# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 5 , 2017 *

Decided J uly 6 , 2017

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER , Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE , Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES , Circuit Judge

No. 16

- 3477

RONALD RUHL , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.
MARCUS HARDY, et al. , Defendant s

- Appellee s

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

.

No. 16 C 6123

Rubé n Castillo , Chief Judge

.

O R D E R
Ronald Ruhl learned through a report from the Illinois Audi tor General that prison administrator s throughout the state had routinely overcharged inmates for purchases made in prison commissaries. Although Illinois law prohibits charging prisoners more t han 25% above cost for commissary items , 730 I LCS 5/3

- 7

- 2a, the Department of Corrections had added another 7% as “ overhead,” effectively fleec ing

* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts an d legal arguments

. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C)

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 16

- 3477 Page 2

prisoners of more than $10.8 million over five years. The practice ended in 2012 , but the Department refused to give inmates refunds for past overpayments. That prompted Ruhl to seek refunds through two lawsui ts in state court, but both times he struck out

. Ruhl then filed t his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claim ing that the refusal to refund the “illgotten funds ” violated the Constitution.
The district court dismissed Ruhl’s complaint at screening, see 28 U.S.C . § 1915A, primarily on the ground that his suit is foreclosed by Tenny v. Blagojevich , 659 F. 3d 578, 580

– 81 (7th Cir. 2011) , which rejected claims identical to Ruhl’s. The plaintiffs in Tenny had asserted that § 5/3

- 7

- 2a creates a protected property inter est in a 25% cap on the markup of commissary items, which, they argued, Department administrators had taken from them without due process

. Id. W e declined to decide whether a protected prope rty interest exist ed but assumed that it did. Id. at 582. Still w e rejected the inmate s’ claim s , reasoning that the D ue P rocess C lause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated because, even if the overcharge s had deprived the plaintiffs of a property right , Illinois provide s an adequate post deprivation remedy thro ugh an action in tort

. Id. at 582

– 83. But the Illinois courts have since rendere d at least two decisions reject ing the assumption on which Tenny relied

. In Jackson v. Randle , 957 N.E.2d 572, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), the state appellate court expressly hel d that prisoners “do not have constitutionally protected ‘rights’ to commissary items at a specified price, and section 3

- 7

- 2a does not somehow magicall y create one.” And in Ruhl’s appeal from the adverse decision in one of his own lawsuits , the court reli ed on Jackson to conclude that his due process claim “is easily dispelled , ” explaining that prisoners “ have no right to a commissary at all, ” much less one that sells goods at a specified price. Ruhl v. Dep’t of Corr s

. , 35 N.E.3d 982, 986

– 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). These decisions , which rejected claims under state law for the overcharges, call into question Tenny ’s conclusion that Illinois provide s an adequate post deprivation remedy for the conduct about which Ruhl complains . M ore importantly, though, the two decisions also establish that no protected property interest is at issue, which means that a claim under the Due Process Clause could not arise. See Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria, Ill. , 735 F.3d 505, 509

– 10, 512 (7th Cir. 2013); Leavell v. Ill. Dep ’t of Nat

. Res. , 600 F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir. 2010).
In this litigation, however, w e need not decide if Tenny ’s analysis remains relevant, since a straightforward ground exists on which to affirm the dismissal of Ruhl’s complaint. Ruhl litigated his due pro cess claim in state court, Ruhl , 35 N.E.3d at 987, then unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Illinois to review the dismissal of that suit, Ruhl v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs. , 42 N.E.3d 375 (Ill. 2015). Under t he doctrine of claim preclusion , that stat e

- court judgment has the same preclusive effect in federal court as itNo. 16

- 3477 Page 3

would in the courts of the rendering state. See Hayes v. City of Chi. , 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012). Illinois applies claim preclusion to bar relitigation of claims that were

— or
co uld have been

— determined in an earlier proceeding when the first suit resulted in a final decision on the merits , the same transaction or occurrence underlies both actions , and those actions involve the same parties. Id

. In state court Ruhl fully litigated his demand for a refund

— even joining a due process claim with his state statutory claim

— and he cannot obtain another bite at the apple by bringing a new suit in federal
court. The pr oper avenue to seek review of a state court ’ s decision is a peti tion for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, not a new suit in federal court

. See Hayes , 670 F.3d at 816

.
AFFIRMED.