United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Research and

Development and Military Procurement, Committee on

National Security, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

1:00 p.m., EDT

Thursday,

June 27, 1996

COMBAT AIR POWER

Joint Mission Assessments

Needed Before Making

Program and Budget

Decisions

Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security

Analysis, National Security and International Affairs

Division

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittees:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges that the

Department of Defense (DOD) faces in ensuring effective combat air power

capabilities for the future. My testimony is based on a comprehensive

report of the major issues related to U.S. combat air power that we expect

to issue in September. This report will synthesize the findings from our

reviews of six key air power mission areas1

 conducted over the past 

2 years and other recent reviews of individual weapon systems. The

overall objective of our work was to determine whether the Secretary of

Defense has sufficient information from a joint perspective to help him

decide whether new air power investments should be made, whether

programmed investments should continue to be funded, and what priority

should be given to competing programs. To provide context for this

assessment, we examined major changes in U.S. air power capabilities

since the Persian Gulf War in relation to those of potential adversaries.

Today, I would like to make four points based on our work:

1. Although U.S. aircraft inventories have declined since the Gulf War, DOD

has added many new aircraft to its fleet and has qualitatively improved the

capabilities of its remaining aircraft and other air power assets. As a result,

DOD’s current force remains highly capable and is more capable in many

areas than the larger Cold War force.

2. With the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces may face potential adversaries

far less capable than the former Soviet Union. These nations’ forces are

considerably smaller, older, and less capable than U.S. forces, and

information suggests that they are likely to be slow to improve their

capabilities. And, while isolated terrorist actions cannot be ruled out, DOD

believes that it is unlikely that these nations could prevent U.S. forces

from achieving their objectives in a military engagement.

3. As the nation attempts to achieve a balanced budget, DOD faces a major

challenge in seeking to finance all of its combat air power investment

programs. At the same time, our work shows that some programs would

only marginally improve existing capabilities at a very high cost. Others

may no longer be needed in view of the changed security environment.

And, for some programs, less costly alternatives could be pursued to meet

identified needs.

1

These include interdiction, air superiority, close support, air refueling, suppression of enemy air

defenses, and surveillance and reconnaissance.

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
4. Our work suggests that DOD is proceeding with major air power

programs without having sufficiently assessed its joint mission

requirements to meet post-Cold War needs. Without such assessments, the

Secretary of Defense does not have the information needed to render

accurate assessments of the need for and priority of planned investment

programs.

I would like to elaborate on each of these issues. But before I begin, I must

tell you that to keep my testimony unclassified, I will be more general than

I would prefer. This is particularly true in my discussion of the capabilities

of potential adversaries. Also, although our comprehensive report defines

U.S. air power more broadly, my testimony today will focus primarily on

fighter and attack aircraft, attack helicopters, bombers, munitions

employed by combat aircraft, and long-range missiles.

Although Smaller,

Current U.S. Air

Power Forces Remain

Highly Capable

Despite downsizing, U.S. forces remain highly capable. While DOD has

reduced its number of combat aircraft, it has retired some older aircraft

while adding new aircraft and enhancing the capabilities of existing

aircraft. These actions have yielded a force that, in many areas, is more

capable than the larger Cold War force.

DOD’s total inventory of combat aircraft has declined from about 8,200 in

1991 to about 5,900 in 1996 as shown in the following chart. The quantities

shown include aircraft designated for operational missions as well as

aircraft set aside for testing and training.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
GAO Changes in DOD's Inventory of Fighter and Attack 

Aircraft, Attack Helicopters, and Bombers, 1991-96 

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

4,243

2,783

2,314

1,552

1,649

1,556

Total Aircraft

1991 8,206

1996 5,891

Army Navy and Marine Corps Air Force

Source: Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed-wing fighter and attack aircraft

have been reduced the most—from about 6,200 in 1991 to about 4,100 in

1996. The services have achieved these reductions primarily by retiring

older aircraft that have been costly to operate and maintain. At the same

time, they have added many newer model aircraft—about 70 F-15E strike

fighters, about 250 F-16 multi-mission fighters, and about 200 F/A-18

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
fighter and attack aircraft. These assets have bolstered U.S. combat air

capabilities.

The total number of attack helicopters has only declined by 79. This

smaller reduction is due to the fact that although 600 older AH-1 Cobras

were retired, both the Army and the Navy have added newer more capable

helicopters. These include about 150 Apache attack helicopters and 300

OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters in the Army and

about 70 Cobras in the Marine Corps.

Although DOD now has fewer aircraft, many of the aircraft being retained

have been qualitatively improved. For example, DOD has improved the

navigation, night fighting, target acquisition, and self-protection

capabilities of many aircraft and has made more aircraft capable of

delivering advanced munitions. These were capabilities that contributed

significantly to the effectiveness of tactical aircraft in the Gulf War. DOD is

also substantially increasing its inventory of long-range missiles and

precision-guided munitions (PGM). It is presumed that the growth in PGMs

could reduce the number of flights and aircraft needed to destroy

designated targets. The following chart shows the added capabilities in

these areas since 1991.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
GAO Increases in Key Combat Air 

Capabilities Since 1991

Long-range missiles

Night-fighting 

PGM-capable

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000

2,662

969

707

Number of systems added since 1991

aircraft

aircraft

Note: Long-range missiles include the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Army Tactical Missile

System. Night-fighting aircraft includes those designed to permit use of night-vision goggles

and/or those equipped with infrared detection devices. PGM capability refers to the ability of

aircraft to autonomously employ precision-guided munitions using laser designators.

Source: Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
Forces of Potential

Adversaries Are

Limited and Likely

Slow to Improve

Based on DOD data and information from other government sources, DOD

does not believe that potential adversaries possess the capabilities needed

to prevent U.S. forces from achieving their military objectives.

Regarding offensive capabilities, although some potential adversaries have

significant numbers of aircraft, none has an inventory that approaches that

of U.S. forces. Also, their aircraft are generally older and technologically

inferior to U.S. aircraft. Some possess significant quantities of

conventional theater ballistic missiles, however, these missiles are often

relatively unsophisticated. The United States does not currently face a

significant threat from enemy cruise missiles, and such capabilities are not

likely to increase until the middle of the next decade, if at all.

Regarding defensive capabilities, potential adversaries have few modern

fighters suitable for air defense. The bulk of their forces are older, less

capable aircraft, and information suggests that they will not be adding

many modern aircraft. Similarly, they generally rely on older surface-based

air defense systems for high-altitude long-range defense. It is believed that

potential adversaries are trying to improve their air defense capabilities by

upgrading their existing systems, purchasing more modern weapons, and

using camouflage and decoys. But, DOD believes that, even with

improvements, it is unlikely that potential adversaries could prevent U.S.

forces from achieving their objectives.

Several factors are likely to inhibit these nations from improving their

capabilities quickly. First, they lack the indigenous capability to develop

and produce the advanced systems that would permit them to significantly

enhance their capabilities. Therefore, advances will likely be confined to

upgrades of existing equipment and the possible acquisition of advanced

systems from outside sources.

Second, worldwide arms transfers have fallen significantly in recent years

and are not expected to reach former levels any time soon. Unlike the

former Soviet Union, Russia normally requires payment for its weapons

transfers. As a result, its arms transfers fell from $29 billion in 1987 to only

$1.3 billion in constant 1994 dollars. From 1992 to 1994, Russia exported a

total of 30 fixed-wing combat aircraft to developing countries. China has

also reduced its arms exports. The following chart illustrates both the

decline in the international arms market between 1987 and 1994 and the

dominance of Western suppliers.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
GAO Trend in the Worldwide Transfers of 

Conventional Arms, 1987-1994

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

0

20

40

60

80

Constant 1994 dollars

U.S. and Allies Russia and China Rest of World

Source: 1994-1995 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency.

Third, the United States and its allies are cooperating to limit conventional

arms transfers to certain nations. For example, the United Nations

imposed sanctions on several nations in the 1990s. These sanctions

prohibited the transfer of weapons or commercial technology that could

be used for military purposes to these nations. No measurable arms

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
transfers were made to these nations after the sanctions were imposed.

Similarly, 28 nations signed the Wassenaar Arrangement in

December 1995. Under this arrangement, the major arms producers agreed

to refrain from exporting arms and dual-use technology to certain nations.

In addition, the Missile Technology Control Regime, created in 1987, is

specifically designed to limit the transfer of missiles, including cruise and

theater ballistic missiles, and related technology. Taken together, the U.N.

sanctions, the Wassenaar arrangement, and the Missile Technology

Control Regime pose obstacles to potential adversaries seeking to acquire

highly-capable weapons and advanced technology.

Fourth, the high technology weapons that could seriously threaten U.S. air

power are expensive, no matter what the source. For example, aircraft

that are part of the original Eurofighter 2000 tactical aircraft contract are

projected to cost about $75 million each. An advanced air defense system

like the Patriot PAC-3 costs over $100 million for each battery. Given the

state of the economies of potential adversaries, it would be difficult for

them to purchase many high-cost systems.

To summarize, although the use of air power assets in terrorist actions

cannot be ruled out as a potential danger, available information suggests

that no potential adversary possesses sufficient capabilities to prevent U.S.

forces from achieving their objectives in a military engagement. Efforts by

these countries to modernize their forces will likely be inhibited by

declines in the post-Cold War arms market, national and international

efforts to limit the proliferation of conventional arms, and the high cost of

advanced weapons.

DOD Faces

Challenges in

Modernizing Its

Combat Air Forces

Although U.S. air power capabilities are already substantial—particularly

in relation to the threat, DOD has planned major air power modernization

programs in some areas to attain even greater capabilities. These

modernization plans center on several very expensive aircraft

development programs—the Navy’s F/A-18E/F fighter/attack aircraft; the

Air Force’s F-22 air superiority fighter; the Army’s Comanche armed

reconnaissance helicopter; and the Joint Strike Fighter.

Table 1 summarizes the estimated costs of DOD’s major air power

modernization programs. We have not included the Joint Strike Fighter in

this table because the program is still being defined and cost estimates are

preliminary. However, current plans are to develop and procure about

2,800 new aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. According to

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
DOD, the unit flyaway cost of the Joint Strike Fighter is expected to range

from about $29 million to $40 million (expressed in 1996 dollars)

depending on the service model procured and the contractor selected. If

these plans proceed, the Joint Strike Fighter would become DOD’s costliest

aircraft modernization program.

Table 1: Estimated Costs of Major Air

Power Investment Programs (as of

Dec. 31, 1995)a

Then-year dollars in billions

Program

Through

FY 1996

FY 1997 to

end of program Total

F/A-18E/F $4.9 $76.1 $81.0

F-22 14.0 56.1 70.1

Longbow Apache 1.9 6.4 8.3

Comancheb 3.1 41.7 44.8

B-1 bomber modifications 1.3 2.5 3.8

AV-8B remanufacture 0.5 1.8 2.3

Weaponsc 23.9 20.9 44.8

Total $49.6 $205.5 $255.1

aExcludes Joint Strike Fighter.

bData as of June 1996.

cIncludes Tomahawk, Longbow Hellfire, and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles; Army

Tactical Missile System; Joint Direct Attack Munitions; and Joint Stand-Off and Sensor-Fused

Weapons.

Source: Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

DOD faces a major challenge in attempting to pay for all of the programs as

planned. To illustrate, annual funding to procure new planned fighter

aircraft alone would need to average about $8 billion in real terms at least

through 2014. This appears to be unrealistic. The defense budget has been

declining in real terms since 1985, and both the administration and the

Congress project relatively flat top line defense budgets in real terms over

the next 6 years. As the nation attempts to achieve a balanced budget, it

may be difficult to increase overall defense spending.

In advising the Secretary of Defense on DOD’s plans, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended last year that the Secretary increase

annual procurement funding to $60 billion by 1998 to better recapitalize

U.S. military forces. This compares to the fiscal year 1997 procurement

budget request of $39 billion. In making this recommendation, he noted

that tactical aircraft procurement plans call for much greater than

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
expected resources in the outyears. The Secretary has said that he will

attempt to achieve the needed funding for modernization by seeking

higher funding levels from the Congress and by achieving savings from

outsourcing, acquisition reform, and infrastructure reductions. But, as

noted, higher defense budgets appear unlikely, and savings from

outsourcing and acquisition reform are uncertain. Moreover, we recently

reported that DOD has not yet projected any significant net infrastructure

savings through fiscal year 2001.2

To put the current funding dilemma into perspective, it should be noted

that the current level of investment that DOD plans is more consistent with

the former Cold War era than with the current security environment.

Based on our analysis of defense spending trends and projections, we have

concluded that DOD plans to spend almost as much over the next 18 years

to execute its current plans for fighter aircraft as it spent over the last 

18 years of the Cold War. One has to ask: With the Cold War ended, should

the United States be spending as much on tactical aircraft over the next 

18 years as it did during the massive defense build-up of the early to

mid-1980s?

To summarize, DOD has planned investments that are unachievable within

likely future budgets and appear to be inconsistent with the current

security environment. As I will discuss in the following sections, there are

good reasons for DOD to reconsider a number of its planned investments. If

it were to modify its current plans, the mismatch between programs and

budget could be reduced.

Major Air Power

Investment Decisions

Are Not Based on

Joint Assessments

Our work shows that DOD is proceeding with major air power programs

without having sufficiently assessed its joint mission requirements to meet

post-Cold War needs. Without such assessments, the Secretary of Defense

does not have the information needed to determine the need for and

priority of planned investments. In our mission reviews, we found that

major force structure and program decisions had been made without

completed analyses of the services’ joint qualitative and quantitative

requirements and aggregate capabilities to conduct these missions. As a

result, a definitive answer as to whether planned investments are needed

is not clear. However, past GAO work and information developed on our six

mission reviews suggest that DOD should reexamine some planned

investments for several reasons.

2

Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for Modernization

(GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 1996).

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
First, current forces in some mission areas already provide combatant

commanders with formidable, often overlapping and redundant

capabilities. The total inventory of assets that can be used to interdict

enemy ground targets illustrates this condition. As shown by table 2, each

of the services have extensive inventories of weapons that can be used for

interdiction.

Table 2: DOD’s Multiple Assets to

Interdict Enemy Ground Targets Service Category Asset 1996 Inventory

Air Force Fixed-wing

aircraft

F-15E

203

F-16 1,450

F-117 54

A/OA-10 369

B-1B 95

B-2 17

B-52 66

Navy and

Marine Corps

Fixed-wing

aircraft

A-6E

63

AV-8B 184

F-14A/D 323

F/A-18 806

Helicopters Cobra 176

Missiles Tomahawk 2,339

Army Helicopters Apache 798

Cobra/Kiowa Warrior 758

Missiles ATACMS 1,456

Source: Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Based on our analysis of DOD’s targeting data, the services collectively

have at least 10 ways to hit 65 percent of the thousands of expected

ground targets in two major regional conflicts. In addition, service

interdiction assets can provide 140 to 160 percent coverage for many types

of targets. Despite numerous overlapping interdiction capabilities, DOD is

investing about $200 billion to provide new and enhanced interdiction

capabilities over the next 15 to 20 years. This figure excludes the Joint

Strike Fighter program, which will further enhance these capabilities.

Second, we believe that programs initiated in response to Cold War threats

should not proceed without being reexamined in light of the changed

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
security environment. For example, the Air Force initiated the F-22

program in 1981 to meet the projected Soviet threat of the mid-1990s.

Under this program, the Air Force would acquire 438 new F-22 air

superiority fighter aircraft. Now, instead of confronting thousands of

modern Soviet fighters, U.S. air forces are likely to confront potential

adversaries having few fighters that could successfully challenge the

F-15—the U.S. frontline fighter. Similarly, the Air Force procured B-1B

bombers during the 1980s to acquire long-range, nuclear-capable aircraft

as quickly as possible. With the Cold War requirement for nuclear-capable

bombers reduced, DOD now plans to spend $2.5 billion to modify its fleet of

95 B-1B bombers to deliver conventional weapons. This investment is

being made despite the already substantial capability to destroy ground

targets through other means. The annual operation and support cost of the

B-1B fleet is $920 million.

Third, there appear to be less costly alternatives to some highly expensive

modernization programs. For these expensive programs, the payoff in

terms of added mission capability—considering the investment

required—does not appear to be “clear and substantial” as mandated by

the National Military Strategy. For example, the Navy F/A-18E/F’s

expected range, carrier recovery payload, and survivability—key areas

that DOD cited in justifying the F/A-18E/F—will be only marginally

improved over that of the less costly F/A-18C/D model. Cost estimates for

these planes vary widely depending on what costs are included. However,

we have recently reported that, based on the Marine Corps’ decision not to

purchase the F/A-18E/F, the unit recurring flyaway cost of this aircraft

could rise to as much as $53 million. This compares to an estimated unit

cost of $28 million for the F/A-18C/D, which has been improved in

capability.

Less costly alternatives to the Army’s Comanche helicopter also appear to

exist. According to Army program officials, the total estimated program

cost of the Comanche program is about $45 billion. Yet three existing

helicopters—the Marines’ Super Cobra and the Army’s Longbow Apache

and Kiowa Warrior already perform many of the functions that would be

assigned to the Comanche. The Super Cobra can already fulfill armed

reconnaissance and attack missions, and planned enhancements will

increase its speed and rate of climb. The Longbow Apache performs many

of the missions intended for the Comanche. Many users believe the

lethality, low observability, deployability, and speed of the Kiowa Warrior

when combined with certain upgrades or doctrinal changes would resolve

many of the deficiencies the Comanche is expected to resolve.

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
In short, a definitive answer as to the necessity of planned investments is

not possible without knowing how aggregate service capabilities match up

against joint warfighting requirements. However, based on our work, we

believe that DOD’s planned investments may be adding little military

capability in some mission areas and, in fact, may not be warranted by the

current and projected security environment. The extremely high cost of air

power investments makes it important for DOD to reexamine each program

in relation to joint requirements and existing capabilities and within the

context of the post-Cold War environment.

Decisions on Air

Power Programs and

Priorities Require

Comprehensive Joint

Assessments

Through key legislation, the Congress has sought to better integrate the

military services, provide a channel for independent military advice to the

Secretary of Defense, and strengthen the joint orientation of the

Department. Although DOD has improved its joint orientation in many

respects, the services continue to heavily influence defense decisions,

particularly those related to investments in weapons. Military advice from

a joint perspective is important to help the Secretary objectively weigh the

merits not only of combat air power but also of other defense programs.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

made the Chairman, JCS responsible for providing military advice from a

joint perspective to the Secretary of Defense. As principal military adviser

to the Secretary, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is expected to

advise the Secretary on the requirements, programs, and budgets of the

military services. The act directs the Chairman to (1) provide advice on the

priorities of requirements identified by the regional commanders in chief

(CINC), (2) determine the extent to which service program

recommendations and budget proposals conform with the CINCs’ priorities,

(3) submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals

within projected resource levels to achieve greater conformance with

these priorities, and (4) assess the military requirements for defense

acquisition programs. The National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal

Years 1993 and 1996 further directed the Chairman, JCS to examine how

DOD might eliminate or reduce duplicative capabilities and authorized him,

through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, to assess military

needs from a joint warfighting military perspective.

Although progress is being made, we believe that the Chairman, JCS needs

to do more to effectively carry out these responsibilities. For example, DOD

established a joint warfighting capabilities assessment process, under

which assessment teams are examining issues related to 10 selected

Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
mission areas. Established in 1994 to support the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council, these assessment teams have identified ways to

improve joint warfighting and have proposed other operational

improvements. However, the teams so far have had little impact in

reducing unneeded overlaps and duplication in existing capabilities. Also,

they have not been directed to delve into more controversial issues related

to U.S. air power, such as assessing alternative ways to modernize U.S. air

power capabilities.

The Department must conduct broader, more comprehensive assessments

if the Secretary is to have the information he needs to make the difficult

tradeoff decisions that may be required. At a minimum, we believe that

such assessments should, for each mission area,

• assess total joint warfighting requirements;

• inventory aggregate service capabilities, including the full range of

available assets;

• compare aggregate capabilities to joint requirements to identify excesses

or deficiencies, taking into consideration existing U.S. capabilities and

those of potential adversaries;

• assess the relative merits of retiring alternative assets, reducing

procurement quantities, or canceling acquisition programs where excesses

exist or where substantial payoff is not clear; and

• determine the most cost-effective means to satisfy deficiencies.

Conducting assessments in this way could help the Secretary of Defense

better decide what priority should be given to competing programs,

whether programmed investments should continue to be funded, and

whether new investments should be made.

Conclusions In conclusion, I would underscore that we believe that it is important that

DOD make air power investments that are matched to identified needs.

Funds spent on programs that add little needed capability at very high cost

when existing capabilities may already be sufficient to meet future

challenges are, in our opinion, funds not well spent.

To be in a position to make sound investment decisions, DOD needs to

closely examine both its combat air power force structure and its

modernization plans, which are rooted in the Cold War era. The high cost

of modernizing the force requires that DOD seek the greatest value in its

investments given current budget projections. Overlapping and often

Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
redundant air power capabilities provide combatant commanders with

desirable operational flexibility to respond to a wide variety of

circumstances. The question is whether, in the post-Cold War era, the

United States needs, or can afford, the current levels of overlap and

redundancy.

The Secretary needs better information from a joint perspective to help

decide what priority should be given to competing programs, whether

programmed investments should continue to be funded, and whether new

investments should be made. The urgent need for such assessments is

underscored by the reality that enormous outlays will be required in the

not-too-distant future to finance DOD’s combat air power programs as

currently planned.

Our work has led us to conclude that the Secretary of Defense needs

broader more comprehensive assessments in key mission areas if he is to

make the difficult decisions that he is likely to face. However, certain

long-standing obstacles must be overcome if the key challenges related to

air power are to be met head on. The Chairman, JCS must be a strong

advocate for the joint perspective as the Goldwater-Nichols legislation

intended. The interests of the U.S. military as a whole must be placed

above the interests of the individual services. And, if circumstances

change and program adjustments are needed, the Secretary and the

Chairman, JCS must be willing to challenge the strong proponents that

develop around major acquisition programs. If DOD is to shape its force

smartly within the bounds of likely budgets, existing levels of redundancy

in capability must be questioned, and no program, once begun, should be

considered irreversible.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

address any questions you or other members of the subcommittees may

have.

Page 15 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
Selected GAO Reports Related to This

Testimony

Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F Will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement

at High Cost (GAO/NSIAD-96-98, June 1996).

Combat Air Power: Assessment of Joint Close Support Requirements and

Capabilities Is Needed (GAO/NSIAD-96-45, June 1996).

Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction

Capabilities Could Save Billions (GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 1996).

Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air

Defenses May Be Too Low (GAO/NSIAD-96-128, Apr. 1996).

Navy Aviation: AV-8B Harrier Remanufacture Strategy Is Not the Most

Cost-Effective Option (GAO/NSIAD-96-49, Feb. 1996).

Aircraft Requirements: Air Force and Navy Need to Establish Realistic

Criteria for Backup Aircraft (GAO/NSIAD-95-180, Sept. 1995).

B-2 Bomber: Status of Cost, Development, and Production (GAO/NSIAD-95-164,

Aug. 1995).

Longbow Apache Helicopter: System Procurement Issues Need to be

Resolved (GAO/NSIAD-95-159, Aug. 1995).

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory,

Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 1995).

Comanche Helicopter: Testing Needs to Be Completed Prior to Production

Decisions (GAO/NSIAD-95-112, May 1995).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22

Aircraft Should Be Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 1995).

Cruise Missiles: Proven Capability Should Affect Aircraft and Force

Structure Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-95-116, Apr. 1995).

Army Aviation: Modernization Strategy Needs to Be Reassessed

(GAO/NSIAD-95-9, Nov. 1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 1994).

Page 16 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
Selected GAO Reports Related to This

Testimony

Strategic Bomber: Issues Relating to the B-1B’s Availability to Perform

Conventional Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-81, Jan. 1994).

(701096) Page 17 GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196
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Permit No. G100