material,

the effectiveness of the State's accounting and control system and the characteristics

of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle.
IX - 43

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

It was the intent of the Delegations of the Member States that engaged in the

negotiations which preceded the drafting of INFCIRC/153 that NPT safeguards would

reflect the concepts of safeguarding the flow of nuclear materials at certain strategic

points that appeared in the preamble to the NPT. Facilities themselves were no

longer subject to safeguards as they had been under INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. The emphasis

. now was on limited access only to strategic points, the definition of material

balance areas, material accountancy and specific formulas for determining the

maximum routine inspection effort for any facility as a function of the annual

throughput of nuclear material. These departures from the original provisions in

the Statute of “access at all times to all places” have been compensated, at least

in part by the new requirements for national systems of accounting and control of

nuclear material and the redundancy that is inherent in the safeguarding of a State’s

full nuclear fuel cycle. These new functions are of immense value. One cannot help

but recall, however, the fact that the United States and the Canadian Delegation

supported by the Soviet Union, fought a loosing rear-guard action during the negotiations in the Safeguards Committee against those delegations which were determined

that NPT Safeguards would be held to a minimum, would be as nonintrusive as possible,

and could not possibly provide a competitive advantage to those which might not be

subject to safeguards because they were either not parties to the NPT or were nuclear

weapon States. There seems little question that in the minds of some of the delegations

the principal deterrent in the Non-Proliferation Treaty was political in nature and the

safeguards provision was secondary.

The critics of safeguards maintain that, in principle, no safeguards system can be

perfect yet perfection is what must be assured. Many difficult problems are cited.

Among them is the fact that in practice, the cumulative analytical errors in the

measurements of the flow of nuclear material in a State’s fuel cycle or even in a
Ix - 44

IAEA and International Safeguards-D.

large nuclear plant may be many times the amount of fissionable material required

to make an explosive device. Significant quantities are defined in terms of these

amounts. Recently, the problem of ’’critical time” has received close attention (27).

It is argued that now the time required to make an explosive device is so short that

safeguards are irrelevant. There is insufficient time to react or respond to a

detected diversion. However, in spite of the many limitations which have been so

carefully built into INFCIRC/153, it is the opinion of knowledgeable observers

that a technically sound and effective Safeguards System can be designed which will

meet the NPT objective of “timely detection of diversion of significant quantities

of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities.”

Given the constraints, the development of an effective safeguards system becomes

primarily a problem of manpower, money, and technological improvements. Some of the

results of the present technical analysis of this problem and the proposed technical

solutions are presented in the following section, IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual

and Safeguards Implementation Procedures.
IX - 45

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

E. IAEA SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL MANUAL AND SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES —. —

The Safeguards Technical Manual (STM). With the request of the Board of

Governors that the Director General use INFCIRC/153 as the basis of negotiating

NPT safeguards agreements between the Agency and the non-nuclear weapon States

party to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Staff of the

Department of Safeguards and Inspections assisted by experts from the Member

States began preparation of a Safeguards Technical Manual which would form the

basis of the procedures and techniques used in the Agency's Safeguards System.

Two sections of the STM have been completed and issued as technical documents by

the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTRODUCTION, PART A-SAFEGUARDS OBJECTIVES,

CRITERIA, AND REQUIREMENTS, (4.op.cit.) and, PART E-METHODS AND TECHNIQUES, (28).

An outline of the Safeguards Technical Manual is included as Annex 1. The remaining sections, PART B, NUCLEAR ACTIVITY AND FACILITY, PART C, INSPECTIONS, PART D,

EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION, AND PART F, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES,

should be available for distribution in early 1977.

The Introduction to Part A is a concise statement of the Agency’s understanding

of its responsibilities, the identity of the State as the potential diverter and the

necessarily adversary nature of Agency safeguards. The first five paragraphs are

reproduced below:

“INTRODUCTION

“Nuclear and non-nuclear material, services, facilities, equipment

and information which are to be used for legally defined purposes may

be deliberately diverted from these purposes. Potential diverters are

facility operators, individuals or groups of individuals and States.
IX - 46

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

The actions aimed at the detection and deterrence of this diversion

are known as safeguards. The IAEA is authorized by its Statute to

accept the responsibility of establishing and administering safeguards

subsequent to a ‘safeguards agreement’ with a State or States.

“All safeguards agreements are built on the basis of an undertaking

by the State. Before the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons came into force this undertaking had always been that ‘special

fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and

information’ shall not be ‘used in such a way as to further any military

purpose’. States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) undertake

not to divert ‘nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices’ . For the application of safeguards

these States also have to conclude with the IAEA agreements

where this undertaking is incorporated by reference.

“IAEA safeguards are aimed at the timely detection of diversion by States

having undertaken to accept safeguards in accordance with an agreement

between the IAEA and the State and at the deterrence of such diversion by

the risk of early detection by the IAEA. NPT safeguards agreements specify

the procedures to be applied for safeguarding nuclear material.

“The IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual describes principles, procedures

and techniques for safeguarding nuclear material. Tile IAEA has to decide

in each particular situation whether these principles, procedures and

techniques enable it to fulfill the responsibility of safeguarding nonnuclear material, services, facilities, equipment and information.
IX - 47

IAEA and International Safeguards-?.

“In the Manual, the principle has been adopted that, under any type

of safeguards agreement, the objective of IAEA nuclear material safeguards

is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear

material. The principle has also been adopted that, unless the IAEA Governing

Organs establish other guidelines in this respect, the IAEA assumes that

the goal of its safeguards procedures is to detect, if it would be missing

in a State in a period of one year, the quantity of nuclear material needed

to manufacture a single nuclear explosive device.”

To this statement should be added the following excerpt from the Introduction to

Chapter 2, DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL:

“In the context of IAEA safeguards, the State with its corresponding

capabilities and resources is considered as the potential divertor and

the probability of attempted diversion is considered small but finite.

The purpose of diversion is assumed to be the acquisition of nuclear

material for uses proscribed by the relevant safeguards agreement.”

This Chapter includes a systematic analysis of the diversion strategies which could

be used by a State in the acquisition of nuclear material. These diversion strategies

could involve:

“a single facility or a number of facilities cooperating in the diversion

and its concealment. Diversion could involve material already in a form

suitable for the intended use or in a form requiring further processing

before such use. This further processing could be undertaken immediately

or the diverted material could be stockpiled for processing and used at

a later time. The diverter may attempt to use safeguarded facilities to
IX - 48

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

process material which has been diverted at another safeguarded facility,

or material which either is at the starting point of safeguards or has

already undergone some processing and which must be under safeguard but

has not been declared by the State. Such an attempt would provide the

IAEA with a chance to detect at a facility material which had not previously been in a safeguarded facility or material which had been previously diverted.

"The material might be diverted in either a single removal or repeated

removals. Immediate detection by the IAEA can only be possible if it

applies strict containment and surveillance measures. Verification of

the physical inventory and of the material balance provides for a delayed

opportunity for detection of diversion.”

The Chapter concludes with a section on the importance of diversion. The observation is made that:

“The importance of the diversion depends on the type and amount of

diverted material. Materials, e.g., plutonium and highly enriched

uranium, which are of immediate use for nuclear explosive devices represents a greater hazard than does the material which requires a lengthy

and complex process to be used for these devices.”

Table 11 taken from this Chapter, provides rough estimates of the times required to

convert different materials to materials suitable for nuclear explosive devices.
IX - 49

cc

I c

u

1

W

0

t

i

I

u

0u

0u

0 --- 1

r- . . . w

I

I

0u

c

c)

h

CJ

u

---- *

c.

cn

I

I

,I

t

G

o

,.

——— —--— ...
IX - 50

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

The remaining three Chapters of Part A of the STM, the IAEA Safeguards System,

the States System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, and Guidelines

for Application of IAEA Safeguard represent the most concise and definitive statement

for both critics and advocates alike of the limitations and capabilities of international safeguards. This document should be carefully read and understood. Chapter

111 concludes with the following statement:

“The technical conclusion of the IAEA’s verification activities

shall be 'a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of

the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, giving

the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated’. It is important as a

measure of the degree of agreement between the measurements of the

operator and those of the IAEA and as a measure of the extent and the

accuracy of the IAEA's measurements that the technical conclusion of

the IAEA’s verification activities includes the operator’s MUF

(Materials Unaccounted For) adjusted for any differences between the

IAEA’s and the operator’s measurements and an estimate of the combined

measurement uncertainties as indicated in Section 5.3.4.

“The IAEA shall inform the State of the results of inspection and the

conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in the State,

in particular, by means of statements in respect of each material balance

area.”

Chapter IV discusses the INFCIRC/153 requirement that the State shall establish and

maintain a “State’s System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material” (SSAC).

The SSAC is essential for the effective implementation of NPT safeguards and provides

the following objectives for such a State System:
IX-5 1

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

“(a) to contribute to the detection and prevention of unauthorized

uses of nuclear material, detect losses of nuclear material, and provide

information that could lead to the recovery of missing material;

"(b) to provide the necessary means for the State to fulfill its

obligations in the field of accounting for and control of nuclear

material under international, contractual or other agreements;

“(c) to assist the management of nuclear facilities

of nuclear material to achieve optimum discharge of

imposed on them by the SSAC: and

or custodians

the obligations

“(d) to encourage the efficient, safe and economical use of nuclear

material by operators through the use of the control measures prescribed by the SSAC.”

Chapter V outlines the “Guidelines for the Application of IAEA Safeguards. This

Chapter concludes with a discussion of the problems of timely detection, significant

quantities, and detection probability and confidence levels. Guidelines are also

provided for the verification and the examination of design information, the

verification of the information contained in records and reports, the evaluation

of material unaccounted for, and guidelines for taking into account the SSAC's

activity,

Because of their relevance to any evaluation of Agency Safeguards effectiveness,

the Sections on Significant Quantities (5.1.2) and Detection Probability and Confidence

Level (5.1.3) are reproduced in Annex J. Based on the

required for fast critical masses and experiments with

significant quantities of nuclear material required to

amounts of uranium and plutonium

fast critical assemblies the

manufacture a single nuclear
IX - 52

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

explosive device has been taken by the IAEA to be:

(1) 8 kilograms of plutonium for all types of plutonium for which

the isotopic concentration of PU-238 does not exceed 80 percent.

(2) 8 kilograms of contained U-233 and U-235 when the combined weight

of the U-233 and the U-235 isotopes equal or exceed 20 percent of the

total weight and when the U-233 isotopic concentration is the larger of

the two isotopes. .

(3) 25 kilograms of contained U-235 when the isotopic concentration of

the U-235 is larger than the concentration of U-233.

This section ends with the observation that, given the relatively small amounts

of nuclear material required to make an explosive device, the IAEA would be confronted, for those States having a sizable scale of nuclear activity, with the

necessity of making a statement on the non-diversion of a very small fraction of the

State’s inventory of nuclear material. Table III is a summary of the accuracy of

material balance and frequency of inventory taking expected by the IAEA.

In the absence of any specific mention in either INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 or INFCIRC/153 of

the concepts of degree of certitude of detection (detection probability) or the concepts of degree of certitude of not concluding that a diversion has taken place when

it has not (confidence level) the IAEA has concluded that these two concepts are implicit in these documents. On the recommendation of Experts from the Member States,

the IAEA has cleared values of 95 percent for both the probability of detection and

the confidence level of detection.

In evaluating the performance of the Agency’s Safeguards System in the future, it is

these objectives, criteria and requirements that should be considered.
IX - 53

g

w-l

g

+

o

.:

Pi

.
IX - 54

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP's). In parallel with the preparation of

the Safeguards Technical Manual by the Division of Development, the Division of

Operations began the preparation of Safeguards Implementations Practices documents

(SIP) for each safeguarded facility. In contrast to the publication of the STM, the

SIP’S are classified as Safeguards Confidential by the Agency not only because these

documents are facility specific and may contain proprietary information which either

the facility operators or the State are unwilling to release but also because they

contain an Agency analysis of the diversion possibilities and the means the Agency

may use to detect such activities.

A model SIP outline has been reproduced as Appendix 8 in “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

and the International Atomic Energy Agency” (1, op.cit.).

The SIP’s are divided into two parts, a general part containing aspects which are

common to all facilities or groups of facilities in a State or States and a facility

part which is specific for each facility containing aspects which are particular to

the given facility, Material Balance Area (MBA) or group of MBA’s. The facility part

draws heavily on the information obtained from the design review of the facility and,

of particular significance, contains a detailed discussion of the diversion possibilities,

means of concealment and the safeguards approach which might be used to detect such

diversion.

Perhaps one of the most important functions of the SIP’s is that it formalizes the

Agency’s analysis of the limitations currently experienced in its safeguarding and

verification activities and identifies the improvements that should be made. Section

10 summarizes this situation.
IX-5 5

IAEA and International Safeguards-E.

1!1..0. Limitations

“The purpose of this important section is to draw attention to those

shortcomings in safeguards implementations at the facility which are

apparent at the time of preparing the SIP. For some reasons there may

be a lack of standardization, inadequate inspection, lack of facility

information, etc. This section will indicate where work remains to be

done. It will also inform the Inspector General and the Director of

the Division of Operations that the work is carried out with these

shortcomings by the Regional Section.

“The list of limitations can also be used as a check list and will remind

the persons concerned to work toward improved conditions. When the

situation changes, a revised SIP will have to be issued.”

Both the Safeguard Technical Manual and the Safeguards Implementation Procedures

reveal an understanding of the necessarily adversary nature of international

safeguards inspection and the resources that might be available to the potential

diverter, the State. These documents also reflect a determination on the

part of the IAEA to undertake meaningful verification and a determination to use

not only the best methods and techniques that are currently available but also to

remain in the fore-front of the State of the art. It should be observed that

these documents like the descriptions of the Agency’s Safeguards System which

preceded them will evolve and hopefully improve with experience in the years ahead.
IX - 56

IAEA and International Safeguards-F.

F. THE MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF SAFEGUARDS DATA.

As has been mentioned in the section of this report on the organization of the

IAEA and the Department of Safeguards and Inspections, the importance of the

collection, processing and analysis of the rapidly increasing amount of safeguards

data required by Information Circular 153 has been a subject of intense concern,

particularly in the last two years. Starting in the late 60’s, the Agency began

with a

system

very small staff the development of an indigenous data base management

for the processing of safeguards data and the preparation of reports. The

magnitude of

initially to

the decision

has actively

experts both

the problem to broaden the base of the Agency’s in-house capability led

the formation of the Information Treatment Group and, very recently, to

to establish a Division for Information Treatment. The United States

participated in this effort and has over the last

to advise and to work directly with the Agency on

two years provided

this critical problem.

The requirements for the Agency’s information handling

in the introduction of a report, by Gmelin, FUNCTIONAL

SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION HANDLING SYSTEM RELEASE 1, (29)

system have been summarized

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IAEA’S

which is quoted below:

11 2. INFCIRC/153 contains provisions that Member States, having concluded

Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information

and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and

material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance

area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards.
IX - 57

IAEA and International Safeguards-F.

“3. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain

an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location

and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards

on the basis of the reported information in order to support the

Agency’s verification activities in the field, to enable the

preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection

intensity,

“4. The provisions formulated in document INFCIRC/153 are specific

in respect of the details of Agency accountancy by requesting the

establishment of a modern and transparent accounting system, a

system based on the material balance and the inventory change concept.

These requirements reflect the recognition that the conventional

accountancy systems, based on concepts developed in 1945-1950, would

not cope with the information requirements of, for instance, IAEA

safeguards necessary to follow the nuclear material used in the

peaceful application of nuclear energy.”

The necessity to maintain the safeguards confidential nature of the information

received from the States and processed by the Data Base Information Handling System

has contributed to the very slow development of this System.

The realization that the existing Data Base System would not be able to process

the very large increases in Data anticipated as a result of the implementation of

the IAEA-EURATOM and Japanese Safeguards Agreements as well as the United States and

United Kingdom offers, led in October the selection of a commercially developed Data

Base Management System to cope with the IAEA’s problems. It is the intent to
IX - 58

IAEA and International Safeguards-F.

supplement the new Data Base System with as many as possible of the programs

developed for Release 1. However, important areas directly related to a full scale

use of all of the information obtained by the Agency remains to be programmed.

For example, information contained in inspector working papers are still processed

by hand, the critical area of analysis of the data remains to be programmed as does

the receipt and processing of data obtained from the non-destructive analysis

measurements made by the inspectors.

The creation of a new Division of Information Treatment and the increases in staff

of this group should make a major impact on this problem. The details of the

organization of the new Division have not been released, however, one suggestion is

a threefold division which would cover operational analysis, systems analysis and

data analysis. Such an organization would treat the data produced by the facility

itself, the data from the full fuel cycle of a State and the statistical treatment

of the data obtained from these sources. In order to meet the six-fold increase in

data to be processed which is estimated for the calendar year 1977, the staffing of

the new division for 1977 has been approved at 12 professionals and 14 GS positions.

For 1978 the recommendation is 13 professionals and 18 GS positions. The heavy

emphasis in INFCIRC 153 on Material Accountancy and Measurement of the Flow of Nuclear

Materials strongly suggests that the critical needs of this function in the months and

years ahead must be met, if the Agency is to fulfill its responsibilities under the NPT.

This formidable task is now being coordinated by an inter-agency U. S. team working

directly with the Staff of the IAEA to strengthen the Agency safeguards through

U. S. Gifts-in-kind. It should be stressed that this is an area where the other

major nuclear supplier states could make significant contributions. Every effort should

be made to persuade them to do so.
IX - 59

IAEA and International Safeguards-G.

G. THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. — .

In Article VII F of the Statute, the Director General and his staff are instructed to:

It . ..not disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential

information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official

duties for the Agency.”

As has been noted in the sections quoted above from Part B, Paragraphs 13 and 14 of

INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 and Part 1, Paragraph 5 of INFCIRC/153, this instruction has been

made much more explicit and has been amplified in a number of details. These

instructions initially intended to protect the commercial and industrial secrets of

the Member States now presents a serious obstacle in the efforts of these States

to ensure their bilateral safeguards responsibilities which have been transferred

to the Agency under trilateral agreements are being effectively implemented. It

appears that without an amendment to the Statute and major revisions to INFCIRC/66

and 153, the Agency cannot legally disclose specific information obtained during its

safeguards inspection or from the reports which have been submitted to it by the

Member States.

At the present time, the summary information on the safeguards activities of the

Agency made available to the Board of Governors by the Director General is identical

to the information included in the section on safeguards of the Annual Report. The

safeguards summary from the Agency's 1975 Annual Report is reproduced in Annex K

with the exception of Table 9 which is reproduced separately as Annex E.
IX - 60

IAEA and International Safeguards-G.

Although the information in the Annual Report is useful to the Board it does not

provide the necessary detail, if the Board is to evaluate the effectiveness of

the Agency’s Safeguards System.

In an effort to resolve this dilemma the Director General mentioned in his report

to the General Conference in September, 1976, his intention to submit periodically

to the Board of Governors a Special Safeguards Implementation Report (SSIR). It is

the intent of the Director General to present relevant information which would

enable the Board to arrive at an opinion with respect to the effectiveness of the

Agency’s safeguards without disclosing confidential information on specific facility

and, if possible, without jeopardizing the flexibility of safeguards implementation.

The form and content of this report has been reviewed by the Standing Advisory

Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) at its first meeting in December of 1975

and in subsequent meetings in May and October of 1976. It is generally assumed that

a complete evaluation of the Agency’s safeguards effort will include both quantitative

and qualitative information on the verification achieved. Any more specific assessment of the success of SSIR in meeting the requests of the nuclear exporting Member

States for reassurance on the Agency’s Safeguards System will have to await the

submission of this report to the Board of Governors.
IX - 61

IAEA and International Safeguards-H.

H. DETERMINATION OF NON-COMPLIANCE AND THE AGENCY’S RESPONSE.

As in the case of release of Safeguards Confidential information discussed

immediately above, the actions which the Agency can take in the face of noncompliance are described in general terms in Article XIIC of the Statute reproduced

in Annex A above and in more detail in paragraphs 18 through 22 of INFCIRC/153 which

are reproduced in Annex L.

The failure of a State to comply with the provisions of INFCIRC/153 and the Safeguards Agreement between the State and the Agency can obviously cover a wide range

of issues. At one end of the spectrum these failures might be trivial. They

might include inadequacies in the National System for Accounting and Control,

questions related to the content of records and reports, their prompt submission,

or at the opposite end of the spectrum, a failure to comply with the basic undertaking of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In general, these matters would be resolved

if possible within DSI or the Secretariat and, if sufficiently serious, would be

brought to the attention of the Board who shall

or States to remedy forewith any non-compliance

On matters of interpretation and application of

“call upon the recipient State

which it finds to have occurred.”

the Agreement, Paragraph 22 of

INFCIRC 153 provides that the issue be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of

three arbitrators. If this tribunal is not convened within 30 days either party may

requests that the dispute be

In practice, a determination

taken to the President of the International Court of Justice.

by the Director General that the Agency had not been

able to verify that there had not been a diversion of nuclear material would begin

in the Department of Safeguards and Inspections with a report from the Chief of a

Regional Section to the Inspector General that his inspectors, for example, had been
IX-6 2

IAEA and International Safeguards-H.

unable to verify an inventory, encountered unusually large, unexplained losses, or that

they had other evidence for. the diversion or the apparent diversion of nuclear material.

The inspector prior to the submission of his report would have endeavored, in turn,

to resolve the discrepancies with the facility operator or at the level of the

National System. Both the Agency and the Board are required to afford the State

every reasonable opportunity to provide whatever necessary reassurance is required.

There can be no question that initially, the Inspector General and the Director

General would be faced with a necessity to evaluate both the quantitative and

qualitative information before the Director General’s report was forwarded to the

Board of Governors. Many technical as well as subjective factors would have to be

weighed. These would include the effectiveness of the State system of accounting,

previous history, the magnitude of the suspected diversion, through-put of the

Facility, the precision and accuracy of the measurements by both the Facility operator

and the IAEA, the availability and reliability of the containment and surveillance

devices, the magnitude of the inspection effort, the performance of inspectors

themselves and, one suspects, questions of a political nature.
IX - 63

IAEA and International Safeguards-I.

1. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS.

If the Board of Governors is unable to resolve a question of nondiversion

brought to its attention by the Director General, it is instructed by the Statute

to report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and the

General Assembly of the United Nations. Under the Statute, the Board may also

“direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or

by a member and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to

the recipient member or group of members.” As a final act, the Agency may suspend

the membership of the State or States from the exercise of the privileges and

rights of the membership. Up until the present time there has not been, of course,

any occasion to exercise or test the interpretation of these powers. If, however,

the phrase “or by a member” is interpreted to include the Supplier States, the return

of this material and equipment at the “demand” of the Supplier States should considerably

strengthen the Agency’s position. The immensely more difficult problem of the actual

application of sanctions would have to be the responsibility of the individual Member

States and more particularly of the Supplier States acting individually or in concert.

As has already been noted, the Agency cannot prevent diversion nor does it have the

power to recover diverted material. It has no police powers.

In general, the Board of Governors operates by consensus. Votes are rarely taken

and a demand for vote is made only when a State feels that its vital interests are

at stake. The decision of the Board as well as the action of the General Conference

have been unique in the absence of the political discord which has characterized the

deliberations of many other international organizations. In spite of this record,

it is difficult to predict the actions of the Board of Governors should it be confronted with a report from the Director General that he could not verify in a specific
IX - 64

IAEA and International Safeguards-I.

State that there had been no diversion of nuclear material. Although it should

not be the case, the response of the Board to such an announcement might be conditioned by the identity of the State and whether or not it was on the Board.

Article XI of the Statute provides that:

“E. Each member of the Board of Governors shall have one vote.

Decisions on the amount of the Agency’s budget shall be made by a

two-thirds majority of those present and voting, as provided in

paragraph H of Article XIV. Decisions on other questions, including

the determination of additional questions or categories of questions

to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority

of those present and voting. Two-thirds of all members of the

Board shall constitute a quorum.”

One could imagine circumstances surrounding a Board vote on non-compliance in

which, regrettably, a majority might be difficult to obtain.

The present Board of Governors now includes representatives from thirty-four

states. It must be assumed that this group would not be completely free from

the regional, national, and political rivalries which separate the Member States

outside of the Agency. Further, it must be assumed that the Governors would operate

on instructions from their governments. In the final analysis any action by the

Agency whether it involves assistance to a Developing Country, a safeguards

inspection, or action by the Board of Governors on the diversion of nuclear materials

is possible only with the sufferance of a majority of the Member States. Should the

Board be confronted with a proven case of diversion, one must believe that the

Member States, recognizing the threat to all, will instruct their Delegations and

their Governors to take promptly those actions which are authorized by the Statute.
IX - 65

IAEA and International Safeguards-J.

J. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS.

There are several political and institutional factors which may be expected in

the next one to two years to have a marked impact on the effectiveness of the IAEA’s

ability to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. In general, officials,

both inside and outside of the IAEA believe that the Agency’s success or failure

not only in its safeguards endeavors but in the full range of activities which

are authorized in the Statute is dependent on the attitudes of the Member States.

In the safeguards area the question of the attitude of the Member States is probably

the most crucial factor. In spite of the progress that has been made with respect

to the need for effective and credible safeguards, there remains an urgent educational

need to enlarge the perceptions of the industrial states as well as the developing

states on the dangers which proliferation present to all. Given a cooperative

attitude by the

Energy Agency’s

Accountancy and

Member States, their determination that the International Atomic

safeguards will be effective, and that strong National Systems for

Control will be established and maintained, reasonable assurance can

be provided that the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes can be

detected. Failing this, and confronted with inadequate funding and over-riding

concerns for either national sovereignty, or the protection of industrial secrets,

the success of the

9

The most pressing,

Agency’s safeguards activities will be placed in serious doubt.

near term problem of an institutional nature directly affecting

the operations of the Agency as a whole and its safeguards efforts, in particular,

is the matter of the retirement, or imminent contract renewal of many key management

people at the highest levels in the Agency. The Director General is sixty-six years

old. If he is to have a successor, the nomination must be submitted to the Board of

Governors in June of 1977. Many of the members of the Director General’s immediate

staff are his contemporaries and are also approaching mandatory retirement. Of
Ix-66

IAEA and International Safeguards-J.

immediate concern is the fact that the contract covering the services of Dr. Rometsch,

the Inspector General, must be renegotiated or a replacement recruited by September

of 1977. The Agency has recently circulated a request for nominations for the

position of Director, Division of Operations, Department of Safeguards and Inspections.

As a result of the proposed reorganization of D.S.I., Directors will have to be

nominated for the new Division of Operations and the Division of Information.

Finally, the Head of the Section for Methods and Techniques, Division of Development

is also approaching mandatory retirement and a replacement for this position will

be required. The staffing of these positions will have a marked and long range

effect on the Agency as well as the performance and morale of the Department of

Safeguards and Inspections. It is not a matter in which decisions can be delayed.

Agency regulations, as well as the needs of the individuals involved require that

the personnel decisions in these areas be made as soon as possible.

The reorganization of the Department of Safeguards Inspections noted above was

planned to meet the major increase in safeguards activities resulting from the

implementation of the IAEA-EURATOM and Japanese Safeguards Agreements and the application of Agency Safeguards under the United States and United Kingdom offers. This

substantial increase in the operational activities of D.S.I. will place new and

exacting demands on the Department and on the management of the two Operations

Divisions. At the level of the Inspector General there will be an even greater need

for strong leadership and effective and imaginative management to meet this challenge.

It is too early to evaluate the impact of the very large increases which the

United States Congress has authorized to strengthen and support IAEA safeguards.

In fiscal 1975, approximately $200,000 was made available in gifts-in-kind through

the Foreign Assistance Act. In fiscal year 1977 a total of approximately
IX-6 7

IAEA and International Safeguards-J.

$1,600,000 will be available through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1977 for similar

gifts-in-kind. It was the recommendation of President Ford that approximately

$5,000,000 should be made available to the IAEA over the next five years. The

effective use of this money will require a careful and realistic assessment of

the Agency’ needs. The United States has established an Interagency Group to

coordinate this major effort with members drawn from ERDA, State, ACDA, NRC and

Following a meeting in Vienna in November with IAEA and U. S. Mission

staffs, an International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) under the direction of

Dr. H. Kouts was set up and a draft Program Plan for Technical Assistance to IAEA

Safeguards (30) prepared.

If the United States does not actively strive to broaden this type of support among

all of the Nuclear Supplier States and the Soviet Union, there is danger that the

United States will find itself carrying a disproportionately large part of the burden.

The report of a German decision to contribute approximately $300,000 in similar

support for IAEA is heartening and should be encouraged. There are many areas where

all of the supplier states could contribute from the training of inspectors to the

use of their most advanced nuclear facilities

newest safeguards procedures and techniques.

benefit. Those states that can contribute to

obligation to do so.

for the development and testing of the

Every state under safeguards would

the improvement of safeguards have an
IX - 68

IAEA and International Safeguards-K.

K. THE IAEA’S ROLE IN PHYSICAL PROTECTION.

As has been noted in the section of this report on the Statute of the IAEA

and in the excerpt” from the section on Objectives of INFCIRC/225 (14, op.cit.) reproduced in this report, the IAEA does not have any responsibility for the provision,

system.

provide

advisor

supervision, control or implementation of a State’s physical protection

The Agency may informally advise a State of its observations and it will

assistance only when so requested by the State. In its role as an informal

and at the urging of some of the Member States, the United States in

particular, the Agency has, in recognition of the importance of the problem of

physical protection, convened a small panel of experts from the Member States in

March of 1972. In connection with the recommendations of this panel of experts

the Agency has published a document entitled, “RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PHYSICAL

PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS”, (31), which summarize the views of this panel.

These recommendations were reviewed in early 1975 by experts from some of the

Member States for the purpose of updating the original publication and reflecting

the progress which had been made in the area of physical protection. The work of

this panel has been published in a document, THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR

MATERIALS, INFCIRC/225, (14, op.cit.). The Agency is well aware that physical

protection can make a substantial contribution to the effort of deterring the diversion of nuclear material, but it also recognizes that physical

nuclear material is an exclusive responsibility of the State, and

an integral part of the State’s National System of Accounting and

protection of

in some States,

Control.

At the present time, there does not appear a consensus in the Board of Governors,

even among the nuclear supplier states on the subject of physical protection. This

lack of consensus reflects deep seated national attitudes, for example the British

reluctance to arm its police and other civil forces. Without such a consensus it is
IX - 69

IAEA and International Safeguards-K.

not possible to take more positive steps in this area. Even though it is unlikely

that the legal responsibilities of the IAEA in this area will change in the near

future, the Agency recognizes the need to bring this problem to the attention of a

much larger number of other states. It is considering, at this time, the possibility,

of convening a meeting on the subject of physical protection for some time in the

early part of 1977. In its advisory capacity, the Agency can act as a center for

information of physical protection, it can convene, if requested, scientific meetings

and symposia on the subject, although no such request has yet been received by the

Agency from any country, and finally it could offer technical assistance in this

area if asked.

The United States in concert with the IAEA and several other countries is also

pursuing the drafting of an International Convention on Physical Security. This

initiative was first proposed in a speech by the U. S. Secretary of State, Dr.

Kissinger to the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1974. In this

address, Dr. Kissinger proposed that:

“The United States will urge the IAEA to draft an International

Convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion

of nuclear material. Such a convention should set forth specific standards

and techniques for protecting material while in use, storage, and transfer.”

The following year on September 22, Dr. Kissinger said in his address before the

General Assembly that:

“The United States has intensified its efforts within the IAEA and with

other nations to broaden and strengthen international standards and safeguards

and has proposed an international convention setting standards to protect

the physical security of nuclear material in use, storage or transfer.”
IX - 70

IAEA and International Safeguards-K.

A revised draft of an International Convention on Physical Protection is now being

reviewed. In spite of the Importance and urgency of the problem, previous experience

with international conventions suggests that prompt action in this area may not be

forthcoming.
Ix - 71

IAEA and International Safeguards-L.

L. THE IAEA REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTER STUDY.

With the growth and spread of nuclear power throughout the world a number of

critical questions have arisen with respect to the storage and reprocessing of

spent fuel, the storage of radioactive waste, the fabrication of mixed oxide

fuel and the stockpiling of plutonium. These matters and related questions of

physical security and safeguarding of such facilities were discussed at the

General Conference of the IAEA in 1974, and within the General Assembly of

the United Nations where Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger took the occasion to

draw the world’s attention to these growing problems. In response to these concerns the IAEA undertook a preliminary study of the economic benefits that might

result from regional centers for reprocessing and waste management. The results

of this study were published by the Agency in September of 1975 (32) and suggested

that the economic benefits were sufficient to justify a further detailed study.

Figure 3 is an organization chart of the present, detailed IAEA study on Regional

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers (RFCC). The comprehensive nature of this undertaking can

be seen from the project elements which include mathematical modeling, fuel reprocessing,

waste management, mixed oxide fuel fabrication, fuel storage, transport, and the

questions of legal and institutional matters. The first of the many reports to be

issued by the IAEA was released in July, 1976, (33) on the Institutional-Legal

Framework Aspects of the RFCC Study. An outline of the RFCC’s Study Project Summary

Report is given in Annex M. Publication of the remaining reports are expected in

time for distribution at the Saltzburg Conference in May of 1977. A status report on

the IAEA study project was issued in September 1976 (34). The status report is reproduced in Annex N.
Project Elements

REGIONAL NUCLEAR

FUEL CYCLE CENTRES

STUDY PROJECT

I

\

I

CHARACTERISTIC

OPERATIONS AND

COST DATA

ASSOCIATED

STUDIES RELATING

TO REGIONAL

CENTRES

4

I

1

# ● t 9 + t ● 4

POWER

GENERATION SPENT FUEL SPENT FUEL WASTE RADIOACTIVE

& SPENT FUEL STORAGE REPROCESSING MANAGEMENT MATERIAL

k

DISCHARGES TRANSPORTATION

\ b 4 + * c

-

FINANCIAL

I
IX-7 3

IAEA and International Safeguards-L.

The report on Institutional-Legal Framework Aspects reviews some of the advantages

and the disadvantages of the RFCC approach. The advantages include economy of

scale, the rational use of technological and financial resources, improved assurances

that safeguards and physical protection would be achieved in the interests of all

States, and improved management for the safe disposal of high activity radioactive waste. The drawbacks cited include a further spread of sensitive technology,

the reduction of freedom for unilateral action by states, concerns about the

effects of inter-country frictions on the dependability of fuel supply and the

substantial commitment of capital and resources that would be required for individual fuel cycle centers in each of the countries of the region. The report

also reviews the organization and experience in the nuclear field of three operating

multinational activities, EURODIF and Eurochemic, and URENCO. The main topics

covered are legal status and structures, governmental/non-governmental roles, internal

administrative structures, commercial/service roles, industrial arrangements,

technology (use, control, etc.), basic financial policy considerations, privileges

and guarantees, membership, duration, etc., and international agreements.

A more detailed analysis of the multi-national or regional fuel cycle centers have

identified the following: potential problems and limitations:

- the interpretation of Article IV of the NPT by signators of the Treaty,

i.e., “the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in the,

fullest possible exchange of equipment, materially and scientific and .

technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”
IX - 74

IAEA and International Safeguards-L.

- the RFCC’s would not necessarily stop participating States from

building small indigenous reprocessing plants

- the possibility of abrogation and take over of the RFCC

- the large RFCC’s would unavoidably encounter problems of precision

and accuracy of measurements of material unaccounted for associated

with large throughput and material flow,

the RFCC might/would speed rather than contain the spread the transfer

of sensitive technology.

- the plutonium obtained from a RFCC and used in mixed oxide fuels

(MOX) could still be easily separated prior to irradiation of the fuel

in a reactor and diverted.

In addition to the economies of scale. improved safeguards and enhanced physical

protection noted above, RFCC's could have tile following advantages:

- the reduction of regional rivalries and the incentive for small,

inefficient national reprocessing plants.

- the reduction of incentives for premature reprocessing of spent fuel.

- the reduction of safeguards costs.

- the limitation of the spread of sensitive technology
IX - 75

IAEA and International Safeguards-L.

- an enhanced role for the IAEA

- the early establishment of regional spent fuel storage sites to

reduce requirements for early reprocessing.

The Director General in his statement to the General Conference in September said

“’The Secretariat’s study tends to indicate that such projects would be advantageous

from an economic, safety, physical security, and safeguards point of view*’. There

are many critics who would take exception to this statement. The question of the

economics of reprocessing is still a subject of intense debate. There does, however,

appear to be an important role for the IAEA in the supervising the storage of spent

fuel and in the management of separated plutonium, two possible functions for

a RFCC. It is possible that Article XII(A5) of the Statute which provides for

the deposit with the Agency of any excess of any special fissionable material

recovered or produced as a product over what is needed for immediate use may

provide the legal basis for a solution to dangerous situations.
IX - 76

APPENDIX IX-D

EURATOM AND REGIONAL SAFEGUARDS

by

Stieff Research and Development Co., Inc.
IX - 77

EURATOM AND REGIONAL SAFEGUARDS

A. —The Treaty of Rome.

The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, was

signed on the 25th of March, 1957 by Representatives of the Governments of Belgium,

Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Since that time, the

European Community has been enlarged by the accession of three new Member States;

the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. With the signing of the Treaty, and the

simultaneous signing of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,

the first multi-national safeguards system was created. This Treaty delegated

to the Community and to its executive body the Commission, the responsibility of

controlling the nuclear materials within their territories. With this act,

the Member States relinquished real and significant aspects of their power and

national sovereignty to the Community. The history of EURATOM has been summarized

by Warren H. Donnelly, (35) in a report prepared for the Subcommittee On National

Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

U. S. House of Representatives.

The safeguard objectives, rights, and responsibilities of EURATOM are contained in

Chapter 8, Safeguards, Articles 77 through 85 of the Treaty, (36). These articles

are reproduced in full in Annex O.

“in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter that the Commission

shall satisfy itself that, in the territories of the Member States (a) ores,

source materials and special fissile materials are not diverted from their

intended use as declared by the users;”

The provision of this Article are of particular interest for two reasons. First,

safeguards in the EURATOM systems begins with the ore as contrasted with IAEA safeguards

which under Information Circular/153, para. 33 states:
IX - 78

“safeguards shall not apply thereunder to materials in mining or

ore processing activities.”

Second, the phrase,

“as declared by the users”,

is in marked contrast to the undertaking

in the NPT or in INFCIRC/153, that "such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons

or other nuclear explosive devices,” or the Statute’s phrase not “to further

any military purpose.” This formulation apparently reflects the French insistence

that the EURATOM Treaty must not restrict her national atomic program nor her right

to produce and use atomic weapons for national security.

The design review provisions of the IAEA Safeguards Systems find their

equivalent in Article 78 which provides that “Anyone setting up or operating

an installation for the production, separation or other use of source material

or special fissile material or for the processing or radiating nuclear fuel

shall declare to the Commission the basic technical characteristics of the

installation to the extent that knowledge of these characteristics is necessary

for the attainment of the objective set out in Article 77.” Thus, although the

EURATOM Treaty does not prevent a State from constructing facilities to manufacture

nuclear weapons it does prevent facilities whose declared functions are in the

peaceful uses of atomic energy from being used for weapons purposes. This aspect

of the Treaty has been strengthened by the ratification of the NPT by the EURATOM

countries with the exception of France.
IX - 79

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards

The records provisions of the EURATOM Treaty are covered in Article 79. Article

80 contains a provision, analoguous to Article X11(5) of the Statute that specifies

“the Commission may require that any excess special fissile material recovered

or obtained as bv-products and not actually being used or ready for use shall be

deposited with the Agency or in other stores which are or can be supervised by the

Commission”. The rights and privileges of the Commission to send inspectors to the

territories of the member states are covered in Article 81, and this Article contains

the important right of the inspectors who “shall at all times have access to all

places and data and all persons who by reason of their occupation deal with

materials, equipment or installation subject to the safeguards provided for in

this chapter.”

These very broad inspection rights are in fact exercised by the EURATOM

inspectors. For example, it is reported that in recent EURATOM inspections

of the URENCO Centrifuge Enrichment Plant in Almelo, the Netherlands, the centrifuge cascade itself has been included as part of inspection. Under the procedures

which the IAEA expects to use for enrichment plant safeguards, its inspectors

would not have access to the cascade area because of the commercial sensitivity

and weapons potential of the technology.

The actions which the Commission may take in the event of non-compliance with

the provisions of the Treaty, are outlined in Articles 82 and 83. These actions

include in Article 83(1) “(c) the placing of the undertaking for a period not

exceeding four months under the administration of a person or board appointed by

common accord of the commission of the state having jurisdiction over the

undertaking; and (d) total or partial withdrawal of source materials for special

fissile materials.” Under Article 83(4) of the Treaty “the member states shall

insure that sanctions are enforced and where necessary that the infringements are

remedied by those committing them.
IX - 80

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-B.

B. REGULATION NO. 7 AND NO. 8

Regulation No. 7 which outlines the procedures for completing the

laid down in Article 78 of the Treaty was approved by the Commission

Brussels on the 18th of February, 1959. The Regulation and its Annex

declarations

in

specify

the Design Information which should be provided for the Commission in what is

the equivalent of the IAEA Safeguards System’s design review questionnaire.

It requires a brief description and general plan of the installation, a description

of the technical processes employed, a description of the methods used in the

installation for measuring and checking the quantity and quality of materials which

are subject to safeguards and information on the composition and nature of the

nuclear production of the nuclear materials used or produced in the facility as

well as its annual capacity.

Regulation No. 8 approved on the 12th of March 1959 defines the nature and extent

of the requirements referred to in Article 79 of the Treaty. This Regulation

specified the records and reports that the Commission would require in order to

determine the quantity and nature of the materials subject to safeguards and in

actual existence in the community, the place where they are located and the

transfers in which they are involved. This Regulation is analogous to the

Sections on Records and Reports of the IAEA Safeguards System. The facility

operator has a relatively large degree of freedom in the manner the records are

kept. The records, however, must contain all of the necessary data which are or

may be required for the material accountancy of all source or special fissionable

material and the operator must be able to substantiate the reports which are made.

The records must be

separately for each

centration of ores,

accessible to the inspector. Each facility must report

material and for each “stage of production” such as the conchemical reprocessing of concentrates, production of hexafluoride
IX - 81

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-B.

enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, etc. In general, reports are required

monthly and indicate all inventory changes of the facility and include an

inventory statement of all of the materials present in the last day of the month.
IX - 82

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-C.

c . THE EURATOM SAFEGUARD SYSTEM

In 1960 approximately one hundred nuclear facilities within the Community

were covered by EURATOM Safeguards. This number had grown to approximately

four hundred by 1975. Table IV and Table V are taken from the review article

by Schleicher, (37) which describes the Euratom Safeguards System and which

summarizes both the number of installations and the amount of nuclear

material under EURATOM control.

TABLE IV

TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS IN CATEGORIES

IN JANUARY 1975

! Category t Number ?

1 f

Safeguarded 1

t ? t

Research laboratories

Mines

Mineral concentration

Mineral refining

Enriched uranium production

Fuel preparation

Fuel production

Reprocessing

Research reactors

Critical assemblies)

Subcritical assemblies)

Power reactors

Stores

87

28

8

6

7

8

27

13

72

47

65

20

t ? —-

t
IX - 83

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-C.

TABLE

AMOUNTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL UNDER EURATOM CONTROL

IN JANUARY 1975

v Type t

Quantity (Kg element) ‘

t ? I

? Plutonium ?

14 844 t

t ? ?

? Enriched uranium t 3 529 985 f

v f t

I Natural uranium ? 32 744 760 1

1

Depleted uranium t

6 467 924 t

? t t

The rate of growth of the EURATOM system is expected to increase with twentyfive new nuclear power stations under construction, the addition of major new

facilities for uranium enrichment planned and started, and with the implementation

of United Reprocessors, the European reprocessing cartel, well under way.

At the present time the Safeguards Directorate of the Commission, which is located

Luxembourg, has a staff of approximately 110 people. The staff, as is the custom with

all European Community Organizations, is drawn from all nine Member States. Because

of the confidential nature of safeguards, each staff member is cleared for access to

secret material. The Directorate is subdivided into three divisions, each Division

being responsible for the inspection of certain specific types of facilities. A

special service group provides computer support and is responsible for processing

the monthly material accountancy reports. Of the 60 inspectors on the EURATOM staff
IX - 84

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-C.

approximately 50 participate routinely in inspections. Roughly one-third are

university graduates. It is the EURATOM practice that the inspectors specialize

in certain types of installation and are responsible for these installations whereever they may be found within the European community. The inspector proposes the

inspection methods to be used for specific facilities, examines the records and

reports of the facility, reviews the differences between the operators declarations

and his findings and makes the first recommendation on the admissibility of losses

and wastes reported by the facility operator. The final decision on this latter

matter is made at the level of the Directorate.

The EURATOM data processing system currently handles approximately 20,000 entry

lines each month from the 400 installations under safeguards and has recently been

described by Schmitt and Kschwandt (38). The accounting system is based on batch

processing in the computer sense rather than the material balance area concept used

by the IAEA. This basic difference has required major reprogramming efforts on the

part of the EURATOM staff in order to meet the requirements of INFCIRC/153. The

first test-runs of the revised monthly reports using magnetic tapes have been

processed in Vienna without major difficulties.

The preliminary budget for EURATOM safeguards for the year 1977 is estimated at

approximately 732,000 units of account(u.a. ) or, approximately $800,000. if the

conversion factor of 1.1 is used for the u.a. A copy of the preliminary draft of the

General Budget for expenditures relating to safeguards is reproduced in Annex P.
IX - 85

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-D.

l’). IAEA/EURATOM SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. — —

In fulfillment of their obligation under Article 3 of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty the representatives of the seven non-nuclear weapons states of the European

Community and, the representatives for the European Atomic Energy Community, and

for the International Atomic Energy Agency signed on April 5, 1973 the “TEXT OF AN

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THE AGENCY IN CONNECTION

WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." This Agreement

incorporates the principles and in many instances the phraseology used in drafting

INFCIRC/153. There are, however, some significant differences. The most important

issues concern the nature of the inspection activities which the IAEA may perform

during its verification of EURATOM safeguards and the question of access and

inspection effort.

Article 3(b) contains the sentence, “... The Agency’s verification shall include,

inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in

accordance with the procedures specified in this Agreement.”

In the Protocol to the Agreement which is reproduced in Annex A, Article 14, the

question of the Agency’s activities are described in more detail. For example, it

is provided in paragraph (a) that

“the Agency inspections shall be carried out simultaneously with

the inspection activities of the Community. Agency inspectors shall

be present. during the performance of certain of the Community

inspections. 11
IX - 86

Paragraph (b) provides that

“whenever the Agency can achieve the purposes of its routine

inspections set out in the Agreement, the Agency inspectors shall

implement the provisions of Articles 74 and 75 of the Agreement through

the observation of the inspection activities of the Community inspectors,

provided, however, that:

“(i) With respect to inspection activities of Agency inspectors .

to be implemented other than through the observation of the

inspection activities of the Community inspectors, which can

be foreseen, these shall be specified in the Subsidiary

Arrangements; and

“(ii) In the course of an inspection, Agency inspectors may carry

out inspection activities other than through the observation of

the inspection activities of the Community inspectors where

they find this to be essential and urgent. If the Agency could

not otherwise achieve the purposes of its routine inspections and

this was unforeseeable.”

The Agency’s position with respect to the interpretation of the word “observation”

is presented in the introduction Chapter 3, of the IAEA Safeguards Technical

Manual (28, op. cit.).
IX - 87

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-D.

“INTRODUCTION

“3.1 The IAEA safeguards system must

verify that a State has complied with

in the relevant safeguards agreement.

enable the IAEA to

its undertaking as specified

The safeguards responsibilities

and rights of the IAEA can not, therefore, be delegated to the

State or to any organization to which the State has delegated

the State’s responsibilities. The IAEA system has been conceived

to ensure the timely detection of diversion that might be attempted

by the wide range of strategies described in Chapter 2. For these

reasons the IAEA must verify the completeness, formal correctness

and validity of the information (including all records and reports)

made available by the State, regardless of the nature or level of

the verification activities carried out by the State.

The important matters at issue between the IAEA and EURATOM concern

tation of the word ‘Observation”. In resolving this matter it will

to consider the Agency’s statutory requirements as well as the need

the interprebe necessary

to prevent unnecessary duplication of effort, unnecessarily high costs for safeguards, inspections,

and the preservation of the EURATOM Safeguards System itself. In this, as in other

crucial questions related to Safeguards, the attitudes of the parties involved is

of major importance and a solution to the problem can be found if it is the desire

of all sides to do so.
IX - 88

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-E.

E. THE NEW REGULATION

On September 22, 1976 the Commission of the European communities published a

new regulation concerning the application of the provisions on EURATOM safeguards

(6, op. cit.). The new Regulation has EURATOM Treaty Articles 77, 78, 79 and 81

as its legal basis. It was

EURATOM Safeguards Agreement

used this occasion to define

prepared in accordance with the IAEA

concluded on the 5th of April 1973. The Commission

new procedures to be used in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Treaty of Rome, to make the necessary changes and

modifications in EURATOM procedures so that its reports would be compatible with

IAEA requirements, and to modify the EURATOM nuclear materials accounting procedures

so that they would be

The first part of the

fundamental technical

in accordance with the requirement of the IAEA.

Regulation concerns the declaration and verification of the

characteristics of installations for the production, separation

or utilization of source or special fissile materials or the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels. The declaration involves notification of the installations

programmed. The second part of the Regulation specifies the accounting system for

nuclear materials. The system involves accounting and operating records and includes

information on the quantities, nature, form and composition of the materials. The

third part regulates imports and exports of source and special fissile materials.

The fourth part contains specific provisions applicable to ore producers, carriers and

intermediaries.
IX - 89

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-E.

The fifth part, under Article 35, lays down specific provisions applicable in

the territories of the nuclear- capon Member States. It is stipulated that the

Regulation shall not be applicable to installations or materials allocated to

defense by a Member State which is not a party to the Verification Agreement. The

Regulation is nevertheless applicable, in a manner to be agreed between Commission

and Member State, to installations and materials which are only temporarily or

partially assigned to a defense requirements.

Schleicher, (37, op.

Safeguards Agreement

System with the much

cit.) in discussing the implementation of the IAEA/EURATOM

contrasts what he describes as the flexibility of the EURATOM

more formal character of the IAEA System. Concern is

expressed for the additional safeguards burden which will result from the IAEA

requirements for verification of physical inventories. The possibility is

specifically mentioned of the need to shut-down large nuclear facilities in order to

take such inventories and the considerable expenses which

entail. Coupled with this inventory verification problem

is the additional burden resulting from the requirement by

such a shut-down would

in Schleicher’s view

the Agency for relatively

large numbers of destructive analyses for uranium and plutonium. These analytical

requirements would significantly increase the cost of safeguards. As has been

mentioned, the major differences in the accounting and reporting procedures as

well as the data analysis methods used by the two safeguards system reflect

fundamental differences in safeguards philosophy. Once again these difficult and

practical problems can be resolved if both parties are determined to work for a

mutually acceptable solution.

The Director General of the IAEA reported in his speech to the General Conference

that:
IX - 90

EURATOM and Regional Safeguards-E.

“At our General Conference in Mexico in 1972, I was pleased

to announce that the Board and the Council of Ministers of

the European Communities had approved the NPT Agreement between

the Agency and EURATOM and the States concerned, I had hoped

to be able to inform the General Conference at this session that

the Agreement had entered into force, but I am, unfortunately,

not yet able to do so. I must draw attention to the fact that

even under the most liberal interpretation, the time limit set

by NPT for the entry into force of that Agreement will expire

early in November this year. I do hope that I shall be able

to inform the General Assembly of the United Nations later this

year that the ratification of NPT by the countries concerned,

which was met with so much gratification in Nay last year,

has been consummated by the entry-into-force within the statutory

time limit of the IAEA/EURATOM Safeguards Agreement.”

At this writing, the statutory time limit has passed and the IAEA/EURATOM Safeguards

Agreement is not in force.
IX - 91

APPENDIX IX-E

NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS CONSULTATIONS - 1

by

Ted Greenwood
IX - 92

Suppliers Consultations - 1

Since the dawn of the nuclear age no student of nuclear matters

has doubted that any country that learned enough about nuclear technology to operate a nuclear power industry would in the process learn

a great deal that is relevant for the design and fabrication of nuclear

weapons. With varying levels of success the international community

has sought to respond to what has been perceived to be a threat to

world peace and security from this overlap between peaceful and military

uses of atomic energy. The great successes include the establishment

of the international safeguards system of the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

in Latin America and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Within

this same tradition have been efforts of nuclear supplier states to

act in concert to minimize the likelihood that the diffusion of peaceful nuclear technology will encourage or make easier the spread of

nuclear weapons.

The First Suppliers' Agreement

On August 22, 1974, Australia, Denmark, Canada, the Federal

Republic of Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet

Union, the United Kingdom and the United States filed identical

memoranda with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy

Agency concerning “procedures in relation to exports of (a) source

or special fissionable material, and (b) equipment and material

designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special

fissionable material."l

As stated by all these states, except the

Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands which had at the time

not yet ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, these memoranda were intended

to coordinate the fulfillment of “commitments under Article III paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not

to provide such items to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful

purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material is subject
IX - 93

to safeguards under an agreement with the International Atomic Energy

Agency." 2

The documents relating to this agreement were distributed

by the IAEA in INFCIRC/209, a copy of which is provided as Appendix A.

The agreed procedures and the so-called Trigger List was the

result of several years of negotiation and represented the first

major agreement on uniform regulation of nuclear exports by actual and

potential nuclear suppliers. It had great significance for several

reasons. It was an attempt to enforce strictly and uniformly the

obligations of Article III paragraph 2 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

It was intended to reduce the likelihood that as a result of competition in the sale of nuclear equipment and fuel cycle services, states

would be tempted to cut corners on safeguard requirements. In addition,

and very important in the light of subsequent events, it established

the principle that nuclear supplier nations should consult and agree

among themselves on procedures to regulate the international market

for nuclear materials and equipment in the interest on non-proliferation.

Notably absent from the list of participant actual or potential suppliers

as from the list of parties to the NPT were France, India and the

People's Republic of China. By 1974,

to one of respect for the agreed-upon

matters related to nuclear exports to

the NPT.

The 1976 Agreement

however, French policy had changed

Trigger List and in all other

act as if she were a party to

Within a year of the delivery of these memoranda a second series

of supplier negotiations were underway. 3

This round, convened largely

at the initiative of the United States, was a response to the Indian

nuclear test of May 1974, mounting evidence that the pricing actions of

the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries were stimulating third

world and other non-nuclear states to initiate or accelerate their

nuclear power programs, and recent contracts or continuing negotiations

on the part of France and West Germany for the supply of enrichment

or reprocessing facilities to third world states, The initial participants

in these discussions, conducted in London under the veil of official

secrecy, were Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan,

the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.
IX - 94

Two major issues were discussed in the series of meetings leading

to a new agreement in late 1976. The first was whether and if so

under what conditions technology and equipment for enrichment and

reprocessing, the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle from

a weapons proliferation perspective, should be transferred to nonnuclear states. The United States, with support from several other

participants was reported to argue in favor of a prohibition on such

transfer and a commitment to reprocessing in multinational facilities.

France had already signed contracts to sell a small reprocessing plant

to Pakistan and South Korea and West Germany had agreed to sell

technology and facilities for the full fuel cycle to Brazil. They

successfully resisted the prohibition proposed by others. The

second issue was whether transfers should be made to states unwilling

to submit all non-military nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards,

or whether total industry safeguards should become a condition on sales.

On January 27, 1976, the seven participants in the negotiations

exchanged letters endorsing a uniform code for conducting international

nuclear sales. The major provisions of the agreement require that

before nuclear materials, equipment or technology are transferred, the

recipient state must:

10

2.

3.

4.

pledge not to use the transferred materials, equipment or technology in the manufacture of nuclear explosives;

accept, with no provision for termination, international safeguards on all transferred material and facilities employing

transferred equipment or technology, including any facility that

replicates otherwise employs transferred technology;

provide adequate physical security for transferred nuclear facilities

and materials to prevent theft and sabotage; and

agree not to retransfer the materials,

third countries unless they too accept

replication, security and transfer and

nation concurs in the transactions.

equipment or technology to

the constraints on use,

unless the original supplier

There is of course a problem in trying to impose such

the diffusion of technology. Technical advances made

country may alter the initial technology to the point

constraints on

by the recipient

where it can be
reasonably claimed to be

handled by specifying an

years - within which all

IX - 95

different technology. Such ambiguities are

arbitrary time period - reported to be twenty

related technology will be unambiguously

considered to be transferred technology and after which differing interpretations may be possible. The basic obligation, however, is not

limited in time. A copy of the news release of February 23, 1976 of

the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency discussing these provisions is attached as Appendix B.

Evaluation of the 1976 Agreement

It is important to recognize what this suppliers’ agreement does

and does not do. It does not ban transfers to non-parties of the NPT

or to states that refuse to place all nuclear facilities under IAEA

*

safeguards. It also does not ban the export of reprocessing and

enrichment facilities and equipment. Rather than deny states technology that is relevant to explosives programs, the agreement attempts

to replace weakening technological barriers against nuclear proliferation

with such institutional and political barriers as safeguards and

governmental pledges.

It requires IAEA safeguards be applied to and a no-explosivesuse pledge be associated with not only such facilities that are actually

exported but also other facilities the recipient may build based on the

same technology. This is a significant strengthening of the provisions

previously applying to Trigger List equipment. The re-transfer provision

not only precludes states acquiring technology with fewer constraints by

retransfer but also gives the exporter a veto over what countries may

receive retransfers. In this way any countries thought to be particularly

high-risk can be prevented from obtaining help via an intermediary. The

provisions also explicitly recognize the importance of physical security

protection of nuclear materials and facilities and will strengthen the IAEA

in its role as advisor on physical security matters to interested states.

Beyond the agreement's provisions themselves, its very existence and

the process of negotiation that produced it have some significant implications.

*Ratification of the NPT or acceptance of international safeguards on all

nuclear facilities has now been adopted unilaterally by Canada as a condition for the supply of reactors or uranium. Canada ha also called on %

other suppliers to adopt comparable conditions of export.
IX - 96

The most important benefit is perhaps the strengthening of the international norm proscribing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nonnuclear states. The importance that nuclear supplier states attach to

the prevention of proliferation is indicated and symbolized by their

agreement on uniform standards despite the rather considerable opportunities and incentives for each state to compete for sales in a rather

tight and lucrative export market by demanding less stringent antiproliferation requirements than other venders. In addition, the process of negotiation and the publicity associated with it, were instrumental in causing the issues of nuclear proliferation and nuclear exports

to be raised to the highest political levels within the governments of

all participants. Rather considerable pressure could therefore be

brought to bear on France and West Germany to adopt a policy more closely

in line with other major exporters. While producing only partial

(although still quite significant) changes before the major agreement

on January 1976 was achieved, subsequent statements by both governments

indicate continued movement closer to the American position and away

from insistence on the right to export sensitive facilities. Finally,

the existence of the supply negotiations made more likely, less difficult

and less costly the application of American pressure on South Korea and

Pakistan to abandon their plans to build reprocessing plants and increased

the political cost for other states that might be contemplating acquiring

reprocessing facilities.

On the negative side is the fact that the negotiations have involved

only actual and potential nuclear suppliers. Having conducted the

negotiations in official secrecy and totally outside the IAEA context,

the parties have left themselves open to several criticisms by potential

purchasing states. The first is that the suppliers are in violation

of their obligations under Article IV Paragraph 2 of the NPT “to

facilitate . . . . the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials

and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of

nuclear energy” and to "cooperate in contributing . . . ● to the further

development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States

party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the

developing areas of the world." The second possible criticism is

that through the suppliers' agreement a group of industrialized states
IX - 97

have formed a nuclear cartel and conspired to promote the continued

dependency on themselves of developing countries that will be prevented

from acquiring industrial capability the importance of which for

building modern industrial economies is demonstrated by the suppliers’

own pursuit of such capability.

If such interpretations gain favor among potential recipients

states, the suppliers ' agreement could contribute to a weakening of

the sense of bargain on which rests the acceptability of the NPT to

many non-nuclear states. It could also weaken the American argument in

international forums that cartelization is an inappropriate mechanism

for organizing commodity markets. In addition, it could become a

symbolic issue of contention in the context of North-South negotiations

over the distribution of the world's resources, wealth, technological

capabilities and power.

Current and Future Issues

AS of November 1976, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy,

the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland are reported to have

5

adopted the suppliers’ guidelines and joined the suppliers discussions.

This raises the number of participants to fifteen and omits only

Argentina, India and South Africa of those states potentially able to

enter the nuclear equipment or services export market in the foreseeable future. There is still no indication that the IAEA will become

involved, even to the extent of serving as a communications medium to

other states as it did in the case of the 1974 Trigger List agreement.

Possible items for future agendas of the suppliers? group include

reopening the question of reprocessing and enrichment exports, establishing

uniform non-proliferation provisions in Agreements for Cooperation and

contracts leading to the supply of enrichment or reprocessing services,

and multinational fuel reprocessing or spent fuel storage facilities.

Now that France and West Germany seem to have altered their own

positions on the issue of sensitive technology exports, this question

might be taken up again in the multinational forum. A total ban on the

transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment, if

it were achievable, would be a very significant negotiating accomplishment. Except to the extent that it would further reinforce the norm
IX - 98

proscribing proliferation, however, it might not contribute very much

to the objective of preventing non-nuclear states from obtaining the

technical capabilities to produce weapons grade materials. Such

a capability would be relatively easily acquired by any state with

sufficient technical sophistication to sustain a domestic nuclear

power industry. The technical demands for building small plutonium

production reactors and a fuel reprocessing plant whose only purpose

was to recover weapons grade plutonium from low burnup fuel are

significantly less stringent than those required to sustain a commercial

nuclear industry. Indeed, many third world nuclear states would be

capable, completely on their own, of building a small, pilot plant

scale, commercial reprocessing plant if one could not be purchased

on the international market. Except for operational experience and

industrial know-how of those who have actually operated plants, the

technology for reprocessing is totally in the public domain. The great

danger of a ban on the transfer of technology is that states determined

to obtain a reprocessing facility may build one on their own, and

then, if they are not parties to the NPT be under no obligation to

the international community regarding safeguards or non-weapons-use.

I-f the suppliers decide that providing market incentives is a

useful means of discouraging states from seeking their own sensitive

fuel cycle facilities, they might take up questions such as the supply

of enrichment and reprocessing services. Just as in the case of

technology exports, in order to avoid competition among suppliers of

services that encourages one state to impose less stringent nonproliferation-related conditions on its customers than another, agreement on uniform standards would be very useful. In addition, to

satisfy those states who wish to dispose of spent fuel or who might

turn to reprocessing to help manage their nuclear waste, the supplier

states could act to create or encourage the creation of one or more

spent fuel repositories under national or multinational control. These

might be associated with reprocessing facilities or be independent.

In the former case, agreement would have to be reached concerning whether

or under what conditions recovered plutonium would be returned to

the country from which it came.
Ix - 99

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/209,

ibid.

David Binder,“6 Nuclear Lands Meet on Control”,

(June 18, 1975), p. 1.

The Honorable Donald Jamieson, "Canada’s Nuclear

p. 1.

The New York Times,

Export Policy”,

Text of Statement on Motions Made in House of Commons, Ottawa,

22 December 1976.

David Binder, “15 Major Nuclear Nations Will Discuss Ways to Curb

Spread of Ability to Make Atomic Arms”, The New York Times,

(November 9, 1976), p. 7.
IX - 100

APPENDIX A

IAEA INFCIRC/209

Communication Received from Members Regarding the

Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain

Categories of Equipment and Other Material
International Atomic Energy Agency

INFORMATION CIRCULAR

IX - 101

INFCIRC/209

‘3 September 1974

GENERAL Distr.

Original: ENGLISH and

RUSSIAN

COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM MEMBERS REGARDING

EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND OF CERTAIN

CATEGORIES OF EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MATERIAL

THE

1. On 22 August 1974 the Director General received letters, all dated that day, from the

Resident Representatives to the Agency of Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Norway,

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland and the United States of America, relating to the commitments of these eight Members

under Article 111, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons[I].

In the light of the wish expressed at the end of each of those letters, their text is reproduced

below as Letter I.

2. On the same day, the Resident Representatives, of Denmark and of the United Kingdom

also addressed complementary letters to the Director General, the text of which is reproduced below as Letter II. On that day also the Resident Representative of the United States

sent a complementary letter, the text of which is reproduced as Letter HI.

3. Also on 22 August, the Resident Representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany ,

and of the Netherlands each addressed to the Director General a letter analogous to the abovementioned Letters I and II, the text of which is reproduced below as Letter IV.

4. The attachments to the Letters I and IV, which consist in both cases of the same

memoranda, are reproduced in the Appendix.

Letter I

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of . . . . has had under

consideration procedures in relation to exports of (a) source or special

fissionable material, and (b) equipment and material especially designed or

prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable

material, in the light of its commitment under Article III paragraph 2 of

the Treaty on tile Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not to provide such

~1] Reproduced in document INl?CIRC/ 140.
INFCIRC/209

IX - 102

items to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the

source or special fissionable material is subject to safeguards under an

agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Government of . . . . has decided to act in this context in accordance with

the attached memoranda.

I shall be grateful if you will bring this information to the attention of all

Members of the Agency.

Letter H

I have the honour to refer to my letter of today’s date, and to inform you that,

so far as trade within the European Community is concerned, the Government

of . ● . . will, where necessary, implement paragraphs 5 of the memoranda

enclosed with that letter in the light of its commitments under the Treaties of

Rome.

Letter 111

With reference to my letter of this date, concerning procedures of the

Government of the United States of America in relation to exports of source

and special fissionable material and of equipment and material especially

designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special

fissionable material, I shall provide you shortly with additional information

concerning the implementation by my Government of such procedures.

I would like to call attention to paragraph 6 of Memorandum B, enclosed with

my letter, and to note that, in accordance with existing procedures of my

Government, safeguards are required in relation to items of equipment and

material exported from the United States of America, in addition to those

specified in paragraph 2 of that Memorandum.

I shall be grateful if you will bring this information to the attention of all

Members of the Agency.

Letter IV

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of . . . . has had under

consideration procedures in relation to exports to any non-nuclear-weapon

State for peaceful purposes of (a) source or special fissionable material, and

(b) certain categories of equipment and material especially designed or

prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.

The Government of . . . . has decided to act in this context in accordance with

the attached memoranda. So far as trade within the European Community is

concerned, the Government of . . . . will, where necessary, implement paragraphs 5 of the memoranda in the light of its commitments under the Treaties

of Rome.

I shall be grateful if you will bring this information to the attention of all

Members of the Agency.
Ix - 103 INFCIRC/209

APPENDI X

MEMORANDUM A

INTRODUCTION

1. The Government has had under consideration procedures in relation to exports of

nuclear materials in the light of its commitment not to provide source or special fissionable

material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special

fissionable material is subject to safeguards under an agreement with the International

Atomic Energy Agency.

DEFINITION OF SOURCE AND SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

2. The definition of source and special fissionable material adopted by the Government

shall be that contained in Article XX of the Agency’s Statute. [1]

THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

3. The Government is solely concerned with ensuring, where relevant, the application of

safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty on the N-on-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[2] with a view to preventing diversion of the safeguarded nuclear

material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If

the Government wishes to supply source or special fissionable material for peaceful purposes

to such a State, it will:

(a) Specify to the recipient State, as a condition of supply, that the source or

special fissionable material, or special fissionable material produced in

or by the use the reef, shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices; and

(b) Satisfy itself that safeguards to that end, under an agreement with the

Agency and in accordance with its safeguards system, will be applied to

the source or special fissionable material in question.

DIRECT EXPORTS

4. In the case of direct exports of source or special fissionable material to non-nuclearweapon States not party to NPT, the Government will satisfy itself, before authorizing the

export of the material in question, that such material will be subject to a safeguards agreement with the Agency, as soon as the recipient State takes over responsibility for the

material, but no later than the time the material reaches its destination.

RETRANSFERS

5. The Government, when exporting source or special fissionable material to a nuclearweapon State not party to NPT, will require satisfactory assurances that the material will

not be re-exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to NPT unless arrangements

corresponding to those referred to above are made for the acceptance of safeguards by the

State receiving such re-export.

[1] See also para. 6 below.

[2] Reproduced in document IIfFCIRC/1400
INFCIRC/209 .

IX - 104

MISCELLANEOUS

6. Exports of the items specified in sub-paragraph (a) below, and exports of source or

special fissionable material to a given recipient country, within a period of 12 months, below

the limits specified in sub-paragraph (b) below, shall be disregarded for the purpose

procedures described above:

(a) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%;

Special fissionable material when used in gram quantities or less as a

sensing component in instruments; and

of the

Source material which the Government is satisfied is to be used only in

non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics;

(b) Special fissionable material 50 effective grams;

Natural uranium 500 kilograms;

Depleted uranium 1000 kilograms; and

Thorium 1000 kilograms.

MEMORANDUM B

INTRODUCTION

1. The Government has had under consideration procedures in relation to exports of

certain categories of equipment and material, in the light of its commitment not to provide

equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production

of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless

the source or special fissionable material produced, processed or used in the equipment or

material in question is subject to safeguards under an agreement with the International Atomic

Energy Agency.

THE DESIGNATION OF EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR PREPARED

FOR THE PROCESSING, USE OR PRODUCTION OF SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

9 The designation of items of equipment or material especially designed or prepared for

the processing, use or production of special fissionable material {hereinafter referred to as

the “Trigger List” ) adopted by the Government is as follows (quantities below the indicated

levels being regarded as insignificant for practical purposes):

2.1. Reactors and equipment therefor:

2.1.1. Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a

controlled self- sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding

zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors

with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium

not exceeding 100 grams ● per year.

2.1.2. Reactor pressure vessels:

Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shopfabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or
IX - 105 INFCIRC/209

2.2.

2.1.3.

2.1.4.

2.1 ● 5.

2.1.6.

2.1.7.

prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined

in paragraph 2. 1.1 above and are capable of withstanding

the operating pressure of the primary coolant.

Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines:

Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for

inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined

in paragraph 2. 1.1 above capable of on-load operation or

employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment

features to allow complex off-load fueling operations such

as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is

not normally available.

Reactor control rods:

Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the

reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 2. 1.1 above.

Reactor pressure tubes:

Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain

fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined

in paragraph 2. 1.1 above at an operating pressure in excess

of 50 atmospheres.

Zirconium tubes:

Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies

of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 2. 1.1 above, and in which the relationship of hafnium

to zirconium is less than 1: 500 parts by weight.

Primary coolant pumps:

Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating liquid

metal as primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in

paragraph 2. 1.1 above.

Non-nuclear materials for reactors:

2.2.1.

2.2.2.

Deuterium and heavy water:

Deuterium and any deuterium compound in which the ratio of

deuterium to hydrogen exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear

reactor as defined in paragraph 2.1. i above in quantities

exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient

country in any period of 12 months.

Nuclear grade graphite:

Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million

boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.50 grams

per cubic centimetre in quantities exceeding 30 metric tons for

any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
INFCIRC/209 IX - 106

2.3.1. Plants for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, and

equipment especially designed or prepared therefor.

2.4.1. Plants for the fabrication of fuel elements.

2.5..1. Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially

designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium.

Clarifications of certain of the items on the above list arc annexed.

THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

3. The Government is solely concerned with ensuring, where relevant, the application of

safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[1] with a view to preventing diversion of the safeguarded nuclear

material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If

the Government wishes to supply Trigger List items for peaceful purposes to such a State,

it will:

(a) Specify to the recipient State, as a condition of supply, that the source

or special fissionable material produced, processed or used in the

facility for which the item is supplied shall not be diverted to nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and

(b) Satisfy itself that safeguards to that end, under an agreement with the

Agency and in accordance with its safeguards system, will be applied to

the source or special fissionable material in question.

DIRECT EXPORTS

4. In the case of direct exports to non-nuclear-weapon States not party to NPT, the

Government will satisfy itself, before authorizing the export of the equipment or material in

question, that such equipment or material will fall under a safeguards agreement with the

Agency.

RETRANSFERS

5. The Government,. when exporting Trigger List

assurances that the items will not be re-exported to

to NPT unless arrangements corresponding to those

acceptance of safeguards by the State receiving such

MISCELLANEOUS

items, will require satisfactory

a non-nuclear-weapon State not party

referred to above are made for the

re-export.

6. The Government reserves to itself discretion as to interpretation and implementation of

its commitment referred to in paragraph 1 above and the right to require, if it wishes, safeguards as above in relation to items it exports in addition to those items specified in paragraph 2 above.

[1] Reproduced in document INFCIRC/140.
INFCIRC/ 209

IX - 107

ANNE X

CLARIFICATIONS OF’ ITEMS ON THE TRIGGER LIST

A. Complete nuclear reactors

(Item 2.1.1 of the Trigger List)

1. A “nuclear reactor” basically includes the items within or attached directly to

reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the

the

components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of

the reactor core.

2. The export of the whole set of major items within this boundary will take place only in

accordance with the procedures of the memorandum. Those individual items within this

functionally defined boundary which will be exported only in accordance with the procedures

of the memorandum are listed in paragraphs 2. 1.1 to 2.1.5. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the

memorandum, the Government reserves to itself the right to apply the procedures of the

memorandum to other items within the functionally defined boundary.

3. It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification

to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for

sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium

production, are not considered as “zero energy reactors”

B. Pressure vessels

(Item 2.1.2 of the Trigger List)

4. A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 2. 1.2 as a major shopfabricated part of a pressure vessel.

5. Reactor internals (e. g. support columns and plates for the core and other vessel

internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser

plates, etc. ) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal

support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel. These items are

sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore,

to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier), so that their supply, outside the basic

supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would not be common practice. Therefore,

although the separate supply of these unique, especially designed and prepared, critical,

large and expensive items would not necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of

concern, such a mode of supply is considered unlikely.

c. Reactor control rods

(Item 2.1.4 of the Trigger List)

6. This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension

structures therefor if supplied separately.

D. Fuel reprocessing plants

(Item 2.3.1 of the Trigger List)

7. A “plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements” includes the equipment and

components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated

fuel and the major nuclear material and fission product processing streams. The export of

the whole set of major items within this boundary will take place only in accordance with the
INFCIRC/209 IX - 108

procedures of the memorandum. In the present state of technology only two items of equipment are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase “and equipment especially

designed or prepared therefor”. These items are:

(a) Irradiated fuel element chopping machines: remotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant

as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated

nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods; and

(b) Critically safe tanks (e. g. small diameter, annular or slab tanks)

especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as

identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel

and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and

which can be remotely loaded and maintained.

8. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the memorandum, the Government reserves to itself the

right to apply the procedures of the memorandum to other items within the functionally

defined boundary.

E. Fuel fabrication plants

(Item 2.4.1 of the Trigger List)

9. A “plant for the fabrication

(a)

(b)

10. The

Which normally comes

of fuel elements” includes the equipment:

in direct contact with, or directly processes,

or controls, the production flow of nuclear material, or

Which seals the nuclear material within the cladding.

export of the whole set of items for the foregoing operations will take place only in

accordance with the procedures of the memorandum. The Government will also give consideration to application of the procedures of the memorandum to individual items intended

for any of the foregoing operations, as well as for other fuel fabrication operations, such as

checking the integrity of the cladding or the seal, and the finish treatment to the solid fuel.

F. Isotope separation plant equipment

(Item 2.5.1 of the Trigger List)

11. “Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared for the

separation of isotopes of uranium “ includes each of the major items of equipment especially

designed or prepared for the separation process.
IX-109

APPENDIX B

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Press Release of February 23, 1976
●

IX - 1 1 0

. . . ..

r: I

 ;

. . . . .- . :-. ,

<.

;

. . . . .

0

.

. .

. . .

.

.4’

j

--- — .

--

.

. . *<

. . . .:.

.,*..

76-3 Please HOLD for release

10: 00 A. M. EST

Monday, February 23, 1976

In a statement prepared for delivery today before the

Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, international Organizations and Security Agreements (Committee on Foreign Relations)

Dr. Fred C. Ikle (Ee-Clay) , Director of the U.S. Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, reported for the first time on two important U.S. initiatives to reduce the threat of further

proliferation of nuclear weapons.

.——————-—---—.-..—-——. —-

The second U.S. initiative concerns promotion of multinational fuel-cycle centers as a long-term concept to head off

the severe dangers of nuclear proliferation and terrorism stemming from further national development of reprocessing Plants.

Emphasizing that our intention is not to Promote reprocessing,

Dr.Ikle reported on IAEA and U.S. studies which have been

initiated to find practical, economic alternatives to such

national reprocessing.
As Delivered

IX - 111

STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLE, DIRECTO R

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

before the

Subcommittee on Arms Control, International

Organizations and Security Agreements

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

Monday, February 23, 1976

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, I greatly

appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.

This morning I would like to comment on two kinds of

initiatives undertaken by the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency and the Executive Branch to deal with nuclear proliferation.

The first concerns nuclear exports, the second, multinational fuel centers.

The United States over the years has sought to work with

other countries to insure that civil nuclear exports would be

used only for peaceful purposes. We have recently had a

number of bilateral and multilateral discussions with nuclear

exporters to develop common rules on safeguards and export

controls. As a result, the United States together with other

exporters has decided to apply certain principles to our future

nuclear exports. Nest of these are consistent with current

U.S. practice; some are new. All are designed to inhibit the

spread of nuclear weapons while permitting nuclear exports of

equipment to meet the world’s growing energy needs. These

principles include the following:

J.

- -

-.

. .

The requirement that recipients must apply international

(IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear imports.

●

The requirement that the importer give assurances not to

use these imports to make nuclear explosives for any purpose -- whether called "peaceful" or not.

The requirement that the importer have adequate physical

security for these nuclear facilities and materials to

prevent theft and sabotage.

The requirement for assurances that the importers will demand the same conditions on any retransfer of these

materials or types of equipment to third countries.
IX - 1 1 2

Now, on the question of more sensitive exports -- those

which involve fuel enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and

heavy water. We intend to use restraint in supply of these

exports, particularly when we think they could add to the

risk of proliferation,

In addition, in cases where we do export sensitive technology, we require that the importers obtain our consent

before they re-transfer any sensitive nuclear technology to a

third country.

These are the minimum standards the US will apply to its

nuclear exports. We are prepared to be more stringent when

appropriate.

Together with other leading exporters of nuclear technology, we are also committed to follow-up efforts along

three lines.

1. To promote international cooperation in exchanging

information on physical security, on measures of

protection of nuclear material in transit, and on

measures for recovery of stolen nuclear material

and equipment;

2. To improve the effectiveness

through special efforts that

tion, and

of IAEA safeguards

support that organiza3. To encourage the designers and makers of sensitive

equipment to construct it in a way that will aid

safeguards.

Mr. Chairman, the second kind of initiatives we are undertaking have to do with multinational fuel-cycle centers.. The

idea for such centers was promoted in the final declaration of

the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty held in

Geneva last year. At the United Nations General Assembly last

autumn, Secretary Kissinger stressed the grave danger of

national reprocessing plants to nuclear proliferation and thus

to world security, and proposed establishment of multinational

fuel-cycle centers as a safer alternative to national control

of reprocessing facilities.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has now begun a

major study of the regional multinational center concept; the

United States actively supports it, and I expect it will be

completed sometime next year. Preliminary results suggest that
IX - 113

large scale centers could bring significant economies of scale

compared with smaller national reprocessing plants. But more

important from my perspective -- these centers may be an attractive alternative to national reprocessing plants,

particularly for countries with more limited nuclear capacity.

This alternative then may encourage countries to forego

national reprocessing facilities and work together. This

would make safeguards -- and the protection of dangerous

nuclear materials more effective. In short, if the concept

proves successful, multinational centers should reduce the

dangers of further nuclear proliferation and of nuclear

terrorism.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has strongly

supported the IAEA study by supplying experts and consultants.

We have also begun our own study on a broad range of related

questions. One such question is whether new approaches to

storing spent fuel could forestall premature national reprocessing; another is how to better manage transportation of

nuclear materials. We are also beginning a preliminary study

of the practical steps the U.S. -- both government and

industry -- might take to advance the concept of multinational

centers abroad,

I was asked recently why ACDA wishes to build reprocessing

plants, The question indicates a misunderstanding of our objectives, Our efforts for multinational approaches should not

be misunderstood: we do not wish to promote the reprocessing

of Plutonium. On the contrary, Our hope, in all these efforts,

is to investigate practical, economic alternatives to national.

reprocessing, and thereby reduce the growing dangers of nuclear

proliferation,

Mr. Chairman, this completes my initial remarks. I would

be pleased to answer your questions concerning these

initiatives or any other aspects of our non-proliferation efforts, past or present.
IX - 114

APPENDIX IX-E

NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS CONSULTATION - 2

by

Stieff Research and Development Co., Inc.
IX - 115

Suppliers Consultations - 2

In the Fall of 1974 the United States began a series of bilateral

discussions with a small group of nuclear supplier states and potential

nuclear supplier states for the purpose of determining whether a common

set of principles could be evolved which would govern the action of the

States in the area of nuclear exports. These discussions, which were conducted

under a cloak of secrecy which has continued until this day, led to the

formation of what is now known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Although

the secrecy which has surrounded these activities has extended to the

members of the Group, it is now generally conceded that the United States,

Canada, the USSR, Japan, France, Germany and the United Kingdom were

involved in these early discussions.

The initial concerns of the nuclear suppliers found their first formal

expression in the final declaration of the NPT Review Conference (40)

held in Geneva from May 5th to the 30th of 1975. This declaration,

accepted by consensus urged that:

(a) “in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating

to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the

application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in

importing states not Party to the Treaty;

(b) “such common requirements be accorded the widest possible

measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;

(c) “all Parties to the Treaty should actively pursue their

efforts to these ends.”
IX - 116

The Conference also urged that actions be pursued to elaborate further,

within the IAEA, concrete recommendations for physical protection of

nuclear materials in use, storage or transit with a view to ensuring a

uniform, minimum level of protection and called upon the States to give the

earliest possible effective application to the IAEA’s recommendations within

the framework of their respective physical protection systems.

Finally, the Conference noted that a number of nuclear supplier states

had adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in

connection with their exports to non-nuclear weapon States not Party to the

Treaty and the Conference attached particular importance to the condition,

established by those States of the undertaking not to divert to nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

When it is recalled that the attendance at the Convention included

58 States Party to the NPT, and seven States signatory but not Party

as well as seven addition States with representation, the significance of

the consensus can be more fully appreciated. Only France among the

nuclear supplier states is not now a part to the Treaty.

The efforts of the nuclear suppliers, including France, to develop

a common export and safeguards policy has been described by both Mr. George

Vest, Director of Politico-Military Affairs (41) and Secretary Kissinger

(42) in testimony before Congress. Although their remarks were severely

constrained by the confidential nature of the suppliers consultations they

did announce the adoption by the United States of certain minimum

principles. These principles include:

- provisions for the application of IAEA Safeguards on all nuclear

exports.
IX - 117

- prohibition of the use of any U.S. export to make any nuclear

explosive device - peaceful or not.

requirement of adequate physical protection of nuclear facilities

and material against theft or sabotage.

requirement for similar safeguards and physical protection on any

 re-export or transfer of these materials or equipment to third

countries.

requirement of special conditions governing sensitive materials

and technology.

The contribution of the NPT Review Conference declarations to the

formulations of the export and safeguards principles of the nuclear suppliers

is obvious. These principles, which the United States has announced it will

apply to its exports, is a unilateral declaration. The announcement does

not reflect a treaty commitment and is not a legal or binding obligation.

However, the United States as well as the other nuclear suppliers do have

a substantial political investment in these principles and would not abandon

them lightly.

The effectiveness of this informal arrangement will be determined most

probably on the basis of the actions which the other Nuclear Supplier States

take with regard to the safeguard conditions which they apply to the export

of their nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The recent decision

by the French president, Monsieur Giscard d’Estang to form a cabinet

level committee to coordinate and supervise French nuclear exports is a

very encouraging development. The impact of this development on French

nuclear export policy will be followed with great interest.
IX - 118

An important statement of Canadian nuclear policy was made in the

House of Commons on December 22, 1976. This unilateral export policy

declaration states that:

“Canadian reactors and uranium shipments to non-nuclear weapon

states under future contracts will be restricted to those which

ratify the Non-proliferation Treaty or otherwise accept international

safeguards on their entire nuclear programme. It follows from this

that Canada will terminate nuclear shipments to any non-nuclear

state which explodes a nuclear device.”

Existing Canadian export policy included a binding assurance that

Canadian materials and technology could not be used for explosive purposes.

The new policy closes a gap by including not only what a State might receive

from other than Canadian suppliers but also what it might do on its own,

as in the case of India. In this way Canada will have an assurance that its

nuclear customers will have been selected only from those countries which

have made a clear and unequivocal commitment to the non-proliferation of

nuclear weapons.

In concluding the statement to the House, Canada urged the other

suppliers to take a collective decision to:

“restrict their nuclear exports to those non-nuclear weapon states

which have ratified the Non-proliferation Treaty or otherwise

accept full-scope safeguards. We regret that to-date it has not

been possible to reach a collective decision to this effect . . .

With this announcement I am calling on other nuclear exporters to

review their own export policies not in the light of commercial

gain but in the interest of maintaining a safe and secure world.”
Ix - 1 19

Prior to the Canadian statement, on October 28, 1976, President Ford

issued a major announcement on U.S. nuclear policy (8, op. cit.). This

document, the product of intense debate and negotiation within the Executive

Branch of the Government reflects and implements in many ways the

declarations of the NPT Review Conference and the principles developed

during the supplier consultations. Above all, it reflects a renewed

and urgent concern with the dilemma of the fissionable atom and the clear

threat to the security of all that will accompany the continued spread of

nuclear weapons and their technology around the world.

President Ford announced a decision to greatly accelerate U.S.

initiatives in conjunction with both nuclear supplier and consumer nations

to control the spread of plutonium and technologies for separating plutonium

and proposed a three-year moratorium on the export of reprocessing and

enrichment technologies and facilities. New criteria were also announced

for determining whether to expand or enter into new agreements for

nuclear cooperation which include:

- Adherence to the NPT which will be a strong positive factor.

- Willingness to submit to full fuel cycle safeguards pending

adherence to NPT will receive positive recognition, as will

- Willingness to forego or postpone decisions to establish a national

reprocessing or enrichment plant, or

- Willingness to participate in the storage of spent fuel and

separated plutonium under an international regime.

President Ford has also directed the Secretary of State to pursue vigorously

the problem of physical security and a possible international convention as
IX - 120

well as the substantial strengthening of the IAEA safeguards System.

Finally, the President, addressed the question of sanctions against States

which violate their nuclear safeguards agreements. The minimum U.S. response

regardless of whether the diverted material was of U.S. origin would be the

immediate termination of our agreements for cooperation and fuel supply.

Additional steps are implied not necessarily related to nuclear matters,

including consultations with all interested nations to determine

appropriate additional action.

It is to be hoped that the remaining nuclear suppliers will issue

similar statements of their revised and strengthened export policies.

Such concerted action may be increasingly difficult to obtain.

Recently, it has been reported in the press that the membership of the

Nuclear Suppliers Group has been substantially expanded to include the

Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and

Czechoslovakia.

It seems clear that the larger Group could consolidate many of the

gains that have been made to date and that this Group might consider some

additional non-proliferation initiatives. The enlargement of the Group is

not, however, without some drawbacks; the most obvious being the increased

difficulty in obtaining a consensus with States with very diverse interests

which include both export and import of nuclear materials and technology.

The informal nature of the suppliers consultations, however, may provide

an essential ingredient in the difficult process of changing long standing

national policies.
IX - 121

APPENDIX IX-F

MULTINATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES

by

Ted Greenwood
Ix - 1 22

MULTINATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES

Any nuclear power reactor produces as a necessary by-product of

its operation fissile material that could be separated from the spent

fuel by chemical means and used in the fabrication of nuclear explosive

devices. For all reactor types now commercially available or expected

to be available during the next decade, the relevant fissile byproduct of power production is plutonium.* One of the most important

proliferation-related issues that emerges out of the gradual international diffusion of nuclear power technology, therefore, is how the

spent fuel and particularly its plutonium contents will be handled.

Basically two options are available. States may choose to reprocess

spent fuel to separate the plutonium and uranium from each other and

from the highly radioactive fission products and other actinide elements

that are produced as the fuel burns or they may choose not to do so.

The benefits of reprocessing are the recovery of uranium and plutonium

for reuse in power reactors, and the reduction in volume of high level

nuclear waste that must be isolated from the environment for tens to

hundreds of thousands of years. Whether states will prefer to reprocess

or store spent fuel depends on the relative economics (which are currently

2

very uncertain ) of reprocessing and recycle versus the so-called throwaway option; their preferred method for handling nuclear wastes; and

the extent to which they see non-economic incentives to recycle

recovered uranium and plutonium. Such incentives might derive from a

*~e high temperature gas reactor, operating on a thorium-uraniurn-zss

fuel cycle is now in operation in the United States. Despite German

and some continuing American interest in this technology, however, such

reactors clo not now appear likely to contribute significantly to nuclear

power programs over the next decade. A thorium-uranium fuel cycle could

be used in todaytsllight- and heavy-water reactors and proposals to do

so have been made. Nonetheless, this again seems unlikely to play a

significant role over the next decade.
IX - 123

desire to reduce dependence on imported uranium or the purchase of

uranium enrichment services or to gain experience with plutonium fuel

3

in anticipation of ultimate reliance on plutonium breeder reactors.

In anticipation of the possibility that a number of non-nuclear

countries will, for one reason or another, choose to reprocess their

spent fuel, considerable attention has focused on possible mechanisms to

reduce the likelihood that widespread reprocessing and the use of

plutonium in reactor fuel will contribute to the proliferation of

nuclear weapons. One possibility is for the United States and other

states with advanced nuclear industries to use exhortation, example,

provision of alternatives through the market, or some combination of

these to persuade other states not to reprocess. Another is to encourage

states not to build their own reprocessing facilities. A ban on the

international transfer of reprocessing facilities or technology is

widely thought in the United States to be reinforcing of both objectives.*

Reliance on spent fuel storage facilities or sufficient reprocessing

capacity under national control in nuclear or low-risk non-nuclear

countries to provide storage or reprocessing services to other states

is also frequently suggested as a means of dissuading states from building their own reprocessing plants. Finally, the creation of such

facilities under multinational control has also been proposed to serve

the same purpose. One multinational reprocessing facility, the Eurochemic plant in Mel, Belgium, has already been built but is no longer

operating.

The fuel for most power reactors now in use and expected to be

available at least through the end of the century requires uranium that

has been partially enriched in the U-235 isotope. Although such lowenriched uranium cannot be used for explosives, any enrichment facility

can (with an economic penalty dependent on the technology used) be

employed to produce high-enriched, weapons grade uranium. Substantial

concern also applies to the spread of enrichment technology, therefore,

*For the role of the nuclear suppliers’ conference in regulating the

international diffusion of this technology, see the submission entitled

"The Suppliers Conference."
IX - 124

although in this case the fact that the material produced in normal

operations would not be weapons grade somewhat reduces the risks compared to the reprocessing case. Multinational facilities (MNFs) have

again been proposed as a means of preventing the diffusion of enrichment technology and facilities to non-nuclear states. In fact two multinational organizations, Urenco /Centec and Eurodif already exist

for the purpose of providing enrichment services.

A few commentators on the subject of nuclear proliferation and the

nuclear industry have suggested going beyond the creation of multinational

facilities to truly internationalizing these components of the industry. 4

Unlike a multinational arrangement which would involve a limited number

of participating states with each or at most a few facilities under

the control of any given multinational organization, the international

approach would have one organization, perhaps the IAEA, which has open

and perhaps close to universal membership own or control all (or at

least most) such facilities in the world.

Advantages and Disadvantages

There are several possible advantages of MNFs

states to rely on them rather than build their own

that might persuade

reprocessing or

enrichment plants. First, they would serve as mechanisms for mobilizing

the technical personnel and know-how of advanced industrial states to

provide a service for which smaller, less advanced states might otherwise

have to become dependent on the industrialized states. Second, by

serving a larger market than would national plants in countries with

small nuclear industries, economics of scale are possible and the cost

of services could be reduced. Third, if spent fuel were stored at an

MNF or if high level wastes separated by reprocessing were not returned

to the country of origin, the MNF would solve the waste management

problem which for many states is very difficult. Fourth, participation

in an MNF might serve as a mechanism for a state to acquire sufficient

technical expertise to build its own facilities at a later date. From a

non-proliferation. perspective the safeguarding and physical protection

of a single, large MNF might be easier and more certain than of many

smaller, national facilities. Compared to relying on services purchased from nuclear supplier nations, MNFs might provide the further
IX - 125

advantages of greater security of supply and at least partial satisfaction of symbolic or nationalistic objectives that might prompt some

developing states to acquire indigenous facilities as a demonstration

of their ability to create and manage complex technological enterprises.

Proponents of the international approach claim that it would have

all of these same advantages. Their major additional asset would be

their ability to mollify more successfully the “sense of inequality,

resentment against what is perceived as discrimination, and a desire

for equivalent rights and status” 5

on the part of developing states.

Disadvantages of MNFs are of three kinds: those common to any

facility, those pertaining to both enrichment and reprocessing

facilities, and those pertaining only to facilities that provide

reprocessing. Participation in any MNF would to some extent reduce

the freedom of individual action of participating states in organizing

and managing their domestic industries. In addition, the problems of

designing the institutional and legal structure and of successfully

initiating, constructing, and operating any MNF would be very severe,

perhaps so severe that failure, unacceptable delays or insecurities

in the supply of services would be anticipated or realized. The possibility of technology transfer cited above as a potentially attractive

feature of an MNF for small nuclear states can also be seen as a serious

disadvantage from a non-proliferation perspective when reprocessing or

enrichment were involved.

Support for a MNF that included reprocessing would weaken the case

that reprocessing itself should be foregone or delayed. If significantly

subsidized by nuclear states in an effort to encourage participation,

an MNF would obscure or undermine the natural market forces that might

otherwise tend to discourage reprocessing. In any case, the argument

against reprocessing would be more difficult to sustain in the face of

a major multinational effort to create a reprocessing facility.

More serious, once plutonium were separated at an MNF it must be

prevented from finding its way into national explosive programs. Reprocessing in a MNF and shipping the recovered plutonium back to the

state of origin, even if under safeguards, would be no better than having

.
IX - 126

each state with its own safeguarded reprocessing plant and plutonium storage

area. Mechanisms must be found, therefore, if a MNF with reprocessing

is to be useful from a rim-proliferation perspective, to prevent such

automatic return of plutonium. Several possibilities are available.

In order to persuade states not to use plutonium fuel at all, they could

be offered an equivalent amount of uranium fuel in exchange for their

plutonium. Such an arrangement would require the cooperation of at

least some suppliers of enrichment services and perhaps also some

uranium producers. Alternatively, states could be shipped their plutonium, but only under strict safeguards and in quantities required

for fairly immediate use in their reactors. To implement this procedure the MNF would have to include a plutonium storage facility and

almost certainly a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication capability.

A MNF that provided only spent fuel storage services would not experience

these difficulties associated with reprocessing. It would in addition

have many fewer technical and administrative demands made of it and

probably be easier and quicker to create than a larger and more complex

facility that included a reprocessing plant and other back-end facilities.

While not a substitute for national reprocessing for states determined

to recycle plutonium, a multinational spent fuel storage facility would

be quite sufficient for those states whose only interest is dealing

with nuclear wastes.

The disadvantages of international control of fuel cycle facilities

are again the same as those for multinational control, except significantly

stronger. Particularly the problems of institutional design, distribution of power and efficient operation would appear to be very serious

in the international case, even if the IAEA were used as the relevant

organizational entity.

Analyses of MNFs

Beyond the internal analyses of international or multinational

control of fuel cycle facilities that have been conducted within the

U.S. and perhaps other governments, two significant studies have been

undertaken. The first is the Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center (RFCC)

Study of the IAEA, initiated in 1975 following a preliminary study the
IX - 127

previous year. The second was the 26th Pugwash Symposium, International

Arrangements for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing, held in May 1976 under the

joint sponsorship of the Canadian and American Pugwash Groups. Both

have focused on the back end of the fuel cycle and on multinational

arrangements only. Much, but not all, of the analysis carries over

directly, however, to the enrichment case and international arrangements.

1. IAEA Region Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center Study

The IAEA study was initiated in response to the interest of member

states in the MNF concept. It is intended “to assist the Member States

in evaluating the relative merits of the RFCC approach to establishing

fuel cycle facilities.” 6As described by the Study’s director its

specific objectives are:

1. “To develop the methodology for assessment of alternative strategies

for establishment of integrated regional nuclear fuel cycle centres,

so as to evaluate their advantages and disadvantages vis-a-vis

dispersed fuel cycle facilities.

2. "To prepare a report on this methodology, including illustrative

examples on approaches and advantages to Member States, for the use

of those organizations interested in the implementation of nuclear

fuel cycle activities.

3. “To provide a mechanism for the establishment of a forum where Member

States and other interested parties can work out alternative strategies

with regard to nuclear fuel cycle activities as well as evolve

appropriate frameworks to cover institutional, legal and other aspects

related to the establishment of such multinational fuel cycle

7

centers.”

A small internal staff at the IAEA is relying heavily on consultants

from member countries to provide technical, financial and other relevant

input data. The technologies to be considered cover the entire back

end of the fuel cycle: spent fuel transport, spent fuel storage,

reprocessing, mixed oxide fuel fabrication, and waste management. The

study also includes the possibility that spent fuel would be stored for

a long period prior to reprocessing. Besides an analysis of economics

and materials flow for which computer simulation and optimization models
IX - 128

have been constructed, the study will examine institutional and legal

aspects; organization and administrative aspects; financial considerations;

health, safety and environmental aspects, safeguards, physical security

8

and process controls; and public acceptance considerations. A report on

Institutional - Legal Framework Aspects was issued in July 1976.9

A summary report with illustrative analyses of alternative fuel cycle

strategies is expected to be presented to the Conference on Nuclear

Power and its Fuel Cycle to be held by the IAEA is Salzburg in May 1977.

Several significant results have already emerged from the IAEA

study. First, despite the emphasis on the regional nature of MNFs

in the study’s name and original conception, this notion has now largely ●

been abandoned because of the recognition that transportation costs

are small enough to preclude significant economies arising out of geo10 graphical proximity. Second, at least one participant in a MNF would

have to bring to the project rather extensive technical know-how and

industrial support and to provide or arrange for a major part of the

financing. Thus, a MNF cannot be a consortium only of states with

immature nuclear industries. The assistance and support of at least

one of the major nuclear supplier countries is thought to be

11

necessary. Third, there appears to be important financial benefit

to be derived from states joining forces to build multinational facilities

rather than building their own national ones. This financial incentive

is thought to be a major incentive for states to participate.

Fourth, great flexibility and variation is possible for the institutional and legal structure that would underlie an MNF. Indeed

substantial variation already exists among the three current MNFs,

Eurochemic, Eurodif and Urenco/Centec.* Existing multinational enterprises that can serve as useful models for a MNF include not only these

three but also Intelsat, Scandinavian Airlines System, Central American

Air Navigation Service Corporation and European Company for the Financing

13 of Railways.

s~ited Reprocessors, while a multinational enterprise does not on

?1ants

or provide services. It is therefore not a usefil model for a MNF.
IX - 129

2. Pugwash Symposium on International Arrangements for Nuclear Fuel

Reprocessing 14

The Pugwash Symposium examined the possible motivations for reprocessing in general and for reprocessing in MNFs in particular. It

compared reprocessing at national facilities and MNF along the dimensions of economics, safeguards, health and safety, waste management,

and physical security. It concluded

“with reasonable clarity that multinational operation need not

necessarily entail a penalty on any of these dimensions.

" Indeed, in some respects the multinational approach holds out

the possibility of substantial gains.” 15

The major potential gains were found to be in economics of scale compared to many small plants, and in facilitating safeguards and physical

security.

The Symposium recognized the concern of all participant states

for security of supply and the special sensitivities of developing

country participants concerning their being provided a full and equal

share in the enterprise. It also recognized the problems of ultimate

disposal of plutonium and of technology transfer. Dealing adequately

and simultaneously with all of these concerns was seen to be a very

demanding task. AS stated in the Symposium paper on institutional

arrangements, “The overarching tension or trade-off is that between the

16 commercial and political aspects of the enterprise.”

The institutional analysis stressed both the variety of mechanisms

available and the difficulty of creating a MNF. It stressed the need

for a high degree of governmental involvement and of increasing size,

functional complexity and membership from a modest beginning. Spent

fuel storage was seen as an appropriate function with which to begin,

Institutional and Political Issues

Some of the institutional and political issues that must be addressed

in considering multinational or international facilities have already

been mentioned. The most important ones revolve around membership, distribution of power, the political-commercial tension, access to technology, and the role of the IAEA. It is the existence of such issues
IX - 130

that constitutes the important distinction between these institutional

arrangements and national facilities. The extent to which they can be

adequately resolved will determine both the feasibility and value of

multinational or international facilities. Answers to detailed questions

about the instrumentality by which the enterprise would be launched and

given legal status, (whether it be an intergovernment treaty or the

creation of a traditional shareholding company for example), and whether

new or existing entities

would flow directly from

issues are resolved.

Membership in a MNF

would be charged with management and operations

the manner in which these more fundamental

could be determined on the basis of geography,

historical ties between governments or commercial enterprises within

participating states, or shared common interests and plans for nuclear

development. There appears to be agreement that at least one technically

advanced state must participate in a multinational venture, but whether

as a regular member or not is not definite. For a MNF membership would.

presumably be closed to the initial interested parties or to other

states acceptable to them. An international arrangement would, by

definition, be open to participation by any state. One special case

of an MNF is of particular interest. This is a bilateral arrangement

for joint control of a reprocessing or enrichment facility between a

nuclear supplier state and its customer. Such an arrangement might

significantly reduce the risk of diversion from transferred sensitive

facilities.

Distribution of power within the venture will be an important

issue. If states are to forego their option to build domestic reprocessing

or enrichment plants and are to feel secure in their dependence on

a multinational or international facility, they must be assured through

an appropriate distribution of power over policy and operations that

their interests will be protected. That is, the structure of the

organization must be politically acceptable to participating governments.

This may be assured by careful drafting of an enabling treaty instrument,

by a requirement for consensus on important decisions, by appropriate
IX - 131

distribution of voting rights and specifying different majority requirements for different issues, by division of responsibility among a number

of decision making bodies following different procedures or by some

combination of these.

There will be a tension within any multinational or international

facility between the desire to operate efficiently on a commercial basis

and the need to be responsive to a variety of (sometimes contradictory)

political objectives. While governments will inevitably be directly

involved in oversight and plotting policy directions, day to day management and supply of services should be protected as much as possible from

political interference. Whether this means creating a multinational

commercial enterprise to manage the facility or contracting with a

single private concern to do so is a matter of choice.

If a facility that includes reprocessing or enrichment is not to

serve as a mechanism by which participating states can increase their

own technological base for the purpose of eventually initiating national

plants, limitations must be imposed on the transfer of technology or

on the purposes to which acquired technology may be put. Competing

with this will be the desire of developing states to use their participation in the arrangement to increase their level of technological

sophistication. This is a fundamental issue that will be difficult to

resolve.

The role of the IAEA can certainly be to provide technical assistance

and a facilitating mechanism for the creation of a multinational or

international facility. It would also no doubt be called on to provide

safeguards. Article 1X.1.1 of the IAEA Statute authorizes the Agency

to “establish or acquire . . . . plant, equipment, and facilities for the

17 receipt, storage, and issue” of nuclear materials. It therefore

presumably already has authority to establish an international spent

fuel storage facility under its control. The Agency cannot of course

act to do so without authorization from the Board of Governors or perhaps

the General Conference. Whether or not its mandate under Article III,

Functions, could be interpreted broadly enough to permit its direct

operation of a reprocessing or enrichment plant or whether its mandate

should be appropriately extended are matters that must be decided by

the Governing Board and Member States.
IX - 132

Evaluation

In assessing its utility from a non-proliferation perspective,

any multinational or international fuel cycle facility must be compared

to the alternatives of facilities under national control in nonnuclear states and relying on other mechanisms to dissuade states from

reprocessing or relying on their own sensitive facilities. The primary

alternative mechanisms of dissuasion would be, in the case of reprocessing,

assuring states of sufficient supplies of enriched uranium to obviate

their desire to recycle plutonium and move rapidly to breeders and, for

enrichment and reprocessing providing sufficient capacity in nuclear or

low-risk non-nuclear states that others would be content to rely on

for delivery of services.

The obstacles to establishing a truly international mechanism for

owning and operating fuel cycle facilities seem greatly to outweigh the

anticipated benefits compared to other alternatives. It does not,

therefore, appear to be a fruitful avenue for study or for policy

initiatives. The relative lack of attention given this option, seems

completely appropriate.

Despite the widespread concern of only a few years ago that the

coming decade would see a shortage of enrichment capacity or at least a

very tight market for enrichment services, this no longer appears to

be the case. Over the next ten to fifteen years there is in fact a high

likelihood that excess enrichment capacity will exist in the world and

that the major policy question for supplier countries, particularly

the United States, is whether or not to build enriched uranium stockpiles.

In addition, the number of commercial suppliers of enrichment services

is diversifying compared to the past when the United States was the

only one. No urgency currently exists, therefore, for the international

community to stimulate the expansion of enrichment capacity at MNFs or

otherwise. Two of the new enrichment suppliers have in fact been

established as MNFs in order to share both the financial cost and enterpreneurial risks. Urenco/Centec involves companies and the governments

of Britain, Holland and West Germany in the provision of enrichment

services using centrifuge technology. Eurodif is a commercial venture
IX - 133

with participation from government agencies or private entities in

France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Iran. Except for Iran there is no

participation in these MNFs from developing countries towards whom the

multinational concept is primarily directed. Nonetheless, given the

anticipated excess and diversity of supply, there appears to be little

incentive at present to stimulate the creation of a new MNF with broader

developing country participation.

The primary interest in MNFs, therefore, is for the back end of the

fuel cycle. Except for the small number of states with reprocessing

plants operating or close to completion, no long term spent fuel storage,

uranium-oxide fuel reprocessing or nuclear waste management capability

exists. There is however a growing demand for such services in every

country with a current or anticipated nuclear industry. The focus to

date on MNFs for reprocessing and spent fuel storage is, therefore,

totally appropriate. The concept does appear in this case to have some

potential net benefit as a mechanism for reducing the likelihood that

the diffusion of nuclear power technology will contribute to nuclear

weapons proliferation.

The strongest case can be made for a MNF that would take and store

spent fuel. Offering such a solution to the waste management problem

of states not now particularly interested in recycling plutonium would

reduce their incentives to reprocess either domestically or abroad.

Of course a national enterprise that offered such services on a commercial

basis would be equally useful, but seems unlikely to come into existence

because of the universal reluctance on the part of countries to serve as

a nuclear dumping ground. This same reluctance might preclude the

establishment of a MNF for that purpose, since it must be actually

sited within some country’s boundaries. There is some chance, however,

that the multinational nature of the facility and its important role in

aiding the cause of non-proliferation would mitigate the opposition.

An assessment of the utility of MNFs for reprocessing depends on

expectations concerning states’ decision to reprocess and the growth of

the commercial reprocessing industry as now constituted. If expectations

are high that most states with emerging nuclear industries can be persuaded

not to reprocess, no action should be taken now to initiate a MNF with
IX - 134

reprocessing. If, to the contrary, many such states are expected to

seek mechanisms to reprocess their spent fuel, the question becomes

how to persuade them not to build their own national facilities.

Unlike the enrichment case, reliance on existing or anticipated excess

reprocessing capacity in advanced industrialized states does not appear

viable. Great uncertainty exists concerning the reprocessing industry

in the United States. Japan is unlikely to have excess capacity in the

foreseeable future. The only sure suppliers of services are the European

partners of United Reprocessors. But even here, the West Germans face

serious difficulties of public acceptance of their planned 1500 tonne

per year plant and expansion of capacity by Britain and France is not

assured. Even if significant capacity could be made available by

United Reprocessors countries to the international market, many states

might well be reluctant to rely on a single foreign supplying entity

and to pay the high prices that United Reprocessors is demanding. In

this case, therefore, the creation of one or more MNF might well be

desirable.

Little can be done until the report of the IAEA Study is delivered

and studied in depth. If, as is likely, the Study finds MNFs feasible

and economically advantageous, action could then be taken by the United

States, by other suppliers or through the suppliers’ conference to

stimulate interest in a specific MNF project. Stimulation is all that

will be possible, however. The major interest and initiative must come

from the states that would be the primary users of the facility. As

pointed out by those analyzing institutional arrangements for the

Pugwash symposium,

"any effort to cajole - not to say coerce - participation in a

multinational fuel cycle enterprise would be wholly misplaced.

A reluctant partner would have available an infinitude of

points and issues to create plausible, irritating, and ultimately

defeating delay and complication in the negotiating process.

Only assent freely given in the perception that the enterprise

really serves the interests-of the countries involved will be able

to surmount the many institutional problems that will inevitably

arise."18
IX - 135

Furthermore, while an MNF for reprocessing might well provide economic

and security of supply advantages to its participating states, it will

contribute to the objectives on non-proliferation only if provisions

are built in to protect against states ultimately building national

plants with technology acquired from the MNF and if an alternative is

found to shipping large quantities of plutonium, even under safeguards,

back to the participating states.

Given the apparent agreement of those who have studied the MNF

concept that modest beginnings stand the greatest chance of success,

economics of reprocessing, there may be considerable advantage in

proceeding in stages. Starting with a spent fuel storage facility

would avoid an early commitment to reprocessing, assist immediately

with the waste management problem and provide a period of modest

demands for the MNF to prove its ability to function and gain the

confidence of participating states. If initially chartered with a

mandate to expand into reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication

and if sited appropriately, a MNF that initially provides only spent

fuel storage services could be expanded later. This is an approach

very worth considering.
IX - 136

1.

2.

3.

4.

s.

6.

7.

8.

9.

See Harold A. Fieveson and Theodore Taylor, ‘Alternative Strategies

for International Control of Nuclear Powert’, in Ted Greenwood,

Harold Fieveson and Theodore Taylor, Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities and Strategies for Control (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1977), and S. Banerjee, E. Critoph and R.G. Hart,

‘

tThorium as a Nuclear Fuel for CANDU Reactors”, The Canadian Journal

of Chemical Engineering, 53 (June 1975), pp. 291-296.

See Mark Sharefkin, “The Simple, Uncertain Economics of Multinational Reprocessing Centers”, in Abram Chayes and W. Bennett

Lewis (editors), International Arrangements for Nuclear Fuel

Reprocessing, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing CO., 1977),

pp. 47-64; and Ted Greenwood, George W. Rathjens, and Jack Ruina,

~~Nuclear power and Weapons Proliferation”, Adelphi paper 130~

(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977),

pp. 18-20.

For a full discussion on motivations for reprocessing, see Ted

Greenwood, ?~why Reprocess? ~~ in Chayes and Lewis} PP* 17-29*

See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, l!Nuclear spread and World Order”S

Forei gn Affairs, Vol. S3, (July 1975), pp. 743-755; and

David E. Lilienthal, ‘If This Continues, the Cockroach Will

Inherit the Earth”, The New York Times, (June 20, 1975), p. 33.

Bloomfield, p. 746.

International Atomic Energy Agency, ~~lAEA Study Project on Regional

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers, Status Report”, (September 1976),

IAEA-RFcc/3, p. 1.

Vinay Meckoni, ‘

f

Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centersf’, IAEA Bulletin,

Vol. 18, No. 1, p. S.

IAEA-RFCC/3, p. 8-9.

International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Centre study: Institutional-Legal Framework Aspectsf’, IAEA-RFCC/2,

(July 1976) .

10. IAEA-RFcc/3, p. 2.

11. rAEA-RFCC/3, p. 2.
IX - 137

12. For a description of Urenco/Centec and United Reprocessor, see

C. Allday, “Some Experiences in Formation and Operation of Multinational Uranium-Enrichment and Fuel-Reprocessing Organizationsft

,

in Chayes and Lewis, pp. 177-187. IAEA-RFCC/2 provides a discussion

of Eurochemic, EURODIF and URENCO, See pages 8-11.

13. IAEA-RFCC/2 briefly discusses these on p. 12. See also Eugene B.

Skolnikoff, “Relevance of Intelsat Experience for Organizational

Structure of Multinational Nuclear Fuel Facilities”, in Chayes

and Lewis, pp. 223-232.

14. The Proceedings of this Symposium are given in Chayes and Lewis.

1s. Constance B. Smith and Abram Chayes, ~?Institutional Arrangements

for a Multinational Reprocessing Plant”, in Chayes and Lewis,

p. 145.

16. Smith and Chayes, p. 148.

17. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency Article 1X.1.1.

18. Smith and Chayes, pp. 17S-176.
IX - 138

APPENDIX IX-G

SANCTIONS
IX - 139

HUDSON INSTITUTE

Final Repor t

T HE R OLE OF S ANCTIONS I N

N O N- PROLIFERATION S TRATEG Y

b y

Lewis A. Dunn

with contributions b y

Edward BoyIan

Mary Esbenshad e

Barry J . Smernof f

Prepared fo r

Office of Technology Assessmen t

U.S. Congres s

Contract No. OT A

-

C

-

5 3

2 February 197 7

HI-2580-RR

HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC.

Quaker Ridge Roa d

Croton-on-Hudso n

New York 10520
IX - 140

THE ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY

Introductio n

In addition to seeking to reduce the pressures for acquiring nuclea r

weapons, non-proliferation strategy may seek to increase constraints upo n

prospective proliferators . This report examines one possible means fo r

doing so : the imposition of sanctions for safeguards agreement violation s

and other proliferatory activities. Beginning with a brief review of th e

current status of sanctions , it then discusses the purposes possibl y

served by sanctions; specific triggering activities and the broader con -

textual situation of a decision to impose sanctions; potential risks an d

consequences of sanctions ; and components of a sanctions strategy, includ -

ing enumeration of specific sanctions . It concludes with an overall evalu -

ation of sanctions’ potential role within non-proliferation policy .

The Current Situatio n

The threat of sanctions as a means of enforcing legal obligation s

already is included within American Agreements for [Nuclear] Cooperatio n

with various countries ; the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute ;

the Foreign Assistance Act as recently amended by the Internationa l

Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976; and former Presiden t

Ford’s October 28, 1916, statement on nuclear policy. These provide a

starting point for the remaining discussion and the relevant aspect s

of each should be noted briefly .

First, American Agreements for Cooperation provide that in th e

event of non-compliance with the Agreement’s provisions--e.g., thos e
IX - 141

guaranteeing non-military uses of the material, equipment, and device s

transferre d --the United States has the right “...to suspend or terminat e

this Agreement and to require the return of any materials, equipment ,

and devices [transferred under it]. ”

Second, Article XII (c) of the IAEA Statute provides tha t

The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Directo r

General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Boar d

of Governors . The Board shall call upon the recipient Stat e

or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it find s

to have occurred . The Board shall report the non-complianc e

to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembl y

of the United Nations . In the event of failure of the recipien t

State or States to take fully corrective action within a reason -

able time, the Board may take one or both of the following mea -

sures : direct curtailment or suspension of assistance bein g

provided by the Agency or by a member, and call for the retur n

of materials and equipment made available to the recipient mem -

ber or group of members . The. Agency may also, in accordanc e

with article XIX, suspend any non-complying member from th e

exercise of the privileges and rights of membership .

Third, Sec. 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amende d

in 1976, would preclude provision of economic assistance, military O r

security supporting assistance or grant military education and training ,

or military credits or [commercial] guarantees to any country whic h

I I( A ) delivers nuclear reprocessing or enrichment equip -

ment, materials, or technology to any other country; o r

“(B) receives such equipment, materials or technology

from any other country ;

unless before such delivery- -

“(i) the supplying country and receiving country hav e

reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials ,

and technology, upon delivery, under multilateral aus -

pices and management when available; an d

"(ii) the recipient country has entered into an agree -

ment with the International Atomic Energy Agency to plac e

all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclea r

fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguard s

system of such Agency .
IX - 142

(Within this section , however, provision also is made for Presidentia l

waiver with subsequent Congressional oversight under certain conditions. )

Finally, possible proliferation sanctions, extending beyond termina -

tion of nuclear assistance, also were alluded to within former Presiden t

Ford's October 28th nuclear policy statement. He warned :

--I serve notice today that the United States will, at a min i

-

mum, respond to violation by any nation of any safeguards agree -

ment to which we are a party with an immediate cutoff of ou r

supply of nuclear fuel and cooperation to that nation .

We would consider further steps, not necessarily confine d

to the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator nation .

Nor will our actions be limited to violations of agreements in

which we are directly involved . In the event of material vio -

lation of any safeguards agreement, particularly agreement s

with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with

all interested nations to determine appropriate action .

Universal recognition of the total unacceptability of th e

abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agreement s

is one of the most important steps which can be taken to pre -

vent further proliferation . We invite all concerned government s

to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear wrongdoing a s

an intolerable violation of acceptable norms of internationa l

behavior, which would set in motion strong and immediate countermeasures .

That is, varied references to potential proliferation sanctions alread y

exist within key non-proliferation agreements and policy statements .

Further future explicit development of sanctions strategy, should i t

occur, would be able to build upon these prior initiatives . Whether t o

move further in that direction depends partly upon the importance of thos e

purposes that might be served by threatening or actually imposing sanc -

tions .
IX - 1 4 3

Purposes of Sanction s

One obvious purpose of threatening to impose or imposing sanction s

would be to influence directly the policies of the specific prospectiv e

proliferator itself . The threat of sanctions, for example, could b e

used to convince a country that had begun clandestinely to reproces s

small quantities of diverted material to cease doing so . Or, thei r

credible threat might help to deter such clandestine violations in th e

first place . Broadly put, the threat and prospect of sanctions coul d

reinforce perceived proliferation constraints, increasing the likeli -

hood that prospective proliferators would continue to conclude that th e

costs of “going nuclear” outweighed the benefits .

A second purpose of imposing sanctions would be to influenc e

onlookers’ perceptions of the constraints upon and costs of “goin g

nuclear. ” In the absence of an effective response to the first safe -

guards agreement violation , for example, other potential proliferator s

could revise upward, perhaps significantly, estimates of their “free -

dom of action. ” But a strong response probabl y

think again about the costs of “going nuclear. ”

this “demonstration effect” may be as importan t

would make such onlooker s

Though not often noted ,

a reason for carryin g

out the threat to impose sanctions as the more direct effect on th e

particular proliferators .

A third purpose of invoking sanctions, now specifically for a

safeguards agreement vioIation , would be to diminish erosion of th e

safeguards system’s effectiveness . If unopposed, a safeguards violatio n

could seriously weaken IAEA organizational morale . The inspectors migh t
IX - 1 4 4

take their responsibilities less seriously and no longer be as ready t o

risk questioning ambiguous activities . Further, without the prospec t

of support from the major powers, the Board of Governors also might b e

less willing to find instances of non-compliance even were evidenc e

forwarded to it by the Inspector General .

Finally, in conjunction with other non-proliferation measures, a

. readiness to threaten and, if necessary , impose sanctions would enhanc e

broader efforts to create an anti-nuclear global climate. By imposin g

sanctions , the United States and other countries would demonstrate th e

seriousness of their opposition to widespread nuclear proliferation an d

their willingness to support that goal by action if needed . Conversely ,

failure to react strongly to a safeguards violation or other futur e

dramatic proliferation events probably would engender and/or reinforc e

a belief that widespread proliferation was inevitable . Not only woul d

growth of proliferation momentum hinder efforts to control nuclea r

exports--why sacrifice commercial advantage to a lost cause?, many sup -

pliers might ask--but it also would augment diffuse pressures for acquir -

ing nuclear weapon s --better to “go nuclear" now before potential oppo -

-

nents do, many countries might rationalize .

Thus, readiness to utilize sanctions could serve a variety o f

non-proliferation purposes . Before turning to a discussion of the pos -

sible risks and consequences of threatening or imposing sanctions, how -

ever, both the types of activities which might trigger sanctions an d

the implications for sanctions strategy of the context within whic h

particular activities occurred warrant attention .
IX - 145

Trig g ering Activities and Contextual Complication s

Table 1 on the following page enumerates a range of possible event s

which might trigger sanctions . These include different types of safe -

guards agreement violations; violations of Agreements for Cooperation ;

withdrawal from the NPT; nuclear gray marketeering; and movement, thoug h

not in violation of any legal obligation, towards a nuclear weapon capa -

bility .

However, the specific context within which any of these event s

occurred could influence the feasibility and/or desirability of invokin g

sanctions . Consider the following questions whose answers might var y

importantly from one situation to the next : Was there any ambiguit y

concerning either what actions had been taken by the specific countr y

or whether its actions violated any pre-existing legal obligations ?

If a violation had occurred, were there any extenuating circumstances ?

Or was the country a special case , one where the imposition of sanction s

appeared impolitic or otherwise inappropriate? Would imposing sanction s

entail a serious risk of triggering a counter-reaction, and of what mag -

nitude, by the sanctioned country or otherwise endanger important foreig n

policy interests ? Would other countries support an American response, o r

would they stand aside , or even rally to the support of the sanctione d

party? Or, to take a final illustration, would American domestic publi c

opinion and political forces support or merely accept the imposition o f

sanctions, or perhaps so oppose them and/or so qualify their applicatio n

in the specific case as to vitiate their impact ?
IX - 146

Table 1

POSSIBLE TRIGGERING ACTIVITIES

1. SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT VIOLATION OR VIOLATION OF AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION

A .

B.

c.

D.

E .

F .

G.

H.

DIVERSION OF MATERIAL

SEPARATION OF PLUTONIUM

FABRICATION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE OR ITS

CRITICAL COMPONENTS

TESTING OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE

REPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY

EXPORT OF REPLICATED TECHNOLOGY

DENIAL OF INSPECTION ACCESS

TAMPERING WITH INSPECTION EQUIPMENT

2 . WITHDRAWAL FROM NPT

3* GRAY MARKETEERING

A . TRANSFER OF MATERIALS OR TECHNOLOGY

B, JOINT PRODUCTION

c. TRANSFER OF HUMAN RESOURCES

4. MOVEMENT TO NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY (WITHOUT

LEGAL VIOLATIONS)

A . CREATION OF INDIGENOUS OPTION

B, COVERT PREPARATIONS FOR TESTING

c. TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPON (QUA PNE?)
IX - 1 4 7

Other questions designed to focus attention upon the peculiaritie s

of particular contexts for threat or imposition of sanctions coul d

be posed . They all suggest that under some conditions there may be com -

pelling reasons not to threaten or apply sanctions . In specific con -

texts either may appear inappropriate, overly costly, or both . If so ,

any sanctions strategy may have to permit some degree of flexibility .

This need to build flexibility into sanctions strategy becomes even mor e

evident when the varied risks and consequences of invoking sanction s

are examined in greater detail .

Risks and Consequences of Threatening and Imposing Sanction s

Turning to the possible consequences of threatening to and/o r

actually imposing sanctions, the following chart (Table 2) provides a

useful starting point . From the vantage point of the United States ,

it depicts the key decisions that would be involved following an allege d

safeguards agreement violation and the major potential alternative out -

comes. For ease of discussion , it begins at the point where the Unite d

States would be confronted by either an IAEA Board of Governors’ findin g

of non-compliance or one of compliance with which it strongly disagrees .

Comparable decision points and alternative possible outcomes would b e

involved in similar cases beginning from a finding of non-compliance b y

another supplier nation, an American finding of an Agreement for Coopera -

tion violation , evidence of gray marketeering on the part of some country ,

an NPT withdrawal, or other triggering activities . The most importan t

possibilities suggested by the chart warrant brief elaboration .
Table 2

ILLUSTRATIVE SANCTION DECISION TREE - U.S. BRANCH

PUNISHED NATION \ NATION

!
IX - 149

First, confronted by an action possibly warranting sanctions, th e

United States might either simply not impose sanctions or first threate n

their imposition and then back down . Among the factors possibly produc -

tive of such non-action might be : bureaucratic disagreement about th e

wisdom of applying sanctions, perhaps threatening other foreign polic y

goals, in that case; domestic political pressures; fear of reprisal ;

and/or the lack of suitable levers . As already suggested above, however,

the consequences of failure to act could be serious; at the very least ,

other countries ’ concern that sanctions would be imposed upon them i n

similar situations probably would decrease . In particular, if th e

United States had first threatened to impose sanctions but then backe d

down, its future threats would be markedly less credible . In addition ,

many might question the seriousness of American opposition to more wide -

spread proliferation .

Secondly, sanctions could be imposed but their subject might no t

modify its policy or activities . Not only would such a locally ineffec -

tive recourse to sanctions leave the initial country’s activities unaf -

fected but, here, too, onlookers might be more prompted to conclude tha t

they, too, had very little to fear . Much would depend upon their particular degree of vulnerability and upon whether American readiness t o

invoke sanctions, though unsuccessful locally, still would convey a

similar future readiness . On that, while granting the importance o f

local success or failure in influencing onlookers, it may be that fo r

sanctions ’ further credibility, success need not be total. For example ,

cessation of clandestine reprocessing though not the return of previousl y

reprocessed material might suffice to deter others .
IX - 150

An additional possible risk is that imposition of sanctions i n

response to a minor violation , e.g., covert reprocessing of small quan -

tities of plutonium , if it did not produce a cessation of the proscribe d

activity, actually might trigger a decision to launch a full-fledge d

nuclear-weapon program . That is, once a country had paid sanctions ’

political and economic price for a lesser proliferation action, it coul d

decide that the cost had been borne and was bearable, so that it migh t

as well go ahead and acquire the political and military benefits o f

“going nuclear ”

Fourth, threat or imposition of sanctions also entails the risk tha t

the sanctioned nation would threaten or adopt counter-measures painfu l

to the United States, and to its coalition partners in the case of multi -

lateral sanctions . Such retaliatory action might range from using economi c

counter-leverage- - e.g., refusal to repay foreign debts, seizure of foreig n

investment, or an embargo on key exports such as oil--to engaging in dis -

ruptive nuclear export practices- - e.g., gray market transfer of nuclea r

materials , human resources, or technology. Not only might such retalia -

tion hurt the sanctioner , but, as for example with gray marketeering o r

non-payment of debts , it could provide a source of replacement revenu e

to aid the sanctioned state .

Each of the preceding potential consequences has emphasized th e

risks of a sanctions strategy . Nonetheless, as indicated by the chart ,

a fifth possible outcome is that of successful use of the threat o r

imposition of sanctions to strengthen proliferation constraints . T h e

sanctioned country could rectify its activities and move to comply wit h

the behavior sought . Or, even though it did not alter its policies ,
IX-151

onlookers still might be impressed by the costs imposed--ones that they ,

too, could suffer-and by the demonstration of readiness to impose sanc -

tions, both leading them to reassess upward their perception of the con -

straints upo n “going nuclear. ” Or, at the very least, the costs of non -

action in terms of onlookers' perceptions of their freedom of action migh t

be avoided .

However, to insure restored compliance, more than simply the avail -

ability of leverage would be needed . Successful use of threatened o r

imposed sanctions to compel a change of policy also may require certai n

preconditions . For example, what the desired outcome is following sanction s

should be conveyed clearly . That is, what specific actions would terminate sanctions must be stated . For example , in the case of cover t

reprocessing in violation of an Agreement of Cooperation, the price o f

revoking sanctions could be cessation of the activity, surrender of th e

material, and thorough on-site inspection to ensure compliance : t h e

sanctioned country should know specifically which is necessary. Or ,

following a nuclear test, perhaps qua PNE, the threat of sanction s

might be 1 inked to the non-occurrence of a second test . More broadly ,

if sanctions or their prior threat are to be used successfully not onl y

to deter onlookers but to influence the policies of the sanctioned party ,

non-proliferation forces and potential proliferators need to have clearl y

in mind what would either result in the actual imposition of sanction s

or their termination once implemented .

Two other possible preconditions for effective use of sanction s

should be mentioned . On the one hand, to the extent that the threat o f

sanctions can be invoked before a possible violation has preceded ver y
IX - 1 5 2

far and before the benefits of violation have begun to accrue, the like -

lihood of success appears greater . Timely warning, therefore, provide s

a needed support for sanctions posture . On the other hand, the succes s

of sanctions in terms of their impact upon onlookers may be partl y

related to perceptions of their legitimacy . The need to legitimat e

sanctions points to the role of an effective international body suc h

as the IAEA for authorizing sanctions ; it also points to the desirabilit y

of a careful declaratory policy making clear what may happen in the even t

of a legal obligation’s violation or some other proliferatory action s o

that action does not appear capricious .

It has to be granted , nonetheless, that the past record of sanctions ’

threat or imposition has not been one of marked success . Canada’s recen t

termination of nuclear assistance to India did not slow greatly India’ s

nuclear program; nor did Canada’s threatened termination of nuclear assis -

tance to Pakistan unless it withdrew its request to purchase a Frenc h

reprocessing plant produce the desired Pakistani response . Further ,

United Nations’ economic sanctions against Rhodesia have been relativel y

ineffective in promoting black majority rule: many countries continue d

to trade with Rhodesia out of need for her products and markets, whil e

Rhodesian economic adaptation, spurred by such outside pressure, produce d

increased rates of growth, averaging 10 percent, over the last decade .

Similar lack of effectiveness characterized use of economic sanction s

against Mussolini’s Italy by the League of Nations in 1935 .

But to extrapolate from the past ineffectiveness of economic sanc -

tions to future sanctions '

 ineffectiveness may be inappropriate .
Ix - 1 5 3

Instead, detailed assessment of the degree of existing leverage ove r

specific prospective proliferators is needed . Further , it has to b e

asked whether fewer countries would have to cooperate now to pu t

together an effective multilateral-sanctions coalition . As propose d

below, on both count s --the availability of levers and the size of th e

coalition necessary for effective multilateral sanctions--the prospec t

of successful recourse to sanctions or their threat appears significantl y

greater than in the past .

The preceding discussion of possible consequences, as well as th e

earlier one of contextual factors, suggests that an overall sanction s

strategy would have to minimize the potential negative consequences o f

sanctions while maximizing their prospective direct and indirect non -

proliferation effects . Both action and inaction have their costs an d

risks . The next section tentatively proposes one such strategy, whil e

also enumerating a range of particular sanctions that could be employe d

within its basic framework .

Sanctions: Strateg y and Lever s

One possible American sanctions strategy would distinguish two pos -

tures : one threatening automatic imposition of sanctions where a clea r

violation of a legal obligation was involved; a second designed t o

create a strong presumption that sanctions might be imposed even follow -

ing more ambiguous violations or in the event of other proliferator y

activities . Such a distinction, providing for a degree of flexibilit y

in the application of sanctions , would constitute a suitable balancin g

of the potential benefits and risks of sanctions .
Ix - 1 5 4

On the one hand, as already argued, failure to respond strongl y

following violation of a legal obligation would have serious advers e

effects upon non-proliferation efforts. In this case, the risks o f

inaction are likely , therefore, to outweigh those of action . Thi s

is recognized by the rigid threat of automatic sanctions followin g

violations of legal obligations . On the other hand, the presumptiv e

sanctions posture, while emphasizin g that more ambiguous activitie s

and not necessarily illegal proliferatory actions could trigger sanc -

tions, acknowledges that in some cases the costs and risks of takin g

action may be too high and that flexibility may be desirable . Combin -

ing suitable declaratory policy and actual decisions, such a postur e

would convey to any prospective proliferator the need to take seriousl y

the risk of a strong American respons e --possibly supported by like -

minded nation s --to future proliferatory activities .

Within the framework of automatic and presumptive sanctions, a

broad set of levers might be utilized . Some of these levers alread y

have been suggested by the initial review of the current status o f

sanctions . More completely, a list of potential sanctions woul d

include the following :

1. termination of nuclear assistance and exports of nuclea r

fuel and technology by the United States alone or i n

cooperation with other nuclear suppliers ;

2 . delaying or cutting off American Ex-lm Bank loans ;

3* delaying or withholding of American economic assistance;

4. American-supported multilateral delaying or withholdin g

of economic assistance ;
IX - 1 5 5

5. delaying or blocking access to World Bank loans, entailin g

multi-nation action by a small coalition using thei r

weighted voting power;

6 . imposition of a multilateral trade embargo ;

7. American refusal to continue supplying late-model conven -

tional arms and associated military training assistance ;

8. American withdrawal of a prior security guarantee;

9. redefinition of the coverage of a pre-existing American

security guarantee to preclude response should a third

party attack the guaranteed country’s nuclear-weapo n

facilities ;

10. American expulsion of a country’s (engineering) students ,

termination of landing rights for its airline, prohibitio n

of tourism to and from it, and severance of communications; an d

1 1 . a ban on private investment within the country in question .

Given the existence of a broad range of potential levers, what ca n

be said about the relative deterrent impact of each? A more detaile d

analysis than can be included in this report has indicated that differen t

prospective proliferators are more vulnerable to some levers than t o

others . Thus , it is not useful to compare the relative deterren t

effect, for example, of nuclear-assistance related sanctions to eco -

nomic assistance sanctions in the abstract . Deterrent impact varie s

from case to case . At the same time, wha t

analyses is the extent to which nearly all

does stand out in detaile d

prospective near-term pro -

liferators would be vulnerable to one or more of these levers .

This may be illustrated in various ways . Some countries, for exam -

ple, are planning to depend heavily (40-50 percent of mid- to late-1980 s

*

President McNamara’s policy is not to bring loans to a vote whe n

40 percent of the weighted votes are opposed. The United States plu s

two or three other countries such as Great Britain, Canada, West Germany ,

Japan, and the Netherlands would control that 40 percent .
Ix-156

projected capacity) upon nuclear power as a source of electricity .

Termination of supplies of nuclear fuels and associated materials woul d

seriously affect such countries. For others, foreign economic assistance ,

including World Bank assistance, provides a significant percentage (mor e

than 25 percent) of yearly capital inflows . Or, even acknowledging tha t

trade can be redirected over time , there are countries for which foreig n

trade constitutes a very high percentage of GNP (more than 50 percent) an d

whose current trading patterns entail heavy dependence upon only two o r

three key trading partners, including the United States . Similarly, fo r

various countries confronting security threats, continued access to sup -

plies of American conventional arms and/or the continuing protection o f

the American security umbrella can be endangered only at great risk .

But, it may be asked , are such indicators of theoretical vulnerabilit y

adequate measures of the potential deterrent effectiveness of sanctions ?

Several recently reported events , if true, suggest that where such vulner -

abilities have been present non-proliferation forces have been able to use

the risk of sanctions to further non-proliferation objectives . Accordin g

to published reports, American pressure was influential in South Korea’ s

decision to forego acquisition of a plutonium reprocessing plant and per -

haps in producing clarification of recent rumors about clandestine repro -

cessing in Taiwan . And, notwithstanding the limited Canadian success vis -

a-vis the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan, a Canadian warning tha t

it might reassess its long-term contracts to supply Japan with uraniu m

may have been a factor in that country’s decision to ratif y

To sum up, a range of levers for use within an overal l

strategy entailing both automatic and presumptive sanction s

the NPT .

sanction s

exists .
IX - 157

And, depending upon the prospective proliferator in question, a signifi -

cant degree of vulnerability to one or more of these levers is likely t o

be present .

The Role of Sanction s

By way of conclusion , two further points about the role of sanction s

in non-proliferation strategy should be made explicitly . On the one hand ,

sanctions are only one of several possible means of reinforcing or increas -

ing proliferation constraints. More importantly, should pressures to acquir e

nuclear weapons become sufficiently intense- - e.g., because a country’s polit -

ical independence or even national survival was seen to be at stake--th e

prospect of sanctions would be unlikely to prevent a decision to “g o

nuclear. ” Measures for defusing proliferation pressures, therefore ,

remain vital . As with other efforts to increase constraints, e.g., b y

more tightly controlling nuclear exports, sanctions may be a necessar y

but not sufficient anti-proliferation tactic .

On the other hand , if the United States and other nations are goin g

to impose sanctions, the legitimacy of doing so would appear to depen d

partly upon the extent to which they assume responsibility for defusin g

those proliferation pressures . To illustrate, in the case of countrie s

closely tied to the United States, the counterpart of using leverag e

to influence their security policies may be a continued American readines s

to preserve existing alliance connections . That counterpart in its variou s

manifestations also needs to be borne in mind when thinking about th e

role of sanctions in non-proliferation strategy .
A.

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

1.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

o.

P.

Q.

R,

IX - 157A

ANNEXES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended

up to June, 1973.

List of Member States, June 22, 1976

Detailed Costs of Safeguards Program

Agency Information Circular/26

Agency Information Circular 66/Rev. 2

Selected Paragraphs

A List of the Agreements Providing for Safeguards Other Than

Those in Connection with NPT Approved by the Board of Governors

as of 31 December 1975

A List of Bilateral Agreements for Cooperation

List of US-IAEA Trilateral Safeguards Agreements

Agency Information Circulat/153 Selected Paragraphs

Outline of the Safeguards Technical Manual

IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual Introduction, Part A

The IAEA Annual Report for 1975, Section on Safeguards

Outline of Regional Nuclear Fuel

Fuel Cycle Center Summary Report

Status Report, IAEA Study Project on Regional Nuclear Fuel

Cycle Center

Treaty of Rome, Chapter VII, Articles 77-85

EURATOM, General Budget for Expenditures Related to

Safeguards (1977)

Protocol to the IAEA/Euratom Safeguards Agreement

List of References
IX - 157B

ANNEX A

SAFEGUARDS RELATED ARTICLES FROM THE STATUTE

OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

AS AMENDED UP TO JUNE, 1973
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

AS AMENDED UP TO JUNE, 1973

ARTICLE II

Objectives

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution

of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the

world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance

provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control

is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

The Safeguards functions are defined in the Statute under Articles

111, A5 and B2 which provide that:

1 5 8
IAEA and International Safeguards-IV.

ARTICLE III

Functions

A. The Agency is authorized:

5* To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special

fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information

made available by the Agency or at his request or under its supervision or control

are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards,

at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at

the request of a State, to any of that Sate’s activities in the field of atomic

energy,

and

B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:

2. Establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received

by the Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are used only for peaceful

purposes.

ARTICLE XI

Agency Projects

F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an agreement with

the member or group of members submitting the project, which agreement shall:

4. Include undertakings by the member or group of members submitting the

project: (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a way as to

further any military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in article X11, the relevant safeguards being specified in the

agreement.

159
IAEA and International Safeguards-IV.

ARTICLE XII

Agency Safeguards

A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the Agency

is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall have the

following rights and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or

arrangement:

1. To examine the design of specialized equipment and facilities, including

nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from the view-point of assuring that it will

not further any military purpose, that it complies with applicable health and safety

standards, and that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided

for in this article;

2 . To require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed

by the Agency;

3 . To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist

in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or

produced in the project or arrangement:

4 . To call for and receive progress reports;

5 . To approve the means to be used for the chemical processing of irradiated

materials solely to ensure that this chemical processing will not lend itself to

diversion of materials for military purposes and will comply with applicable health

and safety standards; to require that special fissionable materials recovered or

produced as a by-product be used for peaceful purposes under continuing Agency

safeguards for research or in reactors, existing or under construction, specified

by the member or members concerned; and to require deposit with the Agency of any

160
IAEA and International Safeguards-IV

excess of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product

over what is needed for the above- stated uses in order to prevent stockpiling of

these materials, provided that thereafter at the request of the member or members

concerned special fissionable materials so deposited with the Agency shall be returned promptly to the member or members concerned for use under the same provisions

as stated above:

6 . TO send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors,

designated by the Agency after consultation with the State or States concerned, who

shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason

of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required

by this Statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and special

fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether

there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military

purpose referred to in sub-paragraph F-4 of article XI, with the health and safety

measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned. Inspectors designated by the Agency shall be accompanied by representatives

of the authorities of the State concerned, if that State so requests, provided that

the inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of

their functions:

7 . In the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States

to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate

assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or

a member in furtherance of the project.

161
IAEA and International Safeguards-IV.

B. The Agency shall, as necessary, establish a staff of inspectors. The

staff of inspectors shall have the responsibility of examining all operations conducted

by the Agency itself to determine whether the Agency is complying with the health and

safety measures prescribed by it for application to projects subject to its approval,

supervision or control, and whether the Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent

the source and special fissionable materials in its custody or used or produced in its

own operations from being used in furtherance of any military purpose. The Agency

shall take remedial action forthwith to correct any non-compliance or failure to

take adequate measures.

c. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining and

verifying the accounting referred to in sub-paragraph A-6 of this article and of

determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in subparagraph F-4 of article XI, with the measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of

this article, and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement

between the Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report

any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to

the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to

remedy

report

of the

forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall

the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly

United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to

take fully corrective action with a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both

of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being

provided by the Agency or by a member, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient member or group of members. The Agency may also,

in accordance with article XIX, suspend any non-complying member from the exercise of

the privileges and rights of membership.

162
ANNEX B

LIST OF THE MEMBER STATES (IAEA)
APPENDIX VI APPENDIX VI

—..—-- IAEA MEMBER NATIONS --—-—--

JUNE 22, 1976 — — ————.

Afghanistan

Albania*

Algeria*

Argentina*

Australia

Austria

Bangladesh*

Belgium

Bolivi a

Brazil*

Bulgaria

Burma*

Belorussian Soviet

Socialist Republic*

Cambodia (Khmer Republic)

Cameroon

Canada

Chile*

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba*

Cyprus

Czechoslovak Socialist

Republic

Denmark

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt, Arab Republic of

El Salvador

Ethiopia

Finland

France*

Gabon

German Democratic

Republic

Germany, Federal

Republic of

Ghana

Greece

Guatemala

Haiti

Holy See (Vatican City)

Hungary

Iceland

India*

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Ireland

Israel*

Italy

Ivory Coast

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kenya

Korea, Democratic

People’s Republic of*

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait

Lebanon

Liberia

Libyan Arab Republic

Liechtenstein*

Luxembourg

Madagascar

Malaysia

Mali

Mauritius

Mexico

Monaco*

Mongolia

Morocco

Netherlands

New Zealand

Niger*

Nigeria

Norway

Pakistan*

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal*

Qatar*

163
APPENDIX VI

Romania

Saudi Arabia*

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Singapore

South Africa*

Spain*

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Thailand

Tunisia

Turkey

APPENDIX VI

Uganda*

Ukranian Soviet

Socialist Republic*

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics

United Arab Emirates*

United Kingdom of

Great Britain and

Northern Ireland

United Republic of

Tanzania*

United States of America

Uruguay

Venezuela

Vietnam

Yugoslavia

Zaire, Republic of

Zambia*

* Member nations that are not party to NPT.

164
ANNEX C

DETAILED COSTS OF THE SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM
N. SAFEGUARD S

COSTS OF THE PROGRAMME

Summary by items of expenditure: Table N.1

Item of expenditure

1973 1976 Increase or (decrease) from 1976 1977 1978

Actual Adjusted Estimate Preliminary

obligations budget Price Programme Total estimate

Salaries and wages

Established posts

Consultants

Overtime

Temporary assistance

Sub-total

Common staff costs

Travel

Meetings

Conferences, symposia,

seminars

Technical committees.

advisory groups

Representation and

hospitality

Scientific and technical

contracts

Scientific supplies and equipment

Common services, supplies

and equipment

Transfer of costs:

Linguistic services

Printing and publishing

services

Data processing

services

Laboratory services

Other: Legal

services

TOTAL

3 180000

917000

410000

.

67000

8000

490 OOL

510000

75000

69000

125000

496000

96000

280600

113500

17400

3500

1 000

10000

41000

8000

6000

13000

72000

10000

584000

200000

105000

30000

17000

3000

(4 000)

68000

-

81000

11 000

275000

128000

10000

3 764000

1 117000

515000

30000

84000

11 000

486000

578 000

156000

80000

400000

624000

106000

4 436 000

1 316 000

610000

55000

76 000

12000

550000

543 000

148 000

90000

500000

663000

112000

4961 633 6443000 576000 932000 1508000 7 951 000 9 111 000

8. 9% 14. 5% 23.4 %

SUMMARY OF MANPOWER

Table N. 2

Number of ● stablished posts

Grade of post 1975

Adjusted 1976 1976

Adjusted Change

1978

1977 Preliminary

estimate

IG 1 1 1 1 1

D 2 3 3 1 4 4

P-5 19 24 24 4 28 30

P-4 33 36 36 5 41 48

P-3 35 33 33 1 34 36

P-2 11 5 5 (2) 3 3

Sub-total 101 102 102 9 111 122

GS 35 36 36 14 50 57

TOTAL 136 138 138 23 161 179

165
ANNEX D

AGENCY INFORMATION CIRCULAR/26, 30 MARCH, 1961 (REF : INFCIRC/26 ,

30 MARCH, 1961, IAEA, VIENNA, AUSTRIA
INFCIRC/26

THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS

On 31 January 1961 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's safeguards system,

which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members.

Table of contents

Paragraphs

I.

II.

III.

I V .

V.

introduction

Definitions

Principles of Agency safeguards

A. General principles

B. Principles of attachment

C. Principles of application

Attachment and termination of Agency safeguards

A. Attachment to nuclear material

B, Attachment to facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material

c . Termination or suspension of Agency safeguards

Application of Agency safeguards

A. General procedures concerning application to

all types of facilities and materials

B. Additional procedures for application to reactor facilities

C. Additional procedures for application to research and

development facilities other than reactor facilities

$f1“ 1‘1 : N l)!~* Equivalent amounts of enriched uranium

1 6 6

1 - 5

6-2 1

22-3 1

22- 23

24-2 7

28-3 1

32-3 9

32-3 5

36 - 37

38-3 9

40-6 6

40-6 9

61 -65

66

1 - 2
INFCIRC/26

page 2

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Under Article III. A. 5 of the Statute the Agency is authorized

"to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable

and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available

by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in

such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request

of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or, at the request of a

State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy."

2. The principles and procedures established for the information and appropriate

guidance of Member States as well as for the guidance of the Board itself in the administration of safeguards by the Agency, are based on the pertinent provisions of the Statute and

enable:

( a ) A State or group of States applying for assistance by or through the Agency to

consider in advance the nature of the safeguards that the Agency would attach;

(b) The parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or a State, to determine

how Agency safeguards might be applied to their activities if they so request;

and

(c) The Board to determine readily what safeguards should be attached to Agency

projects or applied to arrangements that the Agency has been requested to

safeguard, and embodied in the relevant agreements.

3. Agency safeguards will be applied to materials and facilities voluntarily placed under

Agency safeguards by a State or States. Where two or more States request the Agency to

administer the safeguards provisions of an agreement between those States, the Agency will

apply those provisions provided that they are consistent with the procedures laid down in

this document. The administration of safeguards by the Agency under this paragraph shall

be governed by an agreement pursuant to the Statute between the Agency and the State or

States concerned which shall be made for a specified period.

4. This document specifies:

(a) The principles that are to be followed by the Agency in determining the safeguards that are to be attached and applied to various types of assistance, and

(b) The procedures to implement these principles.

The safeguards procedures cover the anticipated requirements by the Agency in the immediate future and relate only to research, test and power reactors with less than 100 megawatts thermal output, to the source and special fissionable material used and produced in

these reactors and to small research and development facilities. Procedures covering

other types of nuclear facilities will be developed as the probable need for them becomes

evident. In regard to produced material, the safeguards provided for in this document

relate only to first generation produced material.

5. The principles and procedures for the attachment and application of safeguards by the

Agency which are set forth hereafter shall be subject to a general review after two years,

in the light of the actual experience gained by the Agency as well as of the technological

development which has taken place.

Ix. DEFINITIONS

6. "Agency" means the International Atomic Energy Agency.

7. “Statute" means the Statute of the Agency.

8. "Board" means the Board of Governors of the Agency.

9. "Director General" means the Director General of the Agency.
INFCIRC/26

page 5

31 Agency safeguards will be applied to specialized equipment and non-nuclear materials

to which Agency safeguards are attached and to facilities [ 3 ] incorporating these items.

IV. ATTACHMENT AND TERMINATION OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS

A. Attachment to nuclear materials

32. (a) Agency safeguards will be attached to source material supplied by the Agency

and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such material,

except when the quantity of PN source material in a State, including the material supplied by the Agency, does not exceed:

(i) In the case of natural uranium or depleted uranium with a uranium-235

content of 0.5 per cent or greater - 10 metric tons;

(ii) In the case of depleted uranium with a uranium-235 content of less than

O. 5 per cent - 20 metric tons;

(iii) In the case of thorium - 20 metric tons.

(b) Agency safeguards will be attached to special fissionable material supplied by

the Agency and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such

material, except when the quantity of PN special fissionable material in a State,

including the material supplied by the Agency, does not exceed 200 grams of

plutonium, uranium -“23 3 or fully enriched uranium or its equivalent in the case

of partially enriched uranium. [ 4 ] Safeguards will be applied in a nominal

marine r when the amount of PN special fissionable material in a State does not

exceed 1 000 grams [ 4 ] .

33. Agency safeguards will be attached to special fissionable material produced in a

principal nuclear facility to which Agency safeguards are attached.

34. Agency safeguards will be attached to nuclear material processed or used in a

principal nuclear facility to which Agency safeguards are attached.

35. Agency safeguards will be attached to all special fissionable material produced in a

reactor to which Agency safeguards are not attached but which contains nuclear material to

which Agency safeguards are attached, if such material permits the reactor to operate at ,

more than 200 per cent of the power at which it could operate without such material.

B. Attachment to facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material

36. Agency safeguards will be attached to principal nuclear facilities supplied or, in the

opinion of the Board, substantially assisted by the Agency. Reactors which, after an inspection at initial criticality, are assessed by the Board to have a maximum calculated

power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts shall be exempted from

such attachment provided that the total such power of reactors thus exempted in any State

may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts.

37. Agency safeguards will be attached to specialized equipment and non-nuclear material

supplied by the Agency, which in the opinion of the Board could substantially assist a principal nuclear facility, other than a reactor with a maximum calculated power for continuous

operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or could in other ways further a military purpose, even when such specialized equipment or non-nuclear material is not in a principal

nuclear facility. The Board may from time to time designate certain specific specialized

equipment and non-nuclear material as being items which would be considered capable of

substantially assisting a principal nuclear facility or in other ways of furthering a military

purpose.

[4] Equivalent amounts can be determined ‘from the equation in the Appendix. The

equivalent amounts of plutonium and uranium-233 are the same as for fully enriched

uranium.

168
INFCIRC/26

page 3

10. "Nuclear material” means any source and/or special fissionable material as defined

in Article XX of the Statute.

11. “Enrichment” means the percentage by weight of the isotope uranium-235 in the total

uranium present.

120

“Depleted uranium” means uranium in which the percentage by weight of the isotope

uranium -235 in the total uranium present is less than that occurring in natural uranium.

13. “Reactor" means any device that can be operated so as to maintain a controlled, selfsustaining fission chain reaction.

14. “Reactor facility" means a reactor including appurtenant facilities such as fuel

storage or cooling facilities or other portions of the plant in which nuclear materials are

handled or used.

15. "Principal nuclear facility" means reactor facilities, plants for processing special

fissionable or irradiated source material, plants for separating the isotopes of uranium or

isotopes of plutonium and such other facilities or plants which may be designated by the

Board.

16. “Supplied or processed by the Agency” means supplied or processed by the Agency

directly, or supplied or processed with the assistance of the Agency when, in the opinion

of the Board, that assistance is of a substantial nature.

17. “Diversion" means the use by a recipient State of fissionable or other materials,

facilities or equipment supplied by the Agency so as to further any military purpose or in

violation of any other condition prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the

State concerning the use of such materials, facilities or equipment.

18. “Agency safeguards” means the measures pursuant to the Statute to prevent loss or

diversion of materials, specialized equipment or principal nuclear facilities.

19. "Attachment” of safeguards" means the requirement to apply appropriate safeguard

procedures.

20. “Application of safeguards" to materials or facilities means the implementation of

appropriate safeguards procedures.

21. “PN [1] material” and “PN facility” mean materials and facilities:

( a ) Supplied by the Agency or to which Agency safeguards are otherwise attached;

(b) Placed under Agency safeguards by agreement with the State or States concerned;

(c) Allocated by a State for peaceful purposes exclusively, provided the State concerned voluntarily sends the Agency notification thereof in connection with

Agency safeguards; or

(d) Supplied from a source external to a State under an agreement that they shall

not be used to further a military purpose or otherwise safeguarded in that State

by other organizations or States, provided that all parties concerned shall have

voluntarily notified the Agency in connection with Agency safeguards of the

material or facilities supplied or otherwise safeguarded in the State so that the

Agency can take account thereof.

[1] This abbreviation means “peaceful nuclear”.

1 6 9
INFCIRC/26

page 5

31 Agency safeguards will be applied to specialized equipment and non-nuclear materials

to which Agency safeguards are attached and to facilities 3 ] incorporating these items.

Iv. ATTACHMENT AND TERMINATION OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS

A. Attachment to nuclear materials

32. (a) Agency safeguards will be attached to source material supplied by the Agency

and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such material,

except when the quantity of PN source material in a State, including the material supplied by the Agency, does not exceed:

(i) In the case of natural uranium or depleted uranium with a uranium-235

content of O. 5 per cent or greater - 10 metric tons;

(ii) In the case of depleted uranium with a uranium-235 content of less than

O. 5 per cent -20 metric tons;

(iii) In the case of thorium - 20 metric tons.

(b) Agency safeguards will be attached to special fissionable material supplied by

the Agency and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such

material, except when the quantity of PN special fissionable material in a State,

including the material supplied by the Agency, does not exceed 200 grams of

plutonium, uranium-”233 or fully enriched uranium or its equivalent in the case

of partially enriched uranium. [ 4 ] Safeguards will be applied in a nominal

manner when the amount of PN special fissionable material in a State does not

exceed 1 000 grams [ 4 ] .

33. Agency safeguards will be attached to special fissionable material produced in a

principal nuclear facility to which Agency safeguards are attached.

34. Agency safeguards will be attached to nuclear material processed or used in a

principal nuclear facility to which Agency safeguards are attached.

35. Agency safeguards will be attached to all special fissionable material produced in a

reactor to which Agency safeguards are not attached but which contains nuclear material to

which Agency safeguards are attached, if such material permits the reactor to operate at

more than 200 per cent of the power at which it could operate without such material.

Be Attachment to facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material

36. Agency safeguards will be attached to principal nuclear facilities supplied or, in the

opinion of the Board, substantially assisted by the Agency. Reactors which, after an inspection at initial criticality, are assessed by the Board to have a maximum calculated

power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts shall be exempted from

such attachment provided that the total such power of reactors thus exempted in any State

may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts.

37. Agency safeguards will be attached to specialized equipment and non-nuclear material

supplied by the Agency, which in the opinion of the Board could substantially assist a principal nuclear facility, other than a reactor with a maximum calculated power for continuous

operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or could in other ways further a military purpose, even when such specialized equipment or non-nuclear material is not in a principal

nuclear facility. The Board may from time to time designate certain specific specialized

equipment and non-nuclear material as being items which would be considered capable of

substantially assisting a principal nuclear facility or in other ways of furthering a military

purpose.

[ 4 ] Equivalent amounts can be determined from the equation in the Appendix. The

equivalent amounts of plutonium and uranium-233 are the same as for fully enriched

uranium.

170
INFCIRC/26

page 5

31 Agency safeguards will be applied to specialized equipment and non-nuclear materials

to which Agency safeguards are attached and to facilities [ 3 ] incorporating these items.

Iv. ATTACHMENT AND TERMINATION OF AGENCY SAFEGUARDS

A. Attachment to nuclear materials

32. (a) Agency safeguards will be attached to source material supplied by the Agency

and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such material,

except when the quantity of PN source material in a State, including the material supplied by the Agency, does not exceed:

(i) In the case of natural uranium or depleted uranium with a uranium-235

content of O. 5 per cent or greater - 10 metric tons;

(ii) In the case of depleted uranium with a uranium-235 content of less than

O. 5 per cent - 20 metric tons;

(iii) In the case of thorium - 20 metric tons.

(b) Agency safeguards will be attached to special fissionable material supplied by

the Agency and to special fissionable material produced in or by the use of such

material, except when the quantity of PN special fissionable material in a State,

including the material supplied by the Agency, does not exceed 200 grams of

plutonium, uranium -233 or fully enriched uranium or its equivalent in the case

of partially enriched uranium. [ 4 ] Safeguards will be applied in a nominal

manner when the amount of PN special fissionable material in a State does not

exceed 1 000 grams [ 4 ] .

33. Agency safeguards will be attached to special fissionable material produced in a

principal nuclear facility to which Agency safeguards are attached.

34. Agency safeguards will be attached to nuclear material processed or used in a

principal nuclear facility to which Agency safeguards are attached.

35. Agency safeguards will be attached to all special fissionable material produced in a

reactor to which Agency safeguards are not attached but which contains nuclear material to

which Agency safeguards are attached, if such material permits the reactor to operate at

more than 200 per cent of the power at which it could operate without such material.

B. Attachment to facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material

36. Agency safeguards will be attached to principal nuclear facilities supplied or, in the

opinion of the Board, substantially assisted by the Agency. Reactors which, after an inspection at initial criticality, are assessed by the Board to have a maximum calculated

power for continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts shall be exempted from

such attachment provided that the total such power of reactors thus exempted in any State

may not exceed 6 thermal megawatts.

37. Agency safeguards will be attached to specialized equipment and non-nuclear material

supplied by the Agency, which in the opinion of the Board could substantially assist a principal nuclear facility, other than a reactor with a maximum calculated power for continuous

operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or could in other ways further a military purpose, even when such specialized equipment or non-nuclear material is not in a principal

nuclear facility. The Board may from time to time designate certain specific specialized

equipment and non-nuclear material as being items which would be considered capable of

substantially assisting a principal nuclear facility or in other ways of furthering a military

purpose.

[4] Equivalent amounts can be determined from the equation in the Appendix. The

equivalent amounts of plutonium and uranium-233 are the same as for fully enriched

uranium.

171
INFCIRC/26

page 7

facilities already approved under the project agreement, the State will advise the Agency

accordingly and submit such designs for examination and approval together with any information that the Agency may request.

43. The Agency shall make its decision about approval of these designs as expeditiously

as possible after the submission of the information by the State.

(c) Procedure for agreement of the records system

44. The State shall agree with the Agency a plan for the system of records for each

facility and material to which Agency safeguards are to be applied. A draft of this plan

shall be submitted by the State in sufficient time to permit review by the Agency and

adoption by the State of an agreed system before the records need to be u seal. Any changes

in this plan shall similarly be agreed with the Agency.

45. The records shal1 include operating records for nuclear facilities, as well as

accounting records of material and equipment, to which Agency safeguards are applied.

46, All records shall be retained for at least two years.

(d) Procedure for submission of reports

(i) General considerations

47. The State shall agree with the Agency a plan for the system of reports for each

facility and material to which Agency safeguards are to be applied. A draft of this plan

shall be submitted by the State in sufficient time to permit review by the Agency and

adoption by the State of the agreed plan before the first report is required to be submitted.

(ii) Routine reports

48. The State shall submit the following routine reports to the Agency:

(a) Operating reports showing the use that has been made of the facility and the

material in the facility since the last report and as far as possible the program of work which is going to be carried out in the facility and with the

material; and

(b) Accounting reports showing the. receipt , issue and location of the material to

which Agency safeguards are applied .

49* The State shall submit the first routine report at the time of the first operation of the

facility under Agency safeguards or at the time when material to which Agency safeguards

are attached is first received at the facility.

50. At the request of the Agency the State shall submit amplifications or elucidations of

routine reports referred to in paragraph 48 above, in the event of unusual circumstances

as determined by the Agency.

(iii) Special reports

51. The State shall notify the Agency within forty-eight hours by the most expeditious

means available:

52.

(a)

(b)

The

(a)

T* ---- ----- --. -1 2 — -2 > -— L - - -..— — ? — -- – -–-2 -- -- – — . —1 .– . . ..1 1 A -- J - -L —.- If any unusual incident occurS, involving an actual or potential loss, destruction

or damage of any facility or material to which Agency safeguards are applied; or

If materia1 is lost or unaccounted for in quantities that exceed those normal

operating losses or unaccounted-for quantities that are accepted by the Agency

to be characteristic of the facility involved.

State shall submit to the Agency a report at least two weeks before:

Any proposed transfer or other transaction that will result in a change in the

quantity of materials to which Agency safeguards are applied in the State, or a

significant change in any facility or complex of facilities considered as a unit

for this purpose by agreement with the Agency; and

172
INFCIRC/26

page 8

(b) Any proposed major change in the planned future program as reported in the

routine reports.

53. The State shall submit any additional special reports requested by the Agency concerning matters referred to in paragraphs 51 and 52 above.

(e) Procedure for inspections

(i) Routine inspections

54. The Agency may make routine inspections of the facility and material to which

Agency safeguards are applied, beginning at a time specified in the project agreement.

55. Inspections will include the examination of the facility to ensure that it is constructed

in accordance with the approved design, and the testing of any equipment or instruments

that are to be used to measure material in the facility to which Agency safeguards are to

be applied. The testing of instruments and equipment shall be carried out only to the extent necessary to test their proper functioning, without reference to their design.

56. Routine inspections after the facility is in operation

(a) Examination of the facility and/or material to

applied;

(b) Audit of reports and records;

shall normally include:

which Agency safeguards

(c) Verification of the amounts of material to which Agency safeguards are

by physical inspection, measurement and sampling; and

(d) Examination and testing of the measurement instruments,

are

applied,

57. If the Agency considers that all the routine inspections that are authorized are not

required, fewer inspections may be carried out.

(ii) Special inspections

58. If an examination of the special reports made under paragraphs 51 and 52 above

indicates the need for a special inspection, the

inspection, to investigate the occurrence.

59. In the event of unforeseen circumstances

inspection may be made provided that a report

stances leading to such inspection.

(f) Nominal safeguards

Agency is entitled to carry out such an

requiring immediate action, a special

shall be made to the Board on the circum60. If the quantities of PN special fissionable material in the State are such that material

supplied by the Agency qualifies for the application of safeguards in a nominal reamer as

specified in sub-paragraph 32(b) above the following shall apply:

(a) Only one routine report shall be required each year regarding the material and

the facilities which are processing, using, or storing such material;

(b) No routine inspections shall be carried out; and

(c) Special reports will be submitted and special inspections performed as

necessary.

1 7 3
INFCIRC/26

page 9

B. Additional procedures for application to reactor facilities

(a) Introduction

61. The following additional provisions apply to reactor facilities. In the present procedures only reactors below 100 thermal megawatts are considered.

(b) Frequency of routine reports

62. The frequency of routine reports for a facility shall normally be twice a year. The

actual frequency for a given facility shall be determined in relation to the frequency of

inspection of that facility.

(c) Frequency of routine inspections

63. Routine inspections shall be made to each facility to which safeguards are applied

except those subject only to nominal safeguards.

64. The number of inspections will be kept to a minimum consistent with the effective

application of safeguards.

65. The frequency of inspection of a reactor facility shall take into account the following

considerations:

(a) The possession by the State or States of an irradiated fuel reprocessing

facility;

(b) The nature of the reactor facility;

(c) The nature of the nuclear material used or produced in the reactor facility; and

(d) The amount of nuclear material used or produced in the reactor facility.

In the light of these considerations , routine inspections shall be conducted at such a fre -

quency that in the interval between inspections the total possible error in the measuremen t

of the quantity of nuclear material used or produced by the reactor facility [ 5 ] cannot

amount to more than O. 2 kilograms of plutonium, uranium-233 or fully enriche d

uranium-235 or their equivalents . The maximum frequency of routine inspections fo r

a reactor facility shall be as shown in the table below. The first column of this table

indicates the annual usage [ 6 ] or the maximum potential production of plutonium,

uranium-233 or uranium-235 expressed in equivalent kilograms, and the second column

indicates the corresponding inspection frequencies.

[51 For the purposes of this document “the total possible error in the measurement of

the quantity of nuclear material used or produced by the reactor facility” shall mean

one standard deviation of the measurement.

[6] Annual usage is the equivalent yearly throughput or inventory, whichever is larger,

and “equivalent” is used in the sense in which it is used in paragraph 32 above and

in the Appendix.

174
INFCIRC/26

page 10

Frequency of routine inspections 7 ]

Annual usage or maximum potential Maximum number

production of Pu, uranium-233 or of routine inspecuranium-235 tions per year

(Equivalent kilograms)

From 0.2 to 1 None (Nominal

safeguards )

More than 1 up to 5 1

More than 5 up to 10 2

More than 10 up to 15 3

More than 15 up to 20 4

More than 20 up to 25 5

More than 25 up to 30 6

The appropriate number of routine inspections will be stated in each project agreement and

provision made therein for changes in case of changed conditions.

c . Additional procedures for application to research and development facilities other

than reactor facilities

66. In this paragraph the only research and development facilities that are provided for

are those in a State which possesses PN special fissionable material in quantities that

qualify, in accordance with sub-paragraph 32(b) above, for the application of safeguards in

a nominal manner. For such facilities the application shall be limited to that shown in

paragraph 60 above.

[ 7 ] Examples of the application of the principle illustrated in the above table are given in

the following table; they are calculated on the basis of typical operating conditions at

the reactor facility:

Illustrative frequencies of routine inspection

Type of reactor facility Design Enrichment of Number of routine

power fuel (per cent) inspections per year

Homogeneous research 50 KW

Heavy water research 3 MW

Pool research 1MW

Pool research 2 MW

Graphite moderated research 4 MW

Test or large research 30 MW

Pressurized water power 40 MWT

Boiling water power 58 MWT

Test or large research 20 MW

Graphite moderated power 100 MWT

20

Natural

20

90

Natural

20

4

4.2

90

Natural

None, subject to the

provisions of paragraphs 32 and 36

above

1

2

2

2

4

6

175
INFCIRC/26

Appendix

APPENDIX

Equivalent amounts of enriched uranium

1. The amount of partially enriched uranium that is equivalent to 200 grams of fully

enriched uranium, is given by the equation:

Amount of uranium in kilograms = 0.2

(Enrichment) 2

(100) 2

2. The amount of partially enriched uranium equivalent

uranium can be determined by substituting x for the figure

graph 1 above.

to x kilograms of fully enriched

O. 2 in the equation in para176
ANNEX E

INFORMATION CIRCULAR 66/REV.2

THE AGENCY’S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

(1965, AS PROVISIONALLY EXTENDED IN 1966 AND 1968)

16 September 1968

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, AUSTRIA

SELECTED PARAGRAPHS
IAEA and International Safeguards-C.

I . GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 

B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE AGENCY’s SAFEGUARDS

‘9• Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall

implement safeguards in a manner designed to avoid hampering a

State’s economic or technological development.

10. The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be

implemented in a manner designed to be consistent with prudent management

practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear

activities,

11. In no case shall the Agency request a State to stop the

construction or operation of any principal nuclear facility to

which the Agency’s safeguards procedures extend, except by explicit

decision of the Board.

12. The State or States concerned and the Director General shall hold

consultations regarding the application of the present document.

13. In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution

to protect commercial and industrial secrets. No member of the Agency's

staff shall disclose, except to the Director General and to such other

members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such

information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards.

any commercial or industrial secret or any other confidential information .

177
IAEA and International Safeguards--c. -5-

coming to his knowledge by reason of the implementation of safeguards

by the Agency.

4. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State,

organization or person any information obtained by it in connection

with the implementation of safeguards,except that:

(a) Specific information relating to such implementation in .

a State may be given to the Board and to such Agency staff

members as require such knowledge by reason of their official

duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent

necessary for the Agency to fulfill its safeguards responsibilities.

(b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency

may be published upon decision of the Board and

‘(c) Additional information may be published upon decision

of the Board and if all States directly concerned agree.”

PRINCIPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION

16. In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, it is desirable

that safeguards agreements should provide for the continuation of

safeguards, subject to the provisions of this document, with

respect to produced special fissionable material and to any materials

substituted therefor.

178
IAEA and International Safeguards-C. - 6 -

1 7 . The principal factors to be considered by the Board in

determining the relevance of particular provisions of this document

to various types of materials and facilities shall be the form,

scope and amount of the assistance supplied, the character of each

individual project and the degree to which such assistance could

further any military purpose. The related safeguards agreement

shall take account of all pertinent circumstances at the time of

its conclusion.’”

III. SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES

A. GENERAL PROCEDURES

INTRODUCTION

2 9 The safeguards procedures set forth below shall be followed,

as far as relevant, with respect to safeguarded nuclear materials,

whether they are being produced, processed or used in any principal

nuclear facility or are outside any such facility. These procedures

also extend to facilities containing or to contain such materials,

including principal nuclear facilities to which the criteria in

paragraph 19(d) apply.”

30. The Agency shall review the design of principal nuclear

facilities, for the sole purpose of satisfying itself that a

facility will permit the effective application of safeguards .

179
IAEA and international Safeguards-C. -/-

31. The design review of a principal. nuclear facility shall take

place at as early a stage as possible. In particular, such review

shall be carried out in the case of:

“(a) An Agency project, before the project is approved;

“(b) A bilateral or multilateral arrangement under which the

responsibility for administering safeguards is to be transferred

to the Agency, or an activity unilaterally submitted by a State,

before the Agency assumes safeguards responsibilities with

respect to the facility:

“(c) A transfer of safeguarded nuclear material to a principal

nuclear facility whose design has not previously been reviewed,

before such transfer takes place and

“(d) A significant modification of a principal nuclear facility

whose design has previously been reviewed, before such

modification is undertaken.

32. To enable the Agency to perform

the State shall submit to it relevant

the required design review,

design information sufficient

for the purpose, including information on such basic characteristics

of the principal nuclear facility as may bear on the Agency’s

safeguards procedures. The Agency shall require only the minimum

amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its

responsibility under this section. It shall complete the review

promptly after the submission of this information by the State and

shall notify the latter of its conclusions without delay.”

180
ANNEX F

A LIST OF THE AGREEMENTS PROVIDING FOR SAFEGUARDS OTHER THAN

THOSE IN CONNECTION WITH NPT. APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

AS OF DECEMBER 1975

Ref. : The Annual Report for 1975, GC(xx)565, International Atomic

Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, July, 1976
Agreements providing for safeguards other than those

in connection with NPT,

approved by the Board as of 31 December 1975

Subject Entry into

force

— .-— .————

Project Agreements

Argentina

Pakistan

Transfer Agreements

(Agreements for transfer of safeguards under bilateral co-operation agreements between

the indicated Parties)

181
Subject Entry into

force? INFCIRC

Japan / United States of America

Japan/ United Kingdom

Korea, Republic of/ United States of America

Pakistan/Canada

b//united States of America Philippine s–

Portugal/United States of America

South Africa/United States of America

Spain/ United States of America

Sweden~//United States of America

Switzerland/United States of America

Turkey /United States of America

Venezuela/United States of America

Unilateral submissions

Argentina

10 Jul 1968

15 Oct 1968

19 Mar 1973

17 Oct 1969

19 Jul 1968

19 Jul 1969

28 Jun 1974

28 Jun 1974

1 Mar 1972

28 Feb 1972

5 Jun 1969

27 Mar 1968

3 Oct 1972

23 Oct 1973

6 Dec 1974

31 Dec 1974

13 Oct 1969

6 Sep 1968

19 Nov 1974

18 Jun 1975

14 Dec 1972

119

125

11 l/Mod. 1

135

120

131

98

92

165

161

123

122

168

202

224

133

118

218

221

175

q An entry in this column does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on

the part of the Secretariat concerning the legal status of any country or territory or

of its authorities s,. or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

y Application of Agency safeguards under this agreement has been suspended as the

State has concluded an agreement in connection with NPT.

c / At present Panama has no significant nuclear activities. The Agreement is concluded

under Article 13 of the Treat:’ for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

1 8 2
A LIST OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN THE CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

(AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1975)

A. Bilateral with individual countries:

Effective

Country Scope date

Argentina Research and power July 25, 1969

Australia Research and power Hay 28, 1957

Austria Research and power Jan. 24, 1970

Brazil Research and power Sept. 20, 1972

Canada Research and power July 21, 1955

China, Rep. of Research and power June 22, 1972

Colombia

Finland

Greece

(note a)

India

Indonesia

Iran

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan

Korea

Norway

Philippines

Portugal

South Africa

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Thailand

Turkey

United

Kingdom

United

Kingdom

Venezuela

Vietnam

Research

Research and power

Research

Power (Tarapur)

Research

Research

Research

Research

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research and power

Research

Research and power

Power

Research and power

Research

Mar. 29, 1963

July 7, 1970

Aug. 4, 1955

Oct. 25, 1963

Sept. 21, 1960

Apr. 27, 1959

July 9, 1958

July 12, 1955

Apr. 15, 1958

July 10, 1968

Mar. 19, 1973

June 8, 1967

July 19, 1968

June 26, 1974

Aug. 22, 195 7

June 28, 1974

Sept. 15, 1966

Aug. 8, 1966

June 27, 1974

June 10, 1955

July 21, 1955

July 15, 1966

Feb. 9, 1960

July 1, 1959

Termination

date

July 24, 1999

May 27, 1997

Jan. 23, 2014

Sept. 19, 2002

July 13, 1980

June 21,2014

Mar. 28, 1977

July 6, 2000

Aug. 3, 1974

Oct. 24, 1993

Sept. 20, 1980

Apr. 26, 1979

July 8, 1978

Apr.- 11, 1977

Apr. 14, 1978

July 9, 2003

Mar. 18, 2014

June 7, 1997

July 18, 1998

June 25, 2014

Aug. 21, 2007

June 27, 2014

Sept. 14, 1996

Aug. 7, 1996

June 26, 2014

June 9, 1981

July 20, 1976

July 14, 1976

Feb. 8, 1980

June 30, 1979

~/Superseding research and power agreement in abeyance; U.S. material covered by IAEA (NPT) safeguards.

183
APPENDIX III APPENDIx III

B. Bilaterals with international organizations

Effective Termination

Organization Scope date date

European Atomic Joint nuclear Feb. 18, 1959 Dec. 31, 198 5

Energy Community power program

( EURATOM)

EURATOM Additional July 25, 1960 Dec. 31, 1995

agreement to

joint nuclear

power program

International

Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA)

supply of Aug. 7, 1959 Aug. 6, 2014

materials, etc.

184
A LIST OF U. 5..-IAEA TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

U.S.-IAEA TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS FOR

APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS TO U.S.-SUPPLIED MATERIALS

Effective Termination

Third party date date (note a)

Argentina

Australia (suspended

7/10/74) (note b)

Austria (suspended

7/23/72) (note b)

Brazil (amended 9/20/72)

China, Republic of

Colombia

Denmark (suspended

3/1/72) (note b )

India

Indonesia

Iran (suspended

5/15/74) (note b

Israel

Japan

Korea (amended 3/19/73)

Philippine (suspended

10/16/74) (note b)

Portugal

South Africa (amended

6/28/74)

Spain (amended 6/28/74)

Sweden

Switzerland

Turkey

Venezuela

7/25/69

9/26/66

1/24/70

10/31/68

12/ 6/71

12/ 9/70

2/29/68

1/27/71

12/ 6/67

8/20/69

6/15/66

7/10/68

1/ 5/68

7/19/68

7/19/69

7/26/67

12/ 9/66

3/ 1/72

2/18/72

6/ 5/69

3/27/68

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

Ac

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

AC

~/AC indicates termination on same date as agreement for cooperation.

~/Suspended in view of NPT safeguards agreements with IAEA.

185
ANNEX I

INFORMATION CIRCULAR /153

THE STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND

STATES REQUIRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

IAEA

SELECTED PARAGRAPHS
PART I

BASIC UNDERTAKING

“1. The Agreement should contain, in accordance with Article

III.1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons , 1)

an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in accordance

with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special

fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within

its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its

control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such

material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices.”

L

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS

4. (Add texts of~)

4. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall be implemented

in a manner designed:

(a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development

of the State or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear

(b) To avoid undue interference in the State’s peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of facilities; and

(c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for

the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

186
‘:5 . ● ● the Agency shall take every precaution to protect

commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the

Agreement. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any

State, organization or person any information obtained by it in

connection with the inplementation of the Agreement, except that

specific information relating to such implementation in the

State may be given to the Board of Governors and to such Agency

staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official

duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent

necessary for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in

implementing the Agreement. Summarized information on nuclear

material being safeguarded by the Agency under the Agreement may

be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly

concerned agree.”

6. The Agreement should provide that in implementing safeguards

pursuant thereto the Agency shall take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall

make every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the

application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the

flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the

Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at

certain strategic points to the extent that present or future

technology permits. In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness,

use should be made, for example, of such means as:

187
“(a) Containment as a means of defining material balance

areas for accounting purposes:

“h) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating

the flow of nuclear material: and

‘“ic) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages

in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production. processing,

use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons

or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be

made, and minimization of verification procedures in

respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this

does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under

the Agreement.”’

t? 7. The Agreement should provide that the State shall establish

and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all

nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and

that such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to

enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been

no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the

State’s system. The Agency’s verification shall include, inter

alia. independent measurements and observations conducted by the

Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II below.

The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the

technical effectiveness of the State's system,”

188
PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY

“8. The Agreement should provide that to ensure the effective

implementation of safeguards thereunder the Agency shall be

provided, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II

belo w with information concerning nuclear material subject to

safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities

relevant to safeguarding such material. The Agency shall require

only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with

carryinq out its responsibilities under the Agreement. Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary

for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under

the Agreement. in examining design information, the Agency shall,

at the request of the State, be prepared to examine on premises

of the State design information which the State regards as being

of particular sensitivity. Such information would not have to

be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that

available for ready further examination by the Agency

of the State.-’

it remained

on premises
“18. The Agreement should provide that if the Board, upon

report of the Director General, decides that an action by the

State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification

that nuclear material subject to safeguards under the

Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the

State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of

whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked.

“19. The Agreement should provide that if the Board upon

examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director

General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has

been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under

the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of

the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures

provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall

take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards

measures that have been applied and shall afford the State every

reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

190
“20. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto

shall, at the request of either, consult about any question

arising out of the interpretation or application thereof.

“21. The Agreement should provide that the State shall have

the right to request that any question arising out of the

interpretation or application thereof be considered by the Board;

and that the State shall be invited by the Board to participate

in the discussion of any such question by the Board.

“22. The Agreement should provide that any dispute arising out

of the interpretation or application thereof except a dispute with

regard to a finding by the Board under paragraph 19 above or an

action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding which is not

settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the parties

should, on the request of either party, be submitted to an arbitrator,

and the two arbitrators so designed would elect a third, who would be

the Chairman. If, within 30 days of the request for arbitration, either

party has not designed an arbitrator, either party to the dispute may

request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint

an arbitrator. The same procedure would apply if, within 30 days of the

designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator

had not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal

would constitute a quorum, and all decisions would require the concurrence

of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure would be fixed by the tribunal.

The decision of the tribunal would be binding on both parties.

191
PART II

OBJECTIVES OF SAFEGUARDS

“28 . The Agreement should provide that the objective of safeguards

is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of

nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture

of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for

purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of

early detection.

"29. To this end the Agreement should provide for the use

of material accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental

importance, with containment and surveillance as important

complementary measures.

"30. The Agreement should provide that the technical conclusion

of the Agency’s verification activities shall he a statement,

in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material

unaccounted for over a specific period, giving the limits of

accuracy of the amounts stated.’”

192
DESIGN INFORMATION

General

42. Pursuant to paragraph 8 above, the Agreement should stipulate that design

information in respect of existing facilities shall be provided to the Agency

during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements, and that the time limits for

the provision of such information in respect of new facilities shall be specified

in the Subsidiary Arrangements. It should further be stipulated that such information shall be provided as early as possible before nuclear material is

introduced into a new facility.

43. The

facility

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

44. The

Agreement should specify that the design information in respect of each

to be made available to the Agency shall include, when applicable:

Identification of the facility, stating its general character,

purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the

name and address to be used for routine business purposes;

Description of the general arrangement of the facility with

reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and

flow of nuclear material and to the general layout of important

items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;

Description of features of the facility relating to material

accountancy, containment and surveillance; and

Description of the existing and proposed procedures at the

facility for nuclear material accountancy and control, with

special reference to material balance areas established by the

operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical

inventory taking.

Agreement should further provide that other information relevant to the

application of safeguards shall be made available to the Agency in respect of

each facility, in particular on organizational responsibility for material

accountancy and control. It should also be provided that the State shall make

available to the Agency supplementary information on the health and safety

procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the inspectors shall

comply at the facility.

45. The Agreement should stipulate that design information in respect of a

modification relevant for safeguards purposes shall be provided for examination

sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when

necessary.
“’46. The Agreement should provide that the design information

made available to the Agency shall be used for the following

purposes:

“ (a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear

material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear

material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification.

“(b) TO determine material balance areas to be used for

Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic

points which are key measurement points and which will be

used to determine the nuclear material flows and inventories:

in determining such material balance areas the Agency shall,

inter alia, use the following criteria;

“(i) The size of the material balance area should be

related to the accuracy with which the material balance

can be established

“(ii) In determining the material balance area advantage

should be taken of any opportunity to use containment

and Surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow

measurements and thereby simplify the application of

safeguards and concentrate measurement efforts at key

measurement points;

“(iii) A number of material balance areas in use at

a facility or at distinct sites may be-combined in one

material balance area to be used for Agency accounting

193
purposes when the Agency determines that this is

consistent with its verification requirements: and

“(iv) If the State so requests, a special material

balance area around a process step involving commercially

sensitive information may be established*

“(c) TO establish the nominal timing and procedures for

taking of physical inventory for Agency accounting purposes:

"(d) To establish the records and reports requirements

and records evaluation procedures:

"(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of nuclear material - a n d

“(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and

surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points

at which they are to be applied.

“It should further be provided that the results of the examination

of the desire information shall be included in the Subsidiary

Arrangements.”

1 9 4
INSPECTIONS

PURPOSE OF INSPECTIONS

7 2 .

The Agreement should provide that the Agency may mak e

routine inspections in order to :

“(a) Verify that reports are consistent with records:

“(b) Verify the location, identify, quantity and composition

of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the

Agreement and

"(c) Verify .information on the possible causes of material

unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties

in the book inventory.”

INSPECTIONS

Access for Inspections

“ 7 6 ...(c) For the pU r pO Se S specified in paragraph 72 above th . e

Agency’s inspectors shall have access only to the strategic

points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the

records maintained pursuant to paragraphs 51-58; and

"(d)In the event of the State concluding that any unusual

circumstances require extended limitations on access by the

Agency, the State and the Agency shall promptly make

arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge

its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations.

The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the

Board.”

195
FREQUENCY AND INTENSITY OF ROUTINE INSPECTIONS

“78 . The Agreement should provide that the number, intensity,

duration and timing of routine inspections shall be kept to the

minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the

safeguards

shall make

inspection

procedures set forth

the optimum and most

resources.

therein, and that the Agency

economical use of available

"79. The Agreement should provide that in the case of facilities

and material balance areas outside facilities with a content or

annual throughput, whichever is greater, of nuclear material not . .

exceeding five effective kilograms, routine inspections shall not

exceed one per year. For other facilities the

duration, timing and mode of inspections shall

basis that in the maximum or limiting case the

number, intensity,

be determined on the

inspection regime

shall be no more intensive than

maintain continuity of knowledge

nuclear material.

i s

of

necessary and sufficient to

the flow and inventory of

"80. The Agreement should provide that the maximum routine

inspection effort in respect of facilities with a content or

annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective

kilograms shall be determined as follows:

196
“(a) For reactors and sealed stores, the maximum total

of routine inspection per year shall be determined by

allowing one sixth of a man- year of inspection for each such

facility in the State:

“(b) For other facilities involving plutonium of uranium

enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for

.

each such facility 3o X /E man–days of inspection per

year, where .E is the inventory or annual throughput

of nuclear material, whichever is greater, expressed in

effective kilograms. The maximum established for any

such facility shall not. however. be less than 1.5 manyears of inspection: and

“(c) For all other facilities, the maximum total of routine

inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for

each such facility one third of a man-year of inspection

plus 0.4 X E man-days of inspection per year, where E

is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material,

Whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms.

“The Agreement should further provide that the Agency and the

State may agree to amend the maximum figures specified in this

paragraph upon determination by the Board that such amendment

is reasonable.

197
“81. Subject to paragraphs 78-80 above the criteria to be

used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration,

timing and mode of routine inspections of any facility shall

include*

‘(a) The form of nuclear material, in particular, whether

the material is in bulk form or contained in a number of

separate items: its chemical composition and, in the case

of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment: and

its accessibility:

‘(b) The effectiveness of the State’s

system, including the extent to which

accounting and control

the operators of facilities are functionally independent of the State’s accounting

and control system: the extent to which the measures specified

in paragraph 32 above have been implemented by the State:

the promptness of reports submitted to the Agency; their

consistency with the Agency’s independent verification:

and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted

for, as verified by the Agency;

“(c) Characteristics of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle,

in particular, the number and types of facilities containing

nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics

of such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree

of containment* the extent to which the design of such

facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory

of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from

different material balance areas can be correlated199
“(d) International interdependence, in particular:

the extent to which nuclear material is received from

or sent to other States for use or Processing; any verification activity by the Agency in connection therewith;

and the extent to which the State’s nuclear activities

are interrelated with those of other States: and

“(e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards?

including the use of statistical techniques and random

sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.”

200
ANNEX J

OUTLINE OF THE SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL MANUAL
Outline of Safeguards Technical Manual

Part A Safeguards Objectives, Criteria and Requirements

Chapter 1 Objectives

Chapter 2 Description of the nuclear material system

Chapter 3 Criteria

Chapter 4 Requirements

Chapter 5 Diversion hazards

Part B Nuclear Activities and Facilities

Chapter 1 Uranium isotopic enrichment

Chapter 2 Conversion and fuel fabrication

Chapter 3 Reactors

Chapter 4 Irradiated fuel processing

Chapter 5 Scrap processing

Chapter 6 Storages

Chapter 7 Research and development

Chapter 8 Nuclear material outside facilities

Chapter 9 Transfer of nuclear material

Part C Inspections

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

Chapter 1 0

Chapter 11

Objectives

Procedures for verification of flow and inventory

Inspection of uranium isotopic enrichment

facilities

Inspection of conversion and fuel fabrication

facilities

Inspection of reactors

Inspection of irradiated fuel processing

facilitie s

Inspection of scrap processing facilities

Inspection Of storage s

Inspection of research and development

facilitie s

Inspection of nuclear material outside

facilitie s

Inspection of nuclear material transfers

201
Part D Evaluation of the Information

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Objectives

Evaluation of the information

State

Evaluation of the information

inspections

Evaluation of the information

analytical services

Evaluation of the information

provided by the

collected in the

provided by the

provided by the

Part II Methods and Techniques — . . . . . . -.. .. .-

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter. 9

Chapter 10

Chapter 11

Classification of nuclear materials, measuring conditions, and measurement methods

Standard reference materials

Methods for weight and volume measurement

Methods of sampling

Analytical methods of measurement of nuclear

material

Methods of non-destructive analysis of

nuclear material

Methods of using isotopic composition

Measurement accuracy for different combinations of materials, conditions and methods

Methods of containment

Methods of surveillance

Methods of identification of nuclear materials

.——---————.

Part F Statistical Concepts and Techniques -—. - .—.—-. -—...—.——-..—. - —
ANNEX K

IAEA SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL MANUAL

INTRODUCTION

PART A

SAFEGUARDS OBJECTIVES, CRITERIA AND REQUIREMENTS

Section on Significant Quantities
“5. ’..3 Significant Quantities .— 

“The expression ‘Significant quantities' is understood as

quantities of nuclear material which are of importance for the

manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The only guidelines to define the quantities which are of .

safeguards importance are the quantities of nuclear material

required to manufacture a single nuclear explosive or the

quantity needed to produce by appropriate conversion the

material required to manufacture such an explosive.

“The amounts of material required for the manufacture of one

nuclear explosive have been estimated in one study (4) to be

25 kilograms of uranium containing 90 to 95 percent uranium-235

or 8 kilograms of plutonium containing 95 percent plutonium-239.

These amounts are related to fast critical masses, and experiments

with fast critical assemblies provide information regarding

the relative amounts of other isotopes

a nuclear explosive. Examples of some

masses are 52 kg of uranium containing

required to manufacture

bare spherical critical

94 percent of the 235 isotope

16.5 kg of uranium containing 98 percent of the 233 isotope: 17 kg

of plutonium (95 percent Pu-239 and 4.5% Pu-240) and 19.5 kg of

plutonium (76 percent of Pu-239, 20 percent Pu-240) and 3 percent

203
critical facilities indicate similar reactivity coefficients for

Pu--239 and U-233 and a reactivity coefficient for Pu--24O intermediate

between those of Pu-239 and U-235. The critical masses noted above

are significantly less when reflecting material is used. For

example, the critical spherical mass of

18 kg when surrounded by a 7-inch thick

uranium and about 26 kg when surrounded

reflector (5).

“For uranium containing less than 90 to

94 percent u-235 is about

reflector of natural

by a 1.74-inch thick

95 percent U-235 the weight

of contained U-235 in a critical mass increases gradually as the enrichment is decreased down to an enrichment of approximately 20

percent, with the specific critical mass weights depending upon the

amount and type of reflector material. Below enrichments of about

20 percent the weights of critical masses increase very rapidly with

about 680 kg of uranium (100 kg contained U-235) being required for a

‘critical mass of 16 percent U-235 with a 3-inch natural uranium reflector (5).

"Based upon the above considerations the quantities of nuclear

material required for the manufacture of a single nuclear explosive

device, for material types not requiring enrichment or irradiation,

are taken by the IAEA to be 8 kg of plutonium for all types of

plutonium for which the isotopic concentration of PU-238 does not

exceed 80 percent: and for uranium in which the combined weights

of the U-233 and U-235 isotopes equal or exceed 20 percent of the

total uranium weight, 8 kg of contained U-233 and U-235 when the U-233

204
isotopic concentration is the larger of the two and 25 kg of

contained U-235 when the U-235 isotopic concentration is the larger.

“For uranium containing less than 20 percent concentration of

the U-233 and U-235 isotopes and for thorium either isotopic

enrichment or irradiation in a reactor is considered to be required

to produce material from which nuclear explosive devices could be

manufactured. In general, quantities larger than 25 kg of contained

U-235 by a factor of 2 to 4 would be required to produce the

material from which a single nuclear explosive device could be

manufactured. For example, to produce by isotopic enrichment

25 kg of uranium of 90% enrichment, assuming a tails assay of

0.003%, would require about 6 tons of natural uranium containing

about 43 kg of U-735. If depleted uranium (assay 0.004% were used

as feed for isotopic enrichment about 25 tons of feed, containing

about 100 kg contained U-235 would be needed to produce 25 kg of

90% enriched uranium. If natural uranium were to be irradiated

in a reactor to produce plutonium at a relatively low burn-up level

(approximately 600 to 800 megawatt-days/ton of uranium which results

typically in about 0.5 kg of plutonium per ton of uranium) about

16 tons of natural uranium containing about 120 kg of U-235 would

he needed to produce 8 kg of plutonium.

"These values indicate the order

material required to manufacture

of States having a sizable scale

of magnitude of the quantity of

a device. Therefore, in the case

nuclear activity, the IAEA would

have to conclude on the non-diversion of a very small fraction of

the State’; inventory of nuclear material.
“5.1.3 Detection Probability and Confidence’ Level

“Neither INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 nor INFCIRC/153 mentions the concepts

of degree of certitude of detection and degree of certitude of not

concluding that a diversion has taken place when it has not. The

IAEA interprets that these concepts, which are usually expressed

by the statistical terms ‘probability of detection’ and

‘confidence level of detection’, are implicit in these two documents.

“Experts from Member States have recommended that the IAEA use

values between 90 and 99% for both. In most cases this will be

95%.

206
ANNEX L

THE IAEA ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1975, SECTION ON SAFEGUARDS

.
SAFEGUARDS

General

125. The Review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non - Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons, which met from 5 to 30 May, expressed strong supper t for effective

Agency safeguards. The Conference paid special attention to export policies, standard and

universal application of the Agency's safeguards, improvement of methods and techniques

and safeguards instruments and the physical protection of nuclear material against forcible

seizure.

126. The Director General has set up a Standing Advisory Group on safeguards implementation to provide advice on technical aspects of Agency safeguards. The Group held its first

meeting in December 1975 and began its examination of verification procedures and safeguards

practices.

127. The Board has taken a number of steps to clarify the scope and duration of safeguards

agreements concluded outside the framework of NPT and of safeguards requirements in

connection with the transfer of scientific and technological information. These steps have

been reflected in recent agreements.

128. The Agency has also helped Member States to set up their national systems of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material and has given training to staff who are responsible

for submitting accounting information to the Agency under safeguards agreements in

connection with NPT.

129. The part of the safeguards information handling system which deals with reports

received from States’ systems of accounting and control on nuclear material subject to

safeguards under NPT, is now handling reports from some States party to NPT and is being

tested for the remainder.

130. The Agency convened the third symposium on the safeguarding of nuclear material

in October 1975. The symposium reviewed the ‘‘state of the art" in safeguards methods,

techniques and instrumentation and it attracted wide participation.

Implementation of Agency safeguards

131. At the end of 1975 the Agency had safeguards agreements in force with 64 States.

The Board had also approved agreements with 17 further States, which are awaiting entry

into force.

132. Of the agreements in force 44 were with States party to NPT and 23 of these States

“have significant nuclear activities (see Table 8 at the end of this section). In addition,

safeguards were being applied in 20 States under 11 project agreements, 21 safeguards

transfer agreements and eight unilateral submission agreements (see Table 9).

133. During 1975 the Board approved:

(a) In connection with NPT, safeguards agreements with Afghanistan, Ethiopia,

Gabon, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sudan, Sweden and Tonga;

(b) In connection with both NPT and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), safeguards agreements with El Salvador

and Honduras;

(c) A Safeguards Transfer Agreement between the Agency, Israel and the United

States of America;

(d) A Safeguards Agreement between the Agency, France and the Republic of Korea;

207
(e) An agreement with Argentina for the application of safeguards to the Embalse

Power Reactor Facility; and

(f) Two agreements with Spain and Switzerland respectively for the application of

safeguards to nuclear material.

.134. The negotiation of agreements to implement the offers of the United Kingdom

and the United States in connection with the application of safeguards in those two States had

entered the final stage.

1350 The Agency's records showed the following quantities of nuclear material to be under

Agency safeguards:

.

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Plutonium (kg)

(a) Contained in irradi- 6661

ated fuels

(b) In other forms 2374

(C) Total 770 1 726 2 900 4730 6300 9035

Enriched uranium

(a) Total element 243 522 1 178 1 865 2305 3 096

(tonnes)

(b) Fissile content 6.1 11.2 26.0 43.0 5 300 66.7

(tonnes)

Source material 1 146 1 200 2 145 3370 3910 4440

(tonnes)

136. During 1975 the Agency carried out 515 inspections in 39 States (216 in connection

with NPT), compared with 474 inspections (165 in connection with NPT) in 38 States during

the preceding year. Of the 515 inspections, 214 were made of power plants, 104 of bulk

fuel plants and 197 of other facilities including research reactors.

137. Inspectors are being trained in the use of recently introduced non-destructive analytical

instruments and techniques and this has improved further the quality of verification.

138. By the end of 1975 the compilation of individual I ’Safeguards Implementation Practices"

enabling the Agency to achieve consistency of inspection procedure in respect of all

facilities where nuclear material was being safeguarded, was well underway. [10]

1390 A list of nuclear installations under Agency safeguards or containing material safeguarded under arrangements approved by the Board is given in Table 10. The breakdown

on 31 December 1975 compared to 30 June of the same year is as follows:

[10] See also document GC(XIX)544, para. 141.

208
N P T Non-NP T

Facilities

30 June 31 December 30 June 31 December

Nuclear power stations 18 18 25 ~j[11]

Research reactors and 47 47 56 56

critical facilities

Conversion plants, 7 7 22 22

fabrication plants and

fuel reprocessing plants

Other separate [12] 47 47 93 93

accountability areas

Safeguards development

140. An Advisory Group on States Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material

met at Brno, Czechoslovakia, in July 1975 and extended the work of the panel held in

Tokyo in November 1973 [13].

141. An advisory group which met in April 1975 prepared a revised set of recommendations [14] to help Member States to minimize the risk of sabotage in nuclear facilities or theft

of nuclear material. The Secretariat is studying the legal instruments that might be appropriate

for ensuring physical protection of nuclear material, particularly when it is transported

internationally.

142. The construction of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory at Seibersdorf was completed

in November 1975 and work on certain categories of samples was expected to begin early in

the new year.

1430 In March 1975 an advisory group helped to draw up guidelines for the development of

safeguards techniques during the next five years. During the year, containment and

surveillance systems have been further refined, particular attention being paid to optical

devices, instruments to monitor the movement of material in nuclear plants and techniques

for sealing. There has also been further progress in techniques for non-destructive measurement of the fissile material content of fuel assemblies and irradiated fuel.

144. The cost of research and technical contracts awarded during 1975 amounted to

$699790, of which 15% was contributed by the Agency and the remainder by the institutes or

Governments concerned. A coordinated research programme for setting up a bank of

correlated isotopic data was started with Member States and EURATOM. The data bank will

be used to develop isotopic correlation techniques and to apply them as a means of

verification of burn-up production of fissile material and reprocessing input analysis.

145. Volume E of the Agency's safeguards technical manual was released for production

in 1975.

[11]

[12]

[13]

(14)

The basis for this number has been changed since 1975; it now relates only to nuclear

power stations that have been subject to inspection during the year under review,

whether or not they have started operation.

Contiguous minor locations where very small amounts of nuclear materials are kept have

been grouped together.

See document GC(XVIII)/525, para.165.

Document INFCIRC/225.

209
Table 8

Situation on 31 December 1975 with respect to the signature of, ratification of, or

accession to, NPT by non-nuclear-weapon States,

and the conclusion of safeguards agreements between the Agency

and these States in connection with NPT

Non-nuclear-weapon States which have Date of ratification

signed, ratified or acceded to NPTY or accessional

(1) (2)

Safeguards agreement with

the Agency

(3)

Afghanistan

Australia

Austria

Bahamas

Barbados

4 February 1970

23 January 1973

28 June 1969

10 July 1973

Approved by the Board

In force: 10 July 1974

In force: 23 July 1972

Under negotiation

2 May 1975

31 October 1972

26 May 1970

28 April 1969

5 September 1969

Belgium Signed: 5 April 1973

Benin

Bolivia

Botswana

Bulgaria

Signed: 23 August 1974

Under negotiation

[n force: 29 February 1972

19 March 1971

2 June 1972

8 January 1969

25 October 1970

10 March 1971

Burundi Under negotiation

Cambodia

Canada

Central African Republic

Chad

In force: 21 February 1972

China, Republic of 27 January 1970

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cyprus

Czechoslovakia

Negotiations discontinued

3 March 1970

16 February 1970

22 July 196 9

Signed: 12 July 1973

In force: 26 January 1973

In force: 3 March 1972

Democratic Yemen

Denmark

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt

3 January 1969

24 July 1971

7 March 1969

In force: 1 March 1972

In force: 11 October 1973

In force: 10 March 1975

El Salvador

Ethiopia

Fiji

Finland

Gabon

11 July 1972

5 February 1970

14 July 1972

5 February 1969

19 February 1974

In force: 22 April 1975

Approved by the Board

In force: 22 March 1973

In force: 9 February 1972

Approved by the Board

12 May 1975

31 October 1969

2 May 1975

5 May 1970

11 March 1970

Gambia

German Democratic Republic

Germany, Federal Republic of

Ghana

Greece

In force: 7 March 1972

Signed: 5 April 1973

In force: 17 February 1975

Provisionally in force:

1 March 1972

19 August 1974

22 September 1970

2 June 1970

25 February 1971

16 May 1973

Under negotiation

Under negotiation

Signed: 6 January 1975

In force: 1 August 1972

In force: 18 April 1975

Grenada

Guatemala

Haiti

Holy See

Honduras

Hungary

Iceland

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

27 May 1969

18 July 1969

In force: 30 March 1972

In force: 16 October 1974

2 February 1970

29 October 1969

In force: 15 May 1974

In force: 29 February 1972

Ireland

Italy

Ivory Coast

Jamaica

Japan

1 July 1968

2 May 1975

6 March 1973

5 March 1970

In force: 29 February 1972

Signed: 5 April 1973

Under negotiation

Approved by the Board

Jordan

Kenya

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait

Laos

11 February 1970

11 July 1970

23 April 1975

Signed: 5 December 1974

Under negotiation

In force: 14 November 1975

20 February 1970 Under negotiation

210
211
Table 10

Nuclear installations under Agency safeguards

or containing safeguarded material under

agreements approved by the

Board of Governorsa/

A. Research reactors and critical facilities

Abbreviated

name

Location Type Capacity In operation

MW(th)

Argentina

Brazil

c /

BulgariaCanada S

/

Chile

China, Republic of

Colombia

Cordoba

Constituyentes

Constituyentes

Ezeiza

Rosario

Lucas Heights. N.S.W.

Lucas Heights, N.S.W.

Lucas Heights, N.S.W.

Graz

Vienna

Seibersdorf

Sao Paulo

Belo Horizonte

Rio de Janeiro

Sofia

Chalk River, Ont.

Chalk River, Ont.

Pinawa, Manitoba

Hamilton, Ont.

Univ. of Toronto

Ottawa, Ont.

Chalk River, Ont.

Chalk River, Ont.

Chalk River, Ont.

Santiago

Hsin-chu

Huaitzupu

Lung-Tan

Hsin-chu

Hsin-chu

Bogota

Vochov

Rez

Rez

Ris#

Ris#

Otaniemi

Rossendorf

Rossendorf

Athens

Tank

Argonaut

Argonaut

Pool-tank

Solid-homogeneous

Tank

Argonaut

Critical Facility

Argonaut

Triga II

Pool

Pool

Triga I

Argonaut

Pool

NRX

NRU

Organic-cooled

Pool-type

Pool-type”

Pool-type

Pool-type

Pool-type

Tank

Herald

Pool

NRX

Pool

Argonaut

0.00

0.12

0.03

5.00

0.00

11.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.25

12.00

5.00

0.10

0.01

2.00

30.00

125.00

60.00

2.5

0.00

0.02

0.00

0.00

0.00

5.00

1.00

40.00

0.01

0.01

Mobile Educational Reactor 0.00

Pool-type 0.02

Critical Facility 0.00

Tank 4.00

Critical Facility 0.00

Homogeneous 0.00

Tank 10.00

Triga II ().2 5

Tank 6.00

Critical Facility 0.00

Pool 5.00

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

212
~tatb/ Abbreviated Location Type Capacity In operation

name MW(th)

c / Hungary - WWR-S M

ZR-4 an d

ZR- 6

Training reacto r

Budapest

Budapest

Tank

Critical Facility

Pool

Triga H

Pool

Pool

Pool

Critical Facility

Critical Facility

Critical Facility

Pool

Tank

Critical Facility

Boiling-water

Tank

Tank

Pool

UTR-B

Pool

Critical Facility

Triga (pulse)

Triga 11

Critical Facility

Triga II

Critical Facility

Critical Facility

Fast Neutron

Source Reactor

Pool

PWR

EBR

Triga II

Triga 111

Triga 111

SUR-1OO

Tank

HBWR

Pool

Pool

Tank

Critical Facility

Tank

Tank

Tank

Tank

5.00

0.00

0.01

1.00

5.00

2.00

5.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.10

50.00

0.00

90.00

10.00

10.00

1.00

0.00

5.00

0.00

0.3

0.10

0.00

0.10

0.00

0.00

0.002

0.10

36.00

50.00

0.10

2.00

1.00

0.00

2.00

25.00

5.00

1.00

8.00

0.00

30.00

1.00

10.00

20.00

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Budapest

Indonesia

Iran~l

Ir@

PRAB (TRIGA H) Bandung

TSPRR Teheran

IRT-2000 Baghdad

Israel IRR-1 Soreq

Japan AHCF

DCA

FCA

HTR

JMTR

JMTR-CA

JPDR

JRR-2

JRR-3

JRR-4

Kinki University

KUR

KUCA

NSRR

Musashi College

of Technology

NAIG-CA

Rikkyo

University

SHCA

TCA

TODAI

Tokai-Mura

Oarai-Machi

Tokai-Mura

Kawasaki-shi

Oarai-Machi

Oarai-Machi

Tokai-Mura

Tokai-Mura

Tokai-Mura

Tokai-Mura

Kowakai

Kumatori-cho

Kumatori -cho

Tokai-Mura

Kawasaki-shi

Kawasaki-shi

Nagasaka

Tokai-Mura

Tokai-Mura

Tokai-Mura

TTR

"Mutsu”

(Nuclear Ship)

JOYO

Kawasaki -shi

Minato-Machi Mutsu

Oarai

Seoul

Seoul

Ocoyoacac

Mexico City

Kjeller

Halden

Pakistan PARR Rawalpindi

c/ Philippine- PRR-1 Diliman, Quezon City

Swierk

Swierk

po~an(j~ EWA

Anna and

Agata

Maria Swierk

Portugal RPI Sacavem

Romania~f VVR-S Margurele

South Africa SAFARI-1 Pelindaba

213
~tatb/ Abbreviated Location

name

Type Capacity In operation

MW(th)

Madrid Pool 3.0 0 x

Madrid

Bilbao

Barcelona

Fast Critical Facility

Argonaut

Argonaut

0.00

0.01

0.01

x

x

x

Studsvik Tank and Pool 50.00 x

Studsvik Critical Facility 0.00 x

Critical Facility

Pool

Pool

Solid homogeneous

Pool

0.00

5.00

30.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

x

x

x

x

x

x

Bangkok Pool 1.00 x

Istanbul Pool 1.00 x

Winfrith Critical Facility 0.00 x

Montevideo Lockheed 0.10

Ljubljana

Vinca

Triga II

Heavy-water

Critical Facility

0.25

6.5

x

x

Kinshasa Triga 11 1.00 x

214
B. Nuclear power stations

Name of

power station Location Type Capacity

Mw(e) In operation

Argentina 319

600

x

7 0 0 .

880 x

2032

22

250

208

750

x

x

x

x

636

143 x

8 8 0

80

880

x

x

380

400 x (fo: 200)

154

357

340

500

460

784

784

784

460

540

826

826

559

826

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

564

650

Karachi 125 x

153

440

x

Garona x

Swede dc 4 4 0

5 8 0

7 6 0

8 3 0

5 8 0

x

x

x

x

x

306

350

350

Switzerland x

x

x

21,5
C. Conversion plants, fabrication plants and chemical reprocessing plants

including pilot plants

Argentin a

ef Pilot Fuel Fabrication Plant, ConstituyentesScrap Reprocessing Plant, Buenos AiresS/

Brazil Fabrication Facility, Metallurgy Department,

Instituto de Energia Atomica, São Paulo

Canadag Eldorado Nuclear Limited Port Hope Refinery

Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Plant

Canadian General Electric Pelletizing Facility

Canadian General Electric Fuel Fabrication Plant

China, Republic of

e/ INER Pilot Fuel Reprocessing Plant–

INER Fuel Fabrication Plant

Denmarkq

/ Metallurgy Department, Risd

e

India Nuclear Fuel Complex - NFC (Enriched Uranium Conversion

and Fabrication Plant), Hyderabad

Japan Power Reactor & Nuclear Fuel Development, Reprocessing Plant

Nuclear Fuel Industries Ltd. (Kumatori-1)

Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. Ltd. (Tokai-1)

Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industries (Ohmiya-1)

Japan Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd.

Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd. i

Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Co. (Tokai) (

Pilot Fuel Fabrication Plants and Conversion Plants:

Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industries (Ohmiya-2)8/

Nuclear Fuel Industries Ltd. (Kumatori-2)$/

Nuclear Fuel Industries Ltd. (Ohi)!?/ ef Nuclear Fuel Industries Ltd. (Takeyama-2)-e/ Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. Ltd. (Tokai-2)-

Mitsubishi Metal Co. ~f

Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. Ltd.

(Central)s/

Norway z

’

ef Fuel Element Pilot Production Plant, KjellerSpain

e/ Pilot Reprocessing Plant, Juan Vigon Research Centre, MadridMetallurgical Plant, Juan Vigon Research Centre, MadridSi

Swedend ASEA-ATOM ,

Conversion and

Fabrication Plant, Vasteras

216
D. Other accountability areas covering more than

one effective kilogr am of nuclear material

Cf HungaryJapan

PolandS/

Switzerland

United Kingdom

United States of America

Research Laboratory. Lucas Heights

Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories

Research Laboratories, R ez

Miscellaneous Locations combined in one

material balance area

Institute of Isotopes

Tokyo University (Tokai)

Institute of Nuclear Research, Swierk

Miscellaneous Locations combined in one

material balance area

Central Hot Laboratory, Studsvik

Laboratories and storages, Studsvik

(except for KRITZ and RO)

Miscellaneous Locations combined in one

material balance area

Federal Institute of Reactor Research,

Würenlingen

Zebra Storage Facility, Winfrith

Windscale Storage Facility, Windscale

Argonne National Laboratory

~1 The nuclear installations that will be covered by the Safeguards Agreement in

connection with NPT, signed with EURATOM and the non-nuclear-weapon States

members of EURATOM on 5 April 1973~ are not listed here.

g An entry in this column does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever

on the part of the Secretariat concerning the legal status of any country or

territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

q NPT Safeguards Agreement.

:/ Denmark joined EURATOM on 1 January 1973 and has signed the Agreement with

EURATOM and its non-nuclear-weapon member States; however, Agency safeguards

are presently applied in this State under the NPT Safeguards Agreement which

Denmark had concluded with the Agency prior to joining EURATOM.

E!/ Pilot plant.

217
ANNEX M

OUTLINE OF REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTER SUMMARY REPORT
1.

2*

3*

o f

approachdescription of the associated studies.

fuel cycle

Constraints and other considerationsInstitutional and Legal

Organization and Administration.

Financial

Health, Safety and Environment

Materials Control

Public Acceptance

15 pp.

218
VOLUME II BACKGROUND —

4. Introduction

4.1 Scope of the Study - methods of work

4.2 Brief description of contents of Volume

4.3 Relationship to contents of Volume I

6.

7.

20 pp.

II

5.1. . Description of mathematical models and

computer programme.

5.2 Assumptions, constraints and other factors

related to the processes and operations.

5.3 Economic and cost evaluations - investments and

schedules.

5.4 Correlation between mathematical models and

process flow models - other testing of models.

Process Flow Models - Characteristic operation-s and

Cost Data

6.1. Power Generation - Spent Fuel Data

6.2 Spent Fuel Storage

6.3 Fuel Reprocessing

6.4 Waste Management

6.5 Mixed-Oxide Fuel Element Fabrication

6.6 Radioactive Material Transport

6.7 Summary- synthesis of back-end

Associated Studies ——

7 .1

7.2

7.3

7.4

7.5

7.6

7.7

7.8

7.9

Institutional and Legal

Organization and Administration

Financial

Health, Safety and Environment

Materials Control

W t?

m tt

Public Acceptance

Summary

Process Controls

Safeguards

Physical Security

30 pp.

10 pp.

60 pp.

60 pp. 260 pp,

60 pp.

25 pp.

15 pp.

60 pp.

60 Pp.

35 pp.

45 pp.

20 pp.

35 pp.

35 pp.

30 pp.

15 pp.

20 pp.

Vol. II Total :

355 pp.

219
REGIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTERS

IAEA STUDY PROJECT

SEPTEMBER 1976

The concept of regional fuel cycle centers has attracted wide interest

as a possible approach towards meeting the fuel cycle requirements of

many countries. Because of the many potential advantages, this concept

has been endorsed by the Member States in discussions at the General

Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency and at the General

Assembly of the United Nations. Accordingly, the International Atomic

Energy Agency, in 1975, initiated a detailed study of the RFCC concept.

It should be emphasized that the immediate aim of the Agency's Study

is to assist the Member States in evaluating the relative merits of the

RFCC approach to establishing fuel cycle facilities. As there is likely to

be a substantial shortage of fuel reprocessing capacity during the next ten

years, it is imperative that the Member States are able to take decisions

as to how long they should plan to store the spent fuel, and find answers

to difficult and elusive questions as to whether they should adopt an interim

thermal reactor mixed -oxide fuel strategy, and what value plutonium is

likely to have for use as recycle fuel in thermal reactors or in fast

breeders.

As the nuclear energy field is one in which long-range planning is

vital, e. g. one needs to allow for an 8-12 years lead time for the

construction and commissioning of a fuel reprocessing plant after a

decision to build has been taken, the study is based on the premise that

Governments would, regardless of the Agency Study, be assessing the

potential of the various fuel cycle strategies in the light of their respective

situations. The Study, therefore, is being pursued with a view to

assisting Member States with their own evaluation and decision-making

processes.

The RFCC concept is based on multinational cooperation in planning

and setting up the fuel cycle facilities in a phased manner in relation to the

other alternative options — (1) of each country setting up its own purely

national facilities; and (2) of countries looking towards reliance on

commercial services being available from existing or expanded facilities

in the countries which currently have the necessary technical capability in

view of their long-standing experience in all major phases of the nuclear

field.

As the RFCC concept envisages multinational partnership in fuel cycle

activities, it would provide a new dimension of assurance that proliferation

of small fuel reprocessing plants would be avoided, and that the safeguards

functions of the Agency, as also contemplated under the NPT, would be

further facilitated and complemented. Co-location of the spent fuel

management and plutonium recycle facilities would also have the advantage

of minimizing the risks associated with the storage and shipment of

plutonium as related to physical security.

The Agency Study is presently concerned mainly with what is referred

to as the "back-end" of the fuel cycle because that is the portion that can

be considered as problematic at present. 220 Alternative choices need to be
examined now- in regard to management of the spent fuel from the current

generation of reactors. The Member States desiring to pursue a

significant power programme will have to do extensive and comprehensive

analysis and planning in this area so as to select the most appropriate

strategy for their needs for the period 10-30 years from now. A regional

multinational framework for evaluating the options and reaching conclusions

on the various strategy alternatives could offer substantial advantages.

The Agency study effort can provide some assistance to any group of

interested Member States even as provisional results from this study

become available and specific case studies could also be taken up if so

desired.

As the Study has progressed, it has become apparent that the variation

in the cost of transport of spent fuel. as related to varying shipment

distance to the possible location of an RFCC, particularly in situations

where sea transport is involved, would not be very significant in relation

to the total fuel cycle cost. Hence, when considering regional groupings it

is not necessary that such groupings be restricted in a narrow geographical

sense, but cooperation between those potential participants who are likely

to have similar plans for the development of their nuclear programmed

could be envisaged.

It has also become evident that the technological and financial

resources that would be required to implement the establishment of such a

fuel cycle center would be such that one or more partners would have to be

those who are in a position to supply the technical know -how and industrial

support and are able to arrange for at least part of the financial resources

required. Hence, potential participants need not think only in terms of

establishing entirely new facilities as existing or planned national facilities

could readily be utilized as the core for a multinational fuel cycle center.

Study Project - Programme Activities

The Study Project is divided into the following three main areas, as

shown in Figure:

(1) Mathematical modelling, computer programming, and analysis of

alternative strategies;

(2) Development of characteristic operations and cost data for use in

the model.

(3) Preparation of associated studies to provide evaluative factors and

guidance relevant to the implementation of the fuel cycle center

concept. This would cover institutional and legal; organizational and

administrative; financial; health, safety and environmental, materials

control (including physical security and safeguards); and public

acceptance aspects.

For each element of the Study it has proven helpful to have one or two

lead consultants work directly with the RFCC Project staff in the

preparation of working documents and related background information.

This preliminary input is then reviewed and revised by a group of

consultants from selected Member States, and the process is repeated if

considered necessary, on a broader basis to ensure full development of the

221
material related to that programme element. The following table shows

the number of meetings already held and planned through the end of August,

together with an indication of the Member States who are assisting the

Agency’s study effort through their experts.

PROJECT ELEMENT

Mathematical Modelling

Fuel Reprocessing

Waste Management

MOX Fuel Fabrication

Fuel Storage

Fuel Transport

Legal-Institutional

Organization and

Administrative

Financial

Health, Safety and

Environment

Safeguards

Physical Security

Process Control

Public Acceptance

MEETINGS:

Held Planned

1 2

2 3

1 2

1 2

1

1 1

6 1

PARTICIPATING

MEMBER STATES

FRG, India, Sweden, USA

France, FRG, Spain, Sweden,

UK, USA

Belgium, France, FRG, India,

Japan, UK, USA

France, FRG, Italy, Japan, UK,

USA

Austria, Canada, France, FRG,

Japan, Sweden, UK, USA

Austria, France, FRG,

Japan, Sweden, UK, USA

Australia, Austria, Belgium,

Finland, France, FRG, Japan,

Korea, Pakistan, Philippines.

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,

UK, USA, Yugoslavia

1 FRG, India, Sweden, USSR,

UK, USA

222
Mathematical Modelling and Economic Analysis of Alternative Strategies

One of the important criteria to be used in evaluating the merits of

RFCC is the overall cost of spent fuel management using integrated

regional facilities as compared with costs using local (national) facilities

for fuel reprocessing and refabrication, taking into account the possibility

of long term storage of the spent fuel without reprocessing. The primary

objective of the mathematical modelling effort is to provide a methodology

for analyzing possible strategies for spent fuel management. This

objective is being met by development of computer programmed which

describe the material flows, facility construction criteria, and capital and

operating costs for the facilities used to treat the spent fuel resulting

from nuclear ‘power plant operation. The computer programmed use a

combination of simulation and optimization approaches to the economic

analysis. Many of the fuel cycle steps, such as spent fuel discharges,

storage at the reactor and transport to the RFCC, are described purely in

simulation modelling; others such as inventory storage at the RFCC and

construction and operation of reprocessing plants are subjected to

optimization modelling to determine the relative economic tradeoff between

provision for spent fuel storage and addition of reprocessing capacity.

It is intended that the developed methodology be sufficiently general,

flexible and easily usable that it could be used by interested Member States

to evaluate the economics of spent fuel management in their particular

situation. In addition, it can be used to rapidly and easily investigate the

sensitivity of RFCC economic results to variations in any of the critical

input data.

Simulation Model -

This model represents an attempt to describe, or "simulate", the

flows of spent fuel through the various transport, storage and reprocessing

facilities, to permit calculation of costs resulting from construction and

operation of those facilities. The description includes facilities for

plutonium storage, conversion, and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication, and

facilities for waste storage, treatment, and disposal. An important

distinguishing feature of this model is that the user makes all decisions

regarding spent fuel inventory storage times and reprocessing plant addition

schedules. By using the programme to analyze a number of possible

strategies, the planner can obtain results useful in selecting the most

appropriate plan for particular conditions. The user specifies a selected

plan for adding all major facilities, such as fuel reprocessing plants and

mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants. The model will then determine the

storage capacity needed for spent fuel inventory in advance of reprocessing.

Given the facility expansion plan, spent fuel storage plan and the cost data

for all facilities, the simulation model will determine the extent to which

223
the facilities are utilized, and the total cost of the planned strategy,

including credits for recovered uranium and plutonium.

Output from the simulation model will include the capital investment

schedule for the RFCC facilities, the annual expenditures for operations,

the average cost per unit of spent fuel discharged from the reactors, and

the total present-worth cost of the plan. The annual revenue received by

the RFCC for services provided will also be computed. In addition,

the computer programme will print out a complete, detailed report on the

annual quantities of materials at each stage of the spent fuel management

cycle.

Use of this model is not limited to the RFCC concept; it can be used

also to analyze strategies involving national facilities, in order to make

cost comparisons between RFCC and national strategies. Further, the

user has the option of specifying that the fuel is to be stored for several

decades before reprocessing plants are introduced.

It should be apparent that, although the simulation model has no

inherent optimization capability, it is very useful for making comparisons

between different strategies of interest to fuel cycle planners, and for

making sensitivity studies involving data uncertainties. Also, the cash

flow data generated by this calculation can be used as the basis for

financial analysis of fuel cycle strategies.

Optimization ModelThis model represents an attempt to determine the economic optimum

schedule for reprocessing plant capacity expansion, considering spent fuel

discharge rates, economies of scale of larger size reprocessing plants

and the added cost of interim storage facilities needed to accumulate an

operating inventory for the larger plants. The planner provides various

capital and operating cost data for the several possible sizes of

reprocessing plants, as well as capital and operating cost data for interim

storage facilities. The optimization model then determines the lowest

cost strategy, from among the many feasible strategies, for spent fuel

storage and reprocessing, including the cost credits for recovered uranium

and plutonium.

The optimization method employed is "backward dynamic

programming’ 1. This technique has the ability to select the optimum

reprocessing plant expansion schedule over the planning horizon, by

examining a finite number of feasible conditions, or "states", that can

possibly exist in each year of the planning horizon. A "state" of the system

is characterized by a discrete reprocessing capacity and a discrete amount

of spent fuel in inventory storage. The dynamic programming procedure

finds the schedule of reprocessing capacity and inventory storage levels

which leads to the lowest cost, when present-worth discounted over the

@arming horizon.

Current Status -

Both ‘of the computer models described above have been programmed

in preliminary form and are used on the Agency computer. Further work

is required on the mixed oxide fuel fabrication model and the waste

management model, and this will be completed in the near future.

224
Illustrative strategies are being analyzed with the models, for the purpose

of examining the effects of different schedules for reprocessing capacity

expansion and to determine the sensitivity of results to various cost

uncertainties, nuclear power capacity growth rates, etc. Results from

these test problems will provide guidance to select more realistic

strategies for further examination.

Participation by Member States

These computer models require input data describing the nuclear

power capacity projected to be installed in each country serviced by the

RFCC, through the year 2000. The Member States currently provide

such data on planned capacity expansions, which may extend through the

mid -1980's. These data are published by the Agency in the annual bulletin

"Power Reactors in Member States". It would be useful if the Member

States could also periodically supply updated projections of nuclear

capacity through the year 2000, supplementing the presently supplied

information on planned capacity.

The Member States could assist the Agency in suggesting meaningful

regional groupings and reprocessing strategies to be analyzed in detail

with the computer models. Continuing participation by the Member States

during this phase of the economic studies would ensure that the results

obtained are for realistic conditions and that the studies are carried out

in a manner useful to the Member States. At the same time, the Member

States would obtain experience with the analysis techniques and computer

programmed used by the Agency, thus facilitating their own use of these

tools for planning purposes.

Development of Characteristic Operations and Cost Data

The Agency is making studies in six technical areas, as shown in

Figure 1, to provide input data to the modelling analysis of alternative

strategies. These studies cover the major activities involved in the "backend” of the fuel cycle, namely:

1. Power plant discharges of spent fuel;

2. Spent fuel storage;

3. Spent fuel reprocessing;

4. Waste management;

5. Mixed oxide fuel fabrication;

6. Radioactive material transportation.

Each of these areas is the subject of a detailed examination by Agency

staff and expert consultants. These studies will identify the important

operating characteristics of facilities needed in each area, characteristics

which are unique to RFCC implementation, important cost data and

sensitivities to size and scale of operation, lead times for facility

construction, staffing requirements, etc. At this time, costs are very

uncertain in all areas of spent fuel management. Very few of these

facilities have been built as individual units, and none have been built in

the RFCC context. Therefore, there is little base of cost experience

comparable to that for nuclear power plants or front-end fuel cycle

facilities. One of the goals of the Agency studies will be to determine the

probable range of costs for each of the various plants needed for spent fuel

225
management. These ranges can then be used in the computer codes to

determine whether important economic comparisons lead to different

conclusions, depending on which value of costs is used. It is expected that

further cost studies may be needed in some areas, in which there is high

sensitivity to cost uncertainties.

Associated Studies Relating to Regional Centers

The Agency is also preparing associated studies in six areas related

to the development and implementation of the regional nuclear fuel cycle

center concept, as shown in Figure 1. These studies cover some of those

aspects that would have to be considered by Member States contemplating

use of the RFCC approach, namely:

1. institutional and legal aspects;

2. Organization and administrative aspects;

3. Financial considerations;

4. Health, safety and environmental aspects;

5. Materials control considerations;

6. Public acceptance considerations.

Each of these areas is being examined by Agency staff and expert

consultants to identify the important factors, understandings and approaches

needed by potential participants in implementing regional centers, as well

as the constraints that would apply in the analysis of alternative fuel cycle

strategies. More specifically, these studies have the following scope and

objectives:

Institutional and Legal Study -

To present possible institutional arrangements and legal considerations

essential to the successful implementation and operation of regional

centers, taking into account past industrial experience and arrangements

for other multinational ventures. A preliminary report entitled

“Institutional-Legal Framework Aspects", RFCC/2, has been issued;

Organization and Administrative Study.

To develop those factors and requirements essential to the everyday

operation of regional centers, especially considerations of staffing,

training of technical and supervisory personnel, provisions for technical

support, industrial backup, etc;

Financial Study -

To examine pertinent methodologies for financial analysis and

accounting considerations, and to explore possible approaches to joint

financing of multinational activities;

Health, Safety and Environment Study -

To develop considerations and requirements in those areas pertinent to

the RFCC approach, especially with regard to safety standards, siting

criteria, radioactive waste and effluent control, and other related health and

safety matters;

226
Materials Control Study -

To present those aspects related to the control of nuclear materials

in three areas, i. e. safeguards, physical security and process controls.

The safeguards and physical security portions of the Study cover the

specific advantages and other attributes that would accrue due to colocation of the spent fuel management and plutonium storage and recycle

facilities operated on a multinational partnership basis. The process

controls portion of the Study deals more specifically with those

considerations relating to nuclear material flows including reprocessing

campaigns, losses of product, accountability and inventory, product swap,

etc. , that would be of interest to the participants;

Public Acceptance Study -

To examine those aspects of multinational operation of regional fuel

cycle centers related to public acceptance of the RFCC approach,

especially in the areas of siting, radioactive effluent control and radioactive waste management.

Preparation of Summary Report

Work on the various programme elements of the Study has proceeded

at a somewhat non-uniform pace depending on the availability of experts

and technical and economic data. However, it is expected that with

continuing assistance from, and interest of, the Member States, it will be

possible to meet the original objective of preparing a summary report on

the RFCC concept, together with illustrative analyses of alternative fuel

cycle strategies in time for presentation at the Conference on Nuclear

Power and its Fuel Cycle to be held in Salzburg in May 1977.

227
ANNEX o

TREATY OF ROME, CHAPTER VII, ARTICLES 77-85
(b) by a person or undertaking and an international organisation

or a national of a third State, where the material is processed,

converted or shaped outside the Community and then returned to

the original person or undertaking; or

(c) by a person or undertaking and an international organisation

or a national of a third State, where the material is processed, converted or shaped inside the Community and is then returned either

to the original organisation or national or to any other consignee

likewise outside the Community designated by such organisation

or national.

The persons and undertakings concerned shall, however, notify

the Agency of the existence of such commitments and, as soon as

the contracts are signed, of the quantities of material involved in

the movements. The Commission may prevent the commitments

referred to in subparagraph (b) from being undertaken if it considers that the conversion or shaping cannot be carried out efficiently and safely and without the loss of material to the detriment

of the Community.

The materials to which such commitments relate shall be subject in the territories of the Member States to the safeguards laid

down in Chapter Vii. The provisions of Chapter VIII shall not,

however, be applicable to special fissile materials covered by the

commitments rcferred to in subparagraph (c).

provisions of this Chapter. The Commission shall inquire into any

request made by a Member State.

Seven years after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Council may confirm these provisions in their entirety. Failing confirmation, new provisions relating to the subject matter of this Chapter shall be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down

in the preceding paragraph.

CHAPTER VI I

SAFEGUARDS

Article 7 7

In accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, the Commission shall satisfy itself that, in the territories of Member States,

(a) ores, source materials and special fissile materials are not

diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users;

(b) the provisions relating to supply and any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third State or an international organisation :

are complied with.

On the initiative of a Member State or of the Commission, and

particularly if unforeseen circumstances create a situation of general

shortage, the Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from

the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, amend the

Anyone setting up or operating an installation for the production, separation or other use of source materials or special fissile

materials or for the processing of irradiated nuclear fuels shall

558 559
declare to the Commission the basic technical characteristics of

the installations, to the extent that knowledge of these characteristics

is necessary for the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 77.

The Commission must approve the techniques to be used for the

chemical processing of irradiated materials, to the extent necessary to attain the objectives set out in Article 77.

Article 79

The Commission shall require that operating records be kept

and produced in order to permit accounting for ores, source

materials and special fissile materials used or produced. The samc

requirement shall apply in the case of the transport of source

materials and special fissile materials.

Those subject to such requirements shall notify the authorities

of the Member State concerned of any communications they make

to the Commission pursuant to Article 78 and to the first paragraph

of this Article.

The nature and the extent of the requirements referred to in

the first paragraph of this Article shall be defined in a regulation

made by the Commission and approved by the Council.

Article 8 0

The Commission may require that any excess special fissile

materials recovered or obtained as by-products and not actually

being used or ready for use shall be deposited with the Agency or

in other stores which are or can be supervised by the Commission.

Special fissile materials deposited in this way must be returned

forthwith to those concerned at their request.

Article 81

The Commission may send inspectors into the territories of

Member States. Before sending an inspector on his first assignment

in the territory of a Member State, the Commission shall consult

the State concerned; such consultation shall suffice to cover all

future assignments of this inspector.

If the carrying out of an inspection is opposed, the Commission

shall apply to the President of the Court of Justice for an order

to ensure that the inspection be carried out compulsorily. The

President of the Court of Justice shall give a decision within three

days.

If there is danger in delay, the Commission may itself issue

a written order, in the form of a decision, to proceed with the

inspection This order shall be submitted without delay to the President of the Court of Justice for subsequent approval.

After the order or decision has been issued, the authorities of

the State concerned shall ensure that the inspectors have access

to the places specified in the order or decision.

560 561
Article 8 2

Inspectors shall be recruited by the Commission.

They shall be responsible for obtaining and verifying the records

referred to in Article 79. They shall report any infringement to

the Commission.

The Commission may issue a directive calling upon the Member

State concerned to take, by a time limit set by the Commission, all

‘measures necessary to bring such infringement to an end; it shall

inform the Council thereof.

If the Member State does not comply with the Commission

directive by the time limit set, the Commission or any Member

State concerned may, in derogation from Articles 141 and 142,

refer the matter to the Court of Justice direct.

Article 83

f. In the event of an infringement on the part of persons or undertakings of the obligations imposed on them by this Chapter, the

Commission may impose sanctions on such persons or undertakings.

These sanctions shall be, in order of severity:

(a) a warning;

(b) the withdrawal of special benefits such as financial or technical assistance;

(c) the placing of the undertaking for a period not exceeding four

months under the administration of a person or board appointed

by common accord of the Commission and the State having jurisdiction over the undertaking;

(d) total or partial withdrawal of source materials or special

fissile materials.

.2.Decisions taken by the Commission in implementation of paragraph 1 and requiring the surrender of materials shall be enforceable. They may be enforced in the territories of Member States in

accordance with Article 164.

By way of derogation from Article 157, appeals brought before

the Court of Justice against decisions of the Commission which

impose any of the sanctions provided for in paragraph 1 shall have

suspensory effect. The Court of Justice may, however, on application by the Commission or by any Member State concerned.

order that the decision be enforced forthwith.

There shall be an appropriate legal procedure to ensure the

protection of interests that have been prejudiced.

4. Member States shall ensure that sanctions are enforced and,

where necessary, that the infringements arc remedied by those

committing them.

Article Article 84

In the application of the safeguards, no discrimination shall :

be made on grounds of the use for which ores, source materials

and special fissile materials arc intended.

The scope of and procedure for the safeguards and the powers

of the bodies responsible for their application shall be confined

to the attainment of the objectives set out in this chapter.

The Safeguards may not extend to materials intended to meet A

defence requirements which are in the course of being specially

562 563
processed for this purpose or which, after being so processed, are,

in accordance with an operational plan, placed or stored in a

military establishment.

Article 8 5

Where new circumstances so require, the procedures for applying

the safeguards laid down in this Chapter may, at the request of a

Member State or of the commission, be adapted by the Council,

acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after

consulting the Assembly. The Commission shall examine any such

request made by a Member State.

CHAPTER VII I

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

Article 86

Special fissile materials shall be the property of the Community.

The Community% right of ownership shall extend to ail special

fissile materials which are produced or imported by a Member

State, a person or an undertaking and are subject to the safeguards

provided for in Chapter VII.

Article 87

Member States, persons or undertakings shall have the unlimited

right of use and consumption of special fissile materials which have

properly come into their possession, subject to the obligations imposed on them by this Treaty, in particular those relating to safeguards, the right of option conferred on the Agency and health

and safety.

Article 88

The Agency shall keep a special account in the name of the

Community, called “Special Fissile Materials Financial Account”.

Article 89

f. In the Special Fissile Materials Financial Account:

or put at the disposal of a Member State, person or undertaking

shall be credited to the Community and debited to that Member

State, person or undertaking;

2. Variations in value affecting the quantities of special fissile

material shall be expressed for accounting purposes in such a way

as not to give rise to any loss or gain to the Community. Any loss

or gain shall be borne by or accrue to the holder.

564 565
ANNEX P

EURATOM, GENERAL BUDGET FOR EXPENDITURES RELATED TO SAFEGUARDS (1977)
232
1. Legal basis and description of the operation

(a) Legal basis

Chapter VII of the EAEC Treaty; Commission Regulations No 7

and 8 on safeguards; external obligations which the Commission

has assumed in respect of non-member countries and

international organizations, especially the Verification “

Agreement concluded with the IAEA in Vienna.

(b) Description of the operation

(a) I n accordance with Article 77 of the EAEC Treaty, the

Commission shall satisfy itself that, in the territories

of the Member States:

- proper use is being made of nuclear materials,

- that the obligations assumed by the Commission in respect

of non-member countries (e.g., cooperation agreement with

the United States) and international organizations

(e.g., Verification Agreement with the Agency in Vienna)

are complied with,

(b) In accordance with Article 81 of the EAEC Treaty, the

Commission shall inspect all nuclear installations on

Community territory which form part of the fuel cycle

from the mining stage through to the reprocessing and

enrichment stage. This is an on-going operation.

2. Type of expenditure

Operating costs.

3. Method of calculation and explanation of changes

(a) Method of calculation

(b) Explanation of changes.

1975 Commitments

1976 Appropriations

1977 Request

220.827 u.a.

270.000 u.a.

302.000 u.a.

233
The increase of some 12% over the 1976 appropriation reflects the

additional expenditure arising from the implementation of the

Verification Agreement concluded with the IAEA in Vienna.

ARTICLE 341 COST OF TRAINING PERIODS

2.

3*

Legal basis and description of the operation

(a)

( b)

Legal basis

As for Article 340,

Description of the operation

Information and general and specialized vocational training:

- Courses and periods of training for Commission inspectors (at

the seat in Luxembourg and at the JRC, in particular Ispra),

-

- Information and training periods with State and intentional

organizations and institutions both within and outside the

Community (e.g., USA and IAEA) which are competent in the matter

of safeguards in order that inspectors can keep permanently

abreast of the latest methods in this field.

- In accordance with basic Euratom standards - issued on

12 February 1959, 5 March 1962 and 17 October 1967 by the

Council as Directives - the inspectors must have sufficient

knowledge to be able to discern and pinpoint hazards and

keep abreast of scientific progress in the field of health

protection. It is therefore important that newly-recruited

inspectors in particular should take part in specialized

courses either at the JRC or at the national centres in the

Member States.

Type of expenditure

Operating costs.

Method of calculation and explanation of changes

(a)

(b)

Method of calculation

Number of participants involved in the training period and on

the courses x (daily allowance x number of days' training +

average traveling expenses + enrollment. expenses) = total cost =

appropriation requested.

Explanation

1975 Commitments ●b 11.659 u.a.

1976 Appropriations : 15.000 u.a.

1977 Request : 22.000 u.a.

It is also to allow training

health protection.

234
ARTICLE 342 SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS

1. Legal basis and description of the operation

(a) Legal basis

As for Article 340.

(b) D - ascription of the operation

2, Type of expenditure

Technical operating costs.

3. Method of calculation and explanation of changes

(a) Method of calculation

Cost of the material + cost of sampling + packaging cost +

transport cost + insurance cost + cost of analysis x number of

samples = total cost = appropriation requested.

(b) Explanation of changes

1975 Commitments 77.334 u.a.

1976 Appropriations 150.000 u.a.

1977 Request 174.000 u.a.

Since the Commission is bound by the Treaty to inspect the

nuclear installations of the Community by carrying out sampling

operations the amount requested reflects the increased

obligations arising from the entry into force of the

Verification Agreement and the inspections which have to be

carried out on the territory of the new Member States. These

new inspections have led to an increase in the work-load of

about 16% over the 1976 financial year.

235
(a) Legal basis

Same as for Article 340.

.- Scientific and technical work involved in the design, researcht

development and application of a large number of techniques for

the measurement and supervision of fissile materials in

accordance with the provisions laid down in Article 77 of the

Euratom Treaty.

2. Type of expenditure

Technical operating costs.

of calculation and explanation of changes

(a)

-

u

(b)

Method of calculation

Purchase price of new material (equipment, instruments,

apparatus) + maintenance and repair of existing material =

total cost = appropriation requested.

The benefits are calculated according to the nature of each

application; prices always vary for reasons such as: *

- market sensitivity to price fluctuations,

- very complex and therefore costly projects.

1975 Commitments 138.317 u.a.

1976 Appropriations 150.000 u.a.

1977 Request 186.000 u.a.

Consequently, the percentage increase in 1977 will be 24%

over the appropriations for the preceding budget year.

236
ARTICLE 344: EXPENDITURE ON FORMAL AND INFORMAL MEETINGS

1. Legal basis and description of the operation

(a)

( b )

Legal basis

As for Article 340.

Description -of the operation

Treaty, the Commission must satisfy itself that, in the

territories of Member States:

proper use is being made of nuclear materials,

that the obligations assumed by the Commission towards

non-member countries and international organizations are

complied with.

organize the following meetings:

- meetings relating to the implementation of the Verification

Agreement concluded with the IAEA: 20 meetings planned,

- meetings on the procedures for drawing up physical

inventories and for the use of equipment, seals, etc:

5 meetings planned,

- meetings of the Advisory Committee on Safeguards: 2 meetings

planned.

2.

Technical operating costs.

3. Method of calculation and explanation of changes

(a) Method of calculation

Number of experts x (daily allowances x number of days present +

average traveling expenses) = total cost = appropriation

requested.

(b) Explanation of changes,

- Commitments 1975 5.695 u.a.

- Appropriations 1976 25.000 u.a.

- Request 1977 26.000 u.a.

The appropriation requested for 1977 remains entirely within the

normal limits of price increases.

237
(b) Ascription of the operation

Any person exposed in the course of his work to radiation must

be protected against the attendant dangers. This applies in

general especially to persons who work in nuclear installations

and to the Commission inspectors who carry out the safeguard

checks in accordance with the provisions of Article 77 of the

Euratom Treaty.

2.

JRC scientific activities.

Method of calculation and explanation of changes

(a) Method of calculation

(Number of inspectors x cost of the various activities

assigned to each inspector) + cost of the exceptional allowances

in case of irradiation + requisite equipment for this operation

+ any administrative costs (for example; administration) =

total cost.

(b) Explanation of changes

This income takes account of the normal trend in the costs

for these operations.

238
PROTOCO L

Article 1

This Protocol amplifies certain provisions of the Agreement and, in particular.

specifics the conditions and means according to which co-operation in the application of the

safeguards provided for Under the Agreement shall be implemented in such a way aS to avoid

unnecessary duplication of the Community's safeguards activities.

Article 2

The Community shall collect the information on facilities and on nuclear material

outside facilities to be provided to the Agency under the Agreement on the basis of the

agreed indicative questionnaire annexed to the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Article 3

The Agency and the Community shall carry out jointly the examination of design

information provided for in Article 46(a) to (f) of the Agreement and shall include the agreed

results thereof in the Subsidiary Arrangements. The verification of design information

provided for in Article 48 of the Agreement shall be carried out by the Agency in co-operation

with the Community.

Article 4

When providing the Agency with the information referred to in Article 2 of this

Protocol, the Community shall also transmit information on the inspection methods which it

proposes to use and the complete proposals, including estimates of inspection efforts for

the routine inspection activities, for Attachments to the Subsidiary Arrangements for facilities

and material balance areas outside facilities.

Article 5

The preparation of the Attachments to the Subsidiary Arrangements shall be performed

together by the Community and the Agency.

Article 6

The Community shall collect the reports from the operators, keep centralised accounts

on the basis of these reports and proceed with the technical and accounting control and analysis

of the information received.

Article 7

.

Upon completion of the tasks referred to in Article 6 of this Protocol the Community

shall, on a monthly basis, produce and provide the Agency with the inventory change reports

within the time limits specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Article 8

Further, the Community shall transmit to the Agency the material balance reports and

physical inventory listings with frequency depending 011 the frequency of physical inventory

taking as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

.

The form

agreed between

Arrangcmcnts.

Article 9

and format of reports referred to in Articles 7 and 8 of this Protocol, as

the Agency and the Community, shall be specified in the Subsidiary

239
INFCIRC/193

Article 10

The routine inspection activities of the Community and of the Agency, including the

inspections referred to in Article 84 of the Agreement, for the purposes of the Agreement,

shall be coordinated pursuant to the provisions of Articles 11 to 23 of this Protocol.

Article 11

Subject to Articles 79 and 80 of the Agreement, in determining the actual number,

intensity, duration, timing and mode of the Agency inspections in respect of each facility,

account shall be taken of the inspection effort carried out by the Community in the framework

of its multinational system of safeguards pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol.

Article 1 2

Inspection efforts under the Agreement for each facility shall be determined by the use

of the criteria of Article 81 of the Agreement. Such criteria shall be implemented by using

the rules and methods set forth in the Subsidiary Arrangements which have been used for the

calculation of the inspection efforts in respect of specific examples attached to the Subsidiary

Arrangements. These rules and methods shall be reviewed from time to time, pursuant to

Article 7 of the Agreement, to take into account new technological developments in the field

of safeguards and experience gained.

Article 1 3

Such inspection efforts, expressed as agreed estimates of the actual inspection efforts

to be applied, shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements together with relevant

descriptions of verification approaches and scopes of inspections to be carried out by the

Community and by the Agency. These inspection efforts shall constitute, under normal

operating

efforts at

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

conditions and under the conditions set out below, the actual maximum inspection

the facility under the Agreement;

The continued validity of the information on Community safeguards provided for

in Article 32 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements;

The continued validity of the information provided to the Agency in accordance

with Article 2 of this Protocol;

The continued provision by the-Community of the reports pursuant to Articles GO

and 61, 63 to 65 and 67 to 69 of the Agreement, as specified in the Subsidiary

Arrangements;

The continued application of the co-ordination arrangements for inspections

pursuant to Articles 10 to 23 of this Protocol, as specified in the Subsidiary

Arrangements; and

The application by the Community of its inspection effort with respect to the

facility, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, pursuant to this Article.

(a)

(b) “

Article 14

Subject to the conditions of Article 13 of this Protocol, the Agency inspections shall

be carried out simultaneously with the inspection activities of the Community. Agency

inspectors shall be present during the performance of certain of the Community

inspections,

Subject to the provisions of paragraph (a), whenever the Agency can achieve the purposes

of its routine inspections set out in the Agreement, the Agency inspectors shall implement the provision of Articles 74 and 75 of the Agreement through the observation of

the inspection activities of the Community inspector. provided, however, that:

244
(ii)

The

than through the observation of the *.#@*.-”.. ”.. ---- -.--.

inspectors, which can be foreseen, these shall be specified in the Subsidiary

Arrangements; and .“.

in the course of an inspection, Agency inspectors may carry out inspection

activities other than through the observation of the inspection activities of the

Community inspectors where they find this to be essential and urgent, if the

Agency could not otherwise achieve the purposes of its routine inspections and

this was unforeseeable.

Article 1 5

general scheduling and planning of the Community inspections under the Agreement

be established by the Community in co-operation with the Agency.

Article 16

Arrangements for the presence of Agency inspectors during the performance of certain

of the Community inspections shall be agreed in advance by the Agency and the Community

for each type of facility, and to the extent necessary, for individual facilities.

Article 17 

In order to enable the Agency to decide, based on requirements for statistical sampling,

as to its presence at a particular Community inspection, the Community shall provide the

Agency with an advance statement of the numbers, types and contents of items to be inspected

according to the information available to the Community from the operator of the facility.

Article 1 8

Technical procedures in general for each type of facility and, to the extent necessary,

for individual facilities, shall be agreed in advance by the Agency and the Community, in

particular with respect to:

(a) The determination of techniques for random selection of statistical samples; and

(b) The checking and identification of standards.

Article 1 9

The co-ordination arrangements for each type of facility set out in the Subsidiary

Arrangements shall serve as a basis for the co-ordination arrangements to be specified in

each Facility Attachment.

Article 2 0

The specific co-ordination actions on matters specified in the Facility Attachments

pursuant to Article 19 of this Protocol shall be taken between Community and Agency

officials designated for that purpose.

Article 2 1

The Community shall transmit to the Agency its working papers for those inspections

at which Agency inspectors were present and inspection reports for all other Community .

inspections performed under the Agreement.

241
INFCIRC/193

Article 2 2

The samples of nuclear material for tile Agency shall be drawn from the same randomly

selected batches of items as for the Community and shall be taken together with Community

samples, except when the maintenance of or reduction to the lowest practical level of the

Agency inspection effort requires independent sampling by the Agency, as agreed in advance

and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Article 2 3

The frequencies of physical inventories to be taken by facility operators and to be

verified for safeguards purposes will be in accordance with those laid down as guidelines

in the Subsidiary Arrangements. If additional activities under the Agreement in relation to

physical inventories are considered to be essential, they will be discussed in the Liaison

Committee provided for in Article 25 of this Protocol and agreed before implementation.

Article 24

Whenever the Agency can achieve the purposes of its ad hoc inspections set out in the

Agreement through observation of the inspection activities of Community inspectors, it

shall do so.

Article 2 5

(a) With a view to facilitating the application of the Agreement and of this Protocol, a

Liaison Committee shall be established, composed of representatives of the Community

and of the Agency.

(b) The Committee shall meet at least once a year:

(i) To review, in particular, the performance of the co-ordination arrangements

provided for in this Protocol, including agreed estimates of inspection efforts;

(ii) To examine the development of safeguards methods and techniques; and

(iii) To consider any questions which have been referred to it by the periodic meetings

referred to in paragraph (c).

(c) The Committee shall meet periodically at a lower’ level to discuss, in particular and

to the extent necessary, for individual facilities, the operation of the co-ordination

arrangements provided for in this Protocol, including, in the light of technical and

operational developments, up-dating of agreed estimates of inspection efforts with

respect to changes in throughput, inventory and facility operational programmed, and

the application of inspection procedures in different types of routine inspection activities and, in general terms, statistical sampling requirements. Any questions which

could not be settled would be referred to the meetings mentioned in paragraph (b).

(d) Without prejudice to urgent actions which might be required under the Agreement,

should problems arise in the application of Article 13 of this Protocol,- in particular

when the Agency considered that the conditions specified therein had not been met, the

Committee would meet as soon as possible at the suitable level in order to assess the

situation and to discuss the’ measures to be taken. If a problem could not be settled,

the Committee may make appropriate proposals to the Parties, in particular with the

view to modifying the estimates of inspection efforts for routine inspection activities.

(e) The Committee shall elaborate proposals, as necessary, with respect to questions

● which require the agreement of the Parties.

242
ANNEX R

LIST OF REFERENCES
1 ,

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

u .

12.

13•

LIST OF REFERENCES

—

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the International Atomic Energy

Agency - an analytical report, prepared for the Committee on

Government Operations, United States Senate by the Congressional

Research Service, Library of Congress, March 1976.

International Proliferation of Nuclear Technology - a report

prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of

the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. House

of Representatives by the Congressional Research Service, Library

of Congress, April 15, 1976.

Assessment of U.S. and International Controls Over the Peaceful

Uses of Nuclear Energy, report to the Congress by the Comptroller

General of the United States> September 14, 1976.

IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual Introduction, Part A, Safeguards

Objectives, Criteria and Requirements. IAEA - 174, Vienna, 1976.

Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center Study, Institutional - legal

framework aspects, IAEA - RFCC/2, July 1976, Vienna, Austria.

Commission Regulation Concerning the Application of the Provision

of EURATOM Safeguards, Commission of the European Communities,

C(76) 1526, Brussels, 22 September 1976,

International Negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation

of Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

Publication 48, January 1969.

Statement of the President on Nuclear Policy, the white House,

Office of the White House Press Secretary, October 28, 1976.

Safeguards Dictionary, Washington, WASH-1137, Technical Support

Organization, Brookhaven National Laboratory, July 1, 1971.

INFcIRc/153, “The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the

Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” IAEA, Vienna, Austria.

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended

up to 1973, IAEA, Viennar Austria, 1973.

Facts of Nuclear Proliferation,” A Handbook prepared for the

Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate by

the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,

December 1975.

INFcIRC/26, 30 March 1961, IAEA, Vienna, Austria.
14. “ThePhysical Protection of Nuclear Materials” (REF: INFcIRC/225

September, 1975, IAEA, Vienna, Austria.

15. “The Agency’s Program for 1977-82 and Budget for 1977, GC(XX)/567,

1967, IAEA, Vienna, Austria.

16. INFCIRC/22 Rev. 15, IAEA, Vienna, Austria, June 1975,

17. B. Sanders and R. Rometsch, “Safeguards Against Use of Nuclear

Materials for Weapons,” Nuclear Engineering International, Vol. 20,

Sepyember 1975, Page 682.

18. INFCIRC/26, 30 March, 1961 IAEA, Vienna, Austria.

19. INFCIRC/26 - Add. 1, 9 April 1964, IAEA, Vienna, Austria.

20. The Agency’s Safeguards System, INFCIRC/66, 3 December, 1965,

IAEA, Vienna, Austria.

21. Provisions for Reprocessing Plants, INFCIRC/66 Rev. 1, IAEA,

Vienna, Austria, 1966.

22. INFCIRC/66 Rev. 2, 16 September 1968, IAEA, Vienna, Austria.

23. The Annual Report for 1975, CG (XX/565), July 1976, IAEA, Vienna,

Austria, page 37.

24. U.S. Congress, The Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing

and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on International Finance, Exports

of Nuclear Materials and Technology. Hearings, 93rd Congress,

2nd Session, July 12 and 15, 1974, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1974, page 14.

25. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations. “The Export

Reorganization Act - 1975.” Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st

Session, April 24, 30 and May 1, 1975. Washington, D.C–, U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1975, page 533.

26. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Texts and History of

Negotiations, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington,

D.C., 20451, February 1975.

27. “Moving Towards Life in a Nuclear World.” ACDA/PAB - 263,

Pan Heuristics, 1801 Avenue of the Stars, Los Angeles, CA 90067,

April 22, 1976.

28. IAEA Safeguards Technical Manual, Part E Methods and Techniques,

IAEA-174, Vienna, Austria, 1975.
29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

Functional Characteristics of the IAEA’s Safeguards Information

Handling System, Release 1, IAEA/STR-42, March 1975.

Program Plan for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards -

i)raft, Energy Research and Development Administration, Prepared

by the International Safeguards Project Office, Brookhaven National

Laboratory, Upton, NY, December 20, 1976.

Recommendations for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,

Produced by a Panel of Experts Working under IAEA Sponsorship in

Vienna, 6-10 March, 1972.

Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers, IAEA Study Project 75-6977,

September 1975.

Institutional-Legal Framework Aspects, Report Regarding Preliminary

Exploratory Phase, IAEA-RFCC/2, July 1976.

IAEA Study Project on Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers, Status

Report, IAEA-RFCC/3, September 1976.

Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe; The Interaction of American

Diplomacy with a New Technology, Warren H. Donnelly, prepared for

the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific

Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of

Representatives, Library of Congress, December 1972, pp. 73-93.

Treaties Establishing the European Communities, Treating Amending

these Treaties, Documents concerning the Accession; Office for

the Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg,

1973.

Experience in the Application of the Euratom Safeguards System in

View of the Introduction of the Verification Agreement, H.W.

Schleicher, P. Bommelle, U. Miranda, M. Schmidtt, and B.W. Sharpe,

(AEA-SM-201/68, International Symposium on Safeguards on Nuclear

Material, Vienna, 20-24 October 1975.)

Some Aspects of IAEA Materials Accountancy in Relation to the

Future EURATOM System, M. Schmitt and H. Kschwandt, IAEA-SM-201/69,

International Symposiw on Safeguards of Nuclear Materials,

20-24 October 1975.

Text of an Agreement Between the European Community and the

Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons; INFCIRC/193, IAEA Vienna, Austria, 14 September 1973.

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, NPT/CONF/35/1, Geneva,

Switzerland, 1975.
41. The Statement of Mr. George S. Vest, Director, the Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs, the Department of State, Before the Subcommittee

on Arms Control, International Organizations

Committee on Foreign Relations of the United

24 February 1976.

42. The Statement of Secretary Kissinger, Senate

Operations, 9 March 1976.

and Security Agreements,

States Senate,

Committee on Government