I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8824 

To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen United 

States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign 

influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 25, 2024 

Mr. KEATING (for himself, Mr. FOSTER, and Mr. HUIZENGA) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy 

to strengthen United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign influence in the 

nuclear energy sector in Europe. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘The U.S.-European 

5 Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act of 2024’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa2 tion initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which 

3 has severely threatened energy security in the 

4 United States, Europe, and around the world. 

5 (2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has 

6 been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its 

7 territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government 

8 can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrain9 ian citizens. 

10 (3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power 

11 plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed 

12 water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors, and 

13 remains dependent on nuclear power for its energy 

14 security. 

15 (4) Russia, in its war of aggression against 

16 Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine’s en17 ergy infrastructure through heavy shelling and tar18 geted attacks, particularly in the winter months 

19 when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulner20 able. 

21 (5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have ille22 gally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Sta23 tion, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and 

24 Russian forces have surrounded the station with 

25 landmines, further threatening regional security. 


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1 (6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been 

2 built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, 

3 the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 

4 Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 

5 (7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs 

6 and fuel services to spread malign influence and 

7 threaten United States and European energy secu8 rity. 

9 (8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent 

10 of the total uranium conversion infrastructure world11 wide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrich12 ment capacity at close to 46 percent. 

13 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

14 It is the sense of Congress that— 

15 (1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear 

16 power industry, the Department of State should 

17 prioritize the utilization of products and services 

18 from the United States, and then prioritize products 

19 and services from Europe and other allied or partner 

20 countries, including Canada, Japan, the United 

21 Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not di22 rectly competing with the United States; and 

23 (2) the United States and its allies must focus 

24 on cooperation, including capacity building and 

25 early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear 


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1 industry in Europe in a way that maintains non2 proliferation, security, and safety standards and 

3 aligns with international obligations and treaties 

4 while combating Russian and Chinese malign influ5 ence. 

6 SEC. 4. STRATEGY. 

7 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State, 

8 in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the 

9 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, 

10 shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-Euro11 pean nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian ma12 lign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe. 

13 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection 

14 (a) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements: 

15 (1) An overview and assessment of the Sec16 retary of State’s efforts to broaden participation by 

17 United States nuclear industry entities in Europe 

18 and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of 

19 United States, European, and partner technologies 

20 and services against Russian and Chinese tech21 nologies in Europe. 

22 (2) An overview of different nuclear reactor 

23 types that are currently deployed or under regu24 latory review in Europe, including large light-water 


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1 reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and 

2 non-light-water reactors, and— 

3 (A) what role, if any, each reactor type 

4 could have in reducing Russia’s influence over 

5 European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 

6 2045, and 2050; 

7 (B) challenges that each reactor type may 

8 face with rapid deployment, including costs, 

9 market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, sup10 ply chain constraints, and regulatory require11 ments; 

12 (C) the impacts of each reactor type on 

13 maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, 

14 including the minimization of weapons-usable 

15 nuclear material; and 

16 (D) opportunities for the use of United 

17 States, European, and partner technologies and 

18 services in the deployment or potential deploy19 ment of each reactor type. 

20 (3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are 

21 currently deployed or under consideration in Europe, 

22 including use of low enriched uranium, including 

23 high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel re24 processing, along with an analysis of the implica25 tions of each fuel cycle on— 


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1 (A) reducing and eliminating Russia’s 

2 market share in Europe for uranium, conver3 sion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now 

4 and 2030; 

5 (B) achieving long-term energy security 

6 free of Russian influence; and 

7 (C) maintaining strong nonproliferation 

8 standards, including the minimization of weap9 ons-usable material as well as high nuclear safe10 ty and security standards. 

11 (4) An overview of nuclear reactor designs and 

12 fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Gov13 ernment is currently funding the development of, 

14 and— 

15 (A) the potential, if any, that each of these 

16 technologies have to decrease or eliminate Rus17 sia’s market share in the United States and 

18 Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium 

19 mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel 

20 fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear 

21 fuel reprocessing in the short, medium, and 

22 long term; 

23 (B) the impact of these technologies on the 

24 minimization of weapons-usable nuclear mateVerDate Sep 11 2014 19:30 Aug 09, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H8824.IH H8824

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1 rial, including the use of highly enriched ura2 nium or plutonium fuels; and 

3 (C) an assessment of the use cases for 

4 each of these designs and fuel cycles. 

5 (5) An overview of the United States Govern6 ment’s diplomatic engagements regarding the nu7 clear energy sector in Europe. 

8 (6) A list of countries in Europe with active nu9 clear power programs, and— 

10 (A) an analysis of each country’s nuclear 

11 energy policy; 

12 (B) an overview of existing areas of co13 operation with regards to nuclear energy be14 tween each country and— 

15 (i) the United States; 

16 (ii) other European and friendly coun17 tries; and 

18 (iii) adversarial countries including 

19 China and Russia; and 

20 (C) an overview of potential areas for fu21 ture cooperation between each country and the 

22 United States with regards to nuclear energy. 

23 (7) An overview of Russian and Chinese influ24 ence in the European nuclear energy sector. 


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1 (8) An overview of how the United States Gov2 ernment is working with allies and partners to 

3 counter Russian malign influence within the Euro4 pean energy sector to include steps taken to counter 

5 Russian influence in the mining and milling, conver6 sion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as 

7 well as in reactor construction. 

8 (9) An overview of how the United States Gov9 ernment balances the urgent strategic need for col10 laboration with allies and partners on countering 

11 Russia’s influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with 

12 commercial competitiveness issues that may arise be13 tween United States companies and companies in 

14 Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 

15 (10) An assessment of Rosatom’s role in Rus16 sia’s energy sector, to include an overview of 

17 strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate. 

18 (c) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after the 

19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

20 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

21 the strategy required by subsection (a). 

22 (d) FORM.—The strategy required by subsection (a) 

23 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 

24 a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided sepa25 rately from the unclassified strategy. 


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1 SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

2 There is authorized to be appropriated $30,000,000 

3 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support 

4 critically needed engagement in Europe consistent with 

5 the strategy required by section 4(a) on countering Rus6 sian malign influence and with a particular focus on re7 sponsible nuclear power program capacity building, early 

8 stage nuclear power project support, and countering Rus9 sian disinformation campaigns. 

10 SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS. 

11 In this Act: 

12 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT13 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com14 mittees’’ means— 

15 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

16 the House of Representatives; 

17 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

18 the Senate; 

19 (C) the Committee on Energy and Com20 merce of the House of the Representatives; and 

21 (D) the Committee on Energy and Natural 

22 Resources of the Senate. 

23 (2) HIGH ASSAY LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.— 

24 The term ‘‘high assay low enriched uranium’’ means 

25 uranium enriched so that the concentration of the 


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1 fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235) is between 5 

2 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium. 

3 (3) LOW ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term ‘‘low 

4 enriched uranium’’ means fuel in which the weight 

5 percent of U-235 in the uranium is less than 20 per6 cent. 

Æ 


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