FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D22-1922

_____________________________

ANTHONY J. DAVIS,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Petition for Writ of Prohibition—Original Jurisdiction.

September 14, 2022

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, an indigent defendant who is represented by 

counsel below, filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this 

Court. He requests three forms of relief: (1) a stay of the criminal 

prosecution below; (2) an order directing the lower court to 

preserve certain information as potentially exculpatory evidence; 

and, (3) an order compelling the lower tribunal to conduct a Nelson

hearing. See generally Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1973).

Petitioner argues that the general rule against hybrid 

representation does not apply in this case because he seeks a 

ruling on a pending motion to discharge court-appointed counsel. 

See generally Sheppard v. State, 17 So. 3d 275, 279 (Fla. 2009) 
2

(describing “hybrid representation” as “simultaneously 

proceed[ing] pro se and with legal representation.”); see also 

McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 865 (Fla. 2011) (describing “hybrid 

representation” as “combin[ing] self-representation with 

representation by counsel”). We agree as to that specific form of 

relief. See Logan, 846 So. 2d at 476 (“Only when a pro se criminal 

defendant is affirmatively seeking to discharge his or her courtappointed attorney have the courts of this state not viewed the pro 

se pleading in which the request to discharge is made as 

unauthorized and a ‘nullity.’”).

Even though the petition filed with this Court is not the actual 

“pro se pleading in which the request to discharge [counsel] is 

made,” we interpret the “affirmatively seeking to discharge” 

language in Logan as authorizing a pro se petition for writ of 

mandamus when a defendant seeks to compel a ruling on a 

pending motion to discharge counsel. With such a petition, an 

indigent defendant can enforce his Constitutional right to effective 

representation by court-appointed counsel. See Taylor v. State, 87 

So.3d 749, 758 (Fla. 2012) (citations omitted):

The Sixth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution guarantees the right to effective assistance 

of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. 

In cases where a defendant is indigent, that defendant is 

entitled to court-appointed counsel....

The right of a criminal defendant to effective 

assistance of counsel includes the right to competent 

counsel.

Cf. Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So. 

2d 646, 649 n.4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (“[T]he denial of a clear 

constitutional right to trial by jury can be remedied by the issuance 

of an extraordinary writ.”).

Therefore, we redesignate the pro se petition for writ of 

prohibition as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Fla. R. App. P.

9.040(c). However, we deny all other requested relief. See Butts v. 

State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D1363 (Fla. 1st DCA June 22, 2022).
3

KELSEY, JAY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Anthony J. Davis, pro se, Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.