United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 21-30210

Andrea Armstrong, Executrix of the Estate 

of Glenn Ford, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Don Ashley; Gary Alderman; Gary Pittman; Everett T. 

Rushing; Billy Lockwood; Frank Datcher; Glynn 

Mitchell; Rodney Price; the City of Shreveport; Caddo 

Parish District Attorney James Stewart; the Estate of 

George McCormick, 

Defendants—Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:15-CV-544

Before Jones, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:

Isadore Rozeman was shot and killed in his jewelry shop in 1983, and 

Glenn Ford was sentenced to death for the crime. Thirty years later, 

Louisiana vacated Ford’s conviction because new evidence identified the real 

murderer. After his release from prison, Ford filed this § 1983 suit seeking 

damages from police officers, prosecutors, and the local government for 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 15, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

2

suppressing, fabricating, and destroying evidence. Ford died shortly 

thereafter, leaving Armstrong as the executrix of his estate. In 2021, the 

district court dismissed Armstrong’s amended complaint in its entirety based 

on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as to some defendants and 12(c) as to others.

The district court correctly dismissed nearly all of the claims, including a

constitutional malicious prosecution claim, which, at the time suit was filed, 

was not cognizable in the Fifth Circuit. See Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 

939, 953–54 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). But this year, the Supreme Court held 

that such claims do in fact emanate from the Fourth Amendment. See 

Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (2022). Nevertheless, the district 

court properly dismissed the constitutional malicious prosecution claim for 

the same reasons it dismissed Armstrong’s Louisiana malicious prosecution 

claim.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

I. Background

Ford was quickly arrested and charged with Rozeman’s murder. He

was convicted of capital murder, and his conviction and sentence were

affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Ford, 489 So. 2d 1250, 1257 (La. 1986).

In 1992, Ford sought state post-conviction relief on the grounds that 

his counsel was ineffective, exculpatory evidence was suppressed, and he was 

actually innocent. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief. Ford next

filed a federal habeas corpus petition in 2012. See Ford v. Cain, No. 5:12-cv00350 (W.D. La. filed Feb. 4, 2012).

While that petition was pending, the State moved to vacate Ford’s 

conviction and sentence based on “credible evidence” that “Ford was 

neither present at, nor a participant in, the robbery and murder of Isadore 

Rozeman.” Ford was released from prison on March 11, 2014. In a joint 

motion to dismiss his federal habeas petition, Ford explained that state filings

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

3

“indicated that an individual named Jake Robinson confessed to an informant 

for the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office that he—not Mr. Ford—shot and killed 

Isadore Rozeman.” Ford v. Cain, No. 5:12-cv-00350, ECF. No. 62 (W.D. La. 

Mar. 14, 2014).

Later that same year, Ford filed a state court petition seeking 

compensation under La. Rev. Stat. 15:572.8 for his wrongful conviction.

See State v. Ford, 193 So. 3d 1242 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2016). The state court

denied relief because Ford could not prove “factual innocence,” that he did 

not “commit any crime based upon the same set of facts used in his original 

conviction.” La. Rev. Stat. 15:572.8(B). The court found that Ford, 

though not the triggerman, was intimately involved with Rozeman’s robbery 

and murder.

Specifically, there was “overwhelming evidence of Ford’s knowledge 

of and involvement in the criminal activity that day and night: his 

participation in selling the stolen property from the robbery; his acting as a 

lookout; meeting with Jake Robinson and Henry Robinson before and after 

the crime; and his attempts to procure buyers for the probable murder 

weapon.” Ford, 193 So. 3d at 1254. Because he “failed to disprove that he 

committed the crimes of possession of stolen goods, accessory after the 

fact[,] and being a principal to the armed robbery,” Ford was denied 

compensation.1 Id.

1 Two concurring judges noted that based on Ford’s involvement with the armed 

robbery leading to Rozeman’s murder, Ford could likely have been convicted for felony 

murder under Louisiana law as it stood in 1983, which was punishable by life without parole.

What this means is that Ford arguably committed second degree murder 

arising out of the facts of this case. Had he actually been convicted of that 

crime, in a petit jury trial conducted in accordance with the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution, Ford would have never 

been released from prison.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

4

While his compensation case was pending, Ford filed this lawsuit in 

March 2015. Ford died three months later, and the executrix of his estate, 

Andrea Armstrong, was substituted. Eleven defendants named in the 

Complaint are parties to this appeal. Armstrong does not appeal the district 

court’s dismissal of other defendants. Eight of the appellee–defendants, 

collectively the “Law Enforcement Defendants,” are current or former 

Shreveport Police officers.2 The ninth appellee is the estate of George 

McCormick, Caddo Parish’s former coroner. The final two appellees are the 

City of Shreveport and current Caddo Parish District Attorney James 

Stewart. Armstrong alleged that the Law Enforcement Defendants 

suppressed or destroyed exculpatory evidence, such as investigative reports 

corroborating Ford’s story and implicating other suspects, and fabricated 

testimony implicating Ford. Armstrong also asserted Monell3 claims against 

Shreveport and the Caddo Parish DA4 based on unconstitutional 

investigative practices. 

The Caddo Parish DA and McCormick’s estate filed Rule 12(b)(6) 

motions. Granting both motions, the district court found that Armstrong 

failed to establish an official policy or custom of the DA’s office as required 

for Monell liability, and the claims against McCormick were barred by 

absolute immunity.

Ford, 193 So. 3d at 1258 (Drew, J., concurring in the Opinion on Rehearing Grant); accord

id. at 1256–57 (Brown, C.J., concurring in the Opinion on Rehearing Grant).

2 Those appellants are Ashley, Alderman, Pittman, Rushing, Lockwood, Datcher, 

Mitchell, and Price.

3 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037 (1978).

4 “Louisiana law does not permit a district attorney’s office to be sued in its own 

name.” Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, when 

attempting to sue a Louisiana DA’s office under Monell, the current DA, rather than the

office, is the proper defendant. Id. Any former DA’s actions at the time of Ford’s 

prosecution are imputed to the current DA for purposes of Monell.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

5

The Law Enforcement Defendants and Shreveport answered the 

Complaint on December 3, 2015. The Law Enforcement Defendants then 

filed a separate Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which the court denied as untimely. 

The Law Enforcement Defendants’ appeal of this order was dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. Armstrong v. Ashley, 918 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2019). 

The Law Enforcement Defendants and Shreveport then moved for 

judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) in April 2019.5 The district court 

ordered Armstrong to file a Rule 7(a) reply.6 After Armstrong did so, the 

Law Enforcement Defendants and Shreveport re-urged their Rule 12(c) 

motions. The district court granted the Rule 12(c) motions in part on April 1, 

2021.7

The district found that Armstrong had not plausibly pled Monell

claims against Shreveport because she did not identify a particular 

policymaker or explain how the City was made aware of its employees’ 

alleged misconduct. The court also held that Armstrong’s claims against the 

Law Enforcement Defendants failed because Armstrong did not plausibly 

allege any individual officer’s violation of Ford’s constitutional rights.

Armstrong timely appealed.

5 Because the district court denied the Law Enforcement Defendants’ 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion on procedural rather than substantive grounds, the district court was 

free to consider the adequacy of the pleadings afresh upon a procedurally proper Rule 12(c) 

motion. See Armstrong, 918 F.3d at 423.

6 Rule 7(a) lists the only seven pleadings that are allowed. The seventh is “a reply 

to an answer,” “if the court orders one.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). When ordering the reply 

here, the district court instructed Armstrong to address specifically the defendants’ 

qualified immunity defenses.

7 The district court denied the Rule 12(c) motions insofar as they required the court 

to decide claims of respondeat superior liability and indemnification against Shreveport 

under Louisiana law. The district court entered partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), 

and dismissed the indemnification claim against Shreveport without prejudice to 

reinstating it if its judgment is reversed on this appeal.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

6

II. Standard of Review

This court reviews the grant of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions 

de novo. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 2010). In conducting 

that review, the court accepts all well-pled facts as true, drawing “all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Harmon v. City of 

Arlington, Texas, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Morgan v. 

Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). But the court does not 

“presume true a number of categories of statements, including legal 

conclusions; mere labels; threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement.” Id.

III. Discussion

There are two groups of defendants. The first includes the Law 

Enforcement Defendants and the coroner, and the second consists of the 

local entities and the District Attorney facing allegations of Monell liability. 

We discuss first the Law Enforcement Defendants and coroner, then

questions of Monell liability, and then Armstrong’s constitutional and 

Louisiana malicious prosecution claims, and last, Armstrong’s additional 

federal and state claims.

a. The Law Enforcement Defendants

Qualified immunity protects the Law Enforcement Defendants so 

long as their individual conduct did not violate clearly established 

constitutional rights. See Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163. When a defendant 

asserts qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to plead facts that 

show why immunity is inapplicable. See Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 

475, 483 (5th Cir. 2012). Armstrong’s pleadings of conclusory statements, 

naked assertions, and threadbare recitals fail to plausibly show violations by 

these defendants of Ford’s clearly established constitutional rights.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

7

i. Due process claims

Armstrong alleges that the Law Enforcement Defendants suppressed 

thirteen exculpatory police reports.8 Armstrong describes each report in 

some detail in her amended complaint and Rule 7(a) response. But other 

than providing ample descriptions of their contents, Armstrong’s assertions 

about constitutional violations surrounding the reports are formulaic. A 

pleading’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above 

the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the 

complaint are true.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 

1955, 1965 (2007) (citation omitted). But conclusory assertions, including 

“conclusory allegation[s] of agreement at some unidentified point,” do not 

qualify as well-pled factual allegations. Id. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966. 

Moreover, well-pled facts that are “merely consistent with” an entitlement 

to relief, that is, equally suggestive of legal and illegal conduct, do not suffice.

Id. The complaint must allege facts “plausibly suggesting” illegal conduct 

such that the allegations are no longer in “neutral territory.” Id.; see also 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, 

it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 

relief.”) (quotation omitted)).

8 The “suppressed” reports consisted of a report suggesting Mr. Rozeman was 

killed after 2:30pm; a report documenting a conversation between one of the defendants 

and a witness who said he saw a “black man” that was not Ford near Rozeman’s shop at 

the time of the murder; several reports identifying alternate suspects; a report documenting 

interviews with children; a report documenting interviews with witnesses Norma Roach 

and Jean Whatley; a report documenting the defendants’ interviews with children; two

reports documenting an interview and photo line-up with witness Michael Thornton; a 

report documenting another witness’s photo identification attempts; a report describing 

Jake and Henry Robinson as “the two prime suspects”; and another report with additional 

information on Jake and Henry Robinson.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

8

The first of the thirteen allegedly “suppressed” reports described 

Rozeman’s murder as occurring late in the day, a time for which Armstrong 

had an alibi. Armstrong asserts that the Law Enforcement Defendants

“knowingly and deliberately failed to provide these reports to Mr. Ford, his 

defense attorneys, or prosecutors,” and that Ford would have used the 

reports to impeach witnesses. This language is found throughout 

Armstrong’s complaint and Rule 7(a) Reply and is repeated for all of her 

claims of “suppression.” Additionally, for every report but the first, 

Armstrong includeslanguage accusing all or a subset of the Law Enforcement 

Defendants of “communicating” with each other about “the existence of 

this information and the problem it posed for their plan to implicate 

Mr. Ford.”

The district court correctly found that these conclusory allegations of 

suppression do not pass muster under governing law. A pleading that only 

contains “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action” does not meet the standards of Rule 8(a)(2). 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 

127 S. Ct. at 1959). Armstrong’s pleadings consist almost entirely of such 

formulaic recitations. She could have identified each witness Ford would 

have impeached with the reports, which testimony the jury likely would have 

discredited, and which defendant was responsible for suppressing each

report. But based upon nothing more than Armstrong’s barebones recitals, 

these ill-pled claims of suppression by the named defendants are factually 

insufficient.

Armstrong’s only non-conclusory factual allegation of suppression is 

that Ford and his counsel did not receive the reports during Ford’s trial. But 

this fact is fatal to Armstrong’s claim, because it is just as consistent with 

Brady violations solely accomplished by prosecutors as it is with police 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

9

suppression.9 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, 127 S Ct. at 1964 (holding an 

antitrust complaint did not plausibly state a claim because it was just as 

consistent with (lawful) parallel conduct as with (unlawful) agreement in 

restraint of trade). Armstrong’s allegations do not distinguish the 

perpetrators.

Armstrong argues that “this Court has held that allegations far less 

detailed than Plaintiff’s suffice to state a due process claim in wrongful 

conviction cases.” To the contrary, the cases she cites illustrate the greater 

specificity that attends successful suppression claims. For example, in Burge 

v. St. Tammany Parish, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999), a wrongfully convicted 

suspect substantiated a Brady claim against a specific police officer by, among 

other things, presenting testimony from a fellow officer that the defendant 

had deliberately hidden exculpatory evidence. See id. at 461; see also Brown v. 

Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding sufficiently specific 

allegations that a lab technician concealed the exculpatory results of blood 

tests); Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding a fabrication 

claim adequate which detailed that defendant “repeatedly altered the light 

settings on the camera with each picture in an effort to make Good’s 

photograph better match the ‘dark tan’ skin tone of the suspect in the police 

sketch”).

Armstrong also argues that because she alleges the suppression of 

numerous items of evidence, less detail should be required as to the particular 

mechanics by which each item was suppressed. Armstrong principally cites

9 “The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that a criminal prosecutor’s 

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant violates a defendant’s right 

to a fair trial. A police officer’s deliberate concealment of exculpatory evidence violates 

this same right, and can give rise to liability under § 1983.” Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 

237–38 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196–97 

(1963) and Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988)). 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

10

Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016), which faulted the lower 

court’s resolution of a Brady claim for “evaluat[ing] the materiality of each 

piece of evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively.” Id. at 394. The 

Supreme Court’s statement is binding but inapposite, because the critical 

issue here is not the materiality of the reports, but why Ford’s counsel did 

not receive the reports before trial. Without pleading details about how and 

by whom each of the reports was suppressed, Armstrong cannot rely on the 

numerosity of the reports (irrespective of their materiality) to cure those 

deficiencies and seek damages. 

ii. Fabricated evidence claims

Armstrong alleges that two of the Law Enforcement Defendants, 

Ashley and Alderman, fabricated evidence by obtaining false statements 

incriminating Ford from Marvella Brown, Donnie Thomas, and Chandra 

Nash.

The Marvella Brown Statement is the most substantial of 

Armstrong’s fabrication allegations. Armstrong alleges that “Defendants 

Ashley and Alderman fed information about the murder to Ms. Brown in 

order to frame Mr. Ford for the crime.” In this allegedly fabricated 

statement:

Ms. Brown said that Mr. Ford had arrived at her apartment 

around noon on the day of the Rozeman murder and left with 

the Robinsons, only to return with a sack containing jewelry. In 

this fabricated statement, Mr. Ford carried a .22 pistol and Jake 

Robinson had a .38 revolver.

Armstrong then alleges that this statement was used against Ford at his trial.

Moreover, Armstrong alleges that “Marvella Brown later acknowledged that 

Defendants Ashley and Alderman had fabricated aspects of this statement”;

“[i]n May 1984, Marvella Brown recanted her statement to Defendants 

Ashley and Alderman”; and “Ms. Brown’s recantation was documented in 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

11

a police report dated May 6, 1984.”

Brown’s alleged “recantation” is a factual assertion that Ashley and 

Alderman fabricated this statement. Yet the Amended Complaint and Reply 

provide no details about the alleged “recantation,” other than that it 

happened, that it involved “aspects” of her statement, and was documented 

in a police report. No doubt that is because the details of the recantation are 

fatal to Armstrong’s fabrication claim. The police report notes that Brown 

visited Alderman and claimed that “she had made a mistake” about Jake 

Robinson being at her house on the day of the murder.10 But Brown did not 

discuss Ford, nor does the report suggest that she recanted the statements 

that (1) Ford had returned with a sack of jewelry, (2) Ford arrived at her 

apartment around noon on the day of the murder and left with the Robinsons, 

and (3) Ford carried a .22 pistol. If fabrication occurred, Armstrong does not 

allege how it was material or harmful to Ford’s case.

Viewed in the context of the May 6, 1984, police report, Armstrong’s 

assertion that Ashley and Alderman fabricated Brown’s testimony does not 

undermine her statements about Ford and is conclusory as to the officers’ 

unconstitutional conduct against Ford. Because the allegations do not

“plausibly suggest” that fabrication actually occurred as to the incrimination 

of Ford, the district court properly dismissed this claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.

10 This police report was attached to the Law Enforcement Defendants’ Rule 12(c) 

motion as an exhibit. Because this report is central to the allegations in the Complaint and 

Reply, this court may consider it. See Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th 

Cir. 2003) (when ruling on a Rule 12 motion, a court may consider “documents that are 

referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim”). This is not 

a case like Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, where the plaintiff’s “complaint expressly 

reject[ed] those elements of the police report that conflict[ed] with her account.” 879 F.3d 

613, 620 n.9 (5th Cir. 2018).

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

12

Regarding Donnie Thomas, Armstrong’s allegations are as follows:

Donnie Thomas had been arrested by Defendant Pittman in 

connection with the possession of some jewelry which had been 

stolen from Mr. Rozeman’s shop the month before he was 

killed.

At some point after Defendant Pittman arrested Donnie 

Thomas and prior to February 2, when Defendants Ashley and 

Alderman spoke with Thomas, Defendants Pittman, Ashley 

and Alderman communicated together and came up with a plan 

to use Thomas and his connection to Rozeman in order to 

fabricate evidence to implicate Mr. Ford in the Rozeman 

murder.

Defendants Ashley and Alderman then spoke with Thomas, 

and claimed that Thomas gave a statement to them that 

implicated Mr. Ford in Rozeman’s murder.

This statement, in a similar manner to the purported statement

from Marvella Brown, was fed to Mr. Thomas by Defendants 

Ashley and Alderman to frame Mr. Ford. And in a similar 

manner as they did with the Brown statement, Defendants 

suppressed the fabrication of the Thomas statement.

These allegations are devoid of supporting factual detail that could render 

them plausible. Armstrong does not explain how the statement implicated 

Ford, or why she believes it to be fabricated, or how the statement was used 

against Ford. The district court properly dismissed this claim because it lacks 

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. 

Armstrong’s allegation that Chandra Nash’s statement was largely 

fabricated is barebones. She alleges:

[B]ecause the report [discussing Chandra Nash’s statement] 

was suppressed, one or more of Defendants Ashley, Alderman, 

Price, Mitchell, Datcher, Lockwood, Pittman, and Rushing 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

13

were able to coerce or otherwise convince Chandra Lisa Nash 

to change her story, fabricating a false statement from her that 

purported to identify Mr. Ford as being near the scene of the 

crime close in time to the murder, which was used against 

Mr. Ford at his criminal trial.

Armstrong does not identify which of the eight Law Enforcement Defendants 

fabricated Nash’s statement and does not provide any factual detail plausibly 

suggesting that Nash’s statement was in fact fabricated. Based on her failure 

to name a perpetrator and the conclusory allegation of fabrication, the district 

court properly dismissed this claim.

iii. Fingerprint evidence

Armstrong also alleges that Sgt. Lockwood, the Law Enforcement 

Defendant who obtained and analyzed the relevant fingerprint evidence, 

destroyed exculpatory fingerprint evidence, fabricated incriminatory 

fingerprint evidence, and also suppressed evidence that other suspects 

shared the “whorl” pattern print found on the bag.

A Due Process Clause claim for destruction of evidence (or failure to 

preserve evidence) requires a showing that evidence was destroyed and that 

the government official acted in bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 

488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S. Ct. 333, 337 (1988) (holding that “unless a criminal 

defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve 

potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of 

law”); United States v. Gibson, 963 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The 

destruction of evidence alone does not constitute a due process violation; the 

defendant must also show bad faith on the part of the government officials.”). 

Although Armstrong makes conclusory references to Lockwood’s 

“destruction of evidence,” her factual allegations concern a failure to 

preserve evidence, rather than destruction. Specifically, Armstrong alleges 

that Lockwood “fail[ed] to take a photograph of the fingerprint he 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

14

supposedly developed,” did “not properly preserv[e] the paper bag as 

evidence,” “failed to document and preserve where the print was allegedly 

found on the paper bag,” and used an improper “method . . . to process the 

bag for prints.” And Armstrong’s only allegation of bad faith is that “[t]his 

destruction of evidence was done in bad faith by Defendant Lockwood 

because he was not interested in pursuing a legitimate investigation designed 

to reveal the truth, which would have exculpated Mr. Ford.”

Because Armstrong provides no facts supporting her conclusory

allegation of bad faith, which, as an allegation of subjective intent, need not 

be accepted as true, her “destruction” claim against Lockwood is 

insufficiently pled. Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1164 n.2 

(5th Cir. 2021) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). And 

Armstrong cites no authority suggesting that a plaintiff can state a claim for 

“destruction” of evidence by merely pointing to potentially useful evidence, 

claiming it was improperly preserved, and then alleging bad faith without

factual support.11 Instead, the thrust of the Court’s reasoning in Youngblood

is that courts should weed out such claims because of the difficulty of 

“imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and 

to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance 

in a particular prosecution.” 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337.

Armstrong’s fabrication allegations against Lockwood consist of the 

11 Armstrong argues that because “Lockwood would have known the fingerprint 

was exculpatory, . . . a bad faith allegation is not required.” This rule conflicts with 

Youngblood, and neither of Armstrong’s cited cases is apposite. California v. Trombetta, 

467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984), was decided before Youngblood and, regardless, 

announces no such rule. See id. at 488–89. United States v. Swenson, 894 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 

2018), simply announced the normal rule for Brady violations involving the withholding or 

suppressing of evidence. Id. at 683. It did not address claims for failure to preserve 

evidence.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

15

following: 

Because Defendant Lockwood had deliberately destroyed the 

underlying forensic evidence, . . . he was free to fabricate false 

fingerprint evidence against Mr. Ford, because there was no 

remaining physical evidence that could contradict him. Thus, 

Defendant Lockwood fabricated false evidence against 

Mr. Ford by claiming that he had found, processed and 

observed a latent fingerprint on the paper bag that had a whorl 

pattern that implicated Mr. Ford. In fact, Defendant 

Lockwood later admitted that he had not seen the center of the 

fingerprint, making any attempt to classify the fingerprint as a 

whorl pattern and to link it to Mr. Ford on that basis totally 

baseless. Instead, Defendant Lockwood simply made up this 

piece of supposed evidence in order to wrongly implicate 

Mr. Ford.

Armstrong alleges that Lockwood “claim[ed]” to have found a print that 

implicated Ford, and “simply made up this piece of supposed evidence.”

Armstrong’s failure to allege how or where Lockwood made this “claim” is 

fatal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (claim must present 

“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” an entitlement to relief). 

To the extent that Armstrong’s claim refers to Lockwood’s testimony at 

trial, it is barred by absolute immunity. See Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty., Tex., 

274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]itnesses are entitled to absolute 

immunity against § 1983 suits based on their testimony in a criminal trial.”).

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

16

Finally, Armstrong alleges that: 

Defendants suppressed exculpatory evidence that any whorl 

pattern fingerprint on the paper bag, as claimed by Defendant 

Lockwood, likely came from another source. Whorl patterns 

are found on approximately 35% of people. One or more of 

Defendants Ashley, Alderman, Price, Mitchell, Datcher, 

Pittman, Lockwood, and Rushing were aware that three other 

suspects had whorl pattern fingerprints, but knowingly and 

deliberately failed to provide this information to Mr. Ford, his 

defense attorneys, or prosecutors in advance of or during 

Mr. Ford’s criminal trial. This suppression was especially 

detrimental to Mr. Ford because the State argued at trial that 

no other suspect had whorl-patterned fingerprints.

This allegation suffers from the same problem as the suppression 

allegations previously discussed. Armstrong’s factual allegations, taken as 

true, are equally consistent with prosecutorial Brady violations as with police 

suppression. Armstrong’s account thus “stays in neutral territory” and 

cannot satisfy Rule 8’s requirements. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 

1966.

Armstrong’s allegation also suffers from the distinct problem of group 

pleading:she simply faults the eight Law Enforcement Defendants as a group 

without factual material suggesting that any particular defendant suppressed 

evidence. Armstrong’s allegation is independently insufficient for that 

reason since a § 1983 plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official 

defendant, though the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; cf. Southland Sec. 

Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e 

do not construe allegations contained in the Complaint against the 

‘defendants’ as a group as properly imputable to any particular individual 

defendant unless the connection between the individual defendant and the 

[illegal conduct] is specifically pled.”). The district court thus properly 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

17

dismissed claims relating to the fingerprint evidence.

iv. Claims against the coroner

George McCormick, as the coroner of Caddo Parish at the time of 

trial, testified for the prosecution as an expert witness on forensic pathology. 

But McCormick never examined Rozeman’s body, and he was not the 

coroner at the time of Rozeman’s murder. Armstrong sued him in his 

personal capacity, and after McCormick died, continued the suit against 

McCormick’s estate.

Almost all of Armstrong’s allegations concerning McCormick relate 

to his testimony. She asserts that he “delivered opinions on two crucial 

issues: the gunman’s dominant hand and the victim’s time of death.” She

alleges he fabricated evidence that the murderer was left-handed (which 

would implicate Ford but not the Robinson brothers), and that the murder 

happened earlier in the day. She also alleges that McCormick “testified that 

‘it was his expert opinion that a duffel bag was placed over Mr. Rozeman’s 

head to muffle the gunshot and to shield the murderer from blood spatter.’” 

(alterations omitted). Finally, she alleges that another forensic pathologist 

demonstrated the fabrication of these claims during post-conviction 

proceedings. The only other allegation against McCormick is the conclusory 

statement that “[h]e was involved in the unlawful investigation and 

conviction of Plaintiff.”

Claims against McCormick predicated on his trial testimony are

barred by absolute immunity. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326,

103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983) (“witnesses are absolutely immune from damages 

liability based on their testimony” and even when “government officials . . . 

testify about the performance of their official duties”). Accordingly, 

Armstrong’s claims related to McCormick’s testimony were properly 

dismissed.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

18

Armstrong argues in response that because “McCormick fabricated 

false testimony before trial,” she seeks to hold him liable for that. She points 

out that government officials do not get absolute immunity for “fabricat[ing] 

evidence concerning an unsolved crime.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 370 

n.1, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1507 n.1 (2012) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 

259, 272–76, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615–17 (1993)). And fabrications are not 

immunized just because the fabricator later presents the false evidence in 

testimony. See, e.g., Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 958 & n.107 (5th Cir. 

2003), abrogated in part by Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022).

This argument is meritless. Armstrong is correct that pre-trial 

evidence of fabrication independent from preparing and delivering testimony 

is not immunized by later testimony. For example, in Buckley, the defendant 

was not immune when he fabricated evidence and made defamatory public 

statements in order to get a grand jury to indict a suspect. 509 U.S. at 262–

64, 113 S. Ct. at 2609–11. And in Castellano (the primary case Armstrong 

relies on), the defendant police officer was not immune when he solicited 

false witnesses and altered tape recordings that were later submitted into 

evidence. 352 F.3d at 943, 958. But Armstrong’s allegations do not approach 

that level of specificity. The only well-pled allegations are that McCormick 

fabricated “evidence” as to the murderer’s handedness and the victim’s 

time of death, the “evidence” being McCormick’s trial testimony. Were 

these allegations sufficient to overcome witness immunity, witnesses would 

rarely receive immunity from suit. Armstrong cites no authority for such a 

radical constriction of Briscoe’s witness immunity. Therefore, the district 

court properly dismissed her claims against McCormick.

b. The City of Shreveport

Armstrong asserts a number of claims against the City under 

Section 1983. None is sufficiently pled. First, she claims the City “had an 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

19

official policy of pursuing police investigations using unconstitutional 

methods, including failing to disclose police reports containing exculpatory 

evidence,” coercing witnesses, fabricating and suppressing evidence, and 

using unreliable identification methods. Her pleadings allege “a systematic 

pattern of withholding of exculpatory information, fabrication of evidence, 

coercion, and other illegal tactics, the sum total of which completely 

corrupted the investigative process.” The Monell standards for imposing 

liability on municipal entities must be satisfied.

To find the City of Shreveport liable under Monell, Armstrong must 

identify a policymaker and identify an official city policy that was the moving 

force behind the alleged constitutional rights violation. See Rivera v. Houston 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037. An “official policy” means:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is 

officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's 

lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers 

have delegated policy-making authority; or

2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or 

employees, which, although not authorized by officially 

adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled 

as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal 

policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must 

be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to 

an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making 

authority. Actions of officers or employees of a municipality 

do not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they 

execute official policy as above defined.

Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).

Armstrong does not allege that an officially promulgated policy 

instructed police to investigate using unconstitutional methods. See Webster, 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

20

735 F.2d at 841. Therefore, she had to rely on a custom or practice “so 

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents 

municipal policy,” and “[a]ctual or constructive knowledge of such custom 

must be attributable” to the policymaker. Id.; see also Davidson v. City of 

Stafford, Tex., 848 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A pattern requires 

similarity, specificity, and sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”). As 

quoted above, Armstrong pled custom or practice and pattern in a conclusory 

fashion without meaningful factual content. Although Armstrong also alleges 

that “persons with final policymaking authority for the Shreveport Police 

Department participated personally in the misconduct described in this 

Complaint,” this, too, is barren of factual support and wholly conclusory. See 

Davidson, 848 F.3d at 395 (discussing liability when “a policymaker performs 

the specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim”).

Second, Armstrong argues that Shreveport failed to adequately train, 

supervise, and discipline its officers. To survive dismissal on this claim, 

Armstrong must plead “that (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or 

train the subordinate officer; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to 

train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights, and (3) the failure 

to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Davidson, 848 F.3d 

at 397. A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference by demonstrating either

that (a) the “municipality had notice of a pattern of similar violations,” or 

(b) “the constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence of a 

particular failure to train.” Id.

Armstrong asserts that Shreveport police officers received subpar 

training across the board, but this general conclusion is not enough to imply 

or state that policymakers acted with deliberate indifference. As already 

discussed, she fails to allege a pattern of similar violations, let alone 

Shreveport’s notice of such a pattern, except in wholly conclusory terms. 

And she does not point to a “particular failure to train” that could render a 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

21

constitutional violation highly predictable. Id. This Monell claim based on 

failure to train, supervise, and discipline fails for lack of factual allegations 

that support a finding of deliberate indifference.

12

c. Caddo Parish DA James Stewart

In the alternative, Armstrong argues that Monell liability may be 

imposed on prosecutors in the Caddo Parish District Attorney’s Office 

because they allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence pursuant to a policy 

or custom. James Stewart, the current Caddo Parish District Attorney, 

stands in as the official defendant.

This claim fails for reasons similar to those that stymie Armstrong’s 

Monell claim against Shreveport. Armstrong’s allegations of a formal policy 

and direct policymaker involvement are again entirely conclusory.

[T]he District Attorney, through its final policymakers, 

maintained a policy, custom, or pattern and practice of 

condoning corruption, that included widespread prosecutorial 

misconduct, including by failing to supervise, discipline, and 

train its prosecutors. . . .

Further, upon information and belief, persons with final 

policymaking authority for the District Attorney participated 

personally in the prosecution of Plaintiff. 

Armstrong’s allegations of an unlawful custom or practice include the 

same formulaic allegations made against Shreveport:

Despite actual and constructive notice, the District Attorney 

had a custom, pattern and practice of promoting, facilitating, 

12 The district court also dismissed Armstrong’s state-law claim that the City of 

Shreveport and the Parish of Caddo are vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat 

superior. This claim fails if there is no underlying tortious conduct. 12 William E. 

Crawford, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Tort Law § 9.11D (2000). 

Here, there was none, as this opinion explains.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

22

or condoning improper, illegal, and suppression of exculpatory 

and impeachment evidence, and failed to adequately supervise, 

discipline and train its prosecutors.

With this claim, however, Armstrong lists nine cases over a 24-year period as 

examples where exculpatory evidence was suppressed by the District 

Attorney’s practices. But nine constitutional violations over a 24-year period 

and thousands of prosecutions are hardly sufficient to show a municipal 

custom. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360

(2011) (four Brady violations over a ten-year period insufficient to apprise a 

District Attorney of the need for additional Brady training). A more 

fundamental problem, noted by the district court, is the mischaracterization 

of these nine cases, none of which found a Brady violation. See, e.g., State v. 

Palmer, 344 So. 2d 964, 968 (La. 1977) (finding that the latent fingerprint 

evidence withheld “was not favorable or exculpatory evidence to which the 

defense was entitled”).13 This proffered litany cannot constitute a plausible

allegation that the Caddo Parish DA’s office had a custom of suppressing 

exculpatory evidence. See Davidson, 848 F.3d at 396.

As with her Monell claim against Shreveport, Armstrong also alleges

failure of the DA’s office to adequately train, supervise, and discipline. Just 

as nine inapposite cases cannot show an unconstitutional custom or pattern,

they are insufficient to place the District Attorney on notice as a means to 

show deliberate indifference. The district court thus properly dismissed 

13 Armstrong faults the district court for “looking beyond the pleadings.” But 

doing so was proper because the cases were “referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and 

are central to the plaintiff’s claim.” Scanlan, 343 F.3d at 536. Armstrong also argues that 

these cases should have put the District Attorney on notice even though the courts found 

no Brady violations. That is incorrect. In Palmer, for example, the District Attorney’s 

office had no obligation to disclose immaterial, non-exculpatory evidence, so that case 

would have done nothing to alert him to any problem.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

23

Armstrong’s Monell claims against DA Stewart. See id. at 397.

d. Malicious Prosecution

The Supreme Court recently held that litigants may bring a Fourth 

Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. Thompson v. Clark, 

142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022). The Court identified three minimum elements 

to common law malicious prosecution claims, “(i) the suit or proceeding was 

‘instituted without any probable cause’; (ii) the ‘motive in instituting’ the 

suit ‘was malicious,’ which was often defined in this context as without 

probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice; 

and (iii) the prosecution” terminated in favor of the accused. Id. at 1338

(citing T. Cooley, Law of Torts 181 (1880)). The Supreme Court did 

not, however, lay out a comprehensive list of the elements for a Fourth 

Amendment malicious prosecution claim, and largely left the question of 

elements to the lower courts. Thus, the Court declined to decide “whether 

a plaintiff bringing a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious 

prosecution must establish malice (or some other mens rea) in addition to the 

absence of probable cause.” Id. at 1338 n.3.

Nonetheless, two elements are required under Thompson. The first is 

that “[b]ecause a [Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution] claim is 

housed in the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff also has to prove that the 

malicious prosecution resulted in a seizure of the plaintiff.” Id. at 1337 n.2; 

see, e.g., Jones v. York, 34 F.4th 550, 564 n.8 (7th Cir. 2022). The second is 

that the traditional favorable termination element of a common law malicious 

prosecution claim “does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal 

prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence.” 

Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1341.

The circuit courts have divided on identifying the elements of a 

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. One fundamental question 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 23 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

24

in each circuit has been whether all common law malicious prosecution 

elements must be met, or whether, in the Fourth Amendment context, malice 

is unnecessary given that “[t]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of 

‘objective reasonableness’ under the circumstances, and subjective concepts 

like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.” Brooks v. 

City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 n.5 (1989)). See 

also Nieves v. McSweeney, 241, F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Gallo v. City of 

Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 1998). Following Thompson, the 

circuit split remains in place.

Before this court’s en banc decision in Castellano v. Fragozo, our 

circuit had determined that “the elements of the state-law tort of malicious 

prosecution and the elements of the constitutional tort of ‘Fourth 

Amendment malicious prosecution’ are coextensive.” Gordy v. Burns, 

294 F.3d 722, 725 (5th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 

939 (5th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Castellano, 352 F.3d at 961 (Jones, J.,

concurring). Consequently, plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit had to prove six

elements to prevail on a constitutionalized malicious prosecution claim. 

Gordy, 294 F.3d at 727. The elements included “(1) the commencement or 

continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the 

present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original 

proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; 

(4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and 

(6) damages.” Id.14 Given Thompson’s clear recognition of the constitutional 

tort of malicious prosecution, overruling our precedent in Castellano, the rule 

14 In Texas, actual innocence was also required. But as discussed, Thompson holds 

that no affirmative indication of innocence is necessary to prove a Fourth Amendment 

malicious prosecution claim. Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1341.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 24 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

25

iterated in Gordy is reinstated and parties asserting a Fourth Amendment 

malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must prove the above elements, in 

addition to the threshold element of an unlawful Fourth Amendment 

seizure.

15 See Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1337 n.2.

But we do not remand for a determination of whether Armstrong’s 

constitutional claim is sufficiently pled because the district court considered 

and rightly dismissed Armstrong’s Louisiana malicious prosecution claim, 

which requires the same six elements as enumerated in Gordy. See Lemoine 

v. Wolfe, 168 So. 3d 362, 367 (La. 2015). Both claims fail to meet at least 

elements (2) and (5). Because Armstrong has not plausibly alleged that the 

defendants suppressed, fabricated, or destroyed evidence, she has not 

plausibly alleged that the defendants were the cause of Ford’s prosecution. 

Moreover, Armstrong has not plausibly alleged facts showing the malice of 

any defendant. Accordingly, both her constitutional and her Louisiana 

malicious prosecution claims were properly dismissed.

e. Conspiracy

In addition, Armstrong alleges that “the Law Enforcement 

Defendants and McCormick, acting in concert with other co-conspirators, 

known and unknown, reached an agreement among themselves to frame 

Plaintiff for a crime he did not commit and thereby to deprive him of his 

constitutional rights.” In a similar vein, Armstrong’s suppression allegations 

often state that the Law Enforcement Defendants all “agreed to suppress” 

the various reports. “In order to prevail on a section 1983 conspiracy claim, 

a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state 

15 Importantly, because an unlawful seizure is the threshold element, see Thompson,

142 S. Ct. at 1337 n.2, if the prosecution is supported by probable cause on at least one 

charge, then a malicious prosecution claim cannot move forward.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 25 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

26

action and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by 

a party to the conspiracy.” Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187 

(5th Cir. 1990). Armstrong’s conspiracy claim was properly dismissed

because she has not plausibly pled any underlying constitutional deprivation 

by the defendants. See Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(“No deprivation, no § 1983 conspiracy.”).

f. Failure to Intervene

Armstrong also alleges that “one or more of the individual Law 

Enforcement Defendants or McCormick stood by without intervening to 

prevent the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, even though they had 

the opportunity to do so.” A failure to intervene claim against a police officer 

requires that the officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an 

individual’s constitutional rights; (2) is present at the scene of the 

constitutional violation; (3) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the 

harm; and (4) chooses not to act. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th 

Cir. 2013). The district court correctly found that “the claim lacks detail as 

to which of the Defendants did what, whether any Defendant knew of the 

misconduct, or who was present at the commission of the misconduct.” 

Armstrong’s claim does not reference the specific conduct of any particular 

defendant as constituting failure to intervene. The district court properly 

dismissed this claim.

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 26 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

27

g. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Armstrong also brought a state-law claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. Such a claim requires (1) that the conduct of the 

defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress 

suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant desired to 

inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would 

be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. White v. 

Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991).

Just as Armstrong fails to adequately plead bad faith (for her 

destruction-of-evidence claim) or malice (for her malicious-prosecution 

claim), she also fails to adequately allege extreme and outrageous conduct. 

“The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, 

as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 

atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. Armstrong’s 

allegations do not go that far. Nor does she allege facts suggesting that the 

defendants “desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe 

emotional distress would be certain.” Id. This claim was properly dismissed.

h. Negligence

Rounding things out, Armstrong brought a traditional negligence 

claim. Louisiana uses the typical reasonable-person standard to assess an 

individual’s liability for negligence. See Lawrence v. Sanders, 169 So. 3d 790, 

795 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2015) (“Duty is defined as the obligation to conform to 

the standard of conduct associated with a reasonable person in like 

circumstances.”); La. Civ. Code Art. 2315. For the same reasons that 

Armstrong did not adequately plead constitutional violations due to the 

defendants’ suppression, fabrication, and destruction of evidence, she also 

fails to plead sufficient factual matter to show that they violated the standard 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 27 Date Filed: 02/15/2023
No. 21-30210

28

of care of a reasonable officer.16 The district court thus properly dismissed 

this claim. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

16 Louisiana’s state qualified immunity statute would also likely stand in the way of 

Armstrong’s recovery on her state-law claims. See La. Rev. Stat. § 2798.1(B) 

(“Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon 

the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or 

discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers 

and duties.”); Rombach v. Culpepper, 2021 WL 2944809, at *9 (5th Cir. Jul. 13, 2021) 

(unpublished) (in § 1983 and Monell suit, affirming dismissal of pendant state-law claims 

based on § 2798.1). 

Case: 21-30210 Document: 00516646912 Page: 28 Date Filed: 02/15/2023