a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

December 2002 HOMELAND 

SECURITY

Management 

Challenges Facing 

Federal Leadership

GAO-03-260
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government has

invigorated the homeland security missions of many departments and

agencies, nearly doubled the amount of federal funds devoted to homeland

security, enacted new legislation to create a new department and strengthen

transportation security and law enforcement activities, leveraged

relationships with state and local governments and the private sector, and

begun to establish a framework for planning the national strategy and the

transition required for implementing the new Department of Homeland

Security and other homeland security goals. Overall, the federal

government's response on homeland security issues is still evolving.

• A new homeland security emphasis is under way, but remains

incomplete. Agencies reported a new emphasis on homeland security

activities, such as accelerated implementation of existing homeland

security activities or increased coordination with other government

agencies or the private sector. Agencies will be challenged in meeting

dual or unrelated missions while maintaining and strengthening

homeland security operations. Government organizational changes are

also contributing to the new emphasis, including creation of the Office of

Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, and the

integration of many homeland security functions into the new

Department of Homeland Security. Although officials say that

coordination efforts at all levels have increased, concerns remain

particularly with state and local government and collaboration with the

private sector needs greater emphasis.

• The federal government’s efforts to improve homeland security

will require a results-oriented approach to ensure mission

accountability and sustainability over time. Efforts to strengthen

homeland security will require a strategy to accomplish agencies’

missions, to create an effective transition for DHS, and to leverage

management practices and key success factors in order to merge and

transform the new department. In recognizing the value of a national

strategy, OHS, DHS, and others should not expect that all of the

homeland security objectives can be achieved simultaneously. As a

result, it will be important for these agencies to focus initially on the

most critical issues and greatest risks, and to guide the strategy’s

implementation in phases. Strategic planning efforts and comprehensive

risk analysis activities have been started, but remain incomplete.

Agencies with homeland security missions and the new department need

an integrated human capital strategy, and the development of a

performance management system and utilization of personnel

flexibilities can improve organizations’ effectiveness. DHS transition

planning has started, but will require sustained efforts, including

attention to management practices and key success factors.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Management Challenges Facing Federal

Leadership

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-260

To view the full report, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Patricia A.

Dalton (202) 512-6806 or daltonp@gao.gov.

Highlights of GAO-03-260, a report to the

Chairman, Committee on Governmental

Affairs, U.S. Senate

December 2002

To understand the federal

government’s response since the

September 11 terrorist attacks,

GAO was asked to review

governmentwide changes and

challenges prevalent in the

missions and activities of agencies

involved in homeland security,

including the coordination and

collaboration required to meet

overall goals and needs, and

government's efforts in planning

and implementing strategic,

transitional, and human capital

activities designed to reorganize

and strengthen homeland security.

GAO recommends that

• OHS, with OMB and DHS,

guide development of

performance measures and

time frames, and clarify the

roles of all parties to establish

accountability;

• OMB develop an effective

transition plan for DHS,

including practices identified in

GAO’s Mergers and

Transformation Forum and

other key success factors;

• OMB, with DHS, ensure the

implementation of broad based

management practices and

principles that will improve the

sustainability of DHS; and

• OPM, with OMB, develop and

oversee the implementation of

a long-term human capital

strategy for homeland security

activities.

OHS had no comments. OMB staff

provided technical comments. OPM

agreed with our recommendations.
Page i GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 6

Background 9

New Homeland Security Emphasis Underway, but Incomplete 12

Addressing Homeland Security Mission through a Results-Oriented 

Approach 34

Effective Oversight Critical to Success 52

Conclusion 52

Recommendations for Executive Action 55

Agency Comments 57

Appendixes

Appendix I: Homeland Security Funding by Department or Agency, Fiscal 

Years 2001 to 2003 58

Appendix II: Critical Success Factors for New Organizations 60

Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Personnel Management 62

Related GAO Products 65

Tables Table 1: Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices Included in 

Our Review 7

Table 2: List of Policy Coordinating Committees 20

Table 3: DHS Organizational Elements 22

Table 4: Lessons Learned about Mergers and Transformations for 

DHS and Other Federal Agencies 43

Figures Figure 1: Key Events Occurring after the September 11 Terrorist 

Attacks 10

Figure 2: Organizational Structure of the Office of Homeland 

Security as of April 2002 18

Figure 3: National Strategy Components 36

Figure 4: GAO’s Model of Strategic Human Capital Management 49
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Abbreviations

ABA American Bankers Association

ACC American Chemistry Council

APHIS Animal and Plant Inspection Service

BOR Bureau of Reclamation 

BSPC Border Station Partnership Council 

CBO Congressional Budget Office

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism 

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOE Department of Energy

DOI Department of the Interior

DOJ Department of Justice

DOT Department of Transportation

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

GSA General Services Administration

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration

HSC Homeland Security Council 

IMRA International Mass Retail Association

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

ISAC information sharing and analysis center 

ISC Interagency Security Committee 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Forces

NACCHO National Association of County and City Health Officials

NACo National Association of Counties

NAM National Association of Manufacturers

NGA National Governors Association

NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center

NLC National League of Cities

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OASPHEP Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health 

Emergency Preparedness

OHS Office of Homeland Security
Contents

Page iii GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPM Office of Personnel Management

PCC Policy Coordination Committee

TSA Transportation Security Administration

USDA Department of Agriculture

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product.
Page 1 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

December 20, 2002 Letr

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman

Committee on Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

While significant progress has occurred over the past year in addressing the 

demands of its homeland security mission, the federal government still 

faces numerous challenges, including the implementation of the newly 

created Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the implementation of 

the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the coordination of 

roles and responsibilities of many entities in the public and private sectors. 

The Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, and the 

American people all have a shared responsibility for ensuring our 

homeland security, but the leadership of the federal government in 

achieving this goal is critical. The federal government will need to 

effectively respond to significant management and coordination challenges 

if it is to provide this leadership and be successful in preventing and 

responding to any future acts of terrorism.

To better understand the federal government’s response since the 

September 11 terrorist attacks, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs requested that we conduct a governmentwide review 

of changes to the missions and activities of agencies involved in homeland 

security. Our objectives included (1) describing changes and challenges 

prevalent in the missions and activities of the various agencies involved in 

homeland security, as well as the nature of coordination and collaboration 

required to meet overall goals and needs, and (2) describing 

governmentwide efforts in planning and implementing strategic, transition, 

human capital, and other management activities designed to reorganize, 

strengthen, and support homeland security. 

In describing homeland security efforts, we used the definition employed 

by the administration in its National Strategy for Homeland Security, 

issued in July 2002. We also focused on those agencies and entities listed in 

the Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism of the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB), as well as other agencies that a review of 

government budget documents and supporting literature indicated had 

significant involvement in homeland security activities. 
Page 2 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Our work is based on the review of documents and interviews conducted at 

more than two dozen federal departments and agencies, including central 

management agencies such as OMB, the General Services Administration 

(GSA) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Additionally, due 

to the dynamic and evolving nature of the government’s homeland security 

activities, some of our work described in this report has already appeared 

in congressional testimony in order to assist the Congress with its 

consideration of DHS legislation and other homeland security issues. 

Although we continue to examine a variety of specific homeland security 

activities and implications for the Congress, this report is also consistent 

with, and summarizes, work we have recently done in the general 

management areas of government transformation, strategic planning, and 

human capital planning.

Results in Brief Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government 

has invigorated the homeland security activities of many departments and 

agencies, more than doubled the amount of federal funds devoted to 

homeland security, enacted new legislation to integrate some homeland 

security agencies and strengthen transportation security and law 

enforcement activities, leveraged existing and new relationships with state 

and local governments and the private sector, and begun to establish a 

framework for planning the multiplicity of activities existing within the 

nation's homeland security goals. 

While a new homeland security emphasis is under way throughout the 

federal government, the response is still evolving. Additional actions to 

clarify missions and activities will be necessary, and some agencies will 

need to determine how best to support both homeland security and nonhomeland security missions. For instance, of the more than two dozen 

federal agencies we contacted, many reported a new emphasis on 

homeland security activities; however, the type of response differed 

depending on the individual agencies' roles and responsibilities. Some 

departments and agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

and the U.S. Customs Service, have accelerated their implementation of 

existing homeland security activities or increased efforts to coordinate 

activities with other government agencies or the private sector. Legislation 

such as the USA Patriot Act, enacted to strengthen law enforcement 

activities related to homeland security, has provided agencies with new 

tools to help fight terrorism. At the same time, the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Coast Guard are significantly 

increasing the priority of and resources allocated to homeland security 
Page 3 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

missions while balancing the demands of their traditional missions, such as 

maritime safety. A number of agencies will be challenged in meeting dual 

or unrelated missions while maintaining and strengthening their homeland 

security operations. The legislation authorizing DHS requires that DHS 

ensure that agency functions not directly related to homeland security are 

not diminished or neglected.

Federal coordination and collaboration efforts in homeland security also 

have been invigorated, as information-sharing activities between and 

among federal agencies have increased. In the aftermath of September 11, 

the President established the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the 

Homeland Security Council (HSC) as the mechanisms for coordinating 

agencies’ homeland security activities and developing a national homeland 

security strategy. These efforts can be built upon further to increase 

coordination and collaboration. Furthermore, the newly created DHS will 

have the responsibility for consolidating many homeland security activities 

and coordinating the efforts of federal, state, and local governments and 

the private sector. The legislation also authorizes HSC and establishes an 

Office of International Affairs. 

Although collaboration with state and local governments is increasing, 

more needs to be done in order to enhance its effectiveness. Collaboration 

with the private sector also needs greater emphasis. Prior to September 11, 

the public and private sectors collaborated on homeland security activities 

but the catastrophic events heightened the recognition that more concrete 

and long-term approaches to improving homeland security were necessary. 

Our work indicated that the federal government, state and local 

governments, and certain parts of the private sector are engaging in 

important projects to improve homeland security, but that a greater 

emphasis on coordination and collaboration is necessary among some 

sectors in order to meet long-term goals. DHS’s Office of State and Local 

Coordination will manage this coordination, along with a liaison official for 

the private sector. 

Moreover, the federal government’s effort to improve homeland security 

will require a results-oriented approach to ensure mission accountability 

and sustainability over time. The various planning activities now under 

way, including the national strategy, DHS transition planning, agencies' 

strategic planning efforts, and human capital planning, have started, but 

their implementation has just begun and will necessitate sustained 

management and oversight to ensure success. The legislation authorizing 

DHS includes provisions addressing human capital planning, 
Page 4 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

comprehensive transition planning, and the development of multiyear 

budget plans for DHS.

A key component in integrating homeland security missions and activities 

is the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, which 

articulates the activities that must be accomplished or coordinated to 

improve the nation’s actions to prevent terrorism. The national strategy 

provides a definition of homeland security and outlines a framework for 

agencies’ activities by setting forth overarching goals, but much of the 

implementation and mechanisms for achieving these goals have not been 

developed, such as establishing meaningful performance measures and 

clear roles and responsibilities. In some instances, the DHS legislation 

specifically calls for performance goals and measures. Our prior work has 

indicated that consolidating and transforming activities into a more resultsoriented organization will require adherence to certain management 

practices and key success factors. A recent mergers and transformation 

forum we held indicated that transforming organizational cultures required 

such practices as ensuring that top leadership drives change, establishing a 

coherent mission and integrated strategic goals, and focusing on a key set 

of principles and priorities. Furthermore, we have indicated in recent 

testimony to the Congress that certain key factors, such as strategic 

planning, risk management, human capital management, financial 

management, and information technology management are necessary to 

achieve the government’s homeland security objectives. A comprehensive 

planning and management focus will also be critical to efforts to transition 

transportation, border security and other specific agencies into a new 

department. The government's efforts in these areas, while under way, are 

neither complete nor comprehensive; additional work will be necessary to 

ensure that these activities fully contribute to homeland security goals. 

Transitioning agencies into a new department will be challenging, with the 

implementation of a fully integrated department expected to take 5 to 10 

years. The President has taken an important first step by establishing a 

transition office within OMB to design and coordinate this transition so 

that agencies are incorporated into DHS as smoothly as possible while 

maintaining their readiness to protect the nation. 

As the federal government clearly faces a number of leadership and 

management challenges in achieving its homeland security mission, we 

recommend the following:

• Given the scope of homeland security objectives across the public and 

private sector, it is important for OHS, in conjunction with OMB and 
Page 5 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

DHS, to set priorities, to help guide and support the development of 

performance measures and time frames, and to assess and oversee 

progress in implementing the national homeland security strategy. 

Through the national strategy, OHS should also lead efforts to ensure 

clarity in the roles and responsibilities of all parties – OHS, OMB, DHS, 

and others – to leverage collaboration among them, and to establish 

effective accountability to meet national goals. Moreover, these entities 

will need to balance and reconcile program objectives and priorities, 

and make realistic resource allocations, within and among homeland 

security and non-homeland security missions across government.

• OMB in developing an effective transition plan for DHS, should ensure 

that the plan incorporates the practices identified in our mergers and 

transformation forum discussed in this report, as well as the key factors 

for successful organizations listed in appendix II in helping lay the 

foundation for a cohesive, world-class organization capable of 

protecting the nation from terrorism. 

• Over the coming years, OMB, in conjunction with DHS, should help 

ensure the implementation of broad-based management practices and 

principles that will improve the sustainability of DHS and other 

homeland security activities, consistent with statutory and regulatory 

requirements as well as the President’s Management Agenda. They 

should, in part, direct the establishment of appropriate plans and 

management systems to ensure the needed management capacity, 

people, partnerships, and accountability to achieve national homeland 

security goals. This includes an effective strategic planning system that 

articulates meaningful performance goals, objectives, and measures; an 

effective human capital strategy; and a process for reporting and 

oversight. Strong financial and information technology systems and 

internal controls will also be critical to the success of DHS and other 

organizations with homeland security missions. 

• OPM, in conjunction with OMB and the agencies, should develop and 

oversee the implementation of a long-term human capital strategy that 

can support the capacity building across government required to meet 

the objectives of the nation's efforts to strengthen homeland security. 

With respect to DHS, in particular, this strategy should

• establish an effective performance management system, which 

incorporates the practices that reinforce a “line of sight” that shows 
Page 6 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

how unit and individual performance can contribute to overall 

organization goals; 

• provide for the appropriate utilization of the human capital 

flexibilities granted to DHS to effectively manage its workforce; and

• foster an environment that promotes employee involvement and 

empowerment, as well as constructive and cooperative labormanagement employee relations.

OMB, OHS, and OPM were provided a draft of this report for their review. 

OPM concurred with the recommendations relevant to them and noted that 

they were actively involved in accomplishing them. OPM also provided 

technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. OMB and 

OHS did not provide official comments. However, OMB staff members did 

provide technical comments to our draft, which we incorporated as 

appropriated. 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

To better understand the federal government’s response since the 

September 11 terrorist attacks, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs requested that we conduct a governmentwide review 

of changes to the missions and activities of agencies involved in homeland 

security. As part of our review, we used the definition of homeland security 

in the President’s February 2002 document, Securing the Homeland, 

Strengthening the Nation. It said homeland security encompasses those 

activities that are focused on combating terrorism and occur within the 

United States and its territories. Such activities include efforts to detect, 

deter, protect against, and, if needed, respond to terrorist attacks. As our 

work progressed, we used the homeland security definition within the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security—a concerted national effort to 

prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's 

vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from 

attacks that do occur. Our objectives included (1) describing changes and 

challenges prevalent in the missions and activities of agencies involved in 

homeland security, as well as the nature of coordination and collaboration 

required to meet overall goals and needs, and (2) describing government 

efforts in planning and implementing strategic, transition, and human 

capital management activities designed to reorganize, strengthen, and 

support homeland security.
Page 7 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

To identify federal agency mission and organizational changes, and the 

development and implementation of results management approaches, we 

obtained available documents and interviewed officials from over two 

dozen federal departments, agencies, and offices. Table 1 details the 

specific departments, agencies, and offices we reviewed.

Table 1: Federal Departments, Agencies, and Offices Included in Our Review

Department or independent agency Agencies or offices

Department of Agriculture Agricultural Research Service

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Food Safety Inspection Service

Office of the Secretary

Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security

National Institute of Standards and 

Technology

Department of Defense Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency

National Guard

Office of the Secretary

Department of Energy Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

National Nuclear Security Administration

Office of Security

Department of Health and Human 

Services

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Food and Drug Administration

Health Resources and Services 

Administration

National Institutes of Health

Office of Emergency Preparedness

Office of Assistant Secretary for Public Health 

Emergency Preparedness

Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation

National Park Service

Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation

Immigration and Naturalization Service

U.S. Marshals Service

Department of Transportation U.S. Coast Guard

Transportation Security Administration
Page 8 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Source: GAO.

We selected these departments and agencies according to the following 

criteria: (1) homeland security importance based on past combating 

terrorism activities and funding as shown in OMB’s Annual Report to 

Congress on Combating Terrorism, (2) homeland security priorities 

discussed in the President’s Fiscal Year 2003 budget, and (3) related GAO 

work. In addition, we examined publicly available documents from state 

and local government and private sector organizations, and we interviewed 

officials of the National League of Cities and the National Association of 

Counties to obtain information regarding the coordination of federal 

homeland security efforts with states and localities. We also reviewed 

external reports, studies, and literature on homeland security. 

To identify homeland security activities on budgeting and funding 

priorities, we interviewed officials from OMB and other respective 

department and agency officials. We analyzed the budget documents and 

budget development process for the 2002 emergency supplemental funding 

legislation and the President’s proposed fiscal year 2003 budget. 

Although OHS met with us for initial discussions about the scope of our 

engagement, it did not respond to our numerous requests for subsequent 

meetings. As a result, our report's description of OHS' role in homeland 

security management is incomplete. In addition, we did not verify the 

accuracy or reliability of the documentation or data provided to us by the 

agencies and departments or other organizations, nor did we evaluate the 

effectiveness of the activities described. 

Department of the Treasury U.S. Customs Service

Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network

U.S. Secret Service

Federal Emergency Management Agency

General Services Administration

Environmental Protection Agency

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Personnel Management

Office of Management and Budget

Office of Homeland Security

(Continued From Previous Page)

Department or independent agency Agencies or offices
Page 9 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

We conducted our review at agency and department headquarters in 

Washington, D.C., and CDC’s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, from 

February 2002 through November 2002 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards.

On November 26, 2002, we requested comments on a draft of this report 

from the Directors of OMB, OHS, and OPM. OHS stated that they had no 

comments. OMB did not provide official comments, but OMB staff 

members did provide technical comments. The Director of OPM provided 

written comments on December 19, 2002, which have been summarized at 

the end of this report and reproduced in appendix III. On December 7, 

2002, we provided excerpts of our draft report to those agencies that were 

mentioned within the report. We received technical comments from USDA, 

DOJ, DOT, Treasury, FEMA, FERC, and NRC, and we have incorporated 

them as appropriate. 

Background Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, the President and the Congress 

have responded with important and aggressive actions to protect the 

nation. Funding for homeland security increased dramatically immediately 

following the terrorist attacks, beginning with the $40 billion emergency 

supplemental appropriations act (Public Law 107-38), passed by the 

Congress on September 18, 2001, $10.7 billion of which was appropriated 

for homeland security initiatives.1

 On October 11, 2001, Senator Joseph I. 

Lieberman introduced a bill in Congress to establish a Department of 

National Homeland Security. The President issued Executive Order 13228 

establishing OHS with the broad responsibility for coordinating efforts to 

secure the United States from terrorist attacks. The President also signed 

into law the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2001 (Public Law 107-56), 

which enhanced law enforcement agencies’ ability to investigate financial 

counterfeiting, smuggling, and money laundering and to share vital 

information to combat terrorism. In November 2001, the Congress enacted 

legislation to address transportation-related homeland security needs, the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71), which 

created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the 

Department of Transportation (DOT) to ensure security in the nation’s 

1

 The remainder of the emergency supplemental funded military actions overseas and onetime costs for rebuilding and recovery at the attack sites. Neither of these activities—direct 

military action and immediate response and recovery—are included in the definition of 

homeland security.
Page 10 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

transportation system, including the security of passengers and baggage in 

commercial aviation. Figure 1 presents a timeline of significant events 

since September 11. 

Figure 1: Key Events Occurring after the September 11 Terrorist Attacks 

a

As enacted, the emergency supplemental (P.L. 107-206) included $5.1 billion in contingent 

emergency spending. The President had 30 days after enactment to decide whether to submit a 

budget amendment to the Congress that designated either all or none of that $5.1 billion of contingent 

spending as emergency funding. On August 13, the President announced that he would not utilize the 

$5.1 billion contingent emergency spending. Hence, the total amount of available funds is 

approximately $24 billion.

Due to the timing of the attacks, the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget 

proposal was the administration’s first opportunity to define in policy and 

funding terms the scope and nature of homeland security activities. For 

purposes of developing the fiscal year 2003 budget, OMB, together with 

OHS, defined homeland security, as “those activities that are focused on 

combating and protecting against terrorism and occurring within the U.S. 

and its territories.” According to OMB officials, OHS was involved in 

providing guidance and setting priorities in the development of the fiscal 

year 2003 budget proposal. 

Sep 01 Oct Nov Dec Jan 02 Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

9/11/01

Terrorist

attacks

9/18/01

$40 billion

emergency

supplemental

signed

9/30/01

FY 01

ends

10/4/01

First known

victim of

Anthrax

attack dies

2/4/02

President submits

FY 03 budget

request

Late Nov 01

OMB “passback” to

agencies on policy,

priorities, and

funding levels 4/24/02

OMB issues guidance

to agencies to

prepare FY 04 budget

6/2/02

President proposes

DHS

legislation 5/2/02

The Congress introduces

DHS

legislation

6/24/02

OMB issues annual

report on combating

terrorism

7/16/02

President issues

National Strategy

for Homeland 

Security

8/2/02

$24 billion

emergency

supplemental

signeda

11/2/02

The Congress passes

DHS

legislation

11/19/01

TSA

established

10/26/01

USA Patriot Act

becomes law

10/11/02

Senator Lieberman

introduces homeland

security legislation

10/8/01

OHS

established

Source: GAO analysis.
Page 11 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

In the end, total federal homeland security funding was approximately 

$37.7 billion in the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget request, later revised 

to $37.8 to include some programs that initially were not included in the 

definition (mainly some spending for the Department of Veterans Affairs). 

Appendix I list homeland security funding by department and agency.

In the spring of 2002, OMB issued planning guidance to executive agencies 

for the fiscal year 2004 budget request. Departments and agencies were 

directed to develop budget requests that constrained growth in all areas 

except those designated by the administration as high priority, including 

homeland security. 

On May 2, 2002, Senator Lieberman and Representative William M. “Mac” 

Thornberry both introduced legislation, and in June 2002 the President 

transmitted draft legislation to the Congress, to establish DHS. During the 

summer of 2002, the legislative branch began debating proposals for the 

new department. As part of the Congress’ consideration of the legislation, 

we provided testimony to several committees about the proposal for a new 

department.2

 We outlined a number of factors that would be critical to the 

new DHS, organizational issues for homeland security, and the 

sustainability of the government’s efforts over the long term. Some of these 

issues are discussed later in this report. In November 2002, the Congress 

passed and the President signed legislation to create DHS. 

Several weeks after the President’s legislative proposal was sent to the 

Congress, OHS issued the administration’s National Strategy for 

Homeland Security, which defined homeland security and outlined three 

strategic homeland security objectives. On August 2, 2002, President Bush 

signed a $29 billion emergency supplemental appropriations act (Public 

Law 107-296), $5.1 billion of which was contingency funding that was never 

made available. Of the remaining $24 billion in available funds, according 

to our analysis, approximately $4.6 billion, or 19 percent, was appropriated 

for homeland security activities. 

2

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation 

Issues, GAO-01-957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).
Page 12 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

New Homeland 

Security Emphasis 

Underway, but 

Incomplete

Many federal agencies have made commitments of planning, funding, and 

resources to meet homeland security missions since September 11. 

Although many agencies we reviewed reported a new emphasis on 

homeland security activities, the responses differed depending on the 

individual roles and responsibilities of specific agencies. Some entities, 

such as the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HHS) CDC, the 

Department of the Treasury, and TSA, provided greater vigilance to existing 

homeland security missions, such as improving the response to 

bioterrorism or blocking terrorist financing. Other agencies needed to 

expand their homeland security missions, at times confronting challenges 

to balancing their expanded homeland missions with important nonhomeland security missions, such as the Coast Guard’s maritime safety and 

fisheries enforcement activities. Still other organizations, including the 

National Guard, were asked to take on new duties. Many agencies have 

also revitalized policy groups or other coordinating mechanisms that, after 

the events of September 11, have become even more critical.

Moreover, earlier this year the President approved the latest Department of 

Defense Unified Command Plan (Plan). Defense has said the Plan will 

realign and streamline the U.S. military structure to better address 21st 

century threats. It is characterized as the most significant reform of the 

nation's military command structure since the first command plan was 

issued shortly after World War II. The Plan, among other things, 

established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The new 

NORTHCOM commander will be responsible for land, aerospace, and sea 

defenses of the United States. Its geographic area will include the 

continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, portions of the 

Caribbean, and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

NORTHCOM will assume the homeland defense duties now held by the 

Joint Forces Command, such as responsibility to civil authorities for 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and major conventional 

explosives events. NORTHCOM will also help Defense deal with natural 

disasters, attacks on U.S. soil, or other civil difficulties. It is also intended 

to provide a more coordinated military support to civil authorities such as 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), and state and local governments.

Meanwhile, the government has engaged in significant reorganization of its 

policy and other operations activities in order to prevent or improve 

protection of the United States against terrorism. As mentioned, the 
Page 13 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

President ordered the creation of OHS to coordinate governmentwide 

homeland security activities and to ensure collaborative partnerships and 

effective information sharing between all levels of government and the 

private sector. A number of new laws were passed designed to enhance 

security and improve law enforcement activities related to terrorism. A 

new cabinet department, DHS, was created to consolidate some homeland 

security functions and to help strengthen coordination among the many 

other homeland security functions that are not included in DHS. 

Federal departments and agencies have recognized that the successful 

achievement of homeland security goals will require more formal and 

intensive coordination. As a result, some agencies created new high-level 

policy offices to centralize communication and decision making while 

others established new interagency councils or task forces to address 

needs, gaps, and overlap. A few agencies consolidated existing dispersed 

homeland security offices and others determined that existing 

arrangements were appropriate and required little or no changes. Federal 

agencies have also taken some steps to provide assistance to state and 

local governments, especially in such areas as emergency management. 

Nevertheless, state and local government organizations indicate that even 

as interaction between and among levels of government has increased, 

more needs to be done in order to enhance its effectiveness. Furthermore, 

although federal agencies and certain parts of the private sector are 

engaging in important projects to improve homeland security, a greater 

emphasis on coordination is necessary among some sectors in order to 

meet long-term goals.
Page 14 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Agencies Emphasize 

Homeland Security 

Activities 

Most agency officials reported that their homeland security activities had 

been expanded since the September 11 terrorist attacks, with some 

officials reporting a new emphasis on their existing homeland security 

missions. Officials reported that agencies’ expanded or accelerated 

existing homeland security activities because of recent legislation and 

substantial emergency supplemental funding. For example, CDC has 

emphasized approaches to protecting individuals against infectious 

diseases caused by bioterrorism as part of its overall mission of preventing 

and controlling diseases. In addition, CDC has recently revised its 

Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines to include operational and 

logistical considerations associated with implementing a large-scale 

voluntary vaccination program in response to a confirmed smallpox 

outbreak.3

 Likewise, FEMA is awarding grants to help States modify their 

emergency operations plans, expand and train community emergency 

response teams, and make enhancements to emergency operations centers 

and communications capabilities. These efforts will lay the groundwork to 

implement the President’s First Responders Initiative, which, once 

approved by Congress, will assist local responders such as firefighters, 

police officers, and emergency medical teams in developing 

comprehensive response plans for terrorist attacks, purchasing equipment, 

training for response to terrorist incidents, and coordinating regular 

exercise programs with other first responders. According to an official of 

the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), it has 

increased its inspection staff by 50 percent at points of entry to intercept 

potential threats to the nation’s food supply and agriculture industry. 

The Department of Energy (DOE) has focused on safeguarding and 

securing its nuclear weapons complex and stored stockpile materials. 

DOE has accelerated the deployment of the Biological Aerosol Sentry and 

Information System, which provides public health and law enforcement 

authorities with information about airborne biological attacks for special 

events, such as high visibility conferences and major sporting events. 

3

 On December 13, 2002, the President announced plans to administer the smallpox vaccine 

to certain military and civilian personnel who are or may be deployed in high threat areas, as 

well as to vaccinate emergency health care workers and other critical personnel who may 

serve on volunteer smallpox response teams. Although the administration is not 

recommending vaccination for the general public, the administration has stated that public 

health agencies will work to accommodate members of the general public who insist on 

being vaccinated. 
Page 15 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

In addition to invigorating existing missions, some agencies have assumed 

new homeland security activities. For example, the USA Patriot Act has 

expanded the responsibilities of Treasury’s Office of Enforcement, 

empowering it to use financial institutions’ transaction data to investigate a 

country suspected of supporting terrorist financing. Additionally, the 

National Guard was deployed to improve airport security. From September 

2001 to May 2002, the National Guard mobilized approximately 7,200 

guardsmen to protect travelers at 444 commercial airports nationwide. 

The new emphasis on homeland security activities has resulted in agencies 

reallocating equipment and personnel from other traditional mission 

activities. For example, the Coast Guard reported the temporary deemphasis of its maritime safety and environmental protection activities 

after September 11. Coast Guard cutters and aircraft that were used mainly 

on the high seas were relocated closer to major harbors and security was 

strengthened at potential terrorist targets such as oil refineries, cruise ship 

terminals, and other port facilities. In March 2002, the Coast Guard 

Commandant issued guidance that its fleet should manage its operations 

and personnel to address the Coast Guard’s non-homeland security 

missions while still maintaining a heightened level of security. We have 

recently recommended that the Coast Guard develop a longer-term strategy 

that outlines how it sees its resources being distributed across various 

missions, and a time frame for achieving it.4

 

In addition, the FBI announced the second phase of its reorganization on 

May 29, 2002, that it planned to shift its mission priorities from nonhomeland security activities such as drug investigations, white-collar 

crimes, and violent crimes to homeland security activities by permanently 

shifting 518 field agents to counterterrorism.5

 Specifically, the FBI plans to 

reduce the number of special agents involved in drug investigations by 

about 29 percent as well as reduce agent personnel in the areas of whitecollar and violent crimes. It is important to note, however, that the 

4

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and 

Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002). 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002) requires that the Coast 

Guard’s non-homeland security functions such as marine safety be maintained intact and 

not be significantly reduced after being transferred to DHS, except as specified in 

subsequent acts.

5

 The FBI reports that of these 518 field agents, 480 agents went to the Counterterrorism 

Program, 25 went to support the training of new agents at the FBI Academy and 13 went to 

the Security Division to implement critical security improvements. 
Page 16 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

majority of the FBI’s personnel will still remain focused on non-homeland 

security missions. 

Several agencies we reviewed have developed dual-purpose programs that 

serve both homeland security and non-homeland security missions. For 

example, CDC has been using its Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 

Program to help state and local health agencies build a communications 

infrastructure to improve the collection and transmission of information 

related to both bioterrorist incidents and other public health events. 

Similarly, HHS’s Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) has 

been using its Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program to help state 

and local hospitals develop plans to respond to bioterrorism events and 

other public health emergencies. Although the origin of a disease may not 

be clear at the outset, the same public health resources are mobilized to 

respond to the emergency and deal with any consequences, regardless of 

the source.6

 Agencies outside the public health and scientific research and 

development arenas also have programs or units that serve dual purposes. 

For instance, the National Guard maintains its dual status as a federal 

military resource (under Title 10, United States Code) and a statecontrolled emergency and consequence management resource (under Title 

32, United States Code). Many of the agencies that will be transferred to 

DHS have both homeland security and non-homeland security missions and 

will be challenged to balance both types of mission. The legislation 

requires DHS to ensure that agency functions not directly related to 

homeland security are not diminished or neglected.

OHS Charged with Broad 

Responsibilities

A significant amount of federal homeland security functions is being 

reorganized or will likely be reorganized in the future. We have indicated in 

previous testimony that a reorganization of some homeland security 

functions may help to improve efficiencies and reduce overlaps in meeting 

critical objectives.7

 Although reorganization efforts have been initiated at 

both the central management and department and agency level, these 

efforts are incomplete and may take years to fully and effectively 

implement.

6

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve 

Coordination but Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises 

Concerns, GAO-02-954T (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002).

7 GAO-02-954T.
Page 17 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

OHS, established by executive order soon after the terrorist attacks, was 

charged with broad responsibilities including, but not limited to working 

with federal agencies, state and local government, and private entities to 

develop a national homeland security strategy and to coordinate 

implementation of the strategy. The Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security heads OHS, which is divided into three functional 

components. 

The Deputy Homeland Security Advisor is responsible for five directorates: 

(1) research and development, (2) policy and plans, (3) protection and 

prevention, (4) response and recovery, and (5) intelligence and detection. 

A Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security is responsible 

for external affairs, which includes directorates for intergovernmental 

affairs, communications, and public liaison. An Executive Secretary is 

responsible for administration and support. In addition, the Executive 

Secretary and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor share responsibility for a 

coordination center that serves as the primary contact for state and local 

entities as well as the private sector and would be tasked with coordinating 

the response to a domestic incident if it occurred and a threat monitoring 

center, which oversees and reviews information for federal agencies. 

Figure 2 provides OHS’s organizational structure.
Page 18 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Figure 2: Organizational Structure of the Office of Homeland Security as of April 2002

Public

Liaison

Directorate

Communications

Directorate

Research and

Development

Directorate

Policy and Plans

Directorate

Response and

Recovery

Directorate

Intelligence and

Detection

Directorate Threat

Monitoring

Center

Protection and

Prevention

Directorate

Coordination

Center

Administration

and Support

Executive Secretary Deputy Homeland Security

Advisor

Deputy Assistant to the

President for

Homeland Security

Special Assistant to the

President for

External Affairs

General Counsel

Assistant to the President

for Homeland Security

Special Advisor

to the President

for Cyberspace

Security

National Director and

Deputy National

Security Advisor for

Combating

Terrorism

Intergovernmental

Affairs

Directorate

Source: Office of Homeland Security, Draft (April 2002).
Page 19 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

In addition to assisting in the coordination of homeland security efforts on 

the federal, state, and local levels as well as the private sector, OHS has 

been responsible for drafting and issuing the national strategy for 

homeland security, designing the homeland security advisory system,8

 and 

working with OMB and agencies regarding the levels and uses of funding 

for homeland security activities. OHS is authorized through Executive 

Order 13228 to certify that budget requests for homeland security are 

necessary and appropriate. The Director of OHS certified the funding 

levels for homeland security activities in the proposed fiscal year 2003 

budget in a memorandum dated February 4, 2002. 

Along with OHS, the President established the Homeland Security Council 

(HSC) to serve as the mechanism for ensuring coordination of homeland 

security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and 

effective development and implementation of homeland security policies.9

 

The council includes a Principals Committee, which consists of the 

secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, Health and Human Services, and 

Transportation, and the Attorney General; the directors of OMB, the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FEMA, and the FBI; the chiefs of staff of 

the President and the Vice President, and the Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security (who serves as chairman). In addition, a Deputies 

Committee, including deputy officials from those departments and 

agencies participating in the Principal’s Committee, serves as the senior 

sub-cabinet interagency forum. HSC’s main day-to-day forums for 

interagency coordination of homeland security policy are the policy 

coordination committees (PCC), 11 of which were established by 

Presidential Directive 1 and are listed in table 2.

8

 The Homeland Security Advisory System, established through Presidential Directive 3, is 

designed to provide a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information 

regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state, and local authorities. Such a system 

would provide warnings in the form of a set of graduated "Threat Conditions" that would 

increase as the risk of the threat increases. This system is intended to create a common 

vocabulary, context, and structure about the nature of the threats that confront the 

homeland and the appropriate measures that should be taken in response. 

9

 The DHS legislation institutionalizes the HSC within the Executive Office of the President 

to advise the President on homeland security matters. Its members are the President, the 

Vice President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of 

Defense, and other individuals the President may designate.
Page 20 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Table 2: List of Policy Coordinating Committees

Source: Homeland Security Presidential Directive –1, October 29, 2001.

Agencies reported varying degrees of input and coordination with this 

central policy development process. Some had frequent contact with the 

PCC or OHS, while others had minimal or no contact at all. For example, 

Defense officials reported having specialists in various areas that attended 

PCC meetings and wrote a chapter for the national homeland security 

strategy. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also reported 

providing input to the national strategy. Officials from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) reported working closely with OHS staff 

and assisting in the development of a critical infrastructure protection plan 

and the threat advisory system. USDA had representatives in all of OHS’s 

directorates and PCC and said that it played an active part in OHS’s 

decision-making process. DOE officials reported being the government 

lead on three PCC. An HHS official said that it was very involved in the 

medical and public health preparedness PCC, the one most important to 

HHS. In addition, many departments had detailees on OHS’s staff.

However, a few departments expressed concern that participation in the 

PCC or contact with OHS was limited or nonexistent even though they 

considered their missions to be important to homeland security. For 

example, officials at GSA’s Public Building Service said they expected to 

work with OHS in developing the homeland security advisory system, but 

they were not involved in formulating the policies. GSA officials said they 

also expected to be involved with OHS on border station security issues, 

but only received feedback through OMB.

1. Detection, Surveillance, and Intelligence

2. Plans, Training, Exercises, and Evaluation

3. Law Enforcement and Investigation

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management

5. Key Asset, Border, Territorial Waters, and Airspace Security

6. Domestic Transportation Security

7. Research and Development

8. Medical and Public Health Preparedness

9. Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management

10. Economic Consequences

11. Public Affairs
Page 21 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Significant Reorganization 

Will Occur with the New 

Department 

One of the most important reorganization efforts is the creation of a new 

cabinet department to consolidate a variety of agencies or functions critical 

to the nation's goal of strengthening homeland security. The administration 

has stated that the creation of DHS would empower a single cabinet official 

whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland from 

terrorism, including (1) preventing terrorist attacks within the United 

States, (2) reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and

(3) minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur.10 

Additionally, DHS will be responsible for homeland security coordination 

with other executive branch agencies, state and local governments, and the 

private sector. The legislation to create DHS will transfer some federal 

entities, such as the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Coast Guard, intact 

into the new department. For the organizations transferred to the new 

department, DHS will be responsible for managing all of their functions, 

including non-homeland security functions. In some instances, these other 

responsibilities are substantial. Table 3 displays the major organizational 

elements of the new DHS.

10 Governor Tom Ridge, The Department of Homeland Security: Making Americans Safer, 

written statement for the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, June 20, 2002.
Page 22 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Table 3: DHS Organizational Elements

Source: GAO.

Element Mission Major agencies included

Directorate for 

Information Analysis 

and Infrastructure 

Protection

Analyze law enforcement and intelligence information 

from federal, state, and local government agencies, and 

private sector entities to identify and assess threats and 

vulnerabilities, and identify priorities for protective and 

support measures. Develop a comprehensive national 

plan for securing key resources and critical 

infrastructure. Administer the Homeland Security 

Advisory System.

National Infrastructure Protection Center (FBI)

National Communications System (Defense)

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (Commerce)

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 

Center (Energy)

Federal Computer Incident Response Center (GSA)

Directorate of Science 

and Technology

Develop a national policy and strategic plan to identify 

and develop countermeasures for chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and other terrorist threats. Assess 

and test vulnerabilities and possible threats. Conduct 

basic and applied research and related activities.

National Bio-weapons Defense Analysis Center 

(Defense)

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (USDA)

Chemical and biological national security 

nonproliferation program, nuclear proliferation 

programs, and nuclear assessment programs 

(Energy)

Environmental Measurements Laboratory (Energy)

Advanced scientific computing research programs 

and activities (Energy)

Directorate of Border 

and Transportation 

Security

Prevent entry of terrorists and terrorist instruments. 

Secure the borders, waters, ports, terminals, waterways, 

and air, land, and sea transportation systems. Carry out 

immigration enforcement functions and provide 

citizenship and immigration services. Establish and 

administer rules governing visas or other forms of entry.

Customs Service (Treasury)

Transportation Security Administration 

(Transportation)

Federal Protective Service (GSA)

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Treasury)

Office for Domestic Preparedness (Justice)

Immigration and Naturalization Service (Justice)

Directorate of 

Emergency 

Preparedness and 

Response

Ensure effectiveness of emergency response providers 

to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies. Provide the federal response to terrorist 

attacks and major disasters and aid in the recovery. 

Build a national incident management system. Develop 

a national response plan.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Integrated Hazard Information System 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Domestic Preparedness Office (FBI)

Domestic Emergency Support Teams (Justice)

Emergency preparedness, national disaster, and 

medical response systems (HHS)

Strategic National Stockpile (HHS)

Coast Guard These entities are transferred intact and report directly to the DHS Secretary. They retain their current missions.

Secret Service
Page 23 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

The implementation of a new department to integrate homeland security 

functions will need to recognize that many non-homeland security missions 

of these agencies and functions will become part of DHS. Creating an 

effective structure that is sensitive to balancing the needs of homeland 

security and non-homeland security functions will be critical to the success 

of the new department. For example, the legislation creating DHS will 

transfer certain public health emergency preparedness programs from 

various federal agencies as well as transfer the control of, but not the 

operation of, certain other public health assistance programs to the new 

department. In addition, the legislation transfers responsibility for certain 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear research and development 

programs and activities to DHS. Although the department has the potential 

to realize gains from increased coordination and consolidation of 

programs, transferring control over some of these dual use programs, such 

as the public health preparedness assistance programs and research and 

development initiatives, would disrupt synergies that currently exist and 

could lead to duplication of existing capabilities. 11 

As we have previously stated in testimony, existing non-homeland security 

missions will still require adequate funding, attention, visibility, and 

support when subsumed into a department that will be under tremendous 

pressure to succeed in its primary mission. In July 2002 testimony, we 

suggested that the Congress consider whether the new department, as 

proposed, will dedicate sufficient management capacity and accountability 

to ensure the execution of non-homeland security activities. 

11 GAO-02-954T and U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department 

Could Improve Biomedical R&D Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts, 

GAO-02-924T (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002).
Page 24 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Coordination Efforts within 

and among Federal 

Agencies Has Increased

As part of their mission revitalization efforts, agency officials said that they 

are increasing their attention to coordinating homeland security activities 

within and among federal agencies through a number of existing and new 

approaches. The national strategy calls for the nation to increase 

collaboration and coordination activities to better align public and private 

resources to secure the homeland. Some efforts to coordinate homeland 

security activities were taking place prior to September 11. For example, 

the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) was created through Executive 

Order 12977 after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 

Building in Oklahoma City to develop and oversee the implementation of 

policies for protecting federal facilities. The ISC comprises 14 departmentlevel agencies and other executive agencies, such as the CIA, EPA, and 

OMB. The ISC has been working to revitalize itself to meet its 

responsibilities in light of the September 11 terrorist attacks.12 

To strengthen antiterrorism programs and to provide a single point of 

contact for senior-level coordination between HHS and other departments 

and agencies, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health 

Emergency Preparedness (OASPHEP) 13 was established within the Office 

of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. OASPHEP is responsible 

for directing HHS’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and 

recover from acts of bioterrorism and other public health emergencies and 

serves as the focal point for the department for those activities. By July 

2002, OASPHEP had dispersed nearly $1.1 billion via cooperative 

agreements to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, 3 selected major 

municipalities (Los Angeles County, Chicago, and New York City), and the 8 

U.S. territories to foster state and local preparedness for bioterrorism, 

other outbreaks of infectious disease, and additional public health threats 

and emergencies. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) created 93 antiterrorism task forces to 

integrate the communications and activities of local, state, and federal law 

12 U.S. General Accounting Office, Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has 

Had Limited Success in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities, GAO-02-1004 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 17, 2002). 

13 Recently enacted legislation, Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188) created the OASPHEP. The responsibilities of 

the office are, among other things, to coordinate preparedness for and response to 

bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. It has been proposed that OASPHEP be 

transferred to DHS. 
Page 25 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

enforcement. Building on DOJ’s antiterrorism task forces, the national 

strategy calls for each governor to establish a single Homeland Security 

Task Force for the state, to serve as the primary coordinating body with the 

federal government. According to the national strategy, this would realign 

the 93 antiterrorism task forces to serve as the law enforcement 

component of the broader homeland security task forces. The homeland 

security task forces would help streamline and coordinate all federal, 

regional, and local programs and would provide a collaborative structure 

for effectively communicating to all organizations and citizens. 

The FBI increased its use of joint terrorism task forces (JTTF), which were 

first established in 1980, to integrate federal, state, and local law 

enforcement efforts to address terrorism.14 FBI officials believe that JTTF 

are an effective means of interacting, cooperating, and sharing information 

between FBI and its federal, state, and local counterparts. The FBI now 

has a JTTF in each of its 56 field offices, plus an additional 10 in satellite 

locations.

The Department of the Treasury created Operation Green Quest, on 

October 25, 2001, a multi-agency financial enforcement initiative led by the 

Customs Service. According to the Department of the Treasury, the 

initiative is intended to augment existing counterterrorist efforts by 

bringing the full scope of the department’s financial expertise to bear 

against systems, individuals, and organizations that serve as sources of 

terrorist funding. In the 18 months it has existed, the Department of the 

Treasury reports that the initiative has seized approximately $21.3 million 

in smuggled U.S. currency and $8.2 million as a result of financial 

investigations of suspected terrorists. 

GSA serves on the Border Station Partnership Council (BSPC) with several 

federal agencies responsible for border security to plan the construction of 

border facilities. BSPC’s coordination role is increasing because homeland 

security efforts are focusing in part on securing the U.S.-Canadian border, 

which includes constructing several new border facilities to accommodate 

the Customs Service, HHS’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 

Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

14 According to the FBI, among the full-time federal participants on JTTF are the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service; Marshals Service; U.S. Secret Service; Federal 

Aviation Administration; U.S. Customs Service; Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the State 

Department; the Postal Inspection Service; the Internal Revenue Service; and the U.S. Park 

Police. State and local agencies are also represented. 
Page 26 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Administration, and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), for 

example. A GSA official said that each agency requires different types of 

facilities to perform its mission, and GSA is coordinating the integration of 

several agencies’ facility needs into one border station.

According to a senior HHS official, an OHS policy coordinating 

subcommittee is working to clarify roles of agencies to better coordinate a 

response to future terrorist attacks. The national strategy calls for 

integrating separate federal emergency response plans into a single 

incident management plan. As an example, in the recent anthrax events, 

local officials complained about differing priorities between the FBI and 

the public health officials in handling suspicious specimens. According to 

the public health officials, FBI officials insisted on first informing FBI 

managers of any test results, which delayed getting test results to treating 

physicians. The public health officials viewed contacting physicians as the 

first priority to ensure that effective treatment could begin as quickly as 

possible.15 According to the national strategy, the new incident 

management plan would cover all national incidents, including acts of 

bioterrorism and agroterrorism and clarify roles and expected 

contributions of various emergency response and law enforcement entities 

at different levels of government in the wake of a terrorist attack. In 

addition, DOJ reported that the United States Government Interagency 

Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, signed in January 2001 by 

the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of HHS, 

among others, outlined that preserving life or minimizing risk to health is 

the first priority of U.S. government operations in response to a terrorist 

threat or incident. Furthermore, DOJ reported that increasing the FBI’s 

capability to address the threat of bioterrorism will require developing 

partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies, especially USDA and 

CDC for matters involving anti-animal and antiplant bioterrorism, and FDA 

for threats involving the food supply. 

15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve 

Coordination but May Complicate Priority Setting, GAO-02-893T (Washington, D.C.: June 

28, 2002).
Page 27 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

In December 2001, DOT created the Interagency Container Working Group 

to improve response to security threats posed by marine, truck, and rail 

containers that enter the nation’s ports or cross the Mexican and Canadian 

borders into the United States.16 The Interagency Container Working 

Group is overseen by OHS. The terrorist attacks of September 11 

demonstrated that terrorists would use our transportation systems as 

weapons, and may exploit vulnerabilities in our marine transportation 

system as well. In February 2002, the working group issued its first report 

to OHS that recommended improvements to the coordination of 

government and business container security activities, enhancing cargo 

data collection, and improving the physical security of containers. The 

report also recommended supporting international container security 

efforts and the increased use of advanced technologies to improve the 

detection of potential security problems with containers. 

Officials Say Collaboration 

with State and Local 

Governments Increasingly 

Effective, but Concerns 

Remain

The administration has said that collaboration with state and local 

governments and other entities is important to homeland security 

effectiveness. In March 2002, the President issued Executive Order 13260 

establishing the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council (Council) 

and Senior Advisory Committees for Homeland Security. According to the 

administration, the Council and committees will provide opportunities for 

state and local officials and emergency services, law enforcement, and 

public health and hospital officials to share homeland security information 

and advice. In addition, OHS officials said they met with state and local 

first responders and elected officials to gather information and address 

concerns about state and local homeland security issues. OHS also has 

hosted conference calls with designated homeland security representatives 

from the states, territories, and the District of Columbia for information 

exchanges. In a July 2002 report on state and local homeland security 

actions, the Director of the Office of Homeland Security said that a key 

objective of the national homeland security strategy was to develop a 

framework ensuring vertical coordination between local, state, and federal 

authorities so actions are mutually supportive and communities receive the 

assistance they need to develop and execute comprehensive 

counterterrorism plans.

16 This working group is part of the National Infrastructure Security Committee within DOT, 

with oversight from OHS, and includes representatives from the Customs Service, 

Departments of Defense and Commerce, DOE, DOJ, USDA, HHS; and other agencies. 
Page 28 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

The national, state, and local association officials we interviewed and 

information from these associations that we reviewed indicated that 

collaboration and support across all levels of government is vital to 

homeland security efforts. For example, in a recent position paper, the 

National Governors Association (NGA) said it viewed homeland security as 

a complex challenge that demands significant investment and collaboration 

among local, state, and federal governments, and integration with the 

private sector. Among other things, NGA said homeland security 

coordination must involve all levels of government, state and local 

governments need help and technical assistance to identify and protect 

critical infrastructure, and the federal government should provide adequate 

federal funding and support to ensure that homeland security needs are 

met.

Officials representing the National Association of Counties (NACo) and the 

National League of Cities (NLC) told us that coordination efforts with OHS 

had been extensive and helpful. For example, NACo said efforts had been 

very beneficial in defining policy and operational needs at the local level, 

and matching federal efforts to those needs. NACo officials said that OHS 

officials were present at each of NACo’s Homeland Security Task Force 

meetings where homeland security policy recommendations were made. 

NACo officials said that OHS had worked closely with NACo in developing 

homeland security policies, operational plans, initiatives, the national 

strategy for homeland security, and the proposal for DHS. NLC officials 

said its involvement has included discussions of fiscal years 2002 and 2003 

funding, criteria for the President’s first responder initiative, policy 

objectives for regional coordination, and resources targeted to local 

governments for domestic preparedness.

However, at the time of our interviews, the national associations voiced 

some concerns about continued federal coordination and services. Both 

NACo and NLC officials hoped the new DHS office dealing with state and 

local contacts would allow the continued collaborative relationships they 

had experienced with OHS. Both said that they support the use of state 

homeland security task forces for DHS coordination with state and local 

governments. NACo officials added that they would like the task forces to 

include local representatives, such as first responders, so there is not 

undue emphasis on state government concerns. NLC officials said the task 

forces should include cities as well as regional officials where resources 

are shared locally. In addition, NLC officials were concerned about other 

federal current or anticipated initiatives, for example, (1) promised first 

responder funding has been delayed, (2) federal standards or mandates 
Page 29 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

might not be accompanied by funding or other support, such as training, 

and (3) existing public safety and security programs might not be 

adequately funded, with funds diverted to homeland security programs. 

They further said local officials also would like more specific threat 

information as part of the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System.

The new DHS legislation contains provisions that should help maintain 

federal coordination. The legislation establishes within DHS’s Office of the 

Secretary an Office for State and Local Coordination that will coordinate 

DHS activities relating to state and local government. In addition, this 

office is to develop a process for receiving meaningful input from state and 

local governments to assist the development of the national strategy for 

combating terrorism and other homeland security activities. 

At the department and agency level, our interviews indicated that existing 

working relationships might have aided homeland security work. FEMA, of 

course, has extensive relationships with state and local governments. 

USDA officials told us that the department has historically had strong, longstanding relations at the state and local level. These relations have come 

through agricultural programs, land grant colleges, and food safety 

activities. They believe these relationships have made it easier to broaden 

the discussion to homeland security issues. In HHS, HRSA took advantage 

of its relationship with the National Association of County and City Health 

Officials (NACCHO) and the American Hospital Association to receive 

input on designing the bioterrorism hospital preparedness program. They 

believe the agency’s already developed relations with state and local 

governments were critical in developing the hospital preparedness grant 

program. CDC officials said they work with NACCHO, NGA, and the 

National Emergency Management Association, along with other health 

associations, such as the American Medical Association and the American 

Nurses Association, to increase surge capacity at hospitals and other 

medical laboratories.

Collaboration with Private 

Sector Needs Greater 

Emphasis

Since September 11, federal government agencies have increasingly 

coordinated with the private sector on homeland security initiatives. The 

importance of federal and private sector partnerships have been 

recognized in the government’s Critical Infrastructure Protection effort, 

started in 1998, and the President’s National Homeland Security Strategy. 

The partnerships cover many areas, particularly critical infrastructure and 

border security. However, the partnerships require additional attention to 

address challenges with information sharing, business continuity, customer 
Page 30 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

protection, business capabilities, and duplicative or burdensome 

governmental efforts.

Several federal agencies included in our study helped identify critical 

infrastructure risks and assess security measures for private sector entities 

they provide service to or regulate. This assistance involved efforts such as 

advisories, inspections, and alerts. For example, the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) said it issued a notice of proposed rule 

making regarding how to define and protect critical energy infrastructure 

information, and is developing the final rule. After September 11, FERC 

assessed all FERC-jurisdictional dams, developed an E-mail system to alert 

all licensees, developed a security program for hydro projects, and 

identified critical dams that require a higher level of scrutiny. During 

operations inspections, FERC engineers annually assess whether security 

measures are in place at all high and significant hazard dams under FERC’s 

jurisdiction. FERC reported that it continues to work with industry and 

other government representatives to address such initiatives as 

cybersecurity and incident response and recovery to hydropower and 

natural gas emergencies. 

Other agency examples include water facilities, food supplies, and public 

health. EPA said it had been working to accelerate the development of a 

waste and water vulnerability assessment tool to be used at 16,000 public 

water facilities. Vulnerability assessments had already been completed 

within major metropolitan areas and EPA had sent security alerts to the 

facilities. USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service has worked with the food 

industry to help prevent biosecurity threats to the nation’s food supply, 

ensure early detection of such threats, and assure containment of 

pathogens. Moreover, in the public health sector, CDC said it has worked 

in cooperation with private sector medical and hospital associations such 

as the American Medical Association and the American Heart Association 

to develop strategies to produce just-in-time information that enhances 

protection and prevention via information technology, especially with 

regard to safety for support workers.

Private sector association information also described government and 

private sector partnerships. For example, DOJ issued a chemical facility 

vulnerability assessment methodology, developed in cooperation with the 

DOE’s Sandia National Laboratories and with the assistance of chemical 

industry representatives. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) also said 

that it had partnered with EPA, the FBI, and others to organize regional 

security briefings around the nation. Its Chemical Transportation 
Page 31 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Emergency Center team had worked with the FBI’s Hazardous Materials 

Response Unit to improve coordination between the chemical industry and 

the FBI. ACC also signed an agreement with the National Infrastructure 

Protection Center (NIPC), a government and private sector partnership, to 

create the Chemical Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center, aimed 

at sharing security-related information between NIPC and the companies 

that make and use chemical products. The American Bankers Association 

(ABA) noted that efforts to address money laundering and tracking, 

particularly with respect to terrorists and their supporters, could draw on 

the Department of the Treasury’s long history of public-private partnerships 

to establish policies and regulations to prevent and detect money 

laundering. After September 11, the National Food Processors Association 

said it established the Alliance for Food Security, a consortium of more 

than 130 industry associations and government agencies that addressed a 

wide range of potential threats and provided guidance.

Border security also has been the target of increased joint federal and 

private efforts. In our previous work, we described the Customs Service’s 

engagement with the trade community in a partnership program to protect 

U.S. borders and international commerce from acts of terrorism. In this 

initiative, U.S. importers enter into voluntary agreements with Customs to 

enhance the security of their global supply chains and those of their 

business partners. In return, Customs agrees to expedite the clearance of 

the members’ cargo at U.S. ports of entry.17 Under this program—called 

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)—Customs said 

businesses sign an agreement that commits them to actions such as 

conducting comprehensive self-assessments of supply chain security and 

developing and implementing programs to enhance supply chain security 

according to C-TPAT guidelines. Business benefits include a reduced 

number of border inspections and an emphasis on self-policing instead of 

Customs’ verification. According to Customs’ officials, 1,100 companies 

have agreed to participate in the program as of November 2002. C-TPAT is 

currently open to all importers, brokers, freight forwarders, and non-vessel 

owning common carriers as well as carriers involved in air, rail, and sea 

transportation and U.S.-Canadian border highway carriers. Customs plans 

to expand the program to port authorities, terminal operators, warehouse 

17 U.S. General Accounting Office, Container Security: Current Efforts to Deter Nuclear 

Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges, GAO-03-297T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18, 

2002).
Page 32 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

operators, and foreign manufacturers. Customs launched the C-TPAT

program in April 2002. 

The DHS Office of State and Local Coordination mentioned earlier may 

also help improve coordination and collaboration with the private sector. 

It will have responsibilities for coordinating with the private sector. In 

addition, under the DHS legislation, the DHS Secretary is to appoint a 

Special Assistant responsible for creating and fostering strategic 

communications with the private sector, creating and managing private 

sector advisory councils, and developing new public-private partnerships.

Partnership Issues Require 

Additional Attention

The federal government and private sector face many challenges in 

establishing homeland security partnerships. In prior work, we stated that 

information-sharing barriers with the private sector were a problem and 

noted that a number of activities have been undertaken to build 

relationships between the federal government and the private sector, such 

as NIPC’s InfraGard program, the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure 

Security, efforts by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, and efforts 

by lead federal agencies to promote the establishment of information 

sharing and analysis centers (ISAC). For example, the InfraGard program 

has expanded, providing the FBI and NIPC with a means of securely 

sharing information and a forum for education and training on 

infrastructure vulnerabilities and protection measures. In addition, NIPC 

said a new ISAC development and support unit had been created, whose 

mission was to enhance private sector cooperation and trust. NIPC 

indicates that ISACs had been established for the chemical industry, 

surface transportation, electric power, telecommunications, information 

technology, financial services, water supply, oil and gas, emergency fire 

services, food, emergency law enforcement, and state and local 

governments. The new DHS legislation contains provisions for information 

sharing and security that may respond to some of these concerns. For 

example, the legislation includes safeguards on voluntarily provided 

critical infrastructure information.

Federal officials and their private sector partners are faced with striking a 

reasonable balance between security efforts and business objectives. 

While the private sector supports homeland security efforts, it also is 

concerned that proposed federal mandates or guidelines might prove 

harmful to security or not adequately consider business needs. For 

example, the International Mass Retail Association (IMRA) had urged the 

Customs Service not to sign a recent rule requiring carriers to transmit 
Page 33 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

manifest information 24 hours prior to a container being loaded on a ship. 

IMRA believed such a requirement might result in increased theft and 

tampering at the foreign port of lading. The National Association of 

Manufacturers (NAM) has supported administration smart border plans 

and attempts to improve cargo security. However, NAM believes that the 

government should carefully assess the impact of new cargo security 

measures on trade and business operations, ensuring that security benefits 

are commensurate with economic costs. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

has also highlighted the need for government and industry teamwork on 

border and transportation security that would allow businesses to stay 

competitive.

In addition, ABA highlighted limitations in bank capabilities in security 

efforts. For example, ABA noted that there are operational limitations to 

what a bank can do in reporting customer transactions. For example, ABA 

said banks can request information on who is the “beneficial owner” of an 

account or the ultimate recipient of a money transfer, but most often would 

have no way to investigate or confirm this information.

Our work indicates that achieving the nation's homeland security goals will 

require considerable input and collaboration between and among the 

federal, state, and local governments. Restructuring federal agencies 

involved in homeland security to reduce overlap or conflicts in assistance 

provision will help to make activities and initiatives more effective, and will 

help to clarify lines of authority and ensure accountability in an emergency. 

Many stakeholders we interviewed indicated that working relationships 

between government levels have increased since September 11, as public 

sector organizations have worked more closely to identify risks and solve 

problems. While progress has occurred in this important area, state and 

local government organizations articulated that concerns remain with the 

level of collaboration in certain areas and with certain obstacles, such as 

access to critical data. Ultimately, the success of public sector 

collaboration is necessary to increase the likelihood that many homeland 

security initiatives can be sustained affordably over the long term.

Similarly, while progress has been made in improving collaboration 

between the public and private sectors, advances have not been made in 

some sectors where such work is necessary. The effective protection of the 

nation's critical infrastructure is vital to public safety and security, and 

efforts to achieve this goal cannot be accomplished by the government 

absent private sector assistance. A greater emphasis is required on the part 

of all stakeholders to find common ground, to eliminate obstacles, and to 
Page 34 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

build strong working relationships in order to strengthen homeland 

security. DHS includes an Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection Directorate that will have responsibility for assessments and 

protection plans for key resources and critical infrastructure. Part of that 

effort will include consultation and cooperation with state and local 

governments and the private sector. For example, the directorate will 

recommend protection measures in cooperation with state and local 

government agencies and authorities and the private sector. 

Addressing Homeland 

Security Mission 

through a ResultsOriented Approach 

The federal government’s effort to strengthen homeland security will 

require a well- articulated strategy to accomplish agencies’ missions and 

activities, to create a transition planning focus for DHS, and to leverage 

certain key success factors for organizational success to ensure mission 

accountability and sustainability over time. A key component in 

integrating homeland security missions and activities is the national 

homeland security strategy, which articulates activities that must be 

accomplished or coordinated to improve the nation’s homeland security. 

While the national strategy seeks to articulate the many important tasks 

and activities that must be accomplished or coordinated to improve the 

nation’s homeland security outlines, much of the implementation and 

mechanisms for achieving goals have not yet been articulated. 

To accomplish the government’s transition efforts will require adherence to 

certain management practices and key success factors. As we have 

previously indicated in testimony before the Congress, these factors 

include strategic planning, risk management, information technology 

management, human capital strategy and management, and a variety of 

other critical management processes and tools that will improve 

opportunities for achieving significant homeland security objectives. For 

example, strong financial management will be necessary to assure 

accountability over significant direct and indirect federal expenditures. 

Improvements in leveraging information technology will also be necessary 

to enhance not only the effective utilization of management systems, but 

also to increase information sharing among and between all parties. 

Appendix II provides a description of the critical success factors discussed 

in our previous testimony. 

Attention to these factors will be critical both to the government’s strategy 

for achieving homeland security goals via multiple departments and levels 

of government and other stakeholders, as well as efforts to potentially 

transition agencies into a new department. By establishing a transition 
Page 35 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

office within OMB, the President has taken an important first step in 

creating an effective transition for agencies to be incorporated into the 

proposed department. Continued transition efforts thereafter in the new 

department must sustain and build upon the initial actions to maintain 

mission focus while simultaneously integrating multiple entities into the 

new structure. Further, the President’s Management Agenda provides 

needed governmentwide emphasis on many important management 

objectives.

National Strategy Requires 

Implementation

A critical component of the government's efforts to coordinate and 

establish a plan for homeland security activities has been the creation of a 

homeland security strategy—one of the initial tasks the President gave to 

OHS shortly after the terrorist attacks. On July 16, 2002, the President 

released the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The administration 

indicated that the national strategy was the product of intense consultation 

across the United States, including conversations with, among others, 

governors and mayors, state legislators, Members of the Congress, 

concerned citizens, academics, soldiers, firefighters, and police officers.18 

The national strategy established three strategic homeland security 

objectives, further defined by critical mission areas under each objective. 

They are 

• to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, with mission areas 

of intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, and 

domestic counterterrorism; 

• to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, with related mission 

areas of critical infrastructure and asset protection and catastrophic 

threat defense; and 

• to minimize the damage and recover from attacks that occur, with the 

mission area of emergency preparedness and response. 

The national strategy also describes four foundations—law, science and 

technology, information sharing and systems, and international 

cooperation—that cut across the mission areas, all levels of government, 

18 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, Washington, 

D.C.: July 2002).
Page 36 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

and all sectors of society. Figure 3 summarizes the national strategy’s 

strategic objectives and foundation areas and related mission areas.

Figure 3: National Strategy Components 

By providing a definition of homeland security, along with a set of strategic 

objectives and crosscutting foundation areas, the national strategy 

provides some direction for the federal government’s homeland security 

Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States

Strategic objectives

Intelligence and warning

Detect terrorist activity before it manifests itself in an attack so proper preemptive, preventative, and protective action can be taken.

Border and transportation security

Promote the efficient and reliable flow of people, goods, and services across borders while preventing terrorists from using 

transportation conveyances or systems to deliver implements of destruction.

Law

Foundation areas

Federal level

Utilize laws to win the war on terrorism while protecting civil liberties.

Science and technology

Have a systematic national effort to harness science and technology in support of homeland security.

Information sharing and systems

Build a national environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information horizontally across each level of 

government and vertically among federal, state, and local governments, private industry, and citizens.

International cooperation

Pursue a sustained, steadfast, and systematic international agenda to counter the global terrorist threat and improve homeland security.

State level

Strengthen state codes to protect public welfare (not mandated).

Domestic counterterrorism

Identify, halt, and where appropriate, prosecute terrorists in the United States, including those directly involved in terrorist activity and 

their sources of support.

Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism

Critical infrastructure and key asset protection

Protect the nation's critical infrastructure and key assets from terrorist attacks to levels appropriate to each target's vulnerability 

and criticality.

Catastrophic threat defense

Develop new approaches, a focused strategy, and a new organization to address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

terrorist attacks.

Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur

Emergency preparedness and response

Develop a comprehensive national system to bring together and coordinate all necessary response assets quickly and effectively.

Source: GAO analysis of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Office of Homeland Security, July 2002.
Page 37 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

activities. In defining homeland security needs and objectives, the national 

strategy describes the nation’s vulnerabilities, the means of attack, and the 

terrorist organizations that potentially pose threats to the United States. 

The strategy also discusses the importance of developing comprehensive 

national threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments to identify homeland 

security needs. Importantly, the risk assessments are discussed within the 

context of other national strategies, such as the National Security Strategy. 

In addition, the national strategy highlights the necessity of 

intergovernmental and private sector partnerships and outlines expected 

near-term budgeting priorities, such as enhancing the analytic capabilities 

of the FBI and increasing the security of international shipping containers.

As with most complex strategies, implementing the national homeland 

security strategy represents a significant challenge. The strategy would be 

most effective if it included definitions of measurable objectives, 

clarifications of responsibilities among federal agencies and other entities, 

affordable, long-term budget priorities, and addressed management 

capabilities and accountability. The strategy sets overarching performance 

expectations through its strategic objectives, which are further defined by 

critical mission areas under each objective. These strategic objectives 

would benefit from having targeted performance levels that define a 

minimum level of homeland preparedness.

Moreover, implementation of the national strategy will depend on clarifying 

federal agency and nonfederal partner responsibilities as well as 

performance objectives. The national strategy identifies DHS as the 

central point for coordinating national homeland security efforts. Many 

national strategy initiatives rely on DHS leadership, yet the national 

strategy does not cover the period prior to DHS’s operation. To better 

clarify roles, the strategy could designate a federal lead agency for each 

initiative below the department level, even for those initiatives that call for 

crosscutting coordination. The new DHS legislation sets out organizational 

responsibilities that may help in further defining partner roles. For 

example, as mentioned earlier, the Under Secretary for Information 

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection is to assess threats and 

vulnerabilities and to develop a national plan for securing key resources 

and critical infrastructure.

Nonfederal partner responsibilities will also be important. Many of the 

national strategy’s initiatives rely on the efforts of nonfederal entities. 

However, only a few strategy initiatives directly address nonfederal 

performance expectations and related accountability. While this is a 
Page 38 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

difficult area given federalism principles, international sovereignty, and 

private sector independence, a national strategy requires national (and 

international) performance expectations and accountabilities if it is to be 

successfully implemented.

Further, the national strategy would benefit from addressing how federal, 

state, local, and private efforts for specific initiatives are operationally 

coordinated and integrated. The national strategy articulates the 

development or consolidation of existing federal plans, such as developing 

a national infrastructure protection plan and integrating federal response 

plans into a single all-discipline incident management plan. However, those 

efforts may not address duplicate program efforts under each of the 

strategic objectives. 

Our review of the national strategy indicates that more than 30 of the 

strategy’s initiatives appear to be already under way in whole or in part, 

including those relating to DHS implementation. For example, initiatives 

are under way to implement the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

of 2001 and target and suppress terrorist financing. However, beyond the 

initial priorities mentioned for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, the 

strategy does not contain a long-range implementation plan for the 

remaining planned initiatives or a discussion about the strategy’s long-term 

implementation costs. Further, priorities need to be established and 

timelines defined.

Implementation of the national strategy will also require addressing key, 

specific federal management capabilities. Some of the federal departments 

and agencies assigned to carry out the strategy face management 

challenges in administering their programs, managing their human capital, 

and implementing and securing information technology systems. Federal 

agencies will need to address these challenges as well as develop or 

enhance specific homeland security management capabilities, such as 

identifying homeland security threats, risks, vulnerabilities, and responses 

and effectively working in interagency, intergovernmental, and private 

sector relationships.

Finally, the strategy could be more explicit on the accountability structure 

that will be necessary to ensure the implementation of efforts to strengthen 

and sustain homeland security. The interrelationship of OHS, OMB, and 

DHS—as well as other federal organizations—is not articulated with 

respect to creating a structure that can assure an effective homeland 

security strategy that is accountable to the President and the Congress. 
Page 39 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Agencies’ Strategic Planning 

Revisions Started, but 

Incomplete

Several departments and agencies reported that since September 11, they 

were developing or revising strategic plans to address homeland security—

yet these efforts are far from complete. Some departments and agencies 

have revised their plans to better incorporate homeland security goals and 

objectives in their planning activities. For example, FEMA has revised its 

strategic plan to broaden its focus on addressing all hazards, including 

weapons of mass destruction, under a new strategic goal focusing on 

terrorism. Under this goal, FEMA plans to develop and implement a federal 

program to support state and local government incident management 

capability and establish a process for sharing information among federal, 

state, and local governments; emergency responders; and the general 

public. 

Likewise, DOJ substantially revised its strategic plan to consolidate 

homeland security activities under a new strategic goal. While homeland 

security objectives were in the strategic plan before September 11, 2001, 

the heightened awareness and overriding priority of DOJ's homeland 

security activities and responsibilities necessitated a separate strategic 

goal to focus on the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist 

acts. Among the strategies addressing this goal is the establishment of the 

Anti-Terrorism Task Forces. Other strategies under this goal include 

building and maintaining the capacity of the FBI, developing an intelligence 

capability that supports DOJ's counterterrorism efforts, mitigating threats 

to the nation’s infrastructure, and coordinating with state and local 

government agencies to develop and maintain domestic preparedness. 

However, according to a recent DOJ Inspector General report,19 the FBI’s 

Strategic Plan has not been updated to reflect the counterterrorism 

priorities in DOJ’s updated Strategic Plan. The FBI indicates that it is now 

updating this plan. 

Other agencies are still in the process of revising their strategic plans or are 

developing new homeland security-specific plans to better incorporate 

their homeland security goals and objectives in their planning activities. 

For example, HHS is revising its strategic plan to consolidate its public 

health threat response and bioterrorism activities under one strategic goal. 

Similarly, USDA is also revising its strategic plan to focus more on 

homeland security initiatives. Several officials noted that they expect 

19 Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and 

Resource Management, Report No. 02-38 (September 2002).
Page 40 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

greater attention to homeland security in the fiscal year 2004 planning 

cycle. CDC officials stated that while its fiscal year 2003 performance plan 

does not contain any new goals regarding homeland security, it expects the 

fiscal year 2004 performance plan to contain new goals and measures for 

the smallpox vaccine program and, perhaps, the public health 

preparedness and response to bioterrorism cooperative agreement 

program. 

The new department, in fulfilling its broad mandate, has the challenge of 

developing a national homeland security performance focus. This focus 

will necessarily rely on related national and agency strategy and 

performance plan efforts of OHS, OMB, and other departments and 

agencies. Indeed, the planning activities of the various departments and 

agencies represent a good start in the development of this focus; however, 

our past work on implementation of the Government Performance and 

Results Act has highlighted ongoing difficulty with many federal 

departments and agencies setting adequate performance goals, measures, 

and targets. Accordingly, attention will need to be given to federal 

department and agency capabilities in developing and achieving 

appropriate homeland security performance expectations and measures 

and in ensuring that there is linkage between these agency plans and the 

national strategy, and ultimately to individual performance expectations. 

Ensuring these capabilities and linkages will be vital in establishing a 

comprehensive homeland security planning and accountability framework 

that will not only guide the nation’s homeland security efforts but also help 

assess how well they are really working. 

The new DHS legislation does require some specific planning efforts that 

include goals and measures. For example, the Directorate of Science and 

Technology is to develop a national policy and strategic plan for developing 

countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction. The directorate must 

develop comprehensive, research-based definable goals and annual 

measurable objectives and specific targets to evaluate the goals.

Comprehensive Risk 

Analysis Efforts Incomplete

Many departments and agencies are placing a stronger emphasis on risk 

management to focus their homeland security activities. In addition, the 

national strategy places a high priority on the collection and analysis of 

homeland security intelligence and information to strengthen defenses 

against different threats. Departments and agencies have told us they are 

refining and broadening their risk management approaches to capture the 

full range of their agencies’ homeland security activities. For example, 
Page 41 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

CDC included a risk assessment in the design of its public health 

preparedness cooperative agreement program. NRC initiated a 

comprehensive reevaluation of its safeguards and security programs soon 

after September 11. NRC officials stated that, although NRC had always 

conducted risk, threat, and vulnerability assessments, a reevaluation was 

undertaken to include additional consequence modeling and vulnerability 

assessments to reflect changes in the threat environment, including the 

effects aircraft used as weapons might have on facilities. In another 

example, FDA recently used a risk management approach in its National 

Food Safety System Project to develop counterterrorism strategies and 

strategic plans, import control programs, and food safety programs. 

Other agencies are focusing their risk management activities on critical 

infrastructure protection. For example, EPA will be working with the 

chemical industry to assist and encourage the development of a chemical 

facility vulnerability assessment tool. In addition, the Department of the 

Interior’s (DOI) Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) is conducting a vulnerability 

assessment of all BOR-administered dams and facilities. BOR has 

contracted with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, and others to conduct in-depth vulnerability 

assessments of these dams and facilities. BOR expects to have 55 of the 

most critical assessments completed by the end of the year and the 

remaining 253 completed by the end of fiscal year 2003. In another 

example, DOE officials said the department was considering altering its 

facilities to make them more defendable and thus reduce the need to add 

additional forces to respond to an attack. 

Under the DHS legislation, DHS will consolidate many vulnerability 

assessment efforts under its Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection Directorate. Combining such efforts could help to eliminate 

possible duplicative efforts, provide a focus for department activities, and 

result in stronger and more coordinated capabilities and information 

sharing. While many federal agencies have taken steps to improve risk 

management, comprehensive approaches remain incomplete. As we have 

indicated in the past,20 we continue to believe that risk management must 

be at the center of the nation's effort to prevent or mitigate terrorism. 

Without a comprehensive risk management approach, there is little 

20 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can 

Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001).
Page 42 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

assurance that programs to combat terrorism are prioritized and properly 

focused.

DHS Transition Planning 

Started, but Requires 

Sustained Efforts for 

Successful Implementation

Effective change for leveraging critical homeland security goals requires 

meaningful transition planning. Careful planning and attention to 

management practices and key success factors, such as strategic planning, 

information technology, risk management, and human capital management 

are important for the broad goals of establishing an overarching framework 

to achieve the national strategy and to create an effective transition for 

agencies being incorporated into DHS. The creation of DHS will be one of 

the largest reorganizations ever undertaken and the difficulty of this task 

should not be underestimated. Under the reorganization, 22 existing 

agencies and programs and an estimated 170,000 people will be integrated 

into the new department in order to strengthen the country’s defense 

against terrorism. With an estimated budget authority of $37.45 billion for 

the component parts of the new department, successfully transitioning the 

government in an endeavor of this scale will take considerable time and 

money. Careful and thorough planning will be critical to the successful 

creation of the new department. While national needs suggest a rapid 

reorganization of homeland security functions, the transition of agencies 

and programs into the new department is likely to take time to achieve. At 

the same time, the need for speed to get the new department up and 

running must be balanced with the need to maintain readiness for new and 

existing threats during the transition period. Moreover, the organizational 

transition of the various components will simply be the starting point—as 

implementation challenges beyond the first year should be expected in 

building a fully integrated department and could take 5 to 10 years to fully 

implement the department in an effective and sustainable manner. 

On September 24, 2002, we convened a forum of public and private sector 

leaders to identify and discuss useful practices and lessons learned from 

major private and public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and 

transformations that federal agencies could implement to successfully 

transform their cultures and DHS could use to merge its various originating 

components into a unified department.21 The results of this forum provide 

insights into the challenges facing the federal government in forming a new 

21 U.S. General Accounting Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and 

Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other 

Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: November 2002).
Page 43 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

cabinet department and in building a world-class, high performance 

organization.

Many major mergers and acquisitions in the private sector do not live up to 

their expectations or potential. In the short term, the experience of major 

private sector mergers or acquisitions is that productivity and effectiveness 

actually decline in the period immediately following a merger and 

acquisition. This happens for a number of reasons, including attention 

being concentrated on critical and immediate integration issues and 

diverted from longer-term mission issues, and employees and managers 

inevitably worrying about their place in the new organization. The key is to 

adopt practices that minimize the duration and the significance of the 

reduced productivity and effectiveness and ultimately create a new 

organization that is more than the “sum of its parts.” 

Research suggests that the failure to adequately address—and often even 

consider—a wide variety of people and cultural issues is at the heart of 

unsuccessful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. But this does not 

have to be the case. While there is no one right way to manage a successful 

merger, acquisition, or transformation, the experiences of both successful 

and unsuccessful efforts suggest that there are practices that are key to 

their success. Table 4 outlines these key practices that can serve as a basis 

for subsequent consideration as federal agencies seek to transform their 

cultures in response to governance challenges.

Table 4: Lessons Learned about Mergers and Transformations for DHS and Other 

Federal Agencies

Source: GAO.

• Ensure top leadership drives the transformational change.

• Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation. 

• Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation.

• Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from 

day one.

• Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process.

• Use the performance management system to define responsibility and assure 

accountability for change.

• Establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related 

progress.

• Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation.

• Build a world-class organization.
Page 44 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

On June 20, 2002, the President signed Executive Order 13267 establishing 

within OMB a Transition Planning Office to design and coordinate the DHS 

transition. A joint memorandum from OHS and OMB directors describes 

“day one” issues that need immediate resolution upon creation of the 

department, such as chain of command, incident management, and 

communications. Planning teams will be of two types: those that are 

organized around the major operating components of the organization and 

those that are crosscutting, that is, teams for functions such as human 

capital, budget, legal, systems, and communications. Additionally, OMB 

Director Mitchell Daniels issued a memorandum temporarily ceasing all 

financial management, procurement, human resource, and information 

technology system development or modernization efforts above $500,000 

for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, to avoid actions and spending that would 

seem wasteful or redundant once DHS becomes operational.

Despite these initial efforts to identify potentially redundant spending, the 

creation of a new department will cost money. The administration has 

maintained that the consolidation of functions within DHS will reduce 

costs below what would otherwise have been the case if these functions 

continued to operate separately. In the long run savings may well be 

realized, but any reorganization will incur start-up costs as well as require 

some funding that may be temporarily redundant, but necessary to 

maintain continuity of effort during the transition period. The 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) priced the various legislative proposals 

for DHS, and all proposals would increase spending. A July 2002 cost 

estimate anticipates that implementation will cost about $4.5 billion over 

the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.22 

This is in addition to the projected net spending for ongoing activities of the 

transferred agencies—about $19 billion in 2002, growing to $27 billion by 

2007 under CBO’s baseline assumptions.23

22 According to CBO, they are planning to revise the cost estimate for direct spending for 

H.R. 5005 as enacted. However, there will not be any changes to the cost estimate for 

spending subject to appropriations. H.R. 5005, as amended, was enacted on November 25, 

2002 (P.L. 107-296).

23 Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 5005 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002).
Page 45 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

CBO’s estimates could best be described as conservative. Although CBO’s 

July 2002 estimate included an assumption that key senior managers will 

need to be in a centralized office location along with core functions, CBO 

does not include such potentially significant cost drivers as the 

combination of the multiple pay and retirement legacy systems. More 

important than a precise cost of the transition is the recognition that there 

will be short-term transition costs and that these costs need to be made 

transparent in a transition plan for congressional consideration.24

The importance of the transition efforts to this new homeland security 

environment cannot be overemphasized. OMB was ordered to initiate a 

homeland security transition planning process for DHS, although its 

transition authorities expire 90 days after the law’s enactment. OMB told 

us that some initial transition efforts for the new department are under 

way, especially regarding the consolidation of multiple financial and 

management information systems among agencies. The creation and 

integration of the new department will only be achieved through a realistic 

and aggressive strategy that, to the largest extent possible, quickly and 

seamlessly merges important homeland security components into a 

cohesive entity capable of protecting the nation from terrorism. The DHS 

legislation requires the President to provide a DHS reorganization plan to 

appropriate congressional committees 60 days after enactment, which he 

did, on November 25, 2002.25 Practices that have been consistently found 

to be at the center of successful mergers, as outlined during our recent 

Mergers and Transformation Forum, and in the key success factors 

articulated in recent congressional testimony (see app. II), will be 

beneficial to this process and helpful to other federal agencies and 

organizations engaged in homeland security.

Strategic Human Capital 

Plan Critical to Transition

An organization's people are its most important asset. People define an 

organization, affect its capacity to perform, and represent the knowledge 

24 The fifth continuing resolution (P.L. 107-294) enacted on November 23, 2002, permits the 

Secretary of DHS, with OMB’s approval, to transfer up to $500 million in budget authority for 

unforeseen homeland security requirements. In addition, OMB is allowed to reallocate up to 

$140 million of unused budget authority appropriated to organizations and entities 

transferring to DHS for salaries and expenses associated with establishing the new 

department. 

25 Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan (The White House, Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 25, 2002).
Page 46 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

base of the organization. A strategic human capital plan is, therefore, 

critical to effectively managing federal agencies with homeland security 

missions and activities, including DHS. The legislation requires all agencies 

moving into DHS, and DHS itself, to appoint chief human capital officers 

and include human capital planning in performance plans and performance 

reports.

Agencies slated to move into DHS will need to address long-standing 

human capital problems in order to ease the transition to the new 

department. One of these challenges has been the ability to hire and retain 

a talented and motivated staff. For example, we have reported that INS has 

been unable to reach its program goals in large part because of such 

staffing problems as agent attrition.26 INS staffing problems in several of its 

functions had been affected by the lack of a staff resource allocation 

model27 that would identify staffing needs. 

To accomplish homeland security missions some agencies have recognized 

the need for new skills in the workforce. It is anticipated that agencies will 

need employees with skills in information technology, law enforcement, 

foreign languages, and other proficiencies. For example, we have reported 

that the FBI has an action plan to hire translators, interpreters, and special 

agents with language skills—areas in which the federal government 

currently has a shortage.28 Similarly, last year’s anthrax outbreak 

highlighted the need for trained communications staff at CDC to respond to 

information requests from the media and the general public.

Increased attention to border security will test the capacity of DHS to hire 

large numbers of inspectors for work at our nation's border entry points. 

Additionally, TSA has faced an extraordinary challenge in hiring and 

training 33,000 passenger security screeners by November 2002. 29 

26 U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing 

the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-02-861T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002).

27 U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of 

Recurring Management Challenges, GAO-02-168T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2001).

28 U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to 

Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-375 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).

29 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation Security 

Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T (Washington, 

D.C.: July 25, 2002).
Page 47 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Moreover, other agencies that are to transfer to DHS are also expected to 

experience challenges in hiring security workers and inspectors. For 

example, APHIS has been seeking to increase the size of its inspection 

force by 50 percent at the same time that the Customs Service, INS, and 

other agencies are increasing the size of their inspection staffs. 

In addition, various agency officials have cited retention problems 

associated with homeland security missions. Since much of TSA’s 

recruitment of federal air marshals has come from other federal agencies, 

this has increased competition for skilled law enforcement staff. 

According to a TSA official, approximately 64 percent of the Federal Air 

Marshal Service’s newly hired staff have previous professional experience 

in other federal agencies. TSA is not limited to the grade and step pay 

structure of the General Schedule, and can offer more flexible 

compensation to law enforcement recruits. Several agency officials have 

cited TSA’s compensation levels as the reason they have been losing many 

employees. For example, the police force protecting the facilities of HHS’s 

National Institutes of Health says it has experienced high turnover over the 

last year. As a result, it is considering offering a better compensation 

package to officers. In addition, INS reported that it did not meet its hiring 

goal for one reason—a significant increase in the loss of agents to other 

federal agencies. INS reported that a 556 percent increase in the loss of 

agents from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2002 was due in large part to the 

availability of higher paying jobs with the Federal Air Marshal Service at 

TSA.

Another potential human capital challenge to homeland security activities 

is the expected retirement of many federal employees in the near future. 

Many of the agencies that are due to be transferred to the new department 

are projected to lose substantial portions of their staffs to retirement. 

According to our analysis of OPM data, 26 percent of career employees at 

APHIS, 33 percent at the Coast Guard, 31 percent at the Customs Service, 

40 percent at FEMA, 21 percent at INS, and 30 percent at the Secret Service 

will be eligible for retirement with unreduced annuities by the end of fiscal 

year 2007.
Page 48 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Agencies and New 

Department Need an 

Integrated Human Capital 

Strategy

Hiring and retaining a talented and motivated staff is only one aspect 

agency leaders must consider as part of its human capital strategy. To 

assist agencies in facing human capital challenges, we have released an 

exposure draft of a model of strategic human capital management that 

highlights the steps that agencies can take to manage their human capital 

more strategically. 30 The GAO Strategic Human Capital Model identifies 

four governmentwide human capital cornerstones that have been shown to 

be essential to agency effectiveness. (See fig. 4.) These four critical areas 

are leadership; strategic human capital planning; acquiring, developing, and 

retaining talent; and results-oriented organizational cultures. To address 

each of these cornerstones, the model identifies eight critical success 

factors, based on the following underlying principals:

• People are assets whose value can be enhanced through investment. 

The objective is to maximize value while minimizing risk.

• An organization’s human capital strategy should be designed, 

implemented, and assessed based on its ability to achieve results and 

contribute to the organization’s mission.

30 U.S. General Accounting Office, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management,

GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002).
Page 49 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Figure 4: GAO’s Model of Strategic Human Capital Management

Four human capital

cornerstones Eight critical success factors

Leadership

Acquiring,

developing, and

retaining talent

Resultsoriented organizational

cultures

Strategic

human capital

planning

Commitment

to human capital

management

Targeted

investments in

people

Empowerment

and inclusiveness

Integration

and alignment

Role of the

human capital function

Human

capital approaches

tailored to meet

organizational needs

Unit and

individual performance

linked to organizational

goals

Data-driven

human capital

decisions 

Source: GAO-02-373SP.
Page 50 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Performance Management 

Systems and Personnel 

Flexibilities Can Improve 

Effectiveness

Performance management systems and personnel flexibilities can help to 

improve the effectiveness of agencies, and some homeland security 

agencies are already utilizing such tools. The Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act requires TSA to develop a performance management system 

and to use performance agreements as a way to align organizational and 

individual goals for employees, managers, and executives. TSA has 

established an interim performance management system, which includes 

procedures for creating performance agreements, monitoring employee 

performance, and determining employee development needs. For 

example, according to the template developed for a TSA executive, an 

executive's performance agreement includes organizational goals to 

improve and maintain the security of American air travel, ensure an 

emphasis on customer satisfaction, and to make substantial contributions 

to TSA and the accomplishment of its performance goals. Results-oriented 

performance agreements are a good mechanism in a performance 

management system to help create a “line of sight” showing how individual 

employees can contribute to overall organizational goals.31

31 U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for Results: Emerging Benefits From Selected 

Agencies’ Use of Performance Agreements, GAO-01-115 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2000).
Page 51 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Moreover, to deal with their human capital challenges, it will be important 

for the new department and other homeland security agencies to assess 

and determine which human capital flexibilities are the most appropriate 

and effective for managing their workforces.32 But while this determination 

is important, how personnel flexibilities are implemented is equally 

important. We have identified six key practices that agencies should 

implement to use human capital flexibilities effectively: (1) plan 

strategically and make targeted investments, (2) ensure stakeholder input 

in developing policies and procedures, (3) educate managers and 

employees on the availability and use of flexibilities, (4) streamline and 

improve administrative processes, (5) build transparency and 

accountability into their systems, and (6) change their organizational 

cultures. By more effectively using flexibilities, agencies would be in a 

better position to manage their workforces, assure accountability, and 

transform their cultures to address current and emerging demands.33

At the same time, new flexibilities for DHS and other homeland security 

agencies should be viewed in the context of how similar flexibilities have 

been exercised by other agencies with similar missions, such as TSA. As 

we testified last summer,34 the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

authorizes TSA to use and modify the personnel system established by the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is exempt from many federal 

personnel provisions. To meet its need for talented employees quickly, TSA 

officials stated that they made use of personnel flexibilities such as 

temporary hiring authority, on-the-spot hiring authority, and the authority 

to use detailees from other agencies and executives on loan from the 

private sector. A TSA official said that these various flexibilities have been 

useful for increasing its staffing for critical positions. TSA is also basing its 

compensation system on FAA’s pay banding approach, which allows the 

agency to hire employees anywhere within broad pay bands for their 

positions. For example, the pay band for screeners ranges from $23,600 to 

32 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 amends part III of title 5 of the United States Code. 

Title 5 covers government employees in areas such as employment and retention, employee 

performance, pay and allowances, and labor-management and employee relations. The act 

allows the Secretary of DHS and the Director of OPM to jointly establish and adjust a human 

resources management system. The legislation establishes criteria for the system, such as 

nonwaivable provisions.

33 U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist 

Agencies in Managing Their Workforces, GAO-03-2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).

34GAO-02-971T. 
Page 52 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

$35,400 (from about $11 to $17 per hour). Pay banding is one example of a 

personnel flexibility that can help agency managers establish a more direct 

link between pay and an individual’s knowledge, skills, and performance.

Effective Oversight 

Critical to Success

The success of the federal government’s homeland security mission will 

depend on effective oversight by the appropriate parts of our government. 

The oversight entities of the executive branch, including the inspectors 

general, OMB, OPM, and OHS, will have a vital role to play in ensuring 

expected performance and accountability. As stated in the President’s June 

2002 DHS proposal, OHS was seen as continuing to play a key role, advising 

the President and coordinating a simplified interagency process. Likewise, 

congressional committees, with their long-term and broad institutional 

roles, will also play a role in overseeing the transformation of the federal 

government as it meets the demands of its homeland security mission. The 

creation of DHS has raised questions regarding how the Congress can best 

meet its oversight, authorizing, and appropriations responsibilities for the 

new department. DHS will be comprised of some 22 federal agencies or 

their components and be overseen by numerous congressional committees. 

The DHS legislation asks each House of the Congress to review its 

committee structure in light of the reorganization of homeland security 

responsibilities within the executive branch. As a result, the Congress may 

wish to explore ways to facilitate conducting its responsibilities in a more 

consolidated and integrated manner. Whether or not the Congress does so 

could have an impact on the effective implementation and oversight of 

DHS.

Conclusion The nation’s efforts to strengthen homeland security will require extensive 

commitments and perseverance to ensure their effectiveness and 

sustainability. There will continue to be multiple demands placed on 

federal agencies’ ability to accomplish their homeland security missions, to 

coordinate and collaborate in meaningful ways with each other, with state 

and local government entities, and with the private sector. Many of these 

demands may be better met through the effective implementation of DHS. 

However, critical roles remain for OHS and other agencies with homeland 

security related missions, as well as for central management agencies like 

OMB and OPM.

The coordination and oversight of a national strategy to better protect 

Americans from terrorism is vital to achieving the nation’s homeland 
Page 53 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

security objectives. This will be a primary role for OHS. Because all 

homeland security objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously, it will be 

important for OHS, DHS, and other agencies to focus initially on the most 

critical issues and greatest risks to security, and to guide the strategy’s 

implementation in phases. For example, concerns related to border 

security or visa processing may need to have priority and resources over 

other areas in which current approaches may be more effective, or in 

which fewer risks are apparent. Additionally, the completion of a 

comprehensive threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment must be 

addressed.

While there are indications that federal agencies are developing better 

working relationships among themselves and with other relevant 

stakeholders, concerns remain about collaboration in certain areas, 

especially in regards to the sharing of critical information. Creating 

effective linkage—building the critical partnerships—will be a key to 

successfully implementing the DHS transition and the national strategy. 

The complexity and urgency of the nation’s homeland security goals 

require effective, cooperative, and sustained action from multiple public 

and private entities, and addressing coordination and collaboration 

concerns will be vital to success. OHS, in conjunction with OMB, must 

help support and oversee the implementation of the national strategy in 

order to ensure that responsible entities have clear missions, are held 

accountable for achieving specific results in a timely manner, design 

effective human capital strategies to attract and retain critical skills and 

talent, and create strong partnerships so that the nation obtains meaningful 

and measurable results in its efforts to prevent terrorism.

Another critical component of implementing the national strategy is the 

effective transition to DHS. OMB will have a critical support and oversight 

role to play in leading this effort through its responsibilities for the DHS 

transition strategy. OMB has the lead responsibility to develop the DHS 

transition plan, and this role will have to be accomplished in conjunction 

with OHS and DHS. The creation and integration of the new department 

will only be achieved through a realistic and aggressive strategy that, to the 

largest extent possible, quickly and seamlessly merges important homeland 

security components into a cohesive entity capable of protecting the nation 

from terrorism. Practices that have been consistently found to be at the 

center of successful mergers, as outlined in our recent Mergers and 

Transformation Forum, and in the key success factors central to well 

performing organizations articulated in recent congressional testimony 
Page 54 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

(see app. II), will be beneficial to this process, and helpful to other federal 

agencies and organizations engaged in homeland security.

There is little doubt, however, that the integration and transformation 

required will be difficult and complex and, as a result, not as quick or 

seamless as would be ideally desired. Nor should focus from important 

homeland security missions being integrated into DHS be unduly diverted 

or sidetracked by administrative concerns during the transition period. 

Thus, management attention must be focused upon an effective transition 

plan that prioritizes functions and appropriately phases in the transition so 

that protection of the nation is maintained at the same time the new 

department’s initial transition steps are accomplished. Achieving this 

overarching goal will be important for DHS and for maintaining linkages 

between people, processes, and results during the transition in order to 

effectively meet objectives for protecting the nation from terrorism. 

It may also be necessary to acknowledge that, at least in the near term, 

program objectives may differ or conflict. In addition, while steps must be 

taken to link all 22 agencies in meaningful ways through an overarching 

mission, common core values, and other means, it may not be necessary or 

appropriate to try and create a single culture within DHS. Program 

objectives of certain DHS agencies may differ or conflict, and difficult 

balances between homeland security and non-homeland security missions 

and resource allocations will remain. Other homeland security objectives 

will be implemented outside of DHS. As a result, OHS, OMB, and OPM 

must continue to assist DHS in resolving policy, budget, human capital, 

communications, and program tensions that may interfere with national 

homeland security objectives, particularly during the transition period.

Further, although the creation of the Transition Planning Office for DHS is 

an important first step in the transition of federal agencies into a new 

department, its termination 90 days after the enactment of the legislation 

creating the department means that a sustained management approach will 

need to be developed and refined over time—as the new department will 

likely take years to become fully integrated and effective. Once again, 

OMB, in conjunction with OHS, has a significant role and responsibility to 

play in supporting the long-term transition efforts of DHS. The 

governmentwide management role of OMB, particularly, may help to 

provide DHS with the expertise and guidance necessary to succeed in 

building this complex new entity. OMB’s oversight of the government’s 

principal management laws and practices relating to performance 

management, information technology, financial management, human 
Page 55 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

capital management, and acquisition management, for example, can help 

DHS’s leadership create a strong and viable structure sustainable for years 

to come. Moreover, OMB’s role in federal management activities can also 

benefit those agencies with homeland security missions that are not being 

integrated into DHS. Ensuring effective homeland security strategic 

planning and performance measurement, for instance, is equally important 

to the success of the FBI as it is to the new department, even though its 

mission will complement and not be subsumed by DHS. 

A realistic human capital strategy that helps to lead agencies’ 

transformation into high- performing organizations will be vital to the 

effectiveness and sustainability of our homeland security efforts. An 

organization's people are its most important asset. People define an 

organization, affect its capacity to perform, and represent the knowledge 

base necessary to achieve its objectives. A strategic human capital plan is, 

therefore, critical to effectively managing federal agencies with homeland 

security missions and activities, including DHS and others. OPM, in 

conjunction with OMB, OHS, and DHS, will need to help craft and support 

such a plan in implementing the national strategy and the DHS transition to 

ensure the optimum effectiveness of organizational goals, cooperation, and 

collaboration among all parties, especially DHS employees and 

management. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

As the federal government clearly faces a number of leadership and 

management challenges in achieving its homeland security mission, we 

recommend the following:

• Given the scope of homeland security objectives across the public and 

private sector, it is important for OHS, in conjunction with OMB and 

DHS, to set priorities, to help guide and support the development of 

performance measures and time frames, and to assess and oversee 

progress, in implementing the national homeland security strategy. 

Through the national strategy, OHS should also lead efforts to ensure 

clarity in the roles and responsibilities of all parties—OHS, OMB, DHS, 

and others—to leverage collaboration among them, and to establish 

effective accountability to meet national goals. Moreover, these entities 

will need to balance and reconcile program objectives and priorities, 

and make realistic resource allocations, within and among homeland 

security and non-homeland security missions across government.
Page 56 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

• OMB, in developing an effective transition plan for DHS, should ensure 

that the plan incorporates the practices identified during our Mergers 

and Transformation Forum, as well as the key factors for successful 

organizations listed in appendix II in helping lay the foundation for a 

cohesive, world-class organization capable of protecting the nation from 

terrorism. 

• Over the coming years, OMB, in conjunction with DHS, should help 

ensure the implementation of broad-based management practices and 

principles that will improve the sustainability of DHS and other 

homeland security activities, consistent with statutory and regulatory 

requirements as well as with the President’s Management Agenda. 

They should, in part, direct the establishment of appropriate plans and 

management systems to ensure the needed management capacity, 

people, partnerships, and accountability to achieve national homeland 

security goals. This includes an effective strategic planning system that 

articulates meaningful performance goals, objectives, and measures; an 

effective human capital strategy; and a process for reporting and 

oversight. Strong financial and information technology systems and 

internal controls will also be critical to the success of DHS and other 

organizations with homeland security missions. 

• OPM, in conjunction with OMB and the agencies, should develop and 

oversee the implementation of a long-term human capital strategy that 

can support the capacity building across government required to meet 

the objectives of the nation's efforts to strengthen homeland security. 

With respect to DHS, in particular, this strategy should

• establish an effective performance management system, which 

incorporates the practices that reinforce a “line of sight” that shows 

how unit and individual performance can contribute to overall 

organization goals;

• provide for the appropriate utilization of the human capital 

flexibilities granted to DHS to effectively manage its workforce; and

• foster an environment that promotes employee involvement and 

empowerment, as well as constructive and cooperative labormanagement employee relations.
Page 57 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Agency Comments On November 26, 2002, we provided a draft of this report to the Directors of 

OMB, OHS, and OPM for their official comments. OMB did not provide 

official comments. However, OMB staff members provided technical 

comments to our draft and we have incorporated them as appropriate. The 

Director of OPM provided written comments on December 19, 2002, which 

have been reproduced in appendix III. OPM concurred with the 

recommendations relevant to them and noted that they were actively 

involved in accomplishing them. OPM also provided technical comments 

that we have incorporated as appropriate. OHS informed us that they had 

no comments. On December 7, 2002, we provided excerpts of our draft 

report to those agencies that were mentioned within the report. We 

received technical comments from USDA, DOJ, DOT, Treasury, FEMA, 

FERC, and NRC, and we have incorporated them as appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you announce the contents of the report 

earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after its date. At that 

time, we will send copies to the Directors of OMB, OHS, and OPM. We will 

also send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees 

and to the federal agencies and offices discussed in this report. We will 

make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, 

the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

Please contact me on (202) 512-6806 if you or your staff has any questions. 

Major contributors to this report included Shawn Arbogast, Joseph Byrns, 

Sharon Caudle, Kevin Copping, Katharine Cunningham, Seth Dykes, Denise 

Fantone, Mark Goldstein, Steven Lozano, Kristeen McLain, Mary Reintsma, 

Bradley Trainor, Summer Ramke, and James Whitcomb.

Sincerely yours,

Patricia A. Dalton

Director, Strategic Issues
Page 58 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Appendix I

Homeland Security Funding by Department or Apendxies

Agency, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2003 ApendxiI

Dollars in millions

Department/independent agency

FY 2001 

actual 

FY 2002

estimateda

FY 2003 President's 

budget request

Department of Agriculture $339.87 $776.56 $573.38

Department of Commerce 97.65 124.35 158.68

National Security/Department of Defenseb 4,021.00 6,665.00 7,844.00

Department of Education 0.04 0.04 0.04

Department of Energy 1,000.28 1,271.13 1,201.40

Department of Health and Human Services 401.36 3,084.12 4,408.39

Department of Housing and Urban Development 1.97 1.97 2.72

Department of the Interior 25.18 114.14 110.51

Department of Justice 4,625.71 7,446.19 7,112.16

Department of Labor 15.97 26.37 26.95

Department of State 476.37 610.26 749.50

Department of the Treasury 1,786.38 2,741.55 2,888.75

Department of Transportation 2,535.95 9,252.60 7,784.17

Department of Veterans Affairs 18.74 47.42 83.92

Agency for International Development 0.11 0.18 0.18

Corporation for National Community Service 0.00 29.00 118.00

District of Columbia 0.00 212.65 15.00

Environmental Protection Agency 5.59 185.91 133.48

Executive Office of the President 0.16 143.80 47.50

Federal Communications Commission 0.00 0.00 1.00

Federal Emergency Management Administration 31.45 329.03 3,554.53

General Services Administration 92.93 276.95 346.91

Kennedy Center 0.00 4.31 1.91

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 120.42 228.92 137.48

National Archives 0.00 2.00 7.00

National Capital Planning Commission 0.00 0.76 0.00

National Gallery of Art 0.00 2.15 2.17

National Science Foundation 212.15 236.29 236.33

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5.85 41.13 34.41

Office of Personnel Management 2.04 1.93 1.25

Securities and Exchange Commission 1.86 0.75 0.17

Smithsonian 0.00 21.70 20.00

Social Security Administration 73.83 113.10 129.16
Appendix I

Homeland Security Funding by Department 

or Agency, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2003

Page 59 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Source: OMB Memorandum M-02-14, "Additional Information Requirements for Overseas Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security for the FY 2004 Budget" (August 8, 2002) and GAO analysis.

Note: Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.

a

The FY 2002 estimated funds includes homeland security amounts from the FY 2002 enacted budget 

($19,582.46); the emergency supplemental enacted September 2001 ($10,728.83), and the 

emergency supplemental enacted August, 2002 ($4,584.15).

b

The category "National Security" includes Department of Defense and intelligence community funding 

combined to keep figures unclassified. 

c

OMB does not report on homeland security funds for the judicial or legislative branch.

United States Postal Service 0.00 762.00 0.00

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 0.00 138.60 65.00

Other small/independent agencies 1.54 2.60 1.97

Totalc $15,894.40 $34,895.44 $37,798.01

(Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

Department/independent agency

FY 2001 

actual 

FY 2002

estimateda

FY 2003 President's 

budget request
Page 60 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Appendix II

Critical Success Factors for New 

Organizations ApendxiI

In our prior work, entitled Homeland Security: Critical Design and 

Implementation Issues, (GAO-02-957T, July 17, 2002), we identified certain 

critical success factors a new organization should emphasize in its initial 

implementation phase. Over the years, we have has made observations and 

recommendations about many of these success factors, based on effective 

management of people, technology, and financial and other issues, 

especially in our biannual Performance and Accountability Series on 

major government departments. These factors include the following:

• Strategic planning: Leading results-oriented organizations focus on 

the process of strategic planning that includes involvement of 

stakeholders; assessment of internal and external environments; and an 

alignment of activities, core processes, and resources to support 

mission-related outcomes.

• Organizational alignment: The organization of the new Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) should be aligned to be consistent with the 

goals and objectives established in the strategic plan.

• Communications: Effective communication strategies are key to any 

major consolidation or transformation effort. 

• Building partnerships: One of the key challenges of this new 

department will be the development and maintenance of homeland 

security partners at all levels of the government and the private sector, 

both in the United States and overseas. 

• Performance management: An effective performance management 

system fosters institutional, unit, and individual accountability.

• Human capital strategy: The new department must ensure that its 

homeland security missions are not adversely impacted by the 

government’s pending human capital crisis, and that it can recruit, 

retain, and reward a talented and motivated workforce, which has 

required core competencies, to achieve its mission and objectives. The 

people factor is a critical element in any major consolidation or 

transformation.

• Information management and technology: The new department 

should leverage enabling technology to enhance its ability to transform 

capabilities and capacities to share and act upon timely, quality 

information about terrorist threats.
Appendix II

Critical Success Factors for New 

Organizations

Page 61 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

• Knowledge management: The new department must ensure it makes 

maximum use of the collective body of knowledge that will be brought 

together in the consolidation.

• Financial management: The new department has a stewardship 

obligation to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; to use tax dollars 

appropriately; and to ensure financial accountability to the President, 

the Congress and the American people.

• Acquisition management: As one of the largest federal departments, 

DHS will potentially have some of the most extensive acquisition 

requirements in government. Early attention to strong systems and 

controls for acquisition and related business processes will be critical 

both to ensuring success and maintaining integrity and accountability.

• Risk management: The new department must be able to maintain and 

enhance current states of homeland security readiness while 

transitioning and transforming itself into a more effective and efficient 

structural unit. DHS will also need to immediately improve the 

government’s overall ability to perform risk management activities that 

can help to prevent, defend against and respond to terrorist acts.

• Change management: Assembling a new organization out of separate 

pieces and reorienting all of its processes and assets to deliver the 

desired results while managing related risks will take an organized, 

systematic approach to change. The new department will both require 

an executive and operational capability to encourage and manage 

change.
Page 62 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Appendix III

Comments from the Office of Personnel 

Management ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Office of Personnel 

Management

Page 63 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security
Appendix III

Comments from the Office of Personnel 

Management

Page 64 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security
Page 65 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Related GAO Products

Homeland Security Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program. 

GAO-03-38. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: CDC's Oversight of Select Agent Programs. GAO-03-

315R. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks 

Reliable Address Information. GAO-03-188, November 21, 2002.

Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New 

Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 

2002.

Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons 

Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal 

Agencies. GAO-03-293P. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.

Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security. GAO-03-

174. Washington, D.C.: November 14, 2002.

Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort 

for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 2002.

Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federally Owned and 

Leased Facilities. GAO-03-8. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002.

Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an 

Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2002.

Homeland Security: Department of Justice's Response to Its 

Congressional Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry 

Vulnerabilities. GAO-03-24R. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2002.

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued 

Management Challenges. GAO-02-1122T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 

2002.

Homeland Security: OMB's Temporary Cessation of Information 

Technology Funding for New Investments. GAO-03-186T. Washington, 

D.C.: October 1, 2002.
Related GAO Products

Page 66 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO-02-1075T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002.

Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has Had Limited 

Success in Fulfilling Its Responsibilities. GAO-02-1004. Washington, 

D.C.: September 17, 2002.

September 11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities. GAO-02-1037. 

Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2002.

National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing 

Challenges. GAO-02-1048R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1012T. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002.

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1011T. Washington, D.C.: August 20, 2002. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002. 

Chemical Safety: Emergency Response Community Views on the 

Adequacy of Federally Required Chemical Information. GAO-02-799. 

Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2002.

Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-02-

957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002. 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises Concerns. 

GAO-02-954T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D 

Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts. GAO-02-924T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. GAO02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002. 
Related GAO Products

Page 67 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership 

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships 

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

May Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 

2002. 

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but 

May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But 

Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington, 

D.C.: June 25, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and 

Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy. 

GAO-02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001, 

Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade Center. GAO-02-700R. Washington, 

D.C.: May 29, 2002.

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving 

National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

Homeland Security: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private 

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland 

Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership 

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and 

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 

2001. 
Related GAO Products

Page 68 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal 

Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. 

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues.

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

Combating Terrorism Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism 

Efforts at Installations. GAO-03-14. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 2002.

Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export 

Control Regimes. GAO-03-43. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2002.

Chemical Weapons: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 

Weapons Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct Budgeting 

Weaknesses. GAO-03-5. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for 

DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-03-15. Washington, 

D.C.: October 22, 2002.

Chemical Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Risk Assessment of 

Defense Capabilities. GAO-03-137T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2002.

Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but 

Could Be Improved and Expanded. GAO-02-890. Washington, D.C.: 

September 10, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat 

Terrorism Abroad. GAO-02-1021. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.

Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls over Transfers of 

Technology to Foreign Nationals Need Improvement. GAO-02-972. 

Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.
Related GAO Products

Page 69 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful 

Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened. GAO-02-904. 

Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.

Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing 

and Cost Benefit Analysis Before Implementation. GAO-02-838. 

Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2002. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear 

Smuggling. GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in Force 

Protection for DOD Deployments Through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-

955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002.

Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but 

Challenges Remain. GAO-02-365. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the 

Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local 

Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance 

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 

2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in 

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 17, 2001. 
Related GAO Products

Page 70 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism 

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, 

D.C.: September 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s 

Council on Domestic Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.: May 

9, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in 

Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.: 

March 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-

14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs.

GAO/T-NSIAD-0-45. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 

21, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and 

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 

1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. 

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999. 
Related GAO Products

Page 71 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response 

Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: 

June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is 

Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve 

Counterterrorism Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.: May 

13, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness 

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: 

November 12, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 

Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: 

October 2, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires 

Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, 

D.C.: December 1, 1997. 

Public Health Public Health: Maintaining an Adequate Blood Supply Is Key to 

Emergency Preparedness. GAO-02-1095T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 

2002.

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in 

Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 

2001. 

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001. 
Related GAO Products

Page 72 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.

Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001. 

Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe 

Food. GAO-02-47T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. Washington, 

D.C.: October 5, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-915. 

Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and 

Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.: 

September 28, 2001.

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness. 

GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000. 

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and 

Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 

1999. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation 

Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington, 

D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public 

Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 

1999.

Aviation Security Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002.

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001. 
Related GAO Products

Page 73 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners' 

Performance. GAO/RCED-00-75. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000. 

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener 

Performance Problems. GAO/T-RCED-00-125. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 

2000. 

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-term Attention Is 

Needed. GAO/T-RCED-98-190. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 1998. 

Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices. 

GAO/RCED-97-111R. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives 

Detection Devices. GAO/RCED-97-119R. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 1997. 

Aviation Security: Technology's Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities. 

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 1996.

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed. 

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-251. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 1996.

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security. 

GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237. Washington, D.C.: August 1, 1996.

Critical Infrastructure 

Protection

Computer Security: Progress Made, But Critical Federal Operations and 

Assets Remain at Risk. GAO-03-303T. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 

2002.
Related GAO Products

Page 74 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security Should 

Be More Fully Addressed. GAO-02-781. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be 

Addressed. GAO-02-961T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More 

Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Information 

Systems. GAO-02-474. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security 

Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO-02-918T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 

2002.

Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure 

Protection. GAO-02-24. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 

Safeguarding Government and Privately Controlled Systems from 

Computer-Based Attacks. GAO-01-1168T. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting 

Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities. 

GAO-01-1132T. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing 

Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO-01-1005T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing 

Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities. GAO-01-769T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing 

National Capabilities. GAO-01-323. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2001.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a 

Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination. 

GAO/T-AIMD-00-268. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000.
Related GAO Products

Page 75 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber 

Security Information Act of 2000. GAO/T-AIMD-00-229. Washington, D.C.: 

June 22, 2000.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information 

Systems Protection. GAO/AIMD-00-90R. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 

2000.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for 

Information Systems Protection. GAO/T-AIMD-00-72. Washington, D.C.: 

February 1, 2000.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed 

to Assure Security of Federal Operations. GAO/T-AIMD-00-7. Washington, 

D.C.: October 6, 1999.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on 

Year 2000 Experiences. GAO/AIMD-00-1. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 

1999.

Disaster Assistance September 11: Small Business Assistance Provided in Lower Manhattan 

in Response to the Terrorist Attacks. GAO-03-88. Washington, D.C.: 

November 1, 2002.

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration 

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington, 

D.C.: August 31, 2001. 

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing 

States for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key 

Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001.

Budget and Management Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief Operating Officer Concept—A 

Potential Strategy to Address Federal Governance Challenges. GAO-03-

192SP. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2002. 
Related GAO Products

Page 76 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Program Evaluation: Strategies for Assessing How Information 

Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals. GAO-02-923. Washington, 

D.C.: September 30, 2002.

Results-Oriented Cultures: Using Balanced Expectations to Manage 

Senior Executive Performance. GAO-02-966. Washington, D.C.: September 

27, 2002.

Performance Budgeting: Opportunities and Challenges. GAO-02-1106T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2002.

Electronic Government: Proposal Addresses Critical Challenges. GAO-02-

1083T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002.

Results-Oriented Cultures: Insights for U.S. Agencies from Other 

Countries' Performance Management Initiatives. GAO-02-862. 

Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2002.

Acquisition Workforce: Agencies Need to Better Define and Track the 

Training of Their Employees. GAO-02-737. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 

2002.

Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management to 

Drive Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 

2002.

Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond.

GAO-02-538T. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2002.

Managing for Results: Building on the Momentum for Strategic Human 

Capital Reform. GAO-02-528T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2002.

A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-02-373SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.

Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 27, 2002.

Managing for Results: Progress in Linking Performance Plans with 

Budget and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington, D.C.: January 

4, 2002. 
Related GAO Products

Page 77 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP. 

Washington, D.C.: August 2001. 

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management 

Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May 

2001. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-263. Washington, D.C.: January 

2001.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 

Perspective. GAO-01-241. January 2001.

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 

Risks.

GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000. 

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission 

Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO/AIMD-97-156. Washington, 

D.C.: August 29, 1997. 

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal 

Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 

1995.

Reorganization FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad 

Transformation Needed. GAO-02-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2002.

Environmental Protection: Observations on Elevating the Environmental 

Protection Agency to Cabinet Status. GAO-02-552T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 21, 2002.

Implementation: The Missing Link in Planning Reorganizations. 

GAO/GGD-81-75. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 1981.

Grant Design Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and 

Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 

1998.
Related GAO Products

Page 78 GAO-03-260 Homeland Security

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go 

Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996. 

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. 

GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.

(450111)
GAO’s Mission The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to 

support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve 

the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American 

people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 

integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail this 

list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to GAO 

Mailing Lists” under “Order GAO Products” heading.

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A check 

or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. GAO 

also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a single 

address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to:

U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Public Affairs Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Service Requested

Presorted Standard

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. GI00