United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1996 ARMY DEPOT

MAINTENANCE

Privatization Without

Further Downsizing

Increases Costly

Excess Capacity

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-201

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272509 

September 18, 1996

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Glen Browder

House of Representatives

In response to your requests, we reviewed the Army’s plans to reallocate

depot maintenance workloads from depots recommended for closure or

realignment by the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC)

Commission. Specifically, we reviewed the Army’s plans to consolidate

workloads at remaining Department of Defense (DOD) depots and

emerging plans to privatize workloads in place or at other private sector

facilities to determine the (1) impact on excess depot capacity and

operating costs at the remaining defense depots, (2) cost-effectiveness of

planned privatization options, and (3) compliance with statutory

requirements.

Background The Army spends about $1.3 billion annually on depot maintenance work

that includes the repair, overhaul, modification, and upgrading of aircraft,

tracked and wheeled combat vehicles, and electronic items. It also

includes limited manufacture of parts, technical support, testing, and

software maintenance. This work generally requires extensive shop

facilities, specialized equipment, and skilled technical and engineering

personnel. Depot maintenance work is generally performed by

government employees in government-owned and operated depots and by

private sector employees in government-owned or contractor-owned

facilities.

During World War II, at a time when the Army was purchasing massive

quantities of new, modernized, and more sophisticated weapon systems,

an emerging requirement for depot level support was met largely by the

creation of government-owned and operated depots. This capability was

expanded to meet the demands of Cold War contingency requirements and

to provide peacetime depot-level support for an expanded array of Army

systems and equipment. By 1976, 10 Army depots performed maintenance

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work in the continental United States and 2 in Europe. Since the

mid-1970s, our agency and others have reported on the redundancies and

excess capacity that existed in DOD’s depot maintenance operations and

facilities, including those owned by the Army. (A list of related GAO reports

and testimonies is attached.) In recent years, major force structure

reductions following the end of the Cold War have substantially reduced

depot maintenance requirements and increased the amount of costly

excess capacity.

Results of Prior BRAC

Processes

The problem of excess capacity, for the most part, has been addressed

through the BRAC process. Prior to the process, some downsizing of the

Army depot system was achieved through the closure of the Sharpe,

California, and Pueblo, Colorado, maintenance depots. During the first

three BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, and 1993, the process determined that

three of the Army’s eight remaining maintenance depots should be closed.

Consequently, maintenance work ceased at depots located in Lexington,

Kentucky, Sacramento, California, and Tooele, Utah, with most workloads

from the closing depots transferred to other DOD depots.

1995 BRAC Process

Decisions

The February 28, 1995, report from the Secretary of Defense to the

Chairman of the BRAC Commission recommended realignment of the Red

River and Letterkenny depot-level maintenance missions. The report

recommended that the Red River and Letterkenny ground combat vehicle

maintenance missions be transferred to the Anniston depot. It also

recommended changing the 1993 BRAC Commission recommendation to

consolidate tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny by transferring the

missile guidance system maintenance workload to the Tobyhanna depot.

The BRAC Commission recommended that the Red River depot be

downsized rather than closed. Citing concern that complete closure of the

Red River depot would adversely affect ground combat vehicle readiness

and sustainability, the Commission concluded that capability for the

depot-level maintenance of ground combat vehicles should be maintained

at more than one Army depot. The Commission recommended that all

maintenance work pertaining to the Bradley family of vehicles be retained

at the Red River depot and that other workloads be transferred to other

depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The

Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation to

realign depot-level maintenance at the Letterkenny depot to other depots

or the private sector. It recommended the (1) transfer of towed and

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self-propelled combat vehicle maintenance workloads to the Anniston

depot and missile guidance system maintenance workload to the

Tobyhanna depot or the private sector and (2) retention of an enclave for

conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and

storage at Letterkenny. Table 1 identifies the five remaining Army

depot-level maintenance activities, provides a general description of each

depot’s workload, and highlights the potential affect of the implementation

of BRAC decisions.

Table 1: Army’s Depot Maintenance

Facilities

Depot Workload description

Potential effect from

BRAC 1995

Anniston, Alabama Heavy tracked combat

vehicles and small arms

Receive combat vehicle

workload from Letterkenny

and Red River Army Depots.

Corpus Christi, Texas Rotary wing aircraft and

associated equipment

No affect.

Letterkenny, Pennsylvania Towed and self-propelled

artillery; tactical missile

systems

Realign depot maintenance,

tactical missile guidance

system workload to

Tobyhanna Army Depot or

to private sector, combat

vehicle workload to

Anniston Army Depot.

Enclave ammunition

storage and tactical missile

disassembly and storage.

Red River, Texas Light to medium combat

vehicles; wheeled tactical

vehicles and troop support

equipment

Downsize maintenance

operations; retain Bradley

family of vehicles, including

multiple launch rocket

system; and transfer

remaining workload to

Anniston Army Depot or

private sector.

Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania Communications and

electronics systems

Receive ground

communications/electronics

from Sacramento Air

Logistics Center and missile

guidance system workload

from Letterkenny Army

Depot.

Implementing the BRAC

Decisions

In developing its March 1996 report to Congress entitled Depot-Level

Maintenance and Repair Workload, the Army reported that it would

privatize workloads assigned to depots being realigned. This included

privatizing, either in-place or at existing contractor locations, the

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maintenance of various trucks, semitrailers, and troop support equipment

maintained by government employees assigned to the Red River depot.

Most of this work was received from the Tooele depot, which the

Commission recommended for closure in 1993. The March 1996 workload

report also included consolidating tactical missile maintenance workload

and maintenance requirements for the Paladin light artillery combat

vehicle to government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities to be

located on the existing Letterkenny installation. Army officials stated that

these plans have not yet been finalized and are dependent on the repeal of

the 60/40 provision in 10 U.S.C.2466, which limits the amount of depot

maintenance funds that can be used for private-sector performance.

The Army Materiel Command is responsible for planning, managing, and

implementing the BRAC Commission’s closure and realignment

recommendations. The Army Industrial Operations Command, a

subordinate activity under the Materiel Command, provides management

support and oversight of Army depot operations. In July 1995, the Army

developed preliminary implementation plans regarding the distribution of

workload from depots affected by the 1995 BRAC. However, as of August 5,

1996, these plans had not been finalized. Our review is based on the

Army’s plans as described to us as of that date.

Results in Brief As we stated in our April 1996 testimony on depot maintenance before the

Readiness Subcommittees of the House Committee on National Security

and the Senate Committee on Armed Services, deciding the future of the

DOD depot system is difficult. Depot maintenance privatization should be

approached carefully, allowing for evaluation of economic, readiness, and

statutory requirements that surround individual workloads. Privatizing

depot maintenance activities, if not effectively managed, including the

downsizing of remaining DOD depot infrastructure, could exacerbate

existing capacity problems and the inefficiencies inherent in underuse of

depot maintenance capacity. Privatization-in-place does not appear to be

cost-effective given the excess capacity in DOD’s depot maintenance

system and the private sector.1

Tentative plans to transfer some workloads from realigned depots to

remaining depots should improve capacity use and lower operating costs

to some extent, but they will not resolve the Army’s extensive excess

depot capacity problems. Since the Army is not effectively downsizing its

1

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the Public-Private Mix

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr, 16, 1996) and (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-148, Apr. 17, 1996).

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remaining depot maintenance infrastructure, privatization initiatives

outlined in DOD’s March 1996 workload analysis report to Congress will

increase excess capacity in Army depots from 42 percent to 46 percent and

increase Army depot maintenance costs. Privatizing-in-place will also

aggravate excess capacity conditions in the private sector. It is not clear

how the Army intends to comply with statutory requirements such as 10

U.S.C. 2469, which requires the use of competitive procedures before

privatizing depot maintenance workloads valued at not less than

$3 million.

The Army’s plans for reallocating depot workloads are still evolving. The

Army has not demonstrated that depot privatization initiatives relating to

the 1995 depot closure and realignment decisions are cost-effective. The

Army’s use of a privatization savings assumption of 20 percent is not

supported. In the absence of further downsizing, opportunities exist to

significantly reduce Army depot maintenance costs by transferring, rather

than privatizing-in-place, workloads from closing and downsizing depots.

Workload transfers will improve utilization and decrease costs of

operations at remaining facilities. Specifically, our work shows the

following:

• Expediting the transfer of ground communications and electronic

equipment from the Sacramento Air Logistics Center to the Tobyhanna

Army Depot could reduce the Tobyhanna depot’s operating costs by as

much as $6 per hour, resulting in annual savings of up to $24 million.

Expediting the transfer would also generate additional savings for the Air

Force by the termination of this work at the Sacramento depot earlier than

currently scheduled in 2001.

• The Army’s current plans will not likely achieve the BRAC 1995

Commission’s projected 20-year net present value savings of

(1) $953 million from realigning the Letterkenny depot or ( 2) $274 million

from downsizing the Red River depot.

• Consolidating the tactical missile workload at the Tobyhanna depot could

significantly improve the utilization at that depot and decrease costs by as

much as $27 million annually.

• Privatizing noncore vehicle and troop support equipment currently

maintained at the Red River depot forgoes the opportunity to consolidate

this workload with similar work at another Army facility and to improve

the utilization and the cost-effectiveness of depot maintenance at the

receiving facility.

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Several statutes may affect the privatization of depot maintenance

workloads. A key provision is 10 U.S.C. 2469. While the Army’s plans for

privatizing work at the Letterkenny and Red River depots are still

tentative, we have not been able to identify any element in the plans that

addresses the 10 U.S.C. 2469 requirement.

Substantial Excess

Capacity Will Remain

Based on Tentative

Plans to Implement

the BRAC

Recommendations

The Army continues to have substantial excess capacity within its depot

maintenance system. Although still evolving, Army plans for allocating

some workloads from realigned depots to remaining depots will likely

achieve some excess capacity reduction and savings at two activities.

However, in the context of the Army’s overall depot maintenance

operations, there are opportunities for achieving greater efficiencies and

cost-effectiveness. In particular, tentative plans to privatize-in-place

certain workloads would result in an estimated 4-percent increase in

excess capacity over the next 3 years. Consequently, these plans do not

appear to be cost-effective. By consolidating these workloads with similar

work at remaining Army depots, the fixed overhead costs would be spread

over a larger number of items, decreasing the per unit costs of

depot-maintenance workloads. Additionally, since private-sector

contractors also have significant excess capacity in existing manufacturing

and repair facilities, privatization-in-place at either the Letterkenny or Red

River depot would also aggravate excess capacity conditions in the private

sector. Further, it is questionable that major excess capacity reductions

will be achieved from public-private sector joint ventures at this time.

Plans for Allocating Some

Workloads to Remaining

Depots Should Reduce

Some Excess Capacity and

Achieve Limited

Operational Economies

Tentatively planned workload transfers from implementing BRAC

Commission recommendations should result in some increase in capacity

utilization and reduction in costs at two of the remaining Army depots—if

the planned work materializes and the gains are not offset by future

workload reductions in other areas. The Anniston depot is scheduled to

receive combat vehicle workloads from the Letterkenny and Red River

depots between 1996 and 1999. Additionally, the Tobyhanna depot is

expected to receive the common-use ground communication and

electronics workload from a closing Air Force depot at McClellan Air

Force Base in Sacramento, California. However, based on presidential

direction, this transition has been delayed until the year 20012

—an action

2

To reduce the economic impact at McClellan and Kelly and the surrounding communities, the

President directed the Secretary of Defense to space out the privatization over a 5-year period. As a

result, about 8,700 jobs at McClellan and 16,000 jobs at Kelly will be retained through the end of this

period.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
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that will increase transition costs and decrease anticipated savings from

the planned workload realignment.

Planned Workload Transfer to

Anniston Army Depot Should

Reduce Excess Capacity

The Army tentatively plans to transfer about 1.2 million direct labor hours

of workload to Anniston from two realigned maintenance depots. A

workload transfer of this magnitude—if funded at this level, with no

further reductions in the Anniston depot’s remaining workload—would

increase Anniston’s overall capacity utilization in fiscal year 1999 from 40

percent to 66 percent. By improving the facility utilization and spreading

the fixed overhead over a larger volume of workload, Anniston’s hourly

operating costs could be reduced by about $14 (from about $98 to $84).

Anniston officials estimated that the one-time cost to transfer these

workloads is $23.4 million. The transition costs include expenditures for

relocating equipment from the realigned depots, purchasing new

equipment, improving facilities, and related personnel actions. The size of

the workload being transferred could represent up to about 680 staff

years. However, because Anniston’s current workload is declining and the

skills required to perform the transferring work are similar to those

required for the current work, Army officials told us the receiving depot

can absorb the new workload without an increase in personnel.

The 1995 BRAC Commission recommended that the Red River depot be

downsized by transferring all non-Bradley vehicle workloads to other

depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. The Army

tentatively plans to transfer all non-Bradley related core workloads to the

Anniston depot. This workload includes about 719,000 direct labor hours

of fiscal year 1999 programmed work for M113 armored personnel carriers

and M9 armored combat earthmovers. Anniston depot officials plan to

begin receiving the new workloads during fiscal year 1997 and plan to be

in full production by fiscal year 1999.

The 1995 BRAC Commission also recommended the transfer of all

self-propelled and towed artillery maintenance work from Letterkenny to

Anniston. To comply, the Army tentatively plans to transfer about 460,000

direct labor hours of fiscal year 1999 programmed workload. The Anniston

depot officials plan to initiate training in August 1996 to facilitate the

orderly transition of the Letterkenny workload. According to Anniston

depot officials, industrial equipment will be moved and some new

equipment will be procured during the first and second quarters of fiscal

1997.

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Planned Workload Allocation to

Tobyhanna Army Depot Would

Reduce Excess Capacity but

Has Been Delayed

In formulating its 1995 recommendation to close McClellan Air Force

Base, the BRAC Commission recommended the transfer of the common-use

ground communication-electronics workload to the Tobyhanna Army

Depot. This workload, which includes items such as radar, radio

communications, electronic warfare, navigational aids, electro-optic and

night vision devices, satellite sensors, and cryptographic security

equipment, is currently estimated to be 1.2 million direct labor hours

annually. A workload transfer of this magnitude, if funded at this level,

would increase Tobyhanna’s capacity utilization from 49 percent to 65

percent, reduce the labor rate by $6 (from $64 to $58), and produce an

annualized savings of about $24 million. However, the Air Force is

delaying transfer of this work until the year 2001 in response to the

President’s direction that 8,700 jobs be retained at McClellan until the year

2001 to minimize the economic impact on the local community.

According to Army officials, delaying all of the workload transfers until

the year 2001 could require the Tobyhanna depot to undergo a

reduction-in-force, followed by a costly rehiring and retraining situation

when the Air Force workloads are eventually transferred. As a result of a

declining workload, Tobyhanna is downsizing its personnel during 1996

with a voluntary separation of about 250 personnel. Army officials said

that an involuntary separation of about 800 personnel may also be required

in fiscal year 1997 or 1998 if no additional workloads are transferred to

Tobyhanna. This reduction would include the loss of personnel having

critical skills and competencies needed to perform the ground

communications workload.

Army Privatization Plans

Without Further

Downsizing May Not Be

Cost-Effective

The Army maintains that its tentative privatization plans will be more

cost-effective than transferring workloads to one of the remaining DOD

depots. However, cost-benefit analyses are incomplete and are based on

unsupported savings assumptions. Furthermore, plans to privatize

workloads at facilities that the BRAC Commission recommended for

realignment will not achieve the BRAC objective of reducing costly excess

capacity. The Army is not likely to achieve (1) the $953-million savings the

BRAC Commission projected from realigning the Letterkenny depot if it

privatizes-in-place the tactical missile and Paladin workloads or leaves a

substantial government tactical missile maintenance workload ongoing at

Letterkenny or (2) the $274-million savings the Commission projected

from downsizing operations at the Red River depot and transferring work

to other DOD depots.3

 Also, for readiness reasons, the Red River depot is

3

The projected savings are net present value for a 20-year period, 1996 to 2015.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

being retained, despite significant excess capacity and rising operation

costs.

Excess Depot Capacity Will

Remain in Army Depot System

Despite movement of some workloads to remaining Army depots,

implementation of the BRAC Commission’s recommendations, as reflected

in DOD’s report to Congress, will likely result in excess capacity at the four

remaining government-owned and operated depots, increasing from

42 percent to 46 percent.4

 This increase is caused by a number of factors,

including (1) a forecasted decrease in future year depot-level maintenance

workload; (2) the Army’s tentative decision to establish a GOCO facility at

Letterkenny for tactical missile and Paladin combat vehicle work rather

than transfer the work to another DOD depot; (3) the BRAC

recommendation, for readiness reasons, to downsize, rather than close,

the Red River depot; and (4) the Defense Depot Maintenance Council’s

decision supporting the Air Force’s plan to delay transfer of the ground

communications-electronics workload from the Sacramento Air Logistics

Center to the Tobyhanna Army Depot until the year 2001.

Table 2 shows maximum potential capacity and current excess capacity

for the Army’s five depots based on programmed fiscal year 1996

workload.5

 This table does not reflect the Army’s tentative workload

transfer and privatization plans.

4

We determined the current excess capacity percentage based on a comparison of maximum potential

capacity and workload forecasts for fiscal year 1996. To assess the impact of planned workload

reallocations, we compared maximum potential capacity to workload forecasts for fiscal year 1999,

adjusting for (1) capacity that the Army plans to transfer to the Red River and Letterkenny depot

communities, (2) planned reallocation of programmed workloads from the Letterkenny and Red River

depots to the Anniston depot, and (3) planned privatization of Letterkenny and Red River workloads.

5

Capacity and workload statistics are described in direct labor hours, with 1,615 direct labor hours

representing one staff year of work. Excess capacity rates are developed by comparing maximum

potential capacity and programmed workload, assuming a 5-day workweek, one 8-hour-per-day shift

operation. Maximum potential capacity is an assessment of the maximum number of direct labor hours

that a depot can produce on a one-shift per-day operation, given existing equipment and facilities and

no manpower constraints.

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Table 2: Excess Capacity in Fiscal

Year 1996 for Five Army Maintenance

Depots

Depot

Maximum potential

capacity (million

direct labor hours)

Programmed FY96

workload (million

direct labor hours)

Percentage excess

capacity

Anniston 4,512 2,976 34

Corpus Christi 4,714 3,507 26

Letterkenny 3,418 2,461 28

Red River 4,684 1,964 58

Tobyhanna 7,606 3,597 53

Armywide 24,934 14,505 42

The BRAC Commission’s recommendation to realign the Letterkenny depot

and downsize the Red River depot was based on anticipated savings from

eliminating costly excess capacity, reducing base operation costs, and

reducing personnel by consolidating similar workloads at other

underutilized depots. While potential privatization initiatives could reduce

the total number of personnel currently required to perform various

workloads, they are not likely to achieve the $1.227 billion ($953 million at

Letterkenny and $274 million at Red River) savings that the BRAC

Commission projected could be achieved by implementing BRAC

recommendations at Letterkenny and Red River.

Excess Capacity in the Private

Sector

Recent changes in force structure and military strategies have created

significant excess capacities in private manufacturing and repair facilities,

as well as in military depots. Industry representatives state that the private

sector has been reducing its excess capacity through mergers, closures,

and consolidations, but DOD has not made comparable reductions in the

military depot infrastructure. A recent Defense Science Board Study

concluded that privatization-in-place should be avoided because this

approach to downsizing results in the preservation of surplus capacity.

Privatization Savings

Assumption Not Supported

The Army’s privatization plans include an unsupported assumption that

private-sector firms will perform the work for 20 percent less than an

Army depot. Army officials told us the 20-percent savings assumption is

based on statements in the May 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions’

report entitled Directions for Defense. We have reported that privatization

savings reported by the Commission do not apply to depot maintenance

because of limited or no private-sector competition and the existence of

excess public depot capacity that increases the cost of performing depot

maintenance work in remaining DOD depot facilities.6

 For example, the

6

Defense Depot Maintenance: Commission on Roles and Mission’s Privatization Assumptions Are

Questionable (GAO/NSIAD-96-161, July 15, 1996).

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
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Commission’s privatization savings estimate was based on studies of

public-private competitions under Office of Management and Budget

Circular A-76. These competitions were generally for simple, routine, and

repetitive tasks that required little capital investment, such as grounds

maintenance, motor pool operations, and stocking shelves. In these

competitions, which attracted a large number of private-sector offerors,

public activities were also allowed to participate and won about half.

Further, saving projections were based on estimates, and our work and

defense audit reports have shown that projected savings for contracted

services were often not achieved due to cost growth and other factors.

Establishing a GOCO at

Letterkenny for Tactical Missile

Work May Not Be

Cost-Effective

Consolidating the tactical missile workload at the Tobyhanna depot could

significantly improve the utilization at that depot and decrease costs by as

much as $27 million annually. However, the Army plans to

privatize-in-place tactical missile workloads at the Letterkenny depot

without determining the cost-effectiveness of transferring all the work to

the Tobyhanna depot and the potential for reducing excess capacity.

Additionally, privatizing the missile workload, which has traditionally been

defined as core, will require a risk assessment. The Army has not

conducted a formal risk assessment.

To support its privatization plans, in January 1996, the Army Materiel

Command requested its Industrial Operations Command to develop a

cost-benefit analysis to support the proposed GOCO operation for tactical

missiles at the Letterkenny Army Depot. The Operations Command was

asked to analyze cost benefits for (1) transferring 14 percent of

Letterkenny’s missile workload to Tobyhanna with the remaining

workload to be performed in a government-owned, government-operated

depot at the current Letterkenny location; (2) transferring all of

Letterkenny’s tactical missile work to a government-owned,

contractor-operated facility; and (3) establishing a government-owned,

contractor-operated depot for 14 percent of Letterkenny’s workload with

the remaining work continuing to be performed in a government-owned

and government-operated depot at the current Letterkenny location. The

request did not ask for an assessment of the costs and benefits of

transferring the complete missile maintenance workload package to

Tobyhanna.

Army Materiel Command officials told us that they interpret the 1995 BRAC

Commission recommendation to transfer missile guidance system

workloads from Letterkenny to Tobyhanna to only include the work

required on circuit cards installed in six Air Force and Navy missile

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systems. This work represents less than 14 percent of the consolidated

missile maintenance workload package at Letterkenny. Based on this

interpretation, the Army could choose to retain 86 percent of DOD’s

consolidated missile maintenance workload at Letterkenny as a

government-owned, government-operated facility.

Army Materiel Command officials told us that work on the requested

cost-benefit analyses is in a “strategic pause” pending action by Congress

to repeal or modify 10 U.S.C. 2466, which currently prohibits the use of

more than 40 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year for

depot-level maintenance or repair for private-sector performance—the

60/40 provision. However, Materiel Command officials also told us they

have no current plans to analyze options to transfer the total tactical

missile workload package to the Tobyhanna depot. They stated that if the

60/40 provision is not repealed, the preferred option may be to establish a

joint military-contractor partnership, with up to 86 percent of the tactical

missile work retained under military ownership and operation while about

14 percent would be performed in the military-owned facility by

contractor personnel.

Determining the most cost-effective alternative for performing the tactical

missile workload would require an assessment of the costs and benefits

that could be achieved from transferring the full tactical missile workload

package to Tobyhanna. Our analysis shows that transfer of the complete

missile maintenance workload package, estimated at about 1.5 million

direct labor hours in fiscal year 1999, would reduce Tobyhanna’s excess

capacity from about 51 percent to about 31 percent. Further, by

consolidating the tactical missile workload in this facility and spreading

fixed overhead costs over a larger amount of work, the Tobyhanna depot’s

hourly operating costs could be reduced by about $6, resulting in

annualized savings of about $27 million. The transfer of both the

electronics workload from McClellan Air Force Base and the missile

workload from Letterkenny would increase Tobyhanna’s overall facility

utilization to about 85 percent of maximum potential capacity—based on

the standard 5-day week, single 8-hour per day shift—and result in

projected annualized savings of about $51 million. Additionally, the BRAC

Commission identified 20-year savings of $953 million from realigning the

Letterkenny depot. These savings are not likely to be achieved if the Army

privatizes-in-place at Letterkenny or continues to operate much of the

missile workload as a government-owned and operated depot.

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Continuing a GOCO Facility at

Letterkenny for the Paladin

Self-Propelled Artillery Vehicle

Is Questionable

The cost-effectiveness of the Army’s plan to continue a GOCO facility at the

Letterkenny depot to support the Paladin self-propelled artillery vehicle

until the year 2001 is questionable—particularly given that the capacity

and capability to perform the work at the Anniston depot currently exist.

Also, continuing work at the Letterkenny depot would require continued

funding of fixed overhead costs at that facility.

The Letterkenny depot has an ongoing partnership arrangement with

private industry to upgrade and modernize the Paladin. Government

employees overhaul and refurbish M109 chassis and private-sector

employees fabricate and install new gun mounts and turrets. System

integration is accomplished by employees from both sectors. The current

upgrade program is scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 1999.

However, the Army tentatively plans to terminate government employee

participation in the program in fiscal year 1997 by changing to 100 percent

contractor employee support for the final 2 years of the program.7

 An

Army Materiel Command official informed us that the Army leadership

met informally and determined that transferring capability for future

Paladin maintenance requirements to the private sector using employees

from the realigning Letterkenny depot would be less risky and costly than

establishing capability at another DOD depot. A formal risk assessment of

this workload transfer to the private sector has not been documented as

required by DOD policy before privatizing core workloads.

Anniston Army depot officials stated that this depot already has repair

capability for the M109 family of vehicles, which are similar to the Paladin.

Prior workload data show that the depot currently overhauls or repairs

eight to nine of these vehicles per year. Further, the Anniston depot would

continue to operate with at least 25 percent excess capacity, even after the

transfer of core workload expected to come from the Red River depot. The

consolidation of Paladin workload would further improve the utilization of

the Anniston facility. On the other hand, if the Paladin workload continues

to be conducted at Letterkenny, it will require continued funding of fixed

overhead at that facility, which otherwise would be eliminated, whether

operated as a government facility or a contractor facility. A determination

of the most cost-effective source of repair for future Paladin work would

require an analysis of overhead costs at both potential repair locations.

7

The planned Paladin privatization was reported to Congress in DOD’s March 1996 depot maintenance

workload report. Army officials stated that these are tentative plans and have not yet been finalized.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

Plans to Privatize Tactical

Wheeled Vehicle and Troop

Support Equipment

Maintenance Workloads Are

Pending

The Army’s tentative plans to privatize tactical wheeled vehicle and troop

support equipment workloads currently assigned to the Red River depot

are based on the assumption that 20 percent savings can be achieved

through privatization, as concluded by the Commission on Roles and

Missions. However, a comprehensive economic analysis to document the

benefits the Army expects to achieve has not been completed. Various

problems and unresolved issues have delayed privatization efforts. For

example, the Army Materiel Command has not determined if these

workloads will be privatized-in-place or awarded to contractors having the

existing capability and capacity to perform work at other locations.

Further, initial efforts by the Army to award repair contracts have been

delayed because technical data and workload specifications lack the

specificity to solicit offers from private-sector contractors.

The 1993 BRAC Commission recommended closure of maintenance

facilities at the Tooele depot and transfer of workloads to other

maintenance activities, including the private sector. In the Army’s initial

plan for terminating maintenance work at the Tooele depot, it planned to

transfer all of its tactical wheeled and troop support equipment

maintenance workloads to the Red River depot. However, in May 1994, the

Army Materiel Command determined that because these workloads did

not support core capabilities, they would be offered for privatization.8

Subsequently, the Army transferred the maintenance mission for these

systems to the Red River depot for interim support, pending award of

repair contracts to private-sector firms. However, privatization of these

systems has been delayed because the Army lacked detailed technical

data, including component tolerances and workload descriptions, that are

required to conduct competitions. The 1995 BRAC Commission

recommended that all Red River work other than the Bradley family of

fighting vehicles should be moved to other depot maintenance activities,

including the private sector. This recommendation did not discuss

privatizing-in-place the workloads at Red River.

While the Army has reported to Congress that this workload will be

privatized, a comprehensive cost analysis has not yet been completed.

Army Materiel Command officials told us that a comprehensive

8

DOD policy provides that core capability exists to minimize operational risks and to guarantee

readiness and sustainability for weapon systems required to support the Joint Chiefs of Staff

contingency scenarios. However, not all critical or mission-essential weapon systems and equipment

will necessarily be maintained in military depot facilities, but the capability to perform depot

maintenance on designated weapon systems must be maintained in DOD facilities. Thus, core

represents the minimum amount of maintenance capability that the DOD components must maintain

in organic depot facilities to ensure that contingency operations are not compromised because of a

lack of essential depot maintenance support.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

cost-benefit analysis supporting privatization plans for the workload

previously assigned to Tooele was initiated in September 1995. Results of

this analysis were to be validated by the Army Audit Agency. It is not clear

whether these plans include privatizing-in-place the workloads at Red

River or accomplishing the work at existing contractor facilities. The

officials also said that their preliminary analysis assumes that

private-sector contractors can accomplish the workloads for 20 to 30

percent less than the current costs of performing this work in Army

depots. Recently, Command officials informed us that work on this

analysis was suspended, pending action by Congress to repeal the 60/40

provision in 10 U.S.C. 2466 and 10 U.S.C. 2469, which requires competitive

procedures that include the participation of public and private entities

prior to privatizing depot maintenance workloads valued at not less than

$3 million.

Our analysis shows that, if the Army were to transfer, rather than privatize,

wheeled vehicle and troop support equipment workloads, the work would

absorb about 20 percent of Anniston’s existing excess capacity. Anniston

depot officials also told us they could support the additional workloads

with their current workforce.

Red River Depot Capacity

Retained for Readiness

Reasons

DOD recommended closure of the Red River depot. However, the BRAC

Commission recommended that the depot be downsized rather than

closed. The BRAC Commission was concerned that complete closure of the

depot would adversely affect ground combat vehicle readiness and

sustainability and concluded that capability for the depot-level

maintenance of ground combat vehicles should be maintained at more

than one depot. The Commission recommended that all maintenance work

pertaining to the Bradley family of vehicles be retained at the Red River

depot and that other workloads be transferred to other depot maintenance

activities, including the private sector. This decision will leave the Red

River depot with about 86 percent excess capacity and substantially

increased operating costs.

An Army Materiel Command analysis projected that costs for residual

Bradley-related workloads will increase by about $15 per hour because

fixed overhead costs will be allocated to a much smaller workload base.

To illustrate the impact, the Red River depot currently is authorized 2,400

civilian employees to produce about 2 million direct labor hours of

maintenance output. Of this number, overhead personnel account for

about 21 percent of the depot workforce. After downsizing operations, the

depot will produce 529,000 direct labor hours with an authorization of

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

1,476 civilians. The number of overhead personnel remains essentially

unchanged under the downsized mode of operations, but the percentage of

overhead personnel to total employees increases to about 35 percent.

Army officials stated they plan to consider options for reducing the

number of overhead positions that will remain at the depot once it is

downsized.

Major Excess Capacity

Reductions Through Joint

Public-Private Ventures

Are Uncertain

In April 1996, we testified that privatizing DOD depot maintenance

activities, if not effectively managed, including the downsizing of

remaining depot infrastructure, will exacerbate existing excess capacity

problems and the inefficiencies inherent in underuse of depot

maintenance capacity. DOD officials have stated they plan joint

public-private ventures to more efficiently use remaining DOD depot

capabilities and reduce excess capacity. While these initiatives have some

potential, it is doubtful whether they will significantly reduce excess

capacity in the Army.

Traditionally, working relationships between public depots and the private

sector are characterized either by a DOD depot providing equipment,

facilities, and materials to a prime contractor for independent repair and

modernization programs or by an original equipment manufacturer

providing new parts to the depot for use in the repair of

government-owned assets. The Army has initiatives underway and

additional plans to use some of its excess depot infrastructure through

joint ventures with private industry. For example, as of June 1996, the

Anniston depot had 10 programs underway or completed and 5 more

planned. These projects involve (1) sharing depot-level workload on major

weapon systems, (2) providing depot resources to private business, and

(3) allowing private-sector use of depot facilities. Depot representatives

told us the partnering, subcontracting, and leasing of depot facilities serve

as a vehicle to develop new working relationships with the private sector

and to make better use of the resources and capabilities that each has to

offer. For example:

• Anniston’s largest shared work program is the M1/M1A2 tank upgrade

program. Anniston depot employees disassemble the tank, prepare the hull

for reassembly, and refurbish selected major assemblies such as the

turbine engine and hull electronic components. General Dynamics Land

Systems Division employees, located in Lima, Ohio, receive the

components from Anniston, build the new turret structure, and assemble

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

the upgraded tank for delivery to combat units. While an example of a

joint venture, this program has no affect on Anniston’s excess capacity.

• A completed Anniston project provided depot resources to private

industry for the fabrication of specialized mining equipment. Under a

direct sales agreement for this nonmilitary project, the depot was a

subcontractor to United Defense Limited Partnership Steel Products

Division and was responsible for the manufacture of certain parts needed

for specialized mining equipment used by a mid-western power company.

The Anniston work included welding, machining, assembling, and painting

of conventional face conveyor pan sections for the specialized mining

equipment.

• In a planned project, Anniston employees will provide cleaning, welding,

machining, asbestos removal, and painting support to General Dynamics

Land Systems Division in a joint venture to upgrade FOX Nuclear,

Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicles. In accomplishing this

project, contractor and depot personnel will use 28,000 square feet of

underutilized depot infrastructure.

It is too early to fully assess the potential impact of these and similar

initiatives. Army officials believe emerging results of the earliest programs

indicate that the concept has potential for preserving needed industrial

base capabilities and improving the use of DOD depot-level maintenance

facilities. However, Tobyhanna depot officials told us their attempts to get

approval for various joint public-private depot projects have largely been

unsuccessful because of various statutory constraints.

We found there were numerous impediments to implementation of various

joint venture initiatives. For example, 10 U.S.C. 4543 provides nine

conditions that must be present in order for certain Army industrial

facilities to sell manufactured articles or services outside DOD, including

the requirement that the services cannot be obtained from a private-sector

source within the continental United States. Depot officials stated that it

would be unusual for there not to be at least one private-sector provider

for most depot activities. Also, 10 U.S.C. 2471 requires that when depot

equipment and facilities are leased to a private-sector firm,

reimbursements must be made to the U.S. Treasury as miscellaneous

receipts rather than to the depot providing the facilities. This provision

reduces the incentive for the services to enter into such arrangements.

Unless these and other statutes are revised, dual use initiatives may have

limited promise for significantly improving the utilization and decreasing

excess capacity of Army depots.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

Statutes Affect Efforts

to Privatize

Workloads

As we have previously reported,9 various statutory restrictions may affect

the extent to which DOD depot-level workloads can be converted to

private-sector performance, including 10 U.S.C. 2464, 10 U.S.C. 2466, and

10 U.S.C. 2469. Title 10 U.S.C. 2464 provides for a “core” logistics

capability to be identified by the Secretary of Defense and maintained by

DOD unless the Secretary waives DOD performance as not required for

national defense.

Titles 10 U.S.C. 2466 and 10 U.S.C. 2469 affect the extent to which

depot-level workloads can be converted to private-sector performance.

Title 10 U.S.C. 2466 prohibits the use of more than 40 percent of the funds

made available in a fiscal year for depot-level maintenance or repair for

private sector performance: the so-called “60/40” rule. Title 10 U.S.C. 2469

provides that DOD-performed maintenance and repair workloads valued at

not less than $3 million cannot be changed to performance by another DOD

activity without the use of “merit-based selection procedures for

competitions” among all DOD depots and that such workloads cannot be

changed to contractor performance without the use of “competitive

procedures for competitions among private and public sector entities.”

While each statute has some impact on the allocation of DOD’s depot-level

workload, 10 U.S.C. 2469 is the primary impediment to privatization

without a public-private competition. The competition requirements of 10

U.S.C. 2469 have broad application to all changes to the depot-level

workload valued at not less than $3 million currently performed at DOD

installations, including the Army depots at Red River and Letterkenny. The

statute does not provide any exemptions from its competition

requirements and, unlike most of the other laws governing depot

maintenance, does not contain a waiver provision. Further, there is

nothing in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990—the

authority for the BRAC recommendations—that, in our view, would permit

the implementation of a recommendation involving privatization outside

the competition requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2469.

The determination of whether any single conversion to private-sector

performance conforms to the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2469 depends

upon the facts applicable to the particular conversion. DOD has not yet

finalized its privatization plans for either the Letterkenny or Red River

depot nor, as of the date of this report, has DOD informed us how it plans to

comply with the statutory restrictions in these proposed conversions. It is

9

Depot Maintenance: Opportunities to Privatize Repair of Military Engines (GAO/NSIAD-96-33, Mar. 5,

1996) and Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the Public-Private Mix

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146, Apr. 16, 1996).

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

unclear whether the planned conversions will comply with the

requirements of existing law.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the

Army to take the following actions.

• Develop required capability in military depots to sustain core depot repair

and maintenance capability for Army systems and conduct and adequately

document a risk assessment for mission essential workloads being

considered for privatization.

• Use competitive procedures, where applicable, to assure the

cost-effectiveness of privatizing Army depot maintenance workloads.

• Evaluate the cost-effectiveness of consolidating all of the Letterkenny

tactical missile workload at the Tobyhanna depot, including an assessment

of the fixed cost savings impact on the workload currently maintained at

Tobyhanna.

• Assess alternatives for reducing the costs of operating the Red River

depot, given the extensive excess capacity that will remain at that facility

after implementation of the 1995 BRAC recommendations.

• Complete cost analyses of the Army’s proposed privatization initiatives,

including the Paladin self-propelled artillery vehicle and wheeled vehicle

and troop support equipment maintenance workloads from Red River. In

comparing the cost and benefits of consolidating these workloads at other

DOD depots with privatizing, the analyses should include the impact on

recurring cost of existing workloads at the depots that would receive the

workloads.

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense review the results of the

Army’s cost analysis for tactical missile maintenance to determine the

most cost-effective course of action. If the consolidation option is

determined to be the most cost-effective, the Secretary should reassess the

Army’s interpretation of the BRAC recommendation and (1) if the

reassessment determines that the consolidation is consistent with the BRAC

recommendation to consolidate the entire tactical missile workload,

except for disassembly and storage at Tobyhanna, DOD should do so or

(2) if the reassessment determines that such a transfer is not consistent

with the BRAC recommendation, DOD should seek redirection from

Congress to accomplish this action.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting orally on our draft report, DOD officials generally agreed

with our findings and recommendations regarding the Army’s plans to

privatize depot maintenance. They stated that the Army’s plans were

tentative and contingent on congressional relief from requirements of title

10, most notably, the 60/40 rule and the requirement for public-private

competitions before privatizing depot workloads that exceed $3 million.

They pointed out that the Army’s plans are being revised because

Congress did not repeal or modify these statutes. They said that in revising

these plans, DOD and the Army intend to meet the requirements of existing

statutes governing DOD’s depot-level maintenance operations. They did not

specify how the plans would meet the requirements.

DOD officials also noted that the BRAC 1995 recommendation regarding

Letterkenny did not provide for the transfer of all the missile maintenance

mission work to the Tobyhanna depot or the private sector—only the

missile guidance work—which they estimate to represent about 14 percent

of the missile maintenance workload. Officials stated that the combination

of the BRAC 1993 recommendation to consolidate tactical missile

maintenance at the Letterkenny depot with the BRAC 1995 recommendation

to transfer or privatize only the missile guidance workload precludes the

Army from consolidating all missile depot maintenance workload at

Tobyhanna. Accordingly, they believe there is no need to evaluate the

cost-effectiveness of an option that the Army cannot implement.

In our view, the BRAC recommendation is sufficiently imprecise to support

a variety of interpretations to include the Army’s proposal, as well as the

consolidation of all tactical missile depot maintenance at Tobyhanna.

Notwithstanding this point, there is nothing that precludes the Army from

assessing the cost-effectiveness of the various alternatives, whether they

are implemented or not. Consequently, we have modified the

recommendation in our draft report and are now recommending that the

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to make such a cost

analysis. In addition, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense

review the Army’s cost analysis to determine the most cost-effective

course of action and if necessary seek redirection from Congress to

implement the most cost-effective action.

Our review indicated that consolidation of the missile workload at

Tobyhanna and elimination of depot maintenance activities at

Letterkenny, with the exception of conventional ammunition storage and

tactical missile disassembly and storage, would offer the Army a more

cost-effective alternative than retaining the excess capacity at both

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

underutilized depots. The continuation of depot maintenance work at

Letterkenny, whether as a government-owned and operated maintenance

depot or as a privatized operation, is not likely to achieve the savings that

could be achieved through the closure of facilities and the elimination of

overhead at one activity. We also believe that given the potential

opportunities to reduce infrastructure and maintenance costs by

consolidating the missile workload at Tobyhanna, DOD should further

evaluate this option before the Army proceeds with a less cost-effective

option.

In other comments, DOD officials suggested that maximum potential

capacity not be used to measure unused capacity at Army depots because

it (1) is not equivalent to the current industrial capacity of a depot,

(2) includes building space that lacks plant equipment, and (3) is useful

only for determining if additional work can be accomplished in existing

space with the transfer or purchase of equipment. They said that the use of

maximum potential capacity inflates the excess problem at the depots. We

believe that maximum potential capacity is an acceptable benchmark for

measuring capacity utilization and cost impact of underutilized facilities.

The services developed, certified, and submitted such data for use in the

BRAC 1995 process. We believe this capacity measure is a conservative

projection of excess capacity, since it is based on a 5-day, one 8-hour shift

operation, while private sector industrial use is frequently 2 or 2-1/2 shifts.

Further, other DOD measures of capacity are constrained by numbers of

available personnel and provide little indication of potential capacity

available through more cost-effective use of industrial facilities and

equipment. Maximum potential capacity provides a reasonable basis for

analyzing the potential capacity available for workload consolidation.

DOD officials also noted that the Paladin self-propelled artillery vehicle

workload cannot continue at the Letterkenny depot in a government

facility after the year 2001 because the 1995 BRAC Commission directed this

mission be realigned to the Anniston depot. We recognize that the BRAC

1995 recommendation for Paladin depot maintenance workload was to

move it to Anniston, but delaying transfer until the year 2001 could

increase the cost of overall depot maintenance operations and decrease

the savings expected to be derived from workload consolidation.

Based on other DOD oral comments, we made technical changes to the

draft report for clarification of several points.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

Scope and

Methodology

In conducting our work, we obtained documents from and interviewed

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.;

Army headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Army Materiel Command and Army

Audit Agency, Alexandria, Virginia; Industrial Operations Command, Rock

Island, Illinois; and Anniston, Letterkenny, Red River, and Tobyhanna

Army Depots. While at these depots, we discussed programs that involved

partnering and other joint ventures with depot officials and reviewed

pertinent documentation on the planned use and the results of these

programs. We did not evaluate the merits of these programs because they

generally were small in number and relatively new. In addition, whenever

possible, we relied on information previously gathered as part of our prior

reviews of DOD’s depot maintenance operations.

To evaluate the impact on excess capacity, we compared maximum

potential capacity and programmed workload forecasts data, as certified

to the Joint Cross Service Group for Depot Maintenance prior to the 1995

BRAC round. We determined current excess capacity percentages based on

a comparison of maximum potential capacity and workload forecasts for

fiscal year 1996. To assess the impact of planned workload reallocations,

we compared maximum potential capacity to workload forecasts for fiscal

year 1999, adjusting for (1) capacity that the Army plans to transfer to the

Red River and Letterkenny depot communities, (2) planned reallocation of

programmed workloads from the Letterkenny and Red River depots to the

Anniston depot, and (3) planned privatization of Letterkenny and Red

River workloads.

To determine the impact of workload reallocation plans on operating costs

for combat vehicles maintenance, we reviewed an economic analysis that

the Army Materiel Command had prepared and a draft audit report of the

analysis that the Army Audit Agency had prepared. To determine the

impact of workload reallocation plans on future operating rates for

electronic type items, we asked officials at the Tobyhanna depot to

compute operating costs based on the their pre-BRAC workload forecasts

and supplemented by possible transfers of 1.5 million direct labor hours of

tactical missile workload from the Letterkenny depot and 1.2 million hours

of ground communications and electronics workload from the Sacramento

Air Logistics Center.

To determine the cost-effectiveness of the Army’s planned privatization

plans, we held discussions with responsible Army officials and reviewed

available documentation from the Army Materiel Command and its

Industrial Operations Command. We could not fully evaluate these plans

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
B-272509 

because the Army had not completed its analyses of all the privatization

initiatives. Given that our analysis was constrained by the preliminary

nature of some Army plans and the absence of some cost data, our

analysis is based on assumptions that may change as better data become

available.

For DOD compliance with statutory requirements, we identified the

applicable requirements and determined their impact on DOD’s plans to

privatize depot-level maintenance workloads.

We conducted our review between February 1996 and July 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this letter to the Secretaries of Defense, the

Army, and the Air Force; the Director of the Office of Management and

Budget; and interested congressional committees. Copies will be made

available to others upon request. If you would like to discuss this matter

further, please contact me at (202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this

letter are listed in appendix I.

David R. Warren

Director, Defense Management Issues

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

James F. Wiggins, Associate Director

Julia C. Denman, Assistant Director

M. Glenn Knoepfle, Evaluator-in-Charge

Jacqueline E. Snead, Evaluator

Paul Newton, Evaluator

Atlanta Field Office Bobby R. Worrell, Senior Evaluator

Mario L. Artesiano, Senior Evaluator

Dallas Field Office Penny M. Harwell, Senior Evaluator

Larry J. Junek, Senior Evaluator

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
Related GAO Products

Navy Depot Maintenance: Cost and Savings Issues Related to

Privatizing-in-Place the Louisville, Kentucky Depot (GAO/NSIAD-96-202,

Sept. 18, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Commission on Roles and Mission’s

Privatization Assumptions Are Questionable (GAO/NSIAD-96-161, July 15,

1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD’s Policy Report Leaves Future Role of

Depot System Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-96-165, May 21, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: More Comprehensive and Consistent

Workload Data Needed for Decisionmakers (GAO/NSIAD-96-166, May 21, 1996).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Privatization and the Debate Over the

Public-Private Mix (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-146/148, Apr. 16/17, 1996).

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not

Easily Quantified (GAO/NSIAD-96-67, Apr. 8, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: Opportunities to Privatize Repair of Military Engines

(GAO/NSIAD-96-33, Mar. 5, 1996).

Closing Maintenance Depots: Savings, Personnel, and Workload

Redistribution Issues (GAO/NSIAD-96-29, Mar. 4, 1996).

Navy Maintenance: Assessment of the Public-Private Competition Program

for Aviation Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-96-30, Jan. 22, 1996).

Depot Maintenance: The Navy’s Decision to Stop F/A-18 Repairs at Ogden

Air Logistics Center (GAO/NSIAD-96-31, Dec. 15, 1995).

Military Bases: Case Studies on Selected Bases Closed in 1988 and 1991

(GAO/NSIAD-95-139, Aug. 15, 1995).

Military Base Closure: Analysis of DOD’s Process and Recommendations

for 1995 (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-132, Apr. 17, 1995).

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for

Closure and Realignment (GAO/NSIAD-95-133, Apr. 14, 1995).

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
Related GAO Products

Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center: Cost Growth and Other

Factors Affect Closure and Privatization (GAO/NSIAD-95-60, Dec. 9, 1994).

Navy Maintenance: Assessment of the Public and Private Shipyard

Competition Program (GAO/NSIAD-94-184, May 25, 1994).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Allocating Workload Between the Public and

Private Sectors (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-161, Apr. 12, 1994).

Depot Maintenance (GAO/NSIAD-93-292R, Sept. 30, 1993).

Depot Maintenance: Issues in Management and Restructuring to Support a

Downsized Military (GAO/T-NSIAD-93-13, May 6, 1993)

Air Logistics Center Indicators (GAO/NSIAD-93-146R, Feb. 25, 1993).

Defense Force Management: Challenges Facing DOD as it Continues to

Downsize its Civilian Workforce (GAO/NSIAD-93-123, Feb. 12, 1993).

(709183) Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-201 Army Depot Maintenance
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