alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### William G. LONG, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-1511

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 21, 1984.

Wm. G. Long, pro se.

Steven A. Gibbins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants-appellees.

Before TATE, GARWOOD, and HIGGIN-BOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

TATE, Circuit Judge:

For purposes of this appeal, the salient facts are these:

Long, a Texas state prisoner, initially on July 14, 1981 filed a petition for federal habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For reasons immaterial to the present appellate issue (the reasons had to do with facilitating state exhaustion and expediting ultimate federal habeas disposition), Long signed a joint stipulation with the state dismissing his habeas petition without prejudice, which was filed on February 11,1982.

Having subsequently exhausted his state remedies, Long then on September 13, 1982 filed the present motion in the federal district court “to reactivate his [dismissed] petition [of July 14, 1981] from its present state of dormancy”; he prayed that the federal court “reinstate his petition for writ of habeas corpus” and grant him the federal habeas relief requested. The petitioner Long appeals from the dismissal of this petition “to reactivate” his formerly-filed (but dismissed) application for federal habe-as relief.1

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the district court erred in dismissing the present petition of September 1982 to reactivate Long’s 1981 habeas petition that Long had voluntarily dismissed in February 1982 by joint stipulation of dismissal of himself and the respondent.

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a), the petitioner’s voluntary dismissal of his action completely terminated the earlier litigation, without further order by the court. *See,**307e.g., *Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,*506 F.2d 914 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*422 U.S. 1048, 95 S.Ct. 2665, 45 L.Ed.2d 700 (1975); *American Cyanamid Company v. McGhee,*317 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir.1963). “A voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the situation as if the action had never been filed. After a dismissal the action is no longer pending in the court and no further proceedings in the action are proper.” 9 Wright *&*Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2367 at p. 186 (1971).

The district court thus did not err in refusing to “reactivate” a finally dismissed former action. The effect of the trial court denial of the present motion to reactivate, of course, is simply to require the petitioner Long to file a new habeas petition, if he desires, to assert the claims presented by the earlier habeas petition that was dismissed without prejudice.

We AFFIRM the present order of the district court that denied the petitioner Long’s motion to reactivate his earlier (but dismissed) habeas application.

AFFIRMED.

1

. The dismissal also had the effect of mooting another motion by Long to delay consideration of the present petition until yet another petition for different habeas relief had been considered by the federal courts.
No. 52318.

protests 63029-K, etc. (New York).

#### Associate British Mfrs. et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel the court found that the facts herein agreed upon were such as to bring the case within the holding in *John Barr*v. *United States*(11 Cust. Ct. 88, C. D. 801), which record was incorporated herein. (See *John Barr*v. *United States,*324 U. S. 83.) In accordance therewith it was held that the currency of the invoices should be converted at the buying rate in the New York market at noon on the day of exportation (the “free” rate of exchange for pounds sterling), as certified by the Federal Reserve bank and set forth by the collector on each of the entries involved. The protests were sustained to this extent.
#### Alice McCauliffe, Respondent, v City of Syracuse, Appellant.

[635 NYS2d 558]

—Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs, motion granted and complaint dismissed. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff failed to raise a factual issue whether the defect noted on a record of complaints maintained by defendant’s Department of Public Works is the same defect that allegedly caused her accident and injuries *(see, Ortsman v Town of Oyster Bay,*178 AD2d 588). Plaintiff submitted no evidence to show that the 1989 complaint of a "low spot” in the road in front of 357 Elm Street, which condition the City asserted was repaired the same day, referred to the crumbling and broken condition of the curb or curb cut that allegedly caused her to fall five years later. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Major, J.—Prior Notice.) Present—Denman, P. J., Lawton, Wesley, Doerr and Balio, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6117

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DWIGHT SHAFFER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II, Chief

District Judge. (CR-92-299-2, CA-96-599-2)

Submitted: October 7, 1997 Decided: November 7, 1997

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dwight Shaffer, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Lee Keller, Victoria

Boros Major, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.

United States v. Shaffer, Nos. CR-92-299-2; CA-96-599-2 (S.D.W. Va.

Oct. 30, 1996).We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
No. 58143.

protests 171748-K, etc. (Los Angeles).

#### Pan American Textile Company and John L. Westland & Son et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of gloves the same in all material respects as those involved in Abstract 57694, the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
#### Franklin Horton, *Respondent, v.*Algernon S. Sullivan, *as Public Administrator, etc., Appellant.*

— Judgment and order denying new trial, reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event. Opinion by Barnard, P. J. ;

Cullen, J., not sitting.
#### Berger, Appellant, *v.*Silliman.

Argued April 24, 1969.

Before Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ.

*Arnold Sousa,*with him *Jacob Philip,*and *Philip & Wimmer,*for appellant.

*Sidney R. Webb,*for appellee.

June 27, 1969:

Opinion

Per Curiam,

In this action for specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of real estate, the parties stipulated *631that the only issue involved is whether the wife-appellee was a party to the agreement. The chancellor determined that she signed as a witness rather than a party and the record adequately supports this finding.

Decree affirmed at appellant’s costs.

Mr. Justice Roberts dissents and would grant specific performance against the appellee-wife on the grounds that the record clearly establishes that she acknowledged and ratified the written contract for the sale of the property.
Exhibit 31.2 

 

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER 

 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

 

I, Rex E. Bosen, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Provide Commerce, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a)designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b)****evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c)****disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer andI have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: May 17, 2004
#### James Sutton and others, *Appellants, v.*William A. Wilkins, *Respondent.*

— Judgment affirmed, with costs. Opinion *by*Learned, P. J.
# Estimating the Magnitude of Annual Peak Discharges with Recurrence Intervals   between 1.1 and 3.0 Years for Rural, Unregulated Streams in West Virginia

U.S. Geological Survey Water-Resources Investigations Report   02-4164

By Jeffrey B. Wiley, John T. Atkins, Jr., and Dawn A. Newell

----

## ABSTRACT

Multiple and simple least-squares regression models for the log10-transformed   1.5- and 2-year recurrence intervals of peak discharges with independent variables   describing the basin characteristics (log10-transformed and untransformed)   for 236 streamflow-gaging stations were evaluated, and the regression residuals   were plotted as areal distributions that defined three regions in West Virginia   designated as East, North, and South. Regional equations for the 1.1-, 1.2-,   1.3-, 1.4-, 1.5-, 1.6-, 1.7-, 1.8-, 1.9-, 2.0-, 2.5-, and 3-year recurrence   intervals of peak discharges were determined by generalized least-squares regression.   Log10-transformed drainage area was the most significant independent variable   for all regions.

  Equations developed in this study are applicable only to rural, unregulated   streams within the boundaries of West Virginia. The accuracies of estimating   equations are quantified by measuring the average prediction error (from 27.4   to 52.4 percent) and equivalent years of record (from 1.1 to 3.4 years).

## CONTENTS

Abstract 

 Introduction

Description of Study Area

Physiographic Provinces

Climate

Background

Acknowledgments

Development of Low-Recurrence-Interval Peak-Discharge Estimating   Equations

Peak-Discharge Data

Basin-Characteristics Data

Magnitude and Frequency Analysis

Data Correlation

Regional Regression Analysis

Estimating Discharges for Gaged and Ungaged Locations

Accuracy of Low-Recurrence-Interval Peak-Discharge Estimating   Equations

Limitations of Low-Recurrence-Interval Peak-Discharge Estimating   Equations

Summary

References Cited

Appendix 1. Fortran Program for Calculating Frequency Factors

Appendix 2. Accuracy of Estimating Equations

----

For additional information write to:

  District Chief

U.S. Geological Survey

11 Dunbar Street

Charleston, WV 25301

 

or visit our Web site at: http://wv.water.usgs.gov/

 

Copies of this report can be purchased from:

 

U.S. Geological Survey

Branch of Information Services

Box 25286, Federal Center

Denver, CO 80225-0286

 

----

 

The text and graphics are presented here in pdf format     (print quality):

 The full report 9.3MB 

Plate to report 610KB

If you have Adobe Acrobat Reader installed on your computer, you may view     and/or print the PDF version of this report. If     you do not have Acrobat Reader, you may download it here.

Users with visual disabilities     can visit this site for conversion tools and information to help make PDF     files accessible.

----
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v RICHARD W. WISEHART, Airman Third Class, U. S. Air Force, Appellant

11 USCMA 251, 29 CMR 67

No. 13,477

Decided February 12, 1960

*Lieutenant Colonel James L. Kilgore*and *Lieutenant Colonel Dwight R. Rowland*were on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Colonel John F. Hannigan*and *Major Lawrence J. Gross*were on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

George W. LatimeR, Judge:

A general court-martial convicted accused of several offenses in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including forgery and uttering a forged cheek, both contrary to Article 123 of the Code, 10 USC § 923. The findings, together with his sentence to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and confinement at hard labor for one year, have been affirmed at intermediate appellate levels, and we granted review limited to the same question of multiplicity before us in United States v Gibbons, 11 USCMA 246, 29 CMR 62, this day decided.

The accused pleaded guilty as charged, but the Government, pursuant to Air Force policy, nevertheless proceeded to introduce evidence establishing his guilt. Included in the prosecution’s evidence is accused’s voluntary pretrial statement, wherein he admitted that on November 3, 1958, he secured a blank check from his room and drew it in his own favor, forging another’s signature to the instrument, and that he later took the check with him to a club, where he negotiated it.

From the above recited facts, it is manifest that we have here exactly the situation which confronted us in United States v Gibbons, supra, and the ruling therein announced is dispositive of the issue herein granted. Accordingly, for the reasons there stated, the decision of the board of review is affirmed.

Chief Judge Quinn concurs.

FeRguson, Judge

(dissenting):

I dissent for the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in United States v Gibbons, 11 USCMA 246, 29 CMR 62, this day decided.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

DIANE MCCLELLAND,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 273 WAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 16th day of February, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
**Exhibit 10.29**

**THIRD AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT**

THIS THIRD AMENDMENT TOEMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “**Third****Amendment**”), is entered into as of November 12, 2010, by and between Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (the “**REIT**”) and DLR, LLC (the “**Employer**” and together withthe REIT, the “**Company**”), and A. William Stein (“**Executive**”). Capitalized terms used and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Employment Agreement (as defined below).

WHEREAS, the Company and Executive have entered into that certain Employment Agreement, dated as of August 7, 2008, asamended by the First Amendment to Employment Agreement, dated as of December 24, 2008, and the Second Amendment to Employment Agreement, dated as of June 9, 2010 (collectively, as amended, the “**Employment Agreement**”), which setsforth the terms and conditions of Executive’s employment by the Company; and 

WHEREAS, the Company and Executive desireto amend the Employment Agreement as set forth in this Third Amendment. 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises setforth herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which is hereby acknowledged, the Company and Executive hereby amend the Employment Agreement as follows, effective as of the date first above written:

1. Section 4 of the Employment Agreement is hereby amended and restated in its entirety as follows: 

“4. **ANNUAL BONUS**. In addition to the base salary set forth above, during the Term, you will be eligibleto participate in the Company’s incentive bonus plan applicable to similarly situated executives of the Company. The amount of your annual bonus will be based on the attainment of performance criteria established and evaluated by the Company inaccordance with the terms of such bonus plan as in effect from time to time, provided that, subject to the terms of such bonus plan and attainment of performance criteria established by the Company, your target and maximum annual bonus shall be 100%and 150%, respectively, of your base salary actually paid for such year. Any annual bonus that becomes payable to you is intended to satisfy the short-term deferral exemption under Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-1(b)(4) and shall be madenot later than the last day of the applicable two and one-half (2 1/2) month “short-term deferral period” with respect to such annual bonus, within the meaning of Treasury Regulation Section 1.409A-1(b)(4).” 

2. This Third Amendment shall be and is hereby incorporated in and forms a part of the Employment Agreement. 

3. Except as amended and set forth herein, the Employment Agreement shall continue in full force and effect. 

***[Signature Page Follows]***

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Third Amendment has been executed and delivered by the partieshereto. 

 
**DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC.**By:  
/s/ Michael F. Foust
Name:  Michael F. FoustTitle:  Chief Executive Officer**DLR, LLC**By: Digital Realty, L.P.Its: Managing MemberBy:  
/s/ Michael F. Foust
Name:  Michael F. FoustTitle:  Chief Executive Officer
 
**EXECUTIVE**
/s/ A. William Stein
A. William Stein
Before the First Division,

May 2, 1949

No. 53088.

#### James E. Fox & Co. et al. *v.*United States,

protests 32236-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise is similar in all material respects to the articles the subject of Abstracts 51306 and 51959, the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
#### Everett E. SHELTON, Appellant, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee.

No. 83-1378.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 16, 1984.

Decided Jan. 23, 1984.

Lessenberry & Carpenter, by Thomas M. Carpenter, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen., by Leslie M. Powell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before HEANEY, ROSS and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Everett E. Shelton appeals the denial of his application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). Shelton was charged in Arkansas court with four counts of theft of property. He chose to represent himself and the court appointed standby counsel for the bench trial, which took place on April 10, 1980. Shelton was found guilty of two counts of theft of property and sentenced to 20 years in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction, with five years of the sentence suspended. Shelton appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, raising one issue of sufficiency of the evidence. The court affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. On December 17, 1981, Shelton filed a petition in the Arkansas Supreme Court seeking permission to proceed under Rule 37.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, alleging that he was denied the right of self-representation and the effective assistance of counsel. The court denied *83the petition. *Shelton v. State, 275*Ark. 40, 627 S.W.2d 18 (1982). Having exhausted his state remedies, Shelton initiated proceedings in United States District Court. The Honorable William R. Overton dismissed Shelton’s petition on the basis of the record without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Shelton alleges that the district court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict on the charge of theft of property. He also argues that the court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was denied the right to represent himself and whether his appointed standby counsel rendered effective assistance.

We have carefully studied the record, including the district court’s memorandum and order, the briefs and the arguments of the parties to this action. We find no merit to Shelton’s arguments, and accordingly affirm pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of this court on the basis of Judge Overton’s well-reasoned memorandum.
No. 64935.

#### Imported Arts and Excel Shipping Corp. *v.*United States,

protest 253054-K (New York).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of figures similar in all material respects to those passed upon in *Wm. S. Pitcairn Corp.*v. *United States*(39 C.C.P.A. 15, C.A.D. 458), claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.