RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-1908-MR

BRANTLEY DUNAWAY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

FAMILY COURT DIVISION

HONORABLE LAUREN ADAMS OGDEN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 13-CI-502108 

MISTI MADISON CORK AND 

MELANIE STRAW-BOONE APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Brantley Dunaway brings this appeal from Orders dated 

November 15, 2019, December 3, 2019, December 9, 2019, and December 16, 

2019, of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Court Division, adjudicating several

post-dissolution motions. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND

This appeal is from a post-dissolution proceeding, and we will only 

recite those facts necessary for resolution thereof. The parties were divorced by 

decree entered January 15, 2015. At the time of the divorce, Dunaway and Misti 

Madison Dunaway (Cork) were awarded joint custody of their two minor 

daughters. The family court adjudged that the children would reside primarily with 

Cork in Louisville, and Dunaway would exercise parenting time one weekend per

month during the school year, liberally during the summer, and on most holidays. 

During the divorce proceeding, Dunaway relocated near Atlanta, Georgia. 

Accordingly, the family court ordered the parties to equally share in the 

transportation of the children to and from Georgia for Dunaway’s timesharing. 

The family court ordered Dunaway to pay child support of $1,483.52 per month 

and to provide the children with medical insurance. Subsequently, Dunaway filed

a motion to reduce child support, and by Order entered on November 16, 2016, the 

family court reduced Dunaway’s child support payment to $1,298.34 per month.

To say the least, court proceedings since the parties’ divorce have 

been contentious. The parties have filed various motions relating to child support, 

transportation issues, and contempt for Dunaway’s failure to abide by court orders 

as to child support and medical insurance. Relevant to this appeal, Cork filed a 

motion seeking the family court to order Dunaway to solely provide transportation 
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of the children to and from Georgia for his timesharing. In support of the motion, 

Cork alleged that Dunaway harassed individuals she sent to Georgia to pick up the 

children on her behalf. Cork also filed motions for the family court to find 

Dunaway in contempt for failure to pay child support and to provide medical 

insurance.1 Dunaway filed a motion to modify parenting time; he wanted the 

children to primarily reside with him in Georgia. Dunaway also filed a motion to 

modify child support and sought to have a portion of his current monthly child 

support payment forwarded to an escrow account until the family court ruled upon 

his motion to modify same. Dunaway additionally filed a motion regarding phone 

communications with the children. The family court rendered an order that 

temporarily required Dunaway to solely provide transportation of the children for 

his timesharing. Thereafter, Dunaway filed a motion to require the parties to share 

equally in transporting the children for timesharing. 

Ultimately, the family court conducted an evidentiary hearing upon all

unresolved motions on July 19, 2019, and September 27, 2019. By Order entered 

November 15, 2019, the family court denied Dunaway’s motion to modify 

parenting time to allow the children to primarily reside with him. The family court 

determined that the current timesharing schedule remained in the best interests of 

 

1 The record reflects that the family court held Brantley Dunaway in contempt by Order entered 

January 25, 2019, for failure to maintain health insurance coverage for the children in 2018.
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the children. The family court also concluded that Dunaway would be solely 

responsible for providing the children’s transportation for timesharing due to his 

harassing behavior of persons transporting the children for Cork during the transfer 

of the children. As to child support, the family court reduced Dunaway’s monthly 

support to $1,021.27 and required Cork to provide medical insurance for the 

children, at a cost of $500 a month. The family court considered Cork’s childcare 

expenses of $750 per month in reducing Dunaway’s child support obligation. The 

family court further found Dunaway in contempt for his past failure to timely pay 

child support and to provide medical insurance for the children. The family court 

decided that Dunaway could “purge himself of this contempt by strictly complying 

with the Court’s orders of support.” November 15, 2019, Order at 10. Also, 

because of his contemptuous conduct, the family court ordered Dunaway to pay 

$877 for Cork’s attorney’s fees related thereto. 

Both parties filed Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 

motions to alter, amend, or vacate the November 15, 2009, Order. These motions 

were denied in part and granted in part by Order entered December 3, 2019. In the 

December 3, 2019, Order, the family court amended the November 15, 2009, 

Order to reflect that the hearing was conducted on July 19, 2019, and September 

27, 2019. Also, it was amended to “require the parties to exchange the first two 
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pages of their federal income tax returns no later than November 1st of each year.” 

December 3, 2019, Order at 1.

Thereafter, Dunaway filed a Motion to Apply Credit due to an 

overpayment of child support. The family court denied the motion by Order

entered December 9, 2019, and again concluded that Dunaway was not entitled to a 

credit. This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues presented on appeal by Dunaway look to various motions 

seeking to modify the family court’s original divorce decree, or subsequent orders 

thereto. The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that such modification motions 

filed post-decree necessitate evidentiary hearings which occurred in this case. 

Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 456-57 (Ky. 2011).2

Accordingly, our initial standard of review is governed by CR 52.01 

provides that the circuit court’s “[f]indings of fact, shall not be set aside unless 

clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 

 

2

In Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453, 456-57 (Ky. 2011), the Court noted:

Consequently, though named a “motion,” a motion for 

modification is actually a vehicle for the reopening and rehearing 

on some part of a final order, which asks for adjudication on the 

merits presented at a required hearing. As such, family courts 

must make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and must enter 

the appropriate order of judgment when hearing modification 

motions. 
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to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” This Court will not disturb those 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 353-

54 (Ky. 2003). And, “findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are 

manifestly against the weight of the evidence presented.” Frances v. Frances, 266 

S.W.3d 754, 756 (Ky. 2008). Thereafter, a family court’s rulings on post-decree 

motions may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Hempel v. Hempel, 380 

S.W.3d 549, 551 (Ky. App. 2012). To summarize our review, if the findings of 

fact by the family court are supported by substantial evidence and the correct law 

is applied, the ruling of the family court will only be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion. See Coffman v. Rankin, 260 S.W.3d 767, 770 (Ky. 2008). 

Additionally, concerning the modification of timesharing or visitation, the family 

court’s abuse of discretion will be examined as to whether any proposed 

modification is in the best interests of the children as required by Kentucky 

Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.320(3). Our review proceeds accordingly.

ANALYSIS

Dunaway initially contends that the family court erred by denying his 

motion to modify timesharing. Dunaway alleges that he sought to “reverse the 

parenting plan, permitting the girls to live in Georgia with him during the school 

year, and provide Ms. Cork what was his parenting time of (1) weekend per month, 

and the summer months.” Dunaway’s Brief at 16. Dunaway claims that such a 
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parenting time schedule comports with the “equally shared parenting” presumption 

set forth in KRS 403.270(2). Dunaway points out that his family lives in Georgia, 

the children have friends in Georgia, and the children would have the benefit of 

better schools and extracurricular activities. Dunaway also believes that the family

court failed to properly conduct a best interest analysis to determine if modification 

of timesharing was appropriate. Dunaway maintains that it is in the best interests 

of the children to modify parental timesharing and permit the children to primarily

reside with him. 

As Dunaway sought a modification of parental timesharing and not 

custody, KRS 403.320(3) controls our analysis. See Pennington v. Marcum, 266 

S.W.3d 759, 769 (Ky. 2008). Under KRS 403.320(3), parental timesharing or 

visitation may be modified if modification would serve the best interests of the 

child. In examining “best interests of the child,” KRS 403.270(2) sets out various 

factors in determining best interest, including the wishes of the child’s parents, and 

the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community. A.G. v. T.B., 452 

S.W.3d 141, 144 (Ky. App. 2014). However, the equal timesharing presumption 

set forth KRS 403.270(2) is only applicable to an initial determination of 

timesharing and not to a modification of timesharing. Layman v. Bohanon, 599 

S.W.3d 423, 431 (Ky. 2020). Again, as noted, the family court possesses broad 

discretion in modifying parental timesharing. Pennington, 266 S.W.3d at 769. 
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And, a decision by the family court upon modification of parental timesharing will 

only be disturbed where a clear abuse of discretion has occurred or where “clearly 

erroneous in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Layman, 599 

S.W.3d at 431.

In its November 15, 2019, Order, the family court determined that it 

was in the best interests of the children to not modify timesharing:

Mr. Dunaway is seeking to change the parenting 

schedule so that the children live primarily with him in 

Georgia. In support of his motion, he has renewed many 

of his complaints about Ms. Cork, including that she 

works long hours and is unavailable to the children; that 

she leaves the children with unfamiliar and unvetted 

caregivers; that she withdraws the children from the 

usual extracurricular activities, and enrolls them in new 

activities without his consent; that she refuses to let him 

speak with the children on the phone; and that she refuses 

to provide him with information concerning the 

children’s education, healthcare, and activities. Once 

again, the Court finds Mr. Dunaway’s claims to lack 

merit. However, the Court will address them in turn.

[Ms.] Cork owns and operates a management 

training company. When she started the business in 

2015, she worked long hours and traveled extensively. 

Having no extended family in the Louisville area, she 

relied on professional nannies to watch the children while 

she worked. Ms. Cork has employed four nannies over a 

five-year period. Several quit after being harassed by 

Mr. Dunaway. Ms. Cork’s current nanny, Jessi Weiss, 

has been with the family for two years. Jessi has her own 

bedroom in Ms. Cork’s home, but she does not live there 

full-time. Ms. Cork described Jessi as “part of the 

family.” The children know and love her.
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Ms. Cork’s business has become very successful and 

now employees several individuals. Ms. Cork no longer 

travels when the children are in her care. She has not 

been away from home overnight in more than two years.

Jessi watches the children an average of 4.5 hours 

per week, after school, while Ms. Cork works (typically, 

from home). Jessi also watches the children for a few 

hours on Thursday nights so that Ms. Cork can have 

dinner with her boyfriend of six years, Coleman Karleski.

. . . . 

Mr. Dunaway also complains that Ms. Cork has 

failed to provide a stable home for the children. He 

alleges that she has moved five times since the parties’ 

divorce. In fact, Ms. Cork has moved three times, but 

she has remained in the same neighborhood. Ms. Cork 

testified that her financial circumstances have improved 

significantly and that each move was for the purpose of 

obtaining a better home for the children.

By his own admission, Mr. Dunaway has also 

moved three times since the parties’ divorce. He has 

lived with his mother, in a small apartment, and now in a 

condominium. 

Savanah [sic] attends Highland Middle School. She 

is enrolled in a highly selective project-based learning 

program for advanced placement students. She earns 

straight-A’s. Savannah is a member of the swim team, 

and she sings in the school choir. She has also 

participated in art club, student council, and dance. Ms. 

Cork describes Savannah as confident and loving, and 

says she sticks up for herself and others.

Finnleigh attends Bloom Elementary School. She 

also earns excellent grades and has outstanding test 

scores. Finnleigh is a member of the Louisville Soccer 

Club and participates in two different competitive 
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leagues. Ms. Cork describes Finnleigh as curious, 

empathetic, and funny. 

Both children have excellent relationships with their 

teachers and peers. They have strong social skills and no 

reported behavioral problems. Ms. Cork has always been 

active in the children’s education. She attends most field 

trips and co-sponsors the Bloom Elementary “Fund 

Run,” an annual fundraiser.

The children are well-bonded to Ms. Cork, Mr. 

Karleski, and his extended family. They enjoy regular 

trips to the beach and the lake. They attend social events 

as a family and enjoy going to the theater together.

Mr. Dunaway complains that Ms. Cork often 

withdraws the children from extracurricular activities. 

This is not the case. Savannah discontinued cheerleading 

in 5th grade because her school no longer offered the 

program. She discontinued soccer around the same time 

to focus on dance. Ms. Cork limits the children to two 

extracurricular activities at a time, to ensure that their 

schooling is not affected. The children select the 

activities that are most important to them. They do not 

quit mid-cycle. Ms. Cork is as involved in the children’s 

activities as she is in their education. She takes them to 

all games and competitions, and to nearly all practices.

. . . . 

Mr. Dunaway also complains that Ms. Cork does not 

keep him apprised of the children’s school functions, 

medical problems, or activity schedule. Ms. Cork has 

provided Mr. Dunaway with contact information for the 

children’s school, sports teams, and other extracurricular 

activities. All information he might require, including 

grades and schedules, is available directly from the 

provider.
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Lastly, in support of his motion for primary 

residence, Mr. Dunaway testified that the schools in 

Buford, Georgia outperform the schools in Jefferson 

County. Aside from a website rating from a private 

company, niche.com, Mr. Dunaway presented no 

information on the Buford school system, including what 

academic or extracurricular programs would be available 

to the children.

KRS 403.320(3) permits the Court to modify an 

order for visitation whenever such modification would 

serve the best interests of the child. In this case, there is 

nothing to suggest that relocating the children to Georgia 

would be in their best interest. Savannah and Finnleigh 

are well established in Louisville. They are thriving in 

school and active in their community. By all accounts, 

they are happy, healthy, well-adjusted, and high 

achieving children. Both are closely bonded to Ms. 

Cork, to her boyfriend (who [sic] they have known most 

of their lives) and to his mother, who they affectionately 

call “granny.”

November 15, 2019, Order at 2-5, 7.

It is clear the family court considered the best interest’s factors set 

forth in KRS 403.270 and believed it was in the best interests of the children not to 

modify timesharing. Of import, the family court found that the children were 

“thriving in school and active in their community” and are “happy, healthy, welladjusted, and high achieving.” November 15, 2019, Order at 7. And, as 

previously noted, the Kentucky Supreme Court has held there is no presumption of 

equal timesharing when considering a motion to modify same. See Layman, 599 

S.W.3d at 431. Based upon our review of the record and the evidence considered 
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by the family court, we are unable to conclude that the family court’s findings of 

fact were clearly erroneous nor was denial of Dunaway’s motion to modify 

timesharing an abuse of discretion.

Dunaway next claims the family court erroneously denied him a credit 

or recoupment of $9,833.72 in overpaid child support payments. Dunaway points 

out that he filed a motion to modify child support on November 13, 2018, and that 

the family court reduced his child support by Order entered November 15, 2019. 

From November 13, 2018, to November 15, 2019, Dunaway states that he overpaid 

child support in the amount of $9,833.72, but the family court did not permit 

recoupment of such overpayment. Dunaway also asserts that Cork was on notice 

that his child support would likely be decreased, and by denying a credit, Cork is 

essentially given a windfall in child support benefits. Dunaway contends the 

family court should have ordered Cork to reimburse him the overpayment of 

$9,833.72, and the family court abused its discretion by failing to do so.

In Kentucky, the law is well settled that child support is for the benefit 

of the child and “belongs to the child not the parents.” Gibson v. Gibson, 211 

S.W.3d 601, 609 (Ky. App. 2006). For this reason, child support benefits are 

zealously guarded by the Court, and any “restitution or recoupment of excess child 

support is inappropriate unless there exists an accumulation of benefits not 

consumed for support.” Hempel v. Hempel, 432 S.W.3d 730, 732 (Ky. 2014) 
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(quoting Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Ky. App. 1986)). So, for Dunaway to 

be entitled to a credit or recoupment of overpaid child support, he must 

demonstrate that Cork possessed an accumulation of child support payments that 

were not consumed for support of the children.

In denying Dunaway a credit or reimbursement, the family court 

found that there was no evidence that Cork possessed any unused accumulation of 

child support. In his brief, Dunaway has not cited this Court to any evidence that 

such an accumulation of child support existed. Rather, Dunaway focuses on the 

unfairness of denying him a credit and of allowing Cork to retain a windfall. We 

emphasize that child support does not belong to a parent and is intended solely for 

the benefit of the child. It is deeply rooted and recognized in our laws that a parent 

has a fundamental duty to support a minor child. There being no evidence to 

support Dunaway’s argument, we conclude that the family court did not abuse its 

discretion or commit reversible error by failing to credit or reimburse Dunaway for 

overpaid child support payments.

Dunaway also asserts that the family court improperly found him in 

contempt for failure to pay child support and provide health insurance coverage for 

the children in 2018. Dunaway argues that he had actually overpaid child support 

after the family court modified the child support payment in 2016; thus, the 

contempt finding was arbitrary. Additionally, Dunaway states that he did not 
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intentionally violate the family court’s order as to child support but lacked the 

necessary funds to meet his monthly child support obligation. Dunaway also 

maintains that he provided health insurance coverage for the children and 

presented evidence demonstrating same. 

The Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized that a trial court 

possesses “broad authority to enforce its orders, and contempt proceedings are part 

of that authority.” Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. Ivy, 

353 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Ky. 2011). As to civil contempt, it is said that the 

“contemnor must, at the time the sanction is imposed, have the ability to purge the 

contempt by compliance.” Ivy, 353 S.W.3d at 334-35. Moreover, in civil 

contempt, the family court may award the injured party compensatory damages 

resulting from the contemptuous behavior. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corrections

v. King, 258 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing White v. Sullivan, 667 

S.W.2d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 1983)). Under KRS 403.240(2), the failure of a party 

to comply with a child support order, without good cause, “shall constitute 

contempt of court.” Our review is centered upon whether the family court abused 

its discretion by imposing contempt. Ivy, 353 S.W.3d at 332.

The record reveals that Dunaway filed a motion to modify child 

support and unilaterally decided to reduce his child support payments thereafter in 

plain contravention of a court order. There is no dispute concerning Dunaway’s 
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conduct as to the child support payments, as he admitted same at the evidentiary 

hearing. In relation to healthcare coverage, the evidence was disputed. Dunaway 

submitted evidence that he paid the medical insurance for the children; on the other 

hand, Cork introduced evidence that Dunaway allowed the medical insurance to 

lapse by late payment of the monthly premiums. 

In the November 15, 2019, Order, the family court observed that 

Dunaway “has a history of adjusting his child support to what he believes is an 

appropriate amount, with no regard to the orders in effect.” November 15, 2019,

Order at 10. The family court specifically found that Dunaway had “willfully, 

repeatedly, and without good cause, [sic] violated the Court’s orders regarding 

child support and health insurance coverage.” November 15, 2019, Order at 10. 

The family court then awarded Cork $877 in attorney’s fees that she incurred due 

to Dunaway’s contemptuous behavior. As to Dunaway’s claim that he lacked 

funds to pay child support, Dunaway is self-employed in the marketing business, 

and the family court imputed to him an annual income of approximately $70,000. 

In an exhibit, he sought to have child support calculated based upon an annual 

salary of $60,000. Additionally, Dunaway apparently possessed sufficient 

discretionary funds to hire a private investigator to surveil Cork prior to the 

hearing. 
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To prevail, it was incumbent upon Dunaway “to show, clearly and 

convincingly, that he . . . was unable to comply with the court’s order or was, for 

some other reason, justified in not complying.” Ivy, 353 S.W.3d at 332 (citation 

omitted). This Dunaway has failed to do. Consequently, we do not believe the 

family court abused its discretion by finding Dunaway in contempt for failing to 

pay child support and to provide health insurance coverage or by awarding Cork 

$877 in attorney fees.

Dunaway also argues on appeal that the family court erred in its award 

of child care expenses. Particularly, Dunaway argues that Cork stated she was not 

seeking child care expenses in her “Discovery Responses,” and failed to 

supplement same as required by “CR 26.” Dunaway’s Brief at 23. Dunaway 

further maintains that child care expenses of $50 per hour for two children is 

excessive and that Cork failed to present adequate documentation of the child care 

expenses incurred. 

KRS 403.211(6) provides that the “court shall allocate between the 

parents . . . reasonable and necessary child care costs incurred due to 

employment[.]” It has been recognized that an award under KRS 403.211(6) “is in 

the nature of a prepayment or reimbursement of the share of actual costs, and if the 

expense is not incurred the other party is entitled to be repaid[.]” Olson v. Olson, 

108 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Ky. App. 2003).
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In this case, Cork testified that $50 per hour for two children was a 

reasonable amount to pay for child care in Louisville and submitted paid child care 

expenses as evidence. Cork further testified that she utilized child care about 4.5 

hours per week. The family court obviously regarded Cork’s testimony as 

compelling and found that she incurred reasonable child care expenses of $750 per 

month. In view of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the family court abused 

its discretion or that its findings were clearly erroneous. As to Dunaway’s claim 

that Cork failed to properly supplement discovery under CR 26 to allege child care 

expenses, there is no citation in Dunaway’s brief as to how this issue was 

preserved for appellate review, and it does not appear that the family court ruled 

upon this issue. CR 76.12(4)(c)(v). We are a court of review and generally do not 

review issues that are unpreserved. Sneed v. Univ. of Louisville Hosp., 600 S.W.3d 

221, 228 (Ky. 2020).

Dunaway lastly asserts that the family court erred by failing to order 

each parent to equally share in the transportation of the children for his parenting 

time. Dunaway maintains that it is unsafe and unreasonable to require him to 

shoulder all the responsibility for transportation of the children between Georgia 

and Kentucky. He insists that it is entirely reasonable to require Cork to share 

equally in the responsibility, and it was arbitrary for the family court to have ruled 

otherwise. 
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It is evident that the family court was concerned about Dunaway’s

past menacing behavior toward individuals who transported the children for Cork. 

The family court detailed such evidence:

Mr. Dunaway complains that Ms. Cork has hired 

myriad unknown persons to facilitate parenting 

exchanges. The Court has addressed this issue 

previously. Mr. Dunaway committed domestic violence 

against Ms. Cork. A no-contact order necessitated use of 

a third-party exchange. Ms. Cork relied on her nannies 

or family members to drive the children to and from 

Georgia. Mr. Dunaway frequently harassed the thirdparty, who would then refuse further exchanges, thus 

requiring Ms. Cork to hire a new individual.

One driver, Meagan Bossey, testified that Mr. 

Dunaway often made her wait 15-20 minutes to retrieve 

the children. On one occasion, he came out to inspect her 

car and noticed the tags were expired. He yelled at her, 

slammed the door in her face, and called the police. The 

police came to the home and released the children to Ms. 

Bossey.

Another driver, Betty Karleski, testified that Mr. 

Dunaway would not allow the children to leave with her 

because she was a stranger. “Granny Bobby” as she is 

known to the children, is Coleman’s mother. The 

children have known her for six years – most of their 

lives – and visit with her at least monthly. She attends 

their birthday parties, dance recitals, and soccer games. 

Mr. Dunaway told Ms. Karleski that she could not leave 

with the children unless she gave him a copy of her 

driver’s license and tags. He detained her for nearly 2 

hours, before eventually relenting and allowing the 

children to leave.

November 15, 2019, Order at 3-4.
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Relying upon the above evidence, the family court concluded that 

Dunaway should continue to provide all transportation to facilitate his timesharing 

with the children. The family court observed that the “parties attempted to divide 

the responsibility for exchanges, but Mr. Dunaway’s unabated harassing behavior 

made that arrangement untenable.” November 15, 2019, Order at 8. Upon the 

whole, we did not believe that the family court abused its discretion or that its 

findings were clearly erroneous as to requiring Dunaway to provide the 

transportation for the children. It was entirely reasonable to do so in light of 

Dunaway’s behavior.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Orders of the Jefferson 

Circuit Court, Family Court Division.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Callie Walton

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Melanie Straw-Boone

Louisville, Kentucky