UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD D. LEONARD,

Plaintiff,

 Civil Action 2:10-cv-956

v. Judge Michael H. Watson

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

ROBIN KNAB, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Ronald D. Leonard, a state-prison inmate proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, brings this civil rights action against Chillicothe Correctional Institution’s (“CCI”)

warden, Robin Knab. This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and

Recommendation on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 43.) Plaintiff has

not opposed Defendant’s Motion. For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that

Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED. 

I.

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, on August 31, 2010, while he was housed in

Segregation Unit Number Two at CCI, another inmate spit on him. He also alleges that on

September 9, 2010, a CCI corrections officer threatened to take him to segregation and mace him

in retaliation for filing lawsuits against CCI. He further alleges that while in solitary

confinement at CCI, he was subjected to cold temperatures in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Warden Knab failed to train and implement proper

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procedures. He posits that the alleged omissions are tantamount to condoning the incidents and

thus, seeks to hold Warden Knab personally liable. 

 In her unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant submits that she is entitled

to summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence establishing the requisite

personal involvement. She further asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because

Plaintiff has failed offer evidence demonstrating any injury. Plaintiff alternatively posits that she

is entitled to qualified immunity. 

II. 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial

burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the court must draw all

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stansberry v. Air

Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s

assertion of fact” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”).

“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must ‘designate specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Kimble v. Wasylyshyn, No. 10–3110, 2011

WL 4469612, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

324 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring a party maintaining that a fact is genuinely

disputed to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record”). “The nonmovant must,

however, do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts, . . . there must be evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of

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the non-moving party to create a genuine dispute.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson

Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

“When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving

party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case,

summary judgment is appropriate.” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at

322–23).

III. 

As a preliminary matter, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s failure to respond to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment amounts to an abandonment of his claims against

her. See Clark v. City of Dublin, 178 F. App’x 522, 524–25 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming trial

court’s finding that a party’s failure to properly respond to the arguments raised in a motion for

summary judgment constituted an abandonment of those claims); Hicks v. Concorde Career

Coll., 449 F. App’x 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The district court properly declined to consider

the merits of this claim because [the plaintiff] failed to address it in either his response to the

summary judgment motion or his response to [the defendant’s] reply brief); Conner v. Hardee’s

Food Sys., 65 F. App’x 19, 24–25 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that the plaintiff’s failure to brief

issues relating to one of its claims in the district court amounted to an abandonment of that

claim). Because Plaintiff has abandoned his claims, summary judgment for Defendant is

appropriate. 

Regardless, the Undersigned agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s failure to offer

evidence establishing her involvement is dispositive. In order to plead a cause of action under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: “(1) deprivation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” 

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Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing

McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006)). To sufficiently plead the

second element, a plaintiff must allege “personal involvement.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567,

575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). This is because “§ 1983 liability cannot be imposed under

a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. (citation omitted). “A supervisor is not liable under § 1983

for failing to train unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or

in some other way directly participated in it.” Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation omitted). Put another way, to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a

plaintiff “must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly

acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct . . . .” Id. Thus, Defendant Knab’s employment as

CCI’s Warden does not automatically establish her personal involvement in the alleged

incidents. As Defendant points out, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Defendant

Knab was in some way directly or indirectly involved in the incident. In sum, Defendant has

established that no genuine disputes as to any material facts remain for adjudication in this case

and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is therefore unnecessary to consider

Defendant’s alternative bases in favor of summary judgment. 

IV. 

 For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT

Defendant’s unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 43.) 

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PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate

review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994

(6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the

issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

Date: January 22, 2013 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

 United States Magistrate Judge

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