[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13064

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

FABIANO B. PINTO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COLLIER COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants,

KEVIN J. RAMBOSK, 

MATTHEW A. KINNEY, 

JOSHUA CAMPOLO, 

ADAM J. DILLMAN, 

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13064

STEVE MAHOLTZ, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00551-JLB-MRM

____________________

Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Fabiano Pinto appeals from the grant of summary judgment 

to two Florida sheriff’s deputies—Matthew Kinney and Steve 

Maholtz—on various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Florida state law 

claims—false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 

excessive force, and battery—stemming from an incident outside a 

nightclub on Pinto’s thirtieth birthday and his subsequent arrest for 

battery of a law enforcement officer. Because Kinney had probable 

cause to arrest Pinto and used only reasonable force, all of Pinto’s 

claims fail, and we affirm the district court. 

I. Factual Background 

Pinto and a group of twenty to twenty-five friends and 

family members were out celebrating Pinto’s thirtieth birthday in 

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Naples, Florida. At one point in the evening, they went to 

Mercato—an outdoor shopping center with several restaurants, 

bars, and clubs. At some point after midnight, the group sought to 

enter the Cavo Lounge, one of the bars in Mercato. Seeing a line 

and roped-off entrance, Pinto approached the manager, Jason 

Buro, and asked whether Cavo had room for “about 20 people.” 

Buro told Pinto that the bar was full and that the group could not 

enter. But Pinto saw his sister and several members of his group 

enter Cavo from a different entrance. Trying to get his sister’s 

attention amid the loud atmosphere to let her know that the group 

planned to walk down to a different bar, Pinto began waiving his 

right hand in her direction, at which point Buro “smacked down” 

Pinto’s hand. Pinto then told Buro, “What the fuck was that about? 

What did you do that for?” and, according to Pinto, Buro told him 

that he “was waiving too close to him and . . . was getting too close 

to [Buro’s] face” and to “[g]et the ‘F’ out of here.” Pinto responded 

by apologizing and explaining that he was trying to get his sister’s 

attention. 

That night, Deputy Kinney was on special-detail duty at 

Mercato and was standing about 10 feet away from Pinto and Buro. 

Several other sheriff’s deputies were also present on the scene. 

Kinney observed the altercation between Buro and Pinto, and, 

according to Pinto, approached and pushed Pinto on his shoulder 

“or back area” as he was turning to leave the entrance to Cavo. As 

a result of the push, Pinto stumbled “probably two feet, two and a 

half” feet but did not fall. Pinto explained that, to maintain balance, 

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he extended his right arm and his hand made contact with Kinney’s 

chest. Pinto said he “knew [he] wasn’t touching regular clothes,” 

and when Pinto turned around, he realized that Kinney was law 

enforcement because he was wearing a uniform marked “sheriff.” 

Kinney immediately grabbed Pinto’s left arm and placed it 

behind his back, but Pinto kept his right hand in the air, allegedly 

because he was confused as to why he was being arrested. Another 

deputy grabbed Pinto’s right arm and handcuffed him. The officers 

held Pinto’s arms and, according to Pinto, his “arm was just kind of 

pushed up a little bit too far, further than [Pinto] could put [his] 

shoulders.” 

After he was handcuffed, Pinto was escorted by Kinney and 

another deputy to a parking garage where a patrol car was waiting. 

Following behind were several members of Pinto’s party. 

The officers positioned Pinto standing against the side of the 

patrol car, where he was searched. Cell phone footage shows the 

individuals who were with Pinto yelling at police officers and 

repeatedly approaching the police vehicle. At one point in the 

video recording, Pinto—standing against the car—yells “I am not 

resisting. I am not resisting at all,” and turns his head to Kinney 

and asks, “What the fuck are you doing?”1 The video then shows 

Kinney using his hand to push and temporarily hold Pinto’s face 

1

This comment is not audible in the video recording, but in his deposition, 

Pinto confirmed that he said “What the fuck are you doing?” when he turned 

his head toward Kinney. 

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back. Several officers then placed Pinto in the vehicle, and he was 

driven to the Naples jail and booked for, among other things, 

battery on a law enforcement officer. He was released on bond the 

next day, and the state attorney ultimately dismissed all charges. 

II. Procedural Background 

Pinto sued Kinney and Maholtz in their individual capacities,

along with several other county officials and law enforcement 

officers, bringing federal constitutional claims under § 1983 as well 

as Florida state law claims. In particular, as relevant to this appeal,2

Pinto asserted numerous claims against Kinney, including false 

arrest and false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment,

excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, false arrest and 

imprisonment under Florida law, and Florida battery. He also 

asserted a malicious prosecution claim under Florida law against 

both Kinney and Deputy Steve Maholtz.3

Kinney and Maholtz moved for summary judgment, Pinto 

opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment, and 

the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. 

The district court found that, because Kinney had probable cause 

to arrest Pinto, his false arrest and imprisonment claims—federal

2

Pinto asserted several other claims against a variety of defendants that he has 

not raised on appeal that we therefore do not discuss.

3 Maholtz was on the scene during Pinto’s arrest and wrote a police report 

attesting that he witnessed Pinto “push or stiff-arm” Kinney. 

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and state—failed as a matter of law.

4 As to Pinto’s Florida battery 

claim, the district court found that Kinney never used excessive 

force against Pinto.5 It similarly rejected Pinto’s § 1983 excessive 

force claim, concluding that Kinney used reasonable force.

6 

Finally, the district court rejected Pinto’s malicious 

prosecution claim under Florida law against Kinney and Maholtz

because, among other reasons, there was probable cause for the 

original charges against Pinto. 

 Accordingly, the district court entered summary judgment 

for the defendants. Pinto timely appealed.

III. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmovant. Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274, 1276–

77 (11th Cir. 2001). Although we must view the facts in favor of 

4

Alternatively, the district court found that even absent actual probable cause, 

Pinto’s claims of false imprisonment and arrest failed because Kinney had 

arguable probable cause and was entitled to qualified immunity (on the § 1983 

claims) and state sovereign immunity on the Florida law claims. 

5

The district court alternatively held that, as to the Florida battery claim, Pinto 

failed to show that Kinney acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose so the 

officials were shielded by state sovereign immunity. 

6

The district court also held that, even if Kinney did use excessive force, he 

was still entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate Pinto’s 

clearly established rights. 

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the nonmoving party, we accept video evidence over the 

nonmoving party’s account when the former obviously contradicts 

the latter. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). “Summary 

judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Burton, 271 F.3d at 1277 (quotation omitted). 

IV. Discussion

On appeal, Pinto challenges the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the defendants on these claims: (1) false 

arrest and false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment 

against Kinney; (2) excessive force under the Fourth Amendment 

against Kinney; (3) false arrest and imprisonment under Florida law 

against Kinney; (4) Florida battery against Kinney; and (5) 

malicious prosecution under Florida law against Kinney and 

Maholtz. As explained further below, because Kinney had 

probable cause to arrest Pinto for battery of a law enforcement 

officer and because he used reasonable force throughout his 

interaction with Pinto, the district court did not err in granting 

summary judgment on Pinto’s claims.

A. Officer Kinney Had Probable Cause to Arrest Pinto 

1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment 

Pinto claims that his arrest and detention at the hands of 

Officer Kinney constituted false arrest and false imprisonment 

under the Fourth Amendment and Florida law because Kinney 

lacked probable cause to arrest him. 

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The protection of qualified immunity “shields officials from 

civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly 

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 

(2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). And 

because the officers were acting within their discretionary 

authority, “it falls to [Pinto] to show that qualified immunity 

should not apply.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1239–40 (11th 

Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff can show that qualified 

immunity should not apply by establishing (1) that the defendant 

violated a constitutional right and (2) that the right was “clearly 

established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 1240. It 

is within our discretion to affirm based on either prong. Pearson, 

555 U.S. at 236. 

On Pinto’s § 1983 false arrest and imprisonment claims, 

Kinney is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate 

Pinto’s constitutional rights because he had probable cause to 

arrest Pinto. Pinto’s state law false imprisonment and arrest claims

fail for the same reason. 

It is well established that probable cause is an absolute bar 

to false arrest and imprisonment claims under both § 1983 and 

Florida law. Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1245; see also Rankin v. Evans, 

133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[P]robable cause constitutes 

an absolute bar to both state and § 1983 claims alleging false 

arrest . . . .”); Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 

1996) (“Where a police officer lacks probable cause to make an 

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arrest, the arrestee has a claim under section 1983 for false 

imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest.”). 

Moreover, “the standard for determining whether probable cause 

exists is the same under Florida and federal law.” Rankin, 133 F.3d 

at 1435. 

A law enforcement officer has probable cause to arrest a 

suspect when “a reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there 

was a substantial chance of criminal activity.” District of Columbia 

v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018); see also Washington v. 

Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022). In determining 

whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, we look to the 

events preceding the arrest “from the standpoint of an objectively 

reasonable police officer.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (quotation 

omitted). Probable cause requires only “a probability” or 

“substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of 

such activity.” Id. (quotation omitted). It “is not a high bar.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

Under Florida law, a person commits a battery on a law 

enforcement officer if he 

(1) intentionally touched or struck the victim or 

intentionally caused bodily harm to the victim; (2) 

the victim was a law enforcement officer; (3) the 

defendant knew that the victim was a law 

enforcement officer; and (4) the law enforcement 

officer was engaged in the lawful performance of his 

or her duties when the battery was committed.

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State v. Granner, 661 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Critical for 

our purposes, the touching element of this offense can be satisfied 

“by any physical contact, no matter how slight,” United States v. 

Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation 

omitted), including “only nominal contact” such as “tapping a law 

enforcement officer on the shoulder without consent,” State v. 

Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 219 (Fla. 2007). 

Pinto’s hand made contact with Kinney’s chest. Kinney was 

wearing a uniform with the word “sheriff” displayed on the front. 

From the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer, 

Pinto’s conduct established probable cause to arrest him for the 

offense of battery on a law enforcement officer. 

Pinto disagrees, contending that viewing the facts in his 

favor “show[s] that he, in no way, intentionally touched or struck 

Kinney” and “that Pinto did not even know that Kinney was an 

officer.” But the existence of probable cause turns on neither 

Pinto’s actual intent nor his subjective impression of the nature of 

his contact with Kinney. We instead analyze the events preceding

an arrest from the perspective of an “objectively reasonable police 

officer.” See Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586. And given that even slight 

contact satisfies the intentional touching element of battery on a 

law enforcement officer under Florida law, an objectively 

reasonable officer could view Pinto’s contact with Kinney as 

creating a substantial chance of criminal activity. 

It is also irrelevant that Pinto did not know that Kinney was 

a law enforcement officer because, viewed from the perspective of 

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an objectively reasonable officer, there was at least a “substantial 

chance” that Pinto saw the word “sheriff” before he touched

Kinney’s vest. Kinney is therefore entitled to qualified immunity 

on Pinto’s § 1983 false arrest claim because, given the existence of 

probable cause, Kinney did not violate Pinto’s constitutional 

rights.

7

7 Pinto argues in the alternative that the false arrest and imprisonment 

occurred when Kinney pushed Pinto—before Pinto touched Kinney, which 

was the act that gave Kinney probable cause to arrest him. But Pinto never 

presented this theory or argument below. Because Pinto raised this issue for 

the first time on appeal, we need not consider it. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. 

Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). 

Moreover, even if Pinto’s argument were properly before us, we 

would reject it because the push was not a seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment. A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment when an 

officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or 

restrains his freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” 

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (quotations and internal 

citation omitted). A Fourth Amendment seizure requires an objective 

manifestation of “an intent to restrain.” Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989, 998 

(2021). Critically, “force intentionally applied for some other purpose” is not 

a seizure. Id. 

Kinney did not seize Pinto by pushing him. Although the force was 

“intentionally applied,” it was not done to restrain Pinto or terminate his 

movements but “for some other purpose”—i.e., to separate him from the 

manager to prevent an escalation of the altercation between the two men. See

id.; see also Clark v. Edmunds, 513 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding 

that a sheriff did not seize a woman by pushing her out of the way of his path

because “he did not intend to acquire physical control over her”). The push 

was therefore not a seizure. 

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And, as discussed above, the existence of probable cause is 

also an absolute bar to false arrest and imprisonment claims under 

Florida law, Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1245, and “the standard for 

determining whether probable cause exists is the same under 

Florida and federal law,” Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435. Accordingly, 

Pinto’s state law false arrest and imprisonment claims fail as well. 

2. Malicious Prosecution 

Pinto argues that his arrest constituted malicious 

prosecution under Florida law because Kinney lacked probable 

cause to arrest him for battery of a law enforcement officer and 

Maholtz made false statements that Pinto pushed or stiff-armed

Kinney—when, according to Pinto, he only incidentally touched 

Kinney as he was regaining his balance after being pushed.

8

Pinto’s Florida false arrest and imprisonment claims related to the 

initial push fail similarly. Under Florida law, the elements of false 

imprisonment are “(1) the unlawful detention and deprivation of liberty of a 

person; (2) against that person’s will; (3) without legal authority or “color of 

authority”; and (4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted under the 

circumstances.” Montejo v. Martin Mem’l Med. Ctr., 935 So. 2d 1266, 1268–

69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Pinto’s claim fails at step one because the push was 

not a “detention” or a “deprivation of liberty.”

8 We note that, in the district court, Pinto also asserted a Fourth Amendment 

malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, which the district court rejected. 

Pinto does not challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 

the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 

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To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under Florida 

law, a plaintiff must establish: 

(1) an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding 

against the present plaintiff was commenced or 

continued; (2) the present defendant was the legal 

cause of the original proceeding against the present 

plaintiff as the defendant in the original proceeding; 

(3) the termination of the original proceeding 

constituted a bona fide termination of that 

proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) there 

was an absence of probable cause for the original 

proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part of the 

present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered 

damage as a result of the original proceeding.

Debrincat v. Fischer, 217 So. 3d 68, 70 (Fla. 2017) (quotation 

omitted) (emphasis added). 

Although it is true that an “arrest without further 

prosecution” can serve as the basis for a malicious prosecution 

action, Levine v. Hunt, 932 So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006),

Pinto’s claim nonetheless fails. Because, as discussed above, 

Kinney had probable cause to arrest Pinto for battery of a law 

enforcement officer, he cannot show an absence of probable cause 

for the original proceeding. Accordingly, his malicious prosecution 

claim fails. 

B. Officer Kinney used reasonable force in arresting Pinto 

Pinto also appeals the grant of summary judgment for the 

defendants on his Florida battery and his § 1983 Fourth 

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13064

Amendment excessive force claims. Pinto argues that Kinney used

excessive force when he initially pushed Pinto, pushed Pinto’s arms 

up at an awkward angle while handcuffed, and pushed Pinto’s face 

toward the police car when Pinto was not resisting. Pinto also 

argues that these acts constituted Florida battery. 

1. § 1983 Excessive Force Claim 

“[I]n addressing an excessive force claim brought under 

§ 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional 

right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force,” as

there is no “‘generic “right” to be free from excessive force.’”

Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 393–94 (1989)). Pinto alleges that Kinney violated his rights 

under the Fourth Amendment to be protected against 

“unreasonable . . . seizures.” See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394–95. 

The key inquiry then is whether the officer’s use of force was 

“objectively reasonable” under the circumstances. Id. at 388, 397. 

We judge “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force from 

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than 

with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. The proper 

application of this test requires “careful attention to the facts and 

circumstances,” including factors such as “the severity of the crime 

at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting 

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. 

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Critically, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later 

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the 

Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 397 (quotation and internal citation 

omitted). “The calculus of reasonableness must” recognize the fact 

that “police officers are often forced to make split-second 

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 

evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a 

particular situation.” Id. We have long recognized that “the 

application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a 

claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” 

Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2000). After all, “the 

right to make an arrest necessarily carries with it the right to use 

some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof, and the typical 

arrest involves some force and injury.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 

1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Pinto has failed to show that Kinney violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights. For starters, Pinto’s claim that Kinney used 

excessive force when he pushed him to separate Pinto from Buro

fails. Fourth Amendment excessive force claims are rooted in the 

right to be free from “unreasonable . . . seizures.” See Graham, 

490 U.S. at 393–95; see also Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1246. And as 

discussed in footnote 7, Kinney’s initial push was not a seizure 

under the Fourth Amendment because it was not done with “an 

intent to restrain,” but rather “for some other purpose”—namely 

to separate two men engaged in an altercation outside of a crowded 

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bar. See Torres, 141 S.Ct. at 998. Pinto’s claim as it relates to the 

initial push fails accordingly.

Turning to the force used in arresting Pinto, including 

Kinney putting his hand against Pinto’s face and pushing him 

against the car, we conclude that such force was de minimis and 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The cell phone video 

recording shows that after Pinto yelled “I am not resisting” 

repeatedly, he turned his head to the officers, got close to their 

faces, and said “what the fuck are you doing,” at which point 

Kinney used his hand to push and temporarily hold Pinto’s face 

back in the direction of the patrol car. We have held in similar 

situations that this type of force was de minimis or otherwise did 

not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Nolin, 207 F.3d at

1255 (holding that an officer grabbing the suspect and shoving him 

a few feet against vehicle, pushing his knee into the suspect’s back 

and the suspect’s head against van was de minimis force); 

Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding 

that officer did not use excessive force when he “grabbed plaintiff’s 

arm, twisted it around plaintiff’s back, jerking it up high to the 

shoulder and then handcuffed plaintiff as plaintiff fell to his knees 

screaming that [the officer] was hurting him,” noting that “[p]ainful

handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force in cases where 

the resulting injuries are minimal”); Jones v. City of Dothan, 121 

F.3d 1456, 1458, 1460–61 (11th Cir. 1997) (de minimis force when 

police slammed the suspect against the wall, kicked his legs apart 

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and required him to raise his arms above his head as officers carried 

out arrest).

Pinto points to our decision in Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 

(11th Cir. 2002), where we held an officer used excessive force in

arresting the plaintiff. Pinto claims Lee is “factually 

indistinguishable” from his case. We are unpersuaded. In Lee, the 

plaintiff was arrested after violating a local horn honking 

ordinance. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1190–91. The officer pulled her out of 

her car by the wrist and, after she was handcuffed and fully secure, 

the officer took her to the back of her car, spread her legs with his 

foot, and slammed her head onto the trunk. Id. at 1191. As a result 

of the force used, the plaintiff suffered severe emotional trauma 

and diagnoses of “bilateral wrist trauma” and nerve damage. Id. at 

1192. In rejecting the officer’s argument that the force used was 

“de minimis,” we specifically noted that the horn honking offense 

was not severe and that the disproportionate force was used after 

“the arrestee [was] completely secured, and all danger vitiated.” Id. 

at 1199–1200. 

In contrast, Pinto was arrested for a more serious offense 

(battery on a law enforcement officer), he suffered no serious 

physical injuries, and, importantly, unlike in Lee, where the 

excessive force took place in a parking lot with no record of any 

bystanders, id. at 1190, here, as revealed by the cell phone video, 

Kinney pushed Pinto’s face amid a large gathering of Pinto’s friends 

who were yelling at and approaching the officers and the vehicle 

where Pinto was being secured. Pinto himself turned his head 

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18 Opinion of the Court 21-13064

toward Kinney to yell at him. So as explained above, the force 

Kinney used was de minimis and distinct from the excessive force 

at issue in Lee. Kinney therefore did not violate Pinto’s 

constitutional rights and is entitled to qualified immunity. 

2. Florida Battery 

We come to a similar conclusion about Pinto’s state law 

battery claim. “A battery claim for excessive force is analyzed by 

focusing upon whether the amount of force used was reasonable 

under the circumstances.” City of Miami v. Sanders, 672 So.2d 46, 

47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). We apply a presumption of good faith to 

law enforcement conduct, holding officers liable only where the 

force used is “clearly excessive.” Id.; Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 

759, 768 (11th Cir. 2006). Given that Kinney’s use of force was de 

minimis and reasonable under the circumstances, it was not 

“clearly excessive” for purposes of Pinto’s Florida battery claim, 

and that claim fails accordingly.9 

9

To be sure, Sanders focused on the use of force during an arrest, and part of 

Pinto’s battery claim involves Kinney’s pre-arrest push to separate Pinto from 

Buro. But we see no reason that the reasonableness inquiry should apply any 

less to battery claims against law enforcement for pre-arrest force. It is wellestablished in Florida law that “[t]he limit of the force to be used by the police 

is set at the exercise of such force as reasonably appears necessary to carry out 

the duties imposed upon the officer by the public.” City of Fort Pierce v. 

Cooper, 190 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966). And one such duty of sheriffs’ 

deputies is to be “conservators of the peace in their counties.” Fla. Stat. § 30.15 

(1)(e). As explained above, Kinney pushed Pinto to separate him from Buro 

after witnessing a verbal altercation and physical contact between the men

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* * *

For the reasons stated, the district court properly granted 

summary judgment to Kinney and Maholtz. 

AFFIRMED. 

outside a crowded nightclub. This force was therefore “reasonable” and not 

“clearly excessive.” Sanders, 672 So.2d at 47. 

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