[Cite as State v. Reeves, 2014-Ohio-3497.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100560

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

DONALD R. REEVES

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-13-571787 

BEFORE: McCormack, J., Kilbane, P.J., and Stewart, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 14, 2014 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Robert Tobik 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

By: Jeffrey Gamso 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Ave., Suite 200 

Cleveland, OH 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Mary Weston 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

9th Floor, Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
TIM McCORMACK, J.: 

{¶1} Appellant, Donald R. Reeves, appeals from the judgment of the trial court 

that accepted his plea of guilty to felonious assault, compelling prostitution, and two 

counts of attempted felonious assault and sentenced him to 17 years of incarceration. 

After careful review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Procedural History

{¶2} On February 25, 2013, Reeves was indicted on 20 counts. Counts 1 

through 9 contained charges of rape, felonious assault, compelling prostitution, 

kidnapping, trafficking in persons, corrupting another with drugs, and intimidation of a 

crime victim or witness pertaining to the time period of January 22, 2013, to February 7, 

2013. Counts 10 through 18 charged the same offenses that allegedly occurred from 

February 9, 2013, to February 13, 2013. The final two counts, felonious assault and 

possessing criminal tools, pertained to acts that allegedly occurred on February 13, 2013. 

{¶3} On July 22, 2013, Reeves withdrew his previously entered pleas of not 

guilty and pleaded guilty to the following: Count 2, felonious assault in violation of R.C. 

2903.11(B)(1), which is a felony of the second degree and includes a maximum possible 

penalty of eight years in prison; Count 3, compelling prostitution in violation of R.C. 

2907.21(A)(1), which is a felony of the third degree and includes a maximum possible 

penalty of 36 months in prison; amended Count 17, attempted corrupting another with 

drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(2), which is a felony of the third degree and 

includes a maximum possible penalty of 36 months in prison; and amended Count 19, 
attempted felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which is a felony of the 

third degree and also includes a maximum possible penalty of 36 months in prison. 

Count 3 is a tier two sex offense that includes certain registration requirements. The trial 

court accepted Reeves’s pleas and found him guilty. In exchange for the plea, the 

remaining Counts 1, 4 through 16, 18, and 20, were nolled. Without the plea agreement, 

Reeves could have received up to 127 years incarceration. 

{¶4} On September 25, 2013, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, during 

which the court advised defense counsel that a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) 

had been ordered and provided defense counsel an opportunity to review the report. 

Counsel declined, indicating that she had reviewed the report and was satisfied with its 

contents. The court then heard testimony from the state, the victim, Detective Joe 

DiGregorio, defense counsel, and Reeves. 

{¶5} Thereafter, the court noted Reeves’s lengthy criminal history, beginning in 

1976 with grand theft, receiving stolen property, and possessing criminal tools, and 

continuing to the present matter. It made findings with respect to the seriousness of the 

crime and the likelihood of recidivism. The court found Reeves’s behavior to be the 

worst form of the offense, and it sentenced him to the maximum of eight years 

incarceration on Count 2 and the maximum of 36 months incarceration on each of Counts 

3, 17, and 19, to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 17 years. 

Assignments of Error
I. The trial court committed error when it did not, at the sentencing 

hearing, inquire whether Appellant’s plea to felonious assault in violation of 

R.C. 2903.11(B)(1) was in fact knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

II. Appellant was denied his right to a fair sentencing proceeding and to be 

sentenced only on facts that were either admitted or proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt when the trial court imposed maximum consecutive 

sentences based at least in part on information regarding alleged offenses as 

to which Appellant was not convicted and which were, in fact, dismissed as 

part of his plea agreement all in violation of his rights under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments, Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, and 

Santobello v. New York. 

The Guilty Plea

{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Reeves contends that the trial court erred 

when it failed to make a Crim.R. 11 inquiry at his sentencing after Reeves made a 

statement alluding to his innocence of the felonious assault charge contained in Count 2 

of the indictment. 

{¶7} Reeves pleaded guilty to Count 2, which charged felonious assault in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(B)(1). That section defines felonious assault as follows: 

No person, with knowledge that the person has tested positive as a carrier of 

a virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, shall knowingly * 

* * [e]ngage in sexual conduct with another person without disclosing that 

knowledge to the other person prior to engaging in the sexual conduct. 
R.C. 2903.11(B)(1). 

{¶8} When the court provided Reeves the opportunity to speak before sentencing, 

Reeves stated as follows: 

I would like to say to the court that, yes, I did have sex with [victim] and we 

did use condoms each time. It was twice. I do it for 21 days and I thought 

she fully understood because she was giving me my HIV pills every 

morning, making sure that I took them that she had all of the opportunity to 

wear the condoms. 

{¶9} Reeves did not move to withdraw his guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1 or claim 

that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Rather, he 

argues now on appeal that his statement at sentencing imposed upon the trial court a duty 

to further inquire whether he “was actually denying guilt of the offense” because Reeves, 

by his statement, raised the issue of whether his plea was knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary. We find no merit to this argument. 

{¶10} Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process by which a trial court must inform a 

defendant of certain constitutional and nonconstitutional rights before accepting a felony 

plea of guilty or no contest. The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey 

certain information to a defendant so that he or she can make a voluntary and intelligent 

decision regarding whether to plead guilty. State v. Schmick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

95210, 2011-Ohio-2263, ¶ 5. 
{¶11} To ensure that a defendant enters a plea knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently, a trial court must engage in an oral dialogue with the defendant in 

accordance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 

450 (1996). Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires that a trial court determine from a colloquy with 

the defendant whether the defendant understands (1) the nature of the charge and 

maximum penalty, (2) the effect of the guilty plea, and (3) the constitutional rights waived 

by a guilty plea. 

{¶12} In determining whether a defendant is making a plea with an understanding 

of the nature of the charge, a trial court has no obligation to advise the defendant of the 

elements of the crime or to specifically ask whether he or she understands the charge, 

provided the totality of the circumstances support the trial court’s determination that the 

defendant understands the charge. State v. Minifee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99202, 

2013-Ohio-3146, ¶ 14. In fact, “[w]here a defendant indicates that he understands the 

nature of the charge, in the absence of evidence to the contrary or anything in the record 

that indicates confusion, it is typically presumed that the defendant actually understood 

the nature of the charge against him.” State v. Wangul, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84698, 

2005-Ohio-1175, ¶ 10. And where a defendant enters a guilty plea without asserting 

innocence, it is presumed that the defendant understands that he or she has admitted guilt. 

State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 19. 

{¶13} This court has repeatedly stated that a defendant’s protestations of 

innocence, however, are insufficient grounds for vacating a plea that was voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently entered. State v. Barrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100047, 

2014-Ohio-1234, ¶ 9; Minifee at ¶ 27; State v. Bloom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97535, 

2012-Ohio-3805, ¶ 13; State v. Abdelhag, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 71136, 1997 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 3394, *10 (July 31, 1997). Moreover, when a defendant makes claims of 

innocence after a guilty plea has been accepted, a trial court has no duty to inquire into a 

defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty.1

 See State v. Auble, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

76709, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3389, *8 (July 27, 2000) (finding that the defendant’s 

protestation of innocence at the sentencing hearing did not necessitate the trial court’s 

inquiring whether the defendant wished to withdraw his guilty plea at that moment); State 

v. Cutlip, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72419, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2899, *4 (June 18, 

1998) (where the defendant made claims of innocence after the plea hearing, did not 

object to the factual basis of the charge, and never moved to withdraw his plea, the trial 

court did not err in accepting the guilty plea); State v. Darks, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

05AP-982, 2006-Ohio-3144, ¶ 18 (because the defendant did not assert his innocence 

 1

 A guilty plea that is made contemporaneously with claims of innocence, known as an 

Alford plea, can only be accepted once the trial court has inquired into the factual basis surrounding 

the charges in order to determine whether the defendant was making an intelligent and voluntary 

guilty plea. State v. Corbett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99649, 2013-Ohio-4478, ¶ 6, citing North 

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Alford does not apply, 

however, where claims of innocence are made after the plea. Id. at ¶ 7, citing State v. Cutlip, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 72419, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2899, *4 (June 18, 1998). Reeves concedes that 

he did not enter an Alford plea. 
until after he entered a guilty plea and the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 and 

determined the defendant entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court 

did not err in accepting his guilty plea after he asserted his innocence); State v. Gales, 131 

Ohio App.3d 56, 60, 721 N.E.2d 497 (7th Dist.1999). The trial court also has no duty to 

inform a defendant about the ability to file a motion to withdraw a plea under Crim.R. 

32.1. Id. 

{¶14} Here, the record indicates that trial court fully complied with Crim.R. 11. 

Prior to accepting Reeves’s guilty plea, the trial court held a hearing and engaged in a 

colloquy regarding Reeves’s understanding of the nature of the charges, the potential 

penalties, the consequences of the plea agreement, and his constitutional rights. The 

court ensured that Reeves was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and that Reeves 

was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. The court then advised Reeves of the 

charges, including the maximum possible penalty of each offense to which he pleaded 

guilty, as well as the potential maximum sentence of all the charges had he not entered 

into a plea agreement. The court also advised Reeves that the offenses were not allied 

offenses. Reeves indicated that he understood the court’s explanation. 

{¶15} Thereafter, the trial court advised Reeves of his constitutional rights, 

including the right to representation, a jury trial, the state proving its case beyond a 

reasonable doubt, confrontation, compulsory process, and the right to remain silent. 

Finally, the court advised Reeves that a plea of guilty would constitute a complete 

admission of the truth of the charges and that by pleading guilty, he waived the rights as 
explained to him. Reeves answered that he understood the court’s advisement. He 

entered guilty pleas to the four counts, and the court found that Reeves made a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary decision to plead. Reeves’s counsel also provided that Reeves 

understood the charges and the potential penalties and stated that she believed the trial 

court had fully complied with Crim.R. 11 and Reeves’s plea was entered knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently. 

{¶16} The record is devoid of any indication of confusion, hesitation, or 

protestations of innocence by Reeves during the plea hearing. 

{¶17} Based upon the above, we find that Reeves did, in fact, knowingly, 

voluntarily, and intelligently enter a guilty plea to the charge of felonious assault in 

violation of R.C. 2903.11(B)(1), as well as the other three charges. Moreover, Reeves 

did not make any claim of innocence until his sentencing, approximately two months after 

the plea hearing; he never objected to the factual basis of the charges; and he never 

moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court was therefore not obligated to inquire 

further into Reeves’s guilty plea. 

{¶18} Reeves’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

The Sentencing

{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Reeves contends that the trial court 

imposed a maximum sentence based upon consideration of dismissed charges in violation 

of his constitutional rights to a fair sentencing proceeding. Specifically, Reeves claims 

that the trial court erred when it heard statements from the victim, the prosecutor, and the 
investigating detective concerning the dismissed charges of rape, kidnapping, 

intimidation of a witness, and human trafficking, and it considered such statements when 

it imposed the 17-year sentence. 

{¶20} At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor provided the trial court with 

background information and pressed upon the seriousness of Reeves’s actions in preying 

upon the vulnerable victim, who was a heroin addict. The prosecutor advised the court 

about Reeves’s course of conduct, which included intimidation, physical abuse, threats to 

her life and the life of her family, drugs, and locks on the bedroom doors. She also stated 

that Reeves would have sex with the victim without her consent when he became angry 

with her. The prosecutor indicated that she had other witnesses who would have testified 

at trial concerning the kidnapping charges. She submitted photographs purportedly of 

the victim’s injuries. The prosecutor informed the court that the case was originally 

investigated as a human trafficking case and that is why Detective DiGregorio, a detective 

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation task force, was involved. The prosecutor 

explained to the court that the human trafficking charges in Reeves’s case were dismissed 

as part of his plea agreement. 

{¶21} Detective DiGregorio advised the court of the “nightmare situation” in 

Reeves’s home and stated that “this is one of the worst crimes that I have seen against a 

human being.” He asked the court to sentence Reeves “appropriately for his crimes that 

he committed.” 
{¶22} The trial court also provided the victim an opportunity to speak. The victim 

told the court that Reeves “knew he was, in fact, HIV positive when he continuously 

raped and performed oral sex on me without protection.” She also stated that every 

morning she was “locked in [Reeves’s] room.” Finally, the victim described some of the 

physical abuse Reeves allegedly inflicted upon her, and she explained that she was afraid 

of Reeves. 

{¶23} Reeves’s counsel spoke on Reeves’s behalf, refuting the various allegations 

made by the prosecutor and the victim, and offering contradictory evidence of the 

charges. Reeves provided his own statement to the court, claiming that he thought the 

victim “fully understood” that he was HIV positive, ensuring that he take his medication 

daily. Reeves also denied threatening or harming the victim, with the exception of 

“kicking at her.” 

{¶24} Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court stated that the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing are to protect the public and punish the offender. The 

court then independently determined that Reeves’s crimes were not allied offenses; it 

explained to Reeves the sex offense registration duties necessitated by Count 3, 

compelling prostitution; it reviewed Reeves’s extensive criminal history that began in 

1976 and continued to the present matter; and it made the requisite seriousness and 

recidivism findings. 

{¶25} In addressing the seriousness factors, the court stated as follows: 

[T]he victim in this matter suffered serious physical and psychological 

harm, that the injury was exacerbated by the victim’s physical condition, 
given the fact that she was a strung-out heroin addict, as well as her young 

age, [and] the defendant’s relationship with the victim facilitated this 

offense. The court does not find that any of the less serious factors in this 

matter apply. 

 

{¶26} In addressing the likelihood of recidivism, the court found as follows: 

[Reeves] does have a history of criminal convictions and * * * he has not 

responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed by the court, [in] Ohio 

as well as [in] California, and the court finds that there is really no genuine 

remorse that is coming from the defendant with regard[s] to his allocution. 

The court finds that the less-likely factors with regard to recidivism do not 

apply in this matter. 

 

{¶27} The trial court then found Reeves’s behavior to be the worst form of the 

offense and sentenced him to the maximum prison term on each count, to be served 

consecutively, for an aggregate of 17 years incarceration. 

{¶28} When sentencing a defendant, the trial court must consider the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set 

forth in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Hodges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99511, 2013-Ohio-5025, 

¶ 7. It may consider “any factors that are relevant to achieve the purposes and principles 

of sentencing and any factors that are relevant to determine the seriousness of the 

offender’s conduct and whether the offender is likely to commit future crimes.” State v. 

Lewis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99395, 2013-Ohio-4593, ¶ 21; R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. 

Providing that the court considered the sentencing purposes in R.C. 2929.11 and the 

guidelines contained in R.C. 2929.12, it has full discretion to impose any term of 

imprisonment within the statutory range. Hodges. 
{¶29} At a sentencing hearing, the offender, the prosecuting attorney, the victim or 

the victim’s representative, and any other person with the court’s approval may present 

information relevant to the imposition of the sentence in a case. R.C. 2929.19(A). 

Before imposing the sentence, the trial court must consider the information presented by 

such persons, along with the record and any PSI or victim impact statement. R.C. 

2929.19(B). 

{¶30} The trial court may not impose a sentence based upon a “‘crime neither 

charged nor proven.’” State v. Dari, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99367, 2013-Ohio-4189, ¶ 

15, quoting State v. Henley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74305, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 5080 

(Oct. 29, 1998). Nor may a court impose a greater sentence upon a defendant based 

upon the court’s belief that the defendant committed a more serious crime than the 

charges for which he was convicted. State v. Peal, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97644, 

2012-Ohio-6007, ¶ 11, citing State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76919, 2000 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 3512, *7 (Aug. 3, 2000); Cleveland Hts. v. Seastead, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

68875, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4513 (Oct. 12, 1995). 

{¶31} However, the trial court is permitted to consider the original charge when 

sentencing. Peal at ¶ 18. When the defendant’s convictions result from a plea 

agreement, that agreement does not preclude the trial court’s consideration of the 

underlying facts of the case in determining the appropriate sentence to impose. State v. 

Frankos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78072, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3712, *7 (Aug. 23, 

2001); State v. Clayton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99700, 2014-Ohio-112, ¶ 18. “‘[T]he 
seriousness of the offense will generally be based upon the judge’s perception of the real 

facts of what occurred, and the plea bargained offense will simply set a ceiling on what 

the judge can impose.’” (Footnotes and citations omitted.) Frankos at *6, quoting 

Griffin & Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law, at 450-451 (2000 Ed.). 

{¶32} Additionally, the court may consider prior arrests, prior unindicted acts, and 

not guilty verdicts before imposing a sentence. See Corbett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

99649, 2013-Ohio 4478, at ¶ 24 (consideration in sentencing of unindicted acts and not 

guilty verdicts are proper when they are not the sole basis for the sentence); Lewis, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99395, 2013-Ohio-4593, at ¶ 23 (just as the trial court may consider 

prior arrests, it may also consider prior uncharged acts in sentencing). In finding it 

well-established that a sentencing court may weigh factors such as arrests for other 

crimes, this court concluded that 

“the function of the sentencing court is to acquire a thorough grasp of the 

character and history of the defendant before it. The court’s consideration 

ought to encompass negative as well as favorable data. Few things can be so 

relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant * * *.” 

State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84582, 2005-Ohio-3427, ¶ 12, quoting United 

States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.1965). 

{¶33} At the sentencing hearing in this case, the trial court relied on what each 

party placed on the record, including the testimony of the victim, the initial investigating 

detective, and that of the defendant himself, as well as the PSI, the facts of the case, and 
Reeves’s prior criminal history. The court also considered the principles and purposes of 

felony sentencing and other relevant sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, 

including the fact that Reeves used his relationship with a vulnerable victim to facilitate 

the offense, he has expressed no remorse, and he has not responded favorably to 

court-imposed sanctions in the past. All of this information was relevant and proper for 

the court’s consideration during sentencing in order to understand Reeves’s character and 

history. See Hinton, supra. 

{¶34} Further, Reeves’s convictions resulted from a plea agreement. Because 

there was no agreement by the parties that the trial court should not consider the 

dismissed charges, and because trial courts routinely consider these matters in sentencing, 

the court’s consideration of the underlying facts in this case was proper. In receiving 17 

years incarceration on the four counts to which he pleaded guilty as part of the plea 

agreement, rather than the possible 127 years incarceration without the plea agreement, 

Reeves received the benefit of the bargain. See Frankos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78072, 

2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3712, at *7. 

{¶35} Finally, there is no indication in the record that the trial court’s sentence was 

reflective of any improper sentencing factors. There are no statements clearly indicating 

that the dismissed charges were the sole basis for the sentence, and Reeves’s sentence 

was within the statutory parameters. 

{¶36} In light of the above, we find that the record supports the conclusion that the 

trial court considered the relevant sentencing factors before imposing sentence, and the 
sentence was not solely based on unproven conduct. The sentence is therefore not 

contrary to law. See Clayton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99700, 2014-Ohio-112. 

{¶37} Reeves’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶38} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 

been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________________ 

TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR