Information Warfare 

An Air Force Policy for the Role 

of Public Affairs 

ROBIN K. CRUMM, Major, USAF 

School of Advanced Airpower Studies 

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF


THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES,


MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF


GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1996–97.


Air University Press


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


June 1996 
Disclaimer 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied are solely those of the author, 

and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution 

unlimited. 

ii 
Contents


Chapter Page


DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii


ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v


ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii


1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4


2 DEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE AND IDENTIFYING 

THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS LINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5


Information Warfare and the CNN Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7


Public Affairs and Psychological Operations


Roles Begin to Blur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12


3 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MILITARY 

PROPAGANDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


Revolutionary War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16


Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17


Spanish–American War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18


World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19


World War II: The War against Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


World War II: The War against Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23


Korea and Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24


Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . 25


Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28


4 PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPTIONS/IMPLICATIONS 

FOR INFORMATION WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31


Three Public Affairs Path Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31


Option One: “Hands Off” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31


Option Two: Public Affairs Conducts Information


Warfare, Upholding Primacy of Truth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34


Option Three: Public Affairs Engages in Information


Warfare, Including Disinformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40


5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43


iii 
Illustrations 

Figure Page 

1 Clausewitz’s Trinity and National Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6


2	 Psychological Operations and Public Affairs Relationship,


Medium Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8


iv 
Abstract 

The successful conduct of military operations in the Information Age demands 

new strategies, new tactics, and new ways of thinking. It also raises important 

moral and ethical issues regarding the relationship between the military, the 

media, and the American public. Because exploitation of the information spectrum cannot be confined to a battle area, it is logical to assume the integration 

of Information Warfare (IW) into warfighting doctrine will target the strategic 

center of gravity encompassed by public opinion—our’s and our enemy’s. The 

military’s use or misuse of information in psychological or deception operations, 

under the guise of IW, could undermine the American public’s trust in the US 

military institution. Although IW is still in its infancy, Air Force policy concerning the role of Public Affairs (PA) in IW has not been sufficiently examined. This 

paper explores the relationship between IW and PA and reveals a direct link 

through the role of propaganda in each. A historical analysis of propaganda in 

past wars yields lessons which can be applied to formulating PA policy on IW 

today. In light of the evidence, three possible options emerge regarding the possible IW roles PA might adopt. Option One—a “Hands Off” policy—seeks to avoid 

any association with IW and represents the current PA approach. Option Two 

upholds the primacy of truth but acknowledges PA must take an active role in 

IW. Option Three suggests PA abandon its policy to tell the truth and actively engage in all IW activities, including disinformation. This paper finds Option Two 

as the logical role for PA in today’s environment and concludes with several recommendations to implement the policy. 

v 
About the Author 

Maj Robin K. Crumm (BS, University of Southern Colorado; MA, University of 

Northern Colorado) is a public affairs officer with 20 years experience in the career 

field. Major Crumm is a recent graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies and Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama. She was assigned to Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and was 

previously assigned as commander, Air Force Pacific Broadcast Squadron, Detachment 3, Yongsan, Korea; and public affairs officer for the chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. 

vii 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

The people thinking hardest about warfare in the future know that some of the 

most important combat of tomorrow will take place on the media battlefield. 

—Alvin and Heidi Toffler 

Millions of people in America and around the world sat mesmerized before their television sets in 1991 watching the first, real-time video coverage of the Persian Gulf War. The public obviously enjoyed the technology 

that enabled them to be armchair warriors, but few realized the significance of witnessing the first “war-in-a-glass-bottle.”1 However, its value 

was not lost on our Iraqi adversaries. News broadcasts as an immediate 

intelligence source fired the imagination of the enemy and the Iraqi Rocket 

Force began watching Cable News Network (CNN) to home-in their Scud 

volleys into Israel and Saudi Arabia.2 

On the coalition side, live news broadcasts of both the bombed Al Firdos bunker and disturbing images from the highway of death brought 

about strategic decisions affecting the prosecution of the war. According 

to Gen Colin L. Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The 

whole world witnessed on television as victims were hauled from the 

smoking rubble . . . the bunker strike underscored the need to start the 

combined air/ground offensive and end the war.”3 President George W. 

Bush also observed, “We’re starting to pick up some undesirable public 

and political baggage with all those scenes of carnage (on the highway of 

death). Why not end it?”4 

Global, real-time news proved to have a profound effect on military 

planning and operations on both sides before and during the Gulf War. 

Communications satellite technology would make it virtually impossible 

for the military to monitor or control the flow of news from the battlefield. 

Uncensored information made available to the American public would be 

just as accessible to allies and adversaries alike via the international news 

networks. 

For the second time in 30 years, information and communication technology would revolutionize the way wars are fought. The first was during 

Vietnam when television brought the war into America’s living rooms each 

evening and emphasized the importance of public support. Operation 

Desert Storm took it two steps further. War could now be broadcast in the 

world’s living room and in real time. If Vietnam did not prove television 

had become an instrument of war, Desert Storm certainly did. 

With military news analysts predicting strategies for the air/ground 

campaign based on “inside” sources, and news correspondents standing 

on rooftops visually depicting Scud volleys hitting their mark or holed-up 

1

in a hotel room in the heart of enemy territory, the media provided a 

wealth of intelligence data for both sides. Col Alan Campen, in an essay 

titled Information, Truth and War, notes that “Television reporters have become a critical instrument in a totally new kind of warfare. Satellite technology . . . can transform reporters from dispassionate observers to unwitting, even unwilling, but nonetheless direct participants.”5 

What are the implications for the US armed forces? Clearly, operations 

security is of grave concern. However, the military must also reevaluate 

the paradigm that seeks to balance the responsibility for US national security with that of the need to inform the American public in light of Information Age realities. While the dynamics of the paradigm may have 

changed, the symbiotic nature of national security and public support remains the same—without public support the military has no mission. According to the 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement: 

Our engagement abroad requires the active, sustained bipartisan support of the 

American people and the US Congress. Of all the elements contained in this 

strategy, none is more important than this: our Administration is committed to 

explaining our security interests and objectives to the nation; to seeking the 

broadest possible public and congressional support for our security programs 

and investments; and to exerting our leadership in the world in a manner that 

reflects our best national values and protects the security of this great and good 

nation.6 

It is not just the media who are capitalizing on communication technologies. The military also has wide-range plans to transform the way it 

fights using information technology; the Air Force calls it Information 

Warfare (IW). Yet, current research has not thoroughly examined how 

public support might be affected by this exploitation of information, especially since it cannot be confined to the battlefield. 

Certainly international television became the verbal battleground of 

Saddam Hussein and President George W. Bush during Desert Storm. It 

also contributed significantly to the deception plan that focused Hussein 

on an impending, but fictitious amphibious assault while coalition troops 

executed the “left hook.” The two examples illustrate how the media can, 

and are being used to engage the enemy in an information war. At risk is 

the democratic idea which says the American public has a right to know 

the truth. Where should the moral and ethical lines be drawn? 

Within the military, Public Affairs (PA) should be the agency most concerned with this phenomenon since, by directive, it is the “sole agent at the 

Seat of Government for the release of official DOD information for dissemination through any form of public information media.”7 Unfortunately, PA 

has demonstrated a reluctance to explore the emerging IW technologies because of institutional and psychological barriers. Institutionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) is limited by law in its authority over the media and 

in the use of “propaganda,” an important tool in IW. The psychological barrier may be even more important because propaganda is culturally a dirty 

word to Americans, although its true meaning has become distorted by his2

tory. Alvin and Heidi Toffler emphasize the aversion Americans—especially 

the press—have toward military propagandists: “While the military knows 

that putting the right ‘spin’ on war news can, at times, be as important as 

devastating an enemy’s tanks—nobody loves a ‘spin doctor’ who wears khaki. 

Especially the American press.”8 

While PA, as an organization, vehemently denies that it “manages the 

news,” the American press has accused the military of managing the news 

in every war since the United States became a sovereign nation. However, 

information technology changes the dynamics of the military-media relationship and demands that PA reconsider the way it accomplishes its mission of garnering public support. The military claims it withholds information, or uses censorship in wartime only to protect the security of 

planned or on-going operations. But with the speed and autonomy with 

which the media disseminated news from the battlefield in the Gulf War, 

complete censorship is now impossible. Is it necessary, then, for PA to 

manage the news in other ways? And if so, is there a role for PA in IW? 

That is the theoretical question of this research paper. According to Col 

Terry Tyrrell, special assistant to the director of Air Force of PA, no one is 

participating in a discussion about what the PA role should be in the 

emerging IW environment.9 

Also at issue is the international nature of news that ensures that the 

information the American public receives will also be the same as that 

available to our adversary. This is a significant issue since psychological 

operations (PSYOP) and military deception in the past have been able to 

target the adversary population with propaganda, and even lies without 

also affecting our own public. 

Finally, and most importantly, the enemy will be using the same realtime media to persuade or even coerce the American public and our allies 

into sympathizing with his cause. Hussein tried it with propaganda of a 

bombed out “baby milk factory” and a personal interview with CNN’s Peter 

Arnett. Americans saw through the crude attempt to win their sympathies, but our next adversary may not be so inelegant. Strong public support and confidence in the military’s activities are an essential element of 

the national will that will be required to see a nation through a war. Countering subtle (or even not-so-subtle) enemy propaganda without a coherent PA strategy is a formula for disaster. Current PA strategy is inadequate in its historical analysis of how propaganda and use of the media 

as a medium have influenced past wars and how future wars on the 

“media battlefield” should be conducted. 

Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 will define IW and identify 

the PA link. Chapter 3 will examine how the military and the PA organization 

in particular, have garnered public support with varying degrees of success 

throughout its major wars. Those lessons gleaned from the historical analysis will be applied in assessing the possible roles which PA could take in its 

approach to IW in chapter 4. The alternatives represent data points on a 

spectrum ranging from no PA role in IW at all to a total embrace of the IW 

3

mission, without regard to current PA organizational structure and regulatory limitations. The analysis should reveal a logical approach for the role of 

PA in IW. The concluding chapter will apply the prescribed role by making 

several recommendations for implementation. 

Armed with an informed strategy PA should be able to accomplish its 

mission of gaining and maintaining public support through a media who, 

according to the Tofflers, “will be a prime weapon for Third Wave combatants in both the wars and anti-wars of the future.”10 

Notes 

1. James E. Haywood et al., The Impact of Media Information on Enemy Effectiveness: A 

Model for Conflict (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1994), 1. 

2. Ibid., 26. 

3. Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 513. 

4. Ibid., 521. 

5. Alan D. Campen, “Information, Truth and War,” The First Information War, ed. Alan 

D. Campen (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press, 1992), 86. 

6. The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: 

White House, February 1996), 45. 

7. Department of Defense Directive no. 5122.5, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2 December 1993), 4. 

8. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century 

(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 165. Note: The Tofflers have suffered some critical 

reviews of their work, especially concerning their selective historical perspective. While 

they will be used extensively throughout this paper, the focus will be on their vision of the 

future that is unmatched in current literature. 

9. Col John T. Tyrrell, special assistant to the director of Public Affairs, Office of the 

Secretary of the Air Force, telephone interview, 29 March 1996. 

10. Toffler, 175. 

4

Chapter 2 

Defining Information Warfare 

and Identifying the Public Affairs Link 

The successful conduct of military operations in IW demands new ways 

of thinking. The military is responding to the challenge of this new era 

with innovative strategies and tactics for fighting wars. There is considerable debate among the services and other government organizations about 

what this novel form of warfare should be called or how it should be defined. However, most military professionals agree that the technological 

innovations of how we sense, record, process and transmit information 

has opened up additional vistas for conducting war. While the definitions 

may seem vague because information embraces so many disparate activities, the Air Force calls the effort IW, and defines it as “any action to deny, 

exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions; protecting ourselves against those actions; and exploiting our own military 

information functions.”1 

IW encompasses six means: psychological operations, electronic warfare, military deception, physical destruction, security measures, and information attack. PA, in its mission to inform the American people, conducts IW when it uses security measures defined as denying the enemy 

knowledge of our military capabilities and intentions. Specifically, PA is 

directly involved in operations security (OPSEC), which often includes 

censorship of information in war. But this paper will show PA can also be 

directly or indirectly, and knowingly or unknowingly, involved in several 

of the other means of conducting IW, in particular PSYOP and military deception. PSYOP uses information to affect the enemy’s reasoning and targets the will to fight. Military deception attempts to mislead the enemy 

about our capabilities or intentions and creates an alternate reality upon 

which the adversary bases his decisions.2 

Most aspects of IW are not new. Targeting the enemy’s communications, 

deception of all sorts, and PSYOP—propaganda in particular—have been 

practiced since the dawn of organized warfare. Other aspects, such as IW 

against civilian computer systems, called “hacker war,” are emerging as a 

result of new information age technologies. However, PSYOP promises to 

be the most transformed by the emerging global information infrastructure.3 Since the use of information influences others is often considered 

coercive, it is this aspect that constitutes most IW activities. 

Protecting against enemy attack on US information is a key aspect of 

the IW definition. According to the Air Force’s Cornerstones of Information 

Warfare, “Information warfare is any action to protect our information 

functions, regardless of the means.”4 Since our adversary often uses 

5

propaganda to attack our national will, it would follow that countering 

enemy propaganda would be an IW function. Yet, countering enemy propaganda by informing and educating the American citizenry, which serves 

to bolster national will, is not really addressed much in IW literature. 

Why? Informing and educating the American public is a PA responsibility 

and a tremendous sensitivity exists within the PA community against 

being associated with IW. “The fear is that PA might be accused of practicing IW in the form of propaganda on our own citizenry,” said Maj Matt 

Durham, director of PA for the Air Force Special Operations Command.5 

Therefore, PA is not currently included under the IW umbrella, although 

the natural link between national will and the IW mission cannot be denied, and new information technologies may make the link unavoidable. 

Twenty-one hundred years ago, Sun Tzu recognized “national unity . . . 

to be an essential requirement of victorious war.”6 For the military, “national unity” and public support for the military’s actions during war goes 

hand-in-hand, translating to national will. Today public support is recognized as a strategic center of gravity, but it took the French Revolution to 

change the paradigm. 

Carl von Clausewitz referred to the nature of war as a “paradoxical trinity,”7 balanced by a combination of the public, government leadership and 

the military in a viable mutually supportive relationship. During his lifetime, Clausewitz witnessed a new era in warfare that evolved from eighteenth century monarchies where the nonmilitary population exerted only 

indirect influence on the conduct of war to one in which the citizens became conscripts and the entire nation suddenly had a vested interest. 

With the French Revolution, “The people became a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance.”8 Figure 1 illustrates the concept of 

Clausewitz’s trinity. 

Military 

Public 

Government 

National Will 

Figure 1. Clausewitz’s Trinity and National Will 

6

The area common to all three forces is often debated, but this author 

believes it represents national will. The greater the synergy or balance 

among the three forces, the greater the national will. Information that can 

unite and balance the three forces is provided through the medium of 

media. Mass communication informs the people about the activities of the 

government and military. The result is a collective public support of the 

government leadership and the military organization to conduct the foreign affairs of the nation. On the other hand, our government leadership 

measures its continued existence and the military measures its ability to 

achieve its objectives based on public support. The degree to which the 

people, government and military, agree regarding a military endeavor represents the extent of national will. In war, the object is to change the national will of our enemy while ensuring American will remains strong. The 

model assumes information, with media as the primary means of transmission, is crucial to the formulation of national will. However, using the 

media as a medium to affect national will poses a vulnerability which information warriors can exploit. 

Today’s technology speeds the information flow among Clausewitz’s three 

entities. New technology makes it quicker and easier to communicate to 

mass audiences and therefore the possibilities of affecting national will have 

also expanded. Therefore, PA’s job of garnering public support for military 

endeavors is also becoming more complex. The greatest concern is the way 

public support is continuously being influenced by what appears to be a biased media. In fact, the Tofflers assert the media are fusing into an interactive, self-referencing system in which ideas, information, and images flow incestuously from one medium to another.

9 According to the Tofflers, “A major 

new factor in information war results directly from the worldwide infosphere 

of television and broadcast news. Many people have begun to realize that 

governmental decisions are becoming increasingly reactive to a ‘fictive’ (not a 

whole, relevant or contextual truth) universe created by CNN and its various 

international competitors.”10 

Information Warfare and the CNN Factor 

Haiti offers an excellent example of a government decision affected by 

CNN’s fictive universe. General Powell, former chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and part of a negotiating team in Haiti headed by President 

Jimmy Carter, told this story: 

. . . then suddenly the door broke open and, Gen Biamby (Haiti’s chief of staff 

of the army) came back in . . . he was livid. And he came right up to me and he 

said, “General, how would you feel if you were in my position? I now know 

what’s happening. Look on CNN. Look at that television. All of the officials in 

Washington are condemning us, threatening us with invasion, talking about 

war, talking about killing. And you sit here talking about peace and reconciliation, and now I have just gotten a call from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and I 

know that the paratroopers are on the way.” . . . And within the next hour, we 

had a deal.11 

7

The threat of paratroopers on the way, in combination with CNN’s portrayal of American will to depose the leadership, obviously led to the rapid, 

successful departure of Raoul Cedras and his cronies. According to 

Colonel Tyrrell, special assistant to the Air Force PA director and one who 

took part in the planning for the Haiti invasion, the CNN effect was accidental. In fact, the White House PA office (for OPSEC reasons) asked and 

the networks agreed not to broadcast the departure of the paratroopers 

from Pope Air Force Base (AFB), South Carolina.12 Ironically, the CNN reports Gen Phillip Biamby referred to were merely a replay of issues that 

aired on the Washington Sunday morning talk shows. While PA played an 

indirect IW role in this event by suppressing the information about the 

paratrooper’s departure and supporting the Sunday morning talk shows 

with information and interviewees, the unintended IW effect they had 

demonstrates the role they could play in the future. 

Public Affairs and Psychological 

Operations Roles Begin to Blur 

Haiti also serves to illustrate the way communicating to a “global village” blurs the very distinct and separate ways the military has traditionally communicated with Americans and with the rest of the world. Communicating with the American public—a traditional PA mission—and the 

way the military communicates with foreign audiences—a mission of 

PSYOP—can no longer be neatly separated into two distinct categories. 

Garnering public support through interviews with the Secretary of Defense or chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Sunday morning talk 

shows (a PA mission) also helped subdue the will of Haiti’s leadership to 

remain in power (a PSYOP mission). The symbiotic nature of the two missions demonstrates the increasing interrelationship between PSYOP and 

PA. The two organizations have fundamentally different target audiences— 

PA communicates to the American public, government (specifically Congress) and its own internal military audience—while PSYOP communicates to the same three types of audiences, except on the enemy side. 

However, they increasingly share the same medium, the international 

media, with which to communicate their messages. Figure 2 illustrates 

this relationship. 

PA 

Government 

Military 

International 

Media 

Enemy Gov’t 

Enemy Military 

PSYOP 

Figure 2. Psychological Operations and Public Affairs Relationship, Medium Sharing 

8

Despite the increasingly shared medium in which the two exist, PSYOP 

avoids PA. Col Don Black, PA director for the Pacific Air Forces, explained 

the divergent relationship he encountered during Operation Vigilant Warrior: “The USIS Country Team wanted PSYOP to discuss its planning in 

the same room with PA, but PSYOP was reluctant. They (PSYOP) want to 

be involved in what we do, but they don’t want us involved in what they 

do.”13 However, in PA’s effort to keep the mission “untainted” from what it 

considers the somewhat more dubious truth or propaganda often used in 

PSYOP, PA also tries to avoid interacting with PSYOP. “It’s not just that 

PSYOP doesn’t want to talk to PA, but PA doesn’t want to talk to PSYOP,” 

said Colonel Tyrrell.14 

Since PA is the “sole agent at the Seat of Government for the release of 

official DOD information for dissemination through any form of public information media,”15 PSYOP doctrine says it must use PA. The relationship 

is outlined in Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations: 

As open sources to foreign countries and the United States, PA channels can be 

used to disseminate international information. To maintain the credibility of 

military PA, care must be taken to protect against slanting or manipulating 

such PA channels. Within the United States, PA channels can be used to provide facts that will counter foreign propaganda, including disinformation, directed at the United States.16 

It is interesting that there is so little desire for interaction between 

PSYOP and PA when the PSYOP doctrine specifically states PA channels 

will be used to disseminate international information. It is also noted that 

PA directives do not address the counterpropaganda mission when PSYOP 

doctrine indicates PA channels are used for that purpose. In fact, PA is 

quite explicit in denying any association with propaganda. By law, PA cannot hire public relations counsel or use appropriated funds for propaganda.17 Per DOD directives, “Propaganda has no place in Department of 

Defense Public Affairs programs.”18 Even the newest doctrine for Public 

Affairs in Joint Operations soon to be published, states: 

The DOD’s obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs and operations may require detailed PA planning and coordination 

within DOD and with other government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public: propaganda or publicity designed to sway or direct public opinion will not be included in DOD PA 

programs.19 

According to the Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations, “In dealing with the media, the United States must speak with 

one voice, both politically and militarily.” Since PA avoids PSYOP in order 

to avoid being portrayed as a propagandist’s tool, it may be an impossible 

task without changing the PSYOP and PA paradigm to speak with one 

voice in today’s environment. 

The same can be said for military deception. The joint doctrine for military 

deception specifically states that such operations will not intentionally target 

or mislead the US public, Congress, or the news media. Deception activities 

9

potentially visible to the media or public must be coordinated with PA so the 

deception operation is not inadvertently revealed.20 PA officers at central 

command (CENTCOM)-level were aware of the military’s deception plan to 

execute the left hook rather than the amphibious assault during Desert 

Storm. Unfortunately, considerable criticism still exists among press professionals who allege the news media were deliberately deceived into covering 

the amphibious assault for IW purposes. Col Michael R. Gallagher, director 

of CENTCOM media relations during Desert Storm and now PA director for 

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insists the allegations are not true 

and that PA was merely trying to help the media get action footage that the 

amphibious exercises amply provided.21 Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf, former CENTCOM commander in chief, adds, “I will swear on a stack of Bibles 

that we never, ever deliberately manipulated the press, and we never, ever 

deliberately planted a false story.”22 

“PA should be deeply involved in the strategic planning of IW so none of 

the traditional roles of PA are interfered with,” said Colonel Gallagher. “My 

biggest worry is that PA will become such prima donnas (concerning IW) 

that the IW people won’t coordinate with them.” The colonel’s fears are not 

spurious in light of fictitious scenarios like the one envisioned by Dr. 

George Stein, a professor at Air War College. His scenario illustrates the 

melding of military deception, PSYOP and PA using emerging mass communication capabilities. The scenario begins with enemy television stations picking up a simulated broadcast message from a commercial satellite in which their leadership urges all fighting to cease. Simultaneously, 

leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts provide supporting details of 

how military units should disarm. Within minutes, CNN and other international networks are also reporting the message of surrender, however 

some networks are denouncing it as a Hollywood hoax. Is it real? It is almost impossible for the society under assault or the rest of the world to 

tell.23 

In a society under assault across its entire infosphere, it will become increasingly difficult for members of that society to verify internally the truth or accuracy of anything. Objective reasoning is threatened. The idea . . . may need to 

be considered with all the care given to the conduct of nuclear war, as the “end 

state” may not be bloodless surrender but total disruption of the targeted society.24 

Americans also witness the astounding broadcast and begin celebrating 

the return of their loved ones from abroad. How will Americans react when 

the truth is revealed and they learn their emotions have been taken on a 

roller coaster ride courtesy of the US military? Perhaps favorably if it 

brings a quick end to the war, but what if it does not? And how expensive 

is the victory if the cost is truth? Dr. Stein cautions, “Any discussion of information warfare . . . by the armed forces of the United States at the 

strategic level must occur in the context of the moral nature of communication in a pluralistic, secular, democratic society.”25 

10

Scenarios like the one described pose grave concerns for PA professionals who believe the misuse of information for psychological effects under 

the guise of IW could undermine the public trust in the US military institution. Carolyn Piper, a PA professional in the Office of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff with more than 20 years of experience, concludes: 

IW has no place in PA. In our democracy, the military organization exists only 

by the consent of the governed. If the institution lies or misleads the people, 

they cannot make informed decisions regarding the issues and we cease to be 

a democracy. Truth is essential to the credibility of the military organization 

and its continued existence.26 

It is this widespread philosophy that has led PA, so far, to take a handsoff approach regarding IW. At the Secretary of the Air Force level, PA plans 

deliberately avoid any discussion of the agency’s role in IW but merely 

outlines the messages the Air Force intends to use to inform the public 

about IW activities within the Air Force.27 PA professionals may also have 

a built-in fear of IW justified in light of a Freedom Forum Study released 

in the Fall of 1995. The survey revealed that six out of 10 military officers 

(from a pool of 935 individuals surveyed) believe, “Military leaders should 

be allowed to use the news media to deceive the enemy.”28 

“That’s disgusting,” commented Colonel Gallagher, when asked his reaction to the survey results. The colonel indicated he has spoken to 

groups concerning PA’s relationship with IW and his continued message 

is “Don’t lie to the news media.” Making an analogy to our nation’s policy 

toward chemical weapons, he believes the military should have a similar 

policy flatly stating it will not lie to the media. Anyone caught lying should 

be court-martialed.29 

Exploitation of the information spectrum obviously has strategic implications far beyond the battle area that have not yet been imagined. From 

a PA perspective, a look at the historical evolution of IW, particularly propaganda, throughout the nation’s wars may shed some light on the potential effect of today’s high-tech version. Critics of IW, R. L. DiNardo and 

Daniel J. Hughes, acknowledge the fundamental link between IW and 

propaganda but assert today’s high-tech propaganda is only an old form 

of propaganda used since the dawn of organized warfare. “It (propaganda) 

has always been designed to inspire confidence in one’s own people and 

leaders and to alternatively ridicule, frighten, or demonize one’s enemy.”30 

Nonetheless, it is useful to take a look at propaganda from a historical 

prospective to glean lessons that may be applied to an appropriate PA 

strategy for IW. In the next chapter an examination of past wars reveals 

propaganda has been used consistently as the military’s primary method 

of maintaining its support from the American people. What is more, there 

is strong evidence to suggest PA, despite its antipropaganda charter, has 

also used propaganda extensively “to earn public understanding, acceptance, and support of the Air Force mission.”31 The following chapter proceeds from a definition of propaganda into the US historical accounts of 

its use. 

11

Notes 

1. Cornerstones of Information Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 

[GPO], 1995), 3. 

2. Ibid., 5–6. 

3. Martin C. Libicki, “What is Information Warfare,” Strategic Forum, no. 28 (Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, May 1995), 4. 

4. Cornerstones, 4. 

5. Maj Matthew Durham, director of PA for Air Force Special Operations Command, interviewed by author, 15 May 1996. 

6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

1971), 39. 

7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89. Note that the translation “paradoxical 

trinity” in the First Princeton Paperback Printing, 1989 of On War is different from the 

1984 version where the translation reads “remarkable trinity.” 

8. Ibid., 592. 

9. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century 

(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 170. 

10. Dr. George J. Stein, “Information - Cyberwar - Netwar,” Battlefield of the Future, 

21st Century Warfare Issues, ed. Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter (Maxwell Air 

Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 156. 

11. Gen Colin L. Powell, USAF, retired, speech untitled, presented to the Association of 

the United States Army Marshall Dinner at the Sheraton Washington Ballroom, 19 October 1994. 

12. Col Terry Tyrrell, special assistant to the director, Secretary of the Air Force Office 

of PA, interviewed by author, 29 March 1996. 

13. Col Don Black, director of PA, Pacific Air Forces, interviewed by author, 19 February 1996. 

14. Tyrrell interview. 

15. Department of Defense Directive no. 5122.5, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2 December 1993), 4. 

16. Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, 30 July 1993), 1–5. 

17. Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1913, Gillette Amendment, cited in Air Force Regulation 190-1 (obsolete), Air Force Public Affairs Program (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1 March 

1989), 18. 

18. Ibid., Enclosure 2-1. 

19. Draft copy of JP 1-07, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations (Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, 1996), 26. 

20. JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 6 June 1994), 

1-4d. 

21. Col Michael R. Gallagher, special assistant (PA) to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, interviewed by author, 20 May 1996. 

22. Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America’s Team, The Odd Couple: A Report 

on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military (Nashville, Tenn.: The Freedom 

Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 154. Note: Authors interviewed General 

Schwarzkopf for their study on 23 January 1995. 

23. Stein. 

24. Ibid., 158. 

25. Ibid., 159. 

26. Carolyn Piper, public affairs officer, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, interviewed by author, 22 February 1996. 

12

27. Maj Clem Gaines, secretary of the Air Force Office of Public Affairs, staff officer responsible for IW activities within the Air Force and author of an AF/IW plan for PA, interviewed by author, 8 March 1996. 

28. Aukofer and Lawrence, 29. 

29. Gallagher interview. 

30. R. L. DiNardo and Daniel J. Hughes, “Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information 

Warfare,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 73. 

31. Air Force Policy Directive no. 35-2, Public Communications Programs (Washington, 

D.C.: GPO, 12 November 1993), 1. 

13

Chapter 3 

A Historical Perspective 

of Military Propaganda 

Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary defines propaganda as “ideas, facts, 

or allegations spread deliberately to further one’s cause or to damage an 

opposing cause.”1 Philip M. Taylor, in Munitions of the Mind, offers this 

definition: “Propaganda is really no more than the communication of ideas 

designed to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way. In 

wartime that usually means getting them to fight or to support the fight.”2 

Joint Pub 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, says it is “any 

form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in 

order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”3 These seemingly benign definitions are not shared by many Americans. In fact, propaganda bears such an inherently negative image, even PA through its directives categorically prohibits its use in any manner. 

Most believe propaganda is composed only of lies; and conversely, what 

is true cannot be propaganda. Instead, propaganda can include any information from pure truth to pure deceit. Propaganda can be divided into 

three areas—white, gray, or black—based upon the acknowledgment of 

the source of propaganda and the accuracy of the information that is communicated. White propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly and communicate accurate information. For example, what listeners hear on Voice of America could reasonably be considered accurate 

information (albeit biased toward democratic ideals). Gray’s propaganda 

may or may not identify the source correctly and the accuracy of the information is uncertain. One example of this type of propaganda was a 

Russian television documentary on the war in Afghanistan that suggested 

the war had been started by outsiders and an individual, identified as a 

Turkish national, testified that he had been sent to carry out a mission for 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Black propaganda gives a false 

source and lies, fabrications, and deceptions are deliberately spread. This 

type of propaganda has been refined to be called “disinformation.”4 

J. Fred MacDonald, a historian and editor of a series on the media and 

society, calls propaganda “an omnipresent, intrusive aspect of modern life 

. . . an integral part of all modern civilizations.” He asserts that it plays a 

critical role in the preservation of order in authoritarian and democratic 

states alike. In authoritarian states, propaganda legitimizes and reinforces the leader’s power while in democracies it serves to convince and 

manipulate. He maintains, “In the modern world, all mass communication 

is persuasive.” MacDonald states that politicians are propagandists, but 

15

so are clergymen exhorting Christian moral goals and TV cartoonists who 

perpetuate muscular heroes battling for justice. National anthems and 

pledges of allegiance to the flag are also propagandistic rituals that bind 

citizens to the purpose of the nation.5 

MacDonald points out profound change occurred in the twentieth century when the common man came to power, establishing the need for new 

and relevant means of predictably controlling “mass man.” Therefore, he 

believes propaganda is a social adhesive. Mass man is educated and controlled through propaganda. His civic values are filtered through school 

boards, party committees, courts of law, and state legislatures that all 

serve to protect the orthodoxy. Communications media—through news 

and even entertainment—then frame the world to complement the historic 

national understanding the mass man has learned. MacDonald concludes 

propaganda has made sustained order possible in mass society. “Despite 

the controversy it has engendered, propaganda has been strategic to the 

survival of mass man and the civilization he now rules.”6 

According to the Tofflers, the military has used six propaganda tools 

over and over again throughout the history of war—atrocity stories; hyperbolic inflation of the stakes involved in a war (civilians are told everything they hold dear is at risk); dehumanization of the opponent; polarization (“Those who aren’t with us, are against us”); divine sanction 

(incantatory phrases like “God Bless America”); and, propaganda that discredits the other side’s propaganda.7 Although today’s vision of IW using 

high-tech propaganda may be moving to a more sophisticated level, the 

key point is that these propaganda tools have worked for the United 

States since the Revolutionary War and continue to work today. 

Unfortunately, the meaning of propaganda has been distorted by history from its original Latin meaning “to propagate” or “to sow.” The word 

originated in 1622 with Pope Gregory XV, who established a congregation 

for the Propagation of the Faith and used propaganda to initiate its ideology and oppose the Protestant Reformation.8 But the concept of propaganda has probably been around since the Paleolithic man began using 

his tools for warlike purposes. Cries and drum beats, for instance, were 

used to frighten the enemy and impress his friends.9 

While it is not the intent of this paper to determine the “right” definition 

of propaganda, a working definition of propaganda is necessary to proceed 

with a historical examination of the term. For the purposes of this analysis, propaganda will be defined as methods of communication designed to 

persuade. 

Revolutionary War 

The American military’s use of propaganda can be traced back to the 

American Revolution, considered the first people’s war. As such, John 

Adams maintained it was a struggle for the “hearts and minds” of the peo16

ple even before the war began. Without the aid of the press and an effective propaganda campaign to explain setbacks and glorify victories (sometimes out of all proportion), the architects of America may never have 

reached their goals. Benjamin Franklin may lay claim to being the first 

American practitioner of black propaganda, writing a number of letters 

and documents under fake names to set other nations against the British 

government.10 George Washington also used the press for his own disinformation, spreading exaggerated reports of enemy casualties to keep the 

people from becoming discouraged. In 1777 he wrote, “It is in our interest, however much our characters may suffer by it, to make small numbers appear large.”11 The conclusion that can be drawn from this earliest 

example of the use of propaganda in war, demonstrates that our forefathers, responsible for the underpinnings of our democracy, used propaganda in all its forms. 

Civil War 

Growing literacy and the invention of the telegraph in the 1850s drew 

the US territories closer together and had profound implications for both 

the Union and Confederate armies in the Civil War. Telegraph lines greatly 

increased the speed with which the press could report on battles and 

troop movements. Journalists suddenly had the ability to describe military engagements as they took place—a development that blurred the line 

between press reports and intelligence.12 Battlefield censorship alleviated 

the problem somewhat and also set the pattern for wartime censorship 

into the twentieth century. It is important to note the significance of censorship to propaganda. Censorship is a form of propaganda. It is as much 

about what is not said as overt expression.13 

However, neither of the armies in the Civil War were prepared to counter 

the rumors and misinformation of the press. Official information lacked 

the color that newsmen could create. The public wanted news and the 

press intended to supply it, whether it existed or not.14 But, like Washington, generals were not beyond using the press to sow their own seeds 

of disinformation. Confederate Gen Albert Sidney Johnston hid the weaknesses of his Kentucky army by planting false reports on his strength and 

campaign strategies with the Southern press, knowing they would be parroted in the North, which is indeed what happened.15 

Improvisation characterized the PA function in the field as there was no 

official PA organization. Each commander had his own policy for handling 

the press. Politically oriented generals cultivated reporters while generals 

like William T. Sherman questioned the Union government’s decision to 

allow newsmen to accompany armies. Gen Ulysses Grant, on the other 

hand, recognized good relations with the media as essential to maintaining communications between the military and American people that went 

a long way toward quieting public concern that the war would never end.16 

17

Conclusions about the Civil War from a propaganda perspective demonstrate that censorship can be an effective propaganda tool. Even then, the 

press agencies had an incestuous relationship among themselves as they 

do today and General Johnston, an enterprising general, exploited that 

vulnerability with disinformation. Sherman, however, learned that without an effective propaganda campaign of his own, support for the cause 

went to the generals who had the media savvy to know how to use the 

press to their own advantage. Civil War propaganda from both sides 

demonstrated that although the United States of America considers itself 

one mass society, propaganda does not necessarily play a unifying role. 

Spanish–American War 

Reporters continued to be nothing short of a nuisance in the eyes of military leaders as the United States entered the Spanish–American War. 

William Randolph Hearst pioneered “yellow journalism”17 and jingoistic 

slogans like “Remember the Maine.”18 It did not help that the war itself 

was a public relations disaster. The press recognized the United States 

was unprepared for large-scale military operations and did not hesitate to 

report it. In the years that followed, the Army began to grapple with the 

public relations prerequisites for achieving a higher level of defense preparedness. In 1907, the Army hired a retired Army officer to handle public relations in order to help sell a long-range plan of expansion and improvement to remedy its wartime unpreparedness.19 

Oddly enough, Air Force PA came of age about this time, many years before the Air Force department was formed in 1947. The “Air Force’s” first 

news release announced the creation on 1 August 1907 of an Aeronautical Division in the Office of the Army Chief Signal Officer. The release was 

written by an officer in charge of the division.20 

Early legislation restricting government public affairs activities appeared in the Gillette Amendment to the Deficiency Appropriation Act of 

1913, specifically forbidding the spending of appropriated funds to hire 

“publicity experts” without the expressed approval of Congress. Later legislation further defined these restrictions to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for “publicity or propaganda purposes” designed to influence 

the direction of legislation pending before Congress, with the exception of 

presentations made directly to that legislative body.21 

It was not until the spring of 1916 that the Army appointed the first true 

PA officer, Maj Douglas MacArthur, to deal with the newspapermen who 

were covering the activities of Pancho Villa in Mexico and the troops who 

were gearing up for possible military intervention in Europe. In fact, Major 

MacArthur is credited by historian R. Ernest Dupuy with overcoming the 

American public’s reluctance to accept the Selective Service Act of 1917— 

PA’s first propaganda effort.22 

18

World War I 

World War I provided the context for how the word propaganda acquired 

the unsavory connotation it has today. At the outset, the British organized a 

secret war propaganda bureau to conduct a highly delicate campaign to secure American sympathies. The Germans also exhorted the Americans to 

join their side with heavy-handed propaganda tactics. The British, on the 

other hand, targeted influential Americans and the media rather than trying 

to appeal to the population at large. While it cannot be said that British propaganda only got the United States into the war, it certainly helped in persuading President Woodrow Wilson, who had run on a “Keep America out of 

the War” ticket, into entering the conflict on the Allied side.23 

British propaganda also had a profound effect on the enemy. Adolf 

Hitler, then a German soldier, recalled: 

In the year 1915, the enemy started his propaganda among our soldiers. From 

1916 it steadily became more intensive and at the beginning of 1918, it had 

swollen into a storm cloud. One could now see the effects of this gradual seduction. Our soldiers learned to think the way the enemy wanted them to 

think.24 

Later, Hitler devoted two chapters in Mein Kampf in admiration of the 

British propaganda campaign, specifying the finer points of timing, cumulative effects and repetition, which he himself would later use. But the 

Germans used British propaganda as an excuse for their defeat—the German army did not fail but was betrayed from within—a theme used later 

to “prove” a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy.25 

When the United States entered World War I, an internal propaganda effort touched citizens in every aspect of their lives. President Wilson appointed 

George Creel to head the committee on public information (CPI), which consisted of the secretaries of state and the secretaries for the Army and Navy. 

Creel, a close friend of Wilson, urged the president to create a government 

agency to coordinate “[n]ot propaganda as the Germans defined it, but propaganda in the true sense of the word, meaning the ‘propagation of faith.’”26 

The public’s perspective of propaganda was understood at this time as dishonest communication employed in underhanded campaigns by a foreign 

enemy. The idea that communication industries had introduced a pervasive 

social propaganda had not yet become a public issue.27 

American war reporting fell into the patterns of propaganda already 

prevalent in Europe. President Wilson reasoned that the outcome of the 

war depended on the people’s will to sacrifice and persist. The CPI was essential to strengthen national determination. As such, it evolved into a 

mammoth propaganda organization, reaching into every part of the nation, and came to maintain officers in every neutral and Allied country. It 

issued a daily newspaper, operated a press service that fed information to 

the news media, produced films and foreign language publications, and 

enlisted a corps of 75,000 patriotic speakers. Its organs stressed the supposed barbarity of the German armies and the justice of the Allied cause. 

19

Wilson himself contributed forcefully to the effort by appealing in his 

speeches to American idealism. The war thus became in the eyes of many 

Americans an effort to end all wars and a crusade to ensure the worldwide 

triumph of democracy.28 

Within this optimistic framework, two darker themes lurked—the condemnation of Germany and Austria for alleged war atrocities and encouragement of citizens to act as vigilantes against disloyal citizens. These 

themes drew heavy postwar criticism. Whereas most Americans had accepted wartime atrocity tales as gospel, the discovery after the war that 

these stories were for the most part lies, showed falsehood could gain the 

aura of truth when presented by a governmental bureau that presided 

over all channels of public communication.29 

Germany’s propaganda was inadequate from the outset. Poorly organized and coordinated, the German Press Bureau had the dual role of 

media relations and maintenance of morale at home and among the 

troops. Unlike the British who had separate departments for each function, the German propaganda machine was overburdened and diluted. 

Therefore, it concentrated on war news and neglected morale. German attempts at counterpropaganda therefore came too late in the war to make 

a difference in German morale.30 

Propaganda conclusions from World War I point to the continued problem of hate-inspired propaganda that does not die after the return to 

peace. Incidentally, the coalition in Desert Storm may have broken that 

mold somewhat when the allies purposely avoided such propaganda 

against the Iraqi people, although there were the usual after effects following the vilification of Saddam Hussein who remained in office. 

The lesson of disinformation against one’s own Allies was also first felt in 

World War I and would spill over in its effect to World War II. By the early 

1920s, propaganda analysis evolved from the World War I critiques of communications. Concerns that democracy was in peril from these new methods 

of persuasion became the dominant perspective throughout the 20s and 

early 30s. Wartime US military propagandist, Walter Lippmann wrote of how 

authorities were able to manipulate the news in ways supportive of official 

policies. He charged modern propaganda had permanently changed the relationship of a self-governing people to their government.31 

As for the lessons of censorship during World War I, the Allies prided 

themselves on their democratic principles, which allowed more plentiful 

news and more freedom of restraint than that of the enemy. However, the 

chief American censor for the US Army in Europe expressed the belief that 

he had served as “a public liar to keep up the spirit of the armies and peoples of our side.”32 Once again, propaganda to manipulate opinion, in the 

form of censorship, left a lingering distaste for omitting details that were 

not of value to the enemy but could, if released, damage morale. 

Finally, the Germans’ failure to create an adequate propaganda campaign may present the most important lesson from World War I. In today’s 

world, PA is also stretched thin trying to accommodate the thousands of 

20

press representatives on the battlefield. The effort to feed the hungry 

“news” monster takes precedence over all else in the PA arena. The German example clearly demonstrates that maintaining morale and counterpropaganda should be the priority. The American military has yet to learn 

this lesson. 

Nevertheless, the Army took away some PA lessons from World War I 

and established a press relations section that became the central coordinator to inform the public of all Army activities. By 1930, the technical 

and administrative branches of the Army had PA officers on staff charged 

with writing speeches, acting as press liaison, and improving relations 

with the community. On the eve of World War II, the PA branch successfully divorced itself from the G-2 Intelligence directorate citing the fact 

that secrecy hampered efforts to keep the public and Congress informed.33 

World War II: The War against Germany 

The ability of the United States to broadcast news electronically had a 

profound effect on propaganda in World War II. The newfound technology 

would enable propagandists on all sides to dwarf the efforts of all other 

conflicts, including World War I. This total war, where bombers attacked 

civilian populations as well as military targets, led to unprecedented cooperation between the government and the media to inform the public.34 

The most potent source of white propaganda in Britain was the British 

Broadcasting Company (BBC). It not only provided propaganda news and 

entertainment, but overt and covert broadcasting. BBC even provided for 

the air defense of Great Britain. It entered the war with the philosophy, 

“No permanent propaganda policy can in the modern world be based upon 

untruthfulness.” Eventually, the “truth,” just not the whole truth, became 

axiomatic.35 

The BBC occupied a special place in the world of mass communication. 

Its august reputation, built wholly on telling the truth and not as a propaganda arm of the government, made it the most-listened to radio service 

in the world. However, for all its voluntary assistance given the Allied 

cause, it was still used as an unconscious agent of the overall deception 

plan called Bodyguard which focused the Germans away from a Normandy invasion.36 

With the entry of America into the war, two separate propaganda organizations were set up—the office of strategic services handled black 

propaganda, and the office of war information worked white propaganda. 

Following the British lead and a similar abhorrence for propaganda after 

World War I, the American military developed their “Strategy of Truth” as 

a fundamental principle of propaganda.37 

Like generals in every war, Gen George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of 

Staff, had to learn how to deal with the press. By the time of the 1944 Normandy invasion, he met with the press regularly to appeal for under21

standing of the Army’s problems and argue on behalf of the controversial 

George Patton. 

President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered relations with the press essential to the process of forging support for the homefront and unity 

among the European Allies. As such, he made public affairs a command 

priority. Where General MacArthur kept reporters at arm’s length in the 

Pacific, Eisenhower turned the press into “quasi-members” of his staff. So 

complete did he woo the reporters to his cause, when he requested they 

suppress the story of General Patton slapping a soldier, they banned the 

news so completely it took three months to reach papers in the United 

States.38 

Relations with the press during World War II were positive despite censorship. However, criticisms emerged after the hostilities that the press 

had been lulled so completely by censors that the American public was 

isolated from war’s realities. The final consensus, though, generally credited both government and media with accurate, honest reporting.39 

The Nazi propaganda campaign demonstrates the similarities and difference between democratic and totalitarian propaganda. Like Hitler, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels greatly admired the Allied propaganda 

campaign in World War I. Nazi propaganda activities were carefully concealed from public view with Goebbels heading up the apparatus with the 

title Nazi Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda. No such office had existed before. The aim of Nazi propaganda was to achieve the 

identification of the party with the state. Centralization of propaganda activities required the elimination of every alternative source of information. 

By 1934, the Nazi party controlled 430 newspapers directly and indirectly 

controlled all the German press.40 Control of information in a totalitarian 

state is paramount to its survival. 

Among the Nazi documents salvaged by Americans in 1945, were close 

to 6,800 pages of script purportedly dictated by Goebbels in a diary that 

covers 1942–43.41 Most significant were 19 principles that reflected 

Goebbels’ propaganda strategy and tactics. However distasteful the concept, many of the principles are profound and have direct application to 

propaganda methods used today. 

Among the principles was the importance of truth; however, for 

Goebbels it was not based on morality but expediency. Truth should be 

used as often as possible; otherwise the enemy or the facts themselves 

might expose falsehood and the credibility of one’s own output would suffer. He also had no second thoughts about censorship. “News policy is a 

weapon of war; its purpose is to wage war and not give out information.”42 

Goebbels often violated his own thoughtful, logical policies though. He 

wrote in his diary, “Propaganda to the homefront must prevent the raising of false hopes which can be blasted by future events.”43 Yet, he summoned the press, including foreign reporters, to announce Moscow’s imminent fall in October 1941. 

22

In the end, Goebbels was forced to recognize six situations that could 

not be appreciably affected by propaganda: hunger and sex; discomfort 

and death caused by air raids; ability to increase industrial production; 

and, religious impulses. Also, overt opposition required forceful action 

rather than clever words and Germany’s unfavorable military situation 

became undeniable fact.44 

World War II: The War against Japan 

Pearl Harbor was a tribute to the disinformation campaign the Japanese had conducted between 1939 and 1941. Japanese propaganda, or 

“Thought War” as they preferred to call it, used radio as its principal instrument. Because of the rivalry between the army and navy, both had 

their own propaganda organizations. Military domination of the government also meant all national propaganda was subject to the same control. 

The real triumph of Japanese propaganda was the fanaticism it had instilled in its warriors; ironically, that same propaganda lacked a clear philosophy concerning a “strategy of truth,” which proved to be a major 

weakness. A Japanese writer observed, “Japan was hopelessly beaten in 

psychological warfare, not because of any particular adroitness on the 

part of the Allies, but because the Allies based their propaganda on 

truth—whereas Japan was unwilling to deal in truth, almost from the outset.”45 Col Tom Mahr, media advisor to Air University, confirms that the 

Japanese are still very sensitive to the lesson they learned about truth in 

World War II. During his tour in Japan as the Fifth Air Force PA, he was 

taken aside and given a history lesson when he tried to discuss proactive 

PA messages with his Japanese counterparts. They were concerned that 

proactive messages insinuated twisting the truth to make a positive story 

and they would have none of it.46 

World War II propaganda lessons suffer from an inability to separate the 

ferocity with which a total war is fought under conditions of unconditional 

surrender and the effect of the most comprehensive propaganda campaigns the world has ever witnessed. Was it successful propaganda that 

bolstered the national will or the threat to national survival that made 

propaganda so effective? It is impossible to tell, but certainly the symbiotic nature of propaganda and national will led Japan and Germany’s 

populace to remain loyal to the end. 

Propaganda would continue to provoke the evil image of Hitler and 

Goebbels long after World War II. However, the military still had much to 

learn about propaganda. It would take the Korean conflict and Vietnam to 

convince the military that total war does not share the same rules as limited war, especially when it comes to communicating with the American 

public. They would relearn Clausewitz’s dictum: 

The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war 

23

on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into 

something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions.47 

Korea and Vietnam 

Bolstered by two victories involving total war, the US military was not 

prepared for the credibility crisis they made for themselves in the limited 

wars that followed in Korea and Vietnam. Frankly, the military expected 

that they would continue to enjoy a collaborative role with the media. But 

General MacArthur handled the press situation badly with the setbacks 

that accompanied China’s entry into the war. According to Lt Gen Bernard 

Trainor (US Army retired), “What started to turn the press against the war 

was actually a reemergence of government disinformation . . . the Allied 

side was putting out bum dope and withholding information.”48 

As military successes became losses, breaches of security by the press 

supposedly forced MacArthur to invoke censorship; but it amounted to a 

propaganda tool to control the bad news. MacArthur’s military PA officers 

provoked the press by extending censorship beyond the areas having to 

do with military security. In several cases, information needlessly withheld by the military was later revealed in newspaper exposes that damaged Army credibility.49 Although censorship may have reduced the number of security violations, it failed to stop them completely. For example, 

on 18 June 1951, Newsweek published a map detailing the order of battle for the entire US Eighth Army.50 

In stark contrast, censorship was virtually nonexistent in Vietnam. 

From a propaganda perspective, however, the conflict crept up on the 

American people. The first phase from 1941 to 1963 received little attention due to America’s minor role. From 1963 to 1967 there was considerable escalation of military involvement and corresponding media attention, though generally uncensored.51 

Peter Braestrup writes in Big Story, that the military and media shared 

a common problem in describing an unconventional war in conventional 

terms Americans could understand—a problem never solved. “By late 

1967, Saigon newsmen felt that Gen William Westmoreland (commander 

of Military Assistance Command in Vietnam)—under pressure from Washington—were [sic] gilding the lily,” hence the name of the daily press briefings, the “Five O’Clock Follies.”52 

Technology was also an important consideration, for television now 

brought war into the homes of Americans every night on the evening news 

and the impact of images on the psyche of the American public took communicators by surprise. PA professionals simply had no experience in 

countering the superficial storylines that accompanied the shocking combat footage. Without a supportive press to tell the whole story with all its 

complexities, public support was doomed. Americans were left with only a 

24

vague notion of what Vietnam was all about, but a clear vision of the horrors of war. 

When President Lyndon Johnson launched a public relations campaign 

requiring that Westmoreland and military PA officers shore up public support, the military found itself squarely in the middle of a political arena 

from which it had previously remained aloof. In fact, it required an order 

by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requiring PA to explain the war 

in every way possible for the military to become fully immersed in selling 

the war.

53 Gen Michael Dugan, former AF Chief of Staff, retired, observes: 

“A ten-year war on remote foreign soil will almost always be a bad story in 

a liberal democracy. The easiest way for defense establishments to manage the media is to generate a compelling story.”54 It is important to note 

that General Dugan supports “managing” the media, a significantly different view from what many of today’s PA professionals hold. 

General Trainor is less kind in his assessment of the military’s errors in 

Korea and Vietnam: “The supportive press at the outset of the (Korean) 

war became very sour and very critical of the military and most of all the 

government. Why? . . . because the government resorted to lies. . . . Outright lies.” In Vietnam, the general believes once the Tet offensive was 

launched by an enemy supposedly “on his last legs,” the media turned 

against the war because of the lying and sensed there were no objectives 

in a war of mounting casualties.55 

While World War I and World War II gave propaganda a bad name, Korea 

and Vietnam did nothing to improve the situation. Lessons from Korea 

and Vietnam include: PA professionals in Korea and Vietnam were “ham 

handed” in their propaganda methods, the most obvious reason is that 

military PA professionals do not receive any formal training about how to 

communicate persuasively, that is propaganda. Censorship began in the 

middle of the war as in Korea or a proactive propaganda campaign had 

begun years into the war as in Vietnam, significantly lowers the probability of success. Even the Germans learned this in World War I with their 

counterpropaganda campaign well into the war. While Goebbels was evil, 

his principles of propaganda were sound and stated as follows: (1) truth 

is best; to do otherwise risks exposure of the lie and loss of credibility, (2) 

do not oversell success on the homefront, (3) propaganda is ineffective 

when an unfavorable military situation becomes undeniable fact, and (4) 

war is an extension of politics as recognized first by Clausewitz. The military cannot separate itself from this reality but must be prepared to fight 

by whatever means required by the leadership—even a propaganda campaign. 

Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War 

The whole military propaganda environment changed with Vietnam. PA 

attitudes as well as technology would put censorship back in primary 

25

focus. Whether it was a backlash from Vietnam or just failure to think 

through the plan, the exclusion of the press from the American invasion 

of Grenada is touted as an all time low in contemporary PA. General 

Trainor explained the military’s decision, “The military said that operations in the age of instant communications had to be very secret, and it 

could not afford to have the press tipping them off—a variation of the old 

argument of operational security used from the time of the Civil War.”56 

In the short-term view, the propaganda tool of total censorship of the 

press was a success and the American public approved. In the long view, 

the military lost credibility when its own initial reports contradicted the 

information discovered later by the media. The American public was left 

with the impression the military lied.57 

The propaganda lesson is that, perhaps for the first time, the military 

recognized it needed the media in order to tell its story. Excluding the 

press from Urgent Fury in Grenada bred suspicion concerning the true 

extent of the military’s success. While the media may also have erred in 

its initial reports from the island, the press lends a third-party objectivity 

to an event. First-hand battlefield reports from the media serve to legitimize what might otherwise be construed as the exaggeration of warriors 

in the flush of victory. 

Operation Just Cause, in Panama, profited just slightly from the lessons of Grenada. A commission, headed by Gen Winant Sidle, investigated 

the Urgent Fury debacle and provided six recommendations to enhance 

the military-media relationship—one of the most significant recommendations included establishment of a Washington-based press pool. “The 

pool” was designed as a compromise between the desire for media access 

and the military’s desire to somehow accommodate the huge numbers of 

press expected. Just Cause served as a test-case for the implementation 

of the Sidle Commission recommendations, particularly the pool. While it 

quelled accusation of total censorship of the battlefield as in Grenada, the 

national media pool could not cover military actions until the second day 

of the operation.58 “Meanwhile, journalists by the score who had nothing 

to do with the pool were flying in on commercial airliners from . . . every 

other place in the world to cover the war on the spot,” said General 

Trainor. 

If more than 800 journalists present during the Panama Operation 

seemed overwhelming, it was only a fraction of the mass of journalists 

who arrived to cover the Gulf War. More than 1,600 reporters had to be 

accommodated during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, above and 

beyond the members of the press pool. The future promises more of the 

same as indicated by the press on the beach at the Marine landing in Somalia. PA’s efforts to frame the story to maximize support will clash with 

the need to accommodate huge numbers of reporters clamoring for more 

news and better access to the battlefield. 

However, communications technology such as suitcase-sized earth terminals added a new and unexpected dimension to IW in the Gulf, perhaps 

26

even exposing a void in military security policy. Satellite technology may 

make censorship obsolete.59 With an international media who have no 

particular loyalty to one side, it will be virtually impossible to impose censorship rules on an international press. Access to the battlefield may no 

longer be an issue when the media can get the information they want 

without having to rely on PA to direct them to the action. 

Fighting the war real-time on CNN and other international media also 

means the enemy can speak directly and instantaneously to the American 

public. During Desert Storm, Hussein used CNN reporters in Baghdad to 

wage his propaganda campaign. Suddenly, PA faced the dilemma of engaging in a counterpropaganda campaign against American reporters controlled by the enemy, reporting instant news on the enemy homefront. The 

so-called baby milk factory bombed by coalition aircraft serves as a classic example of the type of propaganda PA had to scramble to refute. A 

timely counterpropaganda campaign in a world of instantaneous news 

poses one of the bigger challenges for PA in future wars. 

Summary 

This cursory historical perspective demonstrates the wealth of lessons 

that can be gained from America’s many years of propaganda experience. 

The following lessons stand out the clearest: The American military has 

used the media since the Revolutionary War to communicate propaganda 

in all forms, to maintain American support, and confuse the enemy. The 

press, despite its inherent weaknesses, continues to be the best available 

medium to tell the military story—our propaganda. PA “controls” the 

media predominantly through censorship, a passive form of IW. However, 

the American public tolerates censorship best when military security is 

obviously at stake and least when censorship merely protects morale. The 

media and the American public accept stricter censorship rules in total 

war than limited war. Counterpropaganda campaigns must be implemented quickly to be successful. Finally, but most importantly, the value 

of truth in propaganda cannot be overemphasized. The authors of our 

Constitution could be considered the worst offenders of this basic precept 

of truth. However, the propaganda experiences early in this century made 

the word “truth” synonymous with the word “democracy” in the American 

culture. 

Some things never change, however. The military’s OPSEC problem of 

balancing access for the press with military secrecy remains as serious a 

concern today as it was two hundred years ago. As technology increasingly allows more immediate media access to the battlefield, this issue 

promises to remain a constant. 

Above all, PA needs to take a harder look at the mission and resolve the 

dichotomy of what PA does in word—no propaganda—with what it does in 

27

deed—white propaganda. Only then will PA be able to critically examine 

its role in IW. 

Notes 

1. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G.& C. Merriam Co., 1977), 

s.v. “Propaganda.” 

2. Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind (New York: Manchester University Press, 

1995), 6. 

3. Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, 30 July 1993, GL5. 

4. Victoria O’Donnell and Garth J. Jowett, “Propaganda as a Form of Communication,” 

in Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective, ed. Ted J. Smith (New York: Praeger Publishers, 

1989), 55–56. 

5. Smith, 23. 

6. Ibid, 32–34. 

7. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century 

(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 67–69. 

8. Randall L. Bytwerk, “Western and Totalitarian Views of Propaganda,” in Propaganda: 

A Pluralistic Perspective, ed. Ted J. Smith III (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 54. 

9. Taylor, 19. 

10. Ibid., 142. 

11. James Thomas Flexnor, George Washington: The Forge of Experience (Boston: Little, 

Brown and Co., 1965), 255. 

12. Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 

20–21. 

13. Taylor, 216. 

14. William M. Hammond, “The Army and Public Affairs: A Glance Back,” Newsmen & 

National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? ed. Lloyd J. Matthews (New Jersey: Brassey’s Inc., 

1991), 4–5. 

15. Alan D. Campen, The First Information War (Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International 

Press, 1992), 89. 

16. Knightley, 27. 

17. Yellow journalism refers to news stories that are often blatantly false. Hearst was 

purported to have told his newsman to provide the pictures and he would provide the war. 

18. Taylor, 174–75. 

19. Hammond, 6. 

20. Air Force Regulation 190-1(obsolete), Air Force Public Affairs Program, 1 March 

1989, 19. 

21. Ibid, 18. 

22. Hammond, 6–7. 

23. Taylor, 183. 

24. Ibid., 187. 

25. Ibid., 188. 

26. Robert Jackall and Janice M. Hirota, “America’s First Propaganda Ministry,” in Propaganda, ed. Robert Jackall (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 138. 

27. J. Michael Sproule, “Social Responses to Twentieth-Century Propaganda,” in Propaganda: A Pluralistic Perspective, ed. Ted J. Smith (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 

8. 

28. William Hammond, “Propaganda: World War I and II,” The Dictionary of American 

History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978), 7. 

29. Sproule, 9. 

30. Taylor, 191. 

28

31. Sproule, 10. 

32. Hammond, 8. 

33. Ibid., 9. 

34. Taylor, 214. 

35. Ibid., 222. 

36. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 320. 

37. Taylor, 232. 

38. Hammond, 11. 

39. Ibid. 

40. Z. A. B. Zeman, “The State and Propaganda,” in Propaganda, ed. Robert Jackall 

(New York: New York University Press, 1995), 178–181. 

41. Leonard W. Doob, “Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda,” in Propaganda, ed. Robert 

Jackall (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 190. 

42. Ibid., 203. 

43. Ibid., 210. 

44. Ibid., 214–15. 

45. Taylor, 240. 

46. Col Tom Mahr, media advisor for Air University, interviewed by author, Maxwell 

AFB, Ala., 1 April 1996. 

47. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 88. 

48. Lt Gen Bernard E. Trainor, “The Military-Media Boxing Match,” transcript from 

Chester W. Nimitz Memorial Lectures in National Security Affairs, Military Perspectives on 

Humanitariam Intervention and Military-Media Relations (Berkeley, Calif.: Regents of the 

University of California, 1995), 36. 

49. Jackall and Hirota, 214–15. 

50. B. C. Mossman, “Command and Press Relationships in the Korean Conflict” (1967), 

Center of Military History Study, Center of Military History files cited in Hammond, 12. 

51. Taylor, 269. 

52. Peter Braestrup, Big Story (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983), 16–17. 

53. Hammond, 15. 

54. Clinton D. Esarey, “The Media and the U.S. Army: You Don’t Always Get What You 

Want; You May Just Get What You Need” (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced 

Military Studies, May 1994), 6. Note: Esarey refers to a speech made by Gen Michael J. 

Dugan, retired, former AF chief of staff, “Defense and the Media in Time of Limited Conflict,” at the International Conference in Brisbane, Australia, 3–5 April 1991. 

55. Trainor, 36–37. 

56. Ibid., 39. 

57. Esarey, 11–13. 

58. Ibid., 16–21. 

59. Campen, 88. 

29

Chapter 4 

Public Affairs Options/Implications 

for Information Warfare 

From the historical analysis of chapter 3, it is apparent that PA and the 

IW community can learn a great deal from the propaganda experiences of 

past wars in formulating an appropriate policy for the PA role in IW. The 

evidence points to three possible paths which PA could pursue. 

Three Public Affairs Path Options 

Option One would proceed on the path which PA is currently heading— 

a hands-off approach to IW. Under the guidance of the current PA directives denouncing propaganda, PA would maintain a strict policy of avoiding any association with IW planning or execution. Option Two suggests 

PA should acknowledge when it engages in white propaganda and take an 

active role in the IW planning process. This option would entail a new attitude toward propaganda, but would uphold the primacy of truth. Option 

Three would embrace all forms of propaganda, including disinformation. 

This third option would include a policy of using the media to deceive the 

enemy. Each option has several considerations that must be examined before arriving at a best possible option. 

Option One: “Hands Off” 

At this juncture, PA has chosen a hands-off approach to IW and that 

may be the easiest answer for now since Air Force doctrine on IW is still 

in draft. Since IW includes propaganda, PA has plausible deniability that 

it has a role in IW because its directives prohibit use of propaganda. There 

may be some wisdom in this wait-and-see approach since critics of IW 

suggest it may just be another fad and that IW advocates have merely 

twisted history to fit the theory.1 Regardless, changing mass communications technology, whatever name is attached to it, has put the PA and 

PSYOP missions on a collision course. The fact that two traditionally separate audiences, the American and enemy publics, now share virtually the 

same communications medium cannot be denied. 

Since PSYOP plans call for extensive use of propaganda and one of its 

major tools is the local and regional media, the incestuous relationship of 

the media guarantees that the PSYOP propaganda message can and will 

be boosted to the international media level, the realm of PA. How then can 

PA deny it does not “do” propaganda? In today’s global-media world, au31

diences cannot be effectively separated, when PSYOPs speaks from some 

remote village, the entire world hears its message. The key here is that PA 

represents the integrity of the entire military organization. PA cannot have 

its own policy against engaging in propaganda while the rest of the military ignores the restriction. 

Marine Corps Lt Gen Anthony C. Zinni, commanding general of the 1st 

Marine Expeditionary Force and commander of United Shield in Somalia, 

emphasizes the importance of coordinating PSYOP with PA. 

In United Shield the message to the Somalis, through leaflets and speakers, 

was that the world would not abandon them, and the Mogadishu port and airport would be closed for only four days. It was important to be consistent in 

press briefings for the media pool and international journalists. If the message 

to CNN was different from the leaflets distributed to the locals, a serious problem could have arisen.2 

PA’s hands-off approach to IW may not serve the military or the American public well. PA currently sees itself as the moral conscience of the 

military organization. PA director, Gen Ron Sconyers, states, “Above all, 

the PA professional embodies ethical decision making. . . . A ‘hybrid’ an 

insider when it comes to understanding how the unit operates but who 

can also look at the organization as an outsider when necessary.”3 

However, the American public does not necessarily view PA in such altruistic light. Philip M. Taylor introduces his book, Munitions of the Mind 

with the statement that the war propagandists were back in business in 

Desert Storm. 

The manner in which they (war propagandists) were able to secure a monopoly 

over the way in which the outside world perceived the war against Saddam Hussein was all the more remarkable in light of the existence of a pluralistic global 

media which should have provided diversity of coverage and reporting instead 

of what many saw as a monochromatic and misleading video-game war.

4 

While there is validity in having a moral conscience in an organization, 

the danger is that within the military, PA’s are viewed as “truth police” 

who are better avoided. PA’s own avoidance of PSYOP and military deception plans leaves itself vulnerable to manipulation and circumvention by 

other organizations within the military. It is no secret that, especially during military operations, the media are being fed information from “unofficial” sources within the military. 

According to retired Gen Perry Smith, a CNN military analyst: 

I had a number of sources in the Pentagon. Two were absolutely essential. Both 

held key positions and had direct access to senior decision makers . . . they 

filled me in on the thinking about the concerns of top officials with whom they 

had close contact. To identify them would violate an unspoken trust and could 

jeopardize their careers.5 

Obviously, General Smith circumvented PA to get the “facts,” and his 

sources in the Pentagon also ignored the DOD directive for releasing official military information. He and several other former military individuals 

set a precedence for news organizations to hire retirees and other experienced military persons who have “inside” sources from whom they draw 

32

information that would not ordinarily be available through PA channels. 

These unofficial sources can engage in all shades of propaganda, including disinformation. Since they wear the military uniform, their manipulation of the media could be perceived as the philosophy of the entire military organization. 

A statistic revealed in the Freedom Forum Study bears this out. When 

the news media were given the statement, “Military personnel are honest 

when dealing the news media” only 43 percent agreed. Motives for maintaining secrecy also illustrated a distrust of military people on the part of 

the media. Ninety-nine percent of the media said they believed that the 

military often, or sometimes, kept things secret because they did not want 

to look bad. Eighty-nine percent said the military often or sometimes 

maintained secrecy because of possible embarrassment over waste and 

inefficiency.6 

When 60 percent of the military population goes so far as to advocate 

deceiving the enemy through the American media as indicated in the Freedom Forum Study, PA may be losing the battle to educate the military organization as to the value of “truth,” the primary lesson brought out in the 

chapter 3 examination of propaganda history. 

Col Ron Rand, PA director at Air Combat Command, believes the results 

of the Freedom Forum may be valid. He asserts that there have been PA 

leaders who have gone out planning meetings of all types, and asked for 

a show of hands as to who thought using the media to lie to the enemy 

was legal, moral, and ethical. Consistently, more than one-half raised 

their hands. When told that PA has a policy not to engage in lies, the answer was “then we just won’t tell you.” Yet, when Colonel Rand asked an 

IW briefer, at the worldwide PA conference in March 1995, if he was aware 

there was widespread intent to knowingly spread misleading information, 

the briefer answered “that’s not part of IW.”7 

Colonel Rand said, “The bottomline is that there are a lot of things being 

done (with regard to disinformation or black propaganda) without the approval of senior leadership.”8 The thoughts of the Air Force chief of staff 

appeared to illustrate the dichotomy between senior leadership’s views 

and the large percentage of military people. 

Our institutional reputation depends upon our ability to create and foster a 

positive image of the Air Force—an image that reflects performance and values, 

noble values underpinned by unwavering integrity. This image must be so compelling that public confidence in our people, our weapons systems, our organization, and our ability to perform our mission is absolutely unquestionable. We 

must consider our corporate image as a priceless resource—as valuable as our 

people and aircraft. . . .9 

The chief of staff’s statement on Air Force PA policy also implies that 

building an “image” requires a certain amount of orchestration. General 

Sconyers goes so far as to say, “In a chaotic and communications-rich 

world, the goal of all communication strategies must be that of creating 

knowledge (author’s italics)—not just imparting data or facts, but pre33

senting information in a way that is so compelling and interesting that 

people can understand it and make use of it.”10 

Did the Air Force chief of staff and the director of PA break the Gordian 

knot against propaganda while the PA institution lags behind? Perhaps. 

General Sconyers acknowledges that senior leaders and PA need to develop a different perspective on the PA mission: 

Air Force leaders must identify and abandon outdated rules and fundamental 

assumptions that once defined PA operations. These leaders cannot look at PA 

the same way today that they did yesterday. The Air Force must go back to the 

beginning and invent a better way, concentrating on what its future policies 

should be and adapting goals and strategies to produce the desired results in 

the face of rapidly changing environments.11 

Given the evidence, PA cannot afford to continue to deceive itself for 

long in the belief Option One is the best answer. Martin Van Creveld said, 

“. . . now as ever, such communities as refuse to look facts in the face and 

fight for their existence will, in all probability, cease to exist.”12 Option Two 

and Three are at least more inventive approaches to the traditional PA 

role. 

Option Two: Public Affairs 

Conducts Information Warfare, 

Upholding Primacy of Truth 

Over the expanse of five continents throughout the coming years an endless 

struggle is going to be pursued between violence and friendly persuasion. . . . 

Henceforth, the only honorable course will be to stake everything on a formidable gamble–-that words are more powerful than munitions. 

—Albert Camus 

An Option Two role for PA would entail proactive management of the news. 

PA does this now, but it does not admit it, and therefore lacks a coherent, 

aggressive strategy. This option includes an expanded role in IW, particularly 

in protecting our own citizenry against enemy propaganda and affecting the 

enemy’s reasoning through use of the media. However, Option Two stops 

short of planting lies in the media for enemy consumption. 

This option better supports the National Security Strategy of “. . . seeking 

the broadest possible public and congressional support for our security programs . . .” by acknowledging a more proactive role in countering enemy 

propaganda and actually persuading the public to think in a desired way. 

Colonel Rand, believes PA “absolutely” has a role in IW “as long as there 

is an innate understanding that it is fact-based propaganda and factbased counter-propaganda.” He believes PA can even help in the tactical 

deception arena, both passively and actively, but PAs have to be aware of 

what is happening. The passive method includes not bringing a particular topic up or simply responding, “I don’t have a comment” in regard to 

a specific question. Actively, a PA can bring up a true fact like, “we’re de34

ploying two destroyers to the Med,” which might cause the enemy to look 

in the wrong direction. But he strongly believes there is never a necessity 

to lie to the media to deceive the enemy. “I have never been put in a situation where I had to use a cover story. I’ve always gone to the leadership 

and suggested a better way to go about it.”13 

The colonel’s thoughts illustrate the need to make PA directives reflect 

IW realities. First, PA needs to include the mission of countering enemy 

propaganda in its directives. It also needs to either define propaganda 

(and what aspect of propaganda PA will not do—lies) or eliminate it from 

its directives so that the PA organization doesn’t totally discount its use. 

Two references to propaganda in the following Air Force policy directive 

could simply be eliminated without changing its meaning. Parentheses 

surround the words proposed for deletion: 

To maintain credibility of internal and external communications, it is Air Force 

policy that a free flow of general, DOD, Department of the Air Force, command, 

and unit information will be made available by commanders at all levels in a 

timely, responsive manner, consistent with security and policy, without censorship (or propaganda). (Propaganda), disinformation, or activities intended to 

misinform, mislead, or deny otherwise releasable information will not be practiced in any PA program.14 

The directive still says PA will provide a free flow of information and it 

will not lie. The danger is that the media, the American public, or even 

Congress could have concerns about the legal and moral intentions of the 

military if the word is dropped. However, the law says the military cannot 

hire public relations counsel or use appropriated funds for propaganda, it 

does not say that the military cannot engage in propaganda. 

The former chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Powell, believes 

that one of the most important keys to military success is a mature understanding of public relations and politics, and how to make them work 

in the military’s favor. “Once you’ve got all the forces moving and everything’s being taken care of by the commanders, turn your attention to television because you can win the battle or lose the war if you don’t handle 

the story right.”15 General Zinni believes, “Whoever controls information 

wins,” and in today’s wars of low-intensity conflict media management is 

most important because of the difficulty of explaining to the American 

public where our national vital interests lie.16 The truth is not incompatible with doing this. 

“The military only recently is learning to overcome its fear of the media 

in order to manipulate them like a politician,” acknowledges General 

Trainor, an ABC military analyst. “But officials do practice spin control 

(managing the way information is presented). Is it legitimate? Let me give 

you a qualified yes.” General Trainor believes the use of spin control 

should be situation dependent. If the spin control is designed to disinform 

your enemy, then there is some legitimacy, but the presumption is that 

disinformation is not exercised. In the Gulf War, because the Iraqis were 

deaf, dumb, blind, and depending on CNN for intelligence analysis, “a lit35

tle bit of spin control was warranted, but the target was the Iraqis not the 

American public.”17 

Colonel Mahr, Air University Media Advisor, believes PA can play a part 

in controlling the news but, “The key is the intent of the message over 

time.” In other words, isolated cases may warrant spin control of the news 

to affect the enemy but it should not be practiced on any sort of routine 

basis. The overall message should be the military only seeks to inform and 

educate the American public.18 Philip M. Taylor, writes in Munitions of the 

Mind, “. . . it is the intention behind propaganda that needs scrutiny, not 

just the propaganda itself. It is intention, that has caused and prolonged 

wars. It is intention that can prevent them.”19 

A paper presented in 1992 by Lt Col Marc Felman, a student at the 

School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), coined the term “media 

spin” for the considerations that the military must give to the way combat 

operations are portrayed in the news media.20 The author went so far as 

to suggest it as a new principle of war. His use of the word “spin” is admirable in light of the current PA antipropaganda mindset. But the level 

of concern some PA leaders have at even the hint of controlling the media 

environment cannot be underestimated. For example, one senior Department of Defense PA professional tore Felman’s paper in half after merely 

reading the title of the paper, “The Military/Media Clash and the New 

Principle of War: Media Spin.”21 

It is this author’s opinion that Colonel Felman’s paper did not go far 

enough. He stopped short, suggesting only that the military “consider” the 

news media’s impact. His media spin paper merely implies actions taken 

by the news media upon the military, but the principles of war are meant 

to be active not passive measures taken to achieve victory. Asserting the 

primacy of truth, the military should add a tenth principle of war to acknowledge the media’s impact, defining it in action words like—“News 

Management”—use mass communication channels to influence American 

support and convey a message of strength of will to the enemy. 

The Air Force PA director also talks about military communication and 

public opinion as a principle of war and PA as the primary weapon. 

In today’s world of instant information, aggressive internal and external communication strategies and considered public opinion are principles of war and 

peace. Through solid PA research, planning, execution, and evaluation, the Air 

Force must create and foster a compelling image of its mission, so compelling 

that confidence in the institution is unwavering even during singular events 

that may momentarily tarnish the corporate image (emphasis added).22 

Another research endeavor accomplished at the ACSC in 1994 supports 

an Option Two-type approach as the appropriate role for PA in IW. This 

paper logically asserts that the immediacy of news reporting makes it impossible for the military to maintain OPSEC by denying information to the 

media. The solution is to decrease the enemy’s military effectiveness with 

information overload. They suggest a collaborative role between military 

36

and media where the news networks are flooded with so much information that the enemy cannot discern valid intelligence data.23 

While this paper shows creative thought regarding IW possibilities for 

PA, it does not reflect reality in its assumption of a cooperative role between military and media or its effect on American public support for the 

war. If the military and media confuse the enemy with the overload of information, would the American public not also find it difficult to determine a coherent thought on which to base its support for the conflict? 

Possibly the greatest detractor from Option Two is the huge task of 

reeducating PA professionals to accept a role for PA in IW. PA professionals have been raised to respond to media queries, publish internal newspapers and conduct civic leader tours. Formal PA training does not include best methods for influencing people through mass communications 

for fear of treading into propaganda waters. In addition, more training is 

required to broaden PA’s perspective on using information not just to inform Americans but also influence the enemy. 

One of the logical restraints against engaging PA in this increased IW role 

is the numbers of PA professionals versus the thousands of media guaranteed to show up at the next war. How can PA do its current mission and take 

a more aggressive IW stand? It cannot, but it could best serve both masters 

by creating a PA cell of experts in the IW organization who could coordinate 

with the PSYOP and military deception planners, and serve as advisors and 

educators to PA officers in the field with IW issues. 

Given the weak interaction between PA and PSYOP, considerable effort 

would be necessary to make these two organizations parts of a team. A 

shared training program would be a start. Combined training and other 

methods to inspire cooperation would force multiply both the PA and 

PSYOP missions. Enhanced understanding of both missions would allow 

PA to maintain its function as the military’s moral conscience without 

being labeled truth police. 

Another disadvantage of PA embarking into the world of IW propaganda has to do with the fundamental assumption that propaganda is 

successful. As one critic points out, the use of high-tech propaganda as 

a major theme of some IW advocates has some inherent weaknesses. 

“The ultimate problem with even the slickest propaganda is that it does 

not always work, and even when it does, its effectiveness is limited. . . . 

As such, it has always occupied a supplemental place in war, but that 

is all.”24 

While the authors are correct in their sweeping statement that propaganda does not always work, neither can they prove any weapon in the 

military’s inventory works everytime, nor is it expected. Just as the allied 

coalition could not ignore the Iraqi Scuds because of their psychological 

rather than their military effect, propaganda’s effect on Americans cannot 

be ignored. Option Two requires PA to confront the challenges of propaganda head on—American national will depends on it. 

37

Option Three: Public Affairs 

Engages in Information Warfare, 

Including Disinformation 

We are bred up to feel it a disgrace ever to succeed by falsehood . . . we will keep 

hammering along with the conviction that honesty is the best policy, and that 

truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentiments do well for a 

child’s copy book, but a man who acts on them had better sheathe his sword forever. 

—The Soldier’s Handbook, 1869 

Sun Tzu said, “All warfare is based on deception.”25 Indeed, military deception is one of the important pillars of IW and a cardinal virtue in war. 

Paul Fussell, in the Norton Book of Modern War, brings this age-old concept into contemporary context: “From the days of the Trojan horse, war 

has necessitated ruses, espionage, deceptions, misrepresentations, and 

other elements of fiction, and a modern war can be distinguished from 

others by the extent, depth, sophistication, and technological expertise of 

these operations.”26 The issue here is not whether the military should 

practice deception in war, but whether or not Americans and our allies 

should be victims of the military’s deception. It is unfortunate that as the 

technological sophistication of deception increases, it has not yet translated into a lesser need to target our own population with disinformation 

to achieve our goals. 

The Option Three role for PA, that of engaging in disinformation with 

the media to accomplish a military deception operation, was not even a 

consideration among any of the PA officials interviewed. In fact, the suggestion is repugnant to their concept of integrity. Colonel Rand sums it 

up, “There are those in the military who believe integrity doesn’t count in 

times of war.” To counter that mentality he believes PA professionals need 

two things, “confidence in the integrity of their answers” to media questions and “the moral courage to say ‘NO’ if the answer is a lie.”27 

How can some IW advocates determine lies and deceit via the mass 

media as a legitimate, necessary way to mislead the enemy, while PA officials hold such strong opposing views? The issue comes down to which is 

more ethical; lying to the American public in order to save lives, or protecting truth, the very fabric of our freedom, which could incur additional 

loss of life? The arguments are awesome in scope and cannot be addressed here with the respect they are due, but perhaps there is no need. 

There is a short answer. For every lie used on the American public in 

the history of war, there were alternatives to that lie. Lying to the media 

is not a necessary and sufficient condition for the success of a deception 

campaign. To say that using the media will save lives and therefore, is 

moral, is a specious argument because there are other ways to accomplish 

the objective. For those who might counter that in war there is no logical 

limit to the pursuit of victory, Clausewitz’s said, “Since war is not an act 

38

of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of 

this object must determine the sacrificies to be made for it’s magnitude 

and also in duration.28 He referred specifically to real war versus ideal 

war. Since our National Security Strategy dictates that our engagement 

abroad “reflects our best national values”29 it would seem that truth, as it 

regards our American public, has a rightful place. 

All the PA officers interviewed for this effort confirm they have never 

(knowingly) lied to the press to further the goals of a deception plan. In 

fact, PA’s truth policy could enhance the success of a deception. For example, Desert Storm serves as a recent example of a deception plan that 

had an effective alternative to lying to the press. PA did not lie to the press 

to get them focused on a Marine amphibious landing instead of the left 

hook. The amphibious exercises were legitimate activities in preparation 

for Desert Storm. News hungry reporters willingly covered the story in 

their effort to show the American people what was happening. The effect 

caused the enemy to look another way, but can the military be faulted for 

not showing the media their intentions to execute a left hook? Such an assumption borders on the ridiculous. General Schwarzkopf elaborated: 

In the very early days of the war, the deception planners came down with their 

deception plan. One of the principle proposals was that we would plant false 

stories in the newspapers. Then the enemy, reading these newspapers, would 

be led to believe them. But a decision made in Washington, which I supported, 

was that’s not the way we do things in the United States of America. We don’t 

lie to the press. We do not put false stories in the newspaper to manipulate the 

enemy. Now I will tell you, quite candidly, when the reporters’ focus was on the 

Marines going out on amphibious operations . . . I was delighted that the press 

was doing that.30 

The example also provides an interesting testimonial to the mounting 

evidence that military people plan to lie to the media. It would appear 

some military planners intended to lie to the press and yet such a plan 

made it to the Washington level before it was disapproved. 

PA faces a crisis so great that even the existence of the PA organization 

may be threatened. Ultimately, PA may be forced into Option Three, lying 

to the press, and its organization absorbed into PSYOPs under the IW umbrella. The military organization may already be out-of-control in terms of 

what constitutes an official policy on IW. Colonel Rand sees a lack of 

structure, policy development, and centralized control of IW activities 

within the Air Force. As one corrective measure, he believes the Air Force 

needs “a policy statement that says we will not use official spokespeople 

of the Air Force to lie to the public.” 

Already, IW advocates circumvent PA channels to communicate directly 

with the media more and more. As mentioned in examples heretofore, 

CNN’s General Smith touts the vital contribution of his “inside sources” 

and Colonel Rand’s informal planning meeting surveys demonstrate the 

intent to spread misleading information unofficially with the promise, “we 

just won’t tell you.” PA cannot be responsible for the “truth” of these unofficial messages. 

39

In addition, the small PA organization may no longer be able to manage 

the huge numbers of media who come to play in today’s wars. Former 

General Schwarzkopf explained the media logistics problems encountered 

in Desert Storm, “. . . if you’ve got 2,060 people, all of whom feel that they 

can go anywhere on the battlefield they want to go, and you are responsible for their housing, their feeding, their transportation, and their communication, it is just totally unmanageable.”31 In such an environment, 

how does PA prioritize its responsibilities to work media relations with an 

increasing responsibility in the IW realm? Perhaps this issue also bears 

on PA’s unwillingness to become involved in IW. 

PA bases its ability to garner public support on its integrity and credibility for speaking the truth. When PA no longer knows what is true or is 

powerless to influence the IW warriors against lying to the press, the entire military organization is at risk. 

Option Three offers what the PA professional would consider an unpalatable solution to the PA role in IW. Yet, this option may be the ultimate IW weapon. The PA organization provides a lucrative cover since it is 

so stalwart in its claims of only speaking the truth. Colonel Mahr illustrates the significance of the possibility by relating a conversation he had 

with an IW briefer at the March PA worldwide conference. The individual 

said, “The reason I tell you the truth is so that when I lie, you will believe 

me.”32 

The comment is shocking, but the reality is that such a strategy is very 

short term in its scope. Major Durham, director of PA for Air Force Special Operations Command, comments, “When you try to use the media to 

deceive the enemy, it’ll only work a couple of times. Operators tend to only 

take a short term view of it.” PA’s role in IW could become nothing more 

than a front for communicating lies through the media. 

Notes 

1. R. L. DiNardo and Daniel J. Hughes, “Some Cautionary Thoughts on Information 

Warfare,” Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 77. 

2. Lt Gen Anthony C. Zinni and Col Frederick M. Lorenz, “Media Relations: A Commander’s Perspective,” Marine Corps Gazette 70, December 1995, 71. 

3. Brig Gen Ronald T. Sconyers, “Revolutionary Air Force Public Affairs: The Vision,” 

Airpower Journal 9, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 50. 

4. Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient 

World to the Present Era (New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), preface. 

5. Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, retired, How CNN Fought the War: A View from the Inside 

(New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), 87. 

6. Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, America’s Team, The Odd Couple: A Report 

on the Relationship between the Media and the Military (Nashville, Tenn.: The Freedom 

Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 32–33. 

7. Col Ron Rand, director of public affairs, Air Combat Command, interviewed by author, 1 April 1996. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Sconyers, 54. 

40

10. Ibid., 48.


11. Ibid.


12. Martin L. Van Crevald, Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991), 223.


13. Rand interview.


14. Air Force Policy Directive no. 35-1, “Public Affairs Management” (Washington, D.C.:


Government Printing Office [GPO], 27 September 1993), 1.


15. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 155.


16. Lt Col Anthony C. Zinni, “Frontier Missions,” speech to Air Force 2025 symposium


at Jones Auditorium (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air War College, 29 November


1995).


17. Lt Gen Bernard E. Trainor, “The Military-Media Boxing Match,” transcript from


Chester W. Nimitz Memorial Lectures in National Security Affairs, Military Perspectives on


Humanitarian Intervention and Military-Media Relations (Berkeley, Calif.: Regents of the


University of California, 1995), 51.


18. Col Tom Mahr, media advisor to Air University, interview by author, 1 April 1995.


19. Taylor, 304.


20. Lt Col Marc D. Felman, “The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War:


Media Spin” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1992), 1.


21. Mahr interview.


22. Sconyers, 47.


23. James E. Haywood et al., “The Impact of Media Information on Enemy Effective­


ness: A Model for Conflict” (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1994),


1–31 passim.


24. DiNardo and Hughes, 73–74.


25. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press,


1971), 66.


26. Paul Fussell, ed., The Norton Book of Modern War (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,


1991), introduction.


27. Rand interview.


28. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret


(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 92.


29. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (White House: GPO,


February 1996), 45.


30. Aukofer and Lawrence, 156. Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf interviewed by author as


part of Freedom Forum Study.


31. Ibid.


32. The quote is not attributed due to its sensitive nature, but was meant to serve as


a warning to PA attendees at the Worldwide PA conference who were examining the impli­


cations of IW.


41

Chapter 5 

Conclusion 

Since the 1996 Worldwide PA Conference in April, PA professionals have 

expressed a more focused desire to examine PA’s future in an IW environment. It is too early to tell what PA’s future role in IW will be, but considerable evidence points to what should not be PA’s role. 

A logical interpretation of the evidence does not support at least two of 

the approaches examined. Option One, a hands-off policy toward IW, and 

Option Three, which condones the use of lies in the press, do not reflect 

the current technological or psychological realities of our nation. Option 

Two suggests an increased role for PA in IW propaganda and the evidence 

strongly suggests the approach is both valid and feasible. Just exactly 

what that role could be is up to PA senior leadership who has the power 

to change the attitudes within their own organization and the tools to 

mold the views of the rest of the military into a coherent policy. 

While this research endeavor will not go so far as to dictate a specific 

role for PA, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence that would help forge a logical role for PA as the IW doctrine within 

the Air Force evolves. 

Conclusion One: PA cannot continue to take a head-in-the-sand approach 

to IW and expect that the PA organization will remain untouched by the ramifications of IW, particularly with regard to PSYOP or military deception 

plans. Even if PA takes no more of a role in IW than to stay attuned to the 

policies and proposals regarding PSYOP and military deception, PA will have 

more confidence in the integrity of the answers its spokespersons must feed 

the press. Recommendation: Host a joint conference of PA and PSYOP and 

other IW planners to discuss interrelationships in the changing world. 

Conclusion Two: All PA’s need to understand what IW is so that they can 

identify it when they see it and can make an intelligent assessment as to 

whether or not it falls within the bounds of PA responsibility and policy. Recommendation: Create a mandatory IW education program for all PA’s. 

Conclusion Three: Whatever role PA decides for itself in IW, PA’s should 

have a thorough understanding of propaganda and it’s function in a democratic society. No formal or informal education exists within the PA community that defines propaganda beyond, “Do not do it.” Recommendation: 

Introduce a propaganda ethics course at the Defense Information School 

(DINFOS) for all PA professionals. 

Conclusion Four: Sufficient evidence exists to support the notion that 

military professionals do not support the PA policy condemning lies to the 

press. Since the PA policy is also the official policy of the Air Force, all military professionals should understand why the military condones the policy despite its seeming contradiction to military deception precepts. Recommendation: Air Force education campaign on the military-media 

relationship, including all professional military education levels. 

43

Conclusion Five: Communications technology makes it impossible for 

PA to censor the press and the international media cannot be expected to 

conform to American press guidelines for OPSEC. Recommendation: PA 

adopt aggressive methods to lessen the impact of real-time reporting— 

specifically, reacting quicker with senior military spokespeople who can 

articulate the Air Force position convincingly. 

Conclusion Six: Retired senior leaders will continue to be hired by media 

corporations as military analysts who will use “inside sources.” Recommendation: (1) Expand media training for a select group of generals who either 

hold a critical position or have the most potential for lending credibility to Air 

Force messages so the military has its own arsenal against media agendas 

gone wrong, and (2) Educate military professionals about DOD directive that 

charges PA with sole responsibility for release of official information. Then, 

rigorously investigate and punish “inside sources” for breaches of policy. 

Conclusion Seven: As IW continues to evolve, PA needs to decide what 

it means by propaganda as written in the organization’s directives. Recommendation: Rewrite the directive to define propaganda or, if PA finds it 

may take on an increased role in propaganda, remove it completely. The 

directive would still identify disinformation as improper. 

Conclusion Eight: Technology still requires mass communications to 

reach PA audiences, but new technologies may make it easier to target individuals and relieve the pressure on the military-media construct. Recommendation: Look at more sophisticated ways to reach niche audiences, 

through the internet for example, rather than relying on the mass appeal. 

Conclusion Nine: The immediacies of today’s communications capabilities 

do not translate to a commensurate rapid crystallization of public opinion. In 

fact, first reports are usually untrue leading to increased confusion concerning the facts. The military cannot wait for public opinion to consolidate 

into a rational course of action. It must act per its political master and public opinion must follow. Therefore, the military must convince the masses 

that its intentions are legitimate and good and its actions are correct, in war 

and in peace. Recommendation: PA should channel and shape public opinion, using propaganda techniques short of disinformation, with the altruistic goal of bolstering national will to achieve victory in war. 

Conclusion Ten: Although this paper has used the correct terminology 

“propaganda” throughout, the negative connotations the word provokes may 

prevent a logical analysis of the issues when evaluating the PA role in IW. 

Recommendation: Change the terminology to “news management” to remove 

some of the emotional baggage associated with the word “propaganda.” 

PA endeavors to meet the needs of the military as professional communicators but they also have a higher authority, the American people, 

whom they ultimately serve. While these two PA responsibilities are not 

new, emerging IW doctrine threatens to put the two responsibilities on a 

collision course. PA must take an active, aggressive role in resolving these 

IW issues so that doctrine reflects the ideals inherent in the American 

democratic society and still meets national security objectives. 

44

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(Order by ‘T’ number in parentheses) 

BARLOW, Jason B., Maj, USAF (T-15). Strategic Paralysis: An Airpower Theory for the 

Present. 1994. 91 pages. 

BEALE, Michael O., Maj, USAF (T-13). Bombs over Bosnia: The Role of Airpower in BosniaHerzegovina. 1997. 58 pages. 

BENCE, Christopher J., Maj, USAF (T-7). Bedding Down with C-O-T-S: Leveraging Commercial 

Industry to Solve the Strategic Airlift Shortfall. 2000. 59 pages. 

BENSON, Bryan J., Maj, USAF (T-4). Transport Bombers: A Conceptual Shift in PrecisionGuided Munitions Delivery. 1996. 45 pages. 

CASSIDY, Michael D., Maj, USAF (T-5). The Transportation Balance: A Study of the 

Transportation Budgeting Process. 1996. 60 pages. 

CICHOWSKI, Kurt A., Lt Col, USAF (T-10). Doctrine Matures through a Storm: An Analysis 

of the New Air Force Manual 1-1. 1993. 59 pages. 

CLARK, John S., Maj, USAF (T-35). Keeping the Peace: Regional Organizations and 

Peacekeeping. 1997. 67 pages. 

CORCORAN, Kimberly M., Maj, USAF (T-53). Higher Eyes in the Sky: The Feasibility of 

Moving AWACS and JSTARS Functions into Space. 1999. 64 pages. 

COSTELLO, Peter A. III, Maj, USAF (T-34). A Matter of Trust: Close Air Support 

Apportionment and Allocation for Operational Level Effects. 1997. 75 pages. 

CRUMM, Robin K., Maj, USAF (T-37). Information Warfare: An Air Force Policy for the Role 

of Public Affairs. 1996. 44 pages. 

DOUCETTE, John W., Maj, USAF (T-6). United States Air Force Lessons in 

Counterinsurgency: Exposing Voids in Doctrinal Guidance. 2000. 50 pages. 

FADOK, David S., Maj, USAF (T-29). John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for 

Strategic Paralysis. 1995. 55 pages. 

HAMILTON, Robert J., Maj, USAF (T-41). Green and Blue in the Wild Blue: An Examination 

of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine since the Vietnam 

War, 1993, 44 pages. 

HOLMES, James M., Maj, USAF (T-32). The Counterair Companion: A Short Guide to Air 

Superiority for Joint Force Commanders. 1995. 75 pages. 

HUNT, Peter C., Maj, USAF (T-31). Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component 

Commander. 1998. 76 pages. 

HUST, Gerald R., Maj, USAF (T-17). Taking Down Telecommunications. 1994. 65 pages. 

KRAMLINGER, George D., Maj, USAF (T-26). Sustained Coercive Air Presence: Provide 

Comfort, Deny Flight, and the Future of Airpower in Peace Enforcement. 2001. 71 pages. 

KRAUSE, Merrick E., Maj, USAF (T-48). From Theater Missile Defense to Antimissile 

Offensive Actions: A Near-term Strategic Approach for the USAF. 1999. 74 pages. 
LARM, Dennis, Maj, USAF (T-28). Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles for Strategic 

Offensive Airpower Roles. 1996. 71 pages. 

LEWIS, Michael, Maj, USAF (T-22). Lt Gen Ned Almond, USA: A Ground Commander’s 

Conflicting View with Airmen over CAS Doctrine and Employment. 1997. 99 pages. 

NOWLAND, Mark C., Maj, USAF (T-12). Eliminating the Rhetoric: An Evaluation of the HaltPhase Strategy. 2001. 72 pages. 

O’HALLORAN, Michael A., Maj, USMC (T-9). A Kill Is a Kill: Asymmetrically Attacking 

United States Airpower. 2000. 55 pages. 

RAMPINO, Michael A., Maj, USAF (T-24). Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch 

Vehicle. 1997. 62 pages. 

ROTHSTEIN, Stephen M., Maj, USAF (T-25). Dead on Arrival? The Development of the 

Aerospace Concept, 1944–58. 2000. 86 pages. 

SCHOW, Kenneth C., Jr., Lt Col, USAF (T-40). Falcons against the Jihad: Israeli Airpower 

and Coercive Diplomacy in Southern Lebanon. 1995. 54 pages. 

SHAWHAN, Karl J., Maj, USAF (T-14). Vital Interests, Virtual Threats: Reconciling 

International Law with Information Warfare and United States Security. 2001. 57 pages. 

SMITH, Philip A., Maj, USAF (T-51). Bombing to Surrender: The Contribution of Airpower to 

the Collapse of Italy, 1943. 1998. 79 pages. 

SNODGRASS, David E., Maj, USAF (T-54). Attacking the Theater Mobile Ballistic-Missile 

Threat. 1993. 76 pages. 

STEPHENSON, Jeffrey L., Maj, USAF (T-52). The Air Refueling Receiver That Does Not 

Complain. 1999. 51 pages. 

TORRENS, Linda E., Lt Col, USAF (T-21). The Future of NATO’s Tactical Air Doctrine. 1997. 

47 pages. 

OUT OF PRINT (No Longer Available) 

BASH, Brooks L., Maj, USAF. The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping. 1994. 

44 pages. 

BLACKWELDER, Donald I., Maj, USAF. The Long Road to Desert Storm and Beyond: The 

Development of Precision Guided Bombs. 1993. 40 pages. 

CARPENTER, P. Mason, Maj, USAF. Joint Operations in the Gulf War: An Allison Analysis. 

1995. 89 pages. 

CHAPMAN, William G., Maj, USAF. Organizational Concepts for the Sensor-to-Shooter 

World: The Impact of Real-Time Information on Airpower Targeting. 1997. 48 pages. 

CHILSTROM, John S., Maj, USAF. Mines Away! The Significance of US Army Air Forces 

Minelaying in World War II. 1993. 52 pages. 

COBLE, Barry B., Maj, USAF. Benign Weather Modification. 1997. 36 pages. 

CONDRAY, Patrick M., Maj, USAF. Charting the Nation’s Course: Strategic Planning 

Processes in the 1952–53 “New Look” and the 1996–97 Quadrennial Defense Review. 1999. 

66 pages. 

COX, Gary C., Maj, USAF. Beyond the Battle Line: US Air Attack Theory and Doctrine, 

1919–1941. 1996. 51 pages. 

DAHL, Arden B., Maj, USAF. Command Dysfunction: Minding the Cognitive War. 1998. 123 

pages. 

DELGREGO, William J., Maj, USAF. The Diffusion of Military Technologies to Foreign 

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40 pages. 

DEVEREAUX, Richard T., Lt Col, USAF. Theater Airlift Management and Control: Should We 

Turn Back the Clock to Be Ready for Tomorrow? 1994. 73 pages. 
DILLMAN, Robert D., Lt Col, USAF. The DOD Operational Requirements and Systems 

Concepts Generation Processes: A Need for More Improvement. 1993. 44 pages. 

DOUGHERTY, Stanley J., Maj, USAF. Defense Suppression: Building Some Operational 

Concepts. 1992. 62 pages. 

DRAKE, Ricky James, Maj, USAF. The Rules of Defeat: The Impact of Aerial Rules of 

Engagement on USAF Operations in North Vietnam, 1965–1968. 1993. 38 pages. 

EGGINTON, Jack B., Maj, USAF. Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction: A Matter of Mutual 

Support at the Operational Level of War. 1994. 40 pages. 

EHRHARD, Thomas P., Maj, USAF. Making the Connection: An Air Strategy Analysis 

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FAULKENBERRY, Barbara J., Maj, USAF. Global Reach–Global Power: Air Force Strategic 

Vision, Past and Future. 1996. 48 pages. 

FELKER, Edward J., Lt Col, USAF. Oz Revisited: Russian Military Doctrinal Reform in Light 

of Their Analysis of Desert Storm. 1995. 69 pages. 

FELMAN, Marc D., Lt Col, USAF. The Military/Media Clash and the New Principle of War: 

Media Spin. 1993. 42 pages. 

FISCHER, Michael E., Maj, USAF. Mission-Type Orders in Joint Air Operations: The 

Empowerment of Air Leadership. 1995. 68 pages. 

GAGNON, George R., Maj, USAF. Air Control: Strategy for a Smaller United States Air Force. 

1993. 51 pages. 

GANN, Timothy D., Lt Col, USAF. Fifth Air Force Light and Medium Bomber Operations 

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GERBER, David K., Maj, USAF. Adaptive Command and Control of Theater Airpower. 1999. 

108 pages. 

GILBERT, Silvanus Taco, III, Lt Col, USAF. What Will Douhet Think of Next? An Analysis of 

the Impact of Stealth Technology on the Evolution of Strategic Bombing Doctrine. 1993. 48 

pages. 

GIVHAN, Walter D., Maj, USAF. The Time Value of Military Force in Modern Warfare. 1996. 

53 pages. 

GRIFFITH, Thomas E., Jr., Maj, USAF. Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems. 

1994. 64 pages. 

GUNZINGER, Mark Alan, Maj, USAF. Power Projection: Making the Tough Choices. 1993. 

79 pages. 

HAYWOOD, James E., Maj, USAF. Improving the Management of an Air Campaign with 

Virtual Reality. 1996. 40 pages. 

HEWITT, William A., Maj, USAF. Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in Vietnam. 

1993. 31 pages. 

HOLLAND, Edward C. III, Lt Col, USAF. Fighting with a Conscience: The Effects of an 

American Sense of Morality on the Evolution of Strategic Bombing Campaigns. 1992. 41 

pages. 

HOWARD, Ernest G., Lt Col, USAF. Demand the Advantage: When Is Airpower Central to a 

Campaign? 1992. 50 pages. 

HOWARD, Stephen P., Maj, USAF. Special Operations Forces and Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles: Sooner or Later? 1996. 39 pages. 

HUNTER, Roger C., Lt Col, USAF. A United States Antisatellite Policy for a Multipolar World. 

1995. 52 pages. 

KELLY, Ricky B., Maj, USAF (T-46). Centralized Control of Space: The Use of Space Forces 

by a Joint Force Commander. 1993. 45 pages. 
KUPERSMITH, Douglas A., Maj, USAF. The Failure of Third World Air Power: Iraq and the 

War with Iran. 1993. 43 pages. 

LEE, James G., Maj, USAF. Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance. 1994. 43 

pages. 

LONGORIA, Michael A., Maj, USAF. A Historical View of Air Policing Doctrine: Lessons from 

the British Experience between the Wars, 1919–39. 1993. 41 pages. 

MATTSON, Roy Michael, Maj, USAF. Projecting American Airpower: Should We Buy 

Bombers, Carriers, or Fighters? 1992. 34 pages. 

MOELLER, Michael R., Maj, USAF. The Sum of Their Fears: The Relationship between the 

Joint Targeting Coordination Board and the Joint Force Commanders. 1995. 65 pages. 

MOORE, Bernard Victor, II, Maj, USAF. The Secret Air War Over France: USAAF Special 

Operations Units in the French Campaign of 1944. 1993. 50 pages. 

NOETZEL, Jonathan C., Lt Col, USAF. To War on Tubing and Canvas: A Case Study in the 

Interrelationships between Technology, Training, Doctrine, and Organization. 1993. 30 

pages. 

NORWOOD, J. Scott, Maj, USAF. Thunderbolts and Eggshells: Composite Air Operations 

during Desert Storm and Implications for USAF Doctrine and Force Structure. 1994. 59 

pages. 

PALMBY, William G., Maj, USAF. Enhancement of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: An Alternative 

for Bridging the Airlift Gap. 1996. 45 pages. 

PELLEGRINI, Robert P., Lt Col, USAF. The Links between Science, Philosophy, and Military 

Theory: Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future. 1997. 70 pages. 

PRAY, John I., Jr., Maj, USAF. Coercive Air Strategy: Forcing a Bureaucratic Shift. 1995. 34 

pages. 

PREBECK, Steven R., Maj, USAF. Preventive Attack in the 1990s?. 1993. 28 pages. 

RAMPINO, Michael A., Maj, USAF. Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Vehicle. 

1997. 62 pages. 

RENEHAN, Jeffrey N., Maj, USAF. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Weapons of Mass 

Destruction: A Lethal Combination? 1997, 58 pages. 

RINALDI, Steven M., Maj, USAF. Beyond the Industrial Web: Economic Synergies and 

Targeting Methodologies. 1995. 84 pages. 

RYAN, Donald E., Jr., Lt Col, USAF. The Airship’s Potential for Intertheater and Intratheater 

Airlift. 1993. 58 pages. 

SCHULTZ, James V., Lt Col, USAF. A Framework for Military Decision Making under Risks. 

1997. 59 pages. 

SHUGG, Charles K., Maj. USAF. Planning Airpower Strategies: Enhancing the Capability of 

Air Component Command Planning Staff. 1996. 37 pages. 

SINK, J. Taylor, Lt Col, USAF. Rethinking the Air Operations Center: Air Force Command 

and Control in Conventional War. 1994. 55 pages. 

STORY, William C., Jr., Maj, USAF. Third World Traps and Pitfalls: Ballistic Missiles, Cruise 

Missiles, and Land-Based Airpower. 1995. 76 pages. 

STREDNANSKY, Susan E., Maj, USAF. Balancing the Trinity: The Fine Art of Conflict 

Termination. 1996. 51 pages. 

SULLIVAN, Mark P., Maj, USAF. The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Denial or Second 

Order Change? 1995. 63 pages. 

TREADWAY, C. G. C., Maj, USAF. More than Just A Nuisance: When Aerial Terror Bombing 

Works. 1998. 46 pages. 

TUBBS, James O., Maj, USAF. Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: Forceful Applications of 

Airpower in Peace Enforcement Operations. 1997. 66 pages. 
VAZQUEZ, Donald (“Bud”), Lt Col, USAF. Build-to-Shelve Prototyping: Undercutting 

Doctrinal Development. 1995. 42 pages. 

WALKER, Daniel R., Maj, USAF. The Organization and Training of Joint Task Forces. 1996. 

45 pages. 

WALKER, Scott G., Maj, USAF. Targeting for Effect: Analytical Framework for Counterland 

Operations. 1998. 86 pages. 

WEST, Scott D., Maj, USAF. Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: Déjà Vu?. 1999. 47 

pages. 

WHITEHEAD, YuLin G., Maj, USAF. Information as a Weapon: Reality versus Promises. 

1998. 52 pages. 

WOLF, Franklin R., Maj, USAF. Of Carrots and Sticks or Air Power as a Nonproliferation 

Tool. 1994. 54 pages. 

WRIGHT, Stephen E., Maj, USAF. Aerospace Strategy for the Aerospace Nation. 1994. 50 

pages. 

WUESTHOFF, Scott E., Maj, USAF. The Utility of Targeting the Petroleum-Based Sector of a 

Nation’s Economic Infrastructure. 1994. 46 pages. 

ZIEGLER, David W., Maj, USAF. Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary 

Thought. 1998. 60 pages.