Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Challenge and response: anticipating US military security concern

/ Karl P. Magyar, editor-in-chief; associate editors, Maris 

McCrabb, Albert Mitchum, Lewis B. Ware. 

443p. 

Includes bibliographical references. 

1. Military planning-United States. 2. National SecurityUnited States. 3. World politics-1989- I. Magyar. K. P. (Karl P.) 

U153.C49 1994 

355'.033073-dc20 94-18448 

CIP 

ISBN: 1-58566-053-1 

First Printing August 1994 

Second Printing April 1999 

Third Printing March 2001 

Digitize Copy from Third Printing November 2002 

NOTE: Pagination changed 

DISCLAIMER 

This publication was produced in the Department of Defens

school environment in the interest of academic freedom and th

advancement of national defense-related concepts. The view

expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do n

reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defens

or the United States government. 

This publication has been reviewed by security and polic

review authorities and is cleared for public release. 

ii 
Contents 

Page 

DISCLAIMER .................................................................... ii 

PREFACE.......................................................................... ix 

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 

The Emerging Post-Cold-War International 

Order and Changing Conflict Environment.........................3 

PART I THE CHALLENGE 

Regional Study 1 Conflict and Confrontation in 

the Post-Cold-War Middle East........................................43 

Regional Study 2 Security Issues in the Former 

Warsaw Pact Region..........................................................65 

Arms Control and Proliferation .........................................91 

The Changing Nature of Alliances ..................................117 

The Military's Changing Sociological Concerns .............141 

US National Security Strategy.........................................159 

Conquest and Cohesion The Psychological 

Nature of War ..................................................................195 

PART II THE RESPONSE 

The Diplomacy of Regional Conflict 

Management.....................................................................221 

Forecasting Military Technological Needs......................239 

Constituting US Military Manpower Needs ....................253 

v 
Military Responses in Nonpolitical Conflicts..................267 

Supporting United Nations and Regional 

Peacekeeping Efforts .......................................................293 

Parallel Warfare Its Nature and Application....................313 

Parallel Warfare Anticipating the Enemy’s 

Response ..........................................................................335 

Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century ........................351 

Waging Wars with Nonlethal Weapons..........................377 

Economic Warfare Targeting Financial Systems 

As Centers of Gravity ......................................................391 

Changing Status of Nuclear Forces..................................411 

Developing Space Assets.................................................443 

Conflict Termination Every War Must End.....................465 

CONTRIBUTORS...........................................................483 

vi 

Preface 

The formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsa

Pact and the coalition war to oust Iraq from Kuwait occurre

within months of each other. These events were of gre

significance to Western statesmen and strategic planners wh

recognized that a fundamental transformation of the internation

system was taking place. 

The decline of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as 

cohesive unit raises the most fundamental question for the militar

planner: Who will be the likely enemies in the future for whic

they must prepare? This was not a dilemma during the cold war a

all conflicts in the world were evaluated within the prevailing Eas

West context. Having assessed the challenges posed by th

enemy's capabilities, military planners worked on the assumptio

of the existence of a hierarchy of responses that could be used a

required, with a massive strategic nuclear attack being reserved fo

the belligerent members of the Warsaw Pact-if necessary. Such 

response is not envisioned for any conceivable enemy today. 

The 1991 Gulf War, however, affirmed very early th

prevalence of war outside the cold war context and that militar

responses to future conflicts will have to be formulated in a wid

sub-nuclear range. The United States-led coalition's response 

Iraq's initiatives did just that. New weapon systems, supportin

equipment, strategies, and tactics were implemented in the defe

of Iraq's armed forces. Influencing the prosecution an

management of that war was the absence of the Soviet Union as 

balancing variable. The lessons learned from that encounter wi

certainly influence future engagements-but against whom is n

clear. 

The authors of this volume agree on one point: That conflic

will continue in the future and that the US will perhaps find it in i

interest to become an active participant in some wars. This volum

ix 
attempts to bring together thoughts about the environment

context in which such, wars will take place and about possible U

military reactions. 

The Introduction and Overview offers a broad review of th

major determinants of international change. Part I follows with 

current review of two regions, the Middle East and the are

covered by the former Warsaw Pact, whose conflicts have th

greater potential of expansion and negative consequence to the U

and to our traditional allies than those conflicts in any other regio

No attempt is made to systematically review other regions whe

conflict is not as globally threatening. This section also offe

insight into other factors that portray the global confli

environment, war, changing US military concerns and US securi

perceptions. Together, these essays address what we perceive a

the “Challenge.” 

Part II ranges over some specific security situations, th

changing nature of warfare, and some anticipated avenues o

responding to the emerging challenges, Conflicts and wars may b

resolved by more than only violent means, and these a

considered within the context of diplomatic or collective effort

Responses to nonpolitical conflicts those in which the defeat of 

regime or an insurgent force is not an objective-are examine

Peacekeeping operations, which have recently placed gre

demands on the US, are investigated. The new technologic

capabilities are reviewed. Air power, parallel warfare, and w

termination theory are presented, And the utility of nuclear force

as well as space assets are updated. These topics and others addre

the “Response,” 

The authors of this volume are all affiliated with the US A

Force Air Command and Staff College at Air University. Maxwe

Air Force Base, Alabama. The book is to comprise one of the tex

for our students, but it is expected that it will generate a wid

interest among military and civilian audiences. The editors hav

not imposed methodological restrictions and indeed, we hav

x 
encouraged a diversity of opinions but within an academic contex

Our own immediate challenge was to produce this wide-rangin

review under great 'time constraints in order to make a very up-to

date volume available to those contemplating future US militar

security concerns. It is important to stress that we all write in ou

personal capacities and that no portion of this volume necessari

reflects the official view of the US Air Force or any U

government agency. 

We, the editors, wish to thank the authors for their time

response to our request for quality work under severe tim

constraints. At the Air University Press, we wish to thank D

Elizabeth Bradley, director; Ms Debbie Banker; Ms Joan Hicke

Ms Linda Colson; Mr. Steve Garst; and our editors, Mr. Hug

Richardson and Dr Glenn Morton, for responding to the challeng

of producing this volume on such notice. 

Karl P. Magyar, PhD 

xi 
INTRODUCTION 

AND 

OVERVIEW 
The Emerging Post-Cold-War International 

Order and Changing Conflict Environment 

Dr Karl P. Magyar 

We have recently experienced the rather sudden end of the co

war, an event that ranks among not only the top public events o

this century, but in view of the projected consequences had 

nuclear war occurred, may be judged as a seminal point in th

history of our civilization. Mankind's highest level of technolog

had been impressed into the service of military security as tw

sizable alliances faced each other nervously as they contemplate

the horrendous costs of implementing their war-makin

capabilities. For the great powers, a big war didn't make sense. B

for many states, smaller wars may well remain attractive. 

This was made amply evident by Iraq's attempted absorption o

Kuwait and refusal to back down in the face of poignant warning

by the US to do so. The ensuing war in 1991 ranked as a majo

engagement, yet not long thereafter it did not deter the loose

organized forces of Somalia's warlord Gen Mohamed Farah Aid

from shooting up UN peacekeeping forces and from inflictin

heavy casualties on America's highly trained Ranger Force. An

while US attention focused on Iraq and Somalia, Yugoslavia wa

undergoing a very bloody breakup; many countries, including par

of what had been the Soviet Union, experienced violent civil war

and numerous prolonged conflicts raged throughout Mric

scarcely affected by the demise of the cold war. We may deduc

that civilization has been spared, but history's relentless onslaug

on numerous societies and their warriors continue unabated. 

We are inundated by analyses that portray as revolutionary th

changes taking place in the post-cold-war era, yet we must qualif

such dramatic assessments to keep a sober view.1 A broad sweep o

recorded history since Thucydides wrote The Peloponnesian W

reveals the pervasiveness of the use of force as the final arbiter o

unresolved disputes, and this method and tendency have not bee

3 
stilled. What does change over history is the nature of war-makin

tools and the methods of their implementation. The cold w

demonstrated history's pervasive penchant for the use of force, b

nuclear weapons had been created whose potential use mad

peaceful resolution of conflicts more advantageous. Howeve

while that rationally derived decision not to employ these weapon

should properly be celebrated, the resort to lesser levels of forc

remains as attractive as ever.2

 It may indeed be argued that the us

of force may increase in light of the global proliferation o

information that has sensitized the masses about their relativ

deprivations and hence diminished respect for their tradition

political structures.3 

Anticipating future challenges, then, concerns the identificatio

of several factors: 

Who will do the fighting? 

What will be their objectives? 

Which war-making tools will be implemented? 

How can we contain the wars and keep external intervenors 

bay? 

How can we reduce their frequency as well as intensity? 

Which of those conflicts and battles will concern US securi

interests? 

Preparing responses to these conflicts entails, above a

sophisticated sociocultural analysis and the ability to constant

adjust the war machinery in terms of its tools as well as the

methods of implementation. Changes have occurred and wi

continue to be experienced regarding which means are employe

in addressing conflict and, to a lesser extent, what the objects o

forcible acquisition will be. But a fundamental transformation 

human nature, as depicted so well by Thucydides, is not to b

anticipated, and hence the attraction for the use of force will mo

likely continue the prevalence of war. Security will be ensured fo

4 
those who most concisely anticipate the challenges-and prepa

appropriate responses. 

The Changing Structure of the

International Order 

The end of the cold war marked an acceleration of change in th

international order. This section examines changes in and th

evolution of the international order, the transition to a two-world

system, the proliferation of nonviable states, region

identification, and ideological developments. 

Change and Evolution 

History has experienced numerous eras of distinct internation

systems-which may be viewed as established patterns o

relationships between states. The cold-war system, with i

overarching characteristic of two predominant powers, the US an

the Soviet Union, each leading its respective military alliance

NATO and the Warsaw Pact-has recently disintegrated as th

Soviet Union fragmented along largely ethnic and historical line

As with the disintegration of all such systems, the transition to 

new order is fraught with uncertainty as a system in transition 

not formulated by anyone's grand design.4 Indeed, no one pow

needs to predominate at all times although an internation

hierarchy inevitably emerges since power abhors a vacuum. Th

US is certainly poised to continue exercising its established glob

role, but we are uncertain of emerging military competitor

Whoever they will be, they will have to attain history's necessar

mix: ambition matched by resources. An imbalance in these tw

variables leads to certain defeat-as was experienced by th

Germans and Japanese in World War II, by the Soviets in the co

war, and by the Iraqis in the 1991 Gulf War. 

Change and transformation, then, are to be expected as the

express the historical tendency of societies to predominate ov

others and to advance their interests. Even those without ambition

5 
for acquisition must take cognizance of those who embark on th

path of aggrandizement, lest they be absorbed. Change offe

fortuitous opportunity to some; others suffer its wrath. 

An examination of history also reveals a pervasive hierarch

order among states with virtually all states embarked on a cours

of evolution from weak, dependent quasi-states or colonies, 

eventually great powers or imperial nations.5

 After new states a

formed, they enter what is, for most, a long period of intern

consolidation in search of legitimate sociopolitical institution

Thereafter, a state is prepared to export its influence or militar

controls into usually weak or vulnerable neighboring states or i

subregion, often resulting in the enlargement of the state. Suc

states then may undertake imperial or global ventures to exercis

direct controls for purposes of exploitation or the strateg

pacification of territories far removed from the home bas

However, at that level, when expanding ambitions are not matche

by developed resources, and the domestic base become

delegitimized, the compulsive phase sets in as the state decline

usually precipitously, losing its great power ranking. This 

precisely what happened to the Soviet Union recently. 

This evolutionary model suggests that the historically pervasiv

competition among states will soon see new challengers to the U

as the only truly global power, while for the US, the challeng

remains to match our global interests with resources. The mod

also identifies fundamentally different types of wars that state

fight at different stages of their evolutionary cycle. The bulk of th

world's nations are presently in their consolidative stage wi

roughly half of them experiencing serious civil strife. Every regio

in the world contains expansionists; however, only the US may b

properly characterized as a global power. 

Today, there are few remaining colonial dependencies fightin

liberation wars for independence. The Western Sahara is one suc

example. Others in the formative stage are the breakawa

territories from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Bosnia is a

6 
excellent example of a new state undergoing a formative war. Mo

of the conflicts in the world, however, are civil wars, whic

typically occur, in the early consolidative period of a nation

evolution. These proliferate largely in the states that have recent

received their independence. America's own civil war was a class

example of a consolidative war. Civil wars traditionally tended n

to attract significant direct foreign military intervention, but durin

the old-war days, such civil wars often incorporated the conte

between the two superpowers. 

It is the expansive phase in the evolution of a nation th

experiences the most disruptive wars as such conflicts a

intenationalized, and they may upset the regional power balance

If the wars are not quickly halted or contained, they could expan

to global proportions. Germany and the Soviet Union engaged 

such an expansive-stage conflict when they carved up contiguou

Poland on the eve of World War II. More recently, Iraq's attempte

absorption of contiguous Kuwait demonstrated the tendency toda

of such a war of expansion to attract distant external involvemen

Finally, global powers tend to be busy military interventionists-b

rarely as blatant initiators of conflicts. Rather, they intervene 

existing conflicts around the globe to redress a deterioratin

balance or, during the cold-war days, to neutralize the perceive

gains by the adversary. The popular image of such global powe

depicts them as perennial aggressors, but more precisely, the

frequent involvements in conflicts tend to be limited and geare

towards halting conflicts before they develop into majo

confrontations. Great powers are interested in maintaining 

balance of power rather than risk having a minor distant region

conflict escalate to the point where the home base may b

threatened. The Soviets confronted such a prospect during the 196

Cuban missile crisis. 

States may be hierarchically organized according to the

evolutionary phase, but another traditional classification syste

must also be addressed as it, too, reflects the waning cold-w

structures. For several years we had referred to the “first world

7 
meaning the democratic, free market, economically develope

states. The “second world” included the authoritarian, comman

economy states of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allie

The “third world” included everyone else, assumed to be th

economically less developed. However, this latter group may b

further delineated by further subgroups to acknowledge the gre

differences among this mixed collection of states. 

The Warsaw Pact has now been dissolved and the Soviet Unio

has fragmented, and therefore the second world is now but a

historical expression. In effect we now have only two worlds-th

first and third worlds. However, this two-worlds context may als

express not only the division of the world between the “haves” an

the “have nots,” but also within most states the division betwee

the privileged minorities and the impoverished masses-whic

implies that all states reflect this two-worlds division. This 

especially the case in traditional third world countries where suc

divisions are becoming evermore significant. Poverty does n

drive a poor state to make war on a rich nation, but the acute cla

differences within states may engender civil wars, especially whe

evident, significant socioeconomic differences are also delineate

along ethnic lines. Such civil wars in turn may often spill in

neighboring states or invite external participants. A prime examp

of a civil conflict stemming from extreme social disparities is th

vortex of conflict in Liberia since 1989, which spilled in

neighboring countries within two years. Such factional disconte

has been in great evidence during the last few years, and much of 

may be ascribed to the impact of modem communications as the

portray the possibilities of better lifestyles to restive population

around the globe. The enemy in such cases is seen by the masses 

be not other countries but their own inept and corru

governments. 

The Transition to a Two-Worlds System 

The world is steadily polarizing into two socioeconomic camp

and the gulf between them is widening despite the programs o

8 
structural reforms introduced by international agencies to rectif

this situation. Vast parts of the third world are becomin

marginalized. The ultimate characteristic that distinguishes the tw

camps is their economic competitiveness. Again, this criterion is a

valid among states as within them. What fuels this competitiv

ability is of secondary consideration as it may be based o

technological abilities, productive workers, access to financi

resources, or commercially attractive geographic or natur

resources. But what matters is the capability to convert suc

advantages into a competitive edge. The new global econom

network increasingly connects the economies of the first world an

the small developed sectors of the states in the third world-which 

the effect of isolating further the world's noncompetitive peop

from the first world and from their own privileged elites the thir

world. Today, the members of the third world number about thre

fourths of the global population, and their plight as well as the

numbers are increasing. 

Another problem with the two-worlds division is the placeme

of the members of the dissolved Warsaw Pact. Some, those state

such as Hungary, Czechoslovak Republic, Poland, the Baltic state

and Russia may realistically expect join the first world, but the

competitive abilities must for e most part first undergo a majo

transitlon.6

 Should they succeed, some may aspire to join th

European Union. Russia may strive to attain a renewed global rol

possibly more powerful than when she led the Soviet Union-no

that Russia is socially somewhat more cohesive than before, whi

not having to be responsible for the poorer southern region. An

the former southern republics of the Soviet Union such a

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, as well as Easter

Europe's Bulgaria and Rumania, will most likely qualify as thir

world states. This may also be the fate of certain areas of e form

Yugoslavia. The key is competitiveness, the imbalance of which 

the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia contributed 

their breakup and much of the subsequent violence. The result 

that the frontiers of the third world have now shifted considerab

9 
northwards, directly to Europe, and expanded the numbers of th

Middle Eastern region's third world countries with the addition o

the Soviet lion's southern republics. This may imply great

instability, the Middle East has already been a volatile area, 

which e now added numerous conflicts in contiguous states. 

The Proliferation of Nonviable States 

The world has always known poor states but they had existed 

isolation, removed from the mainstream of international affairs, o

they were colonial territories of European empires whos

traditional character was maintained if by virtuous design. In fac

only their rare commercial advantages were developed and the

only to suit the requirements of the colonial power and not th

subjects. As these colonies became independent, it was feared th

most lacked the essential prerequisites for a meaningf

independent existence. They would not be capable competitor

Analysts identified the “small state” problem with its focus o

small size and population bases. Soon there were numerou

“micro” and “mini” states in the United Nations whose population

were often less than those of modest-sized cities in the develope

world. 7

 Would these states be “viable”? 

Today there are two dimensions to this problem. First, wh

constitutes viability? Neither size nor population can be the so

criterion as small political entities such as Switzerlan

Luxembourg, the Gulf Emirates, Singapore, and Hong Kong a

doing well. By contrast, huge countries such as Mauritania, Nige

Sudan, Mongolia, or Afghanistan are barely able to functio

Viability, then, has a qualitative aspect, which means that mo

than only quantifiable criteria must be considered. We may sugge

that to be considered viable, a state should be able to convert i

resources into socioeconomic progress for its inhabitants 

accordance with the more advanced standards of the internation

community. We may also ask, if only a restricted elite profits fro

the little economic progress that is made, ought the state to b

considered to be viable? This debate is heavily informed by th

10 
character and successes of the first world. As the gulf widen

between the two worlds, more states become nonviable and thu

potential sources of instability. 8 

The second dimension of the viability problem concerns th

consequences of the proliferation of many such small states as we

as large, but noncompetitive, nonviable states in the internation

system. It was feared, as in the case of Grenada, that small state

would barter their scarce resources such as strategic location to th

superpowers or to other regionally ambitious states. As a sma

state, Cuba had managed to be the most dangerous confrontatio

point of the cold war. Kuwait, with its population of less than 

million, became the object of a major war due ultimately to its ow

nonviable defensive capability. Despite its size and population o

some 8 million, Somalia's descent to anarchy may portend 

possible flood of other third world states that will demonstrate th

problems of nonviability. Yet another related problem surfaced 

1993 when the elected president of Haiti, the newly elected civilia

president of Nigeria, and the elected government of Burundi we

ousted by their militaries. They all called on the internation

community to help install them in power. 9 If done, would the

rule be truly legitimate if it had relied on external force o

influence? The end of the cold war will ensure that not all conflic

stemming from nonviable conditions will be the object of glob

interests; however, they may still be exploited by region

expansionists with far-reaching consequences. 

Regional Identification 

During the cold war the superpowers in effect developed th

world community into an integrated global system. Conflic

anywhere in the world attracted the attention of one, then of th

other, superpower; hence, even distant developments we

examined for strategic advantage. However, the end of the co

war has influenced the regionalization of global affairs again a

vast areas are now turning inward while some regions a

becoming marginalized in relation to the major global player

11 
While certain positive developments may emerge from th

tendency in terms of conflicts that will not engulf the globe, suc

regionalization may have adverse effects on certain members o

the regions who possess only limited resources for their ow

defense and who may not be able to prevent becoming involved 

local conflicts. And another problem concerns the consequences o

marginalization of certain states and entire regions with its adver

economic implications that may engender civil strife. 

Prominent areas subject to such regionalist tendencies includ

Eastern Europe, the territories of the former Soviet Union and o

Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, North Americ

North and Northeast Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.10 A revie

of these regions will quickly reveal the missing cold-war context a

was amply illustrated by the absence of the Soviet Union as 

factor in the Gulf War. Eastern Europe has largely been abandone

by the Soviet Union, and its countries are seeking their ow

separate links with the European Union, NATO, or with th

external world community. The former republics of the Sovi

Union are seeking their own new ties and redefining relations wi

Russia. Yugoslavia's breakup would scarcely have been tolerate

by the Soviet Union during the cold-war days, but today, beyon

the United Nations' peacekeeping role, Western Europe has bee

reluctant to intervene militarily, which in turn discouraged 

greater role by the US. That conflict may yet spill into the rest o

the Balkan region, but despite dire predictions, the war an

atrocities of Yugoslavia have not spread beyond its borders. 

The Gulf War was the first major confrontation of the pos

cold-war days, the prosecution of which was enabled to a larg

extent by the nonavailability of the Soviet Union on Iraq's sid

The allied coalition, which included several regional states, and th

peace initiatives among Israel, the Palestine Liberatio

Organization (PW), and neighboring states in 1993 also bear th

imprint of the new regionalization. However, as previously note

the Middle Eastern region is not necessarily becoming mo

pacific as new forces are emerging and volatile new territories a

12 
being appended to this region. More positive prospects fo

regionalization may be found in Southeast Asia. With the absenc

of the Soviet Union and the recent initiatives by Vietnam to invi

foreign economic ties, regionalization is becoming identified' wi

intensified economic interaction which, if successful, should imp

the stabilization of this previously volatile region, which ha

played such a major role in the cold war. Regionalization was als

evident in the 1993 debate in the US regarding the signing of th

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). And the US 

recognizing the economic interest shift from its tradition

European orientation to that of the Pacific rim region and to i

own hemisphere. The US acknowledged the effectiveness o

Europe's economic regionalization by participating in th

formation of our own competitive trade structures. 

It is in Africa where the negative dimensions of regionalizatio

are most in evidence. With the absence of the Soviet Union as a

adversary on that continent, Africa has ceased to be an area o

strategic global competition, while its generally declinin

economic performance has rendered Africa of marginal utili

value as a global partner. North and Northeast Africa have becom

the objects of Islamist designs, which may aspire to incorpora

both areas into a coherent Islamic fundamentalist (Islamist) regio

with the goal of eliminating all secular governments. Closer ties 

the Middle East may be expected, and should Islamism the

engulf Saudi Arabia and other states, a new Islamic bloc cou

emerge as a very formidable strategic region which would redefin

traditional Western security interests stretching from Portugal 

Pakistan. 11 

Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing another regionalist episod

since its initial attempts to establish a meaningful united identi

following independence. Much of the continent was divided alon

ideological lines with excolonial, Soviet, Cuban, Chinese, and U

interests vying for strategic advantage and surrogate battleground

Africa is presently forced to turn inward, as it has quickly lost i

attraction to external powers. The peacekeeping effort in Somal

13 
started off as an enthusiastic international operation, but th

ensuing frustration soon demonstrated the limited interests in th

anarchic conflict which, despite a substantial investment 

manpower and money, would not be resolved without a prolonge

commitment. Recommendations for direct participation by th

Organization for African Unity (OAU) or for the formation of 

regional peacekeeping force to be constituted by neighborin

countries were soon made. These proposals followed on the hee

of the questionable effort by the Economic Community of We

African States (ECOW AS) to bring peace in Liberia's civil w

with the insertion of a well-armed, multinational military forc

from the region. After more than three years of massive effor

which included much aerial bombing, the fighting had not stoppe

and it may be questioned if this regional effort did not in fa

prolong the war and suffering. Certainly, much of the regio

became destabilized in the process. 

Regionalism bears close scrutiny as it may offer positive step

to resolve local problems, but regionalism may also contribute 

tensions due to insufficient local resources. In such regions, w

may expect the emergence of dominant actors whose hegemoni

aspirations will naturally be resisted by potential victim

Regionalism may also lead to intensified cooperation in econom

fora such as integrated communities. This would be a welcom

development as it has been amply ascertained that such integratio

subsequently dissuades hostile relations. However, we need 

guard that regionalization does not become a euphemism fo

marginalization as in the case of Africa. 

Ideological Developments 

Has history ended, and has Western-style liberal democrac

won and will it sweep across the globe? This is a question asked b

Francis Fukuyama.

12 Previously, Daniel Bell had asked if ideolog

had ended. 13 We may ask: is ideology dead or are glob

ideologies undergoing transformation-as they have don

throughout history? Two major developments this century hav

14 
contributed to the skepticism regarding doctrinaire ideologie

those which express not only an historical mission and ethic of 

society but also a dynamic action plan for the future. First, Ado

Hitler's extreme national socialist ideology led Germany on its pa

of unprecedented destruction. Second, the collapse of the Sovi

Union and the Warsaw Pact, as well as the fundamental change

taking place in China and other socialist states, has discredite

communism as another extreme ideology. The result is th

whether right or left, in their extreme forms, there has emerge

widespread distrust about ideologies as they inevitably introduc

authoritarianism and atrocities. Ideologies which are to be tolerate

are those that are in the political center and demonstrate a soci

ethic but retain a good degree of flexibility, pragmatism, an

vagueness. They also do not proselytize aggressively. 

In this sense, ideologies have gotten a bad reputation, but the

have not been eliminated. It is not conceivable that mankind

sociopolitical development can advance in an ideological vacuum

Values and collective aspirations are universal cultur

characteristics; what changes over time are only the specif

contents. “Pragmatism” in the sense of “whatever works” ma

sound very nonideological, but identifying what works to attain 

specific goal reveals an ideological orientation. 

Liberal democracy, the well-established ideology of the Wes

concerns near universal participation in determining th

composition and direction of governments, protecting certa

rights, and maintaining essentially private ownership an

centralized market economies. This is the prevailing ideology th

first world whose members exhibit mostly subtle differences on th

issue of government intervention in socioeconomic polic

Because of the attainment of the advanced economic welfare leve

of the members of the first world, liberal democracy is held in hig

esteem by that sector ld is gaining adherents in other parts of th

world. Interestingly, while it is widely assumed that th

socioeconomic success of the first world derives directly from i

moderate ideology, this cause and effect relationship is subje

15 
debate. China

s economy has grown at an astounding rate well ov

a decade while maintaining largely centralized controls-althoug

there is no question that recent liberalization measures over certa

sectors have contributed these rapid advances. In a similar vei

Asia's newly industrializing countries (NIC) advance

impressively under less-than-democratic conditions and with th

governments playing a heavy interventionist role. In essence, w

must guard against making unwarranted assumptions about liber

democracy as a universal political ideal and as an econom

panacea. 

Opposition to liberal democracy stems from two sources. Som

argue that the inherent socioeconomic inequality, as is evide

many liberal democracies, is a necessary feature in order for it 

work. Those who are noncompetitive fall by the wayside and eith

exploited or neglected. The result is crime, slums, drug

unemployment, and poverty-in essence, the prevailing third wor

component within first world societies. The other source o

opposition stems from a variety of other ideological foundation

that allude to the inappropriateness of liberal democracy for the

societies, or they posit the superior ethic their own ideologies. I

the former case, militant national socialists (fascists) saw liber

democracy as weak and likely to survive in a competitive an

hostile world. A nation's human resources had to be melded into 

militant productive machine to advance that nation's securit

Communism, on the other hand, promised an egalitarian utopia 

all, but it invariably stumbled into variations of Stalin's gulag

Liberal democracy won the contest for survival with the leadin

proponents of both National Socialism and communism, althoug

there is in evidence an occasional revival of interest in fascis

leaning sentiment as in Russia's 1993 election, and there exis

considerable residual support for communism among its previou

adherents and those who never abandoned all Marxist orthodox

The latter still comprise a quarter of the world's population. 

Others reject liberal democracy on the grounds of i

inappropriateness to their conditions or because of the existence o

16 
long-standing culturally based opposition. In the former cas

many third world states may pay lip service to the tenets of liber

democracy, but the reality depicts oligarchic authoritarianis

whose leaders defend their position by arguing that the standar

features of liberal democracy are premature for their societies a

they lack the essential institutional prerequisites. Their critics rep

that this explanation conveniently assures the perpetuation of th

oligarchies in power-whether military or civilian. These argumen

need to be reconciled, especially for those states judged to b

nonviable as even with the best of efforts, it is unrealistic to expe

that liberal democracy will flourish long in a failing socioeconom

environment. 

Those who base their opposition on cultural consideration

present more formidable challenges. Many argue that their cultur

traditions ascribe a different context for human rights or fo

universal political participation. The Chinese ask if the US, with 

mere 200-year political tradition, can teach a country with 

tradition dating 4,000 years. Here, we should guard lest w

underestimate the influence of the cultural environment that shape

the interpretation of ideologies. In other words, liberal democrac

socialism, capitalism, human rights, and so on, have gained wid

respect as ideological concepts, but they will be manifested 

different ways. This was demonstrated by Mao Tse Tung whos

Communist Party adopted a Marxist ideology, which had bee

conceived within the context of Europe's industrial revolution, b

which was steadily modified in China to suit the needs of a peasa

movement striving to lift China from the feudal age into th

twentieth century. Many of Marx's philosophical premises derivin

from Europe's intellectual history were discarded as Mao gradual

altered the imported ideology to suit the traditional Chines

context. Towards the end of Mao's rule, many age-old Confucia

tenets were validated again-though they had been active

suppressed during his first decade in power. Certainly he use

Marxist ideology as an operational doctrine to justify h

assumption of power within China, but he did not accept th

17 
assumptions of his Eastern European and Soviet counterpar

whose claims to universalistic truths had been well grounded 

Europe's philosophical traditions and periodic demonstrations o

messianic proselytization. The consequence of this cultur

difference was the Sino-Soviet split, which fueled the failures o

Marxism in the West. China's more parochial cultural traditio

enabled that country to survive-as it has for four millennia-whi

the more orthodox Soviet-style Marxist regimes all collapsed, a

did Hitler's projected 1,OOO-year Reich, and in a previous ag

Europe's globe-spanning empires-all after comparatively short li

spans. 

There are several indicators pointing toward new ideologic

developments. The foremost force that is enjoying a resurgence 

religion-which throughout history has rarely been far remove

from political concems.14 The current episode was inspired by th

1979 ouster of the Shah of Iran by the Islamic fundamentalists, le

by Ayatollah Khomeini. Soon, several other such Islami

movements swept the Middle East and North and Northeast Afric

gaining, if not outright power, much respect among the secul

governments who were their targets. The enemies are not only th

non-Muslim infidel, but also the degenerate and secul

governments in Muslim societies that hold any governing doctrin

other than those derived from the Koran. Western-style liber

democracy certainly cannot be compromised with such tenet

Should this political movement succeed in ousting all non-Islam

governments in the huge Muslim world stretching from Mauritan

to Pakistan, by uniting, it could aspire to become a ne

superpower, fueled by the substantial resources of the Arabia

peninsula-an area identified as a prime target. Other religiou

sources of political influence include a new wave of Hind

fundamentalism in India, while Christian fundamentalists hav

become a potent political force in the U.S. And the Russia

Orthodox Church may emerge as another such political force a

was evidenced by its mediative role in the turbulent days 

Moscow in 1993. 

18 
In the third world, variations of socialism will survive but n

for long in their militant or doctrinaire forms. Ideologic

flexibility will be conditioned by hard socioeconomic realitie

Yesterday's liberation heroes have failed to produce, but unless th

economic fortunes of their countries are reversed, the emergence o

new controversial leaders is to be expected. Their doctrines wi

certainly call for a redefinition of relations with the first worl

reparations to be paid by the first world to compensate fo

historical injustices, and a call for greater unity among themselve

to maximize their bargaining power. Variations of democracy wi

be in evidence, but they will enjoy only a short life span in th

absence of dramatic socioeconomic progress. Ultimately, th

solutions to the third world's problems will probably be addresse

more effectively by evolving ideological developments in the fir

world as they are modified for the third world context, than by th

third world's own formulations. As economically marginalize

territories, their own ideologies will also remain marginalized. 

Redefining the United Nations's Global Mission 

Like its predecessor the League of Nations, the United Nation

(UN) was established to prevent the outbreak of another world w

by implementing collective security measures. The emphasis 

both cases was the prevention of wars between states, but toda

most conflicts are within states. Certainly many of these civil wa

have the potential of spilling into their regions, and indeed, man

have done so. However, as in the case of Somalia, emergin

international humanitarian sentiment is demonstrating concern fo

lives lost regardless of the nature of the conflict. This new glob

vision is being developed rapidly as the United Nations 

expanding its traditional concern with only international wars 

include wars at the domestic level as well. A clear distinctio

between the two levels is becoming difficult to make as civil wa

increasingly tend to become internationalized. 

During the cold war, the United Nations was the scene of th

spirited diplomatic struggle between East and West for allegianc

19 
of the 

South-the third world.

When united, the Souths votin

strength in the General Assembly would invariably determin

whose views would prevail. After the massive armed interventio

by the United Nations in the Korean conflict in the early 1950s, th

United Nations was subsequently excluded from participatin

militarily in most major cold war conflicts such as the war 

Vietnam. Instead, the United Nations focused its attention on th

vast social and humanitarian concerns of especially the numerou

nations that had recently received their independence. It wa

reasoned that addressing the source of problems should reduce th

likelihood of war's breaking out. In the security realm, the Unite

Nations turned its attention to peaceful intervention in third wor

conflicts in the form of peacekeeping operations as a replaceme

for the much more ambitious designs of collective security. 

In that endeavor, the results are mixed. Lucia Mouat expresse

the reason for the peacekeeping trend, “Often more by default tha

by design, UN peacekeepers have been taking on the role of wor

Cop.”16 In theory, the United Nations ought to be the ide

institution for addressing these regional conflicts, but th

organizational structure of the United Nations has not bee

developed sufficiently to take on such a huge responsibility. In 

speech to the United Nations in September 1993, President Clinto

warned that the United Nations cannot become engaged in ever

one of the world's conflicts and that the United Nations must kno

when to say no.17 As of the date of that speech, the United Nation

had 17 peacekeeping missions under way at an annual cost of $3

billion and with results far from universally positive. One hundre

thousand United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping troops we

deployed, one-fourth of them in the former Yugoslavia alone-y

the atrocities there had not ceased and peace remained elusive. Th

United Nations's operation in Somalia consumed over a third of i

peacekeeping budget and, likewise, peace remained elusiv

Addressing the evolving problem posed by renegade gener

Mohamed Farah Aidid in Somalia, the New York Times note

“Arresting and trying criminals is completely uncharted territor

20 
for the United Nations,

 Other controversial involvemen

include Cambodia, where despite the expenditure of $2 billion, th

country has not been pacified and could erupt in war again, I

Angola, the United Nations's efforts came to naught as th

insurgency against the government resumed after election resul

were rejected by the government's opponents. And in Cyprus, th

internal standoff persists with the United Nations's peacekeepin

mission in place 29 years. By contrast, the UN's operation in Sin

is judged to be a success. 

Besides the peacekeeping controversies, another notable deba

concerns the work of the United Nations World Conference o

Human Rights, which convened in Vienna in mid-1993. A majo

ideological debate emerged as delegates debated and disagreed o

certain aspects of human rights, Are human rights universal o

culturally relative, it was asked.19 Beyond agreeing on the morali

of the broad concept of human rights, can there be univers

agreement on the specific contents? Not surprisingly, the Musli

world posited the necessarily superior position of sharia-Islam

law. China and other oriental countries insisted that the huma

rights issue couldn’t disregard economic factors. Indonesia argue

that national development must take priority over human right

Also, it was argued that the collective rights of society mu

supersede those of individuals who may threaten society's stabilit

And going beyond mere abstract rhetoric of human rights, 5

Islamic states demanded the condemnation of Serbian aggressio

against Muslim Bosnia. 

The US led the arguments for the universalistic view and for th

rights of the individual. In this the US reflected the standar

Western tendency towards exporting aggressively its universalist

ideological views-which others see as arrogant and intrusive. Th

debate has not been stilled, but the conference may indicate th

the United Nations is becoming perhaps the major forum fo

ideological debate and that there may be emerging a Unite

Nations-based global value system. Where ideology ha

traditionally developed in isolation and often spilled out of i

21 
borders, the United Nations may provide an invaluable venue 

sharpen such debates at the intellectual level and not on th

battlefield. 

In these post-cold-war days, the United Nations may experienc

a renaissance, but its fortune lies not in its own hands. Rather, 

will be the leaders of the global community who will define th

organization's role as a security, social, humanitarian, o

intellectual force. The US pays one-fourth of the UNs upkeep an

hence will shape much of its agenda. The desire to provide th

United Nations with a permanent crisis-response instrument ha

been expressed, but opposition may be expected from US source

harking back to similar opposition during the League of Nations

days. Now that global tensions at the superpower level have bee

reduced, is there a need for such an ambitious and cost

undertaking, it is asked. 

Global Challenges

US Perspectives 

This section examines and discusses US understanding of an

interaction with global challenges. Taken up in turn are U

perspectives of global affairs; changing interests; emergin

security interests; identifying the challenges; levels of response 

them; managing those responses; and a discussion of histor

leadership, and power. 

US Perceptions of Global Affairs 

The US is justified in viewing its future global role with som

trepidation. We won the cold war contest for survival against th

menacing Soviet adversary and have gained a reprieve from majo

threats of other credible enemies for a while. However, we are n

certain of the future in terms of emerging challenges. History ha

not ended and, while it is not a comfortable prospect, history's ow

logic suggests that we are the next great power to decline. This 

not necessarily imminent; in the meantime, much work remains 

22 
be undertaken to improve the welfare of the land and to extend th

welfare to the greater commonwealth of humanity. The demand f

America's positive intervention is ever increasing, but as noted 

the outset, the ultimate challenge is to match ambition wi

resources. This seems to be an evident formula, but in view o

history's vicissitudes; managing successfully its implementatio

has proven to be mostly elusive. 

The US views a world in transition, characterized by tw

significant developments. First, despite data which depic

declining political rights and civil liberties, the Western notion o

liberal democracy is becoming a widely accepted ideologic

framework governing the relations between rulers and the ruled.

However, there are powerful exceptions, and we cannot rule o

the emergence of new ideological extremists. Also, the operation

forms of democracy are not always encouraging. The US also see

as positive the greater global acceptance of market-base

economies-which the US believes is inherently tied to democrac

and necessary for the real advancement of nations.

21 Howeve

concerning free market ideology, we may expect more oppositio

as, indeed, the US economy is itself taking some new direction

The US has also taken the leadership in spreading the seeds o

human rights-but the manifestation of this is far from uniform

These are the forces, which support the stabilization of the worl

and the US is widely credited with leadership in spreading thes

principles. 

The second development has been the tendency toward

national fragmentation and ethnic polarization.22 The US general

attempts to discourage such fragmentation, fearing the likelihoo

of spreading violence that may accompany the process, th

weakening of the economies, and the prospect for some of th

resultant units to be nonviable. The international community 

called upon with ever-increasing frequency to intervene in suc

conflicts, which can become expensive and can get bogged dow

This fragmentationist tendency could proliferate widely and swee

Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia, and parts of the Orient-possibly eve

23 
China. Its origins may usually be traced to the failure to develo

nationally or to uneven development of ethnically delineated su

national units. Occasionally sociocultural reasons may be th

source of dissent, and these too may become prevalent in th

future. These fragmentationist states encounter violence as the

disintegrate and subsequently as they enter new formative an

consolidative stages. Numerous wars over minority population

and new borders such as those in the former Yugoslavia wi

proliferate. For the US, merely discouraging this development wi

not suffice; the problem will have to be addressed at the econom

and strategic levels. If tractors don't bring the desired results, tank

will inevitably have to be called in. 

Other developments, which contribute to America’s curre

global outlook, include a more regionalist view of internation

affairs. By signing NAFTA, the US hedged its bet that its ow

region may be developed in competition with the European Unio

Similarly, the notable inroads made at the US-hosted Asia-Pacif

Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1993 signaled once aga

America's shift away from its historic Eurocentric view of th

world, while also acknowledging the primacy of economic ov

strategic concerns-the latter, which had been the case during th

cold war. Geographically and commercially, the US is well poise

to intensify relations with the Pacific rim.

23 Russia remains o

commercial interest to the US private sector while the rest of th

old Soviet Union's territories remain primarily of strategic concer

due to the numerous wars in that region and the unsettled proble

of the dispersal of nuclear weapons in several of the new state

Western Europe remains the most stable political partner wi

whom our long-standing commercial differences are addresse

peacefully, primarily in General Agreement on Tariffs and Trad

(GATT) negotiations. As for the third world in general, its hug

sector of marginalized states are advised by the US to ado

democratic structures and market economies, but their success o

failure with them will hardly impact on the US except if certa

ensuing conflicts become internationalized. 

24 
Changing Interests 

A nation's external interests may be classified as cor

intermediate, and peripheral. Core interests concern strateg

matters as they ensure the security of the state: intermedia

interests are those that seek to maximize welfare; and peripher

interests are those that advance more abstract socioideologic

values. During the height of the cold-war days, the pursuit of co

interests predominated in US foreign policy as all global even

were scrutinized for their prospects of altering the tense pow

equation. Presently, this practice has been somewhat relaxe

because the conflicts that do erupt will not wreak imminent glob

catastrophe nor will all conflicts, if isolated, affect US strateg

interests adversely. 

There has now occurred a perceptible shift towards the pursu

of intermediate interest-level economic objectives. This directio

has been inspired by widespread public awareness of structur

economic problems-especially the long-term damage potential o

the growing deficit. The international marketplace is where som

solutions to economic growth are to be found. Accordingly, the U

may be expected to increasingly engage in spirited debate an

bargaining at international economic fora and to re-examine i

competitive posture.24 In this regard, Europe and Japan have bee

good teachers but the widespread domestic resistance to signin

the NAFI'A accord identified significant vestiges of traditional U

isolationism. Having just disengaged from the global securi

stage, many are reluctant to transfer the battle to the world

economic arena. The US did well in the strategic competition wi

the Soviets, but the new competition is against capable adversarie

who have long concentrated their energies in that arena out o

opportunity as well as necessity. Except for occasional response

to moderate-size security threats to our core interests, most of ou

innovative international activities in the near future should be 

this intermediate level. 

25 
At the peripheral level, little overt hostility is to be expecte

Radical variations of socialism have rapidly lost influence, and th

US State Department has been emphatic not to portray Islamism a

a threatening ideology. Nor is there much opposition to America

basic ideological tenets. National Security Adviser Anthony Lak

noted, “democracy and market economics, are more broad

accepted than ever before. We have arrived at neither the end o

history nor a clash of civilizations, but a moment of immens

democratic and entrepreneurial opportunity, and we must not was

it.”25 The first world's ideological cohesiveness and advance

socioeconomic status is a very powerful challenge to those wh

would decry the virtues of Western liberal democracy. Mo

significant at the peripheral level are the humanitaria

interventions undertaken in conflicts-such as those in Somalia an

Bosnia-which do not pose direct or immediate threats to US co

interests. Of the 6,000-some US troops engaged in peacekeepin

operations as of October 1993, 5,000 were on the ground 

Somalia alone.26 There exists substantial opposition within the U

to such ventures, illustrating well the limited energies to b

engaged in such peripheral pursuits. This is corroborated in U

relations with China, whose human rights record has bee

identified as requiring much improvement, while at the same tim

the US is avidly seeking to expand the already-large trade ties.27 A

a time of reduced great power tensions, it might be expected th

concern with peripheral issues may intensify, but countervailin

isolationist sentiment may depress any enthusiasm for suc

involvements. 

As is evident, US perceptions of global affairs certainly acce

that a fundamental transition is taking place. Anthony Lak

summarized its main features: the broad acceptance of democrac

the US is this new era's dominant power; there exists an explosio

of ethnic conflicts; and the pulse of the planet, and the pace o

change in human events, have changed dramatically.28 As 

response, he counsels a “strategy of enlargement”-of the world

free community of market democracies. At the official level, the

26 
is an upbeat tone about the new era and its promising prospects fo

market democracies, but the evidence suggests also a great

degree of pragmatism. This is illustrated by tolerance of regime

which either do not fully conform to such structures, providin

they offer advantage to our intermediate-level economic interest

or, as in the case of Boris Yeltsin's Russia, such tolerance advanc

in the long run the desirable end product.29 

Emerging US Security Interests 

Traditionally, “security interests” have implied narrow militar

concerns, but this concept has now been broadened to includ

other areas as well. The 1993 White House National Securi

Strategy of the United States notes, “Today's challenges are mo

complex, ambiguous, and diffuse than ever before. They a

political, economic, and military; unilateral and multilateral; sho

and long-term.”30 Victory over the Soviets in the cold war 

attributed to, among other factors, America's political, economi

and military strength. These all constitute part of the total securi

equation.31 Firm democracies ensure stability, and the docume

states the need to eliminate any perception that the US will tur

inward and “renounce our mandate for global leadershlp.”32 In th

economic realm, the US faces the “continuing challenge o

protecting and broadening open markets and of formidab

economic competitors such as Japan and Germany.”33 

Militarily, the National Security Strategy of the United State

observes: “While we no longer face the single defining thre

which dominated our policy, budgets, force structures ... multip

threats to our security still remain.”34 Threats to global securi

emanate from regional instabilities, proliferation of advance

conventional arms, ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destructio

terrorism, and the international drug trade. A concise statement o

US security perceptions is offered: 

Our experience in the Gulf War demonstrated that we cannot be sure 

when or where the next conflict will arise; that regions critical to our 

interests must be defended; that the world must respond to 

27 
ggg; g

...that the proliferation of advanced weaponry represents a clear, present, 

and widespread danger; and that the United States remains the nation 

whose strength and leadership are essential to a stable and democratic 

world order.

35 

This official statement of US security perceptions expresses th

acceptance of the changing strategic environment, it acknowledge

the cessation of the cold war, and it cautions us not to assume 

reduced conflict environment. Aggression in the world wi

continue; it may even intensify. However, the warriors, the

objectives, and their weapons and methods of implementing the

will change. The challenge is now more nebulous-an

multifarious-than during the cold war, and while we may hav

more time to engineer responses to threatening situations, in vie

of the proliferation of advanced weaponry and the freque

eruption of new conflicts, military vigilance will remain the ord

of the day. 

The National Security Strategy of the United States envisage

an ambitious global leadership role for the US, but in view of th

enormous burden that may have to be borne as in the projecte

response to “straightforward aggression,” the American public ha

offered early indications that there might be limits to suc

ventures. Responding to Iraq's aggression in Kuwait was palatab

as there were severe implications for the first world's industri

viability. But the failure to respond to the commission of atrocitie

in Liberia, Rwanda, or Angola at the same time suggests a mo

selective degree of engagement. Indeed, our involvement 

Somalia, whose damage in terms of human misery is not great

than that in Angola, suggests that more than only humanitaria

concerns may be at stake. Core geopolitical considerations, rath

than peripheral-level concerns, may still be the driving force 

determining which conflicts shall receive our attention. In th

regard, the US maintains its established realist proclivity an

despite frequent official-level pronouncements, the new era wi

not likely be shaped by idealist actions. 

28 
Having turned away from the Soviet Union and the Warsa

Pact as the focal point of military threats, the US now faces th

third world as the source of conflicts and regional destabilizatio

This global sector has been enlarged with the addition of sizab

territories from the old Soviet Union. Most conflicts in the thir

world will be primarily domestic affairs as they reflect th

characteristics of states in the formative and early consolidativ

stages-in which civil wars are fought in the process of sta

formation and legitimation. Usually, such wars pose no glob

threats unless they spill into the region or they attract extern

support and intervention. However, some of the former Sovi

territories may retain the nuclear weapons emplaced on the

territories during the cold war. Also, their proximity to establishe

Middle Eastern hot spots increases the likelihood of these civ

wars having an adverse regional impact. The US may be expecte

to offer mediative and diplomatic services to those with non

threatening civil wars but to offer financial inducements to tho

with a more menacing capability such as Ukraine or North Kore

Working through multilateral organizations such as NATO or th

United Nations may also receive renewed impetus. 

However, the third world also contains states in their expansiv

phase and these, like Iraq, will pose the most likely challenges wi

potentially grave consequences. As they aspire to great-pow

status, their regional ambitions may be seen as a first ste

Accumulating new resources will help in the realization of the

goals in turn. As such, regional hegemons require special attentio

and only a global power can monitor and, if need be, contain suc

emerging powers. Most conceivable threats to global stability wi

emanate from these third world expansionists. 

In this regard, the US has not had a consistent policy wi

respect to expansionist states, as some had served useful purpose

during the cold war. Certain expansionists such as Israel, Sou

Africa, Morocco, Iran under the Shah, and India provided valuab

regional balancing roles to offset Soviet, Chinese, or other local

generated designs. Some expansionists such as Cuba or Nor

29 
Vietnam were seen as serving Soviet purposes; others, such a

Iraq, threatened long-term global economic stability; whi

regionally active states such as Nicaragua or Libya pursued the

own third world leadership agendas. Now, with the decline of th

Soviet Union from the world power stage, there will be less reaso

for the US to respond to all such attempts at regional hegemon

and we may witness a host of second rank powers attempting 

reorder their respective regions. Unless they threaten vital U

interests, the US will not interfere with their efforts. 

The previous bipolar global system is giving way to a regiona

based multihegemonial system out of which should emerge th

next great powers. The US shows little evidence of wishing 

remain the only active superpower, but much apprehension 

expressed about the uncertainty of the new candidates. Althoug

the US would be most comfortable with the Europeans or th

Japanese, as they are well-known quantities, neither harbors suc

ambitions. Global responsibilities are costly and entail risk. Russ

could conceivably be favored for such a role due to that country

proximity to the volatile southern territories of the old Sovi

Union, the Middle East, and China, and its traditional interests 

the Balkans-an area which West Europeans are reluctant to so

out.36 However, Russia's own internal problems must first b

resolved, which will most likely be a lengthy process. Barrin

these candidates, others will emerge from the third world. Th

foremost prospect is China-which has been history's grand mast

of regional hegemony but has previously avoided major glob

roles. The US was unsuccessful at dissuading China from testing 

nuclear device in October 1993.37 For the US, monitoring th

hegemonial intentions of such emerging regional powers will ran

alongside tracking nuclear capabilities, as our most importa

strategic planning responsibilities. 

Identifying the Challenges 

In times of war, identifying developments that will requi

responses is a relatively easy task because of the comparativ

30 
immediacy and clarity of the confrontational situation. I

peacetime identifying challenges that require responses becomes 

supreme challenge in itself. We have argued that, in the futur

conflicts as well as deteriorating environments that may lead 

conflicts are to be expected. If not identified in time, wars ma

quickly ensue and spread beyond the borders of the combatan

and engulf entire regions. As a global power, the US must monito

all such developments if we are to exercise control ov

international order. Not all wars can be stopped nor can they all b

ignored. Certain wars will bear more serious consequences tha

others and distinguishing in a timely manner between them wi

challenge the global statesmen.38 However, correctly anticipatin

those developments that will shape future conflicts will constitute 

more vital service. Deciding which wars to enter requires th

calculation of one's own interest and risk, but anticipating whic

deteriorating situations will lead to conflict requires sophisticate

sociopolitical analysis and an appreciation of the subtleties o

foreign cultures. It is to be expected that some will argue that th

end of the cold war allows the US an opportunity to turn inwar

and focus on long-standing domestic issues. But the historical fac

of international competition do not allow a global power the luxur

of ignoring certain events before they have been properly assessed

Response Options 

Appropriate responses to global challenges require caref

selection from the options available. This section lists an

discusses some of those options. 

Levels of Response 

The framework for anticipating such challenges and formulatin

responses is offered by the security interest model, which depic

core, intermediate, and peripheral interests. At the peripheral leve

responses may be expected to be less certain, ad hoc, and reflectiv

of changing political perceptions and ideologies of ne

administrations in charge of the decision-making apparatus. Thos

31 
traditionally identified, as idealists in foreign affairs will promo

activist agendas aimed at ameliorating the antagonisms an

disparities among global cultures. Peace, they argue, can b

attained by addressing mankind's fundamental needs for digni

and welfare. This globalist view calls for positive programs for th

advancement of human rights and democratic freedoms and 

flexible on the question of economic structures. And glob

institutions and the rule of law are to be actively supported as the

enhance the emergence of a global community of man. It is a

admittedly long-term view requiring a substantial investment o

resources in a moral venture which, however, is not supported b

the evidence of man's continuing proclivity towards war. It is n

only the poor who fight-as both world wars have shown. 

Those who insist on concentrating the nation's external energie

almost exclusively on core issues tend to be identified traditional

as realists. They argue that the Soviets were offered amp

opportunity to integrate themselves and the Warsaw Pact membe

into a peaceful world community. What kept the peace, howeve

was not morality or the cooperative formulation of a glob

community but America's superior economic and military powe

which, by the mid-1980s, the Soviets could not hope to challeng

This realist position holds that all nations seek power an

preponderance over others and that this condition cannot b

ignored. The correct assessment of the military strength o

potential protagonists can contribute to peace-as it did between th

US and the Soviet Union during the cold war. Realists are relucta

to make assumptions about global values and hence they disda

grandiose international institutional designs. Pursuing peripher

interests aggressively is an exercise in frustration, as it require

more resources than anyone possesses while it also impose

cultural universalism on hesitant nations. What can be understoo

is immediate power and self-interest, which need to b

unambiguously portrayed to reduce the likelihood of war breakin

out. The Soviets understood what constituted our core interests, b

32 
the range of our interests was not adequately portrayed to Sadda

Hussein in advance of the Gulf War. 

Identifying problems according to this framework does n

simply assume that idealists focus only on peripheral concerns an

realists on core interests.39 Far from it. Both recognize th

preeminent need for physical security as a core value. But realis

are not comfortable at pursuing peripheral interests while idealis

are uncomfortable if they ignore them. However, the gap betwee

these perspectives may be narrowed by the focus on intermedia

interests-those that involve a nation externally in the pursuit o

welfare maximization. Certainly, the unprincipled pursuit o

exploitative economic advantage may easily be disdained, but th

peacefully negotiated intensification of international econom

relations may be mutually advantageous to all involved 

accordance with the classic theories of international trade. And 

view of the peace that prevails, among members of the first wor

who enjoy very complex economic ties, it is postulated th

extending this net to a wider array of nations should add to glob

stability. 

In this regard, with major and immediate threats to America

core security interests having receded, but with the overextensio

of scarce resources being a likely consequence of pursuing avid

peripheral objectives, the US may find that its prime diplomat

interest and method will lie in this intermediate-level econom

realm. For the US such a response to global affairs is logical 

view of ours being comfortably the world's largest economy, but 

will not be without problems as we face formidable competitors fo

whom economic survival forms part of their core interests an

because the US finds it difficult to shirk isolationist sentiment

Responding at this level will require rapid adjustment, away fro

our military means with which we are more familiar. As great

success accrues in economic diplomacy, it may be expected th

the calls for military intervention will decline-but also, that whe

military means are implemented, it will probably be in substanti

confrontations on the order of the Gulf War. 

33 
Managing Responses 

Identifying correctly the challenges will test our statesmen' b

formulating appropriate responses will, of course, be equal

important. Once the decision has been made to intervene in 

deteriorating situation, and the level of required response has bee

assessed, another option will have to be considered: should th

response be unilateral, multilateral, or through glob

organizations. 

Responding to Soviet-centered threats during the cold w

required, for the most part, unilateral initiatives as challenges we

posed to our core interests. Certainly the US worked closely wi

allies, especially NATO, but the threat perception, leadership, an

the decisive troop and weapons commitment were dominated b

the US. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, US decision make

formulated the response and then secured the approval of ou

allies. Allies played only marginal roles in the Vietnam War and 

Operation EI Dorado Canyon against Libya in 1986, and the U

acted alone in the 1989 Operation Just Cause in Panama. Durin

the cold war the Soviet enemy was formidable and nucle

equipped, which meant that US perceptions of threats to co

interests would predominate as the US would bear the ultima

brunt of a full attack. But the proclivity towards unilateral action 

well grounded in America's isolationist tradition, which als

extends into the economic realm. 

The US has engaged in multilateral efforts, but such allie

cooperation is often operationally only nominal although it serve

a useful political purpose. This was the case in the operatio

against the Dominican Republic in 1965, against Grenada in 198

and in the Vietnam War.40 Against Iraq in 1991 the US assemble

a significant alliance that included several major Arab states, b

again the US initiated and managed the operation while als

supplying most (not all) of the firepower. Certainly allie

participation was not on the order of World War II. Generall

since 1945 US multilateral operations involved allies more fo

34 
political than for vital military supportive purposes, often to satisf

US domestic constituencies. The absence of such militarily activ

allies would hardly have halted America's determination 

prosecute those engagements. 

The US has also been a major supporter and participant 

efforts undertaken by the UN's, starting with the support extende

by President Harry S Truman to the UN's police action in Korea 

1953. Various degrees of participation in United Nations-manage

operations followed over the years as that organization came to b

identified with global peacekeeping responsibilities. In 1993, th

US had military troops stationed in Somalia, the Sinai, Macedoni

and small contingents in Western Sahara, Cambodia. Iraq-Kuwa

DMZ, and Lebanon-all in support of the UN peacekeepin

operations.41 However, US troop commitments to UN operation

are not without controversy, much of it reflecting our penchant fo

unilateral actions. America's major questions about the revitalize

United Nations role concern the overextension of UN operation

paying for their costs, corruption, and inept military leadershi

and there is very serious opposition to having any US troops und

UN command.42 Several US war deaths in the Somali interventio

occurred while under UN-commanded operations.43 Others argu

that the United Nations is about to embark on a global nation

building offensive-for which the US military is not designed o

trained.44 Having the United Nations assume great

responsibilities for keeping the peace was an integral feature of th

originally envisioned new world order, but this option need

considerable refinement. 

Several factors will determine the choice among the options o

unilateral, multilateral, and global cooperative responses. With th

demise of the Soviet Union, major nuclear threats to the US hav

greatly diminished, which implies that more time is available 

meet potential conventional challenges. This development als

offers opportunity for building regional or global multilater

institutional capabilities with our established allies or with ne

ones. Some conflicts such as Just Cause or antinarcotics operation

35 
will be of little concern to others as their interests will not be 

stake. But if the tranquil relations extant among the members of th

first world are to be extended to a wider community, there may b

advantage in greater security cooperation and multilater

approaches to conflict resolution. Wars may becom

depersonalized in the sense that they will not be viewed as dispute

between only two parties, and instead they may assume 

universalistic character: a crime against humanity-for which a

nations have responsibility. Was not the welfare of the wor

jeopardized when, towards the end of the Gulf War, Iraq torche

Kuwait's oil fields and that scarce resource was wasted an

permanently removed from serving mankind? 

Today the absence of an aggressive Soviet Union offers th

opportunity to build such institutional links. Working with clos

allies will remain an attractive proposition, but the efforts to do s

in Bosnia and Somalia have demonstrated lingering limits of suc

cooperative ventures. It is the further refinement of the Unite

Nations's capability that still offers promising opportunities. Th

organization has been overtasked and is subjected to too man

clashing perceptions, but we may argue that its full potential ha

not yet been tapped. The US may find great advantage in utilizin

the UN's resources once they have been further developed. Unt

then, the US may be expected to retain its essentially unilaterali

proclivities. 

History, Leadership, and Power 

In her influential 1976 article, “War and the Clash of Ideas

Professor Adda B. Bozeman observed: “It is much harder fo

Americans than for other peoples to accept [such] a world vie

because the United States, almost by definition, stands for th

denial of cultural differences and the neglect or irrelevancy of th

past.”45 And a celebrated article by Samuel P. Huntington, “Th

Clash of Civilizations?” appeared in 1993. He predicted: “Th

great divisions among humankind and the dominating source o

36 
conflict will be cultural. ...The clash of civilizations will domina

global politics.”46 

Huntington exemplifies Bozeman's contention. She notes th

the clash of ideas has prevailed since it was “inaugurated b

Herodotus when he explained the Persian Wars as a confrontatio

between the rival civilizations of Europe and Asia.”47 Huntingto

presents his thesis as if it were a new development-a new phase o

sorts-but Bozeman argues that this is what war has been abo

throughout history. We may argue the merits of specif

momentary strategic, economic, or political objectives being th

motives for wars but ultimately, war is about ideas-the buildin

blocks of civilizations. In this regard, Huntington offers little th

is fundamentally new. 

Huntington elaborates on the concept of civilization an

identifies seven major ones, along whose cultural fault lines, whic

separate these civilizations, will occur the most important conflict

Civilizations differ from each other on views concerning th

relations between God and man; the individual and the grou

citizen and state; and on matters of rights, responsibilities, libert

authority, equality, and hierarchy.48 He agrees with Bozeman th

the nation-state is weakening as a source of identity. Huntingto

writes that the West is at the peak of its power and that this in tur

may be responsible for the non-Western civilizations turnin

inward again. And Huntington also offers an interesting conclusio

that other civilizations are attempting to modernize witho

becoming Western, however; they wish to acquire the physic

accouterments of Western societies.49 

Huntington introduced a welcome-if controversial-element 

the current studies of international relations, but he als

encountered substantial criticism from several perspectives. 

Realists argue that the nation-state still remains the focal point o

war as entire civilizations don't fight, but nation-states do. An

they contend, the fight is for some sensible interests which a

cultures value. In other words, all states operate within the conte

37 
of core, intermediate, and peripheral interests, but they differ wi

respect to the specific content of these categories. But idealists, o

globalists, maintain that there is a common bond that cuts acro

all civilizations and that its ideological expression is evolving 

the United Nations. This view underlies the debate on th

universalization of human rights, which is also represented by th

work of organizations such as Amnesty International. In the sam

vein, Seyom Brown notes: “. ..the increasing mobility of person

and information assures that, like it or not, human rights condition

in all countries will be globally monitored. “51 

Neither Bozeman nor Huntington, nor realists and idealist

have pronounced the final word on this fascinating debate, whic

is important because the debate has forced the US to go beyond i

traditional ethnocentric concerns. Such xenophobia may b

tolerated in the case of marginal states but certainly not for a glob

power. The cold war served to “deisolate” the world's civilization

as the US and the Soviet Union explored every obscure conflict fo

its strategic impact. Today, with only the US having such interes

and capabilities, leadership requires more than only the pursuit o

national advantage but also the willingness and the ability 

ameliorate clashing views of civilizations. A lesser power ma

pursue only parochial interests, but a global power must go beyon

mere realist policies lest the evolving community of civilization

steers an undesirable course. 

It remains to identify the nature of the leadership that 

required. The US learned in the cold war that military leadersh

costs money-and does not necessarily guarantee preferred result

Yet the investment cannot be avoided. Military leadership require

the outlay of huge expenditures on arms and forces and it als

made the US the prime target of war should a global war hav

broken out. The goal of global military leadership must ultimate

be global stability by ensuring that the inevitable wars that wi

break out will remain contained and not spiral out of control. 

38 
Similarly, economic leadership also requires sacrifices. 

global power cannot simply approach the global economy fro

only the perspective of profit maximization, for soon it will b

calculated that its preponderant military might can be impressed 

pursuit of economic objectives. A global economy could n

survive on such an exploitative foundation. Global econom

leadership requires the creation of appropriate institutions that wi

further the maximum welfare levels for the greatest number b

positively incorporating all states into the great internation

division of labor. Also, the use of economic instruments a

preferred alternatives to force has not yet realized its full potentia

And again, leadership in developing this instrument is likewise th

preserve of responsible global powers. 

Leadership must also concern the formulation of idea

appropriate to the evolving relations between global culture

Inevitably this will mean leading the historical synthesis o

civilizations. In this regard the US has not been inactive and ha

proffered models of liberal democracy and human rights. Howeve

much more remains to be developed. Specifically, it must not b

assumed that the ideological structure of the leader's own domest

context is necessarily appropriate for all states-regardless of the

developmental level. Sensitivity to historical differences amon

cultures and civilizations must also be demonstrated. The US mu

accept that most other cultures see the US as but the most rece

ambitious Western power, dressing age-old economic interests 

the garb of universal moral precepts. It is not the formulation o

moral precepts that they find objectionable, but the inconsiste

policies implemented in their pursuit-which may be driven b

economic criteria. Some conflicts are addressed while others-ofte

much more grave-are ignored. No one power will soon presid

over the formal synthesis of the world's great civilizations, b

global leadership today ought to offer the base of mor

commonalty to diminish the clashes between them. 

Finally, power has been transformed. Throughout histor

power has been evaluated in its military context and more recentl

39 
power has come to signify economic capacity. Yet these bases o

power are ephemeral as we observe the rise and fall of history

great empires. Much more lasting and far more influential hav

been ideas-the very foundations of civilizations. We need 

remember that empires, like nation-states, have short life span

compared to civilizations, which in human culture remain eterna

Whether Confucius or Plato, Christ or Mohammed, Kautilya o

Machiavelli, we today debate their ideas and we will continue 

do so long after their and our nation-states have given way to ne

political configurations. Their ideas emerged out of civilizatio

contexts, which give them their respectability. Hence the power o

ideas is ultimately the greatest power if the criterion is buildin

lasting cultures and civilizations, rather than the possession o

material capacity to influence events. 

40 
Notes 

1. Such views tend to inspire skepticism. See Adam Roberts. “A new age in 

international relations?” International Affairs 67, no. 3 (1991): 509. Similarly. 

Richard Falk suggests that there might have been a new world order, but it was 

short lived. “In Search of a New World Model.” Current History 92, no. 573 

(April 1993): 145. 

2. Writing about the new world order. Douglas Simon notes: “...it was a litt

naïve, built more on hope than reality.” USA Today, 11 October 1993. Also, 

Michael T. Klare, “The New Challenges to Global Security,” Current History 

92, no. 573 (April 1993): 155. 

3. Although there has been a significant reduction in global arms 

expenditures, there were more war-related fatalities globally in 1992 than since 

the height of the Vietnam War. Christian Science Monitor, 14 December 1993. 

4. The attributes of the new world order are summarized well by Mahmood 

Monshipouri and Thaddeus C. Zolty, “Shaping the New World Order: America

Post-Gulf War Agenda in the Middle East,” Amled Forces and Society 12. no. 

(Summer 1993). Of course not everyone agrees on the facts of a new world 

order. See C. G. Jacobsen. “Myths. Politics and the Not-Sa-New World Order,” 

Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 33 (1993). 

5. This theory is based on my graduate studies with Professor George Liska

It is elaborated in Karl P. Magyar, “Low-Intensity Conflicts: The African 

Context,” in Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges (Maxwell AFB, 

Ala.: Air University Press, 1990), 172. 

6. See “Toward a 1Wo-Tier Commonwealth,” Christian Science Monitor, 1

October 1992. 

7. Wolfgang Ramonat. “Microstates in the United Nations,” Aussen Politik 

32, no. 3 (1981); John C. Caldwell, Graham E. Harrison and Pat Quiggin, “The 

Demography of Micro-States.” World Development 8 (1980); and Michael 

Ward, “Dependent development: problems of economic planning in small 

developing countries.” in Percy Selwyn, ed., Development Policy in Small 

Countries (London: Croom Helm, 1975): 115. 

8. S. N. Sangmpam distinguishes between empirical and juridical. or soft 

types of statehood. “Neither Soft nor Dead: The African State Is Alive and 

Well.” African Studies Review 36, no. 2 (1993): 74. 

9. “ Talks to Restore Haiti's Democracy Proceed,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 29 June 1993. Also, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily 

Repolt, Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 October 1993, 1. 

10. See Kenichi Ohmae, “The Emergence of Regional States,” Vital 

Speeches of the Day 58, no. 16 (June 1992): 487. 

11. Karl P. Magyar, “Northeastern Africa's Strategic Role in the Expanding 

Middle Eastern Conflict Zone,” unpublished manuscript (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, 1992). 

12. Francis Fukuyama, “Have We Reached the End of History?” The 

National Interest (Summer 1989). 

13. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas 

the Fifties (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960). 

41 
, ,, (p

1976): 83-87. 

15. Walter S. Jones and Steven J. Rosen, The Logic of International 

Relations, 4th ed. (Boston: Utile, Brown and Company, 1982): 515-17. 

16. Christian Science Monitor, 6 October 1993. 

17. Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 1993. 

18. New York Times, 17 June 1993. 

19. Christian Science Monitor, 18 and 25 June 1993. 

20. The discouraging data is offered in the annual report by Freedom House

Montgomery Advertiser, 17 December 1993. 

21. The myth of capitalism as the road to global prosperity is raised by Pau

Kennedy, “The Forces Driving Global Change,” Christian Science Monitor, 9 

April 1993. 

22. Myron Weiner notes that traditionally scholars had been reluctant to list 

ethnicity as a major factor in international relations. “Peoples and states in a ne

ethnic order?” Third World Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1992): 317. 

23. “Clinton Pushing Business With Asia,” New York Times, 11 Novembe

1993. 

24. “Clinton Team Shifts Toward Trade Activism,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 5 February 1993. 

25. Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 1993. 

26. USA Today, 11 October 1993. 

27. “US and China T1y to End Bar to High-Tech Trade,” New York Times

12 November 1993. 

28. Christian Science Monitor, 29 September 1993. 

29. “Some Question Legality of Yeltsin's Actions,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 24 September 1993. 

30. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States 

(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 1. 

31. A broadened concept of national security is also offered by Joseph J. 

Romm, Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects (New York: 

Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 1. 

32. White House, National Security Strategy, 1. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Ibid., 21. 

35. Ibid., 1. 

36. Robert Pegaro, “Help for Central Asia,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 

October 1993. 

37. Sheila Teffi, “When China Speaks, Asia Listens,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 17 November 1993. 

38. Stephen John Stedman elaborates on selective intervention in “The New 

Interventionists,” in Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign 

Policy, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 322. 

42 
Introductory readings are offered in John A. Vasquez, ed., Classics of 

International Relations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), 

chapters 1-2. 

40. John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future 

(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's US, Inc., 1991). 

41. USA Tociay, 11 October 1993. 

42. “ Dial Emergency, “ The Economist, 14 August 1993. 

43. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “'Multilateralism' Deadly in Somalia,” Montgomery, 

Advertiser, 14 October 1993; and “Multilateralism's Obituary Was Written in 

Mogadishu,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 October 1993. 

44. Trent Lott, “UN Must Not Direct US Troops,” Christian Science 

Monitor, 16 November 1993. 

45. Bozeman, 79. 

46. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72

no. 3 (1993): 22. 47. Bozeman, 79. 

48. Huntington, 25. 49. Ibid., 49. 

50. “The Summoning,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (1993): 2. 

51. Seyom Brown, International Relations in a Changing Global System: 

Toward a Theory of the World Polity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 137. 

43 
PART I 

THE CHALLENGE 
Regional Study 1 

Conflict and Confrontation in the 

Post-Cold-War Middle East 

Dr Lewis B. Ware 

With the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the collapse of th

Soviet Union, some observers thought that the Middle East wou

recede from public view, shrinking to a space in the nation

consciousness appropriate to our preoccupation with more pressin

domestic issues. But the Middle East already reoccupies 

commanding position in post-cold-war American polic

deliberations. In fact, since the collapse of Saddam's ambitions 

the Gulf, the region has exercised an even more tenacious grip o

the attention of the American public. 

The reasons for the enduring presence of the Middle East in th

American perception of global politics are not difficult to discer

011 is still considered a strategic commodity; far from bein

formalized in a peace treaty, the unprecedented agreement in 199

between Israelis and Palestinians to recognize each other ha

caused yet a new round of inter-communal violence; th

demographic shift to Western Europe of large numbers of Midd

Eastern laborers represents an unwelcome intrusion of the glob

suburbs into the inner cities of the industrialized West with all th

social disequilibrium that accompanies the inequities of unequ

development; and the region boasts new political actors who hav

access to arms in quantities large enough to challenge the Midd

Eastern secular state system and to disturb the tenuous region

balance. 

In a word, everything in the Middle East is still geopolitical

connected to everything else. For that reason the region will be 

potentially volatile zone of conflict for the foreseeable future. W

may therefore be certain that US security concerns will b

enmeshed in the politics of this changeable part of the worl

Taking that assertion as a given of the American strateg

43 
perception of the region, I propose to analyze the extent to whic

and under what circumstances, the nature of Middle Easter

regional conflicts has actually changed. I will examine a number o

issues in the context of this analysis. 

First, this study looks at selected cases of the increasing tren

toward religious and ethnic nationalism in the region. The impa

of this trend on several Middle Eastern states will then be analyze

and while it is certainly too soon to make any definitive judgme

about the future of the regional secular state system in genera

readers may discern a pattern of political action in the

movements that points to an acceleration in the fragmentation o

other vulnerable regional regimes. 

Second, several examples of intergovernmental organization

(IGO) will be chosen and their value for the future integration o

the region will be assessed. By so doing, this paper does not aim 

establish the IGO as an antidote to the above trend but to indica

in what ways Arab cultures and political economies often conspi

to make integration as risky a proposition for regional stability a

is fragmentation of the secular system. 

Third, the study speaks to the need for a redefinition of th

Middle East in terms of the realities that reflect a post-cold w

regional security environment where fragmentation and integratio

play an increasingly important political role. In that context, th

paper also examines a typology for conflicts, which may arise 

the Middle East as a consequence. 

The Process of Regional Fragmentation

Some Observations on Hamas and the 

Kurds 

Since the beginning of the decolonization process and th

extension to the region of the Soviet-American rivalry, the secul

nation-state model in its various forms has been applied to th

problem of Middle Eastern regional organization and developmen

These models assumed that the evolution of the secular state wen

44 
hand in hand with the theory and practice of political an

economic modernization. The United States and the former Sovi

Union promoted their respective versions of modernization und

the rubric of the capitalist and Marxist-Leninist model of natio

building. By so doing the US-Soviet competition complicated th

already formidable problems of sociopolitical consolidation th

the countries of the contemporary Middle East were undergoing 

the 1960s following independence from colonial rule. Thes

countries tended to exhibit the kinds of conflicts that pertained 

this particular stage in their national growth; conflicts wi

neighbors over sovereignty, territory, natural resources; conflic

with the former colonizing powers over political autonomy; an

conflicts with Israel, a country that the regional states assumed wa

the West's neocolonial proxy. 

While it deplored these regional Middle Eastern conflicts, th

West dealt with them within the framework of a system o

international law that the Middle Eastern states inherited from the

colonial past. The cold-war superpower rivalry tried 

accommodate these regional conflicts and tried to contain the

within a pattern of alliances whose anticipated equilibrium wa

designed to preclude the domination of a single regional actor. I

this way the regional countries were integrated, howev

imperfectly, into a global bipolar international political system. B

it was the imposition of this system that masked the unfinishe

task of sociopolitical and economic integration within the Midd

Eastern secular state itself. In the present post-cold-war Midd

Eastern environment, the forces of religious and ethnic nationalis

propose that only they can complete the process of integration 

which the regional secular state has so manifestly failed. In makin

this claim, these nationalists are not only hostile to the secul

state, but they have also rejected the principles upon which th

regional political system of secular states was founded. 

These nonstate actors act in the name of eternal religious and/o

ethnic “truths.” Some observers tend to think that the propagatio

of these “eternal truths” is an ideological phenomenon new to th

45 
region. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Throughout i

classical history, the Middle East has been susceptible to th

challenge of religious and ethnic alternatives to the organizin

principles of empire and state. When the Middle East wa

integrated into the contemporary bipolar global system in whic

modernization was the dominant socioeconomic ethos, it becam

axiomatic in the West that such traditional historical factors a

religion and ethnicity could not function as elements of progre

and, therefore, would be eliminated as categories of nation

consolidation. This unfortunate misperception blinded the West 

the fact that underneath the political superstructure o

modernization and development, enthusiastically embraced an

promoted by the Middle Eastern secular state, a suppressed curre

of religious and ethnic nationalism has always been patient

waiting to reassert itself. Hence, when religious nationalis

reappeared in Iran in 1979, it took the West entirely by surprise. 

Both ethnic and religious nationalisms reject the secular sta

for a number of reasons: religious nationalism-in this case, th

various forms of the radical political ideology we call Islamism

considers the secular state illegitimate because it has betrayed i

obligation under Islamic law to protect, defend, and provide for th

prosperity of God's chosen community, the ummah And yet at n

time in Muslim history has the conflation of the temporal and th

spiritual, in the form of the secular state acting as executor 

God's plan for universal salvation, attained a satisfactory standar

of practical application. Historically, the absence of integrate

interests between Muslim states and societies has always existe

and in times of increasing socioeconomic malaise has led 

serious tensions. 

The Islamists' strike at the secular state from within is an effo

to replace it with governments according to holy writ; the secul

state responds vigorously in an attempt to end the Islami

challenge to its power. Present-day Islamists are leading 

concerted attack against the Egyptian and the Algeria

governments where the gap between state and society is sti

46 
ominously large; but this is not where the most ominous dang

from Islamism lies. It lies in the Arab-Israeli arena where 

struggle between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) an

Hamas (Organization of Islamic Resistance) for the right 

dominate Palestinian independence politics portends serious futu

disequilibrium.l 

Hamas is the acronym in Arabic for “zeal,” and Hamas ha

shown considerable zeal in directing and sustaining the activitie

of the Palestinian revolt against Israeli occupation (the intifadah

that began in the winter of 1987. Active in Gaza because of th

post-1948 Egyptian administration of the Strip, Hamas wa

initially an offshoot of the Egyptian al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (th

Muslim Brothers). Originally a group of Islamic reformists, th

Brothers turned to a more active form of radical political prote

after Gamal Abd al-Nasser's 1952 revolution when they challenge

Nasser's Pan-Arab vision in the name of encouraging the Egyptia

secular state to adopt a more Islamic character. Both Nasser an

the Brothers claimed that Israel was the proxy of the West. B

whereas Nasser raised the struggle against Israel to the pantheon o

Pan-Arab political virtues to end the Western presence in th

Middle East, the Brothers pursued their desire to free the Musli

personality from its dependence on neocolonial patterns of thoug

by mounting a sociocultural crusade against Zionist domination 

Gaza where they were already well represented. Ironically. Isra

cooperated in this crusade when, to impede the spread of PL

influence, Jerusalem encouraged countervailing Islamic tendencie

by permitting the construction of new mosques in the occupie

territories. As religious sanctuaries, the mosques were off-limits 

Israeli authority. Consequently, the mosques became a focal poi

for the gradual creation of an Islamist movement as the Brothe

began to turn gradually to the politics of radical religiou

nationalism. It was in the Gazan mosques that Hamas extremis

was born. 

The catalyst for the subsequent growth and maturity of Hama

however, was the spontaneous outbreak of the intifadah. Th

47 
intifadah took the PLO by surprise. The PLO had done nothing 

precipitate the uprising and could do even less to control it. Th

natural beneficiary of this situation was Hamas, which, with th

self-help institutions created by the Brothers already in plac

offered a powerful alternative focus to the PLO for th

mobilization of Palestinian political loyalty. To Hamas the PLO

declaration of a future secular and democratic Palestinian state wa

incompatible with their Islamist political worldview. But Hama

made a temporary truce with the PLO to ensure the success of th

intifadah. Now that the PLO has been recognized by Israel as th

political interlocutor for the Palestinian people, Hamas has move

further toward the rejectionist camp. It is quite likely then that th

fragile truce will no longer hold and that a civil conflict will erup

among Palestinians for control of the statehood process. Should a

Islamist Palestinian state come to share a contiguous border wi

Israel and Jordan, the situation would be inimical to Israeli an

Jordanian security, to say nothing of the security of oth

neighboring secular Arab regimes. 

Because Hamas is antisecular is not to suggest that i

antisecularism will be generalized to the entire region and that as 

result the Middle Eastern secular state is doomed to extinction. It 

only to assert that increasing internal fragmentation has sapped th

secular state of its vigor to the extent that the threat may caus

under conducive circumstances, a number of the weaker states 

disintegrate. The Islamic political worldview, one shou

remember, lacks a sense of sovereignty that coincides with define

territory. Wherever the believer is, the ummah is; hence, th

ummah theoretically does not recognize the sanctity under law o

national borders. This makes Islamism a transnational phenomeno

par excellence with all that implies for the security of region

regimes. 

Despite its tendency to cause political fragmentation, Islamis

is inclusivist. Islamism abhors anarchy because the unity of th

ummah is the supreme social value in Islam. So Islamism seeks 

reintegrate the fragmented secular system into a reconstitute

48 
political community based on the broader, allegiance of faith. Th

exercise of brute power in its creation notwithstanding, Islami

inclusivism demonstrates a concern for social improvement. It 

ethnic nationalism that is truly exclusivist. 

It is commonly assumed that ethnic nationalism is dependent o

some visible, observable characteristics that separate peoples in

national groupings-such as language, culture, history, territory, an

so on. There is ample evidence that ethnic nationalism in fact ma

be grounded in the psychological perception of historical wrong

woven over time into the fabric of a community's soci

mythology.2

 The anachronistic belief in historical wrong passe

along atavistically from the culture of one generation to the cultu

of the next defines the enduring identity of a community vis-a-v

the outside. Once frozen into uncompromising political attitude

this belief perpetuates the distinction between they and w

Whereas religious nationalism aspires to the largest possib

political community because of its universalizing ideology, ethn

nationalism maintains an aloof position toward the outside becaus

of its typical minority attitudes of distrust, fear, apprehensio

secrecy, demonization of the “enemy,” and so on. For this reaso

ethnic nationalism usually manifests itself in separatist and/o

irredentist activities against the state. 

But this does not mean that ethnic nationalism necessari

considers the secular state illegitimate per se. Rather, the secul

state is viewed as an emanation of historical oppression. Ethn

nationalism seeks therefore to shelter the “nation” from secul

depredations by claiming sovereignty over parts of the secular sta

which it designates an ancestral “homeland.” And so it is clea

from the ethnonational point of view, that ethnicity provides th

fundamental condition of nationhood upon which the nation base

its inalienable right to self-determintion in its territorial homeland

On the other hand, ethnic communities may also form nation

minorities within a state. While national minorities may posse

the potential for a separate political identity, their designated statu

49 
as such satisfies the immediate communal need for sociocultur

autonomy within a larger secular unit. And so ethnic nationalis

may also exist within a state without necessarily demanding th

attendant accoutrements of political power. 

The present tensions between the Kurds and the Turks over th

question of Kurdistan illustrate one such case where th

incompatibility of the concepts of nation and national minority ha

exacerbated an ancient historical conflict and may have seriou

repercussions for future regional stability.3

 In the post-Gulf W

period the Kurds appear to be taking two major political direction

in the four-state border area (Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey) whe

they represent a demographic majority: they have either agreed 

continue to live under Iraqi sovereignty as national minorities wi

guarantees to their clan leaders of communal autonomy; or the

have agitated, through the quasi-Marxist PKK (Kurdish Worker

Party), for an independent Kurdistan to be carved out of Turkis

territory. 

The separatist thrust of the PKK is particularly troubling to th

Turks. The Turks do not recognize the Kurds as a nation

minority, because they do not recognize a distinct Kurdis

ethnicity. Such is the heritage that modern Turkey owes to Musta

Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish republic who, b

disavowing all claims to former Ottoman possessions after Wor

War I, took the first important step toward the establishment of 

secular, civic nationalism; that is, he declared that republica

Turkey comprised one nation-the Turks-within one territori

boundary. For this reason Atatürk was loath to recognize th

special position of Turks living outside the Turkish republic lest 

recrudescence of the “myth” of ethnic nationalism cause the ne

Turkish republic to be accused of neo-Ottoman imperialism

Historically, republican Turkey has considered the ethnic Turks o

the post-WWI Balkans national minorities of the countries 

which they resided, a status they were not willing to apply to th

Kurds within their own borders. 

50 
For the past several decades, Turkey has been seeking fu

membership in the European Union (EU).4 Turkey believed tha

by virtue of its participation in the 1991 Gulf War, it would final

obtain that goal. Instead Turkey earned yet another rebuff. Sinc

that time Turkey has been actively courting compensatory marke

among the Black Sea countries and the Central Asian republics o

the former Soviet Union. But more important than the commerci

aspect of these demarches, Turkey believes these new relationship

also serve politically to stabilize a potentially volatile region. T

express the desire for closer political relations with Central Asi

Turkey emphasizes common Turkic affinities. In other words, b

treating the Turkmen, Azeri, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Uzbek people

as “nations,” Turkey uses ethnopolitics for the purpose o

stabilization, a policy not substantively different in intent from th

one applied to the same region by late nineteenth-century Ottoma

Pan-Turkists. In present times, however, this policy has created a

internal debate in Turkey concerning the meaning of nationalit

which the Kurds, who demand that the Turks also treat the

politically as a nation, have begun successfully to explo

Operation Provide Comfort-called irreverently Statehood b

Stealth-certainly enhanced the Kurdish self-perception as a natio

when Turkey let the Kurds from Iraq seek shelter in Turkey fro

Saddam Hussein. To put the predicament in more precise politic

terms, were Turkey to let the Kurds into the country as a nation

minority, and then it would be open to the same pressure fro

Balkan Turks. And, since in the Kurds' case, this admission cou

lead potentially to separatist demands, such a situation wou

surely compromise Atatürk concept of civic nationalism, which p

the accent on the unitary nature of state and people. So Turkey ha

hardened its stance against Kurdish ethnonationalism. Moreove

the Kurdish border problem exacerbates the already tenuou

conflict over water rights in the Tigris-Euphrates valley with Ira

and Syria, both of which have felt the impact on their foreig

relations of a historically festering Kurdish minority problem

Hence, Turkey must face the possibility of conflict with a nonsta

actor and/or with one or more contiguous states, two scenario

51 
which threaten the regional stability, Turkey seek so avidly 

construct. 

The Kurdish PKK aspires to create a state from adjoinin

Kurdish territories carved out of four contiguous states. Islamism 

not interested, on the other hand, in political separatism nor 

coexistence with the secular state. Islamism is totalistic. Th

secular state is an alien body in a purposeful universe, th

introduction of chaos into order. The secular state cannot b

allowed to exist if God's plan for the universe is to be realize

Whether the challenge emanates from religious or ethn

nationalism, the consequences for the secular state rema

essentially the same. Deprived of its legitimacy by the former or o

its sovereignty by the latter, the secular state would be unable 

operate autonomously in the regional or international system

Under these conditions, the secular state is bound to defend itse

against ethnic and religious nationalism, since no state voluntari

commits “politicide.” 

It is interesting to note that many sociologists, anthropologist

and social psychologists contend that both ethnic and religiou

nationalism make no essential distinction in the way they act in th

world or view their relationships with those who do not share the

ideas. One could argue from the psychosocial point of view th

religious and ethnic nationalisms have both adopted a simil

Manichaean, conspiratorial, and reactionary approach to secul

political society. And yet, any similarities between ethnic an

religious nationalism in the Middle East are in the long ru

superficial. Inasmuch as Islamism recognizes no higher form o

sociopolitical organization than the ummah, it considers all ethn

identification a form of degraded tribalism that submission to th

higher values of Islam is supposed to supersede and destro

Ethnic nationalism of any kind and Islamism therefore cann

coexist because they are mutually exclusive on the ideologic

level. This signifies that, practically speaking, if ethnic nationalis

and Islamism give the impression of sometimes making commo

52 
cause against a secular enemy, they will end up, in the fin

analysis, competitors for political power. 

The Process of Integration 

Some Observations on the Gulf Cooperation Council 

and the Arab Maghrib Union

The very same states whose integrity is presently bein

threatened by the process of fragmentation are vigorously pursuin

the antidote of regional socioeconomic integration. The Arabs hav

traditionally conceived of the process of socioeconomic integratio

both as an instrument of mutual benefit and as a way to attain som

of the political goals of Pan-Arab unity. And yet socioeconom

integration, like the process of fragmentation, may lead 

unexpected stress on the Middle Eastern secular state system an

could, under propitious circumstances, lead also to conflict. 

Integration has come to have a definite and rather restricte

meaning in the contemporary Middle East. It has always been 

tenet of Pan-Arabism, and in particular its Baathist variant, that th

independent Arab states should endeavor to merge politically b

yielding their individual sovereignties in the service of forming 

union of Arab nations. The notion that the Arabs are one peopl

one society, and one body politic, upon which this tenet is base

draws its special force and direction from the vision of the Musli

universe in which the Arabs' place as messengers of the Islam

revelation was a privileged one. Yet, apart from the fictive unity o

the classical Arabo-Islamic empire, there is no historical precede

for the integration of the Arabs into a superstate. The mo

prominent Pan-Arab unionists, of whom Gamal Abd al-Nass

represented the zenith and Muammar Qadhafi the nadi

desacralized the Islamic content of this vision to put it at th

service of the reconstitution of the postcolonial Arab politic

order. Throughout its checkered history, Pan-Arab unionism ha

been subjected to a competition among its most powerf

advocates to determine which would have the honor of organizin

political integration under the aegis of its own one-sta

53 
nationalism. The winner temporarily enjoyed the privilege o

directing the Arab politico-military effort against the form

colonial powers and Israel, their imputed surrogate. Romantic an

negative, Pan-Arab unionism served, in secular terms, the sam

purpose Islamism served in religious terms: it protected th

ummah, however narrowly conceived in the secular sense, from i

enemies and defended it from further disintegration, rather tha

providing the foundation for progressive, forward-lookin

sociopolitical policies; thus, it has furnished the basis for a region

political culture around which Arab regional aspirations as well a

frustrations have rallied at the expense of the nation-buildin

enterprise. In the final analysis, the weight of the Pan-Arab cultur

baggage and the internecine struggle between the major Ara

players (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya) for the right to control th

Arab destiny did more to impede Arab progress than to promote it

Political unionism has certainly failed to meet its objective

despite random attempts to revive it. As a result, the last decad

has witnessed a decided turn toward maximizing the power o

Arab economic resources in the interest of unity. This shift o

emphasis was presaged by the initial success of the Organization o

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) when in 1973 it use

petroleum as a weapon of coercion against the West for i

perennial support of Israel. The resulting wealth that began 

accumulate presented a number of unforeseen problems to the oi

rich Arab nations, particularly in the realm of migratory labo

practices, internal and Gulf security, regional and international ai

territorial disputes, and so on, and required coordination on leve

previously deemed inappropriate to countries usually high

suspicious of each other. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC

was created in 1981 to satisfy this need for coordination. But onc

again, the impulse of this initial integrative effort was directe

inward rather than outward and was more an effort to redefine th

status of each individual country vis-a-vis the other in a region

arrangement than it was to establish the grounds for a definition o

54 
new relationships with the industrialized world. Still, the GCC wa

the start of a new and important direction for the Middle East. 

Since the creation of the GCC the Middle East has undergon

some very important transformations. The glut of oil on the glob

market after 1985 brought the price of petroleum products to a

all-time low from which the region has not yet recovered. Th

weakness of prices forced a severe curtailment of Saudi intern

development plans, which in turn affected the economies of tho

countries most dependent on exporting labor to the Saudi marke

In addition to these factors, the Saudi political decision to furloug

Arab workers from countries that took a pro-Iraqi position durin

the Gulf War further exacerbated already critically high levels o

regional and global unemployment. The loss of revenues fro

repatriated workers, accelerating unemployment, the depression o

prices for domestic oil production, and a failure politically an

economically to react positively to these challenges hav

threatened the stability of many regional countries, especial

Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria because of their particul

vulnerabilities to outside economic conditions. 

In Arab North Africa (the Maghrib) the immediate response 

the dilemma of the oil-rich Gulf Arabs was increased waves o

emigration toward the EO countries and especially France, a

emigration which the North African governments endeavored 

control since emigration represented for the North African Ara

countries a further deterioration in their hard currency balances an

a strain on their fragile European economic and politic

relationships. These governments turned belatedly to liber

economic reforms. 

An important reform was put into effect in 1989 whe

Morocco. Algeria, Tunisia. Libya, and Mauritania agreed to a

integration scheme called the Arab Maghrib Union (UMA).5 Lik

the GCC, the UMA fulfilled primarily a need to defend the Nor

African regimes collectively from internal dissension and 

bargain in strength with the resurgent forces of European uni

55 
through a coordination of their foreign policies. The UM

proposed that as an institution only, it could make North Afric

more attractive for European trade and investment once th

Maastricht Treaty went into effect, lest the EU deny North Afric

access altogether to the potentially huge European market. Th

UMA also proposed that only together could its member nations b

in the best position to negotiate emigration policies with th

European Union. Furthermore, expanded access to outside marke

could be complemented by the creation of an internal market fo

goods and services in which North African know-how, labor, an

manufactures would move unimpeded across national frontier

Thus, the UMA was meant both to imitate the EU and to prote

North Africa from its competition. 

Superficially, such movements toward integration appear to b

mutually advantageous for their partners. But imbedded in thes

schemes are some problems which could lead to just the opposi

effect. The UMA process implied that the political process b

opened to plural political interests for the purpose of nation

mobilization, not the least of which were the inimical interests o

the Islamists, whose charge that the secular state could no long

protect the ummah immediately gained a receptive audience. Fro

their unique perspective the Islamists make no distinction betwee

such integrative schemes and the neocolonial conspiracy of th

secular West to dominate the Muslim world. To the Islamists, th

West uses integrative economic schemes to spearhead furth

penetration of Arab political structures and to degrade Musli

society under the guise of economic improvement and aid. Th

Islamists point out that secular regional regimes consent to th

conspiracy because they believe that by enhancing the wanin

political power of their secular, Western-trained and -oriente

elites, these integrative schemes will ultimately forestall th

inevitable Islamic revolution. Everything to the mind of th

Islamist is a sinister emanation of this collusion. According to th

Islamists, secular regimes are reluctant to Arabize their education

curricula completely, for example, not because Arabic does n

56 
meet the need for technical training in an economical

interdependent world dominated by the EU, but rather because 

would advance the Islamization of society. By the same token, th

commercial codes that governments must amend to encourage th

uniformity of economic exchange are evidence to the Islamists o

the regimes' desperate attempts to promote secular law ov

Islamic law and therefore to cast aspersions on Islam's ability 

deal with issues of modernization and socioeconomic progress. 

If these problems of domestic stability were not enough to giv

secular regimes pause for reflection, there exist other issues th

beggar the endeavors of these regimes to integrate. Often, th

accommodation of vastly different political economies is 

daunting task both in terms of the scale of commercial exchang

and the compatibility of institutions. Tunisia, for example, has a

economy caught up in the throes of privatization but constraine

by limited political pluralism under a dominant single part

Algeria, once a guided economy classified as a single-party Ara

social democracy, is today also trying to liberalize as the sing

party withdraws from the public economic domain in the face o

strong Islamist pressure; Morocco has a laissez-faire economy a

an aspect of the flexible relationship between king, urba

bourgeoisie, and a multiparty system; and Libya still flounde

under the effect of the anarchy engendered by Colonel Qadha

when he imposed an extreme decentralization of the economy 

the name of the people's “Jamahiriyyan” democracy. 

It is unfortunate that such countries cannot afford the luxury o

permitting market forces to determine the evolution of a directio

and of a pace to their cooperative economic enterprise. Althoug

there are pressing reasons of economic health why these regime

should liberalize by withdrawing from the public domain an

thereby make the state more attractive to Western capital, suc

action is neither congruent with their political cultures nor with th

structure of their political economies. 

57 
Nor is there much hope that the reforms associated wi

liberalization will actually take hold. The state will continue 

define the necessities of economic restructuring. And the Midd

Eastern state, like present-day China, will do so in the belief th

economic restructuring can be accomplished without significa

political change. This restructuring will oblige the state to push i

“internal” boundaries further and further out toward its actu

“territorial” borders by means of an even more strenuou

mobilization of the population for these new economic structure

And such mobilization has always meant an increase, political

speaking, in the imposition of the state over society. And so th

state, through the means of a dominant party, will surely imping

more rather than less on national economic activity. 

If the Middle Eastern state succeeds in its mobilizing effort-an

there is no guarantee that it will-its success will transla

immediately into greater legitimacy at a time when the state need

legitimacy the most. The Islamists, who themselves have a

alternative Islamic economic program to promote, will contest th

legitimacy because they cannot fail to interpret any return of th

state to vigorous economic intervention as a new form of intern

colonialization, a sinister way to exploit the people in the name o

rationalizing the process of extracting national resources. Hence, 

is not difficult to appreciate the wide range of possibilities fo

conflict that the process of economic integration might some da

pose. 

Conclusions 

To say that the issues presented in this study are being posed 

a new and radically different political context is to understate th

gravity of the problem, especially with respect to the Middle Eas

During the past 150 years, the Middle East has been progressive

organized under a system that reflected none of its territoria

cultural, social, economic, religious, ethnic, or political realitie

The imposition of a Western concept of territoriality, law, an

political organization and demeanor on the Middle East was mea

58 
to serve the imperial requirements abroad of the colonial powe

for stability at home. It was not meant to serve the needs of th

colonized peoples for sound government and administration. Th

result was that even after decolonization, inasmuch as th

structures put in place by the West have been largely left intact b

not politically and culturally internalized, the problems of th

Middle East continue to be analyzed within a frame of referenc

that pertains solely to the Western nation-state. Hence, it remain

both alien to the region and to its political culture. For the We

this signifies that our Eurocentric concept of the Middle East is n

longer valid. Where once we viewed the Middle East as a

extension of our own political worldview, we are now obliged 

view the Middle East in its own terms and to rethink its meanin

accordingly. Where once the Middle East was defined solely 

terms of the relationship between the nation-state and the allianc

systems of the two global superpowers, today the disintegration o

the Soviet Union and the resurgence of ethnic and religiou

nationalism have restored a degree of autonomy to region

politics. Ethnic and religious nationalism has weakened the hold o

the nation-state on Middle Eastern society, given Middle Easter

boundaries a new functional and psychological equivalence, an

has thus enlarged those boundaries to include areas such as Centr

Asia, which hitherto had been subsumed under other definition

rubrics. 

The cases of fragmentation that this study has analyze

represent only the most salient examples of a trend that appears 

be growing progressively more disruptive since the Soviet Unio

collapsed. Fragmentation is today proliferating with particul

vehemence in such areas on the periphery of the contemporar

Middle East as in the Caucasus, where Abkhazians are fightin

Georgians, in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Azeris and Armenian

continue to murder each other, and in the former Soviet Centr

Asian republics, where tensions are high between the local Turk

peoples and the minority Slavs. In these selfsame areas, we n

only find that the imposition of Soviet rule has masked older, mor

59 
historically entrenched rivalries, but also that Islamist movemen

are making a bid to playa predominant role in the politic

disposition of the now newly independent ex-Soviet republics. Ye

anybody who has studied Islamic history cannot find th

phenomenon particularly odd. The student of Islamic histor

knows that these areas were once frontier provinces of the classic

Arabo-Islamic empire. And, he knows also that no matter whic

imperial power happened, by dint of circumstance, to impose i

power on the peoples of these areas, these people neverthele

underwent the same continuous cycle of ethnoreligious revivalis

that has marked the political and cultural history of the tradition

Middle Eastern heartland. If then, in the post-cold-war era, w

propose, as this study implies, to redefine a region geopolitical

according to the specificity of its historical political culture and 

the problems particular to that culture rather than to the specifici

of contemporary superpower politics, we will have good reason 

suggest that the Middle East is in actuality geopolitical

expanding. 

But the issues of ethnic and religious conflict are not simp

problematic for the Middle East; Western Europe will have to fac

the potential for confrontation among its own ethnic minorities th

Serb, Croat, and Muslim ethnic nationalisms today portend, to sa

nothing of the impact that Muslim religiocultural issues are no

presently having on the concept of pluralism in France an

Germany, where the concentration of Middle Eastern Musli

immigrants is the highest on the European continent. Moreover, w

would do well to assess in the light of its global impact the mo

recent instance of religious nationalism in Asia, where pressure

between Muslims and Hindus over the political disposition o

Kashmir has been building ever since the retreat of the Britis

from the subcontinent. In a word, the entire global system 

presently being shaken-and more vigorously than in times o

superpower competition-by the continuation of instability 

peripheral areas. And such instability can have importa

repercussions for the understanding of future US securi

60 
requirements in a political environment that has yet to b

satisfactorily defined. 

Neither is the hope by any means assured that the integrativ

process will lead to a lessening of tensions. For if th

fragmentation of the Middle East poses imponderable quandarie

the same Call be said for the process of integration since we cann

be certain that the inevitable relinquishing of national sovereign

necessary to make supranational, nongovernmental organization

of economic unification function efficiently will actually produc

the stability we anticipate. The consolidation of European uni

through the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty will certain

be a formidable task. Can such a task be any less formidable fo

the North American Free Trade Agreement or for other nasce

organizations of economic union in less advantaged parts of th

world? 

The simultaneous fragmentation and integration of the Midd

Eastern environment point to a substantially different typology o

regional conflict. The chances are extremely slim that the U

military may have to fight future classical conventional actions o

limited duration against Middle Eastern rogue states such as Ira

It is much more probable that US forces will be engaged 

protracted operations against nonstate actors whose religious o

ethnic nationalism threatens to destroy states such as Saudi Arab

or Egypt, the survival of which is a core interest of the Unite

States. Such operations will present the same kind of problems th

the US military had to face in Somalia-operations that will b

conducted without the benefit of front lines, clearly identifiab

enemies, or a well-defined end-state. 

There is no doubt that such nonstate actors are prepared to mak

maximum efforts to obtain their ends. Under these conditions, it 

axiomatic that US responses be predicated on appropriate an

accurate analyses and that these analyses be free of the kind o

thinking that depicts Middle Eastern conflict in monolithi

civilizational terms.6

 Monolithic thinking fits well the paradigm o

61 
a Jominian military that seeks to concentrate its force against th

enemy in the belief that the existence of a single center of strateg

gravity presupposes a single node of tactical pressure and therefo

the possibility of a decisive engagement. But it will not suffice a

an answer to the requirement that the United States military adju

itself to the new political environment in this volatile part of th

world. The Middle Eastern conflictual environment is simply to

complex and too rich in contradiction to be managed by reducin

conflict to monocausal factors. Each manifestation of conflict 

the Middle East must be dealt with on its own merits. And befo

any successful response to conflict can be made, flexib

examination of the issues must be renewed with vigor and paire

to an appropriate configuration of military force. 

62 
Notes 

1. For an analysis of the Hamas organization in the context of the ArabIsraeli political arena, see Lewis Ware, “LIC in the Middle East,” in Stephen 

Blank et al., Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges (Maxwell AFB, 

Ala.: Air University Press, 19 December 1990), 5-22. 

2. An excellent discussion of these points may be found in D. B. Vought, 

“Ethnic Conflict: The Invariable in the Human Condition” (Unpublished paper

International Studies Association-South, Maxwell AFB, Ala., October 1993). 

3. The consequences of Turkish ethnopolitics toward the Kurds and other 

Balkan peoples are well documented in Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and the 

Balkans: Regional Security and Ethnic Identity” (Unpublished paper. 27th 

Middle East Studies Association annual meeting, Research Triangle Park, N.C

11-14 November 1993). My discussion of this issue is based on Professor 

Winrow's analysis. 

4. For purposes of this paper, I will use “EU” to include members of the 

European Economic Community, the European Community, and the newly 

named European Union. 

5. For a general introduction and appraisal of the UMA, see Oussama 

Romdhani, “The Arab Maghrib Union,” American-Arab Affairs, no. 28 (Spring 

1989): 42-49. An excellent analysis of attempts at regional unification prior to 

the creation of the UMA may be found in Mary-Jane Deeb, “Inter-Maghribi 

Relations Since 1969: A Study of the Modalities of Unions and Mergers,” The 

Middle East Journal 43, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 20-34. 

6. See the article by the distinguished political scientist Samuel P. 

Huntingdon, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. 

Lauded by some as “the 'X' article of the post-Cold War era” and condemned b

others, Huntingdon's views were the subject of a collective response by a 

number of well-known scholars. See Jeane Kirkpatrick et al., “The Modernizin

Imperative,” in Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993, 22-26. 

63 
Regional Study 2 

Security Issues in the 

Former Warsaw Pact Region 

Dr Paul Hacker 

Few events of our time have caught the imagination and ha

such profound significance as the collapse of the communi

system in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The democrat

revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of th

Warsaw Pact in early 1991, and the breakup of the USSR later th

year were developments that profoundly altered the securi

picture in Europe. This essay considers some of the mo

significant problems faced in the former Warsaw Pact regio

Considered broadly, these include the following: (1) mo

crucially, how to consolidate democracy in Russia and to promo

a new set of relations with the former Soviet republics 

conditions of internecine wars, perceived threats from Islam

extremists, and economic breakdown: (2) how to achieve th

coexistence of different nationalities occupying the same territor

in many countries in the region; and (3) how to overcome th

legacy of over four decades of communist rule and subservience 

the former USSR in Eastern Europe while developing a new set o

ties to the West that will enhance security throughout th

Continent. 

Russia 

Developments in Russia will continue to exert significa

influence not only in the former Soviet republics, but in Easter

Europe as well. Upheavals, marked most graphically by th

military assault on the Russian White House on 4 October 199

have yet to take their course. Russia faces all the problems of i

former East European allies-including the need to develop stab

democratic structures, transform to a market economy, clean up th

environment, reorient and downsize its military, and correct oth

problems. While Russia's immediate postindependence orientatio

65 
seemed to be heavily slanted toward the West, subseque

developments suggest that a more nuanced and balanced policy ha

evolved. Russian president Boris Yeltsin has appropriated some o

the rhetoric of his nationalist rivals in championing the interests o

the 25 million Russians inhabiting the other republics, especial

regarding such issues as citizenship in the Baltic states. Russia ha

also asserted a leadership role in preserving security in th

republics. The foreign policy doctrine released in December 199

calls for cooperation with the West but notes that Western state

may have interests that diverge from those of Moscow.1

 Th

document even suggests that the US might seek to replace Russ

as the principal security guardian over the Commonwealth o

Independent States (CIS) under the guise of “mediatory an

peacekeeping efforts.”2 Russia's shying away from meaningfu

action against Serbia in the Bosnian conflict is also a sign of i

reluctance to become too closely associated with Western views. 

Future Role for the Russian Military 

A major problem for the Russian military has been 

restructure for a world of peace and to find a new mission. Th

prospect of fighting a war in Western Europe or of using militar

force to keep control of Eastern Europe has been superseded by th

need to protect Russian interests in the former Soviet republic

Rapidly deployable airborne troops and peacekeeping units, rath

than the vast tank armies assembled in the past, are the order of th

day. This section looks at some of the major issues involvin

Russia's armed forces.3 

Under Soviet rule, Russia's armed forces had a proud traditio

As one analysis described it, the Soviet Union, like Prussia befo

it, was not so much a country with an army as an army that use

the entire country as its own billeting area. 4 With its good pa

prestige, and perks the officer profession was highly sought afte

Five million strong at its peak in 1988 (all Soviet forces), th

Russian army has dwindled to an estimated 1.5 million member

66 
with another 770,000 now serving in the armed forces of th

various republics. 

The Russian military today suffers from postempire hang-ove

Its officer corps has been reduced to an impoverished, disunite

and often homeless mass. Some 595,000 troops have been pulle

back from Eastern Europe and the Baltic states since 1989; o

these, some 180,000 have no permanent housing. By the end o

1993, according to one estimate, the number of officers (630,000

will actually exceed the number of enlisted (544,000) because o

difficulties in meeting draft requirements.5 The military industr

that supported the Soviet military has been confronted with th

need to massively restructure for civilian use. Military spending, 

real terms, has fallen 78 percent since 1989; arms procurement fe

68 percent between 1991 and 1992 alone, while military researc

and development (R&D) was reduced by half. 

One of the most important problems that Russia must face is th

lack of real civilian control over the military. The army has bee

drawn into politics by the unsettled circumstances of the countr

especially its weak institutions. A kind of praetorianism ha

developed in which the military acts on its own rather than as a

agent of civilian authority. The army is also affected by the fa

that it has been stripped of its mission-it is no longer the “defend

of socialism against world imperialism,” it is distrusted by its ow

people, and it lacks political guidance. Senior military officer

feeling that the Russia they are sworn to defend has been debase

to a second-rate power and, maintaining a residual fear of th

capabilities of the US and its allies, have demanded an end 

certain concessions that have included hasty withdrawals from th

Baltic states, the idea that the East European states could easi

join NATO, and especially, surrender to Japanese demands 

surrender the four Kurile islands occupied by Soviet troops 

1945. 

New Military Doctrine 

67 
Russia has revised its military doctrine, but in a way that 

consistent with the military's view of the world and its need

therein.6 The new doctrine abandons the first use of nucle

weapons, which had been a declared Soviet policy for decades an

is a bow to the fact that Russian conventional forces are not a

overwhelmingly superior to those of potential adversaries as the

once were. The doctrine denies that Russia is faced with an

specific threats or enemies and redirects military efforts to dealin

with local wars and regional conflicts (i.e., those on Russia

borders) through smaller, mobile units. Significantly, among th

threats to Russian security that the doctrine foresees are not on

such traditional ones as territorial claims on Russia, local war

attacks using weapons of mass destruction, and the proliferation o

such weapons but also the “suppression of the rights, freedoms an

legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation 

foreign states. “7 

Monroesky Doctrine 

Blueprint for Future Intervention? 

There is ample evidence that current Russian officials persist 

thinking about their country and its security situation in classic

terms of spheres of influence-a notion that has been referred to as 

Russian “Monroesky Doctrine.” No less an authority than Foreig

Minister Andrei Kozyrev, writing in the Washington Post just 

week after the bloody events in Moscow that nearly toppled h

president, argued that the West must accept the legitimacy of 

Russian role in the “near abroad” countries of the CIS: 

Protection of legitimate rights of the millions of Russian-speaking 

minorities in the former Soviet republics, the economic reintegration of 

the republics and peacemaking activities in conflict areas: All of these 

are an objective necessity. Just as a relapse into imperial politics would 

lead to a repetition of the Yugoslavia scenario in the former Soviet 

Union, so too would renunciation by Russia of its proper role 

.....[A]ssistance to Russia in implementing its peacekeeping mission in 

the post-Soviet space-is precisely the formula for partnership with 

Russia.8 

68 
A more forthright view was voiced by Professor Andran

Migranyan, Russian foreign affairs expert and Yeltsin advisor, wh

argued that in view of the Russian presence in the new republic

and the arbitrary nature of borders and questionable legitimacy o

some of the regimes. “Russia should declare to the wor

community that the whole geopolitical space of the former USS

is a sphere of its vital interests and should say openly that it 

opposed to the formation of any closed military-political alliance

by the former Union republics, either with one another or wi

those countries that have an anti-Russian orientation and that 

would regard any steps in this direction as unfriendly.”9

 Migranya

defended this concept against charges that it represented a form o

great power chauvinism by recalling that the US itself has state

that many regions of the world constitute a zone of vital interest

Yeltsin himself also suggested that the UN should grant Russ

special powers to protect peace and stability in the region of th

former Soviet Union.10 

One Russian military writer noted that the idea is widespread 

the military that some sort of Russian-dominated union will b

reconstituted in the near future and that it is unnecessary 

withdraw behind Russian borders since the military will simply b

moved back in the near future. He also quoted Defense Minist

Pavel Grachev as having told his colleagues in an internal briefin

that a decision had been made not to pull back to Russia's borde

but to maintain forces outside them, especially in Central Asia an

the northern Caucasus.11 Thus, the issue of whether Russian force

are truly engaged in peacekeeping-a function that is acceptable 

the West-or in finding a thin veneer to reconstitute Russia

domination over the former Soviet republics remains an ope

question. As one journalist summed it up, “Russian forces a

regarded as saviors in Tajikistan, revanchists in Moldov

occupiers in the Baltic nations, and interventionists and liars 

Georgia.”12 

The Former Soviet Republics 

69 
In his own country, Gorbachev

s reforms released forces he wa

unable to control, resulting in the aborted coup against him 

August 1991, which was followed shortly thereafter by the breaku

of the USSR into separate republics. While the coup was th

immediate cause of the breakup of the USSR, that process was 

long-term one made inevitable by conflicts among variou

nationalities that became more apparent as the lid was lifted and b

resentment against Russian domination. 

The breakup of the USSR was sealed by the 1 December 199

referendum in Ukraine in which voters overwhelmingly approve

independence. Without Ukrainian participation, both Russia

president Boris Yeltsin and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbache

agreed that the continuation of the USSR would be impossible. O

8 December 1991, meeting in the Belarusian capital of Mins

Yeltsin, Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk, and Belarusia

president Stanislav Shushkevich agreed to form the ne

Commonwealth of Independent States as a loose coordinating bod

for the former Soviet republics. Later that month, in Almat

Kazakhstan, a total of 11 of the original 15 republics (witho

Georgia and the Baltics) signed a protocol making all the 1

republics cofounders of the CIS. 

Collective Security in the Former USSR 

In Minsk, the issue of disposition of the Soviet armed force

was addressed. It was agreed that each republic could found i

own army and that nuclear weapons would remain under unifie

command. It was agreed that the Russian president would mainta

primary authority over nuclear weapons-then based in Ukrain

Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as Russia. The other three state

expressing their intention to become nonnuclear powers at a futu

unspecified date, would have veto power over Russian use of tho

weapons. Each of the republics, starting with Ukraine, then move

to build their own armies. 

The question of the security system encompassing the CIS is sti

an evolving one. Initial Russian attempts to retain control ov

unified armed forces failed by early 1992 (except for Russia

70 
control over strategic nuclear forces belonging nominally to th

CIS). By May of that year, a Treaty on Collective Security wa

signed in Tashkent by the republics of Russia, Kazakhsta

Tajikistan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This wa

followed up by the CIS charter signed January 1993, to whic

Belarus and Turkmenistan also acceded. The charter contains 

number of obligations in the field of mutual assistance an

cooperation in the field of defense and security, but could not b

characterized as a new defense alliance.13 Ukraine remaine

“noticeably absent,” fearing that the arrangement might become 

fig leaf for reimposition of Russian control. In October 199

Georgia, under duress of civil war, also joined the collectiv

security arrangement. The treaty provides for coordination o

efforts in the defense field. 

Ukraine 

Ukratrie, with 54 million inhabitants, about a fifth of whom a

ethnic Russians, and with the largest nuclear arsenals in the wor

after those of the US and Russia as well as substantial parts of th

former Soviet military industrial complex, is a special case of pos

Soviet security. As described in the New York Times, the countr

has a total of 1,656 nuclear warheads and 176 strategic missile

more than France, the United Kingdom (UK), and Chin

combined. The newspaper also noted that Ukrainian preside

Leonid Kravchuk had decided to retain 46 SS-24 missiles left ov

from the Soviet arsenal (the republic also has 130 88-19 missile

and 41 nuclear bombers with about 600 warheads). Kravchuk ha

first agreed to dismantle all nuclear weapons on Ukrainia

territory, ratify the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Trea

(START), and become a nonnuclear state, then hedged on h

promises and finally signed an agreement in Moscow with visitin

US president Bill Clinton and Russian president Yeltsin on 1

January 1994 committing his country to dismantle its nucle

arsenal in return for economic compensation. Kravchuk has state

that he would try to convince the Ukrainian Parliament to take u

the issue again, but the final outcome remains uncertain. 14 

71 
Another area of contention was the Crimea, which wa

transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. Under former vic

president Aleksandr Rutskoi, the Russian Parliament passed 

resolution demanding that the Crimea be returned to Russi

Adding to the tension is the fact that the majority of the area

population is Russian (the Crimea voted by a small majority 

favor of Ukrainian independence in 1991). Closely related to th

Crimea issue is dissonance over the disposition of the Black Se

fleet. In 1992, the Russian and Ukrainian presidents agreed to spl

the fleet, but this measure has proved difficult to implement 

practice. Because of the lack of a suitable Russian harbor in th

region, some have suggested that the Russians lease the Crimea

port of Sevastopol, which is the fleet's home port. The Russian

rejected the idea. There are also tensions with the Crimean Tatar

deported in 1944 by Stalin as “security risks,” over Russian failu

to provide essential oil deliveries, and Russian fears ov

Ukrainization of the schools. 

The nuclear issue is a reflection of larger insecurities 

Ukraine's relationship with Russia, as well as the feeling th

possession of nuclear weapons (even without the codes necessar

to launch them) makes Ukraine (which nominally has the thir

largest nuclear arsenal of any state in the world) a force to b

reckoned with. Retention of nuclear weapons is seen as 

bargaining chip that will not be given away cheaply. Thes

insecurities include uncertainty over the loyalty of the 60,00

Russian officers (out of 100,000 officers in the Soviet arm

stationed in Ukraine) who remained with the new Ukrainian arm

and took a loyalty oath to it.15 While US officials, from Preside

Clinton down, have urged the Ukrainians to proceed with earlie

announced intentions to give up the weapons (which some exper

suggest are a wasting asset that is difficult to maintain an

dangerous to store), some other observers have countered that on

by keeping its own nuclear weapons can Ukraine provide a

effective deterrent against a potential nuclear or convention

Russian attack. 16 

72 
Ukraine in early 1994 was also a country in difficult econom

straits; inflation was running at a rate of up to 100 percent a mont

energy production had nearly collapsed, and many factories we

idle or operating at under 30 percent of capacity. Befo

independence, about 30 percent of Ukraine's gross domest

product (GDP) came from the defense industry. It is heavi

dependent on Russian energy imports. Its exports (chiefly coal an

steel) are collapsing under the weight of bureaucratic red tape, an

it is therefore unable to pay the high prices demanded by Mosco

for oil. 17 

The Baltic States 

The Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet empire 

1940 by brute force and remained there until the collapse of th

attempted coup in August 1991 in Moscow allowed the 

declaration of independence of all the republics of the USSR

Thus, it is not surprising that as Atis Lejins of the Latvian Institu

of International Relations recently put it, “It must be clearly state

that the Baltics see the greatest threat to their security emanatin

from Moscow.”18 In his view, this threat is not simply historic

but represents a continuation of previous policies adapted to ne

circumstances. Lejins noted that the official Russian foreign polic

conception published in the Diplomatichesky Vestnik in Februar

1993 stated that while Russia seeks good relations with the Balt

states, it will need to retain strategic sites in the Baltics and mu

defend the rights of Russians living there. In negotiations 

Jurmala, Latvia, for example, the Russians proposed in May 199

that the Skrunda early warning site remain until the year 200

(supposedly to allow time to build a replacement), the Ventspi

Sigint station until 1997 (ostensibly for the same reason), 19 and th

Liepaja naval base until 1999. This determination to keep the site

was reportedly repeated by Russian defense minister Grachev in a

internal briefing to officers on 14 September 1993.20 Russia

leaders depict the Latvians and Estonians as violators of huma

rights because they are trying to restrict the political rights of th

73 
Russian-speaking population, most of which moved in after th

1940 annexations. 

Lejins also quoted with some trepidation the paper of D

Karaganov, deputy director of the European Institute of the Sovi

Academy of Sciences at a seminar in Moscow on 6 October 199

Karaganov set out the thesis that Russia must protect not on

Russians living in the republics but also those members of th

indigenous population who are eastern rather than wester

oriented. Russians should not be allowed to immigrate to Russ

from the republics, an investment program should be instituted th

would create Russian political and economic enclaves in the ne

states, the Russian language should be actively promoted 

schools and media, and the Baltic states should immediately gra

Russians full citizenship rights.21 He argued that Russia shou

have the right to intervene to restore order in the ex-Sovi

republics.22 

One legacy of the half-century of Soviet occupation of th

Baltic states is the influx of Russian settlers and their offsprin

While in Lithuania the percentage of Russians in the loc

populace has been held to about 10 percent, the figure goes 

some 30 percent in Estonia and over a third of the population 

Latvia. Attempts of the indigenous governments to limit the votin

rights of mainly Russian outsiders, while understandable from th

historical viewpoint, have been harshly criticized not only b

Russian officials but also by Western human rights organization

An estimated 25.000 Russian troops remain in Estonia and Latvi

those in Lithuania were withdrawn at the end of August 1993.23 

Moldova and the “Trans-Dniestr Republic” 

When elections were held in December 1991 in Moldova (muc

of which was the Romanian province of Bessarabia until annexe

by the USSR in 1940), they had no effect in the areas of Dnies

Moldova (on the left bank of the Dniestr River abutting Ukrain

and Gagauzia, between Ukraine and Romania in the sout

Separate elections were held in these areas and a breakawa

74 
republic in Dniestr Moldova declared its independence. A majo

concern of the Russians who form the basis for the separati

movement is fear that Moldova will rejoin with Romania and th

Russians will face second-class status. Clashes erupted in Marc

and June 1992 when Moldovan president Snegur attempted 

reassert Moldovan authority in Trans-Dniestr. The Russian sid

received the support of the Russian Fourteenth Army stationed 

the republic. While the Russian government publicly supports th

territorial integrity of Moldova and has sent a separa

peacekeeping force to the area, it has been unable or unwilling 

control the activities of the popular Lt Gen Alexandr Lebedev, th

Fourteenth Army's commander, who was previously praised b

Russian president Boris Yeltsin but who fiercely criticize

Yeltsin's decision to use force against his political opponents 

Moscow in October 1993. Lebedev would like to see th

Moldovans recognize the independence of the breakaway Tran

Dniestr republic. That he has been able to maintain himself despi

his opposition to Yeltsin's policies suggests that there are defini

limits to Moscow's control over some of its more assertive militar

leaders in the field.24 When Snegur visited Moscow a few day

after Yeltsin crushed the hard-liners in Moscow, he was snubbe

by the Russian president, one of whose aides added salt to th

wounds by announcing that Trans-Dniestr had received about $3

million in cheap energy and raw material imports from Russ

during the first nine months of 1993.25 

Georgia 

Georgia declared its independence as early as April 1991, eve

before the breakup of the USSR. An outspoken nationalist, Zvia

Gamsakhurdia, was elected president the following month, but h

soon lost support when he began to use dictatorial methods to de

with opponents. He also attempted to tamper with the politic

autonomy granted the Moslems of South Ossetia in the nort

When tensions rose, riots, shootings, and demonstrations too

place, ending with the president's departure from the country 

75 
January 1992. He subsequently returned, however, to his pow

base in western Georgia and attempted to stage a comeback. Whe

Eduard Shevardnadze took over as Georgia's head of state lat

that year, he was faced with insurrections by forces loyal 

Gamsakhurdia and separatists who took over South Osset

(wanting to join it with North Ossetia in Russia) and the Abhkaz

region that abuts it on the Black Sea. Shevardnadze reluctant

appealed to Russia for military assistance. The assistance wa

granted, but the price Shevardnadze reluctantly paid-bringin

Georgia into the CIS on 8 October 1993-was too much for many o

the 5.5 million Georgians to bear. Some, such as Defense an

National Security Parliamentary Committee chairman Nod

Natadze, called the action “treason.” Many other Georgians regar

their country's independence as strictly limited, with foreign an

especially defense policy under strong Russian influence. 

Agreements on mutual defense that were signed with Russ

will allow Russian troops to remain in Georgia indefinitely, despi

the fact that the Georgian parliament had voted earlier in 1993 

send all Russian troops out of the country by 1995. The agreemen

allowed Russia the right to maintain bases in key areas, includin

the Black Sea port of Poti. There is strong suspicion that th

Russians were aiding separatist elements in order to have their ow

say over events in Georgia. It is certain that some of the separatis

involved were aided by Russian troops with manpower an

equipment, but it is not entirely clear whether that aid was given 

the direction or with the connivance of Moscow. One can als

recall the fact that Russian defense minister Grachev, speaking 

1993, had said flatly that Russia could not risk leaving Abkhaz

because this would mean, “losing the Black Sea.”26 Meanwhile, th

fighting has been great in its economic and human toll, as hundred

of thousands of refugees fled the fighting (250,000 were driven o

of Abkhazia). 

Armenia and Azerbaijan 

76 
Armenia and oil-rich Azerbaijan have been fighting over th

disposition of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mostly Armenian enclav

inside Azeri territory, since 1988. When riots in the area did n

induce a demanded transfer of the territory to Armenian control, 

was placed under direct rule by Moscow from July 1988 

December 1989. A drive then began to push Azeris out of bo

Armenia and Karabakh. In 1991 Armenia offered to give up claim

to Nagomo-Karabakh in exchange for free elections in the enclav

and additional autonomy. Fighting flared up again in early 199

thousands of people from both sides have been made into refugee

At that time, Armenian forces fighting in the enclave not on

extended control over areas formerly held by the Azeris but als

carved out a corridor to Armenia allowing direct access betwee

Armenia and the enclave. In late October 1993 Armenian force

seized the last strongholds of Azeri forces in southwester

Azerbaijan; some 20,000 Azeri refugees are estimated to hav

crossed into Iran. 

Azerbaijan's strongly nationalist and anti-Russian presiden

Abulfez Elcibey, was ousted in 1993 in a bloody coup and replace

by former Politburo member Heidar Aliev. Before he was ouste

Elcibey came under increasing pressure from Russia, which gav

aid to Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh. Surprising

enough, the Russians in this case helped engineer his ouster n

through direct use of their r forces but by withdrawing them 

May 1993. Their withdrawal emboldened the Armenians to resum

the offensive and thus pave the way for Elcibey's replacement by 

more pro-Russian leader. Aliev was formally elected president 

October. Aliev, who expressed readiness to join the CIS 

September 1993, has also tried to use economic inducements 

Russia to intervene in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute wi

Armenia, including a reduction in the share of oil fields to b

prospected by Western firms in order to give more of a share 

Russian companies. Some reports suggest that Allev has als

assured the Russians the right to base troops in his countr

77 
including on the border with Iran, in return for support again

Armenia.27 

Tajikistan 

Situated as it is on the northern border of Afghanista

Tajikistan represents the southern outpost for Russian security 

stopping the influx of militant Islam. Since December 199

Tajikistan has been controlled by a government led by form

Communists.28 The government took over after a bloody civil w

with tens of thousands being killed. The strife was motivated mo

by clan and regional loyalties than by interethnic disputes or a fig

between Communism and Islamism. All parties were banne

including the Islamic Renaissance Party, a moderate partner in 

previous coalition. More radical Islamic fundamentalists a

continuing a guerrilla campaign against the government an

receive support from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Pakistan, b

especially from Afghan guerrillas wanting to avenge the Russia

occupation of their country in the 1980s. Some 20,000 Russia

troops of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and a border guar

unit are based in the republic of 5.7 million inhabitants. Russ

pays 70 percent of the republic's budget (25 percent more tha

before 1991).29 Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev explaine

that the reason for the presence of Russian forces was to provide 

“shield against the spread of regional and clannish Islam

extremism in Central Asia.” While Russian fears that Tajikista

will become the first domino to fall to Islamic extremism are n

groundless, the larger issue is whether the cure is appropriate to th

illness-in other words, whether the choice is simply to succumb 

radical Islamic forces or to agree to a restoration of Russia

military domination. Meanwhile, the pro-Communist forces hav

been ruthless in dealing with their opponents, jailing or executin

many and closing opposition newspapers.30 

Kazakhstan 

78 
While Kazakhstan president Nursultan Nazarbayev has said h

country persists in its intention to go nuclear-free, he has expresse

some misgivings afterwards, asking for US, Chinese, and Russia

security guarantees. Kazakhstan, however, has signed the Strateg

Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and nonproliferation treatie

The START I treaty was ratified overwhelmingly by the country

parliament during a December 1993 visit by Vice President A

Gore, who also gave Nazarbayev what he wanted-the promise of 

summit meeting with President Bill Clinton in 1994 

Washington. 

Relations with the Middle East 

Relations with Middle Eastern states at the end of 1993 seeme

to be developing slowly, being driven primarily by basic econom

interests, although with some special circumstances as well. Th

major players appeared to be Turkey and Iran. 

Due to the fact that both countries are neighbors, Iran an

Azerbaijan have had what may be the most active contacts in th

region between the central Asian republics and Middle Easter

states. Iranian interest stems from the fact that some 15 million o

its citizens are of Azeri extraction. Remarks by former Aze

president Elcibey in speaking about a “southern Azerbaijan” 

1992 raised Iranian hackles. The Iranians have not tried to cultiva

Azerbaijan as an ideological bridgehead, despite the fact that th

republic is predominately Shiite Muslim as is Iran. Iranian intere

now is predominately directed at finding a solution for the confli

over Nagorno-Karabakh, given the fact that the dispute has force

thousands of Azeri refugees to flee into Iran as Azeri territory 

occupied by Armenian forces, and at promoting econom

cooperation, as is the case with other states in the region. Thu

during a visit to Azerbaijan in late October 1993, Iranian preside

Heshemi-Rafsanjani condemned Armenian actions in the dispu

over Nagorno-Karabakh but in subdued tones, calling th

“continued aggression regrettable and a source of anxiety.”31 In th

economic field, the Iranian president concentrated on promotin

79 
economic integration. He carried a similar message to the capita

of other states in the region. The Azeris, for their part, we

interested in obtaining as much active support from Iran a

possible to stop the Armenian offensive. 

While Turkey has a natural interest in promoting ties with th

Turkophone countries of the trans-Caucasus and Central Asi

Turkish policy has also been low-key in this regard. Give

Turkey's historical enmity to Armenia, it is understandable that th

Turkish government has tilted toward Azerbaijan in its dispu

over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the Turks have rejecte

appeals for a more overt role that would involve committin

military force. 

32 

Cooperation with other states has developed more slowl

Israel, for example, has extended diplomatic ties to the Centr

Asian republics and is interested in promoting commercial ties. 

has been suggested that if peace should develop in the Middle Eas

some joint ventures between Israeli and Saudi businessmen in suc

fields as agriculture and agricultural machinery are not out of th

question. 

East European States 

Beginning with Hungary in mid-1989, the East European state

one by one overthrew the Communist regimes that had dominate

every aspect of life in the area since the 1940s. The Hungarian ca

was unique inasmuch as the Communist regime itself began th

process of liberalization that it hoped would allow it to return 

power in a free election. In Poland, a series of roundtab

discussions in early 1989 led to semifree elections later that yea

Due to Communist miscalculations, the Communist-led coalitio

collapsed and non-Communist forces were able to establis

Poland's first free government in a half century in the latter half o

1989. In October 1989, as a direct result of its inability to contr

the flow of its citizens beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pa

(Hungary decided in the summer of 1989 not to turn back Ea

80 
German citizens wanting to travel to Austria), the East Germa

regime tried to prolong its vitality by forcing long-time Communi

leader Erich Honecker to step down. However, on 9 November, 

was forced to open the Berlin Wall and soon lost control of th

situation, leading to further changes and the absorption of th

country into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) on 3 Octob

1990. In Czechoslovakia, brutal police intervention against 

student demonstration on 17 November 1989 commemorating th

closing of Czech universities by the Nazis 50 years earlier was th

spark that led to a massive outpouring against the regime an

forced it to enter into discussions with opposition forces th

resulted in the formation of a coalition government the followin

month, and soon afterward, the removal of all 'Communists fro

higher office. In Albania and Bulgaria, the process was similar a

ruling Communist parties first replaced their leaders and the

engaged in talks with opposition elements that led to the gradu

replacement of former leaders by non-Communists. Only 

Romania did the process end violently when President Nicola

Ceaucescu was overthrown in a bloody revolt that led to his an

his wife's execution by reformist Communist elements constitutin

a National Salvation Front that remains in power. 

Problems of Transformation 

The East European states are beset with a number of problem

in making the transition to a democratic market-oriented econom

Many voters in East Europe, accustomed as they are to a modicu

of social welfare and guaranteed employment, have punishe

governments that have sought to introduce economic reforms th

have placed hundreds of thousands out of work and caused shar

price rises and falls in the standard of living. Movements th

piloted their countries from Communist dictatorship towar

Western-style democracy have themselves fragmented. The nee

to restructure economically has been brought home especially 

defense industries, whose products no longer find a market. Slova

sensitivities to decisions by the Czech-dominated feder

81 
government in Prague to end arms production and exports was on

of the factors that contributed to a sense of estrangement that led 

the 1993 breakup. 

Security and Military Issues 

In the security sphere, the East Europeans face a new securi

equation, both because of the political and territorial changes th

have taken place in the past four years as well as the direct impa

of the mandate of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Trea

to reduce conventional armaments and the dictates of econom

exigencies. In 1988, for example, Poland had 406,000 of its ow

troops, a secure eastern border, 58,000 Soviet troops on its ow

soil, and a western “buffer” comprised of 172,000 East Germa

troops in 11 divisions and 380,000 Soviet troops in 19 division

Poland's forces are to be cut to 200,000, facing over a millio

troops in Russian Kaliningrad (some 400,000 by the end of 199

and growing), Germany (370,000), Ukraine, Lithuania, an

Belarus.33 The heavy concentration of Russian forces in th

Kaliningrad salient causes headaches for the Poles. The area, in th

words of one specialist, “has become a giant armed camp wi

greater combat power than the entire Polish armed forces.”3

While Poland is not even in potential conflict with any of i

neighbors, sensitive issues do persist, which include protecting th

Polish minority (200,000) in Lithuania and in Belarus (500,000), a

well as finding middle ground between Ukraine and Russia. 

Czechoslovakia, before its January 1993 separation, had a 10

division force of some 200,000 troops, which was in the process o

being cut in half. In late 1993, the Czechs had an estimate

106,000 and the Slovaks 47,000 troops in their separate armie

Five Soviet divisions of 75,000 have now left the country. Hungar

had 120,000 troops in 15 brigades in 1988 and four Sovi

divisions of 64,000 troops. Hungarian strength is being cut 

75,000. The East European states have sought to deal with the

new security situation through mutual consultation and discussion

with the West through the European Community (EC)-know

82 
since 1 November 1993 as the European Union (EU)-and the Nor

Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was organized 

1991. They have to deal with the legacies of the past-dominatio

by the USSR, government control of the economy, and close

societies while dealing with issues that have been buried for year

Bulgaria in 1992 signed a friendship treaty with Russia th

provides for, among other things, consultations in the event of 

crisis threatening their security and pledges not to suppo

aggression against each other. 

Nationalities and Minorities 

One problem that is widespread throughout the region is that o

treatment of minorities and nationalities.35 None of the states 

the region has used the “Yugoslav approach” of civil war to de

with the issue, but it remains a sensitive one in several cases.3

The Hungarians are the largest minority in the region, with a

estimated 3.5 million in Romania alone, including 2 million 

Transylvania, 700,000 in former Czechoslovakia (most 

Slovakia), 450,000 in former Yugoslavia (most in Serbia

Vojvodina) , and Ukraine (about 200,000 in Transcarpathia). O

the one hand, Hungarians are sensitive to the position of the

brethren abroad; on the other hand, neighboring governments ar

suspicious of Hungarian motives, wondering whether they hid

irredentist aims of restoring a greater Hungary that existed befo

the end of World War I. 

In Bulgaria, the Turkish minority of about 1 million (out of 

million people) was subject to discrimination and repression by th

Communist government of Todor Zhivkov from 1984 to 1989. I

right to use its native language was severely restricted, and i

people were forced to change their names to Bulgarian ones. Aft

the political turn in the country, the legislation was rescinded and 

Turkish-based party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, for 

time held the balance of power in Parliament. The Bulgaria

Socialist Party (ex-Communist) has continued to use the Turkis

issue to inflame the public. While the Bulgarian government ha

83 
tried to remove obstacles to good relations with Turkey, the fear o

the former colonial master still exists just below the surfac

currently aggravated by the feeling that there is a militar

imbalance between the two states in Turkey's favor, aggravated b

Turkey's close ties to NATO. In Moldova, some 2.8 millio

persons of Romanian extraction are joined with 600,000 Russian

and 562,000 Ukrainians in the Moldovan republic. Anoth

450,000 Romanians are living in a part of Ukraine that wa

originally the southern portion of the pre-1940 Romanian provinc

of Bessarabia, then annexed to the USSR. There are also som

200,000 Romanians living in Hungary. Minorities are als

scattered elsewhere in the region. In Estonia they amount to 3

percent and Latvia 47 percent of the population (predominate

Russians). Some Germans remain in all the Central Europea

countries. 

Attempts at Cooperation 

Visegrad 

The heads of state of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 

1990 met in the Hungarian town of Visegrad to discuss a regime o

informal collaboration among their countries later called th

Visegrad cooperation.37 The Visegrad Group has established n

formal structure or linkages but discussions have ranged ov

cooperation in economic, political, and security areas. On

possible attraction of the Visegrad Group is that it would provid

an umbrella under which its members could enter Europea

security or economic cooperation institutions. To be sure, with

the participating countries, there is no consensus as to the degree 

which the Visegrad cooperation should be advanced. For exampl

Czech prime minister Vaclav Klaus has been a less-than

enthusiastic supporter, arguing that his Czech republi

independent since 1 January 1993, needs to look west, not east. O

the other hand, one Polish observer suggested a number of area

for fruitful cooperation, including military production, an

furthering links with Ukraine.38 Another area of collaboration, 

84 
his view, is the increasing problem of illegal immigration; 

Poland, for example, 32,292 illegal aliens were arrested in 199

compared with 2,407 three years earlier. Poles and Slovaks, 

general, place the greatest hopes in the Visegrad process, th

Czechs the least, with the Hungarians somewhere in the middle.3

While the Czechs are looking west, the Slovaks have not settled 

simmering problem with Hungary over the construction of th

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project on the Danube River. Th

issue has been mediated by the EC, and its legal aspects will b

decided by the Hague Court. 

Some Tentative Conclusions 

and Implications for the US 

The security situation in the former Warsaw act and ex-USS

region is in a state of transition. The former domination by th

USSR of the international environment (as well as the domest

politics) of the East European states has been replaced by a high

uncertain landscape devoid of firm military, political, or econom

alliances. The East Europeans are searching for new ways 

promote their political and economic stability and to find ne

guarantees for their security. Throughout the region, there has bee

a rush to join Western institutions, and disappointment in findin

that such organizations as NATO or the EC are not welcomin

new members from the East with open arms. 

Quite obviously, the security situation in the former USSR 

somewhat differentiated from that in Eastern Europe. Russia hold

and will continue to hold a dominant position by its size an

power. This reality will require a nuanced Western policy th

recognizes legitimate Russian interests but seeks to warn Russia

leaders away from the tried and tested path of using military forc

to maintain their sway over the newly independent states. Whi

there has been strong sympathy for the people of the Baltic state

some have criticized the West for putting out of its collective min

less blatant examples of the use of force (or those further from th

locus of Western attention) such as Georgia.40 

85 
As of now, it does not seem that the Russian maximu

objective amounts to a full recovery of the strategic losses suffere

by the breakup of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Its aims 

Eastern Europe appear to be more defensive than offensive at th

juncture--ensuring that no states join a pact that could be directe

against Russian interests rather than seeking to reimpose contr

over them. As for the ex-Soviet republics, Russia seems mo

determined to take unilateral measures that will reestablish 

strategic presence, although again the desire to guard again

destabilization from outside seems to be a strong motivating forc

especially in the case of Tajikistan. The Russians, however, hav

not been reluctant to intervene in other situations where they fe

some advantage will accrue-especially in such cases as Georgi

The victory of the protofascist Liberal Democratic party in th

December 1993 elections has made prediction of developmen

even more obscure. The Western certainty that the country wa

headed toward democracy and a market economy now deserve

rethinking. Indeed, as has happened more than once in the past 

other states, Russian developments may also show that mark

reform and development do not automatically promote politic

stability, and indeed, may cause a contrary trend. 

There will be a fine line for US policy to walk in the future. O

the one hand, the US recognizes that the former Soviet republic

still constitute an area of important strategic interest for Russi

somewhat in the way Latin America does for the US. The US is b

no means unsympathetic to concerns such as the seepage o

militant Muslim fundamentalism through such portals a

Tajikistan, where the Russian army is already heavily involve

Given the fact that the US public is reluctant to support a U

peacekeeping role in Bosnia, in an area much closer to th

consciousness of Americans, it is doubtful whether the US cou

become actively involved in peacekeeping operations in the form

Soviet periphery. The obvious response is likely to be “let th

Russians do it” and to try to circumscribe the rules of the game a

far as possible to preclude a resurgence of imperialism under th

86 
guise of peacekeeping. In this connection, however, US levers a

likely to be limited, and more in the economic sphere than in th

political or military sphere. 

While the US is not ready to respond to the plea of the Ea

Europeans for full NATO membership, the security concerns o

those states are very much in the minds of American policymaker

While there is no scenario on the horizon for a return 

Communist rule of the past (which historically was initiated, by th

march of Soviet military power), there is no certainty that the

states will have a smooth transition to democracy and a mark

economy. An activist US policy in the region will be required 

ensure that events do not overtake us and get out of hand. 

87 
Notes 

1. See S. Neil McFarlane, “Russia, the West, and European Security,” 

Survival 53, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 14. 

2. Ibid. 

3. Michael Gordon, “As Its World View Narrows, Russia Seeks a New 

Mission,” New York Times, 29 November 1993, A1. 

4. “Russia's Armed Forces: The Threat That Was,” The Economist, 28 

August 1993, 17. 

5. Serge Schmemann, “Russia's Army: Now a Shriveled and Volatile 

Legacy,” New York Times, 29 November 1993, sec. 1,7. 

6. Serge Schmemann, “Moscow Outlines Doctrine for its Military of the 

Future,” New York Times. 3 November 1993. What is described as a “detailed 

account” of the new doctrine was published in Rossiskoye Vesti, which is 

translated in Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS)-SOV-93-222-S, 19 

November 1993. 

7. Ibid., 3. 

8. Andrei Kozyrev, “And Now: Partnership with Russia's Democrats,” 

Washington Post, 10 October 1993. 

9. Quoted in Milton Kovner, “Russia in Search of a Foreign Policy,” 

Comparative Strategy 12, no. 3 (October 1993): 313. 

10. Ibid., 314. For an excellent analysis of the evolution of the Russian view 

of the relationship with the former Soviet republics stressing integration and a 

“first among equals” role in security matters see John Lough, “Defining Russia

Relations with Neighboring States,” RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 2 (14 May 

1993): 53-60. 

11. Gordon, A6. 

12. Steven Erlander, “Troops in Ex-Soviet Lands: Occupiers or Needed 

Allies?” New York Times, 30 November 1993, A6. For a Russian view critical 

“neo-Clausewitzian thinking” on the use of military force, see Pavel K. Baev, 

“Peace-keeping as a Challenge to European Borders,” Security Dialogue 24, no

2 (1993): 137-50. 

13. See “Russia's Security Concerns to be Met in Cooperation with NewlyIndependent States in the Territory of the Former USSR, a Generalized 

Overview,” by Ambassador Shustov (Unpublished paper prepared for the 

Conference on Europe's Security Futures (subsequently COESFJ, Garmisch, 

Germany, 3-5 June 1993). Shustov depicts the collective security mechanism 

evolving in the CIS as one which is compatible with cooperation with “EuroAtlantic security mechanisms” (page 6). See also Ronald M. Bonesteel, “The 

CIS Security System: Stagnating, in Transition, or on the Way Out?” European 

Security 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 115-38. 

14. For a discussion of this issue, see “Ukraine President Now Plans to Kee

Some Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, 20 October 1993; and Peter Greier, 

“U.S. Anxiously Eyes Ukraine Atomic Arsenal,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 

December 1993, 3; also Mary Kaldor, “Everyone Needs Good Neighbors,” The 

Statesman and Society, 6 August 1993, 14-15; and Sergi Kiselyov, “Ukraine: 

Stuck with the Goods,” Bulletin oj the Atomic Scientists 49, no. 2 (1993): 30-3

88 
y, y 

Untested Loyalties,” New York Times, 2 December 1993, AI. 

16. Greier, 3. 

17. See Jane Perlez, “Economic Collapse Leaves Ukraine with Little to 

Trade but Its Weapons,” New York Times, 13 January 1994. A4. 

18. Atis Lej ins , “The Baltic Security Dilemma: How to Secure Restored 

Independence?” (Unpublished paper prepared for the COESF), 2. 

19. Ibid., 3. 

20. “In Ex-Soviet Lands, Troops Now Find a Mixed Reception,” New York 

Times, 30 November 1993, A6. 

21. Lejins, 12. 

22. Ibid., 13. 

23. Michael Gordon, “To Latvians a Single Russian Soldier is Still One To

Many,” New York Times, 30 November 1993, A6. 

24. See discussion in Stuart Kaufman, “The Politics of Russian Military 

Policy: Continuities and Contrasts from Brezhnev to Yeltsin” (Unpublished 

paper delivered at the ISAS/South Conference, October 1993), 21-22. 

25. See “Bessarabian Homesick Blues,” The Economist, 30 October 1993, 

62. 

26. See “Tricked and Abandoned,” The Economist, 2 October 1993. 56; 

Daniel Sneider, “Georgia on the Brink as Shevardnadze Turns to Russia,” 

Cluistian Science Monitor, 1 November 1993, 3; and Raymond Bonner, “Pact 

with Russia Bedevils Georgian,” New York Times, 9 December 1993. 

27. See “The Bear Pauses,” The Economist, 11 December 1993, 62. 

28. See Raymond Bonner, “Why All Eyes Are on a Place Called Tajikistan

New York Times, 7 November 1993, sec. 4, 5. 

29. See Bonner, “Ukraine,” A1. 

30. See Raymond Bonner, “Asian Republic Still Caught in a Web of 

Communism,” New York Times, 13 October 1993. 

31. “Iranian president Heshemi-Rafsanjani Visits; Holds Talks with Allev,” 

quoted in FBIS-SOV-93-207, 28 October 1993, 57. A Russian analysis of 

Rafsanjani's visit was that “Tehran appears to have decided not to strive to 

spread its thinking in the Central Asian region, but to forge reciprocally 

beneficial economic cooperation...The Central Asian governments...are very 

cautious about any efforts to import any ideological influence or thinking from 

abroad.” See “Iranian President's Visit to Central Asia Viewed,” quoted in FBI

SOV, 20 October 1993. 90. For a Turkish view of the region, see Seyfi Tashan, 

“Caucasus and Central Asia: Strategic Implications” (Unpublished paper 

prepared for COESF), 

32. For an overview of the Azeri-Armenian connection with the Middle Ea

see William Ward Magos, “Armenia and Azerbaijan, Looking toward the 

Middle East,” Current History, January 1993, 6-11. Magos points out that 

Armenia has been isolated internationally over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, 

but notes that established Armenian communities throughout the Middle East a

as an important source of influence in these states. 

89 
y , pp

Chaos?” Strategic Review, Winter 1993, 18-25. 

34. Ibid., 20. 

35. For a broad overview of the problem of East European minorities, see 

“That Other Europe: The Economist, 25 December 1993, 17-20. 

36. See Georg Brunner, “Minority Problems and Policies in East-Central 

Europe,” in John R. Lampe, ed., East European Security Reconsidered 

(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1993), 145-54. 

37. For a fuller discussion of East European attempts at cooperation, see 

David Shumaker, “The Origins and Development of Central European 

Cooperation,” East European Quarterly 27, no. 2 (September 1993): 351-73. 

38. Henryk Szlajfer, “Central and East European Security Perspectives: 

Polish View” (Unpublished paper prepared for the COESF), 15. 

39. See Miroslav Polreich, “Central European Security Perspectives,” 

(Unpublished paper prepared for the COESF), 9. 

40. See Melor Sturua, “Yeltsin's Newest Proconsul” and John R. Hannah, 

“The (Russian) Empire Strikes Back,” both in New York Times, 27 October 

1993, A13. Quite typically, this fear of Russian intentions extends to Eastern 

Europe as well. In a 10 December 1993 interview, Polish foreign minister 

Andzej Olechowski sought a clearer commitment from the US and the West on 

Poland's request for NATO membership, arguing that the West is “playing into 

Russia's hands by not seeing the signals of imperial thinking.” See Jane Perlez, 

“NATO Commitment Sought by Poland,” New York Times, 12 December 1993

A3. 

90 
Arms Control and Proliferation 

Bradley S. Davis 

Over the centuries there have many sincere attempts b

mankind to stop, or at least to erect some boundary, to the horro

and lunacy of war. Nations, governments, and religions have bui

ethical and religious barriers against war; they have outlawed 

and set up councils to arbitrate settlements through internation

law. Countries have tried to withdraw from the threat of w

behind the walls of neutrality, or to escape it by practicin

isolationism. When these stratagems did not work, they joined wi

other nations for the collective defense of their peace and securit

The rare attempts to control the manufacture, distribution, and us

of weapons were seldom successful or lasting. Arms control in i

infancy was chiefly the imposition of the will of the victor over th

loser of a conflict. 

In today's world the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biologic

weapons, referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD

presents a national security challenge of unprecedented proportion

for the United States. This challenge is especially true today sinc

the demise of the former Soviet Union and the resulting birth o

numerous, independent republics, each searching for its uniqu

identity and an equal place among the world of nations. Witho

the former Communist government's tight security and positiv

controls over their WMD, the black market in those weapons 

flourishing as third world countries and terrorist organization

around the world acquire them or their components. What possib

reason could be advanced to justify a country's pursuing th

acquisition or development of WMD, especially newly emergin

countries with such fragile economies? Some of the reasons see

from the point of view of the states acquiring these weapons are 

counter a perceived threat to their homeland security, to respond 

a lack of positive security guarantees, to gain world status an

prestige, to heighten a power projection capability within a 

certain regional area, or to counter a greater power's influence. 

91 
The security challenge facing the United States today 

twofold. How do we attempt to reduce and eventually elimina

through arms control treaties the number of WMD currently he

or being developed by nations around the globe and at the sam

time strengthen the nonproliferation regimes for arms of all types

This essay briefly reviews the history and the current activity o

arms control treaties and agreements and then moves on to 

discussion of nonproliferation regimes today. Possible solutions 

the problem of WMD proliferation are offered. While WM

include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, the emphas

during this discussion, unless noted, is on nuclear weapons. 

Arms Control 

The activity of arms control can be traced at least as far back a

1817 when the United States and Great Britain concluded one o

the most distinguished examples of a voluntarily negotiated an

highly successful agreement to control armaments. The Rush

Bagot agreement limited the naval forces each side could hav

stationed and patrolling on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain

The International Peace Conferences at The Hague in 1899 an

1907 were the first attempts to approach the problem of war an

peace on a worldwide scale. The participating nations recognize

that the interests of all nations required their collective action 

control modern weapons of war and their ever-increasing an

devastating consequences. 

The stupendous power unleashed by the use of nuclear weapon

at the end of World War II shattered all the old concepts of w

and weaponry and imposed a new urgency and demanded ne

perspectives on international efforts to control nuclear armament

Since that time there has been a nearly continuous attempt on th

part of the United States to limit nuclear armaments. The co

war's superpowers have had an adversarial relationship ripe fo

arms control agreements since the time the Soviets detonated the

first atomic device in 1949. However, a combination of factors ha

recently brought the problem of arms control to the top of th

92 
international priority list. The disintegration of the Soviet Unio

and subsequent reorganization into new, independent republic

frantically searching for recognition and respect in th

commonwealth of nations have drastically increased th

membership in the infamous "Nuclear Club" (fig. 1). 

NUCLEAR CLUB 

Acknowledged Members: 

Suspected Members: 

Past/Present Suspected 

Aspiring Members: 

1994 

United States, Russia, Ukraine, Kaza

Belarus, United Kingdom, France, an

India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Afr

Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Ira

Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea 

Figure 1 

By June 1982 both the United States and the Soviet Union ha

initiated talks on further agreements beyond the old Strategic Arm

Limitation Talks to limit offensive strategic nuclear weapon

Although the early negotiations were somewhat tumultuou

especially after President Reagan's "the Soviet Union is an ev

empire" pronouncement, the Strategic Arms Reduction Trea

(START) was finally signed by President Bush and Gener

Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in July 1991. Onc

implemented, START will be the first treaty to actually reduc

operational strategic offensive arms and will lead to stabilizin

changes to the composition of, and reductions to, the deploye

93 
strategic armed forces of each party. The overall strategic nucle

forces in both countries will be reduced 30 to 40 percent, with a

accompanying reduction of 50 percent in the most threatening an

destabilizing weapon systems. In his letter of transmittal to th

Senate for its advice and consent on the newly signed treat

President Bush commented, 

The START Treaty represents a nearly decade-long effort by the United 

States and the Soviet Union to address the nature and magnitude of the 

threat that strategic nuclear weapons pose to both countries and to the 

world in general. The fundamental premise of START is that, despite 

significant political differences, the United States and Soviet Union have 

a common interest in reducing the risk of nuclear war and enhancing 

strategic stability.2 

The United States had several objectives in pursuing this treat

First, the agreement was intended not simply to limit or cap th

number of strategic offensive weapons but to significantly reduc

them below current levels. Second, the treaty was designed 

allow equality of American forces relative to those of the Sovi

Union. Essentially, this meant that equality of military numbers d

not require identical force structures; rather, it demanded limi

that allowed each party equivalent capabilities. Finally, an

perhaps a cornerstone to the entire agreement, was the exactin

verification regime specified in the treaty. This verification regim

includes exchanges of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM

test-launch telemetry tapes, permanent on-site monitoring o

mobile missile ICBM assembly facilities, 12 separate types of on

site inspections, cooperative measures, and data exchanges 

complement our national technical means of veriflcation.3

 Th

system of safeguards, confirmed through the use of an extensiv

list of inspections to intrusively verify Soviet treaty complianc

was absolutely critical to ensure that American national securi

was not jeopardized. The Soviets, too, would have the right 

conduct these inspections to ensure the "wicked" Americans we

not cheating. 

Unfortunately, the road to peace is very rocky and never easy 

accomplish. In August 1991 General Secretary Gorbachev bare

94 
survived the abortive coup attempt by Communist par

traditionalists, but it did spell the death knell to their crumblin

empire. By early 1992 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wa

a part of history. A hope the Americans had held dear for nearly 5

years had unbelievably come true, almost before the nation cou

react to it. The United States was politically ill prepared for th

aftermath of the Soviet Union's demise and for the mad scramb

by the newly independent republics to assert their newfoun

identity. The situation also caused the proverbial wrench to b

thrown into the works of the treaty process because the fresh

signed START treaty was a bilateral agreement between th

United States and a country that now no longer existed

International law permitted the new republics to repudiate and n

accept the treaty, something the US government desperate

wanted to avoid. Somehow the Bush administration needed 

engender a solution to the problem of salvaging the treaty. The fir

step was actually taken by the new "nuclear republics" Russi

Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. During a 23 May 1992 meetin

in Lisbon, the four leaders of the new states, along with the Unite

States, signed a protocol to the START treaty, committing the fou

states to "make such arrangements among themselves as require

to implement the treaty's limits and restrictions, to allo

functioning of the verification provisions of the treaty, and 

allocate costs."4

 The final part of the protocol stipulated that Russ

would accede as the successor of the former Soviet Union to th

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear state, while the oth

three republics would sign and ratify the NPT as nonnuclear state

in the "shortest possible time." (This last point will be ver

important as the discussion unfolds concerning proliferation.) I

separate, legally binding letters to President Bush, the leaders o

the three nonnuclear countries further guaranteed the tot

elimination of nuclear weapons from their soil within the seven

year implementation period of START. This meant all tactic

nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan would b

returned to Russia for decommissioning, and these three republic

would also assist in dismantling and removing to Russia a

95 
strategic offensive weapon systems and weapons. To compleme

these steps, the United States signed with each of the new republic

individual protocols, which effectively altered the previou

bilateral START treaty between the United States and the Sovi

Union into a multilateral agreement between the United State

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. 

There will be extremely difficult times ahead as the new

independent republics of the former Soviet Union begin th

process of START treaty implementation. The division in

republics of all that was the Soviet Union for 70 years will b

stressful to the new national identities, to emotional ties to the o

ways, to each economy, to the new republics' infrastructures an

natural resources, and to their cultural values. The most harrowin

problem these states will deal with is the disposition of the form

Soviet nuclear arsenal and its support and productio

infrastructure. All of the tactical nuclear weapons are supposed 

have been withdrawn to Russia in accordance with the Lisbo

Protocol. Of the close to 11,000 strategic nuclear warheads in th

old Soviet arsenal, less than 1 percent is located in Belarus, 1

percent in Ukraine, 13 percent in Kazakhstan, and 73 percent 

Russia.5

 Ukraine and Kazakhstan could respectively become th

third and fourth largest nuclear powers in the world, each superio

to Britain, France, and China combined, if they chose to repudia

the Lisbon Protocol. The prospective failure to mainta

centralized control over these forces during the dismantlement an

removal makes the rest of the world break out into a cold swe

and not without reason. The new republics are experiencing th

wrenching internal economic and social calamities of any ne

nation. Violent collisions of national minorities with th

predominant ethnic population in the republics and the potenti

rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and Kazakhsta

could lead to a change of leadership in some republics. A chang

to an unknown leadership could greatly affect relations among th

republics and with outside states and lead to a revision of the

96 
commitments with unpredictable consequences for their previous

stated position on nuclear weapons. 

All is not bleak though since the further arms control initiative

going beyond those of START I announced by President Bush an

General Secretary Gorbachev and then by Russian Preside

Yeltsin, were ultimately codified into the START II treaty an

signed by the United States and Russia on 3 January 1993. Durin

the two-phase draw down, both sides will reduce their present-da

arsenals by approximately two-thirds. After completing thes

reductions, projected for the year 2003, the aggregate ceilings fo

nuclear weapons allowed to be operationally deployed by eith

side will be a maximum of 3,000 to 3,500. Of particular note fo

the United States was the article in the treaty banning all multip

independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) on ICBMs. Th

ban on MIRVed ICBMs has been a centerpiece of American arm

control initiatives because these weapon systems were the ver

strength of the Soviet Union's nuclear might. This treaty achieves 

major breakthrough in the scale and scope of nuclear reduction

but it still focuses on the means of weapon delivery, not th

dismantlement of warheads. 

A clarification should be interjected at this point concerning th

intent of the two START treaties. They were designed an

negotiated to emphasize the reduction of deployed deliver

vehicles (missiles and bombers) in place of the reduction of th

actual nuclear weapons themselves. START I and II limit th

number of deployed weapons and delivery vehicles, but not th

total number of weapons allowed in each party's arsenal. Onc

removed from their associated delivery vehicles, an unlimite

number of warheads can be stored indefinitely by either countr

The underpinning logic to this approach is that if the deliver

vehicles with the corresponding weapon(s) were not operational

deployed (and this would be confirmed under the verificatio

regime using on-site inspections and national technical mean

[satellite imagery]), then the nuclear weapons themselves could n

be used against the other party. 

97 
There is a corresponding negative impact to this process o

reducing the US and Russian nuclear arsenals to drastically low

levels since it inevitably brings the problem of third nucle

powers to the forefront of strategic policies. Nuclear third partie

clearly have to join as equal partners in future arms control talks 

some point in time. This is not necessarily the biggest proble

facing the United States and Russia now, but it definitely wi

complicate any further negotiations on additional reduction

Continued nuclear proliferation around the world will continue i

impact on the future of multilateral arms control. A dire

consequence will be the raising of the perception level for strateg

requirements of the other nuclear powers, and perchance those o

Russia and the United States. New, inexpensive, extreme

accurate strategic and tactical delivery systems, increasin

targeting flexibility, and the development of subkiloton munition

may force decisions by these nations away from force structures o

minimal deterrence. Indirectly, proliferation could encourage th

development and deployment of antiballistic missile systems b

the nuclear powers; a culmination that would inadvertently affe

their own strategic relations and force postures. With the emergin

Russian-US friendship, the codevelopment of a more effectiv

policy of nuclear proliferation prevention must take priority, and 

must be joined by the other nuclear powers. Failure in this regar

will greatly jeopardize nuclear weapons reduction beyond STAR

II. 

Eventually, other nuclear powers should not only be invited 

join this regime, but they should be strongly compelled throug

whatever incentives the United Nations, the United States, an

Russia can enforce to ensure full participation. The new an

friendly political relations between Russia and the United State

allow an expanding regime such as this, and should not b

mistaken by the other nuclear powers for a lack of trust, as in th

past, but as an effort to promote greater transparency an

predictability in their strategic relationship. The purpose of th

regime would be to gradually transform the strategic relationsh

98 
of all parties from the balancing of the present-day retaliator

capabilities against one another to the joint management of 

strategic stability based on decreasing weapons numbers and ale

levels. 

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The Rest of the Story 

Chemical and biological weapons are just as damaging an

capable of inflicting horrible pain and suffering as are nucle

weapons, and their control and eventual elimination have also bee

a priority goal of the United States. The extensive use of poiso

gas during World War I (over one million casualties and ov

100,000 deaths) led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting th

use of both poison gas and bacteriological methods in warfar

During World War II even though new and more toxic nerve gase

were developed, President Roosevelt's stern warning against the

use may have persuaded the Axis powers not to employ them. 

Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the opinion of civilized 

mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope we never will be 

compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no 

circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used 

by our enemies.

6 

After the war the United States tried unsuccessfully for years 

complete separate agreements banning the use, production, an

stockpiling of these weapons, but the Soviet Union repeated

blocked each proposal because they demanded these agreemen

must be linked together. In late 

1969 President Nixon declared that the United State

unilaterally renounced the first use of lethal and incapacitatin

chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounced a

methods of biological warfare. This diplomatic "kick in the pant

forced the Soviet Union finally to alter its position and support th

separate agreements approach. An agreement banning biologic

weapons was signed in 1972 and ratified by the United States 

99 
1975. The terms of the convention mandated the signatories not 

undertake the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisitio

of biological agents or toxins, to include the weapons and the

means of delivery. Within nine months after the entry-into-forc

date, all parties to the agreement were to have completed the tot

destruction of all material. On 26 December 1975 all executiv

branch departments and agencies certified to the president that the

were in full compliance with the convention. 

It took almost 20 years from that date for the world to agree to 

comprehensive agreement concerning chemical weapons. Th

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in Paris 

January 1993 by 130 states and by 17 others since then. Th

convention is the first truly global disarmament treaty wi

extensive verification provisions. Unlike the NPT, the CW

reflects a post-cold-war era of improved, enlightened north-sou

relations providing equal rights and obligations among all partie

clearly defined procedures for cooperation and assistance amon

member states, and strict export controls aimed at states that a

not parties to the convention. The CWC is the first experience fo

many signatories with an arms control treaty with such extensiv

reporting requirements and intrusive verification provision

CWC's ratification and implementation during the next sever

years will affect in a major way how the signatories of the Non

Proliferation Treaty feel about arms control in the future. The

analysis on whether to rely on cooperative international o

unilateral arms races will be greatly influenced by their experienc

with the CWC. To delay for any appreciable length of time th

implementation of the treaty within their territories may jolt the

confidence in multilateral disarmament agreements, and this lo

of confidence could have very detrimental consequences at th

crucial NPT Review and Extension Conference in April 1995 an

at the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapon

Convention in 1996. The CWC's credibility will be strengthene

immeasurably when the United States and Russia, the two state

100 
possessing the largest chemical weapons stockpiles, ratify th

conventions. 

When one considers that the objective of the CWC is 

eliminate a major weapon of mass destruction and to lay th

groundwork for new global security relationships, the resource

required to implement the CWC are comparatively small indee

While it is not without flaws, and while important issues that mu

be resolved quickly remain unresolved, the work under way in Th

Hague has nonetheless provided generally auspicious signs th

chemical disarmament can soon be transformed from dream 

reality. Perhaps the biggest challenge and potential stumblin

block Just ahead is that the power and responsibility to make th

happen has now passed from an elite group of negotiators to 

much broader group of lawmakers, technical experts, industr

officials, and public organizations throughout the world and acro

the political spectrum. 7 

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction 

Britain, France, and China are likely reassessing their nucle

postures and arms control attitudes because of the continuin

hesitancy of Ukraine to remove all strategic nuclear weapons fro

its territory in accordance with the START I treaty and Lisbo

Protocol. Despite the January 1994 signing of an accord b

presidents Clinton, Kravchuk (Ukraine), and Yeltsin (Russia) 

Moscow outlining the agreement to dismantle and remove all th

strategic nuclear weapons from Ukraine and return them to Russi

the reaction by the British, French, and Chinese to the potenti

sudden refusal by Ukraine to adhere to this agreement and to i

emergence as the world's third greatest nuclear power might ver

well be a rapid buildup of their forces and rejection of furth

limitations. However, the heaviest blow would be struck upon th

process of nonproliferation for nuclear weapons. The chances o

extending the term of the NPT at the Review and Extensio

Conference scheduled for 1995 would be close to zero. If Ukrain

101 
can have them, then why not India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Israe

let alone Germany, Japan, and North Korea? 

President Kennedy warned in 1962 that "fifteen or twenty o

twenty-five nations may have these [nuclear] weapons by th

middle of the 1970s."8 The world is very lucky that Preside

Kennedy was wrong in his prediction. Although nucle

proliferation has not kept pace with his schedule, there seems n

reasonable means to impede the proliferation of these weapons an

technology. Today there are nearly 500 civil nuclear power plan

in operation or under construction in 32 countries.9

 The world 

recognizing that the spread of the technology and comprehensio

required to build nuclear weapons is running far ahead of an

international control. The stories of Iraq's secret nuclear weapon

program have rejuvenated world fears that the nuclear clu

membership is growing, resulting in a correspondingly decreasin

confidence in traditional nonproliferation procedures. Preside

Bush announced in his 1992 State of the Union message, "W

must have this protection [reference to the Strategic Defens

Initiative] because too many people in too many countries hav

access to nuclear arms." 10 

From the technical standpoint the only stumbling block 

fashioning a nuclear weapon is procuring the fissile material 

create the chain reaction of a nuclear explosion. It takes 

minimum of 25 kilograms (55 pounds) of highly enriched uraniu

or eight kilograms (17.6 pounds) of, plutonium to make a weapo

Weapons-grade fissile material is produced by enriching th

concentration of U-235 in natural uranium to 90 percent or highe

Plutonium, on the other hand, is gleaned by chemically separatin

(reprocessing) spent (irradiated) reactor fuel. The world's concer

over nuclear proliferation has caused most countries not to bui

plutonium-fed "breeder reactors," but when the world's fini

supply of natural uranium reserves is exhausted, these sam

countries have no current alternative but to go to these reactors fo

additional fuel. By one estimate there could be 300 tons o

weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000.11 New British an

102 
French reprocessing plants may account for the production of ov

200 tons in the next decade. Japan wants to acquire 100 tons of th

amount, which equals the total sum in the entire United State

nuclear arsenal. Japanese plans for the acquisition of so muc

plutonium has alarmed the world, North Korea being very vocal 

its concern over a possible Japanese weapons program. There is n

doubt the Japanese could build a nuclear weapon quickly with the

technical expertise and that much material. 

The list of countries having nuclear weapons, those probably

have, and those want-to-have countries is clearly growing. "Clu

Nuke" has nearly doubled its numbers with the disintegration o

the Soviet Union. The original members coincidentally are th

same permanent members of the United Nations Security Counc

The new members are the newly independent republics of Belaru

Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, as well as India. The most obvious wa

to show one's nuclear weapons capability is to detonate a nucle

device. Six countries have accomplished this feat since the nucle

age began: the United States (960 explosions since 1945), th

former Soviet Union (715 since 1949), Britain (44 since 1952

France (192 since 1960), China (36 since 1964), and India (1 

1974).12 The first five countries have "declared" nuclear arsenal

while India's 1974 explosion was described by the government fo

peaceful demonstration purposes only to aid in the civilian nucle

program. Along with India, the additional probable Club Nuk

members include Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa, all wide

feared either to have clandestinely assembled an undisclose

number of nuclear weapons or to have the ability to build the

quickly once the decision is made. Other nations have displaye

dubious intentions of trying to join the ranks of nuclear ownershi

These nations include Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Kore

An encouraging note though is a recent Reuters news report fro

Algeria which states, 

Algerian Foreign Minister Salah Dembri said, "I formal

announce today in the name of the country's ruling authoritie

Algeria's intention to adhere to the nuclear Non-Proliferatio

103 
Treaty. Algeria is against military uses of the atom,

 Dembri sa

while inaugurating the country's second nuclear reactor, built wi

Chinese assistance 90 miles south of Algiers. 13 

The ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan in Sou

Central Asia has triggered simultaneous nuclear programs capab

of producing weapons by both countries. By one official estima

India has the components with which to assemble 40 to 6

weapons on short notice, while Pakistan could produce five to 1

weapons. 14 Why would countries who could redirect th

enormous resources required for a nuclear program into oth

sorely needed programs want to pursue these WMD? India almo

assuredly wants to increase its prestige in the international aren

and to be seen as the dominant state in the area. This is more tru

today as its once major political and military ally, the Sovi

Union, broke up into a number of separate republics, and i

biggest and potentially most aggressive foe, China, has bee

expanding its influence into the region. Pakistan probably pursue

its nuclear program not for world prestige, but from a region

standpoint. It is the first Islamic country with a nuclear capabili

anywhere in the region of the Islamic Crescent. To Pakistan

credit and the world's relief, it has requested that the United State

mediate at regional nuclear disarmament talks and has joint

pledged to sign the NPT along with India. India has objected 

this proposal since it is of the opinion the NPT is discriminator

and believes nuclear weapons proliferation should be addressed o

a global versus regional basis. Progress is occurring thoug

because both countries agreed to lessen the risk of nuclear war b

pledging not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. 

Israel allegedly manufactures up to 40 kilograms (88 pounds) o

weapons grade plutonium annually in addition to other necessar

components for thermonuclear weapons. One hundred to 20

nuclear weapons, with a high estimate of more than 300 weapon

may be currently in the Israeli arsenal, even though officially Isra

pretends to have no weapons, and the United States supports th

charade with a "see no evil, hear no evil" attitude. Even the mo

104 
conservative potential number of weapons in the region shou

cause the world to recoil in horror. South Africa's progra

(probably with extensive Israeli assistance) was shrouded in a

much secrecy as Israel's until the summer of 1993. At that tim

South African president F. W. de Klerk announced to the wor

that South Africa had indeed established a nuclear program

However, the political bombshell of his announcement was th

South Africa had actually assembled a small number of comple

weapons. President de Klerk declared these weapons would b

dismantled and the South African nuclear program would subje

itself to the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA

safeguards and inspections to verify that no nuclear materia

equipment, or facilities in its possession would be misused fo

military purposes in the future.15 

Iran, Iraq, and North Korea lead the list of nuclear weapo

"want-to-haves" and are attempting through various means 

acquire them. Iran is a signatory of the NPT, but Iranian leade

have nonetheless reiterated Iran's right to possess nuclear weapon

and believe Muslim nations should balance Israel's suspecte

capabilities. Before the Gulf War in 1991 Iraq was believed to b

five to 10 years away from constructing a nuclear weapon. I

postwar IAEA inspections estimates have Iraq less than two yea

away from having the bomb. Iraq, as an NPT signatory, had a

early as 1972 concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement wi

the IAEA. Yet, while openly participating in the internation

nonproliferation system, Iraq was able to clandestinely violate th

system, as we have witnessed during the post-Gulf War Unite

Nations-mandated inspections of their nuclear facilities. 

Recent intelligence disclosures of North Korea's nucle

program and its assumed ability to produce nuclear weapons hav

dampened the recent warming trend in North Korean relations wi

South Korea and Japan. 

The prospect of an uncontrolled North Korean nuclear weapons program 

leading to an arsenal of hundreds of nuclear weapons early in the next 

century would have profound impact on the strategic stability in 

105 
pg

futures and China would be much less likely to consider reducing its own 

nuclear forces. Any retreat from the IAEA'S newly established authority 

for special inspections would drastically weaken the agency's future 

effectiveness.16 

Threats by North Korea of abrogating its NPT membersh

unless South Korea and the United States make concessions hav

done nothing to stabilize this region of the world. Hopefully, rece

indicators are that a solution may be in the offing, 

...in what amounted to a diplomatic breakthrough. North Korea said it 

was willing in principle to allow full access to its reactor and 

reprocessing plant. Given the right package of incentives, like diplomatic 

recognition, security assurances and economic ties. Pyongyang might be 

persuaded to trade away its nuclear program, just as South Africa and 

Belarus already have. 17 

The world will look to the United States for continue

leadership in settling this tricky situation, and its solution may b

an example of how the NPT treaty can and should work in th

years to come. 

It must be strongly noted though that the finger of wor

condemnation for pursuing weapons of mass destruction cannot b

pointed solely at the above countries. The economic laws of supp

and demand force us to backtrack to the ultimate suppliers o

nuclear knowledge as well as fissionable material. Assistance fro

profit-minded governments, businesses, and individuals around th

industrialized world share in the blame. France has provide

nuclear assistance to India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, and South Afric

Germany has supplied nuclear technology to Argentina, Braz

India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Pakistan. The United States is also 

blame. Israel supposedly acquired 100 kilograms (220 pounds) o

American weapons-grade uranium in the 1960s and followed th

coup with further smuggling of krypton triggering devices in th

early 1980s. Nuclear test data from the United States als

mysteriously showed up in Israel. The situation most alarming th

world right now is the suspected brain drain of Soviet nucle

scientists and weapons technicians who are finding employme

106 
opportunities in the third world. An estimated 1 million Soviets a

working in various third world countries, 1,000 to 2,000 having th

knowledge to design and manufacture nuclear weapons and the

components. 

It is gravely evident that immediate action is required to plu

the holes in this leaking ship of proliferation. The cornerstone 

the world's nonproliferation activities today is the treaty on th

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As early as the 1960s th

use of nuclear reactors to generate electricity was becoming a va

source of reactor by-product: plutonium. Enough plutonium 

being produced now to produce 15 to 20 nuclear weapons daily. 

An organized international system is required to prevent diversio

of these nuclear materials as well as to lessen the risks of nucle

war, accidental detonation, unauthorized use, and regional confli

escalation. The United Nations has sponsored various proposa

from the United States, the Soviet Union, and a variety o

nonnuclear states. The biggest stumbling block was the Sovi

insistence that collective security organizations (like NATO

should not have access to any member's weapons. An agreeme

was eventually finalized after intense negotiations. The trea

entered into force in 1970, and since then it has been signed b

more than 140 countries. The NPT is essentially a bargain betwee

the nuclear weapons haves and the have-nots. For their pledge n

to acquire nuclear weapons, the have-nots received a reciproc

pledge from the haves to provide nuclear assistance suitable to th

development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for the have

to slow and reduce vertical proliferation or growth in the sizes an

capabilities of the existing nuclear arsenals. 

Other blocks in the international wall of nonproliferatio

include the International Atomic Energy Agency established 

1957. It serves as the primary verification tool for the NPT

monitoring compliance with the treaty's legal obligations an

norms and as a facilitator for the transfer of peaceful nucle

materials and technology. The IAEA safeguards are designed 

provide timely warning of proliferation problems by detecting an

107 
diversion or misuse for military purposes of significant quantitie

of declared peaceful nuclear materials, equipment, and facilitie

The Zangger Committee is a voluntary group of nuclear materia

major suppliers, who developed a list of dual-use items who

export is designed to trigger the application of IAEA safeguard

The list includes nuclear reactors, reactor components, and certa

nuclear materials such as heavy water. The Nuclear Supplie

Group, or London Club, developed guidelines adhered to by mo

than 25 countries and includes provisions of physical security fo

transferred nuclear facilities and materials, the acceptance o

safeguards, and the prohibition of third-party retransfer of nucle

exports. It also established Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ

where certain regions of the world have been declared throug

treaties to be off-limits to nuclear weapons (further discussion o

NWFZ later). 

One of the NPT's stipulations is that review conferences mu

be held every five years. The past conferences (1975, 1980, 198

1990) all reaffirmed the treaty's arms control success, but there a

problems still to be hammered out. The planned conference 

April 1995 is considered extremely important by most countrie

because there is a required vote on whether to continue the trea

for an indefinite period, while at the same time there have bee

grumblings by more than a few of the nuclear have-nots that th

treaty is discriminating against them. There is a prevailing sense 

the world community that time is running short to stem the tide o

nuclear proliferation. 

Failure by the United States, Russia, and the world communi

to persuade Ukraine to abide by its political commitment to jo

the NPT and ratify START I makes it impossible to speculate o

any development that will further imperil the indefinite extensio

of the NPT. The January 1994 agreement signed between th

United States, Russia, and Ukraine to remove the strategic nucle

weapons from Ukraine's territory is now only a promise to b

fulfilled, with no substance as yet. A majority vote on th

indefinite extension will be defined by the two issues of how we

108 
the NPT has worked up to the date of the conference and whether 

reduction of the nuclear arsenals, required under Article VI, ha

been faithfully pursued. If Ukraine still is maintaining nucle

weapons, the foundation of the NPT will be shaken, forcing th

major countries to reanalyze their strategic and security concern

Additionally, without entry-into-force of the START I and 

treaties, Article VI of the NPT will not have been honored by th

United States and Russia since not one formal, international

recognized agreement would exist between the two countrie

limiting their nuclear armaments. With that in mind other nation

may decide for only a short extension of the treaty pending furth

developments. This argument also leads to the belief that th

START I treaty implementation and signing of the NPT b

Ukraine would be a giant leap forward, cementing the spirit o

NPT as an effective nonproliferation tool requiring indefini

extension. 19 

If the unthinkable situation occurs in which one of the successo

nuclear republics decides to commit a deliberate act o

proliferation and maintain its nuclear weapons, this decision wou

cause severe repercussions around the world. Widesprea

possession of nuclear weapons in various regions of the wor

would decrease the relative military and political power of th

United States and other nuclear powers. It could frustrate Unite

Nations peacemaking/peacekeeping operations and slow th

emergence of a world security system capable of keepin

organized violence to a minimum. Tragically, it could als

convince some nonnuclear industrial states that the time is not rig

to trust their individual security to multilateral security system

perceived to be weak and ineffectual. Countries like Ital

Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea all have strong militar

potential that includes a rapid nuclear weapons productio

capability. Their perception that the nonproliferation regime 

untrustworthy and unable to provide basic security again

proliferation may force them to begin their own nucle

development programs in self-defense. 

109 
Solutions 

The Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an

most importantly the IAEA and the NPT have done a better-than

average job of slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, b

they have not stopped or even reduced the developmen

manufacture, or stockpiling of these weapons. What else can b

done? What other actions can individual countries, regions, th

superpowers, the United Nations, or the entire world do to stop th

flow of nuclear arms? First and foremost, the will to do somethin

further must be stronger, and the participants in any furth

nonproliferation actions must be disposed to transform the

collective will into positive action. One solution would be 

strengthen current peaceful nonproliferation norms, specifically th

detailed inspection regime or safeguards used by the IAEA. An

country that owns nuclear weapons and is serious about stemmin

continued proliferation must take the lead by lessening its relianc

on such weapons. By maintaining huge arsenals of these weapon

such countries are attesting to the rest of the world the

importance, and it should come as no surprise that other countrie

may also want them. Once this giant political hurdle has bee

crossed, there are a variety of actions that can be taken in additio

to the current nonproliferation regime. These steps are of varyin

magnitude and will present difficult political, economic, an

military obstacles to those nations willing to find a solution. 

One enhancement to the strengthened IAEA safeguards wou

be to include all nuclear installations of all UN member states. 

the five declared nuclear powers agreed and were backed by 

Security Council resolution requiring all other United Nation

members to do likewise, this action could freeze both the declare

and undeclared nuclear arsenals. Concurrently, the United State

and Russia could dismantle the reduced warheads resulting fro

current and future arms control agreements, transferring the fissi

material to monitored storage areas under IAEA safeguards. Th

reductions in the US-Russian nuclear arsenals should be mad

110 
permanent for long-term effectiveness, and they should agree n

to continue the current treaty-allowable practice of withdrawin

nuclear warheads from the field and storing them. The curre

START I and II treaties allow retaining the capability to produc

new warheads without limit. Both countries, therefore, mu

negotiate a verified, bilateral agreement to dismantle all strateg

warheads reduced under START and subsequent agreements o

negotiations and include a provision prohibiting reuse of fissi

material mined from old warheads for the production of new

weapons. The United Nations Security Council would, at the sam

time, start a program to entice the handful of states not current

NPT members to join the NPT or any similar regime o

multilateral controls which would end their capability, present o

future, to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, as long a

IAEA safeguards could be implemented. The bilateral agreeme

between Brazil and Argentina, who are not current signatories o

the NPT, outlines an agreement to adhere to the safeguards of th

IAEA and to terminate their individual nuclear programs. 

The pending START treaties between the United States an

Russia cover only a portion of the nuclear club membership. Th

full implementation of the proposed US-Russian actions should b

contingent upon the agreement of the other declared nucle

weapon states-Britain, France, and China-to voluntarily follow th

stated limits by freezing the numeric level of their warhead

restricting missile production to a bare minimum, phasing o

nuclear warhead testing, stopping all fissile material productio

and allowing all their nuclear facilities to come under IAE

supervision. A Security Council decision would enjoin the counc

to take any necessary joint action against states or terrorist group

initiating the use of nuclear weapons. Such joint action decide

upon by the Security Council is authorized under chapter 7 of th

United Nations Charter and could include features like econom

sanctions against any United Nations member state refusing 

submit all nuclear installations under their control to IAE

safeguards, or some other multilateral equivalent. 

111 
The reductions and restrictions upon the nuclear capabilities o

the five declared nuclear powers, who are also the permane

members of the Security Council, would assure continued toug

council supervision of this broader system for control over nucle

weapons. For example, the council could "decide to obliga

supplier countries to report to the IAEA sales and transfers of a

components and items on a list prepared by the suppliers group.

This action is now carried out on a voluntary and incomplete basi

Another nonproliferation concept, which currently' has tw

shining examples of success in Latin America and the Sou

Pacific region is the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

NWFZs are internationally recognized regions of the world th

have been created by formal treaties that include verificatio

provisions to stop the migration of nuclear weapons and assist 

efforts to roll back proliferation where it has already occurre

NWFZs also could help defuse regional tensions and instabili

that increase the incentive for countries to opt for nuclear weapon

and they offer an attractive alternative to states that have rejecte

the NPT membership because of its perceived discriminator

nature. Both existing NWFZ treaties, Tlatelolco in Latin Americ

and the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific, express a desi

to remove the threat of nuclear war from their respective region

to contribute to global elimination of nuclear weapons throug

regional measures, and to prevent the proliferation of nucle

weapons. Both agreements highlight the value of NWFZs 

building regional confidence and security .21 

The current NPT embodies a double standard legitimizin

nuclear weapons in possession of some but not by others. This 

the crux of the claim by many countries without a nucle

capability that there is no equality in the treaty. The NPT

nonproliferation tenets should be applied equally both to nucle

weapon nation haves and have-nots. Members of the nuclear clu

to maintain their credibility and effectiveness on nonproliferatio

matters, must practice what they preach. De-emphasizing an

devaluing the possession of nuclear weapons by agreement of a

112 
the nuclear states, along with permanent reductions in the

arsenals, will show the resolve these countries have to ensure th

safety of the world. The constraints of the NPT, linked wi

sufficient authority, resources, and backing, plus the IAE

safeguards system are the best hope for preventing the continuin

proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

All the aforementioned ideas are proposed to prevent th

acquisition of nuclear materials and weapons or the production o

them from current civilian-use programs. What happens after 

country or other actor is already in possession of weapons an

begins to rattle its nuclear sabers? Until now nonproliferatio

efforts have encompassed only political and economic activitie

and sanctions in an attempt to stop the proliferation or at least sto

the intent to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Political an

economic sanctions mayor may not be fully effective in forcin

that country or actor to freely and voluntarily curb the threats o

use or even relinquish their "claim to fame." To physically preve

the use of this weapon or weapons is when the military optio

should be considered for possible employment. We are no

stepping into the realm of the "twilight zone" o

counterprol1feration-a coherent strategy to prevent countries fro

acquiring any WMD through a combination of nonproliferatio

regimes, export controls, and political persuasion, or should effor

to prevent the acquisition of these weapons fail, to deter or destro

them prior to their use. The estimation of the adversary's potenti

threat and intent by the United States or United Nations will he

determine the level of military response. The threat is 

combination of factors including the type of weapon o

proliferation that has occurred, the delivery capability, th

adversary's intent of use, and the inherent regional instability. Th

willingness to take military action (unilaterally, bilaterally, o

multilaterally) in response to this threat is also a combination o

factors, including US/UN military capability, our knowledge of th

adversary, what US/UN interests are at stake, and the domestic an

international support perceived for the use of the military option. 

113 
willingness to act by the United States or the United Nations is n

commensurate to the level of threat, the military option is simp

not available because it will fail. 

One fact predominates: the use of military force should not an

cannot be the first option explored in response to a threat. It mu

follow and be totally integrated into a unified response usin

political, economic, and military options. If the military action 

then to be used, two outcomes must occur. First, the military actio

must inflict the minimum requisite punishment to ensure th

adversary is worse off than before. Second, the action mu

establish a credible reputation through its results to discourag

future proliferators from triggering like actions. If the intende

military action does not succeed, not only will it not remove th

specific threat that precipitated the military response, but the enti

world will assume that military action is futile as a solution to th

problem of proliferation. 

An effective and efficient nonproliferation regime (and possib

a counterproliferation option) will send a clear and precis

message to any current or potential proliferator. This message mu

be carried forward by a unified, coordinated effort of the politica

economic, and possibly the military elements of the world bod

First, the acquisition of WMD will not be easy or cheap. Secon

any attempts to threaten or use WMD will be dealt with rapid

and severely by the United States and the international communit

There are many potential pitfalls to using a military option in 

counterproliferation regime, and their effects must be balance

when contemplating the use of military force. A military respons

is only a stopgap measure at best. Israel's surprise attack on Iraq

Osiraq reactor in June 1981 only temporarily slowed Iraq's nucle

program. Second, military strikes are likely to produce unintende

consequences. For example, Israel's attack on Osiraq only drov

the program underground into hardened facilities. An attack on a

operating reactor could also risk a Chernobyl-like disaster. Thir

military strikes set a precedent for other countries to launch the

own attacks against suspected sites on the territory of adversarie

114 
(South Korea has made some provocative statements abo

knocking out North Korea's nuclear facilities in the wake of th

Gulf War.) Finally, military strikes against nuclear facilities are 

clear violation of international norms against such action. In fact 

December 1990 the United Nations General Assembly voted 141-

to condemn attacks against nuclear reactors. The lone dissentin

vote was cast by the United States. 22 

The current nuclear nonproliferation regime does nothing b

maintain the nuclear status quo, and inherent to that situation a

secret and unchecked proliferation activities by a variety of sta

and nonstate actors. If the world is scared enough and sane enoug

to really desire an end to this nuclear madness, it is absolute

essential that the nuclear haves practice what they preach to th

have-nots and that all rules of nonproliferation and nucle

weapons reduction and elimination apply equally to all participan

across the board. There have been many who have proclaime

their ideas in this arena to be the panacea, and it is a sure bet the

will be others in the future with a better mousetrap. There a

though certain logical precepts and common-sense steps, which, 

applied, will have a constant positive force on the nonproliferatio

regime. 

No progress will be possible though without the activ

participation and unanimous agreement of the present members o

the declared nuclear states. In this respect, progress will not b

possible under any circumstances without the foresight and th

initiation of strong, enlightened leadership on the part of th

United States. This is the premier national security challenge th

United States faces in the arms control and proliferation arena

today. Will America recognize its responsibilities to step forwar

and provide the requisite leadership critical to undertake this task? 

115 
Notes 

1. United States Anus Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agreements, Text and Histories of the Negotiations (Washington

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1990). 3. 

2. Treaty Document 102-20, Message of the President of the United States 

transmitting the 1reaty between the United States of America and the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 

Offensive Arms (Washington. D.C.: US Government Printing Office. 25 

November 1991), iv. 

3. Ibid., v-vi. 

4. Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russian Nuclear Disarmament: Problems and 

Prospects," Arms Control 14. no. 1 (April 1993): 105. 

5. Ibid., 103. 

6. Ibid., i, 131. 

7. Peter Herby, "Building the Chemical Disarmament Regime," Arms 

Control Today, September 1993, 19. 

8. Oscar Luire, "Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Still Time to 

Act," The Defense Monttor21, no. 3 (1992): 1. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid., viii, 3. 

12. Ibid., 3. 

13. "Algeria to Sign Anus Treaty," Reuters News Service, 22 December 

1993. 

14. Ibid., viii, 3. 

15. Ibid., 4. 

16. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "The North Korean Crisis" (editorial), Arms 

Control Today, May 1993, 2. 

17. "If North Korea Has Bombs," New York Times, 28 December 1993. 

18. Ibid., i, 89. 

19. Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "It's Ukraine, Stupid!" (editorial), Arms Contro

Today, September 1993, 2. 

20. Jonathan Dean, "Comprehensive Control over Nuclear Weapons," Arm

Control 14. no. 1 (April 1993): 250. 

21. Jon B. Wolfsthal, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Coming of Age?," 

Arms Control Today, March 1993,3. 

22. Ibid., viii. 6. 

116 
The Changing Nature of Alliances 

Maris McCrabb 

The final decade of the twentieth century marked a dramat

change in the relationship between the United States and the rest o

the world. l America's security, traditionally defined as preservin

the United States as a free nation with its fundamental values an

institutions intact, seemed as assured as at any time in the pos

World War II era.2 For 40 years America knew what nation

security meant-protection against the overarching threat o

communist expansion. Furthermore, America knew the means 

counter this threat-a series of alliances like the North Atlant

Treaty Organization (NATO) with like-minded states oriente

against the Soviet threat. With the demise of the Soviet Union an

democracy breaking out in the former communist states of Easter

Europe, the threat to America's security seems tangib

diminished. Likewise, the role of, and indeed the need for, i

alliances has undergone a substantial transformation. 

The purpose of this study is to examine the changing nature o

alliances in light of the changed nature of the internation

environment.3 It describes current alliance characteristics an

discerns emerging trends within alliances. It examines the change

motives for membership and under what conditions the allianc

will either act or not act. It describes the formal and inform

decision-making apparatus within the alliances. Fundamentall

this is an attempt to uncover the objectives of these alliances. Th

thesis of the study is that alliances are moving from tradition

balance-of-power and external-threat orientations towar

mechanisms for resolving conflicts internal to the alliances o

among their participants. 

To show how the changed nature of the internation

environment is changing the nature of alliances, this study looks 

three cases: NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and th

Visegrad Group. NATO and the WEU are alliances that have roo

117 
in the very origins of the cold war. They allow us to examine th

impact that the new international environment has on existin

alliances. The Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and th

Czech Republic) barely fits the definition of an alliance. Howeve

there is some argument that this group carries the seeds of wh

future alliances may well look like and why and how they may b

formed. 

The relevancy of this study lies in the impact that these change

will have on US military options and contingency planning. It 

almost becoming a cliche that America will no longer engage 

unilateral military operations-Panama, EI Dorado Canyon, and th

antidrug efforts notwithstanding.4

 Likewise, it is becomin

redundant to speak of the malaise of NATO and its search for a

identity and mission in the “new world order.”

5

 This “NATO

sclerosis” has in some ways occurred parallel with the rebirth o

the WEU as a competing military security institution and pose

questions concerning the link between NATO and the WEU suc

as whether they can coexist in the same manner they have done s

over the past 40 years and, if so, what roles and missions each wi

play. Finally, while much of the concern has been over the securi

needs and aspirations of the Commonwealth of Independent State

(CIS), a potential US security/ concern must also include the oth

former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states. An importa

question deals with the security arrangements of Poland, Hungar

and the Czech Republic, for example, fitting into the larger NAT

(or WEU) universe. 

This study begins an examination of these concerns, with a bri

historical background on the two previous upheavals in th

realignment of alliances: the nineteenth-century attempt by th

Congress of Vienna to institutionalize the Grand Coalition after th

defeat of Napoleon and the post-World War II point-counterpoi

of NATO and the WTO. The attention then rapidly turns to th

twenty-first century by looking at the future of NATO and the ro

the European Union (EU) 6 and the WEU will play in US securi

calculations. The study examines opportunities and pitfalls that a

118 
organization like the Visegrad Group presents to the US. Finally, 

closes with some conclusions and recommendations for US policy

Historical Background 

Napoleon's opponents formed coalitions whose membe

fluctuated according to the perceived self-interests of th

individual nations.7 Their fundamental outlook was determining 

the greatest threat was Napoleon or those who opposed him. Th

only nation consistently opposed to him throughout the Napoleon

Wars was Great Britain. 

Post-Napoleonic Nineteenth Century 

Napoleon's fall began with his establishment of the Continent

System on 21 November 1806.8 This system was Napoleon

attempt to close continental Europe to British trade. Britain neede

those markets. She exported metals and textiles and imported nav

stores and cereals. Napoleon's attempt to force Spain and Portug

into the system (through invasion) started the Spanish War o

Independence. To support the Iberian nations (and to tie dow

French forces), Britain landed troops in Portugal on 21 Octob

1807, and the Peninsular War began. It became Napoleon

“Vietnam” quagmire. Likewise, the French invasion of Russia o

24 June 312 was directed at stopping Russian trade with Gre

Britain. 

The first attempt at semiformal collective security was th

Quadruple Alliance of November 1815, which consisted o

Austria, Prussia. Russia, and Great Britain. Bourbon France wa

admitted in 1818. Its purpose was to control threats from with

Europe. The alliance, which met irregularly in congress, prohibite

intervention in internal affairs, 9 but it did not stop are betwee

nations (or even member states), nor was it a rum to resolv

conflicts. The continental keeper of the peace was Austria und

the leadership of Prince von Metternich. After 1850, the role o

Russia in European stability was also central. These two state

119 
provided the 

backstop for other, ore regional partnerships suc

as Britain protecting Belgium. Austria protecting Italy, and Pruss

protecting the Rhineland. Continuing the arrangements solidifie

by the Battle of Trafalgar. Britain remained hegemonic on the sea

It would be a mistake to believe that the Congress of Vienn

stopped war between the major powers or that it was successful 

eliminating revolution (which the rulers equated with a desire 

eliminate autocratic rule) from Europe. The ancient regimes th

existed before 1789 were gone forever. Thus, this early attempt 

the use of an alliance for collective security failed. 

Post-World War D 

Point-Counterpoint-NATO and the WTO 

The next major realignment of alliance powers occurred aft

World War II. The entry of the United States into NATO marked 

watershed in the history of US security policy. Since the days o

the Founding Fathers, America had studiously avoide

entanglement with foreign alliances. With the founding of NATO

not only had the US entered into a permanent security alliance wi

other states, but also the US pledged itself to playing a leading ro

in ensuring the stability of the Western world. 

While there is scholarly debate on the origins of the cold wa

there is some agreement on the precipitating events.10 Two of th

most significant events occurred in Turkey and in Greece.

Traditionally, that part of Europe had been protected by Gre

Britain, but Britain, weakened by the war and unable to provid

assistance to either Greece or Turkey, turned to the United State

President Harry S. Truman, in a historic reversal of US polic

announced on 12 March 1947 that the US would “support fre

peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or b

outside pressure.”12 This Truman Doctrine was interpreted by th

Soviet Union as an intrusion into the internal affairs of other state

The wartime amity between the Soviet Union and the Unite

States was on fragile ground. By 1947, Poland was ruled by th

120 
Communist party. In February 1948, the pro-Western party 

Czechoslovakia was expunged. Then in June 1948, the Sovie

blocked all overland access to Berlin, which, while under fou

power (US, Soviet, British, and French) administration, wa

completely surrounded by the Soviet zone of occupation. Truma

immediately instituted the famous Operation Vittles-the Berl

airlift. That same month, the US Senate passed a bipartisa

resolution supporting collective defense in Western Europe, and o

4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washingto

Its original 10 European countries13 plus Canada and the US we

expanded by Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 195

and Spain in 1982.14 

To counter NATO, Stalin institutionalized Soviet control ov

Eastern Europe through the WTO, which was founded on 14 Ma

1955 when eight European states15 signed a Treaty of Friendshi

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.16 The cold war was on, an

Europe was divided into two camps. Alliances now formed 

dominant, though not exclusive, overarching framework fo

international relations between states. 

This brief historical review has highlighted three importa

considerations to bear in mind when analyzing future allianc

characteristics and models. First, for the US and for most nation

alliances have been the exception. Second, alliances have bee

formed to counter a known external threat. Finally, prior to th

current situation facing NATO, alliances fell apart soon after th

common threat was gone; they did not evolve into lastin

arrangements, nor did they necessarily expand to includ

nondefense security issues. 

Towards the Twenty-first Century 

The following case studies on NATO, the WEU, and th

Visegrad Group are avowedly Eurocentric. There are three reason

for this.17 First, only in Europe has the US pursued multipartn

alliance ties. The other defense security alliances are mo

121 
traditional bilateral alliances and/or multilateral coalitions. Secon

it is in Europe that the specter looms of long-standing US allianc

partners framing their own alliance without the US. Finally, th

issue of central and eastern European countries poses a significa

dilemma for both the US and other European nations, notab

whether there should be Western security guarantees to these state

and. if so, what form should they take. Some argue that thes

guarantees should be expressed as bilateral arrangements wi

EU/WEU and/or NATO. However, if there are not securi

guarantees to these states, the question remains whether they wi

form a multilateral security arrangement among themselves. Th

last issue has been at the heart of the proposed “Partners for Peace

initiative launched at the January 1994 NATO summit. Accordin

to Anthony Lake, President Bill Clinton's national security adviso

Through [the Partnership for Peace), former members of the Warsaw 

Pact will be able to plan, train, exercise, and, if necessary, operate with 

NATO forces. ...NATO itself will be better prepared for possible 

contingencies in the east and the new democracies will be better prepared 

to play their role in building a secure Europe. 18 

The US, Europe, and the Future of NATO 

It is not the purpose of this study to explore in any depth th

origins of NATO. 19 As outlined above, NATO was primari

formed to counter the perceived threat of Soviet expansion 

Europe following World War II. It is important to note that NAT

followed efforts by individual European states to form a collectiv

defense (discussed in more detail below). It is also important 

note that NATO's defense security orientation was only part of th

US plan for ensuring the security of Europe. The Marshall Pla

was as much a part of the US moves in Europe as was th

Washington Treaty codifying the Atlantic Alliance. 

The future of NATO largely depends upon the future role th

US is willing to play in the alliance. That, in turn, depends main

on what role the alliance will play in maintaining Europea

defense and political security. Obviously, then, the role of th

122 
alliance will be determined by what challenges NATO foresees 

these two areas. This has much wider implications. It also concern

NATO joint force planning. Prior to the collapse of the WTO

NATO joint force planning was a means by which NAT

countries coordinated their military capabilities and policie

Without a common threat, NATO has no obvious need for joi

force planning. This therefore frees individual nations to develo

their own force structure and employment policies.20 The first ke

question concerns the possible threats to European security. Onc

that concern is answered, the next step is to determine what U

interests are in Europe. From these interests, we can the

determine what role, if any, the US will play in the NATO allianc

Finally, these changes in NATO's perceptions of threats will affe

the decision making in the alliance. 

There are three possible defense security threat scenarios 

Europe.21 The first is a resurgent Russia threatening stability 

Europe by directly threatening the West. While the probability o

this occurring may be quite low, the costs of a major power war 

Europe would be quite high. Under this scenario, NATO provide

a transition insurance policy. NATO and US forces committed o

the Continent exist perhaps for decades as Russia completes i

transition to political democracy.

22 

The second scenario is war in Eastern Europe that threatens th

West. This scenario has two aspects. The first is the spread of w

to the West. This would most likely occur if the West (or even 

single Western state) appears to one of the belligerents to b

actively (or covertly) aiding their adversary. The second aspe

involves the West being drawn into a war in the East when Russ

enters on the side of one of the belligerents. This ties the secon

scenario back to the first. Again, NATO would act as a balancer o

forces in Europe. 

The last scenario involves Russia going to war against 

neighboring Eastern state, such as the Ukraine.23 This scenar

would be considered threatening to the West as a prelude to th

123 
first scenario (i.e., a resurgent Russia threatening the West). In th

case, NATO acts as a guard against the conflict spilling over in

the West. Given these threat scenarios, the next fundamental issu

posed concerns the US security interests in Europe. 

There are two important parts to the discussion over America

interests in Europe. While there are some “Fortress America

advocates who argue that the US should return all its force

stationed overseas back to the US, most adhere to the notion th

the US must remain engaged in Europe. The issue, though, is wh

is meant by “engagement” and what is the extent of th

engagement. Some argue that with the demise of the Soviet Unio

and the WTO and the end of the cold war, the US no longer ha

any defense security concerns in Europe. They are optimistic th

the likelihood of major power war in Europe is small and th

outbreaks of wars within and among small powers, whi

regrettable, are not of concern to the us. Others argue that the U

must remain militarily engaged in Europe for defense, politica

and economic security reasons. Essentially, they argue th

America could be excluded from a prosperous and stable Europ

based around the EU and extending into Eastern Europe an

possibly Russia. A second argument revolves around an unstab

Europe leading to a renewed great-power rivalry.24 

Another rationale for NATO is that it maintains stability with

Western Europe.25 This line of argument centers on the fear of 

militarily resurgent Germany. With the movement of Wester

Europe's forward defense line away from the German border, the

fears center on two potential outcomes. The first is a Germany th

seeks defense security in nuclear weapons or at least in a

expanded military. Ironically, the second is the fear of a militari

impotent Germany. 

The nuclear Germany scenario envisions Europe, stripped of th

US nuclear umbrella, reverting to pre-World War II securi

policies when each nation viewed its security as being based upo

its own capabilities. Here Germany, faced with a nuclear Franc

124 
and Great Britain in the west, and a nuclear Russia and perhap

Ukraine in the east, abrogates the 1955 Paris Agreements th

prohibit Germany from possessing nuclear weapons. This scenar

is not dependent upon Germany actually possessing the weapon

only that it might obtain them. The argument rests on the beli

that a nuclear (or even a militarily strong) Germany will b

perceived as a threat to other Western European (indeed, perhap

all European) nations. 

The latter scenario, a militarily weak Germany, is based upo

the argument that in the absence of US forces in Europe oth

Western European states need a bulwark to the instability o

Eastern Europe that a militarily strong Germany could provide. I

light of the three threat scenarios postulated above, the reduction

taking place in the German military are of increasing concern 

other European states.26 

In sum, while the US distinctly has defense security interests 

NATO, the likely scenarios point to much more murky threats tha

in the past. Consequently, the US will no longer play the role o

“first among equals” in NATO decision-making. Therefore, it 

important to consider some of the ramifications for policy-makin

in an alliance of equals. 27 The first is that a given situation is le

likely to be identified as a problem requiring action whe

responsibility is dispersed among alliance members. This creates 

bias towards avoidance of issues. Second, issues tend to be frame

narrowly, again reflecting the uncertainties, particularly thos

caused by the uncertainties of collective actions, over which acto

is expected to do what. Third, the absence of a compelling thre

tends to make government leaders more susceptible to fickle publ

opinion. This is exacerbated by elections that are not synchronize

leading to at least one of the member states facing elector

concerns. Thus, the nature of “the West's welfare-minded, inward

looking societies, leads to risk-averse, self-protective thinking.”

Finally, weak political leaders, sensitive to public opinion, lookin

at ambiguous issues will be less likely to commit themselves 

decisive action without a high degree of consensus among th

125 
alliance members. The result tends to be decision by committe

and the attendant possibility of inaction and groupthink. 

The EU and the WEU 

The WEU shares common roots with NATO. Those roots ste

from a recognition by the Western European nations followin

World War II for a need for collective defense. The first act bega

with a Treaty of Defense Alliance (known as the Dunkirk Treaty

between France and Great Britain signed on 4 March 1947. I

intent was to prevent further German aggression. This arrangeme

was extended to include 

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on 17 March 194

(the Brussels Treaty).29 This alliance formed the nucleus for th

Atlantic Alliance and NATO. Furthermore, these nations, with th

exception of Great Britain, formed the nucleus for discussions th

led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Communi

(ECSC).30 

The ECSC was the brainchild of French foreign minister Robe

Schuman. It was concerned with high politics. Th

reindustrialization of Germany was a great concern to the oth

nations of Western Europe. They were committed to finding a wa

of preventing another central European war. Germany, on her par

was searching for a way of regaining control over the Ruhr an

Saar areas that had been under French jurisdiction since the end o

the war.31 The ECSC filled each party's requirements. German

regained sovereignty over the areas while the other nation

through the ECSC High Authority, retained some control over th

outputs and uses of these regions (as well as the outputs and use

of all ECSC member states). The idea that integration would lea

to increased regional security had a distinct scholarly basis. Dav

Mitrany, a leading theorist of this school that came to be calle

“functionalism,” believed that the close collaboration inherent 

economic integration would eventually “spill over” into oth

areas, thus building a “web of interests” that would fost

126 
increased political cooperation and hence provide a five basis fo

regional security stability .32 

The success of the ECSC led to further negotiations o

establishing a European political community and European defens

community. These were designed to further integrate Germany in

Europe. However, both of these proposals failed in the Frenc

National Assembly in 1954. This led to negotiations to broaden th

Brussels Treaty Organization. The ensuing Western Europea

Union came into force on 6 May 1955 when Germany and Ita

joined the original five signatories of the Brussels Treaty .33 

There are three interconnected decision-making bodies in th

WEU. The Council is the executive and policy-makin

organization with general competence over all questions relative 

the application of the treaty. It meets twice a year and th

presidency is held for one-year terms on an alphabetical rotation. 

has a subcouncil Permanent Council consisting of ambassadoria

rank ministers that meets biweekly. The Assembly, composed o

108 parliamentarians, while largely consultative, is empowered 

make binding decisions concerning questions about its intern

functioning. It usually meets twice a year. The final organization 

the WEU Institute for Security Studies, which carries out researc

for the Council and Assembly, promotes greater awareness o

European security issues, and organizes meetings with oth

European institutes.34 

From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, the WEU wa

somnolent. This was due to the entry of Britain into the EU and th

“civilian power” approach European states took to harmoniz

external policies. Thus, the primary rationales for the WEU-

provide a forum for Britain to discuss common issues and 

cooperate on security issues-were assumed by other organization

In the mid-1980s, the WEU, under French initiative, wa

revitalized for three reasons. First, it was increasingly clear that th

EU was unable to assume a common defense and security identit

Second, the specter of a “reheating” of the cold war between th

127 
US and USSR made many Europeans realize that they required 

forum for defense cooperation divorced from a superpower. Thir

there was increasing concern that the German peace moveme

might lead to German neutrality. The catalyst was the Reykjav

Summit of October 1986 between President Ronald Reagan an

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. The proposals put forth 

that summit concerning elimination of nuclear ballistic missiles le

to a fear in European circles that they might no longer be able 

rely on America's nuclear umbrella. 

The WEU Council issued the “Platform on European Securi

Interests” in October 1987, reaffirming the WEU's primar

objective of preventing war through deterrence. It did, howeve

mark the first appearance of a distinctive “European identity” 

security matters.35 

The second significant event was the EU's Single European A

(SEA) that came into force on 1 July 1987 and established th

European Political Cooperation (EPC) with responsibility fo

coordinating the external foreign policies of the EU. However, th

SEA was silent on coordination of security matters. Such matte

were explicitly left to WEU and NATO. The primary reasons fo

this are reluctance by the member states to relinquish sovereign

over defense matters to the supranational EU Commission or EPC

suspicion by the US over the effect on NATO, and the weakness o

the WEU institutions. 

There are two differing views on the WEU's relationship wi

NATO. The first, often referred to as the “Atlanticist” view, argue

that the WEU should be the “European Pillar” within NATO. Th

view rests on five overlapping arguments. First, the Atlanticist

despite the end of the cold war, believe that 

NATO remains essential to the defense and wider security o

the European continent. Second, they believe that NATO is bett

able to adopt a more political orientation to accommodate move

towards a greater European security identity. Third, the Atlanticis

believe that a US military presence in Europe is needed for th

128 
foreseeable future and that only NATO can achieve this. Fourt

they see NATO as a bulwark against renationalization of securi

policies. Finally, they see NATO as a means of managing th

political and security evolution of Europe in the post-cold-w

era.36 

Those who have an opposite view see the WEU as a means o

fostering increased European integration. They foresee the WE

as the security arm of the EU. As the EU moves to closer econom

integration (via the SEA and the European Monetary Union) an

greater foreign policy integration via the EPC, they argue that th

natural evolution for a common Security voice is via the WEU .37 

The most telling arguments against the WEU playing a centr

role in European security involve the WEU's inability 

coordinate actions in both the Gulf War and in Yugoslavia (at lea

as of January 1994). Further, while the WEU is becoming mo

integrated with the EU, it has the fatal flaw of not containing a

the EU's members.38 This is a particular concern in light of th

addition of Sweden, Austria, and Finland by the mid-1990s. Th

first two are traditional neutral states, and the third is still face

with the delicate balancing act of not appearing to be a threat 

Russia. Despite the collapse of the WTO, Russia still does not hav

a western security alliance state directly on her borders sav

Norway at the Kola Peninsula.39 

The Visegrad Group 

Any security arrangement in Europe must address the proble

of the former WTO states. For the purposes of this study, th

discussion is limited to the Central and Eastern European state

and does not include the former Soviet republics. Since the end o

World War II, the West has used a perimeter strategy to ward o

threats to its security. Is such a strategy, moved further east, sti

viable? Some argue that the most promising European strategy 

collective security and the best means to accomplish that is throug

the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE).

Others argue that the best means to ensure security to Easter

129 
Europe is through some sort of accommodation in which the We

provides security guarantees to the East. This can be accomplishe

either through formal or informal arrangements with NATO or th

EU/WEU or through verbal guarantees without any structur

ties.41 One option not often explored is the viability of Easter

states forming their own collective defense security arrangement. 

There is a fundamental tie between democracy, econom

liberalization, and security. It is not a matter of providin

democratic institutions first, followed by market econom

antecedents such as private property rights, then adding securi

regimes later. Rather, it is the establishment of all three systems, 

a balanced manner, that secures the twin goals of peace an

prosperity. This is the central challenge facing the states of Easter

Europe. There are key obstacles facing these postcommunist state

in their first few decades of proto democracy. First, political apath

of the populace, born of long authoritarian rule and a cynicism th

current politicians cannot solve their problems, is a direct result o

the high political costs of marketization. Second, the political an

bureaucratic opposition to reforms by the remnants of the form

communist nomenklatura and the uncertain civil-military relation

is a source of internal instability. Finally, the explosion of ethn

identity and the long-standing irredentist problems facing man

Eastern European states has both external and internal instabili

dimensions.42 A real danger is that a combination of these facto

may cause the collapse of the fragile governments and the

replacement by demagogic and potentially rogue governments. 

To solve these security problems, Eastern Europea

governments have pursued various strategies. The most promine

have been attempts to gain some sort of association with Wester

states, either through NATO or the EU.43 However, these state

have also formed associations among themselves, based upon th

common perception that while restructuring, redeployin

reducing, professionalizing, depoliticizing, and developing ne

arms sources and the like were essential steps in transforming the

military forces, they were not going to achieve security sole

130 
through their national armed forces. The main source of Ea

European security will be a combination of bilateral, regional, an

multilateral schemes. 

Focusing on the regional attempts, the experiences of Hungar

Poland, and Czechoslovakia44 (the Three) is instructiv

Immediately after achieving their independence from Sovi

domination in 1989, these three states viewed cooperation amon

themselves as a transitory phase, as a test of preparedness, towar

eventual EU membership. However, by mid-1992, the internation

as well as regional climate had changed significantly. Firs

following the turmoil over the Maastricht Treaty ratification, th

EU turned decidedly inward and focused more on the implication

of deepening rather than the prospects of widening. Furthermor

any expansion of the EU was viewed more in favor of the mo

prosperous European Free Trade Area (EFTA) states of Swede

Finland, Austria, and Norway than the poorer East European state

Thus, the Three recognized that full EU membership was not goin

to occur this century. The second significant event was the Augu

1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union. This forced the Three 

undertake serious consultation of common security concern

However, the past record of relationships among the Three argue

against substantial cooperation in the present. 

Therefore, the Three took immediate steps to lay to rest some o

these past conflicts. First, they agreed to forgo any attempt 

reopen territorial issues. Second, they attempted to defuse th

volatile irredentist issue. This had been a particular concern o

Hungary, who pledged to renounce sovereignty claims over oth

states with large Hungarian populations in return for guarantees o

ethnic minority rights. The Three have pursued cooperation alon

several separate paths. The broader Central European Initiative 

brings together the Three with the neighboring states of Ital

Austria, and the 7 former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia an

Croatia. 

131 
The Visegrad Group, which is confined to the Three, ha

proceeded along the lines of pursuing greater economic integratio

and joint security efforts. The Three, through experiences 

coordinating a joint response to the August coup, the civil war 

Yugoslavia, and the protracted EU negotiations have realized th

they carry more weight when speaking with a single voice. Henc

at their Prague summit in May 1992, they decided on a joi

application to the EU. Likewise, they pursue common interes

within NATO's newly formed North Atlantic Cooperatio

Council.46 In accomplishing these tasks, however, the Three hav

explicitly stopped short of formalizing their efforts institutionall

This is because some, Hungary in particular, believe that such a

institution may be used as an excuse by the EU to delay fu

membership in the community. 

In sum, the Central European states of Hungary, Poland, and th

Czech Republic have used many different, but complementar

avenues to increased cooperation. They have done so primarily 

response to the diminished prospects for fuller integration in

existing Western European structures. It is too much to call th

Visegrad Group an alliance in the traditional meaning of that term

There is no formalized structure, for example. However, in term

of using cooperative frameworks to achieve lasting goals, th

Visegrad Group offers many insights into future arrangement

First, the group covers a broad range of issues, from economic an

defense security concerns to migration, borders, and externa

relation issues that traditionally fall under political-securi

discussions. Second, the Three realize that more can be gained b

joint action than can be achieved unilaterally. Despite pa

disagreements, they do recognize common grounds. Finally, the

have learned much from other similar type arrangements. Th

Three have held numerous meetings with representatives o

Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg-the so-called Benelu

countries-about building regional cooperation along the Benelu

lines.47 

132 
Conclusions 

The fundamental cause of the changing nature of alliances is th

end of the cold war. This changed the international environme

from one characterized by predominantly bipolar, defense securi

concerns to a multipolar arena in which defense security issues a

receiving competition from other security concerns, main

economic security. Furthermore, the internal relationships of th

post-World War II alliances are significantly changed. Whe

defense security issues dominated, the United States and the Sovi

Union were the hegemonic powers in their alliances. As Joh

Spanier notes,48 these unequal power arrangements within alliance

had two significant outcomes. First, due to the differential 

power, each bipolar superpower was, in effect, a unilater

guarantor of their allies' security. Second, this dependency of th

lesser powers on the dominant power reduced the freedom o

movement of the lesser powers. For example, the US response 

the Soviet stationing of missiles in Cuba in 1962 was take

unilaterally, even though any war that might have resulted wou

surely have affected America's NATO allies. Likewise, when th

Nationalist Chinese wanted to invade mainland China, the U

stopped them. The Soviets exercised similar restraint on th

Communist Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 1958 because th

Soviets believed such an action would risk wider war with th

United States. 

The changed international environment has significant impac

on US security concerns and the role alliances will play. First an

foremost, the bipolar (or now unipolar) defense security world 

being supplanted by a multipolar economic-security world. This 

not to say that defense security concerns have been eliminated. Th

world is still a dangerous place.49 What it does imply is that for th

major industrialized nations of the world, defense-securi

concerns follow economic-security concerns, a complete revers

from the 40-plus years following World War II when econom

security concerns were often subordinated to defense-securi

133 
concerns. This transformation of the international arrangemen

have two ramifications. First, if the theories of internation

relations theorists are correct, this multipolar world will be mo

stable. This is because each major power views all other actors a

both potential adversaries and potential allies. This gives the sta

greater mobility to align and realign itself. The second ramificatio

is that such alignments will tend to be short-lived and issu

specific. This too should lead to greater stability because issu

disagreements will be resolved by compromise instead of conflic

Much like domestic political actors, each state will recognize th

an opponent on one issue may be an ally on another. Mo

important, each actor recognizes that each opponent, as potenti

ally, must not be forced to total capitulation on anyone issue th

may preclude cooperative action on another issue. 

This comparison with the domestic political process leads to th

second implication that the changed international environment ha

on US security concerns and the role of alliances-the increasin

role that domestic policies and the political process will play 

alliances. It has been an American tradition that foreign policy wa

the province of the executive branch and enjoyed bipartisa

support from the legislative branch. On the other hand, econom

policy, seen as domestic policy, was very much subject to th

vicissitudes of the political process, particularly the interplay o

domestic interest groups. As economic-'security issues take th

fore in international relations, the boundary between foreign an

domestic politics becomes blurred. 

These two forces-the emergence of economic-security ov

defense-security issues and the increasing role of domestic politic

process in international relations-are affecting all the alliances th

remain from the cold-war era. They are also shaping new alliance

as they form. These changes will significantly affect US securi

policies in the twenty-first century. 

First, NATO will remain but only as a means of consultatio

between the US and Europe. While maintaining its ostensib

134 
defense-security veneer, it will become more involved in issue

dealing with economic-security matters. The US will pursu

defense-security policy through unilateral determination of issue

under a United Nations umbrella. Likewise, the Europeans wi

pursue collective defense policy through the wider-mandate

European Union-expanded to include Central and Easter

European nations in at least associate status-that will use the WE

as its defense security arm. 

Second, pure defense-security alliances will lose their vitality 

not outright disappear. Nations will still cooperate, however, b

the alliances will be issue-specific and immensely more flexibl

The relaunching of the WEU in the 1980s and subseque

development is a case in point. The impetus for a revived WE

was a new awareness that serious discussion of a Europea

external identity and a defense capability could not be postponed 

a changed global environment. Equally important, however, wa

the awareness that the WEU was no more than a transition

institution, albeit a critically important one. The final product wi

be a EU-based political-security and defense security arrangemen

To get to this state, the WEU provides a forum for senior defen

and foreign affairs officials of nine European nations to me

regularly outside the NATO framework. Recognizing this, th

NATO heads of state, at their January 1994 summit, authorized th

establishment of a Combined Joint Task Force headquarters 

coordinate the efforts of NATO and the WEU. 50 

Finally, alliances will supplement cooperative agreemen

between the states in these issue-specific arrangements. Thes

alliances will be used to resolve wider conflicts. In other word

alliances, instead of being either specifically defense'-securi

oriented (as is NATO and the WEU) or economic-security an

political-security oriented (i.e., EU), will be forums for discussio

and resolution of all three agendas. The model will be more lik

the European Council of the EU than the North Atlantic Council o

NATO. 

135 
The primary policy implication for US decision makers is 

recognize these changed international environmental condition

Second, US policy makers must not try “new wine in old bottles

For example, the US should not attempt to refocus NATO 

achieve nondefense security goals. The US should look to oth

multilateral organizations to fulfill the continuing need for glob

engagement. Recognizing that security in the twenty-first centur

will be predominately, though not exclusively, economic-securi

based, the US needs to refocus on building and maintaining i

economic base. 

Finally, those involved in planning military options in th

twenty-first century must likewise change their horizons. Th

familiar scenarios are gone. The new scenarios are murky at bes

American leadership in European security matters can no longer b

taken for granted. Thus, military officers must become even mo

aware of the geopolitical environment. They must be attuned to th

political ramifications of their plans and, reflecting the ambiguou

defense-security arena, be sensitive to requirements laid on by the

political masters that may involve less than clear and concis

objectives. In the past, a concrete plan against a known threat on

required “fine-tuning” around the edges. This situation no long

exists. Just as diplomats in this changed world must relearn the a

of statecraft, so too must military professionals rediscover the a

of planning under conditions of ambiguity. 

136 
Notes 

1. For one senior military leader's view on the changing role of the US in th

post-cold-war era, see US Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan's “Power 

Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism,” Parameters 23, no. 2 (Summer 

1993): 2-15. 

2. See William G. Hyland, “Reexamining National Strategy,” in The Natur

of the Post-Gold War World (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College 

Strategic Studies Institute, 1993). 

3. First, though, some definitions are in order. The Department of Defense 

defines an alliance as a formal arrangement to accomplish broad, long-term, 

objectives. This is in contrast to a coalition, which is an informal agreement 

between two or more states for common action. Balance of power refers to the 

state system in which any shift away from equilibrium leads to counter shifts 

through mobilization of countervailing power. That is, power begets opposing 

power; the best antidote to power is power. External threat orientation as used 

this study refers to the core objective of an alliance. It means that the purpose o

the alliance is to counter some other identified state. For example, NATO clear

stated that its purpose was to counter the Soviet Union in Europe. Likewise, the 

WTO was formed precisely to counter NATO. Conversely, internal conflict 

resolution means that the purpose of the alliance is to provide a forum to 

mediate policy conflicts among the alliance member states. Additionally, these 

conflicts are not limited to defense issues but may embrace wider concerns suc

as economic or political conflict. 

4. For a discussion of the times when the US will engage in unilateral actio

and the desire for collective action, see US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's 

Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1993), 1-23. 

5. For a countering argument that claims NATO is still relevant and indeed 

essential to US security, see Capt William F. Hickman, “NATO: Is It Worth th

Trouble?” Naval War College Review 46, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 36-46. 

6. The evolution of the European Union is beyond the scope of this paper. 

For our purposes, “EU” will be used to include members of the European 

Economic Community, the European Community and the newly named 

European Union. 

7. For an insightful analysis of the coalition wars against Napoleon, see 

Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from 

Breitenfeld to Waterloo (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1991). 

8. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: 

Vintage Books, 1987), 129-39. 

9. Ibid., 184-90. This was a fundamental problem for nineteenth-century 

geopoliticians. 

10. This section is based mainly on John W. Spanier's Games Nations Play 

(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 140-45; and David W. Ziegler, War, Peac

and International Politics, 9th ed. (New York: Harper-Collins, 1993), 53-61. 

137 
g , qy 

relinquish some territory that the Soviets believed the Turks had falsely 

appropriated following the Bolshevik Revolution m 1917 when the Soviet Unio

was weakened by civil war. Turkey refused the Soviet request. In Greece, the 

government found itself in a civil war with communist guerrillas that were 

believed to be controlled by the Kremlin. 

12. Ziegler, 58. 

13. Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 

Luxembourg, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy. 

14. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures (Brussels: 

NATO Information Service, 1989), 11. 

15. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, 

Romania, and the USSR. 

16. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures, 207. 

17. Obviously, this is not all inclusive, See Gregory Treverton, “America's 

Stakes and Choices in Europe,” Survival 34. no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 119-35. 

18. Anthony Lake, “How Partnership for Peace Will Build Security in 

Europe,” Boston Globe, 12 January 1994, 11. 

19. For those interested in a deeper understanding of the NATO origins, see 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, chapter 1. 

20. See Ted Greenwood, “NATO's Future,” European Security 2, no. 1 

(Spring 1993): 1-14. 

21. These scenarios are based upon an analysis done by Charles L, Glaser, 

“Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe, 

International Security 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 8-13. 

22. Treverton, 123. He writes, “NATO has the great virtue of existing.” 

23. Some may argue that there is a fourth possible scenario-a war between 

Western states. 

24. See Phil Williams, Paul Hammond, and Michael Brenner, “Atlantis Los

Paradise Regained? The United States and Western Europe after the Cold War

International Affairs 69, no. 1 (1993): 1-17. 

25. See Paul Bracken and Stuart Johnson, “The Changing Framework of 

European Security,” Defense Analysis 9, no. 2 (1993): 227-30. 

26. The Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces) are scheduled to be reduced 

from the pre-unification level of 515,000 (which included East German forces) 

to 370,000 by the end of 1994. See Thomas-Durell Young, The “Normalization

of the Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures (Carlisle Barracks, Pa

US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, September 1992), 8-17. 

27. For a complete analysis of the consequences of NATO's emerging 

consensual decision-making process, see Michael Brenner, “Multilateralism an

European Security,” Survival 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 138-55. 

28. Ibid., 149. 

29. For a more detailed examination of the roots of the WEU, see Alfred 

Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defens

Identity within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity (London: Brassey's. 1989). 1-

4. 

138 
y gy

complete title, “Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and 

Collective Self-defense.” highlights the diverse nature of this alliance. 

31. Ziegler. 263-64. 

32. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Jr. Contending 

Theories of International Relations, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Row. 1981). 

418-21. 

33. The Paris Agreements, signed on 23 October 1954, actually consisted o

six documents in four areas: (1) West German sovereignty and the termination 

of the occupation regime there: (2) the revision of the Brussels Treaty and the 

creation of the WEU that included Germany and Italy; (3) German rearmament

and (4) French-German agreement on the Saar. See Julia A. Myers. The Weste

European Union: Pillar of NATO or Defence Ann of the EC? (London: Centre 

for Defence Studies, 1993), 3 

34. Ibid., 7-8. 

35. Ibid., 17-18. 

36. Ibid., 23-27. 

37. Ibid., 32-36. 

38. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, signed on 7 February 1992 

by the 12 EC members, invites the members of the EC who are not in the WEU 

to become either members or observers. Likewise, it invites non-EC European 

members of NATO (Iceland. Norway (who subsequently has applied for EC 

membership) and Turkey [whose EC membership application is on hold)) to 

become associate members of the WEU. See Anand Menon. Anthony Forster, 

and William Wallace, “A Common Defence?” Survival 34, no. 3 (Autumn 

1992): 98-118. 

39. It is interesting to note that Norway is the only NATO member that has 

no plans to cut its defense budget. They fear that much of the equipment broug

out of Central Europe under the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement has 

been relocated in the Kola Peninsula. Hickman. 45. 

40. Charles L. Glaser argues that collective security will not work. His 

argument is based on fundamental flaws in collective security, not any specific 

flaws in a European system. The two key flaws are that states will fail to meet 

their commitments and that collective security only works when it is 

unnecessary, Glaser, 27-29. 

41. German Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe argues that Eastern Europe 

should be tied structurally to the West. See his “Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies

A Grand Strategy for a New Era.” Survival 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 134. 

Glaser argues that NATO can prevent instability in the East through security 

guarantees not requiring formal or informal structural ties, Glaser, 19-23. 

42. See Daniel N. Nelson, “Democracy, Markets, and Security in Eastern 

Europe,” Survival 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 159-64, for further elaboration on 

these obstacles. 

43. Perhaps reflecting the desperation born of the fear of violence in the 

former Yugoslavia spilling over their boundaries, Albania formally applied for 

NATO membership in early 1993. The application was turned down. Ibid., 166

139 
y , py pp

Czech and Slovak Republics. The Slovak Republic, under Prime Minister 

Vladimir Meciar, is generally seen as the most recalcitrant state. See David 

Shumaker, “The Origins and Development of Central European Cooperation: 

1989-1992,” East European Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 1993): 355. 

45. The Central European Initiative started as the Alpine-Adria Working 

Group in 1977. Ibid., 357-60. 

46. This council was formed in November 1991 specifically to foster 

security cooperation between the 16 NATO members and former WTO states. 

47. Shumaker, 365-66. 

48. Spanier, 143. 

49. It is worth noting that the issue that brought France back into NATO's 

integrated command structure for the first time since its withdrawal in 1966 wa

the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

50. “NATO Leaders Enjoy Rare Accord on Arms,” Defense News, 10-16 

January 1994, 1,8. 

140 
The Military's Changing Sociological Concerns 

Rali M. Dobberstein 

America's most pressing sociological concerns include rapid

changing demographics, a growing percentage of women in th

work force, and increasing efforts toward gaining civil rights an

social acceptance for homosexuals. The US population 

becoming more diverse by race and by ethnic origin. By the ye

2000 proportionally more Americans will be members of 

minority group. Additionally, there has been a greater acceptanc

of women and gays in the workplace. A study conducted by th

United Nations (UN)-sponsored International Labour Organizatio

noted women will represent a majority of the work force by th

end of the decade. As for gays we can expect changes in society 

reshape the nation's political agenda, creating advocacy groups fo

new legislation and altering the consequences of existing laws. 

The United States armed forces as a reflection of the nation 

microcosm has the same sociological concerns. In the future, 

number of questions of sociological concern will come to th

attention of the United States military. The armed forces of th

twenty-first century will be challenged on demographi

homosexual, and gender issues. The most important issue we wi

face is changing demographics. Within the realm of changin

demographics lies the issue of language. We may have in ou

armed forces a situation similar to that of the Canadian arme

forces-essentially an awareness of the importance of making th

forces more representative of a multicultural nation. New policie

may include expansion of language training, recruiting, an

promotion policy to achieve proportional representation throug

rank structure, separate training for non-English-speakin

personnel covering most specialist trades, and non-English

speaking personnel in ships, flying squadrons, and ground-forc

units. These types of initiatives, coinciding with sharp reduction

in overall strength and a weak budget coupled with politic

interference would no doubt be acutely unpopular with th

141 
English-speaking majority. The non-English-language units wou

make the armed forces look as multicultural as the country the

serve. Time, patience, and new generations of personnel wi

gradually make bilingualism seem more natural. As we will se

these issues are the subjects of intense debate. This issue o

changing demographics alone deserves a separate study-one th

goes beyond the scope of this paper. My paper will discuss th

secondary issues we as an armed force will face in the twenty-fir

century. These issues center around the question of equal righ

and opportunities for both gays and women, the collective good o

society, and concern for the overall performance of the arme

forces in terms of the effect gays and women will have on th

military's morale, good order, discipline, and ability to fight. Th

study intends to analyze the homosexual and women-in-comb

issues that, as we will see, have already caused some changes; an

given the intense debate surrounding them, will continue to cau

changes for years to come. How will these challenges affect th

military? The answers are to be determined. 

Homosexuality in the Armed Forces 

Department of Defense (DOD) policy concerning homosexua

in military service has recently changed. Prior to 1993 personn

policy barred homosexuals from entering or serving in the arme

forces. Under this policy individuals who stated they we

homosexual, who engaged or intended to engage in homosexu

behavior, or who married or attempted to marry someone of th

same sex were administratively discharged from the militar

service. In addition homosexual or heterosexual acts of sodomy o

disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and disciplin

in the armed forces were punishable by court-martial. 

In July 1993 President Clinton announced a compromise pla

commonly referred to as the “don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue

policy. President Clinton's policy stated that sexual orientation wa

not a bar to military service. It also proposed to end the practice o

questioning recruits and service members about their sexu

142 
orientation but allowed the military to continue to discharge thos

who engage in homosexual acts, state that they are homosexual o

bisexual, or marry or attempt to marry someone of the same se

President Clinton's compromise also called for even-hande

enforcement of the Uniform Code of Military Justice fo

heterosexuals and homosexuals and an end to witch-hunts to forc

homosexuals out of the military. 

In fall 1993 the House and Senate both countered Presiden

Clinton's compromise plan with new legislative policy. The ne

legislative policy approved in November 1993 states that Congre

has the constitutional right to make rules for the military, that th

armed forces are unique, and persons who demonstrate 

propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create a

unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order an

discipline in the military. Under this new policy, making 

statement about one's sexual orientation is considered an “act

The legislation makes no mention of orientation, witch-hunts, o

the code and says a future defense secretary could reinstate th

policy of asking recruits their sexual orientation. 

As we implement this new don't ask, don't tell, don't pursu

policy it is useful to examine the attitudes and policies of oth

countries. A number of countries have tackled the issue of wheth

homosexuals should be allowed in the military. NATO acceptanc

of gays runs full spectrum “from that of the Dutch-where gays 

the army are represented by a union-to that of the Greeks-wh

flatly ban gays from service” (see Table 1). 1 

Although numerous countries have policies that are more liber

than the current US ban, nations that allow homosexuals to serv

openly have not resolved the problem of fully integrating them in

their armies. The Dutch, Germans, and Israelis are but sever

examples, and their experiences foretell some of the problems th

US can expect if it too allows homosexuals to serve in its arme

forces. For nearly two decades the Dutch military has been open 

homosexuals under a government wide edict that make

143 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual preference illegal, and y

research found widespread discrimination against gays. There we

few cases of physical assault but many examples of verbal abuse. 

Although lesbians were found to have experienced few

problems than gay men, homosexuals of both sexes faced a

“unfriendly” military environment. Although the German arme

forces' (Bundeswehr) prohibition on gays ended in 1969, .th

Bundeswehr also has experienced problems in fully integratin

homosexuals into their army. For example, “gay German office

find paths to promotion blocked, and in some cases have bee

blocked from access to classified material.” 2

 Gay conscripts ofte

find life in the Bundeswehr unpleasant. 

Israeli policy states homosexuals are not to be denied promotio

because of their sexual orientation, that they are allowed to becom

career soldiers, and that they may serve in the most elite fightin

units, even those on critical frontiers. Reality however is qui

different. Israeli soldiers found to be gay or who proclaim the

homosexuality must undergo psychological testing. Their files a

annotated, and they are usually barred from positions requiring to

security clearances. Known gays rarely are assigned to comb

units and do not serve without stigma regardless of the positio

they hold. 

144 
Table 1 

NATO Policies on Gays in Uniform

Belgium Not acknowledged as a relevant issue. Neither conscripts nor volunteers are as

about their sexual orientation. Homosexuality itself does not exempt Belgians from 

draft unless there are accompanying psychological disorders as determined by clin

evaluation. Homosexual conduct between consenting adults off duty is not punish

but inappropriate homosexual and heterosexual behavior can lead to dismissal f

military duty or exclusions from certain units and jobs. 

Britain Homosexuals are officially barred from service, but unofficially the British Defenc

Ministry says the practice of prosecuting gays simply for being gay is rare. 

Homosexual acts among consenting adults have been decriminalized in military as 

well as civilian law as long as it is off duty. 

Canada Was ordered by the Federal Court of Canada to drop its ban on gays in the Canadia

Forces in October 1992. Canadian service members were not required to certify the

were heterosexual when they enlisted, but openly gay persons were often discharge

or had their transfer or promotion opportunities limited. The files of service membe

who were either discharged or denied promotion because of their sexual orientation 

are being reviewed for reconsideration by military authorities. 

Denmark No law or policy. Neither conscripts nor volunteers are asked about sexual orientati

Treated as a personal, private matter. 

France No legislation or written codes. Gays are allowed to serve in the French military as 

long as they do not harass other members of their units. But gays and lesbians can 

avoid being drafted by claiming their homosexuality is incompatible with service li

Germany Homosexuality cannot be used as a reason not to be drafted, although potential gay 

conscripts who claim service would be psychologically injurious are evaluated and 

frequently given alternative mandatory service. Career members of the military who 

are openly gay do face discrimination, frequently finding promotions blocked and 

access to top-level classified information denied. 

Greece Homosexuals are barmed from military service. 

Italy Homosexuals are deemed unsuitable for military service. During medical 

examinations, homosexual conscripts will be declared ineligible if found to have 

behavioral “anomalies, caused by sexual deviations. 

Luxembourg Homosexuals are not precluded from service. Military service is voluntary and 

enlistees are not asked about sexual orientation. Improper conduct-whether 

homosexual or heterosexual-is punishable by discharge or court-martial. 

Netherlands Basic law prohibits all discrimination, for any reason. A union represents homosexu

in the military. Unwanted advances are treated as improper behavior. Courses in 

human relations are conducted for commanders and include homosexual issues. 

Legislation is pending for homosexual survivor benefits. 

Norway Not considered a relevant issue and no one entering the service is asked about their 

sexual orientation. Unwanted advances by either homosexual or heterosexual servic

members are treated as improper behavior contrary to good order and discipline. 

Portugal Not seen as a relevant issue. Homosexuals may serve in the armed forces, although 

conduct may be punishable. 

Spain There are no codes regulating homosexuals in the military. Like religion, sexual 

orientation is considered a person's own choice. 

Turkey Homosexuals are not permitted to serve openly in the armed services, although they 

are not asked about their sexual orientation upon entering the service. 

Source: Reprinted courtesy of Army Times, 11 January 1993. Copyrighted by Army Times Publish

Company, Springfield, Virginia. 

145 
David Burrelli, in his examination of homosexuals and U

military policy, believes “the question confronting policy make

remains, to what extent, if any, would open homosexuality b

disruptive to morale, cohesion and readiness in the ranks, and 

what extent does any such disruption justify discrimination?” 

Other problems to keep in mind are public opinion, including th

views of current active duty military personnel and the scientif

literature on group cohesion, sexuality, and related health issue

Lastly, legal and enforcement issues must be addressed. Rona

Ray notes “DOD and the services have commissioned two majo

efforts that focused on whether homosexuals were more of 

security risk than heterosexuals and concluded that there was n

factual data to substantiate that premise.” 4 

The Rand Corporation has conducted many studies for th

Department of Defense. Recent research into the issue o

acknowledged homosexuals serving in the military concluded th

acceptance by the public and by the people serving in the U

military is critical. A review of various surveys indicates that U

public opinion is divided over this issue. Until recently rough

half of the population believed that homosexuals should not b

allowed to serve. However, a very recent poll indicates that th

percentage who believes they should not be allowed to serve und

any conditions has dropped to less than 25 percent. Clearly th

public has become more accepting of homosexuality and o

homosexuals serving in the military. 

In a study undertaken by Rand's National Defense Researc

Institute, researchers found that “military opinion 

overwhelmingly against allowing homosexuals to serve. In survey

and Rand-conducted focus groups, a minority of service membe

expressed indifference to or approval of the policy change, an

women were less opposed than men.” 5 The debate has centere

around concern about the effect that an acknowledged homosexu

would have on “combat effectiveness and unit cohesion.” Mo

military leaders argue that introduction of a known homosexu

into a unit, no matter how discreet his or her behavior might b

146 
would seriously undermine the cohesiveness of that un

Unfortunately, the subject has not been studied specifically, and n

controlled experiments or other research bears directly on th

issue. 

The Rand Corporation also discovered that a large body o

applicable research exists in the fields of industrial organizatio

social psychology, sports psychology, and group behavior. Oth

potentially relevant material can be found in the ethnographic an

biographical military literature. The principle conclusion from th

literature is a commonsense observation: It is not necessary to lik

people in order to work with them, so long as members share 

commitment to the group's objectives. 

The new US policy emphasizes actual conduct, not behavio

presumed because of sexual orientation, and holds all servic

members to the same standard of professional conduct. Ran

Corporation found that four features of this standard are central: 

• A requirement that all members of the military services conduct themserves in ways that enhance 

good order and discipline. Such conduct includes

showing respect and tolerance for others. While

heterosexuals would be asked to tolerate the 

presence of known homosexuals, all personnel,

including acknowledged homosexuals, must 

understand that the military environment is no place to advertise one's sexual orientation. 

• A clear statement that inappropriate personal 

conduct could destroy order and discipline and that

individuals are expected to demonstrate the 

common sense and good judgment not to engage in such conduct. 

• A list of categories of inappropriate conduct,

including personal harassment (physical or verbal conduct toward other, based on race, gender, sexual 

orientation. or physical features), abuse of authority, displays of affection, and explicit discussions of sexual practices, experience, or desires. 

• Application of these standards by leaders at every level of the chain of command, in a way that 

ensures that unit performance is maintained. 6 

147 
Our new conduct-based policy does not require extensiv

revisions to existing military rules and regulations or to personn

policy. Rand Corporation concluded that on issues such a

recognizing homosexual marriages or conferring benefits o

homosexual partners, there is no reason for the DOD to chang

current policy or to become the lead federal agency in these areas

Women in the Armed Forces 

America is experiencing a growing percentage of women in th

workplace. Women will represent a majority of the work force b

the end of the decade. We will now focus our attention on a hot

debated gender issue--that of women in combat. 

Current laws and policies regarding the assignment of wome

in the armed forces have recently changed. Prior to 1991 publ

laws and policies prevented women from serving in comb

positions in any of the four services. The old laws that restricte

the assignment of women in the Navy, Marine Corps, and A

Force were enacted in 1948 when the women's auxiliar

components were made part of the permanent military structur

Under these statutes women in the Navy and Marine Corps cou

not be assigned to duty on ships or in aircraft that were engaged 

combat missions, nor could they be assigned to other tha

temporary duty on vessels for the Navy except hospital ship

transports, and vessels of similar 

classification not expected to be assigned combat mission

Similarly, Air Force women, except those in designated medica

chaplain, and judge advocate functions, could not be assigned 

duty on aircraft engaged in combat missions. There have nev

been any statutory restrictions on the utilization of Army women 

combat. Rather, the Army Department policy paralleled th

statutes and restricted women from assignment to those skills an

positions that through doctrine, mission, or battlefield locatio

invited the highest probability of direct combat. 

148 
In December 1991 public laws were amended and repealed thu

allowing the Air Force and Navy to use women as combat pilot

Although the statutory ban was lifted, each service maintaine

regulations and/or policies governing the assignment of wome

Women continued to be excluded from serving in direct groun

combat positions (infantry, armor, artillery, and combat engineers

combat aircraft, or on combatant ships. In April 1993 Defens

Secretary Les Aspin announced a policy that allows women to f

combat aircraft. The Air Force immediately changed to a gende

neutral pilot training and aircraft assignment system. Ne

legislative policy approved in November 1993 allows wome

sailors to serve permanently on combat vessels. 

As we begin to break the combat barrier it is also useful 

examine the attitudes and policies of other countries. Althoug

most Western Alliance countries allow women to serve in som

capacity in the armed forces, only a few have opened combat pos

to women (see Table 2). Policy on employment of women 

combat has developed independently within each countr

Northern European and North American members have tended 

be more open earlier than their southern partners. In Denmar

Canada, and the Netherlands, for instance, women are read

willing, and legally able to fill combat roles. Although som

women presently serve in combat positions in Denmark, Canad

and the Netherlands, none have actually served in a direct comb

unit under wartime conditions. In all cases the decision to integra

women into combat positions was based primarily on equ

opportunity. These countries have pursued a gender-neutral polic

in assigning women to military specialties. “Although the goal o

these countries is a 20 percent 'critical mass' for women in th

naval, air and ground forces, all are willing to operate at 

minimum level of five percent.” 7

 It has been difficult, howeve

for any of these countries to attract and retain women in an

significant numbers. Debate and criticism continue to plague the

efforts. Similar circumstances can be expected in the United State

149 
armed forces as they take on the monumental task of integratin

women into combat roles. 

In 1988 Denmark became the first NATO country to allo

women in combat units. David Fouquet in his article notes that “

addition to aiming for equal rights, the decision was to som

degree motivated by difficulties in obtaining enough young me

for the forces,” 8

 Despite Danish attempts to introduce “fu

equality” between the sexes in its armed forces, women are n

permitted on submarines or in deep-sea diving, Additionall

Danish Air Force women are experiencing difficulty integratin

because of reservations in the air force as to the pilotin

capabilities of women in high G-force aircraft like the F-16. 

In 1987 the air arm of the Canadian forces opened all of i

jobs to women, including flying single-seat fighter aircraft. Tw

years later, the Canadian forces were ordered to end their comba

exclusion policy. The Human Rights Tribunal in Canada gave th

armed forces 10 years to achieve “full integration for women

This decision, which gives women the right to join men in comb

units such as artillery and infantry continues to exclude them fro

submarine duty. Although the full integration of women into th

Canadian forces is well ahead of schedule, it too is not witho

controversy. The vast majority of Canadian women lack th

stamina and endurance to serve in the infantry. Also, for reason

unknown, the four women trained as fighter pilots are no long

assigned to tactical fighter squadrons. 

150 
Table 2 

NATO Policies on Women in Combat 

Belgium Unrestricted employment of women. Allows women in combat. 

Britain Under British law, women are not allowed in any combat roles and may be armed 

only for self-defense and certain guard duties. 

Canada A 1989 decision by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal opened all combat 

positions in the Canadian Forces except submarines to women. 

Denmark First NATO country to introduce full equality between the sexes in its armed force

Frontline combat units have included women since 1988; however, the Ministry of 

Defence prohibits women from flying combat aircraft. The Danish Air Force is 

receiving considerable pressure to reevaluate this policy. 

France Does not allow women in combat. 

Germany Does not allow women in combat. Limited primarily to the medical services. 

Greece Does not allow women in combat. Greek policy limits participation to certain aren

of military warfare, primarily the medical services, as well as clerical and secretari

duties. 

Italy Only NATO country to bar women from serving in its armed forces in any capacit

Recently (1989) began to debate legislation that would open up its military service

to women. 

Luxembourg Allows women in their armed forces. Limited primarily to the medical services. 

Netherlands Allows women in combat. All combat assignments are open to women with the 

exception of submarines and the Dutch Marine Corps. 

Norway Unrestricted employment of women in all branches of the armed forces. 

Portugal Very restrictive rules governing the employment of women in the armed forces. 

Limited primarily to the medical services. No longer (as of 1989) recruits women. 

Spain Recently (1988) adopted legislation opening up its military services to women. 

Turkey Does not allow women in combat. Women serve primarily as administrators, 

doctors, nurses, and instructors. 

Note: Table information not obtained from a specific source but written by the author and adapted 

the format of Table 1. 

James Hyde, in his examination of women in combat, notes th

the Netherlands, with one of the most liberal NATO policies, n

only permits women to serve in combat roles but in some case

151 
they are chosen before men if considered to have the sam

abilities, In his words, “the Dutch want women to defend the

country.” 9

 All Dutch training institutes are open to women as a

all military posts. The Dutch have found however, that wome

generally don't qualify for marine, submarine, engineer, or oth

duties with heavy physical requirements. With only tw

exceptions, Royal Dutch marines and submarines, women a

permitted in every combat role. 

At the root of the controversy about women in combat roles 

the issue of individual rights conflicting with the collective goo

for society and concern for the overall performance of the arme

forces. The questions and concerns confronting policymakers a

the same as those surrounding the homosexual issue. 

In 1992 The Presidential Commission on the Assignment o

Women in the Armed Forces researched the issue of women 

combat. In doing so, they made a great effort to determine th

attitudes of the public toward women in combat and the effect o

such assignment on the public. They concluded that militar

readiness should be the driving concern regarding assignme

policies; there are circumstances under which women might b

assigned to combat positions. Overall, they found that one of th

strongest sociological arguments in favor of women in comb

focused on selecting the best-qualified person for a positio

regardless of gender. It was their belief that under som

circumstances, American society not only allows, but actual

encourages and approves the further integration of women in

combat roles. Specifically, public and military opinion varie

depending on the combat role studied. In terms of ground comba

they found that members of the military are strongly again

women serving in all branches of ground combat. The public, o

the other hand, has mixed views on service in different groun

combat specialties. When it came to combat aircraft, “69 percent o

all pilots (Air Force, Navy, and Marines) believed that wome

should not be assigned to combat aircraft.” 10 The question o

assigning women to combatant vessels received the least objection

152 
py 

women should be assigned to combat ships. 83 percent of the public surveyed said that women 

should be assigned. Among those who had prior 

military experience, 72 percent said that women 

should be assigned to combatant ships. The results of the military poll showed that in today's Navy, 73 percent of those surveyed felt that women should be 

allowed to serve on combatant ships. In fact, onehalf of Navy respondents felt that women should be 

required to serve on combatant ships. 11 

Despite recent changes in the United State's combat-exclusio

laws, American military women are prohibited by service policie

that preclude them from serving in direct ground combat position

The specialties that fall under the exclusion are grouped into fou

major areas: infantry, armor, artillery, and combat engineer

Scientific studies clearly show that unit cohesion can be negative

affected by the introduction of any element that detracts from th

need for such key ingredients as mutual confidence, commonali

of experience, and equitable treatment. Cohesion problems mig

develop around physical standards of endurance and stamin

forced intimacy flack of privacy, traditional western value

dysfunctional relationships, and pregnancy. 

Legal issues also pose a special problem for the United State

Concerns exist regarding the effect of changes in combat exclusio

laws and policies on women's current exemption from conscriptio

and registration obligations. 

Conclusions 

What will the American society look like in a generation? A

indicators point toward a population that is becoming more divers

by race and ethnic origin. The growing presence of minori

groups nationwide will be evident in the workplace, especial

among young entrants to the work force. “During the remainder o

the century, three of every five of the new entrants to the nation

labor force will be a member of a recognized ethnic or raci

minority.” 12 The US Department of Commerce projects th

Black; Asian and Pacific Islander; American Indian, Eskimo, an

153 
Aleut; and Hispanic-origin minorities will comprise 37.9 perce

of the population by 2025. Additionally, there has been a great

acceptance of women and gays in the workplace. Women wi

continue to increase in the work force. C. Edward Wall notes th

“for the rest of the 1990s, some studies project: Two out of thre

new workers will be female.” 13 By 2000 women are expected 

make up more than half of the labor force. Ronald Ray note

“general public attitudes in the United States about homosexuali

appear to be changing.” 14 National polls, conducted by Gallup an

Penn and Schoen Associates, Inc., “indicated that more American

now say they believe that homosexuals should be allowed 

participate in various occupations, including the armed forces. 

Gallup survey conducted in March 1991 of a cross section of th

American population of adults aged 18 and over showed that 6

percent of those interviewed felt that homosexuals should b

allowed to serve in the armed forces, whereas only 51 percent fe

that way in 1977.” 15 The number of homosexuals in society 

always difficult to determine. Ronald Ray, in his examination o

the homosexual issue, notes “the limited data currently availab

(largely Kinsey Institute studies) suggests that the primary sexu

orientation of between 5 and 1O percent of the general U

population is homosexual.” 16 

What will the United States armed forces look like in 

generation? The United States armed forces as a reflection of th

nation in microcosm will experience similar changes. Although th

changes may not be extreme within the military, trends in the sam

general direction are anticipated. Given the “young” average age o

the military, we can expect the same and quite possibly an eve

greater increase in the number of minorities serving in our arme

forces. Remember, C. Edward Wall stated, “three of every five o

the new entrants to [the] nation's labor force will be a member of 

recognized ethnic or racial minority.” 17 Race and ethnic relation

will take on greater importance than at any time in our military

history. We may even face the same situation Canada did in 197

154 
that is, having to make our armed forces more representative of 

multicultural nation. 

A growing percentage of women in the work force will b

paralleled by a growing percentage of women in the military. Wi

the integration of women into selected combat units under way, w

will no doubt see more women exposed to combat, captured, an

killed in defense of our nation. We will accumulate more data o

how women perform in combat and the effect they have on a unit

morale, good order, discipline, and ability to fight. We ma

eventually evolve to the point where there will be unrestricte

employment of women in the military. Secretary of Defense Le

Aspin's decision to lift the combat barrier poses new question

Would we ever go so far as to draft women in time of nation

crisis? The Supreme Court ruled in 1981 that women we

excluded from registering for the draft. Rationale behind th

decision was that any reinstated draft would be intended 

increase the pool of people available for combat. Now that comb

planes and ships are open to women, might they too be considere

part of the available personnel pool in a major conflict? 

If the armed forces are a microcosm of society and the Kinse

Institute is correct, we can expect between 5 and 10 percent of th

military to be homosexual. Keep in mind that the number o

homosexuals in any given group is hard to define. DOD

exclusion policy that involved a screening-out process and a lac

of acceptance of homosexuality in the military probably limited th

number of homosexuals in the military. Consequently, we ca

expect a slight increase in the number of gays in the military no

that DOD has ended the practice of questioning recruits an

service members about their sexual orientation. US policy ha

taken the middle ground-discouraging homosexuals from joinin

the military but not automatically discharging those who a

already in it. 

Information in this essay points to pending sociologic

concerns for the United States armed forces. The issues o

155 
homosexuality and women in combat will pose challenges; but, a

mentioned earlier, the real challenge will be grappling wi

changing demographics. As we have seen, we are alread

experiencing pressure to remove the barriers. It is only a matter o

time before the inevitable occurs. The manner in which the ne

US policy is implemented will have a decisive impact on wheth

these problems are managed with minimal disruptions o

undermine the effort to change. US policy must be clear an

consistently communicated from the top with emphasis o

behavior and conduct. Leadership at all levels must send message

of reassurance to their subordinates and be empowered 

implement the policy. A continuous improvement process shou

be established to identify and correct any problems. 

156 
Notes 

1. Tom Philpott et al., “NATO Acceptance of Gays Runs Full Spectrum,” 

Army Times, 11 January 1993, 20. 

2. Ibid. 

3. David F. Burrelli. Homosexuals and U.S. Military Personnel Policy 

(Washington. D.C.: Library of Congress. 1993), i. 

4. Ronald D. Ray. Gays: In or Out? (Washington. D.C.: US General 

Accounting Office. 1992), 5. 

5. Rand Corporation. Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy

Options and Assessment (Santa Monica, Calif.: 1993), xxi. 

6. Ibid., xxv. 

7. Robert T. Herres, The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of 

Women in the Armed Forces (Washington. D.C.: US Government Printing 

Office, 1992), C-21. 

8. David Fouquet, “Growing Role for Women in the Forces,” Jane's Defenc

Weekly, 29 July 1989, 166. 

9. James C. Hyde, “Gender Gap Narrows in Allied Services, but Women 

Still Fight for Combat Roles,” Armed Forces Journal International, June 1989, 

28. 

10. Herres, 29. 

11. Ibid., 32. 

12. Rand Corporation, Congress and the Year 2000: A Demographic 

Perspective on Future Issues (Santa Monica, Calif.: 1991), 15. 

13. C. Edward Wall, A Matter of Fact (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The Pierian Pres

1993), 225. 

14. Ray, 6. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Ibid., 10. 

17. Rand Corporation, Congress and the Year 2000, 15. 

157 
US National Security Strategy 

Dr Paul Hacker 

Because of the momentous changes in the international are

resulting from the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolutio

of the Soviet Union, it is useful to take stock and examine th

implications of these transformations. This essay examines som

of the major trends in the 1990s and shows how they a

necessitating a rethinking of the priorities for US national securi

policy. It begins by identifying the concept of national securit

noting how that concept is evolving over time into a broader on

than the purely military. It then considers the current internation

system and some elements that provide the basis for consideratio

of our national security strategy. It then focuses on the agencies o

government that exist to sort out security issues and delineate

their responses to recent trends. It proceeds to explore th

consequences of the breakup of the Warsaw Pact for the futu

structure of European security, especially the implications o

internal developments in Russia. Finally, it concludes that potenti

threats to US security have been transformed, but by no mean

dispersed, in the new international environment. 

The Concept of National Security 

Many writers have attempted to define national security. Whi

they often differ in their focus, there is a general consensus o

what the concept entails. Thus, Harold Brown, former secretary o

defense, explained the concept as “the ability to preserve th

nation's physical integrity and; to maintain its economic relation

with the world in reasonable terms; [and] to protect its natur

institutions and governance from disruption from outside.” l

 Oth

writers include the notion of retaining the core values of one

nation (Walter Lippmann), the absence of both threats to thos

values and fear that they will be attached (Arnold Wolfers), or th

enrichment of life in all its spheres (Michael Louw). 2

 Nation

159 
securities should also be considered from the viewpoint of suc

dimensions as military versus nonmilitary or external versu

internal. While the original postwar concept of national securi

primarily focused on its military dimensions, writers in the pa

two decades have broadened the notion to include access to ra

materials (especially petroleum), the fight against drugs an

terrorism, and the environment. National security has also bee

seen as having an important internal component that include

economic competitiveness, high literacy, and the sense of person

safety. 3

 Brown, for one, saw slackening of economic growt

declining productivity; a dissipation of natural resources; a loss o

domestic cohesion from ethnic or other conflicts; an erosion of th

educational system; a decline in the work ethic; the alienation o

the poor, aged, or minorities; and the loss of confidence in th

national leadership as trends that could sap America's ow

security. Surely, the borders between the internal and extern

aspects of national security are blurring. Not untypically, Preside

Bill Clinton has made it clear that domestic concerns-especial

job creation-will have a strong impact on shaping h

administrations's international policies. The public debate over th

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was played o

primarily in terms of NAFTA's likely impact on American job

While some have criticized this “dollar-oriented” foreign policy, 

does point up one basic political reality-a president's policies a

only as viable as the public support he can gain for them. The oth

part of this reality is that it is becoming more and more difficult 

separate economic policy from foreign and defense policy becaus

all of our relationships with other major powers involve mixes o

competition and cooperation. 4 

To be sure, a certain realism must pervade the discussio

Surely, without a healthy economic base, no nation can should

the burdens of military defense. On the other hand, military option

must be available to counter military threats, as it is by no mean

sure that nonmilitary means alone can do the job. 

160 
The Structural Framework 

of National Security 

The organizational system of national security that exists toda

was established by the National Security Act of 1947, as amende

The act created the National Security Council (NSC), headed b

the president, with the vice president and secretaries of state an

defense as members: and the director of Central Intelligenc

Agency (CIA) and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS

as advisors. It also created the first peacetime intelligence agenc

the CIA: a unified Defense Department: and a JCS headed by 

chairman and vice-chairman, with each of the uniformed servic

chiefs as members. The purpose of the JCS is to plan unifie

military strategy and reduce rivalry and duplication among th

armed services in areas such as military procurement, research, an

weapons development. Besides the armed services, the Sta

Department, and the intelligence community, other agencies wi

important roles to play include the Department of Commerc

primarily responsible for helping American firms find oversea

markets; the Treasury, responsible for our financial dealings wi

other nations: and Energy, which controls our nuclear testin

program. No less important in this regard is the Congress, with i

power of the purse over expenditures (especially foreign aid an

the military), the Senate's ability to approve senior appointment

and the possibility of determining by legislation the structure o

national security-related agencies and overseeing their activitie

through investigations and hearings. 

Effective coordination of all aspects of national security polic

among the various agencies of government is surely a crucial on

Each president has brought his own style into the picture. Som

presidents have chosen to use the NSC and its staff more heavi

than the Department of State to carry out particular activities (e.g

note the tension between National Security Advisor Zbignie

Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in the Cart

administration). Some have relied on small groups of truste

161 
individuals not associated with either body. In some cases, senio

NSC staff have been brought into the Department of State to tak

over policy-making positions. In the Clinton administratio

indications are that the NSC is reverting to its classical function o

coordination among the relevant federal agencies rather than takin

an independent role for itself. 

Intelligence Operations 

Throughout the cold-war period, the primary responsibility o

US intelligence agencies was to protect US security by gatherin

information about threats of surprise attack and subversion fro

the Soviet Union, its allies, and clients. In this connection, it 

useful to review what has changed and what remains the same 

the post-cold-war era. 

The fact that Russia alone retains the capability to destroy th

US, combined with the importance of events in Russia to th

security concerns of its neighbors, means that developments 

Russia and the former USSR will continue to be of prime concer

to US strategic planners and thus to the intelligence community a

well. This attention will monitor arms modernization programs, a

well as Russia's future political landscape-its leadership and i

intentions both at home and abroad. 5

 Intelligence priorities wi

also focus on verification of arms control treaties, includin

strategic weapons, conventional forces in Europe, and chemic

and bacteriological weapons. 

In the post-cold-war environment, while the threat of a Russia

surprise attack is almost nil, the need to provide lead-time warnin

of any attack will not end. As US military assets draw down, th

US will be more vulnerable to surprise attack against itself or i

friends and allies. As former House Intelligence Committe

chairman Dave McCurdy pointed out, the question of intelligenc

data sharing will become more important in the future, as majo

US military actions are likely to be undertaken as part of 

coalition. 6 

162 
Another priority will be to keep track of attempts to prolifera

weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. Intelligenc

sharing will be an issue not only vis-a-vis allies and futu

coalition partners, but also in regard to international organization

such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whos

work is crucial in the area of nonproliferation. 

Other priority areas include support for future contingencie

such as peacekeeping operations, drug interdiction, monitorin

social unrest arising from population growth and internation

conflicts, assistance to insurgents or counterinsurgents, dependin

on which side they are fighting. 7

 Last, but not least, in the list 

the need to monitor terrorists and to assist in antiterrori

operations. 

The Post-Cold-War World 

Implications for American Policy 

In the post-1945 period, the US has pursued an activist foreig

policy involving the projection of American power abroad. Th

fundamental goal of American security policy was summed up 

one word-containment-meaning the use of force and oth

instruments to stop the expansion of Soviet power. This expansio

was seen as threatening in its ideological challenge to the bas

precepts of Western democracy, its propaganda conducted again

America's friends and allies, and wars of national liberation th

aimed at overthrowing regimes depicted as being colonial or bein

closely associated with major Western powers. The USSR and i

East European allies conducted espionage and forgery campaign

against the West and provided training and support to individua

and groups characterized as terrorists in the West. With th

collapse of the USSR and the democratization of its former allie

these threats have effectively vanished and the need has arisen 

consider the attributes of the post-cold-war international syste

that will determine future security policies. 

Attributes of the New International System 

163 
With the collapse of the USSR, some writers suggest that a ne

unipolar system has emerged, with the US being the only releva

superpower. As Charles Krauthammer has put it, the US is th

“only country with the military, diplomatic, political, an

economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatev

part of the world it chooses to involve itself.” 8

 While some ma

question that view, he does make an important point in noting th

in discussions of collective security, dealing with such episodes a

the Gulf War, one should not lose sight of the fact that witho

active American prodding and involvement, there would have bee

no UN or other response to Iraqi aggression. 9 

A second attribute is that, even though the ending of East-We

confrontation has made the threat of a deliberate nuclear attack o

the West highly improbable, the continued existence of massiv

nuclear arsenals means that arms control is still a relevant issue. A

one specialist pointed out, even after the implementation of th

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), both sides wou

retain some 12,000 strategic nuclear warheads. The START 

treaty, assuming it is implemented, would reduce warheads 

3,000-3,500 for each side by the end of the century. Along with th

START agreements, a comprehensive test ban-a measure strong

opposed by the Reagan-Bush administrations but favored by th

Clinton administration-is more likely to be realized and shou

help reduce incentives for modernization of nuclear weapons. 10 

The main area of concern over former Soviet nuclear weapon

is not so much the threat that they would be used against the We

as it is uncertainty over the disposition of the former Soviet nucle

arsenal. For one, those weapons were contained on the territory o

three other republics besides Russia (Kazakhstan, Belaru

Ukraine), and Ukrainian leaders have indicated reluctance to pa

with all of the weapons on their territory without firm securi

guarantees from Moscow (but also the US) and payments for th

costs involved in dismantling those weapons. Another issue 

whether Soviet nuclear weapons or expertise will be sold to th

164 
highest bidder in third world nations desiring to become membe

of the nuclear club. 

Along with the reduction in the threat from our old adversar

comes the likelihood that new states will join the nuclear club ov

the next few years. Iraq's nuclear program was in an advance

stage at the time of the Desert Storm operation, which set it bac

but cannot be guaranteed to have ended it. North Korea has refuse

IAEA inspection and has engaged in bellicose behavior over i

nuclear program: it is likely that the country is on the verge o

crossing the nuclear threshold if it has not done so already. Nation

that have acquired or are in the process of developing nucle

weapons include India, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Taiwan, Liby

Brazil, and Argentina. South Africa, which had its own nucle

weapons program, has voluntarily given it up. A number of oth

states have engaged in research on chemical and biologic

weapons. By the year 2000, some 20 states may also have th

capability of building their own ballistic missiles. According 

former defense secretary, Dick Cheney, by the year 2000, “mor

than two dozen developing nations will have ballistic missiles, 1

of these countries will have the scientific skills to make their ow

and half of them either have or are near to getting nucle

capability, as well. Thirty countries will have chemical weapon

and ten will be able to deploy biological weapons.” 11 

Proliferation of missiles from North Korea to such customers a

Syria and Iran is becoming an increasing headache. So too are les

than-responsible Chinese policies that have allowed Chines

Silkworm missiles to be shipped to Iran in 1987 and sold oth

weapons to Iraq that were used against coalition forces in 199

The crux of the problem with China is not merely the shipping o

the weapons them serves: China has also assisted in the transfer o

missile technology that will allow other states to begin their ow

missile manufacturing. China has also furnished nucle

information to a number of third world states aspiring to their ow

nuclear weapons. 12 

165 
With such a combination of factors, the US ability to mount a

operation such as Desert Shield/Storm looks increasing

problematic in the future. 13 As Frederick Strain, a proliferatio

expert, put it, “The possibility that the United States may fac

nuclear blackmail or assault has never been greater. When nation

are ruled by despots who have little experience in crisis resolutio

and have a tendency to confuse personal ambition with the nation

interest, the likelihood of disaster increases dramatically.” For th

reason, he concludes that the US, more than ever before, needs 

develop a defense against ballistic missiles. 14 

Another reality with which policymakers will have to deal is th

fact that the US military can expect to have much more limite

resources available in the years ahead; indeed, by 1995, militar

spending as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP) 

expected to be under 4 percent-less than at any time since befo

Pearl Harbor. 

In terms of the consequences of the above trends, one needs 

reconsider the concept of deterrence. If containment has been on

of the key concepts of postwar US policies, deterrence has sure

been the other. Most of US strategic thinking was governed by th

mutual assured destruction (MAD) doctrine that postulated that th

Soviets would not attack the US and its allies as long as they we

convinced they would suffer a counterattack that would destro

their society. With the expectation of a Russian nuclear attac

discounted by most analysts, the question now becomes one o

whether deterrence has a continuing utility as marginal insuranc

or whether it is still valid as a concept in the conventional arena. 

The credibility of a deterrent is only as great as the ability 

convince a potential aggressor that his actions will be met with 

counterforce sufficient to destroy him and his military force

Clearly, in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 199

conventional deterrence failed, mainly because Sad dam Husse

was unconvinced that the US and its allies would go to Kuwait

rescue. The concept of deterrence can work when one is dealin

166 
with an adversary who proceeds from the same psycho cultur

postulates as our own. The US may be faced with more cases lik

that of Saddam Hussein in the future that do not easily len

themselves to this sort of persuasion. 

The reader should also be aware that one of the four ke

concepts of the Bush administration's final concept paper o

national security strategy-reconstitution-has been criticized b

some specialists as downgrading our ability to offer a credib

deterrent. As defined in the strategy, reconstitution means th

ability to recreate a global war-fighting capability, includin

training and fielding new fighting units from cadres, mobilizin

previously trained or new manpower, and activating the industri

base on a large scale. 15 However, there are many uncertainties 

such a scenario. Will there be sufficient warning? Will the US b

capable of acting in time? Will our industrial plants be capable o

returning to military production or will they already have gon

over to other activities? Will needed expertise be irretrievably los

US reconstitution may also be regarded as a casus belli for anoth

power and might hasten the spiral of conflict rather than dampen 

The Gulf War of 1991 has also caused a rethinking of nation

security strategy in the wake of lessons learned from the conflic

First of all, Iraq's use of the Scud B missile in the Gulf War ha

affected the way in which we perceive strategic defens

particularly against ballistic missiles. The Scud attacks did n

achieve their desired intent to terrorize the populations of Israel o

Saudi Arabia or to bring Israel into the war. They did, howeve

cause a renewed emphasis in US thinking on the need to count

theater missile attacks. The focus of the Strategic Defen

Initiative (SDI) program, consequently, is more toward meetin

limited threats than its initial direction against strategic missi

attacks (the program is now known as GPALS, or global protectio

against limited strikes). 17 

167 

16 
The Gulf War also underscored the importance of forwar

military presence. US forces were not prepared for forward defens

of either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia but had a limited forwar

presence in terms of a moderate naval force and a ready Sau

infrastructure. Where infrastructure assets are being reduce

elsewhere, we must increase the mobility of our forces, includin

sea lift for heavy-armored ground' forces, a naval presence, an

deployable, sustainable tactical air strike forces to provide fo

future contingencies. Having the consent of Saudi Arabia to fie

the half-million-plus coalition force was crucial to its succes

However, future conflicts may not provide such a clear-cut enem

as Saddam Hussein and may require more convincing than wa

even the case in 1990 when US representatives needed to push 

reluctant Saudi king to agree to large-scale deployments on h

territory. 18 Moreover, the buildup time provided in the Kuwai

situation may be much shorter or nonexistent in possible futu

conflicts. 

There are also some political lessons to be learned. Publ

support was sustained because US military strategy allowed for 

quick resolution of the conflict rather than an endless quagmir

Secondly, coalition support for each operations can be essential n

so much because of the additional war-fighting capabilities it give

as for the legitimacy it lends the operation in the eyes of the U

public, Congress, and foreign countries. 

NATO and US Policy

What New Role? 

For four decades, NATO remained the core of the US allianc

system. The US sought to preserve the freedom of the people o

Western Europe and to provide a system of collective securit

through the alliance, against Soviet-led attacks from the east. Th

issue facing us today is what to do about NATO now that i

original raison d'etre no longer exists. The collapse of the Warsa

Pact, followed by the breakup of the Soviet Union, has vast

changed the East-West balance of power. The East Europea

168 
militaries can no longer be counted on to be the spearhead of 

westward invasion. The Soviet Union that controlled them is n

longer in existence, and the Russia that replaced it is not 

position to reassert that control. The level of military forces is als

decreasing in Europe, with substantially more cuts in convention

forces inflicted on the former Eastern bloc militaries than those o

NATO, in order to keep the forces of the former East and West 

rough balance. 

Some basic questions arise. First, does NATO have a viable ro

to play in the future given the collapse of its adversaries? If s

how might its role be transformed from the present? Second, wh

should NATO's posture be vis-a-vis demands for inclusion fro

East European states and the former Soviet republics, includin

Russia itself? 

While no decisions have been made, some indications a

already apparent. First, enough uncertainty about Europe's futu

still exists to ensure that NATO will continue, albeit with

changed parameters. A continuation of the alliance will increase i

members' security by providing a hedge against backsliding 

Russia and possible instability in Eastern Europe. It could als

provide the glue that would ensure that Western Europe stay

together and that tensions do not erupt among West Europea

states. 

Decisions on the future of NATO will be made after caref

assessments of Western security interests and how they might b

best served. Scenarios other than a now unlikely Russian attack o

the West could exist: if a war were to break out in the Eas

resulting in Russia expanding its present zone of control-say ov

Ukraine-and Russia were to consequently consolidate its militar

hold westward back into Eastern Europe, the threat situation fo

the West could arise that resembles more and more the pre-198

scenario. Conflict in the East-most likely internal in nature-doe

have a possibly destabilizing impact for the West in its potential 

cause massive refugee flows. 19 

169 
The question of East European inclusion in NATO is mo

complex. Already, the issue has become an emotional one for som

East European leaders who are alarmed over what they see as bo

a return to old ways in Russian strong-arm tactics in some of th

former Soviet republics, as well as over the victory o

ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 199

elections. 20 East Europeans argue that the West should not let th

issue of expansion of NATO membership be subject to a Russia

veto. However, recent forthright statements by Russian preside

Boris Yeltsin on the subject, including the warning to NAT

Secretary-General Manfred Worner that Russia would have to tak

counter measures in case of NATO expansion eastward, hav

strengthened the already considerable wariness of allied leade

over the expansion issue. For now, the new slogan Will b

“Partners for Peace”-a program approved at the January 199

NATO summit that will offer increased common activities betwee

NATO and the former Warsaw Pact members but will sidestep th

issue of membership with the security guarantees that it entails. 

The issue is not simply the desire not to provoke Russia into 

counterproductive response. It also includes the fear that som

NATO members have over the effect enlargement will have on th

alliance, the realization that NATO was unable to have an effect o

the Bosnian war, the fear of being drawn into future nation

conflicts in Eastern Europe, and finally, the inability of th

organization, especially in times of severe budget cuts, 

implement the security guarantees to its new members that wou

be part of an enlargement decision. 22 

US Military

Projections for the Future 

While it is not the purpose of this chapter to focus in detail o

US military force planning for the future, a few highlights a

certainly relevant. Perhaps the core document in planning to me

national security needs in the post-cold-war era is the Bottom-U

Review, presented by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, on 

170 
September 1993. In formulating the framework within whic

military planning takes place. Aspin postulated four categories o

dangers to US interests: (1) nuclear weapons and weapons of ma

destruction; (2) regional threats of large-scale aggression by loc

powers, but also smaller, internal conflicts based on ethnic o

religious animosities, state-sponsored terrorism, and subversion o

friendly governments; (3) dangers to democracy and reform in th

former USSR and Eastern Europe; and (4) economic dange

which would result if the US failed to build a strong, competitiv

and growing economy. 

Postulating that US forces must be sufficient for th

contingency of fighting up to two major regional conflicts (MRC

simultaneously, Aspin projected a cut of US forces to 10 division

(plus five more in reserve) for the future Army; 11 aircraft carrie

(with one in reserve, 45-55 attack submarines, and 346 ships) fo

the future Navy; 13 active and seven reserve Air Force fight

wings (with up to 184 bombers); and three Marine Expeditionar

Forces. These plans also include a cut of US forces in Europe b

nearly half to about 100,000, with the retention of about th

number in Northeast Asia as well in South Korea, Japan, an

Okinawa. Cuts in the 45,000-strong troop levels in Korea are like

to be postponed pending the resolution of the issue of Nor

Korea's nuclear capability. In Southwest Asia, heavier reliance wi

be made on naval forces and periodic force deployments rath

than ground bases. Prepositioning of equipment to be used 

possible ground conflicts is also to assume increased importanc

Taken another way, whereas active duty US military force

numbered 2.1 million in 1990, this figure was reduced to 1

million by 1992 and is expected to fall by about a quarter to 1

million by 1997. About a third of the projected reduction of up 

700,000 troops-some 250,000 -is expected to come from the Arm

23 

Thus, the search for a national strategy to replace containme

and strategic nuclear deterrence will continue. The new watchwor

of “peacetime engagement” may not fully capture the essence o

171 
the new era, but it is intended to convey the notion that the U

expects to use its military forces more for peaceful purposes (e.g

humanitarian relief) than for warfighting, even if that contingenc

must be prepared for. It does involve more use of diplomatic an

economic instruments to deal with states and situations which ma

be hostile to our interests. It also means that more reliance will b

placed on military forces based in the continental US, with th

possibility of rapid deployment to deal with future regional crise

Finally, dealing with those crises will compel us to determin

whether to act alone or whether to assemble the kind of ad ho

coalition that proved so successful in the Gulf War. 24 

Peacekeeping Operations 

The issue of how to mold UN peacekeeping operations into 

larger framework compatible with US interests is also a questio

that is high on the agenda. While the US shied away from mo

direct involvement in such operations during the height of the co

war, it has made important financial contributions and has bee

responsible for much of the logistic support necessary for thes

operations to succeed. Peacekeeping has been a growth industry-

1987 there were five peacekeeping operations (PKO) with 

manpower allocation of 10,000 and a budget of $233 millio

today the number of operations is up to 18 and the annual cost ha

skyrocketed to $3 billion. More recent events, such as the killing o

US servicemen in Somalia, have made participation in PKOs le

palatable to the American public and to Congress. Current U

thinking, as contained in a draft National Security Decisio

Directive (NSDD) , would sanction operations approved by the U

Security Council in dealing with a threat to international peace an

security as contained in the UN charter. These threats, under th

American definition, could include “one or a combination of th

following: international aggression, a humanitarian disast

requiring urgent action coupled with violence, a sudden an

unexpected interruption of established democracy or gro

violation of human rights coupled with violence or the thre

172 
thereof.

 

 At the same time, the document requires that eac

operation have a clear objective, strategy for completion, politic

support, and must serve US interests. Particularly hazardou

missions would have to have a US commander or a US officer ne

the top of the chain of command. As President Clinton succinct

phrased it during his address to the UN General Assembly 

September 1993, “If the American people are to say yes 

peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no.” 

Conclusion 

The Certainty of Uncertainty 

While it may seem a banality, one of the most importa

conclusions emerging from a discussion of future US nation

security strategy is that we are dealing with a much less certa

world than we have been accustomed to. The previous opponen

world communism and its leader, the USSR-was well known, an

the strategy for dealing with it has joined the “trash heap o

history.” In its stead has come a series of lesser and more uncerta

threats. Security was defined in primarily military terms, and th

prevention of surprise attack on the US and its allies was th

apogee of its efforts. 

While military preparedness will always be essential if only a

an insurance policy against threats that may be coming down th

road but are not evident today, it is also a given fact that th

amount of resources dedicated to protecting the national securi

will be a function of how the American public perceives th

security and threats to it. Characteristically, a 1990 survey o

American attitudes regarding security threats identified dru

trafficking as the most serious, followed by nuclear proliferatio

Soviet nuclear weapons and Soviet aggression came at the botto

of the list of 14 items. 26 One survey of post-cold-war nation

security strategy put it this way: “As we look ahead, the threat 

more diffuse, the institutions more varied, and the roles an

missions of the players more diverse, while the consensus of th

173 
American public over what the primary issues really are, at lea

for the real term, will be much looser.” 27 

Thus, national security strategy will be formulated in a muc

more complex environment in the future. Paradoxically, as the U

remains the only real superpower, It finds: itself restrained in i

ability and willingness to use that power in troubled situations suc

as Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia; and it lacks the ability it once had 

dominate its allies. It will need to deal with Russia in a ne

framework, balancing the desire to keep that country developin

down the road to democracy and peaceful engagement with th

West, with the understanding that Russia remains a potential

powerful adversary that has its own views of how it should behav

It will also need to enlist Russia in common efforts that may not b

successful to ensure that weapons of mass destruction and the

delivery means do not fall into the wrong hands. It will have 

deal with the outbursts of nationalism and hatred so apparent toda

and will have to determine the resources available to back up ou

policies, whether they entail the use of military force or politica

economic instruments. It will need to foster a robust economic an

spiritual base at home to keep America a vibrant society th

continues to provide leadership in uncertain times. It will need th

support of its own people and their representatives if it is to b

successful. 

174 
Notes 

1. Harold Brown. Thinking about National Security (Boulder: Westview 

Press. 1983), 4. 

2. In Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Kevin V. Mulcahy, American National 

Security: A Presidential Perspective (Pacific Grove. Calif.: Brooks/Cole 

Publishing Co., 1991), 4-5. 

3. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, for example, remarked in 197

that “the problems of energy, environment, population, the issues of space and 

the seas now rank with the questions of military security, ideology, and 

territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.” See 

Roger Cary and Trevor C. Salmon, eds., International Security in the Modern 

World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 2. For a complete work focusing 

entirely on the nonmilitary aspects of national security, see Joseph J. Romm, 

Defining National Security: The Non-Military Aspects (New York: Council on 

Foreign Relations Press, 1993). 

4. See Dave McCurdy, “Glasnost for the CIA,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 1 

(January-February 1994): 127. 

5. See Loch K. Johnson, “New Directions for US Strategic Intelligence,” in 

James E. Winkates, Jr., J. Richard Walsh, and Joseph M. Scolnick, eds., US 

Foreign Policy in Transition (Chicago: Nelson Hall Publishers, 1994), 82-83, 8

6. McCurdy, 135. 

7. Thomas B. Grassey, “US Intelligence and the New National Security 

Strategy,” in James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, eds., Reconstituting 

America's Defense: The New US National Security Strategy, 36-37. 

8. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” in Graham Allison and 

Gregory M. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War 

to New World Order (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1992), 297. 

9. Ibid., 297-98. 

10. See Robert A. Hoover, “Old Business, New Business: US Arms Contro

Policy in the Post Cold War World,” in Winkates, Walsh, and Scolnick, 52-75. 

11. Quoted in Krauthammer, 302. 

12. See Monte R. Bullard, “US-China Relations: The Strategic Calculus,” 

Parameters, Summer 1993, 86-95. 

13. See David Hughes, “Regional Nuclear Powers Pose New Risks to US 

Military,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 January 1992, 65. 

14. Frederick R. Strain, “Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence: A Policy 

Conundrum,” Parameters, Autumn 1993,85-95. 

15. In George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States 

(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1993), 15. 

16. See introduction by Paul N. Stockton in Tritten and Stockton, 4-6. 

17. Michael N. Pocalyko, “Riding on the Storm: The Influence of War on 

Strategy,” in Tritten and Stockton, 57. 

18. Ibid., 60-63. 

175 
g yp

the conclusion that NATO's continuation is the best alternative to deal with all 

of them, see Charles L. Glaser, “Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security 

Arrangements for Europe,” International Security 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993): 5-

50. 

20. See, for example, comments by Polish foreign minister Andrzej 

Olechowski, quoted in Jane Perlez, “NATO Commitment Sought by Poland,” 

New York Times, 12 December 1993, sec. 1, 6. See also Craig Whitney, 

“Russian Vote Stirs Uncertainty for NATO Talks,” New York Times, 15 

December 1993, 8. Whitney quotes Olechowski as saying, “We were concerne

up to now; now [after the nationalist victory in the Russian elections] we are 

worried.” 

21. For example, a comprehensive proposal for expanding the activities of 

the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a coordination body in which 

the former Warsaw Pact and newly independent states of the former USSR are 

linked to NATO without actual membership, was made by the former deputy 

commander in chief of the US European Command, Gen James P. McCarthy. 

His proposals included participation in alliance humanitarian and relief 

operations, consultations on security matters of concern to NACC members, 

expertise in nuclear security and safety, in inspection information sharing, 

defense conversion, refugees, and peacekeeping cooperation in negotiations on 

conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE). See James P. McCarthy, 

“Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe: New Opportunities for 

NATO,” Strategic Review, Spring 1993, 60. 

22. For a further discussion of the problems entailed by NATO enlargemen

see, for example, “The World Sends NATO Back to the Drawing Board,” The 

Economist, 25 December 1993, 61-62; and Justin Burke, “Eastern Europe 

Presses Its Case for Speedy NATO Membership,” Christian Science Monitor, 7 

January 1994, 6. 

23. See James E. Winkates, Jr., “US Defense Policy in the 1990's,” in 

Winkates, Walsh, and Scolnick, 41. 

24. Ibid., 48-49. 

25. See Paul Lewis, “Reluctant Warriors: UN Member States Retreat from 

Peacekeeping Roles,” New York Times, 13 December 1993, I-9. 

26. Gregory F. Treverton and Barbara A. Bicksler, “Conclusion: Getting 

from Here to Where?” in Allison and Treverton, 421. 

27. Ibid. 

176 
Conquest and Cohesion 

The Psychological Nature of War 

Martin L. Fracker 

This is the theory of “weapons decide everything.” which is a 

mechanistic theory of war. ...In opposition to this view, we see not only 

weapons but human beings. Although important, weapons are not the 

decisive factor in war; it is man and not material things that decide the 

issue. 

Mao Zedong 

The recent crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti have stumpe

American foreign policy and stymied US military planners. N

coincidentally, these are also complex crises with roots buried dee

in the history and population of each region. While we are n

currently at war, the policy difficulties that these situations hav

posed raise the question of just how we would go about winning 

we were at war. The recent US-led victory over Iraq has reinforce

a traditional American view that war is about destroying the oth

side’s physical war-making capacity. Historian Russell Weigle

has called this mind-set a preference for “wars of annihilation,” 

preference that he says prevented Americans from being able 

cope with the Communist strategy in Vietnam. 1

 Mao Zedon

intellectual father of America’s Vietnam defeat, derided th

mechanistic mind-set. He argued, and the Vietnam War seemed 

prove, that real war is not about destroying physical capacit

Rather, real war is about destroying the desire to keep fightin

War, in other words, is a problem in psychology. 

Central to the psychological nature of war is what Carl vo

Clausewitz called the “wonderful trinity” embodied in the peopl

the army, and the government. The people, he said, provide th

passions that ignite the conflagration of war. The army provide

the talent and courage that interact with chance to determine th

outcome of battles. The government provides the politic

objectives that give the reasons for war and determine wh

conditions will constitute victory. 

2 

195 
The population plays a special role in the psychological natu

of war. Even undemocratic governments ultimately rule with 

least the passive acquiescence of those governed. And virtually a

modem militaries draw themselves from their larger population

This dependence of both government and military on populatio

therefore suggests that a state’s population is the fulcrum upo

which war rests. This conclusion, in turn, suggests that th

enemy’s population should be the key target in war. This does n

mean attacking the population with bombs and bullets or eve

necessarily attacking the things upon which the population

quality of life depends. Military theorist Robert Pape has argue

convincingly that such attacks on civilians are fruitless. 3

 Rathe

the psychological object of war is the population’s conviction th

the war is in their interest. When the population turns against th

war, the government must redirect energies toward safeguarding i

position at home. And the army, knowing that it no longer figh

for family and friends, loses its fighting spirit. 

To develop this theme, we begin by looking at why the politic

leadership is not the proper target once war has begun. We wi

then examine wartime populations themselves, explore th

mechanisms by which populations influence the outcome of war

and see that the proper target should be the internal cohesion th

binds them to their rulers. Finally, we will examine military force

and see that successful psychological operations do much mo

than merely play on soldiers’ fear of death. Rather, successf

campaigns are integrated into larger efforts aimed at underminin

the enemy society’s cohesion; these campaigns convince th

combatants that they are fighting and dying for the wrong people. 

Political Leaders 

Reactance and Resistance 

Clausewitz viewed war as a political decision based on a mor

or-less rational calculation of the costs and benefits of war. 4 Fro

this perspective, fighting may not always be necessary to achiev

victory. Sometimes, it may be enough to convince the enemy

196 
political leaders that acceding to one

s demands costs less tha

trying to resist them. Hitler showed that this kind of persuasion 

sometimes possible when he convinced the French and British 

1938 to accept his occupation of Czechoslovakia, first of th

Sudetenland and then of the whole country, rather than fig

another war. However, the recent Gulf War shows th

Clausewitzian strategy sometimes fails. Even when faced with th

overwhelming condemnation of the United Nations, th

unprecedented and massive deployment of coalition military forc

and the resolute determination of President George Bush to evi

Iraq from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein could not be persuaded 

accede to the coalition’s wishes. 

Political psychologist Philip Tetlock and his associates hav

suggested that persuasion attempts that rely on cost-benef

calculations often fall because nonrational factors exert mo

influence over human decisions. 5

 For example, rational politic

leaders entering a conflict should reassess the conflict’s costs an

benefits as events unfold. But real political leaders, as most huma

beings, tend to ignore important developments that contradict the

initial beliefs while paying too much attention to minor events th

support them. Saddam Hussein, who apparently thought th

American public opinion would cripple President Bush in the Gul

may thus have found his belief buttressed by small, sporadic, an

ineffectual antiwar protests in the US. At the same time, he seem

to have discounted President Bush’s continuing consolidation o

international support. 6 

Perhaps a more important factor influencing Saddam wa

“reactance,” the tendency to become more strongly committed to 

course of action when faced with demands to change. Demand

that people change their behavior threaten a basic human need fo

self-determination, and people respond with defiance in order 

reestablish their independence. 7 In terms of the Clausewitzia

model, reactance dramatically raises the amount of pain that th

enemy is willing to suffer. Thus, President Bush’s demands fo

Saddam immediately and unconditionally to withdraw fro

197 
Kuwait likely sparked massive reactance within the Iraqi leade

guaranteeing that he would pay virtually any price to stand fas

The US-led coalition then had little choice but to fight, hoping th

military pressure would succeed where diplomacy had failed. 

Once war has started, the enemy leaders’ reactance must b

overcome before they can be persuaded to quit-a formidab

challenge because the use of military force instigates even mo

reactance. Some researchers believe that repeated failures 

restore one’s freedom of action eventually causes reactance 

collapse into helplessness. 8

 If so, then consistently attacking an

undermining the enemy’s military strategy could eventual

produce his psychological defeat, as Pape has recently argued. 

Yet, history suggests that producing helplessness in wartim

political leaders rarely succeeds. In World War II, both German

and Japan fought well beyond the point at which they had an

realistic hope of winning. Pape suggests that the Germans foug

to a decisive conclusion because fighting seemed preferable to th

costs they would suffer once they surrendered. 10 Japan also foug

ferociously despite horrendous casualties and devastating setback

induced to surrender only by the confluence of econom

strangulation, America’s use of the atomic bomb, and Russia

entry into the war. 

The aftermath of the Gulf War demonstrates a further difficul

in destroying a political leader’s determination to keep fightin

Forced out of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein did not surrender until 

was clear that he could not win. Yet not even that humiliatio

seems to have lessened his resolve to eventually preva

Devastating losses inflicted by the coalition may have convince

him only that a different strategy was needed. The fact that h

remains in power, continues to oppress Kurdish and Shii

minorities, and apparently still strives to develop weapons of ma

destruction indicates that he yet hopes to one day dominate th

region by force and intimidation. 

198 
A clearer example of this problem is the aftermath of U

involvement in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had seen at lea

two different military strategies fail in their efforts to annex th

South: guerrilla strategies before 1968 and more convention

strategies thereafter. But the North’s leaders never lost faith 

their ability to eventually triumph. As events showed, they we

convinced that winning only required letting the Americans decla

victory and leave. 

Yet, It is not impossible to produce helplessness in nation

political leaders. The North Vietnamese succeeded in fostering 

sense of helplessness and incompetence among US leaders th

extended well beyond Southeast Asia and even the cold war. In th

years from 1972 to 1980, the United States passively endure

Marxist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragu

Growing Communist insurgencies in the Philippines, Peru, and E

Salvador were met with little if any direct response from th

United States. American helplessness continued to the depths o

the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, ending only with Ronald Reagan

ascendancy to the presidency. But the North Vietnamese had n

defeated US forces in a single major battle. Rather, they ha

simply destroyed the cohesion of America’s population, fracturin

the essential unity of people and government. 

Population

Cohesion and Conquest 

While most people recognize the role popular support played 

America’s Vietnam defeat, a common assertion holds that non

democratic states are immune from such public pressur

Commenting on German discontent under the Nazis, the Unite

States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded: 

If they had been at liberty to vote themselves out of the war, they would 

have done so well before the final surrender. In a determined police state, 

however, there is a wide difference between dissatisfaction and expressed 

opposition. ...However dissatisfied they were with the war, the German 

199 
p

p

evident. 11 

But if popular support counts only in democracies, one ca

hardly explain why Clausewitz put it on the same level as th

government and armed forces. Clausewitz, after all, was writin

about war, as he knew it in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth

century Europe. Democracy, to the extent that it had existed at a

had flickered only briefly, and only in France, before collapsin

into Napoleon’s withering grip. Neither can one explain Sun Tzu

concern with popular support in dynastic China more than tw

thousand years earlier: He had warned that wars should not over

burden the people lest they become impoverished and resentful. 12 

Yet, if we accept Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s insistence th

popular support does matter in undemocratic states, we a

challenged to identify the mechanism by which such suppo

makes a difference. In democracies, of course, people can vo

their leaders out of office. In non-democratic states, where votin

is either forbidden or irrelevant, there are still at least two oth

mechanisms. The first is that the people may revolt against the

political leaders, as the Germans successfully did in the final day

of World War I. This threat of revolt probably helped motivate Su

Tzu’s concern because the wars of ancient China were common

interrupted by popular rebellions and coups d’etat. 13 But revol

don’t have to succeed in order to endanger dictatorial regimes. 

failed rebellion or even just the threat of an uprising can still forc

governments to divert scarce war resources to the costly task o

keeping themselves in power. Further, the fear of rebellion ma

preclude dictators from taking militarily necessary steps that cou

alienate the population. This fear, for example, may explain wh

Hitler failed to fully mobilize the German economy for war unt

well into the conflict when, as history proved it was too late. 

A second mechanism grows from the fact that the armed force

are drawn from the population. When Clausewitz insisted that th

people provide the passions of war, he implied that the troop

commitment to a conflict reflects that of the people as a whol

200 
John Spanier, in his book Games Nations Play, makes clear th

relationship between popular support and military effectivenes

Undemocratic states, he says, must worry about mass suppo

because 

a people’s acceptance of military service, separation of families and 

death measures its commitment to the nation. ...The German armies 

fought very well in two wars, despite the Allied blockade in World War I 

and the heavy bombing in World War II; widespread support for 

Germany’s government lasted until near the end in each instance. 

Japanese soldiers demonstrated a tenacious fanaticism during World War 

II, which led them to fight hard for every inch of territory, to sacrifice 

their lives freely in the process and to impose heavy casualties on 

American marines. 14 

Sun Tzu said essentially the same thing writing of th

importance of harmony between the people and their leaders. H

spoke of the people and the army in virtually a single breath, as 

one could hardly be distinguished from the other: 

When troops are raised to chastise transgressors, the temple council first 

considers the adequacy of the rulers’ benevolence and the confidence of 

their peoples ...When one treats people with benevolence justice, and 

righteousness and reposes confidence in them, the army will be united in 

mind and all will be happy to serve their leaders. The Book of Changes 

says: “In happiness at overcoming difficulties, people forget the danger 

of death.” 15 

From Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Spanier, it seems clear that th

unity of the population with its military and government is key 

victory in war. The Nazi propagandists understood this princip

and used it to good effect in Austria and Czechoslovakia, s

thoroughly dividing the civilian populations against themselve

that the German army was able to occupy both countries virtual

without resistance. 16 They achieved at least as impressive a fe

against the French. In To Lose a Battle, Alistair Horne describe

how Hitler identified social disunity within France as something h

could use to render the French army all but useless. Otto Abet

whom Hitler sent into France, carefully cultivated the anti-Semit

and antisocialist sympathies of the French elite. They were easi

convinced that only Germany stood between Europe and Jewis

201 
bolshevism. Another line targeted the French socialists and aske

why socialists should fight for the interests of fascists an

reactionaries. Still another propaganda theme played on the Frenc

distrust of Britain. The Jews controlled Britain, so the line wen

and this would be Britain’s war against Germany-but it would b

the French who die. The Nazi propaganda machine finally too

aim at the average French soldier, asking why the soldier wh

lived in grubby barracks, ate from substandard canteens, and wa

paid only pennies a day should fight for pampered officers wh

lived in luxury. The outcome was all that Hitler had hoped fo

France did not mobilize her forces, and when the invasion final

came, the French fought without enthusiasm. In just six week

Hitler defeated one of Europe’s greatest armies. 17 

The Germans had perhaps learned from their experience 

World War I during which the Allies deliberately used militar

pressure and propaganda to fracture German society. In 191

British lieutenant general Sir George Macdonogh wrote: 

Although it may be argued that the German Armies cannot be decisively 

beaten in the field, the German nation is very vulnerable politically. The 

best weapon to take advantage of this weakness is military pressure for it 

will more than anything else accentuate the internal dissentions and 

contribute more rapidly than any other measure to the undermining and 

final breaking of the German war-spirit which is our foremost war-aim. 18 

(Emphasis added) 

To further destroy German cohesion, the Allies supporte

indigenous radical socialists who feared that a German victor

would make socialism in Germany all but impossible. At the sam

time, the Allies undertook a vigorous propaganda campaign aime

specifically at German social cohesion and designed to promote a

anti-kaiser revolution. The propaganda emphasized that ordinar

Germans were working, suffering, and dying for a greed

capitalist elite. This line was well received among the Germa

people who finally began to wonder “why they should go on bein

killed and starved for masters who [told] them only lies,” 19 On 

November 1918 following a period of civil uprising and sever

government resignations, the kaiser abdicated and the Sociali

202 
Party, by then in control of the Reichstag, proclaimed the Germa

Republic. Two days later, the republic surrendered to the Allie

even though the German army was undefeated, still fighting o

foreign soil. 20 

Oddly, the lessons Germany learned in World War I and applie

so well in France more than 30 years later were forgotten when th

Nazis invaded the Soviet Union. A multinational empire a

oppressive as any under the czars, the Soviet Union was ripe for a

attack on its social cohesion. Indeed, when the Nazis first invade

the Ukraine, the civilian population welcomed them as an army o

liberation. Stalin was so alarmed that he ordered any Soviet soldi

who surrendered to the Germans to be considered a traitor. Y

Hitler failed to capitalize on the Ukrainians’ hatred of Russi

Instead, he imposed a brutal occupation aimed at subjugating th

Slavic people whom he regarded as inferior and at appropriatin

the Ukraine as land for Germans. By his inhuman treatment, Hitl

welded the Ukrainians to Stalin, thereby assuring his own defeat. 

The United States likewise discovered the importance o

national cohesion in Vietnam. For the North Vietnamese, the on

serious obstacle to a united Vietnam was the United States. The

knew that the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) could not defe

the United States in a purely military contest, but they understoo

that this fact was not decisive. At the heart of North Vietnam

strategy was the doctrine of protracted war. Sun Tzu had warne

against such wars. “For there has never been a protracted war,” h

said, “from which a country has benefited. ...War is like unto 

fire; those who will not put aside weapons are themselve

consumed by them.” 22 His reasoning was that prolonged wa

overtax the state treasury, exhaust the army, and overstress th

civilian population. In the end, the people would rise up an

overthrow their own government. 

But what Sun Tzu saw as protracted war’s danger, Mao saw a

its opportunity. For by intentionally protracting a war against 

militarily superior nation, one could inflict upon the enemy 

203 
, p

ammunition, decline of morale of the troops, discontent of the people at 

home, shrinkage of trade, an expenditure of (millions of dollars) and 

condemnation before the court of world opinion. 23 (Emphasis added) 

Mao made the objective of protracted war especially clear when h

wrote: 

Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically and then abandon territory? 

Will not the blood of heroic fighters be shed in vain? This is an incorrect 

way to pose the question. One eats first and then relieves oneself: does 

one eat in vain? One sleeps first and then gets up: does one sleep in vain? 

I think not. ...[W]e have gained time [and] realized our objective of. 

...wearing down the enemy. 24 (Emphasis added) 

The North Vietnamese therefore waged a war intended to brea

not American military might but American will. While there seem

to be little evidence that the North Vietnamese conducted actu

propaganda operations within the US, they didn’t need to. 25 In an

pluralistic society, numerous social rifts are bound to exist, and th

United States has not been spared. 26 The stress produced by 

seemingly endless war may have been enough to start and susta

the processes that would split and demoralize the American peopl

The universal draft may also have played a role, disruptin

people’s lives and putting families in fear for their loved ones gon

off to war. Sun Tzu had warned that “if the war drags on witho

cessation men and women will resent not being able to marry.” 

Added to this disruption were moral qualms about the war that th

strategy of protraction successfully exacerbated. Many American

correctly judged the South Vietnamese government to be autocrat

and opposed to liberal concepts of democracy and fairness. D

such a government merit the war’s horrible costs? Grotesqu

images burned themselves permanently into the America psyche: 

captured Vietcong guerrilla murdered on the street in front o

cameras; a child terror frozen while being engulfed in explodin

napalm; American soldiers gutted, dismembered, and poured in

body bags. 28 

Fissures long latent in American society yawned open. No le

a figure than retired Marine Corps general David Shoup, a Med

204 
of Honor winner, proclaimed that the US armed forces ha

“relished” the war in order, as Time magazine put it, to “field te

new weapons and season a generation of career soldiers,” thereb

transforming America into a “militaristic and aggressive nation.” 

President Dwight Eisenhower’s nightmare of a military-industri

complex gone mad seemed to have come true. But in the publ

mind it was not these warmongers who bore the cost of th

military’s obsession; it was the 18-year-old innocent who shou

have had all his life to look forward to. 

The war had pitted average Americans against military

industrial elites who seemingly cared nothing for the blood the

spilled. That image erupted into brilliant colors when Ohio nation

guardsmen opened fire into a crowd of protesters at Kent Sta

University, killing three students. It was reinforced by the My L

massacre, for more than a year a darkly held Army secret. L

William Calley, apparently following orders, murdered th

innocent, child and adult, able and feeble, women and men-2

civilians in all. The military seemed to have violated everythin

that Americans cherished about themselves. 30 

The turning point had come in the form of the 1968 T

offensive. The Vietcong, with the encouragement of the North, ha

sprung its most massive attack in more than three years of wa

Though the United States beat back and destroyed the guerril

army, the psychological shock had already done its job. Befo

Tet, Washington had been whispering foolish assurances that th

end was just in sight; all that was left was a little mopping up. Fo

many Americans, Tet seemed to prove that the president and th

military had been lying all along. The following year, American

rejected the Democratic leadership that had given them the war an

elected Richard Nixon instead. Nixon accordingly change

America’s war objectives. From that time on, according to militar

historian Mark Clodfelter, the United States fought mainly 

achieve a face-saving withdrawal. 31 Though the shooting w

would continue throughout Nixon’s first term, the North ha

already won the only war that counted. 

205 
As Saddam Hussein approached the Gulf War almost 20 yea

later, he hoped to replicate North Vietnam’s success against th

United States. Accordingly, Iraqi propaganda emphasized that th

United States was preparing to fight another imperialist war for o

designed to prop up a corrupt and repressive Kuwaiti regime. A

usual, it would be the poor and the minorities who would die 

this rich man’s war. The war, the Iraqis said, would be anoth

Vietnam, lasting many years and costing countless lives. The Ira

propaganda machine, however, did little more than talk. Sadda

believed that the US public already opposed sending its boys to d

in an Arab war. He saw the few antiwar demonstrations th

occurred and the debates in Congress as evidence of a wide ri

between the Bush administration and the American populatio

Apart from maligning US intentions, all he really had to do, h

thought, was to drag out the crisis long enough, and the rift wou

explode into a Vietnam-era antiwar movement that would hobb

President Bush and force American acquiescence. 32 

The rift that Saddam Hussein perceived simply did not exist. 

poll sponsored by Newsweek magazine taken only hours after th

war began showed that the vast majority of Americans supporte

President Bush’s actions. This was not a transient rally-around-th

flag support; a month later, fully 90 percent of the adult populatio

supported the war effort. 33 What Saddam needed to do and did n

do was to identify those social ruptures that actually existed 

American society and actively exploit them, just as Hitler ha

exploited existing ruptures within Austria, Czechoslovakia, an

France. 

Interestingly, what Saddam failed to do, American antiw

activists attempted. The Georgia chapter of the Nation

Organization of Women asked why women should support a ma

war for “gender apartheid,” referring to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

unprogressive treatment of women. The National African

American Network, noting that blacks make up 22 percent of th

military but only 11 percent of the civilian work force, asked wh

African-Americans should shoulder the risk of death for a socie

206 
that denies them other kinds of opportunity. Environmentalists 

Missoula, Montana, asked why environmentally consciou

Americans should fight and die for the great polluter, oil. Certa

homosexual rights groups portrayed the impending war as 

distraction from the fight against Acquired Immune Deficienc

Syndrome (AIDS). Other activists, chanting, “We won’t go fo

Texaco,” implied that a war would somehow serve only th

interests of big oil companies. There were even anti-Jewish appea

made against the war by groups such as Lyndon LaRouche

organization, Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam, and the Liber

Lobby. 34 

In the end, all of these attempts to divide American society an

produce large-scale opposition to the war failed. Some of th

appeals were not credible to their intended audiences. The Nation

African-American Network’s theme, for example, probab

sounded strange to African-Americans who could not help noticin

that the highest-ranking officer in the military, Gen Colin Powe

was black. The idea that only the big oil companies cared abou

petroleum prices undoubtedly rang hollow to average American

who put gasoline in their cars every week or who would use oil 

heat their homes during the coming winter. 

Jacob Weisberg, writing in the liberal New Republic magazin

suggests that the antiwar activists caused their own failure. Th

activists, he wrote, seemed trapped in a time warp, as if sti

focused on the Vietnam War, unable to adapt to the curre

situation. In one rally, young men even chanted, “Hell no, w

won’t go!” as if at risk of being drafted. The protesters seeme

either not to know or care that Saddam Hussein had brutal

invaded Kuwait, was looting its wealth, murdering its citizens, an

threatening much of the world’s oil lifeline. The proteste

seemingly thought there could be nothing worth fighting for. T

make matters worse, the antiwar rallies often became forums fo

extremist groups. Ramsey Clark’s National Coalition to Stop U

Intervention in the Middle East, one of the two major organizers o

these rallies, was a front group for the Workers World Party th

207 
had approved of the Tiananmen Square massacre and no

apparently endorsed Saddam’s annexation of Kuwait. 35 A speak

at one of the coalition’s rallies, not untypically, castigated th

“illegal state of Israel” and cried, “Down with Zionism!” Anothe

representing the American Indian Movement, demanded that th

United States withdraw from both Saudi Arabia and Arizona. Th

effect of these rallies was to alienate ordinary Americans who ma

have had doubts about the war but who lived their lives in th

political center. It was hardly surprising, then, when a Wall Stre

Journal-National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) poll conducte

during the war found that 60 percent of Americans had lo

whatever respect they once had felt for the protesters. 36 

In short, attempts to turn the US population against the Gu

War failed because they lacked credibility, were morally an

intellectually bankrupt, and were ineptly executed. Whether a

intelligent, well-planned, and carefully executed propagand

campaign could have succeeded is not known. Iraq’s aggression 

Kuwait was unmistakable; the war’s morality was recognized eve

by many who opposed it. 37 In light of the economic disruptio

caused by the 1973 Arab 011 embargo, the threat to America

economic security seemed real. 38 Nevertheless, intelligent, wel

informed, and patriotic Americans did oppose the war prior to i

start. Among these were such notable figures as Ambassador Jean

Kirkpatrick, columnist Patrick Buchanan, and senators Mar

Hatfield (R-Oreg.), Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), John Glenn (D

Ohio), and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) 39 This observatio

combined with the social discontinuities that exist within America

society, suggests that a cleverer enemy than Saddam might hav

succeeded in destroying American cohesion and will. 

Combatants 

Cohesion and Fear 

Saddam had adopted a more or less passive psychologic

strategy against the US population, but his efforts directed again

the American military were much more active and direct. H

208 
launched a campaign intended to exaggerate threats of chemic

attack and the hardships of desert war. He apparently believed th

as Operation Desert Shield dragged on, these themes wou

eventually cause American troops to desert or refuse to deploy. Y

here too Saddam was inept. For example, an Iraqi propagand

broadcast warned American GIs that while they were suffering 

the excruciating heat, their wives and girlfriends back home we

dating movie stars like Bart Simpson (whom the Iraqis did n

realize was a cartoon character). 40 

In contrast, such appeals had worked when the Germans use

them against the French in 1940. Nazi propaganda, for exampl

warned French soldiers that while they were preparing to fig

Britain’s war, British soldiers were enjoying the favors of Frenc

women. 

41 Within the context of French social resentments as we

as historic French distrust of the British, the Nazi assertion

seemed believable. Indeed, the Nazi effort was probably successf

only because it was well integrated into a larger, brilliantly crafte

campaign aimed at every segment of French society. Saddam cou

make no such claim. 

But Saddam has company in propaganda ineptness in moder

wars, for in Vietnam the United States likewise bumbled its wa

through the conflict. What the United States did in th

psychological war was, for the most part, directed at th

Communist fighters of both the Vietcong and the PAVN

Apparently, the intent was to exacerbate the psychological stre

imposed on enemy fighters by the search and destroy mission

upon which the United States had come to rely. 42 According to L

Col Robert Chandler, an Air Force intelligence officer serving 

Vietnam, United States psychological operations struck five majo

themes: (1) fear of death from US attacks, (2) the hardships o

living and fighting in the jungle, (3) certainty that the communis

were losing, (4) concern for families back home, and (5) dou

about North Vietnam’s ultimate goals. 43 Though this campaig

occasionally succeeded in inducing Vietcong soldiers to give up, 

was an overall failure. The Vietcong generally did not surrende

209 
instead, they fought to their death in the 1968 Tet offensiv

Members of the PAVN didn’t surrender either; rather, the

achieved their goal of driving out the United States and final

uniting the country under communism. 44 

Why didn’t the American psychological campaign work? Som

writers blame the failure on poor execution. For example, Lt C

Benjamin Findley notes that the US dropped “fear leaflets

imprinted with the ace of spades, unaware that the Vietnames

didn’t know that the ace of spades was supposed to signify deat

Another fear leaflet gruesomely depicted human corpses, whic

the Vietcong took as American gloating over Vietnamese deaths. 

Execution was not the problem. Rather, the campaign itself wa

ill conceived. Campaigns that aim at merely frightening enem

personnel while leaving them essentially cohesive seem bound 

fail. Threats of death merely provoke reactance and thereby stiffe

determination. Prolonged stress could conceivably turn reactanc

into helplessness, but cohesion counteracts the effects of stress. 

Returning to the five themes developed in the America

psychological campaign, only the fifth attempted to divide th

Vietcong from the North. Whatever good appeal may have don

was probably undone by the third, which tried to convince soldie

that the government of South Vietnam was winning. That was th

worst possible message to send. 

Consider that South Vietnam was fissured between rulers an

the ruled. The communist victory in the North had forced th

dispossessed Catholic elite to flee southward where they quick

gained control over the government. Historian Larry Cab

documents that Ngo Dinh Diem, president, of newly formed Sou

Vietnam, 

committed a massive and egregious error in 1956, when he prohibited the 

traditional and deeply cherished village elections and instead appointed 

as village chiefs fellow Catholic refugees from the North. This was a 

blunder, which even the French and the Japanese had not committed. 47 

210 
The following year, Cable continues, Diem made things eve

worse by launching a land reform program that, besides bein

corrupt, failed to redistribute any land. When the indigenou

Vietnamese peasantry complained, Diem’s brother, Nhu, led th

security police in a brutal repression. Thus, South Vietnamese rur

peasants, mostly poor and Buddhist, found themselve

oppressively governed by an urban, rich, and corrupt Catholic ex

northern elite bent mainly on securing its own comfort. Litt

wonders that the peasants revolted, swelling the ranks of th

Vietcong. Even less wonder that, as the United States stepped in 

back up the elitist government, southern peasants saw America a

their enemy. 

As the United States undertook the war in Vietnam, it faile

either to recognize or else to act on the recognition that th

Vietcong expressed genuinely perceived grievances of the souther

peasantry. Cable documents how the United States treated th

Vietcong as merely an auxiliary to the North’s PAVN when in fa

the Vietcong constituted an independent insurgent force whos

principle aim was to rid the South of its recently arrived ex

northern oppressors. While the North Vietnamese certain

welcomed the insurgency and would use it to achieve their ow

goals, the United States, by fighting to sustain the government th

had caused the insurgency in the first place, only fanned the flame

of rebellion. 48 

The American propaganda message that the government o

South Vietnam was winning the war must therefore have on

reinforced the peasantry’s belief that it had no choice but to fig

or continue living under oppression. The peasantry acted out Su

Tzu’s dictum that “if they know there is no alternative they wi

fight to the death.” 49 Thus, American psychological operations, a

a whole, very likely cemented the Vietcong to the North. 

Yet the ingredients were in place for a successful psycho

logical war aimed at separating the insurgents from their Norther

allies. The southern peasants resented the northern interlopers an

211 
through the Vietcong were fighting both for liberation an

independence. Political unification was a principal goal of only th

North Vietnamese who foresaw the Vietcong as a postwar politic

rival. 50 To win the psychological war, the United States needed 

make itself the southern peasants’ liberator and unmask Nor

Vietnam as seeking only the South’s subjugation. Col Horac

Hunter, Army counterinsurgency expert, eloquently stated th

point: 

The Communists identified with decent causes, which they perverted, 

while we, with the best of motives, shored up repressive and venal 

systems. ...We talked about reform and democracy without assuring 

either reform or democracy. ...As a result, we were sullied by association 

with reactionary and corrupt regimes and seemingly condemned to lose. 

...Winning require[d] making the revolution ours. 51 

Instead of fighting the Vietcong, the United States neede

somehow to take its side and force a settlement upon th

government. Yet because the US saw itself engaged wi

monolithic communism in a global zero-sum game, the politic

goals of the Vietcong seemed unacceptable. But by opposing th

insurgents and in effect the aspirations of the southern peasantr

the US played into North Vietnam’s strategy of using the Vietcon

to wear down the United States and using the United States 

destroy the Vietcong. 52 

In contrast to the failed US efforts in Vietnam, the coalition

psychological war against Iraqi soldiers was spectacular

successful. Following weeks of relentless bombing and th

stunning mechanized blitzkrieg on the ground, Iraqi soldie

surrendered by the thousands without fighting; they were broke

men, often shuddering in tears. Gen Charles Homer, wh

commanded the coalition’s air forces, attributed the ma

surrenders to the psychological impact of round-the-cloc

bombardment, a conclusion at least consistent with Israe

psychologist Zhava Solomon’s studies of combat stress. 

Nevertheless, it is not clear that the bombing alone could hav

produced the intense distress that the defeated Iraqi soldie

212 
displayed. For example, British and American researchers studyin

soldiers’ reactions to sustained shelling in World War II dre

conflicting conclusions. Unlike their British counterpart

American investigators suggested that soldiers eventually becom

desensitized to continued attacks. 54 

Key to the demoralization of Iraqi soldiers may have been 

basic sense that the war was not theirs. A Newsweek report

quoted an Iraqi close to the government as saying at the time th

“this is not our war. This is Saddam’s war. He’s put us back 4

years.” 55 How widespread this feeling may have been among th

Iraqi military is not known, but one suspects it may have bee

common among those on the front lines who were poorly traine

and only recently mobilized from among the general population. 

so, these soldiers’ lack of personal commitment to the war, mo

than the bombing itself, may explain their quick surrenders. 

Conclusion 

Facing the New World Order 

The United States can no longer count on winning wars b

destroying the enemy’s military, if it ever could. The world is n

soon likely to forget that twice in this century nuclear-arme

superpowers were defeated by much smaller, poorly equippe

armies: the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union 

Afghanistan. Saddam Hussein thought he could do the same an

perhaps could have if he had been smarter about it. Others wi

undoubtedly try and some will probably succeed if the US does n

learn to fight the psychological war as well as it fights th

“mechanistic” one. 

Psychological war focuses on Clausewitz’s “wonderful trinity

the people, the army, and the government. The army, interactin

with chance, determines the outcome of battles. The governme

sets the war’s political objectives and defines what victory wi

mean. But at the heart of modern war is the populatio

Governments, democratic or not, rule with at least th

213 
acquiescence of the people. Modern militaries are drawn from, an

are therefore subsets of, their larger populations. Populations, a

Clausewitz said, provide the passions of war; they are the fulcrum

upon which war rests. The enemy’s population, then, is the prop

target in war-specifically, the population’s conviction that the w

is in its interest. When the population turns against the war, th

government is forced to redirect scarce war resources towar

safeguarding its power. The army is robbed of its fighting spir

The key to turning the population against the war is to divide th

society against itself, breaking the unity of the masses with the

rulers. To accomplish this division, one must identify and explo

those socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic discontinuities that exi

among the enemy’s society. Nazi Germany defeated France b

setting rich against poor, capitalist against socialist, Christia

against Jew. Each group came to see the war as serving only th

other’s interest and therefore no one really wanted to fight. Nor

Vietnam defeated the United States because the average America

likewise came to see the war as being in the interest of only th

military- industrial complex. Americans, for their part, fought o

the wrong side, fighting to prop up an oppressive, eliti

government against peasants who saw Communist revolution a

their only way out. Had we but realized that the Vietcong longe

for independence from the North as much as for freedom fro

their oppressive rulers, we might have won-not by killin

Communist soldiers but by turning the Vietcong against Nor

Vietnam and welding them to ourselves. It is a lesson that w

should remember as we face the new world. 

214 
Notes 

1. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, Ind.: 

Indiana University Press, 1973), 464-67. 

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J. J. Grisham (London: Penguin, 

1968), 121-22. 

3. Robert A. Pape, Jr., “Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works 

and Punishment Doesn’t,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (December 1992): 

423-75. 

4. Clausewitz, 125. 

5. Philip E. Tetlock, Charles B. McGuire and Gregory Mitchell. 

“Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence,” Annual Review of 

Psychology 42 (1991): 239-76. 

6. See Norman Cigar, “Iraq’s Strategic Mindset and the Gulf War: Blueprin

for Defeat,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15 (March 1992): 1-29, for a discussio

of what Saddam Hussein may have been thinking. 

7. Jack W. Brehm, A Theory of Psychological Reactance (New York: 

Academic Press, 1966). 

8. Joel Brockner et al. “The Role of Self-Esteem and Self-Consciousness in 

the Wortman-Brehm Model of Reactance and Learned Helplessness,” Journal o

Personality and Social Psychology 45 (1983): 199-209. For recent discussions 

the learned helplessness theory, see Jay G. Hull and Marilyn Mendolia, 

“Modeling the Relations of Attributional Style, Expectancies and Depression,” 

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (1991): 85-97; and Mario 

Mikulincer. “Attributional Processes in the Learned Helplessness Paradigm: 

Behavioral Effects of Global Attributions,” Journal of Personality and Social 

Psychology 51 (1986): 1248-56. 

9. Pape, 423-75. 

10. Ibid., 461-64. 

11. The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War) (Pacific 

War) (1945; reprint, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, October 1987), 

12. 

12. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford 

University Press. 1963), 73-74. 

13. See Samuel Griffith’s introduction to The Art of War, especially the 

footnote on page 7. 

14. John Spanier, Games Nations Play (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 

Quarterly Press, 1993), 177. 

15. Sun Tzu, 63-64. 

16. Karl R Stadler, Austria (New York: Praeger, 1971); J. F. N. Bradley, 

Czechoslovakia (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971); and B. Bilck, 

Fifth Column of Work (London: Trinity Press, 1945). 

17. Alistair Home, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Boston: Little, Brown an

Company, 1969), 85-87, 103-4, 109-15. Also, see Larry H. Addington, The 

Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington. Ind.: Indiana 

University Press, 1984), 187-92. 

215 
Q, yy

RUSI: Journal of the Royal United States Services Institute for Defence Studie

130 (3 September 1985): 49-54. 

19. George Herron, quoted in George G. Bruntz, “Allied Propaganda and th

Collapse of German Morale in 1918,” in Psychological Warfare Casebook, ed. 

William E. Daugherty (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958), 96-

105. 

20. Addington, 157. Both Occleshaw and Bruntz point out that the 

propaganda campaign alone probably could not have broken German will. The 

military campaign created the socioeconomic pressure that made Germans 

susceptible to propaganda, and the resulting socialist uprising precluded the 

German army from having time to regroup and carry on the war. 

21. Paul Blackstock, “German Psychological Warfare against the Soviet 

Union, 1941-1945,” in Psychological Warfare Casebook, ed. William E. 

Daugherty (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958), 263-73. 

22. Sun Tzu. 73. 

23. Mao Tse-Tung, On the Protracted War (Beijing: Foreign Language 

Press, 1960), 53. 

24. Ibid., 120-21. In this passage, Mao actually writes about “our objective 

of annihilating and wearing down the enemy.” His use of the term annihilate, 

however, does not necessarily imply the physical destruction of the enemy’s 

force. Rather, as he says on page 75, it means to “disarm [the enemy] or to 

deprive him of his power of resistance.” 

25. Jeffrey P. Kimball, ‘The Stab in the Back Legend and the Vietnam War

Armed Forces and Society 14 (Spring 1988): 433-58. 

26. See for example, Paul Luebke and John F. Zipp, “Social Class and 

Attitudes toward Big Business in the United States,” Journal of Political and 

Military Sociology 11 (Fall 1983): 251-64; and A. Wade Smith, “Public 

Consciousness of Blacks in the Military,” Journal of Political and Military 

Sociology 11 (Fall 1983): 281-300. The recent Los Angeles riots sparked by th

Rodney King beating also attest to the rifts lying just beneath the surface of 

American society. 

27. Sun Tzu, 74. 

28. To say that the war itself produced all these effects is not to say that the 

North Vietnamese did not consciously abet or take advantage of them. On the 

contrary, the communists made every effort to publicize civilian collateral 

damage from US air attacks, for example, and permitted American journalists 

and sympathetic celebrities such as Jane Fonda to visit North Vietnam. For 

discussions of the role the media played in this process, see Gerald S. Venanzi, 

“Democracy and Protracted War: The Impact of Television,” Air University 

Review 34 (January-February 1983): 58-71; and Michael Mandelbaum, 

“Vietnam: The Television War,” Parameters 13 (March 1983): 89-97. 

29. ‘The Military: Servant or Master of Policy? ,” Time (11 April 1969): 20

22. 

216 
y, (y 

Press, 1978), 326-27, 356-64. See also “Who is Responsible for My Lai?,” Tim

(8 March 1971): 18-19. 

31. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of 

North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 148-49. Clodfelter quotes 

Nixon as later saying, “We were going to continue fighting until the 

Communists agreed to negotiate a fair and honorable peace or until the South 

Vietnamese were able to defend themselves on their own-whichever came first

32. Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel W. Jacobowitz, “Psyop in Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm,” in Psychological Operations and Case Studies,” ed. Fran

L. Goldstein and Benjamin F. Findley, (Unpublished book manuscript, 1993); 

and Cigar, 1-29. 

33. Newsweek, 28 January 1991 36; and Newsweek, 25 February 1991,25. 

34. Newsweek, 28 January 1991, 38; The Nation, 1 July 1991, 8-9; The 

Progressive. February 1991, 13; and U.S. News & World Report, 4 February 

1991,20. 

35. The other was the more moderate National Campaign for Peace in the 

Middle East, which Jacob Weisberg notes did condemn Iraq’s invasion of 

Kuwait and called for continuing economic sanctions as long as necessary. 

36. Jacob Weisberg, “Means of Dissent,” The New Republic, 25 February 

1991, 18-20. 

37. “A Just Folly,” New Statesman & Society 3 (11 January 1991): 4-5. 

38. But see Shilbey Telhami, “Between Theory and Fact: Explaining 

American Behavior in the Gulf War,” Security Studies 2 (Autumn 1992): 96-

121. 

39. Time, 10 September 1990, 27-28; and Reader’s Digest, June 1991, 159-

60. The Time article also identified Dr Edward Luttwak as initially opposed to 

the war. 

40. Cigar, 4. 

41. Home, 111. 

42. Weigley, 464-67. 

43. Quoted in Benjamin F. Findley, Jr., “U.S. and Viet Cong Psycho- logica

Operations in Vietnam,” in Goldstein and Findley. 

44. For brief but insightful discussions of why the US lost in Vietnam, see 

Weigley, 455-70; and Spanier, 403-6. Some writers like U. S. G. Sharp in 

Strategy for Defeat (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1978) and Harry G, Summers Jr., 

in On Strategy (Novato. Calif.: Presidio, 1982) have argued that a 

“conventional” or “mechanistic” strategy could have defeated the Vietnamese i

properly applied. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power, and Larry E. Cabl

Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine 

and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986) strongly 

criticize that assertion. 

45. Findley, “U.S. and Viet Cong Psychological Operations in Vietnam.” 

217 
, , pyg,

39 (July 1989): 43-50: Zahava Solomon, “Does the War End When the Shootin

Stops? The Psychological Toll of War,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 

20 (1990): 1733-45; Zahava Solomon, Mario Mikulincer, and Steven E. Hobfo

“Effects of Social Support and Battle Intensity on Loneliness and Breakdown 

during Combat,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (1986): 1269

76; idem, “Objective versus Subjective Measurement of Stress and Social 

Support: Combat-Related Reactions,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical 

Psychology 55 (1987): 577-83. 

47. Cable, Conflict of Myths, 185. 

48. Larry E. Cable, Unholy Grail: The US and the Wars in Vietnam, 1965-8 

(New York: Routledge, 1991). 

49. Sun Tzu. 110. 

50. Cable, Unholy Grail. 220. 

51. Horace L. Hunter, Jr., “Capturing the Revolution,” Military Review 70 

(January 1990): 89-90. 

52. Cable, Unholy Grail, 220-21. 

53. Lt Gen Charles A Homer, “The Air Campaign,” Military Review 71 

(September 1991): 16-27; and Zahava Solomon, “Does the War End When the 

Shooting Stops?,” 1733-45. 

54. Anthony Kellet, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle 

(Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982) 254-57, See also Martin L. Fracker, 

“Psychological Effects of Aerial Bombardment,” Air Power Journal, Fall 1992

56-67. 

55. Newsweek, 18 February 1991, 32. 

218 
PART II 

THE RESPONSE 
The Diplomacy of Regional Conflict Management 

Albert U. Mitchum, Jr. 

Thinking about war termination in the rational-choice approach, by 

analogy to chess, assumes that during the terminal stage of a war, a state, 

pursuing its national interests or goals, will prudently calculate the 

probable consequence of alternative courses of action, choose the one 

that maximizes its interests, and act accordingly. ... Indeed, the national 

interest could be operationally defined as the goals for which a state 

would prefer to keep waging a lost war rather than concede. 

-Leon V. Sigal 

Fighting to a Finish 

This essay will explore the implications of regional confli

management. There are several concepts that have recent

appeared in the literature on conflict management that deserve 

more detailed discussion. Specifically, one such idea is the conce

of establishing buffer zones in an attempt to ease tensions, much a

the boxing referee does when he asks both fighters to return to 

neutral comer. That might work well for the sport of boxing whe

both contestants in the sport acknowledge the jurisdiction an

legitimacy of the referee. Imagine the complications, however, 

one or both of the combatants in the arena refused to comply wi

the referee’s instructions. l 

The analogy is not so farfetched in the world of the realpolit

where the United States finds itself the only viable superpowe

During the past 40 years the politics of containment have left th

US deeply involved in wide and diverse parts of the worl

Without the threat of communist expansion to contain, we hav

been forced to rethink our posture. As the 45-Years’ War, the co

war, ends in the blink of a calendar, we find that the world ha

become accustomed to a US presence. Meanwhile the US ha

become accustomed to the primacy of US interests and dealin

only with the specific and vital US interests being threatened. Th

may be a luxury we can no longer afford as we grapple with th

reality of living in a world where US national interests may not b

221 
directly threatened but where US action is demanded by the wor

at large. 

Many in the US would like to turn inward and leave thes

external conflicts to the United Nations. Secretary-General Boutro

Boutros-Ghali has outlined four missions for the United Nation

(UN) in “An Agenda for Peace.” These missions, which form th

basis of his vision, are preventive diplomacy, peacemakin

peacekeeping, and postconflict peace building. 2

 We will use th

secretary-general’s outline as a starting point. Indeed it is one o

the few models existing in the real world. In the next few page

we will briefly explore the vision, the reality, and the implication

of future costs and consequences of US activity as a constabular

force in regional conflict management. 

The emergence of limited war has meant that military activi

had to be conducted below the thresholds that would trigger 

direct confrontation between superpowers. 

The use of force in international relations has been so altered that it 

seems appropriate to speak of constabulary forces, rather than of military 

forces. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it 

is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, 

and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory. 3 

The constabulary concept defines a military framewor

allowing it to be used as an instrument of power projectio

Despite the capability to destroy the world, we theorize about th

use of military force just as we would about the use of politic

influence, economic power, and information dominance a

instruments of power projection. The obvious paradox is that th

military professional who is trained and prepared for employme

of force (force projection) on a grand scale may also be the be

suited for a role in regional conflict management on a subnation

scale. 

This is in keeping with the vision that the secretary-general o

the United Nations espouses for military forces. Boutros Boutro

222 
Ghali

s foreword to the Yearbook of the United Nations, 199

gives us a glimpse of his vision for the future: 

The year 1991 saw the definitive end of the Cold War and the bipolar 

era. Political energies previously held captive to the super-power struggle 

were released; new states were born as people recovered their freedom; 

major steps forward helped to reduce the threat of nuclear war. A new 

spirit of hopefulness and a belief in the relevance of common action 

began to take shape. But it also emerged that the transition to a new 

pattern of international relations would be neither easy nor risk free. 

One of the most hopeful signs was the clear consensus among states that 

the age of the United Nations had come. The United Nations suddenly 

found that it was no longer paralyzed by the bipolar struggle: indeed, the 

world looked to the organization as never before. It was increasingly 

being asked to take on and fulfill its historic mission: that of the 

guardianship of peace and hope. 4 

Not two years after these words were written they began to lo

some of their power. It is not the lack of interest nor the loss o

direction but the harsh glare of reality that has begun to diminis

the words’ impact. What has also begun to tarnish is a clear

defined role for the US military in regional conflict managemen

The strategy of containing violence within a specified area as 

confined regional conflict requires highly centralized control of th

instruments of power projection by civilian policymakers. In the

situations military combat forces are only one facet of an overa

campaign of coercion through diplomacy. 

Along these lines the secretary-general considers preventiv

diplomacy the most desirable and efficient method for easin

tensions before they erupt into violence. As a subset of preventiv

diplomacy, he suggests preventive deployments of armed forces 

unstable areas. In his vision these forces serve a diplomat

mission to deter cross-border predatory behavior as well as 

stabilize internal hostilities. His vision also calls for the creation o

demilitarized zones in this preventive context. 5 However, th

introduction of armed forces capable of combat and the impositio

of demilitarized zones could act to institutionalize a conflict. Take

223 
to its logical extreme, preventive intervention could lead to th

type of repression that sowed the seeds of conflict in Yugoslavia. 

If the conflict cannot be prevented, the next step would be 

bring the conflict to a peaceful resolution. This peacemaking ro

tasks the UN to bring hostile parties to agreement by peacef

means. If peaceful diplomatic means fail, the UN would deplo

heavily armed peace-enforcement units. 6

 While peacemaking an

peace enforcement break new ground for the United Nations, th

new plan also calls for increases in its other, more traditional ro

of peacekeeping. The secretary general forces full participation o

the General Assembly in supporting mediation, negotiation, an

arbitration efforts, plus a greater reliance on the International Cou

of Justice for peaceful adjudication of differences. 

As the international climate has changed in the last four year

the peacekeeping mission has evolved rapidly as a popular an

viable concept, despite increased demands in logistics, equipmen

personnel, and finance. Peacekeeping entails inserting light

armed forces where a cease-fire has already been agreed to by th

warring parties. Peacekeepers primarily monitor and encourag

conformity of the parties to the cease-fire or armistice. 7 In a

effort to capitalize on recent successes the secretary-gener

recommends a $50 million revolving reserve fund and 

prepositioned stock of peacekeeping equipment for under-equippe

troops. The implications are that member states should comm

certain equipment to stand by for immediate use and th

peacekeeping personnel would receive improved languag

training. The secretary-general sees peacekeeping as a short-ter

stability factor designed to improve the chances of long-ter

peace. Unfortunately, he does not present a plan to create th

infrastructure and support base this would require. 

He also believes that postconflict peace building would fost

confidence between parties to an armed dispute. These nation

forces on loan to the UN would disarm the belligerents, repatria

refugees, monitor elections, protect human rights, and he

224 
reform/strengthen governmental institutions. They wou

undertake projects such as developing agriculture, improvin

transportation systems, sharing resources, and improving educatio

to bring states together. The technical assistance of this UN

imitation of the peace corps is conceived as a way to transfor

deficient national structures and strengthen democratic institution

8

 Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s agenda assumes the UN has or ca

readily acquire the capabilities, the latitude, and the national will 

use them. The secretary-general’s plans for an enhanced role in th

post-cold-war era are based on the assumption that the majo

powers generally agree and are generally equal in economic a

well as military power. 

The Reality 

The end of the superpower and ideological rivalry has n

meant the end of superpowers. There remains one lone superpow

in the world today, the United States. Several writers hav

described the current world structure as being unipolar, with th

United States sitting at the apex. For the near future, only th

United States possesses the combination of political, economi

and military power to perform all the missions outlined in “A

Agenda for Peace.” The events of the 1990s lend credence to th

assertion. 

International peace and collective security have been primari

defined and shaped by the United States. In short, where the U

has not led, neither has the UN nor the rest of the world. It was U

action that prevented the predatory aggression of Iraq fro

continuing south of Kuwait and wresting control of the Arabia

Peninsula. One could argue, as some states have already argue

that the UN served as a tool of US foreign policy. The Securi

Council resolutions to condemn the invasion, approve th

economic embargo, and to use force were de facto consent to u

policy. While the US could have acted unilaterally if needed, 

was appreciably easier and politically more palatable to act 

concert with other states. Admittedly, the use of force was muc

225 
easier to sell to the American people and to Congress whe

“legitimized” through multilateral consensus. 9 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm represent, in fact, the fir

peacemaking and peace-enforcement operations in the post-cold

war era. The unprecedented cooperation of many dissimilar state

fueled the emerging hope for the UN to take a more proactive ro

in international peace and security. But here the analogy break

down because the reason for US involvement was that the US sa

its own interests directly threatened. The US, therefor

immediately involved itself to rectify the situation. 

The further evidence of the UN’s inability to perfor

peacemaking operations is the literal disintegration of Somali

The overthrow of President Siad Barre proved to be a quagmire fo

the UN. With the Somali government and infrastructures virtual

nonexistent, conditions there seemed to provide the ideal challeng

for the newly resurgent UN to test its mettle. The organizatio

responded and established the United Nations Operation 

Somalia (UNOSOM) in April 1992. 

Current Perspective

Somalia 

For more than two decades, the African nation of Somalia was a pawn in 

the global battle between communism and democracy. First the Soviet 

Union and then the United States poured millions of dollars’ worth of 

weaponry into the sparsely populated Muslim nation in their struggle 

over what was called ‘the strategic Horn of Africa.’ When the cold war 

ended, Somali President Mohammed Siad Barre fell from power and the 

country slipped back into obscurity. But the killing only intensified as 

local warlords turned their Kalishnikovs and M-16s on aid workers and 

even on relief ships. Where man left off the killing, nature stepped in: 

Three years of drought have dried up water supplies, killed livestock and 

baked cornfields into concrete. 

-Carla Robinson 

‘Waiting for America” 

Somalia presents a unique set of challenges to be faced. Th

country has disintegrated into family-based tribes and coalitions o

226 
tribes that often lack central leadership. The principal thrust come

from groups of armed gangs referred to as “technicals.” The

technicals mix with the local population and owe their allegianc

to local warlords. As the system of law and order broke down, th

rest of the population armed themselves. The US ambassador 

Kenya warned, in a cable to the US under secretary fo

international affairs, “Somalis, as the Italians and Britis

discovered to their discomfiture, are natural-born guerrillas... The

will mine the roads. They will lay ambushes. They will launch hi

and-run attacks. They will not be able to stop the convoys fro

getting through. But they will inflict-and take-casualties.” 10 

The first significant UNOSOM action was with the deployme

of 3,500 troops to Mogadishu in September. Their peacekeepin

mission was simply to protect humanitarian relief supplies. 11 Th

United States landed marines in early December and brought 

approximately 25,000 combat, combat-support, and other troops 

stabilize the internal situation and protect the relief supplies. Th

United States, in effect, engaged in a small-scale peac

enforcement action to disarm and separate the rival clans and 

foster a mutually agreeable settlement between them. 12 The U

planners could take a lesson from the US experience. Preside

George Bush provided assistance reluctantly to the Somalis an

only after a UN resolution offering a coalition solution. The U

resolution specified “the US-led international force will be allowe

to use ‘all necessary means’ to create a secure environment fo

humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” 13 In setting nation

objectives, President Bush declared Operation Restore Hope 

humanitarian mission. He also warned the technicals, howeve

that the US would not tolerate interference. Situations like the on

in Somalia are not very satisfying, but are likely to be increasing

common in the years ahead. With that in mind, there is a lesso

here to be taken from the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Cours

(JDACC) Air Campaign Planning Handbook. This handboo

directs the campaigner to gather information on the enemy

culture and religion as well as on health, social structure, foo

227 
public utilities, mass media, the monetary system, and final

significant ethnic and socioeconomic breakdowns. 14 In Somalia

case, culture and religion must be the foremost consideration 

achieving the desired end state because all other elements of th

governmental infrastructure are either destroyed or incapable o

caring for the population. 

I caution that in researching the Somali culture and formulatin

courses of action, we must guard against the pitfalls o

ethnocentrism. The Somali Muslim is not likely to perceive ou

actions as we do from within our frame of reference. America 

unique in assimilating a wide variety of people into a single socie

without distinct social classes, -major ethnic divisions, o

subnationalistic undercurrents. 15 Somalia, on the other hand, is 

“fractured country, long molded by a culture of decentralizatio

where the basis for all political and social structure is genealogy

16 The authority of clan elders, now more than ever, provides th

foundation for Somali society. The national leaders of Somalia

recent postcolonial nationhood pitted one clan against another an

this development, combined with the influx of modern small arm

severely weakened the traditional position of the clan elders. No

warlords and technicals wield authority at gunpoint. The society 

in flux. 

A UN resolution defined the end state in Somalia as a secu

environment for humanitarian relief operations. The best means o

restoring near-term security was to ensure that the Soma

population identified US intervention as purely humanitarian an

not favoring one tribe over another. In addition, any use of a

power beyond airlift would only increase Somali misery and add 

the cost of rebuilding. For example, if the US were to apply a

strikes against warlord strongholds, we would only aid th

consolidation of territory by other clans. Attacks on Somalia

already sparse infrastructure would further delay delivery of ai

thereby inflicting more suffering on the people and increasing th

costs of rebuilding Somalia. 

228 
Current Perspective

Yugoslavia 

We would be remiss not to mention the situation in the form

Yugoslavia 17 where the United Nations Protection Forc

(UNPROFOR) consists of about 23,000 troops at this writing. Th

troop presence, however, has not deterred ethnic cleansin

detention camps, refugees, nor killing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

One European diplomat familiar with the crisis commented: “Wh

we’ve seen in Yugoslavia isn’t peacekeeping, peacemaking o

peace enforcing. It’s been a case of watching as peac

deteriorates.” 19 As in Somalia, the UN has deployed peacekeepin

forces with a peacekeeping mind-set into a peacemaking/peac

enforcing situation; there is no peace to keep, so the UN force

have been inadequate to the task. 

The experiences in Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, and the form

Yugoslavia all point to one reality; there is a need for U

leadership in a new world order of uncertainty and instability. Th

UN is not yet prepared to take the lead step in international peac

and stability which Boutros Boutros-Ghali envisions. 

Although the means to accomplish the ends are not exact

clear, nor universally acknowledged, the objectives seem cle

enough. The UN’s stated goal is to establish humanitarian relief 

the besieged cities of Bosnia. 20 The more difficult objective is 

bring the fighting to an end in order to establish a lasting peac

between the warring factions. The first step toward this end wou

seem to be deciding which course to follow. 

The difficulty is in determining the best course to follow an

the most appropriate means to accomplish the desired end stat

There has been much discussion of a bombing campaign again

the Serbian forces. The danger is that there is a downside to 

successful bombing campaign in which the Serbian forces could b

driven to a guerrilla war that could, in turn, lessen the direct impa

of air power. At that point we would be forced to choose between 

continued bombing campaign against a highly mobile target or 

229 
mounted house-to-house assault that would require an enormou

number of troops. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) gives us this ster

warning: 

You need to know how to get out as well as get in. Whatever is done 

militarily ought to be carried out quickly without implying a long-range, 

continuing commitment by US forces...and I suspect the same thing by 

European forces. 21 

Even the option of an air campaign against Serbia is fraug

with potential political, military, economic, and moral costs. The

are no easy solutions and the costs are prohibitive. 

Future Implications

Costs and Consequences 

The reality of the world is that the United States enjoys certa

technological advantages over most of the world’s military force

and these secrets are jealously guarded by an army of bureaucra

and legislation aimed at prohibiting the export of certa

technologies. It seems the potential for compromise of some o

these technologies increases as we become involved in le

structured coalition force arrangements. While we all want ou

soldiers to be protected by our best and latest technologies, we d

not want to see these same technologies used against them

Conventional wisdom would point to arms and parts left behind 

Vietnam being used to repair US-made equipment in other parts o

the world. Conventional wisdom and recent experience wou

point to Iranian pilots flying US-made fighter aircraft and terroris

threatening the US with US-made Stinger missiles original

intended for the Mujaheddin. The point here is to highlight th

dichotomous situation where our servicemen and servicewome

might be denied our full range of technology because of the dang

of technology transfer to temporary allies in a UN-sponsore

coalition. 

Unsuccessful involvement in UN-sponsored missions in

world conflict zones can only hurt the United States’s posture an

230 
prestige in the eyes of the world. The United States stands at th

edge of a pax americana technica that no single nation in the wor

can challenge. We should be selective as to our involvement 

military operations that do not directly support advancement of U

objectives. The technological advantages we enjoy were paid fo

by US taxpayers in a hard-fought technology race with the form

Soviet Union. US taxpayers, therefore, should have a voice in th

use of those technologies, which they financed through sacrifice. 

The alternative then is to recognize that US taxpayers have, an

still are, footing much of the bill for military activity overseas. 

the mandate the current administration claims is to be believed, U

taxpayers are more interested in programs at home even if they a

at the expense of programs abroad. 

Domestic sentiment says that diplomats should be given th

chance to resolve regional disputes without involving US militar

forces, and they should be held accountable if they do not. Th

Clinton presidency appears to be centered on domesticity, not o

global interdependence and collective security. The reality of th

world indicates that comanagement of regional conflicts has n

performed as expected and that the US by default is in hig

demand to “make it work.” The question that begs to be asked the

is who picks up the pieces if the US fails? The caution, despi

world opinion, is to be very selective as to the nature and depth o

US involvement. 

Summary 

Clearly regional conflict management is a role at which the U

could look in order to keep the hot spots in the international syste

from boiling over. In a recent statement before the House Foreig

Affairs Committee, a State Department official commented: 

We have reached one of the three great junctions of 20th century history. 

We have won the Cold War, just as we have won the First and Second 

World Wars. Our prestige and influence are at an apogee, but in some 

ways, we are tired from the struggle and want to turn inward. Our 

231 
pyy 

somebody-anybody-to take over the load overseas. 22 

During the early 1960s under former secretary-general Da

Hammarskjöld, peacekeeping operations were termed “preventiv

diplomacy” and were intended to keep the major powers ou

especially the superpowers, by bringing in the smaller powers 

stabilize a situation before the superpowers would feel compelle

to intervene. 23 Today, the challenge will be just the opposite: 

find a way to attract American interest, involvement, an

leadership. 

One of the potential problems is the concept of a continuum o

UN actions, any of which can be chosen in response to a give

situation. 24 The steps from preventive diplomacy to peacemakin

to peace enforcement, and finally to postconflict peace building a

appear to follow a logical, linear flow of options which will f

almost any situation in some fashion. 

However, there is a very fundamental and significant jump fro

peacekeeping to peace enforcement. 25 The difference is not ju

one of degree, but a near quantum leap in kind, and it reflects th

fundamental interests of the conflicting parties. In peacekeepin

situations, both sides have mutually agreed to a cease-fire, consid

a cessation of hostilities to be in their best interests, and harbor th

hope of at least a tentative agreement on future relations. In peac

enforcement situations, on the other hand, at least one side ha

something to gain from the conflict and is therefore reluctant 

stop the fighting. Even if a peace-enforcement action is successf

in terminating the open conflict between hostile parties, it will n

necessarily eliminate the root cause of the conflict. The cause an

ultimate resolution of conflict is a political process, not a pure

military activity. 26 Therefore, a successful peace-enforcemen

action does not necessarily lead to a peacekeeping operation. Th

difference is not trivial, and carries significant implications in th

type of forces the United Nations would need to deploy. 27 

232 
Peacekeeping is the United Nations

s most visible an

prominent mission. It is also the mission which will continue 

largely define the organization’s role, in international peace an

security for the near future. It is the most practical and the mo

practiced of the UN’s missions. Peacekeeping forces do not hav

to create peace, the waning factions have already agreed to a ceas

fire or armistice. Peacekeepers are caretakers to a peace alread

agreed upon, and most importantly, their presence is desired b

both sides. Hence nations are more willing to contribute forces fo

peacekeeping. Certainly, peacekeeping is a “growth industry” wi

a future for even further growth. 28 It is, however, also one of th

most difficult missions 29 since it is essentially a diplomat

initiative but one that must be based on power. Suffice it to say th

it is hard enough to build and coordinate activities within th

political architecture of any individual nation state. It is a

exponentially more difficult task for a coalition of states. 

Postconflict peace building is a logical follow-on mission 

peacekeeping. Postconflict peace building is also performed at th

pleasure of both parties. This mission could be performe

following the conclusion of a successful peacekeeping operation o

in conjunction with an ongoing peacekeeping operatio

Peacekeeping operations, however, will not necessarily build th

foundations for a future peace; only the opposing sides can do tha

Peace-building operations have a great potential as lubricants 

the longer term peace process, not as the fuel for it. 

In situations in which American national security interests a

directly threatened as in the Persian Gulf, the United States wi

take the lead to secure them. This will be all the more true in 

major peace-enforcement situation. The United States can b

expected to build ad hoc coalitions and to seek legitimacy fo

actions in the international community as well as with th

American Congress and the American people who have borne an

will bear the majority of the expenses incurred in any suc

operations. From a US perspective the UN serves as a tool o

233 
American policy in situations where vital US national securi

interests are at stake. 

In localized situations, however, where peripheral nation

security interests are involved, the US will be more reluctant 

step in and more willing to support UN action. However, as th

Somalia experience demonstrates, when a legitimate missio

undertaken by the UN proves too tough for it to handle, the U

may feel compelled to step in and get involved or even to take th

lead. The UN cannot create the peace it seeks to ensure. Only th

respective states in a conflict can really create the peace th

secretary-general desires. The UN is far more likely to be nudge

and pushed along by the actions of individual states in th

international system than it is to shape the agendas for the state

themselves. The new world order may not be so new. It may ver

well be the same old order with many of the same old playe

playing on a new field. 

Furthermore, since the US is not bound to the UN, the potenti

for exploitation of regional conflicts by regional powers does exis

If the US is prepared to accept this potential, then we need d

nothing. If we do not accept it then we need to take action, but th

instruments of diplomacy and economic coercion should b

exploited before we commit US lives where US interests are n

clearly at risk. This may be the alternative paradigm for US forc

employment abroad-let the diplomats do their work and hold the

accountable. 

234 
Notes 

1 The boxing referee might be able to enforce his ruling and could even 

declare the center of the ring a no-man’s land as a kind of buffer zone. 

Unfortunately, this might also serve to ensure the combatants do not come to 

agreement on the rules. Such a ruling might well serve to institutionalize the 

tensions it was intended to relieve. 

2. One could argue that what these missions really form is a demand for 

military and diplomatic muscle that can be met by only one power on earth. 

3. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrai

(New York: Free Press, 1960), 418. 

4. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1991, vol. 45 (New 

York: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), foreword. 

5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace,” UN Chronicle, 

September 1992, 3. 

6. The stated purpose for these peace-enforcement units is to enter into a 

combat zone in order to forcibly create a cease-fire. 

7. Peter R Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s 

(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 81. 

8. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 3. 

9. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 

1,26. 

10. Carla Robbins, “Waiting for America,” U.S. News & World Report, 7 

December 1992, 26. 

11. Russell Goekie, “US Commits Forces to Somalia, But for How Long?” 

Africa Report, January-February 1993, 5. 

12. A glaring ineptitude of international proportions left the first contingent 

of 500 troops pinned down by local warring factions and unable to ensure their 

own safety, much less protect supplies. The situation continued to deteriorate 

and the remainder of the force could not be deployed. Then, the UN relief ship 

carrying 10,000 metric tons of food was shelled trying to enter Mogadishu’s 

harbor and forced to turn back to sea. By November it was clear that the UN w

not up to the task in Somalia. Only the US possessed the combination of 

political, economic, and force projection capabilities along with the national w

to establish a positive presence in the country. 

13. The plan called for the US to go in-country to stabilize the situation and 

pave the way for a larger, follow-on contingent of UNOSOM peacekeeping 

forces. The Somalia situation again suggests the US is the only country that can 

take on and lead peace-enforcement operations. It also suggests that UN peaceenforcement activities can occur only with the cooperation, involvement, and 

leadership of the United States. 

14. Eric Randell and Carla Robbins, “Operation Restore Hope,” U.S. News 

& World Report, 14 December 1992, 28. 

15. Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course (JDACCI, Air Campaign Planning 

Handbook (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and 

Education, July 19921, 2, 7. 

235 
y, y (

Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1992), 118. 

17. Jeffery Clark. “Debacle in Somalia,” Foreign no. 1 (1993): 110. 

18. The main interest at the time of this writing is the region of BosniaHerzegovina, which is slightly larger than the state of Tennessee (51,000 squar

miles) and has an extremely rugged topography. Bosnia is a net importer of foo

and can meet the needs of only about half of its approximately four million 

inhabitants. Only about 20 percent of the land is arable and the majority of it is 

in private hands. The region does, however, have some natural resources: coal, 

iron, bauxite, manganese, and timber. Bosnia’s main industries before the war 

began were those linked to the Yugoslav arms production and exportation. The 

fighting has taken its toll, and the region now suffers from plummeting 

production. 28 percent unemployment, and an inflation rate that reaches 80 

percent per month. This is exacerbated by various economic blockades that 

Serbia and Croatia have imposed in the areas where most of the industry is 

located. The country’s infrastructure includes 13,000 miles of highway and 100 

miles of pipeline for crude oil. The telephone system boasts over 700,000 

subscribers, but it is woefully antiquated. There are only two television stations 

and only two major airports. At the risk of sounding glib, this was not a formul

for economic success and growth, even before the conflict began. 

19. Thomas G. Weiss, “New Challenges for UN Military Operations: 

Implementing an Agenda for Peace.” Washington Quarterly. Winter 1993, 56. 

20. Michael S. Serrill. “Underfire,” Time, 18 January 1993, 32. 

21. David A Fulghum. “US Weighs Use of Nonlethal Weapons in Serbia if 

UN Decides to Fight,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 August 1992, 

64. 

22. Fulghum, 62. 

23. US Department of State. Dispatch 3, no. 13 (30 March 1992): 246. 

24. David W. Ziegler. War, Peace, and International Politics, 4th ed. 

(Boston: Little. Brown and Company, 1987), 326. 

25. Donald M. Snow, “Peacekeeping. Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement

The U.S. Role in the New World Order,” U.S. Army War College Fourth 

Annual Conference on Strategy, February 1993, 19. 

26. Ibid., 21. 

27. Ibid., 20. 

236 
q

peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping forces are not combat 

forces. The soldiers have traditionally been lightly armed for self-defense, 

inserted by mutual agreement of the parties in conflict, and viewed as neutral 

parties to the original conflict. The role of peacekeeping forces is analogous to 

national police forces rather than military forces. Peace-enforcement units, on 

the other hand, are combat units by necessity. Their purpose would be to engag

in combat and their presence in a conflict would be opposed by at least one of 

the combatants. These units would not be viewed as neutral and could very we

be regarded by one side as reinforcements for the other. They must be armed 

with exponentially higher capability than peacekeeping forces for at least two 

reasons. To achieve a decisive effect in the battle zone, they will want to get in 

fast and quickly terminate hostilities to reduce the loss of life to the respective 

belligerents. Secondly, if the United Nations asks the US to contribute forces to 

a combat zone for something less than our own national interests, then the 

United Nations will have to take the necessary measures to ensure the greatest 

chance of survival of these troops: this necessarily means using decisive force. 

Decisive force means more than just firepower. It also requires strategic and 

tactical mobility, flexibility, precision, unit cohesion, and considerable amount

of training. Peace-enforcement units will require more than just ground troops; 

they will require air, space, and naval forces to be decisive. Since these are 

combat units, they will require the sophisticated logistics network to maintain 

them. Extensive, responsive transportation assets will be required to insert the 

units into or near the combat zone as well as support the logistics aspects of the 

operation. There are other requirements to building a decisive force, but they ar

beyond the scope of this discussion. 

29. John Spanier, Games Nations Play, 8th ed. (Washington. D.C.: 

Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1993), 542. 

30. Currently there are 15 member nations that compromise the Security 

Council, and there is general agreement the composition of the Security Counc

needs to be changed. Many of the proposals include placing Germany, Japan, 

and third world potential members such as India, Brazil, and Nigeria as 

permanent members on the Security Council, expanding the body to 20 or mor

nations. While this might make the Security Council more representative of 

global and regional powers, it would most certainly hamper its ability to make 

quick or decisive decisions on the use of force. The inevitable debates might ad

legitimacy, but they would do so at the expense of mission accomplishment 

(e.g.. preventive deployments or peace enforcement). 

237 
Forecasting Military 

Technological Needs 

Anthony D. Alley 

Time and again, we have seen technology revolutionize the battlefield. 

The US has always relied upon its technological edge to offset the need 

to match potential adversaries’ strength in numbers. Cruise missiles, 

stealth fighters and bombers, today’s smart weapons with the state-ofthe-art guidance systems and tomorrow’s brilliant ones. The men and 

women in our armed forces deserve the best technology America has to 

offer. 

-Victor H. Reis 

“Foundations for the Future” 

Clearly, the political establishment in office at the time o

Desert Storm saw technology as an important element in defens

The acquisition process that aimed to keep US militar

technologies five to 10 years ahead of those of the Soviet Union 

even credited as a contributor to America’s victory in the cold wa

1

 Although cuts in defense spending will certainly alter th

acquisition processes for high technology, the Clinto

administration appears to be no less interested in technology. 2 

Moving from the broader, political perspective to th

Department of Defense (DOD) opinion of the role of technology 

the Gulf War, the DOD notes, “A revolutionary new generation o

high-technology weapons, combined with innovative and effectiv

doctrine, gave our forces the edge.” 3 In the DOD’s final report 

Congress on the conduct of the war, former Secretary of Defen

Dick Cheney also noted that capitalizing on the leading-edg

technologies available during Desert Storm “promises to chang

the nature of warfare significantly.” 4 

The potentially decisive nature of technology in warfare ha

been well stated. However, forecasting technological needs can b

an especially challenging task. The spectrum of availab

technologies is quite broad, and the pace of technological change 

239 
swift. The Committee for Strategic Technologies for the Arm

(STAR) is predicting that 

the explosive rate of technological progress observed in the last three 

decades can be expected to continue, if not increase, during the next three 

decades. Weapons of 20 years from now will have completely outmoded 

those of today, just as those of U.S. forces outmoded the older weapons 

of Iraqi forces in the Persian Gulf war. 5 

Trying to understand the intricacies of the thousands o

technological subsystems proposed for use in military operations 

far beyond the capabilities of most. Still, the importance o

technology in military operations and public/ congressional intere

in the military’s high-dollar/high-tech expenditures compel us 

understand what shapes and drives our procurement of technolog

Each of us needs to be able to articulate the significance o

technology in military operations. Consequently, it may be best 

take a top-down approach and consider some of the influences an

principles that drive the pursuit of technologies. 

This essay is offered in response to this challenge. It wi

highlight some of the principles of military operations that can b

extended with technology. Thereafter, a few of the majo

influences on technological procurement will be addressed. Th

view is purposefully broad, and the material is presented as a

impetus to further consideration, study, and dialogue. The majori

of examples used to demonstrate technology’s impact on militar

operations is taken from Desert Storm. It should not be taken th

Gulf War technologies represent the extremes of possibilities fo

technology nor that they will be sufficient to counter the ne

threat, but given the recent nature of the war and the unprecedente

television coverage, most readers will be familiar with the system

and occurrences addressed. 

Technology is a term that can be difficult to come to grips wit

For the purposes of this essay, the term technology is assumed 

mean a system or subsystem sought for practical application. Th

is, technology infers research and development with practical aim

and objectives. Political and military aims, at least at strategic an

240 
operational levels, ought not to be dictated by technology. Mo

appropriately, technologies should be pursued to meet, and a

therefore subordinate to, political and military objectives. 6

 Still, 

must be noted that, “Strategy without suitable tactical instrumen

is simply a set of ideas.” 7 

Technology as an Extension

to Military Principles 

Application of the principles of war, detailed in Air Forc

Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States A

Force, does not secure success in military operations. Instead, the

“represent generally accepted truths that have proven effective fo

commanders employing forces in combat.” 8 If we accept th

technologies make up the vehicles of force employment, speakin

both figuratively and literally, then technologies that extend th

ability of commanders to fight according to the principles of w

should prove most effective. That is, technologies that maximize 

commander’s ability to use force economically, concentrate powe

maneuver, maintain the offensive, and so on, will pay great

dividends than technologies that make lesser contributions to th

exercise of those principles. Consequently, an excellent framewor

for the consideration of technologies is in terms of the

contributions to the employment of military forces under th

principles of war. 

For’ example, during World War II, it would have required 10

aircraft dropping a total of 648 1,100-pound bombs against 

power-generating plant to achieve a 96 percent probability o

striking the plant with two bombs. During Desert Storm, the sam

probability could be achieved with only one aircraft dropping tw

precision guided bombs. 9

 Were we compelled to argue for on

technology over the other, in this example, we would argue 

favor of precision guided munitions and associated deliver

systems, given their ability to offer the commander a great

opportunity to capitalize on simplicity and economy of force. 

241 
From this example, it can be seen that the technologie

associated with precision guided munitions, as employed durin

the Gulf War, contributed directly to economy of force an

simplicity, and indirectly to the exercise of other principles of wa

Where this technological advantage was not available durin

Desert Storm, it can be seen that economy of force and simplici

were sacrificed. The DOD’s final report to Congress on th

conduct of the Gulf War notes that 

the lack of PGM [precision guided munitions] capability on many US 

aircraft required planners to select less-than-optimum attack options, 

such as delaying attacks or assigning multiple sorties with non-precision 

munitions. Operation Desert Storm results argue that a higher percentage 

of US attack aircraft should have PGM capability to increase the amount 

of target damage that can be inflicted by a finite number of aircraft. 10 

Of course, some of the same technologies that contributed 

economy and simplicity also contributed to surprise. Most notabl

the F-117 utilized stealth technology to bring firepower to Ira

facilities inside Baghdad. “Platforms like the F-117 provided low

risk attack options that required neither the traditional imperativ

of air superiority nor electronic-warfare and fighter-esco

support.” 11 This assessment of stealth technology is especial

significant. When Army AH-64 attack helicopters first struck Ira

radar sites during the initial moments of Desert Storm, F-117 

were already beyond those radar sites and well inside Ira

providing that country’s military a rather startling wake-up ca

So, the stealth technologies of the F-117 greatly extended surpris

allowing commanders to employ weapon systems with litt

warning and attack where attack would have been traditional

awkward. 

In order to support the principle of maneuver, technologies th

allow for flexible power projection need to be pursued. This wi

become increasingly difficult as more and more US installation

overseas are closed. Even after forces have deployed into th

theater of operations, distances to strategic targets can restrict th

numbers and types of assets that a commander can launch again

242 
an enemy. Power projection proved to be a focal point for effo

during the Gulf War with nearly 17,000 tanker sorties flown 

support of combat missions. Many aircraft required refuelin

support to and from targets inside Iraq, and it is estimated th

nearly 60 percent of the sorties flown by air-refuelable aircra

required air-refueling support. 12 As our focus shifts from a majo

battle against the former Soviet Union and to regional operations 

support of peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and localize

instabilities, power projection will need to be a factor considere

with most technological purchases. 

It should come as no surprise that operations out of area an

coalition warfare will also confound efforts to operate under th

principle of simplicity. Orchestrating integrated attack packages o

multinational forces requires a lot of attention to detail an

carefully communicated directions. For instance, during Dese

Storm the daily air task order (ATO), the document which detai

targets, routing, support, and other particulars, grew to hundreds o

pages. The long time required to plan the day’s activities, genera

the ATO, and then distribute it electronically using the Compute

Assisted Force Management System was significant. Howeve

most units received details of that portion of the ATO pertinent 

their unit via secure telephone long before they received th

electronically distributed ATO. 13 Technologies that simplify th

functions of communicating, planning, and executing tasks are 

must, especially if we continue to operate as participants 

multinational coalitions and away from well-established militar

facilities. 

Of course, technologies that simplify operations need n

reduce security. For instance explicit communications betwee

units within theater and between Gulf-based units and agencies 

the US were vital if information and material were to continue 

flow. Spare parts were required, plans needed to be coordinate

and taskings needed to be generated in as direct and simple 

manner as possible, but security could not be compromised. Secu

telephone systems proved to be one of the most effectiv

243 
technologies of the war. An extension of this technology, secu

fax systems, was especially useful. Target details, such as th

layout of buildings, were faxed to attacking units to enhanc

mission effectiveness. 14 Commanders will continue to requi

technologies that foster this sort of simplicity without sacrificin

security. 

Few technologies contributed to the principle of offensive in th

Gulf War as did those associated with high-speed antiradiatio

missiles (HARM). The Gulf War Air Power Survey Summar

notes, “The use of HARMs effectively neutralized both elemen

of Iraqi ground-based defenses-antiaircraft artillery (AM) an

surface-to-air missiles (SAM)-by suppressing the SAMs an

thereby allowing coalition aircraft to fly above the lethal range o

AAA.” 15 Consequently, commanders were able to prosecute th

air war at the time and place of their choosing. This freedom o

action was a prime contributor to the coalition’s ability to mainta

the initiative. 

Influences on Technological Pursuits 

These few examples demonstrate that links betwee

technologies and war-fighting principles can be establishe

However, as we consider the suitability of various technologies fo

military applications, we are likely to find that choices are never a

simple as selecting technologies solely due to their utility 

exercising the principles of war. Instead, a variety of other facto

will also influence our decisions. 

First of all, we are likely to find that the exercise of th

principles of war is frequently constrained by political concern

and ethical considerations. For instance, early in the Gulf W

there seemed to be no pressing military need to target Iraqi mobi

Scud missile systems due to their limited accuracy. 16 Howeve

after a few Scud attacks against Tel Aviv and other Israeli citie

“many sorties were diverted or replanned from their intende

targets to hunt and suppress the Scuds.” 17 In this case, it could b

244 
argued that political considerations subverted the principles o

mass, economy of force, offensive, and maneuver. The recorde

history of our experiences in Vietnam is replete with simil

contravening concerns. Another example that is more germane 

the issue of technology acquisition focuses on the use of weapon

of mass destruction. There are those who argue, for instance, 

favor of the deterrent potential assumed to be characteristic o

nuclear weapons versus large standing armies. However, politica

social, and moral influences encourage a broader, more balance

perspective for weapons procurement. 

Away from the battlefield, political and social issues will als

influence our pursuit of technologies. The 25 March 1991 issue o

Fortune magazine begins its article “How Defense Will Change

with the following note: 

When military historians look back on the 20th century, they may well 

call the war against Iraq the last big hurrah for America’s awesome arms 

industry-an all-stops-out, razzle-dazzle, techno-killer grand finale. 

Normally a performance like that would guarantee future engagements or 

at least a rousing encore. But-for now-this show is over. 18 

Fortune may have overstated the point a bit, but clearly, defens

spending is on the decline. Defense funds are being diverted in

social programs and debt reduction. Some estimates foreca

defense cuts to bring defense spending for 1997 down to th

buying power levels of 1960. 19 Consequently, some degree o

concession will need to be made as the best and most promisin

technologies are procured from among the growing number of ver

attractive alternatives. 

This increasing number of technologies and restricted budge

will have another influence on technology procurement. In time

past, the US was guaranteed a technological edge in militar

matters by virtue of the services’ procurement procedures and ou

well-established and well-financed defense industrial bas

Systems could be sponsored, from prototype throug

implementation, by the DOD. Exclusive control of researc

development, and production could be tightly manage

245 
Consequently, management of technology transfer an

technological preeminence were relatively certain. Changes in th

economy have diminished that certainty. 

In response to budgetary pressures, the services may b

compelled to buy systems off the-shelf or, at least, ask defens

contractors to field prototypes in a more open market. It has als

been suggested that the US military will need to field system

derived from commercially available parts. 20 As Victor, H. Rei

director of defense research and engineering, noted before th

House Appropriations Committee, “we will produce weapo

systems only when we have an identifiable need, when th

technology is in hand and only when it is cost effective [emphas

added].” 21 There is no reason to believe that these commercial

available subsystems could not make their way into the weapons 

a future adversary. The implication is, in future battles, we cou

be challenged by technological systems on par with our own. 

This problem is exacerbated by the globalization of productio

Industry will continue to look for less expensive areas fo

manufacturing, and in some instances, those areas will be outsid

of the US. Consequently, research and development and advance

production technologies will be available to a wider audience. 

An anticipated spin-off is that postgraduate students in technic

fields, a dynamic source for military technologies, will reloca

away from the us in order to complete their studies nearer researc

and development (R&D) centers. 23 Again, these factors are like

to contribute to the technological sophistication of our adversary 

the next war. Our approach to technology will need to take th

into account. 

Budgetary restrictions also compel us to pursue pow

projection technologies more aggressively. As fewer weapo

systems and personnel are strategically stationed near potential h

spots, we must seek technological solutions to power projectio

challenges. These solutions must include needs for glob

surveillance in preparation for operations out of our local are

246 
enhanced precision for navigation and weapons deliver

minimization of collateral damage; employment of weapo

systems across greater distances; and maintenance of a

superiority from afar. Of course, each of these challenges is like

to generate additional expenses and technological complications o

its own. Long-haul transport with the means of delivering materia

into unprepared areas may be crucial. Air refueling seems to be 

certain requirement. Virtual reality systems may provide aircre

and others with simulated in-theater training in advance of the

deployment. Satellite-based, secure communication systems ma

need to be procured. 

We can diminish some of the impacts of reduced budge

through a number of approaches to technological purchase

Pursuit of technologies with low failure rates could reduce suppo

costs. If systems are purchased with extended longevit

upgradeability, and high reliability in mind, fewer personnel wou

be required to maintain these systems. 24 

The problem of limited funding for military hardware can b

exacerbated in that fewer defense dollars typically means small

production runs and higher costs per item. Of course, an increase

awareness of the potential for developing systems and subsystem

with sister services could help offset this problem. An emphasis o

jointness can enhance effectiveness on the battlefield throug

commonality in communication, supplies, and spare parts. Th

benefits of jointly sponsored research, development, an

procurement should be a primary consideration as we foreca

appropriate technologies for future military operations. 

Were the challenges to forecasting technologies offered b

broader political agendas and reduced defense spending n

enough, the evolution of the services’ roles and missions is like

to demand new solutions supported by new technologie

Humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, drug interdiction, and other, a

of yet unforeseen, roles and missions may demand more of ou

time, attention, and technology procurement dollars. 

247 
An easily overlooked element in technological procurement 

the operator. The STAR committee notes, “The informatio

explosion on the battlefield, and in preparation for battle, wi

continue as intelligence sensors, unmanned systems, compute

based communications, and other information intensive system

proliferate.” 25 Organizing this data in practical ways an

presenting it for effective use by planners and operators will b

especially challenging and require substantial technologic

investment. User interfaces will also have to account for th

increased number of systems allocated to each individual in 

shrinking military. Jeff Hecht of New Scientist appropriately note

‘‘as fewer soldiers come to control more systems, each on

becomes a more valuable asset making it increasingly important 

communicate with and protect soldiers during a conflict.” 

Ideally, end-users would be actively involved in research an

development to ensure technologies meet their needs for ease o

use and effectiveness. 27 

A final point to consider as we try to forecast technologic

requirements: having stated that technology’s contributions 

military operations can have decisive effects, it is of immen

importance to understand that superior technologies do not w

wars on their own. “It is a supremely dangerous error to suppos

that technology is a solution for the problems of war. 

A strategy devised by technocrats, based solely on superiority 

weaponry is not strategy at all. Machines do not win wars.” 28 A

noted earlier, the right technologies working together with a

effective strategy made the difference in Desert Storm. Strateg

objectives, and technology are inextricably linked. 

Summary 

Hopefully, these few examples of applied technologies an

factors that will impact our procurement of technological

sophisticated systems give some basis for the development of 

framework for the consideration of such acquisitions. Howeve

248 
there is still a good way to go and many challenges ahead as we tr

to make decisions about the best and brightest technologie

suitable for military applications. As Colin Gray notes in his boo

Weapons Don’t Make War, “If one looks for works that see

systematically to explore the connections among policy, strateg

and weapons, the hunt is poorly rewarded indeed.” 29 Instea

weapon systems, military plans, arms control, and other weapon

related issues are addressed as “technical subjects separate fro

broader strategic or policy meanings.” 30 In many ways, th

problem is similar to developing curriculum without a

instructional systems development (ISD) philosophy. A lot of goo

education takes place without the benefit of ISD, but concern

about truly meeting students’ needs, expense, and quality o

instruction typically go unanswered. Likewise, investment 

technologies without serious consideration of strategy or wa

fighting principles may leave doubt about their suitability. W

need to work toward a paradigm for technological pursuits th

encompasses policy, strategy, objectives, principles of war, an

budgetary constraints. 

If, as stated earlier, we are to justify the expense of hig

technology, we need to be able to articulate the connections befo

Congress and the public. This essay has been written to promp

thinking about these connections; to encourage consideration o

technologies with regard to principles of war; and to note a few o

the influences that will impact the way we procure technologie

and which technologies we will pursue. 

As noted, the principles of war do contribute to an effectiv

framework for the consideration of technology requirements. A

roles and missions evolve, we will still need to think in terms o

power projection, economy of force, security, and so on. Howeve

the officer charged with evaluating technologies for futu

operations will not be so fortunate as to be able to think solely 

terms of military war-fighting principles. Budget cuts will have 

significant impact on procurement. Smaller production runs wi

exacerbate the problems of fewer defense dollars. Th

249 
globalization of commerce and the broadening alternatives o

technological systems will mean that the US may meet 

technologically sophisticated enemy in the future. We can allevia

some of the problems associated with budget cuts as they relate 

technology procurement if we consider reliability, maintainabilit

and interoperability. It is also of great importance to remember th

technology does not win wars on its own. Technology must b

developed, procured, and employed with clear objectives in min

and as part of a sound strategy. 

250 
Notes 

1. Victor H. Reis. “Refocused Science and Technology Supports U.S. Powe

Projection Needs,” Defense Issues 7, no. 6 (19 March 1992): 1. 

2. Ibid., 2-4. 

3. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, prepared 

under the auspices of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1992), ix. 

4. Ibid., xii. 

5. STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First 

Century, prepared by the Board on Army Science and Technology, Commissio

on Engineering and Technical Systems, and National Research Council 

(Washington. D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992). 256. 

6. Colin S. Gray. Weapons Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military 

Technology (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 2. 

7. Ibid., 67. 

8. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United 

States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992,14. 

9. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War 

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 192. 

10. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, ix. 

11. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary, 29 March 1993, 212. 

12. Ibid., 195. 

13. Ibid., 199. 

14. Ibid., 198. 

15. Ibid., 196. 

16. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 122. 

17. Ibid., 224. 

18. Nancy J. Perry, “How Defense Will Change,” Fortune, 25 March 1991, 

58. 

19. Reis, 2. 

20. STAR 21,29. 

21. Reis, 1. 

22. STAR 21,34. 

23. Gray, 2. 

24. STAR 21,31-32. 

25. Ibid., 8. 

26. Jeff Hecht, “Weapons for the 21st Century,” New Scientist 135, no. 183

(8 August 1992): 21. 

27. Reis, 1. 

28. Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober, Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military 

Disasters and Their Lessons for Modem Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Pres

1990), 10. 

29. Gray, 1. 

30. Ibid., 5. 

251 
Constituting US Military 

Manpower Needs 

Joseph W. Kroeschel 

In the winter of 1991, people from around the globe witnesse

the systemic destruction of the Iraqi military, arguably the four

largest army in the world. News accounts of the US and coalitio

forces in Desert Storm showcased the incredible power, range, an

accuracy of high-technology weapons and the extraordinar

abilities of the soldiers, sailors, and airmen using those weapon

Indeed, these two elements, superb hardware and high-quali

manpower, were the fundamental ingredients that led to success 

the Gulf War, and these ingredients are the sine qua non to th

presentation of peace in the future. 

The central question in the post-cold-war era is how much o

these ingredients are needed to protect US vital interests and 

what combination. Complicating the issue is the need to move ta

dollars from defense to revitalizing our economic infrastructu

and reducing the budget deficit. Military personnel cuts, it 

argued, provide immediate dollar savings, unlike weapon system

procurement dollars that are spread out over several years. Thu

large-scale manpower reductions have been implemented and th

administration’s national defense strategy is to rely on high

technology weapons, many of which are still in the planning stag

Such a strategy seems acceptable given the visual evidence th

American public witnessed from the Gulf War. Precision guide

weapons could hit enemy tanks in Iraqi territory. Laser guide

bombs destroyed key targets, and Tomahawk missiles launche

from ships demonstrated that they could destroy military structure

hundreds of miles away without harming nearby civilian facilitie

Given this experience, why shouldn’t we develop a nation

defense strategy that relies on high technology? The answer 

simple. The administration has no corresponding strategy to obta

253 

l 
the high-quality manpower to operate and maintain high-tec

weapon systems of the future. 

On the surface the development of a manpower strategy ma

appear unnecessary. After all, we are working very hard to reduc

the size of our military forces, but we cannot get enough people 

separate or retire. Selective early retirement boards have been th

norm for years. Special benefit packages have been developed 

provide incentives for midlevel personnel to separate or reti

early. Early-out programs and involuntary separations have als

been necessary, and we have cut accessions to the minimum lev

to sustain the future force structure. Even with all these program

we still have more people in uniform than we need. 

Why, one may ask, would we need a strategy to obta

manpower? There are three reasons. First, our 20 years o

experience in manning the all-volunteer force (AVF) shows th

high-quality manpower is not always easy to obtain or readi

available. Second, the characteristics of the labor force from whic

we will recruit our future military will be dramatically differe

from the young people recruited in the seventies and eightie

Finally, we need a manpower strategy due to the time dela

between recruiting shortfalls and the ability of the Department o

Defense (DOD) to respond to those shortfalls. The programmin

budgeting, and appropriation process is far too lengthy to respon

quickly to manpower shortages. 2

 Before elaborating on 

manpower strategy, “quality” manpower must be clarified. 

High-“Quality” Manpower 

The issue of high-quality manpower for our high-technolog

military is not solely a question of whether or not the people ca

operate or maintain the equipment. To a certain extent, thes

problems can be offset by designing systems, albeit at increase

costs, to be simpler, more user-friendly, and more reliable. Rathe

the quality of military manpower is directly related to readines

The question of how to define “quality” is debatable, but th

254 
services use two factors, high school diploma and aptitude te

scores, as a measure of quality. The reason for this is th

experience has shown that high school graduates, on average, a

more likely to complete initial training, are involved in few

disciplinary incidents, are promoted more rapidly, and are mor

likely to be eligible to reenlist. In fact, high school graduates a

about twice as likely as non-high school graduates to comple

their initial enlistment. 3

 Thus, higher quality recruits transla

directly to increased readiness due to reduced costs, low

disciplinary problems, and higher experience levels. 

The second measure of quality, the Armed Forces Qualificatio

Test (AFQT), helps to determine entry qualifications into th

services. A subset of the AFQT is used to determine qualificatio

for specific initial skills training. Again, the services have foun

that persons scoring in the lower percentile on the AFQT nee

more training and have greater disciplinary problems, therefo

increasing costs and reducing readiness. For these reasons the nee

for quality manpower is not simply an issue of matching weapon

and equipment with capable manpower. Rather, quality manpow

is necessary to keep training costs to a minimum, increa

experience levels, and reduce disciplinary problems. Quali

manpower directly relates to readiness, and it has not always bee

easy to obtain in the AVF. 

The AVF and Manpower Shortages 

In 1973, after a lengthy national debate, the all-volunteer forc

began as military conscription ended, and DOD began competin

for manpower with civilian industry. Despite an ample labo

supply from the baby boom of the fifties, the military did not fa

well in obtaining high-quality manpower. Recruiting goals cou

not be met, and the services had difficulty getting volunteers wi

high school diplomas or high aptitude test scores. By the end of th

decade, many were claiming the AVF unworkable. 4 Faced with 

poor image from the Vietnam era and lower pay relative to civilia

workers, the military services could not compete for labor wi

255 
civilian firms. At the same time, emerging technology was leadin

to the development of high-tech weapons. In short, America face

the same problem in the 1970s and early 1980s that we face in th

future—attracting high-quality people into the military to mainta

and operate high-tech weapons and equipment. In 1984 Mart

Binkin said: 

When Virgil sang of arms and the man, words like “smart” and 

“friendly” characterized the warrior, not his weapons. Today, because of 

modem technology, these terms are more often used to describe the 

machine than the man. Dramatic advances have spawned a generation of 

weapon systems designed to tell friend from foe, to stalk the enemy with 

precision and stealth, and to destroy him with unprecedented efficiency. 

But can ordinary Americans operate and support these advanced systems, 

or have the emerging technologies pushed military hardware beyond the 

capabilities of the people the armed forces can expect to attract and 

retain? 5 

When Binkin wrote these words, the nation had for 13 yea

experienced dismal recruiting and retention with the AVF. Th

AVF that successfully prosecuted the Gulf War proved, without 

doubt, that the military could attract and retain people with th

skills necessary to staff our nation’s forces. But the highly traine

and highly skilled AVF that served during Operations Dese

Shield/Storm was a product of the eighties—a decade with 

president, a Congress, and a people who supported the notion th

military service is an honorable endeavor worthy of fa

compensation. We face a very different environment in the futu

when, political concerns aside, the supply of high-quali

manpower available to serve in a high-tech military will declin

and competition for that manpower will increase. At the same tim

our nation’s young people are showing a waning interest 

enlisting, and the recruiting environment is littered with the storie

of drawdown casualties who have lost faith in the government. 6 

That is not to say, however, that we should maintain a larg

military force, in spite of the reduced threat, to forestall futu

personnel shortages. On the contrary, to maintain a youthfu

responsive force we must have a personnel system that is dynami

256 
We need a viable recruiting program to bring in new accession

Then we must have high-quality training programs, a fair an

equitable promotion program, and a selective reenlistment progra

to retain high-quality personnel. In addition, we need a viab

retirement program as both a recruiting incentive and a personne

reduction program. Such a personnel system will allow new peop

to enter, serve, and ultimately leave through attrition or retireme

and keep our armed forces youthful and responsive. The point 

that we cannot rely solely on high technology as a panacea to ou

national security. We must also develop a strategy to obta

manpower in the changing environment ahead. 

A Changing Labor Force 

The cultural, demographic, and socioeconomic nature of ou

nation’s labor force will change dramatically in the future. Th

recruiting environment will be characterized by shrinking numbe

of young people entering the work force and a larger proportion o

the population made up of racial and ethnic minoritie

experiencing high rates of poverty that will hinder the

educational attainment and future productivity. In the next decad

63 percent of people entering the labor force will be women. On

out of every four children will be born to an unmarried woma

and 70 percent of our adolescents will not have lived in a two

parent family through their first 18 years. 7 These disadvantage

young people will also experience two or three times th

percentage of developmental delays, learning difficulties, an

emotional or behavioral problems than children living in inta

two-parent families. 8

 Educational attainment for persons 25 yea

and over is also a concern. In 1991, approximately 78 percent of a

people 25 years and older had graduated from high school, b

only 67 percent of African-Americans had completed high schoo

For Hispanics in the same age category only 51 percent had hig

school diplomas. 9

 At the same time, we were seeing a dramat

decline in young people interested in enlistment. In January 199

DOD reported a 10 percent decline in enlistment interest overall. 

257 
An Army study also identified a 30 percent decline in enlistme

interest for 16-to 21-year olds, and a 45 percent decline amon

African-Americans. 11 These changes in the characteristics of th

work force and the decline in interest towards serving in th

military will have serious consequences for our ability to obta

high-quality manpower to meet defense needs. 

The Management Process—

Slow to Respond to Shortages 

Our ability to resolve manpower shortfalls is hampered by 

lengthy management process. This issue is particularly importa

with the reduced force structure and manpower requirements in th

future. Lengthy time delays between actual labor shortages and ou

ability to fill those shortages will limit our surge capability to me

future contingencies. For example, in 1981 the Air Force ha

critical shortfalls in current and projected engineerin

requirements. Numerous programs such as engineering bonuse

scholarship programs, and increased recruiting budgets we

developed to fill requirements. Nonetheless, it was not until 198

five years later, that the engineering shortage ended. While muc

of the delay can be attributed to educational requirements, it sti

took approximately two years from the time a critical nee

developed before legislation and appropriations were mad

Consequently, a reliance on high-tech equipment and weapon

without the ability to rapidly overcome labor shortfalls ma

seriously limit military readiness. Gary R. Nelson, former depu

assistant secretary of defense, noted: 

The AVF is a volatile program, different in characteristics from the draft 

system it replaced. The AVF is far more sensitive to the movements of 

the business cycle, to relatively small but sudden changes in the demand 

for non-prior service enlistees, and to unexpected developments. ...The 

management process by which the federal government responds to a 

decline in enlistment supply is totally inadequate to the problem at hand. 

The program-budget and appropriations process is two years from start to 

finish. We could go from surplus to disaster in that period of time-and in 

a much shorter period if there were a surge in demand. 12 

258 
The problems in recruiting and retention in the first decade o

the AVF, the changing characteristics of our labor force, and th

long lead time before military labor shortages can be overcom

suggest a strategy to obtain manpower in the future. Fortunatel

our 20-year history with the AVF has also given us a wealth o

experience in dealing with manpower issues. Before we ca

develop a strategy we must address some of those issues. 

Recruiting

A Smaller Force Means 

Fewer Requirements 

In the 1980s the DOD was recruiting about 300,000 youn

people each year to meet desired active duty enlisted streng

goals. 13 One may argue therefore that our reduced force structur

which calls for about 200,000 active duty accessions per year, ca

easily be sustained, even in a highly competitive recruiting marke

In June 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said that in the fir

half of 1993 only 94 percent of the new recruits had a high scho

diploma versus 97 percent in 1991. As a result he said he wou

spend more money on recruiting. 14 But such a simplistic approac

to hiring manpower for the AVF ignores the changing manpow

landscape as well as the complexity of obtaining militar

manpower. Taking a snapshot of the recruiting environment fo

one year and looking a little closer may help to clarify why th

issue is not simply a function of recruiting. 

In 1981 there were 4.3 million 17- to 19-year-old male hig

school graduates and seniors. Forty-one percent of those did n

qualify for enlistment for physical, mental, or other condition

Twenty-eight percent were in college and 8 percent were already 

the service, leaving 23 percent, or 983,000 potential enlistees. 

On the surface, the number of available 17- to 19-year-old male

appears quite sufficient since we can recruit females or older adu

males. But there are other limitations we must consider. Firs

according to the youth attitude-tracking study in the fall of 198

73 percent of those potentially eligible to enlist said they probab

259 
would not, or definitely would not, enlist in the armed forces. 

Therefore, about 270,000 males in the 17- to 19-year-old categor

were available in 1981, but many of these would be ineligible fo

enlistment because they would not qualify on the AFQT. In fact, 

any given year, only a portion of the labor force is eligible fo

enlistment. In 1984 only 61 percent of the 18- to 23-year olds we

eligible for enlistment based on the services’ aptitude an

educational standards. 17 Also, while the percentage varies fro

year to year, approximately 20 to 30 percent of those who actual

enter the service with high school diplomas fail to complete th

first 36 months of service, 18 This is due to separation from basic o

technical training, failing to maintain medical or behavior

standards, or other reasons. 

Clearly, the available military manpower pool is directly relate

to the quality of the labor force and the qualifications for militar

service, as well as to interest in serving in the military. The labo

force of the future may not have the interest, the qualifications, o

the educational background of those we recruited in the 1980s. W

should also remember that future leadership, recruited in the AV

environment of the 1980s, will not share the ethnic, racial, an

cultural characteristics of the young people they are leading. A

Assistant Secretary of Defense Christopher Jehn said: 

You have to remember that the military is a closed system with (no 

lateral entry) and recruitment is its lifeblood. The youngsters we recruit 

today are the sergeants, captains and majors of 2005. If we don't do a 

good job today, our military will be weaker in the future. 19 

The question of obtaining high-quality manpower is infinite

more complex and is not solely a function of recruiting an amp

supply of people from our population. It requires careful analys

of future population demographics, the availability of qualified an

interested people, the political and public support for the militar

and the likely economic conditions in which DOD will compete fo

labor. For these reasons, a strategy for obtaining manpower shou

consider these complex issues, and contingency plans should b

260 
developed to counter the effects of possible labor shortages an

surge requirements, 

Minorities in the Military

Opportunities or an Unfair Burden? 

During the period from 1961 through 1966, African- American

represented 11 percent of the 19- to 21-year olds in America—an

one out of every five Army combat deaths in Vietnam. Whe

conscription was used to man our nation’s military, African

Americans were more likely to be drafted than whites, so the

were more likely to serve in combat units and be wounded o

killed. 20 One of the primary arguments in favor of the AVF wa

the fact that volunteers, rather than draftees, would serve in th

military. As a result, the services must compete for labor with th

civilian economy, so pay and benefits must be attractiv

Unfortunately, in the 1970s the nation was not prepared to devo

such resources to the military, causing the services to low

standards and recruit many who had not finished high schoo

During this same period, to overcome economic or education

disadvantages in the civilian sector, African-Americans soug

employment in the military. In the seventies 25 percent of African

Americans who turned 18 entered the military but 30 percent o

them did not have a high school diploma. 

21 The military becam

the major employer of African-Americans, and the military had 

higher proportion of minorities than the population at large. 

Many economists and social leaders began to question th

wisdom of filling our nation’s military with poor, disadvantage

youths who did not benefit from our economic system yet wou

die in disproportionate numbers in future wars. Other economist

political leaders, and manpower planners argued that the militar

was providing economic opportunities not otherwise available 

the civilian world. 

In the 1980s, higher pay and benefits made the military mor

competitive and attractive, leading to higher retention and a high

261 
percentage of new enlistees with high school diplomas. Politic

and public support for the military also increased, leading to 

greater number of middle class whites and minorities in th

military. The debate over whether the military is providin

economic opportunities or taking advantage of disadvantage

youths became academic. However, prior to our involvement 

Desert Shield/Storm, the debate raged again. Fortunately, we d

not suffer a great abundance of casualties in Desert Storm and thu

repeat history from the early 1960s. But a growing proportion o

minorities entering the labor force means that we will have mo

minorities entering the military. The issue as to whether military 

providing opportunities or exploiting disadvantaged youths wi

become more pronounced. Manpower planners must understan

this issue and consider the problem in developing a plan to obta

military manpower. 

The Institutional or Occupational

Model and Military Pay 

A discussion of military manpower in relation to militar

compensation invariably leads to a debate over whether or n

military service follows an institutional or occupational forma

Those who believe that military service follows an institution

model see military service as a calling requiring sacrifice an

devotion to the institution. Compensation is less important in th

institutional model because self-sacrifice and devotion to th

institution characterize the people who serve. By comparison, th

occupational model views military service as just another job in th

bureaucracy. Consequently, competitive pay and benefits a

critical to keeping an adequate labor force. To explain thes

viewpoints more clearly consider the following quote from Charle

C. Moskos and Frank R Wood: 

I go anywhere in the world they tell me to go, any time they tell me to, to 

fight anybody they want me to fight. I move my family anywhere they 

tell me to move, on a day’s notice, and live in whatever quarters they 

assign me. I work whenever they tell me to work... I don’t belong to a 

262 
yg 

like it. Maybe that’s the difference. 22 

The current military pay system, which evolved from the dra

era, generally follows the institutional model. All service membe

are paid based on grade and years of service; therefore, th

institution does not view some jobs as more important than other

The military pay system in the AVF environment has becom

replete with special pays and bonuses. But these are paid a

inducements for retention, enlistment, or reenlistment; are change

based on manning levels; and are not part of military retiremen

Some economists believe that the military pay system should b

more efficient, following an occupational model. Payment fo

labor services, they believe, should be based on market forces lik

the civilian labor market. Using this approach, military membe

would be paid based on their specific qualifications, the job to b

done, and the market wage derived from the civilian economy. Fo

example, nurses may be paid a higher mean wage than, sa

navigators, given the shortage of nurses relative to the supply o

navigators. Compensating wage differentials would also be paid 

induce people to work in undesirable places or accept oth

undesirable aspects of the job. 23 Therefore, sailors would be paid 

higher wage than airmen with the same grade and years of servic

the difference in wage being a compensating wage differential fo

sea duty. Further, a cook aboard a ship would be paid less than 

radio repairman on the same ship because of the higher education

requirements for the radio repairman. These compensating wag

differentials would be part of the sailor's wage package and wou

be included in retired pay computations. 

As high-quality labor resources become more scarce and w

have fewer tax dollars for defense needs, manpower planne

should look to changing the DOD pay system to make it mo

efficient. 

A Strategy for Obtaining Military

Manpower 

263 
In November 1983, 275 economists, manpower expert

political and military leaders, and academicians met at the U

Naval Academy to review, analyze, and discuss the AVF. Th

product of that conference was a complete review of the AV

successes, limitations, and suggested course for the future. 24 Th

first part of our strategy is to develop a DOD manpower plannin

group. This group would have three specific functions. Firs

manpower and personnel experts would evaluate curre

manpower shortfalls, recruiting problems, and demographic trend

Second, human-factor engineers would ensure that new, high-tec

weapon systems are designed to be reliable and user-friendl

Third, economists on the group would develop changes to th

DOD pay system when needed and complete econometric analys

and modeling to identify potential manpower problems. 

The DOD planning group should host an annual conferenc

like the AVF conference held in 1983, to review demograph

changes and discuss manpower issues and problems. Further, th

manpower planning group should meet on a monthly basis 

review and approve drawdown plans, discuss implications for th

future, and consider other manpower issues. To meet futu

requirements and respond rapidly to changing manpower need

the group should be able to seek legislative changes an

appropriations to reduce the lengthy management process. 

The military pay system should also be changed to reflect th

changing nature of military service. The post-cold-war drawdow

of our military forces has changed the institutional characteristic

of the military. Forced retirements and separations are causin

those in uniform to become more concerned with job security an

benefits than with service to the institution. The military pa

system should be changed to coincide with the occupational mod

allowing the services to compete for high-quality labor in th

future. One service may have to pay a higher wage to compensa

people for the undesirable aspects of the work, or different job

within a service may require different wages. 25 

264 
Developing a manpower planning group to resolve manpow

problems and changing the pay system are two aspects of ou

manpower strategy that will help us work the manpower side of th

equation. The third component addresses the hardware side. Th

is, DOD must ensure that new high-tech weapons are engineered 

be user-friendly and reliable. Martin Binkin suggested this in 198

when he said: 

Most worthy of special attention are those options that would diminish 

the need for large numbers of highly qualified people by reducing the 

complexity of military systems, by making them more reliable, or by 

facilitating their maintenance.... Affording manpower equal billing with 

performance, schedule, and cost early in the weapon development cycle 

would brighten the prospects that the systems fielded by the armed 

services in the future will be within the capabilities of their personnel and 

that the nation will realize a fuller return on its investment in military 

technology. 26 

Conclusion 

After World War I, World War II, and the wars in Korea an

Vietnam, our nation reduced the size of our military forces. In th

post-cold-war era we must do the same. But we have not y

learned the most important lesson from past drawdowns. That is, 

threat to our nation could come again. We cannot rely on futu

high-tech weapons and dismiss the need for high-quality men an

women to field those systems. We must have a defense strategy fo

the procurement of high-quality hardware and a strategy to obta

high-quality manpower. A DOD manpower planning group wi

allow us to focus on key manpower issues and give us a bett

response to manpower shortages. Revising the military pay syste

will make DOD more competitive in the labor market and c

costs. Finally, developing high-tech weapons that are user-friend

and reliable will reduce the need for expensive manpower. 

265 
Notes 

1. “Pentagon Culture Clash,” U.S. News & World Report 115, no. 2 (12 Jul

1993): 32. 

2. William Bowman, Roger Little, and G. Thomas Sicilia. The All-Volunte

Force after a Decade: Retrospect and Prospect (Washington, D.C.: PergamonBrassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1986), 48. 

3. James Kitfleld, “Mustering,” Government Executive 24, no. 5 (May 

1992): 13. 

4. Ibid., 15. 

5. Martin Binkin, Military Technology and Defense Manpower 

(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), back cover. 

6. “You’re Out of the Army Now,” Time 139, no. 10 (9 March 1992): 30. 

7. Peter A. Morrison, Congress and the Year 2000: A Demographic 

Perspective on Future Issues (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation. 1991): 4

12. 

8. Ibid., 23. 

9. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Population Profile 

of the United States 1993, series P-23, no. 185 (Washington, D.C.: Governmen

Printing Office, 1993), 15. 

10. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congre

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1993), 50. 

11. “Pentagon Culture Clash,” 32. 

12. Bowman, Little, and Sicilia, 11. 

13. Ibid., 277. 

14. “The Week,” Time 141, no. 24 (14 June 1993): 12. 

15. Bowman, Little, and Sicilia, 275. 

16. Ibid., 280. 

17. Binkin, 21. 

18. Ibid., 12. 

19. Kitfleld, 15. 

20. Martin Binkin, Who will fight the next war? (Washington, D.C.: The 

Brookings Institution, 1993), 68. 

21. Ibid., 72. 

22. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood, The Military: More Than Just a 

Job? (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers

1988), xiii. 

23. Joseph W. Kroeschel, Compensating Wage Differentials and Military 

Labor Supply (Monterey, Calif.: Naval postgraduate School, December 1988), 

47. 

24. Bowman, Little, and Sicilia, vii. 

25. Kroeschel, 46-47. 

26. Binkin, Who will fight the next war?, 131. 

266 
Military Responses in 

Nonpolitical Conflicts 

Steven W. Zander 

The purpose of this essay is to investigate the feasibility of th

use of military assets in nonpolitical conflicts. It concentrate

primarily on antidrug operations, given the fact that other uses o

military force in nonpolitical conflicts (such as peacekeeping an

humanitarian operations) are dealt with elsewhere in this volume. 

begin by offering a definition of nonpolitical conflicts, and discu

how the national drug control strategy will affect future use o

military assets to support law enforcement agencies and foreig

governments in the conduct of antidrug operations. Next, I offer a

overview of the major military commands and law enforceme

agencies as a prelude to discussing how the military is used 

counterdrug operations in three locations—in the drug-producin

countries, in the transit zone, and within the US. Finally, I believ

past experience suggests that the military can play an importa

role in waging the “drug war,” even if its success is limited by 

number of caveats. 

Nature of Nonpolitical Conflicts 

While there is often no clear division between political an

nonpolitical conflicts, the latter term commonly refers to thos

instances requiring the use of military forces to solve issues th

are other than political in nature. Thus humanitarian assistanc

commonly involves using military assets to save lives and assis

survivors after natural disasters. Peacekeeping operations a

intended to facilitate a peaceful settlement of disputes b

separating warring parties, but they do not normally have politic

objectives. 

This essay concentrates on another kind of operation-th

interdiction of the flow of drugs to the US. One might argu

whether drug interdiction operations qualify as “nonpolitical” sinc

267 
they often entail disagreements with supplier nations over how 

eradicate the drug traffic, and because in some states dru

traffickers have made an alliance with indigenous political force

to threaten stability in their home countries. Certainly, the Unite

States has brought tremendous pressure to bear to influence the

nations to increase their counterdrug activities. 1 

However, the US has gone to great lengths to ensure that it doe

not become involved in the internal politics of such nations; 

sends troops or other forms of assistance only upon the request o

host nations. 2 Although a primary focus on the eradication o

drug-trafficking elements can contribute to instability in the targ

nation, a policy of simultaneous institution building can he

achieve antidrug objectives. 3 

Elements of Drug Control 

Conduct of the drug “war” comes down to a matter of strateg

Most agree that the war is waged on two fronts 4—a supply fro

that targets drug-producing nations and indigenous undergroun

drug organizations and a demand front that targets Americans wh

do not “just say no to drugs.” 

Many disagreed with the Bush administration’s focus o

interdiction (approximately 70 percent of a $11.7 billion budget 

1992) instead of on demand-reduction programs focusing o

education, treatment, and prevention. 5 Bush’s National Dru

Control Strategy was based on the view that interdiction program

were more costly than demand-reduction programs due to th

costly military and law enforcement equipment the form

required—radar, helicopters, aircraft, computers—for domest

and foreign military and law enforcement agencies. 

With a change of administrations, many saw an opportunity 

raise the portion of the budget directed to demand reduction 

about 50 percent. 6 Surprise was expressed when the ne

administration suggested a drug policy that seemingly wou

continue to favor interdiction. 

268 
Surely there will be more allocation of resources to deman

reduction programs. President Bill Clinton stated as much in h

recent State of the Union address. Indeed, much has been learne

since the military became actively involved in various stages of th

war, whether in Latin American countries, interdicting drugs 

transit, or trying to arrest the problem within our national borders. 

Wisely, the Clinton administration has embraced a policy th

targets the true center of gravity in the drug war: drug productio

Although the formal National Drug Control Strategy for 1994 

yet to be released, administration spokespersons have presented 

consistent view of the future strategy. 

State Department counselor Timothy Wirth has stated that th

“new” drug strategy will focus on drug organizations, convincin

drug-producing nations to stop production operations, an

eradication of drug crops 7

—key steps that have proven essential 

disrupt drug-trafficking activities. 

Those who say that this policy is nothing new are in many way

right. A review of the national drug control strategies, publishe

since 1989 to present, reveals a comprehensive knowledge of a

facets of the drug problem. Therefore, there is nothing new th

can be tried; however, what is new is that the policies initiate

during the Bush administration are bearing fruit. 

The policy of institution building, based upon providin

economic and military assistance, has reinforced democrat

governments now prevalent in Latin America. These governmen

have newfound ability to counter not only revolutionar

movements within their countries, but to focus on the drug

trafficking organizations. 

Further, these governments have evidently come to recogniz

that the drug-trafficking organizations within their countries have 

destabilizing effect both economically and socially. Proof is in th

growing number of drug seizures, destruction of cocain

processing laboratories, arrests, and the growing number o

indigenous military and police operations conducted since 1991. 8 

269 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matte

Melvyn Levitsky in 1992 noted that while the situation 

improving, many problems remain. He told a Senate subcommitte

that there are 

inherent difficulties which must be overcome in trying to deal with an 

underground, illicit, violent, and economically powerful adversary... 

[and there] are barriers that must be overcome in assisting governments 

in the region—many of which have multiple problems of economic 

recession, under development, indigenous guerrilla subversion of 

democratic institutions, internal corruption, and weak judicial and penal 

institutions-in order to respond to this threat. 9 

However, what is also “new” is that the countries have the wi

to combat drug traffickers (not to be confused with possessing th

capability, which some do not yet have)—will that for years wa

not evident. Its absence was ascribed to governmental corruptio

stemming from the drug trade and the weak institutions Levitsk

mentioned. 10 It is because of this new will that the Clinto

administration’s continuance of past policies may succeed. Fo

with the will and the US-provided resources, the foreig

governments will have the ability to disrupt the drug organization

and accomplish drug crop eradication programs—programs that 

the past have failed if for no other reason than the time-consumin

labor-intensive characteristics associated with past operations. 

Eradication will succeed much as was prescribed by Gar

Williams in his paper, “The War on Cocaine: Strategy an

Tactics,” released in March 1991. There are herbicides availab

(including one he advocates in his paper or another presently und

study) that will, after delivery by aircraft, eradicate coca plant

and given that these plants require 18 to 24 months to grow fro

seedlings into a viable crop, this time will provide the necessar

break in the drug cycle. 11 This break will enable winning the dru

war by addressing the demand front in the US. Williams offers th

historical precedence of a similar drug epidemic that wa

successfully arrested between 1920 and 1960. 12 As further proo

that there are no new strategies, Williams also suggested that the

are essentially three centers of gravity in the drug problem: th

270 
drug organizations in Colombia; 

 eradication of the drug crop

because it is slow moving and therefore much easier to hit than th

fast-moving drug trafficker in jet aircraft or high-speed boats; 

and using the military to provide security for police engaged in th

interdiction of the drug traffickers’ transit lines. 15 

Finally, another reason the new drug strategy will succeed 

because the previous administration made wise investments in th

military portion of the drug budget. Indeed, of the $12.7 billio

estimated for counterdrug efforts in 1992, only $1.3 billion wa

specifically identified for the Department of Defense (DOD). 16 O

this relatively small share of the drug budget, half was used 

acquire needed improvements to detection and monitoring, an

command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3

systems. This amounted to a side benefit since the antidrug ro

was an extension of the military war-fighting capability; a

improvement that proved useful in support of drug interdictio

operations also improved military capability. 

With the detection and monitoring systems in place, or soon) 

be so, and the integrated C3I systems that have been established o

are in the pipeline, the Clinton administration would be ill advise

to deemphasize this important element of the National Dru

Control Strategy. For as Wirth has stated, “the new policy does n

mean that narcotics will be allowed to flow unhindered into th

United States.... The United States will continue to engage in mo

selective and flexible interdiction programs near the US border, 

the transit zone, and in source countries.” 17 To this end, the U

military and leading law enforcement agencies (LEA) have built 

comprehensive, at times complex, network of cooperation betwee

themselves and with producer nations to interdict the flow o

drugs. To better understand this network, the following discussio

will focus on elements of the military and law enforceme

agencies that play major roles in waging the drug war. 

Major Military Commands and

Law Enforcement Agencies 

271 
The US has a comprehensive drug control strategy that, ov

me, has provided for an increase in the military forces an

equipment used for antidrug activities. Starting with the Nation

Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 1989, the militar

has played a leading role in detection and monitoring of dru

activities in the air, on sea, and on land; providing improved C

support for law enforcement agencies and host nations, an

increased support of domestic operations primarily through th

National Guard. 18 The secretary of defense directed in 198

through a series of guidance letters, that the military support effor

to attack the drug problem in three areas: at the source—ho

nations, in transit to the US, and within US borders. 19 

The military response takes advantage of existing militar

command structures established to counter military threats in the

respective areas of responsibility. Efforts have been under wa

since 1989 to take advantage of inherent capabilities within thes

commands to target the drug trade and improve interoperabili

with civilian law enforcement agencies that are leading or have 

major role in counterdrug efforts in a particular command’s area o

responsibility. A brief discussion of the major military command

and LEAs follows. This will be followed by discussions on ho

joint operations have been or could be conducted to meet the dru

interdiction threat. 

Military Command Structure 

Four war-fighting commands have responsibility for supportin

counterdrug operations within their areas of responsibility. The

are Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Atlantic Comman

(LANTCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and North America

Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). 20 

SOUTHCOM, headquartered in Quarry Heights, Panama, 

responsible for counterdrug efforts from the Guatemala Mexic

border to Cape Horn. As Gen George A. Joulwan stated before th

Senate Armed Services Committee in 1993, “Trafficking in illeg

drugs adversely affects every nation without exception in th

272 
[SOUTHCOM area of responsibility] AOR. 

 It include

operations in Central America; the Andean-ridge countries of Per

Bolivia, and Colombia; and the southern-cone countries o

Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela. Given its location it plays a ke

role in the support of the Andean Strategy aimed at curbing th

illicit drug trade. It exercises control over a Special Operation

Command (SOCOM), Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo, located 

Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, and security assistanc

organizations located in 16 of the region’s countries.22 

USACOM, formerly LANTCOM, has primary responsibili

for counterdrug efforts from the North Pole, through the nor

Atlantic, to the waters surrounding South America. This include

detection and monitoring of air and sea smuggling in the Atlant

Ocean (west of the 17th parallel), Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Se

and portions of the eastern Pacific (up to the 92d parallel

Counterdrug operations in the Caribbean are planned an

coordinated through its subordinate command, JTF 

headquartered at Key West, Florida. Common to all militar

functions established to support drug interdiction, informatio

obtained regarding drug trafficking is shared with the appropria

LEA responsible for interdiction. 23 

USACOM has delegated to the US Army Forces Comman

(USFORSCOM) responsibility for drug interdiction efforts alon

the 2,000-mile southwest border, which includes the border state

of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The subordina

JTF 6, primarily a command and control headquarters, coordinate

the activities of National Guard forces of these four border state

JTF 6 was located at Fort Bliss, to better coordinate the activitie

of Operation Alliance (a law enforcement coalition of federa

state, and local law enforcement agencies providing coordinate

interdiction efforts along the southwest border) located in El Pas

Texas, near the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). 24 

PACOM has responsibility for over 105 million square mile

covering the Pacific and Indian oceans (up to the 17th parallel) an

273 
as such overlaps SOUTHCOM responsibility in tracking cocain

and marijuana from Mexico. Adm Charles R. Larson described th

drug threat facing PACOM before the Senate Armed Service

Committee in 1993: “As was the case last year, more than 7

percent of the world’s estimated opium production continues 

take place in the Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand, and Lao

Although cocaine remains the most serious threat to American

the heroin threat is growing most rapidly, and the Andean carte

are beginning to cooperate with the warlords of the Golde

Triangle.” 25 To meet this threat, counterdrug activities a

coordinated and implemented by JTF 5, headquartered at Alamed

California. These operations include command, contro

communications, and intelligence assistance for host natio

operations planning support; intelligence support; training of hos

nation counterdrug forces; and tracking cocaine and martjuan

from Colombia and Mexico, and marijuana from Hawaii. 26 

NORAD employs its network radars (originally designed fo

high-altitude airspace penetrations but parameters were changed 

track slower routine traffic) to detect aircraft attempting 

penetrate US borders. This is done in partnership with Canada o

the northern border and includes over-the-horizon backscatt

radar, based aerostats (blimps carrying radar antennae), and E-

airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to dete

aircraft along the north American coast and the southern U

border. Alert aircraft are also employed to assist the US Custom

and US Coast Guard with their interdiction missions. 27 

These major commands are provided assistance as needed b

the unified commands of Special Operations Command; Centr

Command (CENTCOM); European Command (EUCOM); an

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). 28 

Law Enforcement Agencies 

All of the military commands must work closely with th

various LEAs to ensure integrated counterdrug operations. Th

federal agencies that have major drug-interdiction responsibilitie

274 
include the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Burea

of Investigation (FBI), the US Coast Guard (USCG), the U

Customs Service (USCS) , and the US Border Patrol (USBP). Joh

Ahart and Gerald Stiles provide concise discussions of thes

agencies in their paper, “The Military’s Entry into Air Interdictio

of Drug Trafficking from South America.” They note that th

primary role of the Drug Enforcement Agency is to combat dru

trafficking. DEA agents have powers of arrest, search, and seizu

and are engaged in both foreign and domestic efforts. “DE

personnel may be assigned to a particular US mission abroad... 

and [DEA] is the lead agency responsible for collection an

maintenance of worldwide drug intelligence information.” 29 

The FBI antidrug jurisdiction overlaps with that of the DEA du

to its responsibilities as the lead agency for investigating intersta

and international drug cases. This overlapping area o

responsibility offers the potential for (and has in the past led 

confusion in the conduct of counterdrug operations. 

The USCG has primary responsibility for drug interdiction o

the high seas and navigable waterways and, with the US Custom

Service, has joint responsibility for air interdiction. In its la

enforcement role (during war it also has a military role), the USC

has broad authority to inspect vessels and regulate maritim

commerce. 

The US Customs Service is the lead agency for dru

interdiction on land and is supported in its efforts by the US Bord

Patrol-an agency under the Immigration and Naturalization Servic

(INS). As mentioned it has joint responsibility for air interdictio

with the USCG, and also supports the USCG in maritim

interdiction. The Customs Service has broad powers in that it ma

board any vessel or enter any vehicle at any place within U

territory. However, their capabilities are restrained in that mo

Customs Service personnel are located only in the major ports an

airfields of the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 

275 
As mentioned the US Border Patrol of the INS supports USC

drug-interdiction efforts on land, primarily as an extension of i

efforts to enforce laws relating to the control of illegal aliens. I

this role Border Patrol agents have the authority to condu

searches at the border even without suspicion of criminal activity. 

As can perhaps be imagined, given the number of major playe

in the drug-interdiction effort and overlapping areas o

responsibility, there is an inherent complexity associated wi

coordinating the counterdrug activities of the various agencie

There are many other agencies (approximately 40 if counting on

federal agencies) which have a role in the drug war, such as th

State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics Matte

which has responsibility for coordinating the US internation

supply reduction strategy. However, the foregoing serves 

establish a basis for discussing the complexity of counterdru

operations, and how these agencies must integrate their activities 

provide a coordinated response to the drug threat. 

Three Stages of the Drug War 

As previously stated, the military is used to support la

enforcement efforts attacking the drug problem in three phase

These include counterdrug operations within a foreign countr

interdiction of drug shipments in transit in the air, at sea, and o

land; and operations within US borders. 

Operations in Foreign Countries 

The National Drug Control Strategy identifies the point whe

the drug trade is most susceptible to disruption-the (drug

organization’s center of gravity-as the drug trafficker’s hom

country base of operation. 30 

This, then, is the basis of the Clinton administration’s “new

policy of institution building, for by strengthening loc

government, police, and military institutions, these countries wi

then possess the capability to curb production and stop traffickin

276 
The question then becomes a matter of whether they possess th

will. 31 

The answer to this question appeared wanting, until relative

recently (1992) when the Andean countries of Peru, Colombia, an

Bolivia, apparently realizing that the effects of drug traffickin

were contributing to internal instability, began waging majo

counterdrug operations that have resulted in the seizure of coc

destruction of processing labs, and the arrest of major crimin

figures. 32 

As part of the Andean Initiative, the US signed militar

assistance pacts with six Andean countries. These pacts provide

for economic and military assistance and equipment and help 

mounting of more effective counterdrug operations. 33 Som

however, suggest this policy has failed, and wonder what ha

changed to make institution building a viable policy. 34 

In reality, lack of commitment still exists. Of primary concer

in Peru and Bolivia is the desire to establish “economic an

political stability... [after years of] suffering from hig

unemployment, political instability, low wages, and social unrest

Against this backdrop, the Peruvian coca crop was estimated 

1990 to bring in $1 billion annually and employ 15 percent of th

national work force. Similar figures for Bolivia are $600 millio

annually and 20 percent of the adult work force. 36 

With these economic realities in mind, the US military is use

to support LEAs and the host nations in drug interdiction activitie

Levitsky explained US policy regarding the use of the military a

follows: 

We have involved the military in supporting roles to provide 

sophisticated assets for detection and monitoring, transport, training, and 

delivery of military assistance hardware and in providing 

communications, logistical, and intelligence expertise to missions abroad. 

Host government militaries provide air intercept, transport, and airlift 

capabilities to their own police, security for law enforcement personnel; 

277 

35 
[

] p; [] y 

operations against outlying drug production complexes. 37 

In fact, the US military has been used to support DEA-le

counterdrug efforts in Latin American countries since the 1980

William W. Mendel provides a good summary of operation

conducted in his article, “Illusive Victory: From Blast Furnace 

Green Sweep.” Initial operations conducted in Bolivia in 1984 wi

US-supported Bolivian troops “were unpopular locally, an

peasant demonstrations... [eventually led to] the withdrawal o

troops.” 38 A more notable effort—Operation Blast Furnace-wa

conducted in Bolivia in 1986. During the course of this operatio

160 US-support personnel with six US Black Hawk helicopte

arrived in Bolivia in July 1986 to “provide air mobility to Bolivia

antidrug forces.” 39 The operation was considered unsuccessful fo

a variety of reasons including poor intelligence, poor prio

planning, poorly trained US personnel, and lack of secu

communications. Publicity alerted drug traffickers who fled prio

to the arrival of law enforcement agents, and antagonism of th

peasant populace led to an uprising against the drug operatio

This further led to condemnation of US actions by nations in th

region and protests within Bolivia that threatened the stability o

the government. 40 However, the operation did prove th

effectiveness of targeting the lab-production capabilities as a cent

of gravity because approximately 90 percent of the coca flowin

from Bolivia was interdicted. 41 More importantly, since the dru

traffickers decided to wait until the US left before resuming coc

processing operations, this removed the source of revenue from th

region. The resultant drop of coca prices led peasants to see

governmental support of alternative crop production. Although an

positive effects were reversed once US-led operations did ceas

the operation successfully proved that destruction of the coca lab

combined with crop eradication could successfully disrupt dru

operations and induce peasants to seek alternative crops. This the

became the basis for future operations. 

278 
According to Mendel, 

Since 1988. DEA has continued i

efforts to suppress cocaine trafficking in the Andean Ridge [th

Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru and the Chapare region in Bolivi

under a program called Operation SNOWCAP.” 42 This operatio

used temporary-duty agents assigned to US ambassadors to assi

police in Peru and Bolivia in counterdrug operations. 

An operation that typifies the difficulties of mountin

counterdrug operations similar to Snowcap in this region is th

more recent Operation Ghost Zone. Mendel described how th

operation began March 1993 and, attempting to use lessons learne

during Operation Blast Furnace, targeted the drug-traffickin

organizations in the Chap are region in Bolivia. “It involved abou

750 Bolivian counterdrug personnel under a Special Narcotic

Force that was... supported by 35 Americans from the Arm

Coast Guard, and US Customs with DEA as the lead agency.” 

The objectives of the operation included reinforcement of 

Bolivian crop-eradication effort and suppressing export of coc

base via air, land, and sea from the growing fields to distant lab

for processing and keeping precursor chemicals from coming i

The operation was intended to last through two growing season

thereby seriously restricting availability of this region as a sourc

of supply to Colombian traffickers. These operations showed ear

indications of success. In anticipation of the expected drop in coc

prices, the Bolivian agency DIRECO (Coca Eradicatio

Directorate responsible for rural development with alternativ

crops) attempted to encourage crop substitution by offering $2,00

for each hectare of coca destroyed. 

During the active counterdrug operation the US military grou

also supported Bolivian goals of strengthening government

control over the region and inspiring economic growth b

providing assistance in the form of 16 major engineering projec

at eight different locations. These projects were considere

essential in convincing the farmer of the long-term benefits o

accepting alternative farming. 

279 
Although the final results of the operation are yet to b

evaluated, there was concern noted as in past operations that soci

tension resulting from the disruption of drug profits would spar

armed struggle. Some of this unrest could have been avoided had 

responsive alternative crop development program been availabl

However, DIRECO failed to provide such a program. This led 

allegations of corruption within DIRECO and eventually resulte

in the Bolivian government’s removing the chairman. A

important lesson learned was that lagging support of an alternativ

crop program contributed to social unrest by allowing the seeds o

desperation to set in among the peasants who now lacked a sourc

of income. This desperation was subsequently fanned by fledglin

revolutionary elements that attempted to organize the peasan

against the US presence and the counterdrug operations. 44 

Positive aspects of the operation included the demonstrated wi

of the Bolivian government to target illicit drug operations. Th

operation also provided the US military an opportunity to enhanc

the professional development of the Bolivian police and militar

Lessons learned likewise paved the way for future cooperation. 45 

Operations in the Transit Zone 

As mentioned, the DOD has been tasked with the leading role 

detection, monitoring, and C31 in antidrug operations. A typic

drug-interdiction scenario could see employment of a combine

interdiction force comprised of Navy ships, USAF aircraft, U

Coast Guard and Customs Service aviation units, and state an

local law enforcement agencies among others. This need fo

interoperability of various agencies engaged in counterdru

operations serves to highlight various aspects which constra

military support efforts. 

First, the extent of the interdiction problem is enormous whe

considered within the context of the total number of potential way

to smuggle drugs into the US. Based upon 1991 US Custom

Service data, over 46 million people enter the US each year by ai

another 374 million by land, and 7 million by sea. Air traff

280 
includes over 560,000 commercial-sized aircraft and 158,00

smaller aircraft. Also there were over 8 million cargo shipments b

land and sea. The sheer volume of traffic represents an enormou

detection and interdiction work load. 46 

Second, the military is restrained from serving in a la

enforcement role by the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 187

Although the act was modified in 1988 to enable the military 

fulfill its support roles, as a result of this act, the military cann

apprehend or arrest suspects-although there are exceptions for th

National Guard in-state status. 47 These functions must b

performed by one of the law enforcement agencies. This mean

that while the military is engaged in detection, monitoring, an

communication activities, when suspect drug activity is detected, 

member of a LEA must be present to accomplish the searc

seizure, and arrest. This includes intercepting suspect vessels o

aircraft outside the US. In cases where a law enforcement agent 

not present, the military must direct the suspects to a locatio

“designated by appropriate civilian officials.” 

The constraints of the PCA place an even greater burden o

cooperation between the military and the LEAs, to ensure that 

police officer is on board a vessel or aircraft or nearby to provide 

timely response. This burden gives rise to concerns that while 

ship or aircraft supports a suspect to a “designated location,” a ga

will occur in the surveillance coverage, enabling another smuggl

to slip through. 48 

A third factor affecting the ability to conduct air intercepts 

the lack of authority to compel suspected smuggler aircraf

operating over the high seas or US territorial waters, to land. Th

is an important constraint given that smuggling by noncommerci

aircraft is considered a major means of transporting drugs to th

US from foreign countries. The Bush administration tried eac

year since the 1990 National Drug Control Strateg

Implementation Act to gain congressional approval for th

authority. 49 As of February 1994 it was still not granted. Howeve

281 
debate revolves around what is 

reasonable use of force and ho

to avoid mistaking legitimate aircraft for criminal activity. As 

result, when smuggler aircraft are detected, they can igno

directions to land, jettisoning their drugs—at times to high-spee

boats waiting below—and fleeing the area. 50 

Finally, there are gaps in the radar coverage necessary to dete

and monitor drug traffic. The previous administration responde

by including the funding for aerostat radar that would be deploye

along the southwest border and in the Caribbean, and for rad

systems in the Andean countries to support counterdrug operation

While aerostat radar systems are a cost-efficient means to create a

effective network, there are inherent problems associated wi

terrain masking and poor operability in various weath

conditions—they must be lowered during rough weather. 51 Furth

gaps are created when an aerostat must be lowered fo

maintenance. This results in the need for greater coordination o

air-based coverage. Thus, on the one side is the drug smuggler wh

is proving more inventive in circumventing the interdictio

network; on the other side are the military and LEAs who a

working aggressively to plug the gaps and deter smugglers. 

The following composite scenario is based upon one describe

by Ahart and Stiles in “The Military's Entry into Air Interdiction o

Drug Trafficking from South America.” 52 It helps to explain th

complexities associated with conducting successful dru

interdiction operations with an integrated military and LE

response. Notification of an impending drug shipment could com

from an in-country Drug Enforcement Agency agent. Suc

messages are relayed through the joint USCG and US Customs C

Center East in Miami, Florida. The center balances the informatio

against the interdiction assets available. 

Once a decision has been made to act, C3

I East requests the JT

4 in Key West, Florida, to realign surveillance assets-frigate

airborne warning and control system, and E-2 aircraft—in

282 
position for best detection of a suspect smuggling flight. JTF 

controls military assets. 

AWACS monitors the suspect aircraft from takeoff until it ca

pass tracking responsibilities to a US Navy frigate on patrol in th

area. AWACS also employs its data-link communications 

broadcast information regarding the suspect to forces assigne

interdiction tasks. 

As the suspect aircraft continues its flight, monitored by th

Navy frigate, US Customs Service aircraft are scrambled 

intercept. Equipped with special night-viewing sensors, a Custom

Service jet aircraft closes upon its target, attempting to stay abov

and behind in the suspect’s blind spot as its progress is monitore

If the aircraft tail numbers are discernible, this information 

passed to the El Paso Intelligence Center to check against i

intelligence data base for prior involvement in drug activity. 

If the aircraft crosses into the US, its flight is monitored until 

touches down, and DEA, FBI, Customs, and local law enforceme

authorities are directed to intercept. However, successful a

interdiction operations have led smugglers to drop their drug carg

from the air to high-speed boats waiting offshore. The aircraft, sti

over international waters and essentially safe from interdiction, ca

then reverse its course unhindered. 

If an airdrop does occur, chase of the smuggling vessel ensue

perhaps by a Customs Service aircraft equipped with ocean

scanning radar, while directing the operations of Customs an

USCG surface craft. If the smuggler craft approaches the shore an

lands, it can then be met by a coterie of law enforceme

authorities. 

However, if the smugglers have realized that they are bein

monitored and in danger of capture, they can attempt to escap

Often equipped with high-speed boats quicker than the LE

surface craft, the smugglers may escape unless the USCG vessel 

one equipped with a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, which can b

launched and continue pursuit until capture can be effected. 

283 
A variation on this scenario might include the aircraft

avoiding a sea drop but continuing on to Mexico and landing at a

isolated airstrip. (This can bring C3

I West and JTF 5 into th

operation if the flight drifts into their area of responsibility.) On th

ground, the illicit cargo can be unloaded and prepared for shipme

overland or overseas into the US. However, the aircraft could hav

been tracked by AWACS and ground-based aerostat radar, an

intercepted by Mexican authorities with DEA advising on th

operation. 

Drug detection, monitoring, and C3I activities comprise the bu

of the drug control budget for the military. By taking advantage o

the inherent capabilities within the military commands, a

effective detection, monitoring, and C3I network now exis

Success in air interdiction has actually resulted in greater attemp

by smugglers to ship drugs overland or by sea. These interdictio

efforts give credibility to US demands upon foreign governmen

to increase counterdrug operations within their borders. Certainly 

foreign policy based upon foreign interdiction of illicit drug

appears hypocritical if a like effort is not mounted by the U

within its borders. This has led to greater use of military force

particularly the role the National Guard has played in th

eradication of the large marijuana crop grown in the United States

Operations within the US—Crop Eradication 

In addition to crop eradication, the National Guard has bee

used to aid the Customs Service in the inspection of commerci

conveyances and cargo containers, which continue to be a majo

means of shipping drugs into the country. 53 

As discussed in the 1992 National Drug Control Strategy, th

LEAs are attempting to take advantage of “the unique skills an

expertise of military personnel to provide assistance and trainin

and are integrating these personnel into support functions. Th

allows agents and inspectors to devote a greater percentage of tim

to their border control mission.” 54 

284 
The 1992 strategy also states that 

in Fiscal Year 199

National Guard personnel performed marijuana eradicatio

operations (nearly 21 million plants eradicated and over $4

million in cash confiscated). Eradication of domestically grow

marijuana resulted in the virtual elimination of the Hawaiian cro

and 87 percent of marijuana production in California. 55 Th

success supports the Clinton administration’s emphasis o

eradication. Logically, stopping the production of the drug wou

seem more economical than trying to stop it after entry an

dissemination in an increasing widespread and complex network o

middlemen and street dealers. 

This concept was reflected in comments by State Departme

counselor Wirth, who stated, “Very aggressive eradication effor

may offer the most cost-effective approach. Although this ha

produced strong opposition by Peru and Bolivia because of th

dependency of rural growers on the drug crop for livelihood. Th

administration would attempt to address these concerns throug

alternative crop-production programs.” 56 

As a matter of fact, there are parallels to crop eradication in th

US and Latin America. In both countries, marijuana usage ha

varying degrees of support by the civilian populace. Fields a

often located in remote areas requiring considerable expenditure o

resource to detect and destroy, and the profits generated by th

crop ensures the grower will resist, perhaps violently, an

eradication efforts. Indicative of eradication efforts, the followin

discussion is based upon Mendel’s “Illusive Victory” which help

convey various aspects of the eradication efforts within the US. 57 

In the summer of 1990, Operation Green Sweep was conducte

on federal land in part of northern California’s Emerald Triangl

the King Range Nature Conservation District. A joint eradicatio

task force was formed under the lead of the Bureau of Lan

Management and consisted of 110 California National Guard, 6

law enforcement agents, and 60 regular Army personne

Eradication efforts were met by hostile growers who did not wa

285 
to lose their piece of the $500 million generated annually by th

area. Resistance took the form of negative press coverage and 

local radio station and Citizen’s Oversight Group whic

discouraged support for the operation and attempted to organiz

civilian demonstrations. Resistance was also offered by the loc

sheriff, originally part of the operation but who subsequent

withdrew and became a harsh critic of the “invasion.” 

The 11-day operation overcame these difficulties and resulted 

destroying marijuana plants valued at over $2.8 million, remov

or destruction of 28 tons of growing equipment, and returning 2

growing sites to their natural state. As a short-term effort th

operation can be considered a success; however, to be tru

effective (parallel to operations in Latin America), a continue

governmental presence was required. 

Conclusion 

The foregoing discussion has served to highlight the comple

situations in which the military must respond to accomplish i

drug-interdiction duties. These include providing support of drug

interdiction efforts in foreign countries, attempting to stem th

flow of drugs through transit zones, and supporting crop

eradication efforts. Although there have been lessons learned e

route to achieving successful counterdrug operations, the militar

has inherent capabilities required to support the ne

administration’s national drug control strategy-a strategy base

upon institution building, disrupting the drug organizations, an

crop eradication. 

As mentioned, institution building has begun to pay dividend

in drug interdiction. Military training, equipment, and intelligenc

has led to disruption of major drug cartels in Colombia and arres

and seizures in all the major drug producer nations. The militar

plays a key supporting role in helping these countries condu

successful antidrug operations as part of the overall national dru

286 
control strategy. Our future strategy, as General Joulwan ha

stated, 

demands a long-term commitment on both supply and demand, at the 

source, in transit, and at home, to be successful. We need to invest in the 

long-term goals of the nations involved with the United States as a 

partner and ally in the fight. ...I have met with the heads of state of these 

nations multiple times, and I am convinced of their determination in the 

counterdrug effort. They are committed. 58 

Although drug-eradication efforts in Andean countries have n

always been successful in the past, as operations Blast Furnace an

Ghost Zone suggest, if crop eradication is conducted, concurre

with long-term interdiction efforts, then the price paid for coca wi

go down. Williams stated that it took 10 years for the dru

organizations to develop extensive coca crops in the Huallag

Valley. This implies that it could take a like effort to eradicate 

(unless an environmentally safe herbicide is used). 59 An

eradication effort mandates that the US and the host nation must b

prepared to provide economic assistance to support alternativ

crop production, otherwise the incentive to develop alternativ

crops (a key step in dismantling the drug organizations) wi

evaporate and ultimately result in social unrest. 

Until such times that the drug organizations are dismantled an

crop fields are eradicated, the military must continue to play 

major role in operating systems that detect, monitor, and track dru

intruders. As the Clinton administration’s 1993 Interim Nation

Drug Control Strategy states: 

Interdiction... keeps many tons of cocaine, heroin, and other dangerous 

drugs from crossing our borders. This important effort attacks the 

traffickers’ critical transportation networks to deny them easy access to 

this country.... Success in keeping the traffic from significantly 

increasing drug availability supports the treatment, prevention, and local 

law enforcement elements of our strategy. 50 

This then brings us to the future role the military will play in th

drug war. The national drug strategies of the past, since 1989, hav

set the bounds of this role: the military supports the antidru

efforts of foreign countries and the major law enforceme

287 
agencies. Given the provisions of the PCA the military wi

continue in a supporting role. Within these bounds, the Clinto

administration has good reason to continue the past policies of th

previous administration for they are beginning to produce succes

While this success can be measured in the tons of drugs seized o

arrests made, the one true measure of success in the drug war 

whether drug usage has declined. DOD coordinator for Dru

Enforcement Policy and Support, Stephen M. Duncan, offered th

following measures of success to a House subcommittee: 

Without claiming specific credit, the Department of 

Defense can fairly share in the success enjoyed since 1988. That success includes: 

-A 13 percent reduction in the current overall 

national use of illegal drugs; 

-The fact that more than 1 million fewer Americans 

are current users of cocaine, a drop of 35 percent; 

-The fact that occasional use of cocaine has dropped 22 percent and that adolescent use has dropped 63 

percent; 

-The fact that the number of marijuana users has 

dropped by about 2 million, or more than 16 

percent; and 

-The fact that among persons ages 12 to 17, the 

current use of any illicit drug is down more than 25 

percent. 

The best evaluation of the department’s counterdrug support is the judgment of those who are suited to 

evaluate that support—the law enforcement 

agencies themselves. Those agencies continue to give the department high marks. 51 

288 
Notes 

1. Peter R. Andrews et al., “Dead-End Drug Wars,” Foreign Policy, no. 85. 

(Winter 1991-1992): 107. 

2. Melvyn Levitsky, “International Narcotics Control: Andean Strategy 

Update” (Statement before House Foreign Affairs Committee Task Force on 

International Narcotics Control), US Department of State Dispatch, 15 July 

1991, 510. This was restated with examples of major international cooperation 

initiatives by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Contr

Strategy: Progress in the War on Drugs 1989-1992 (Washington, D.C.: 

Executive Office of the President, January 1993), 27-29. 

3. Thomas W. Lippman, “The US Takes New (Old) Path in Narcotics 

Battle.” The Washington Post, 12 January 1994, A8. 

4. The actual reference is “There are some who believe the Federal effort 

should be evenly divided among what are loosely called ‘supply reduction’ and 

‘demand reduction’ activities.” Office of National Drug Control Policy, Nation

Drug Control Strategy (Executive Office of the President, February 1991), 2. 

Later, two fronts are identified in domestic terms of “casual drug use” and 

“chronic drug use” by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. See Nationa

Drug Control Strategy: A Nation Responds to Drugs (Washington, D.C.: 

Executive Office of the President, January 1992), 4. 

5. Joseph B. Treaster, “Pentagon Plans Shift in War on Drug Traffickers,” 

New York Times, 8 October 1993, A4. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Lippman, A8. There is ambiguity on what the Clinton administration’s 

policy will be on drug interdiction. Office of National Drug Control Policy, 

Breaking the Cycle of Drug Abuse: 1993 Interim National Drug Control 

Strategy (Washington. D.C.: Executive Office of the President, September 

1993), 22, offers that, “In a country with borders as vast and as open as our ow

however, interdiction is a costly undertaking that requires the cooperation of 

numerous federal agencies and the source and transit nations. We will review 

existing interdiction organizations, resources, and methods to ensure they are 

operating in the most effective manner. Programs that are proven effective will 

be continued.” This was further addressed by Lee P. Brown, director, Office of 

National Drug Control Policy, during an interview on “Meet the Press,” 23 

January 1994, where he stated there would be increased focus on domestic drug

prevention efforts; and focus on drug-producer nations and eradication efforts, 

while citing interdiction in the transit zones as too costly. 

8. For a good summary of counterdrug efforts waged by Colombia, Peru, an

Bolivia, see Melvyn Levitsky, “Progress in the International War Against Illici

Drugs” (Statement before Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and 

International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), US 

Department of State Dispatch, 2 March 1992, 158-60. 

9. Ibid., 156. 

10. Why Latin American countries lacked the will to pursue antidrug 

activities is discussed by Andrews et al., 111-19. 

289 
y , gy ,

the Study of Foreign Affairs, Department of State Publication 9849, March 

1991, 11. 

12. Ibid., 6-8. 

13. Ibid., 16. In this paper, Williams discusses crop eradication through the 

use of tebuthiuron. To enable this operation he proposes that, “American 

military trainers can help keep narcotics police alive by giving them some 

paramilitary training.” Although he later qualifies it when he states, “The 

crackdown in Colombia, if it can be sustained, and the proposed eradication in 

Peru, if it can be implemented, attack the supply problem at the root. Neither 

action requires the deployment of military forces by the US.” Ibid., 19. 

14. Ibid., 13. 

15. Ibid., 16. 

16. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy 

(Executive Office of the President, January 1992), 144. For a more detailed, 

historical perspective of the total National Drug Control Budget, 1981-1992, by 

a major agency, see Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug 

Control Strategy: Budget Summary (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of th

President, February 1991), 216-19. More detailed descriptions of specific budg

line items are at pages 175-82. 

17. Lippman, A8. 

18. Joint Publication 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other 

Than War,” final draft, April 1993, VI-3. Authority for military involvement 

started with the Defense Authorization Act for 1989 and was further codifed in 

guidance letters from the secretary of defense during 1989, ultimately included 

in the National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992 

(Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 17 September 1992), 15; with like inclusion 

in service doctrine such as The Air Force and US National Security: Global 

Reach-Global Power (June 1990), 15. Also for comprehensive counterdrug join

doctrine see JCS, Joint Publication 3-07.4, “Joint Doctrine and JTTP for 

Counterdrug Operations,” initial draft, 15 August 1992. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Army-Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict, “The Role of the 

Department of Defense in the National Counterdrug Effort,” (Langley AFB, 

Va.: 10 June 1993), 58-73. Note the document is not cleared for public release. 

This discussion is based on Joint Publication 3-07.4, initial draft, A-1 though A

4; and VI-I through VI-60. For a concise summary of the major commands and 

counterdrug activities accomplished in foreign countries, see Stephen M. 

Duncan, “DOD’s Counterdrug Efforts” (Statement to Defense Subcommittee, 

House Appropriations Committee, 1 April 1992) Defense Issues 7, no. 29, 1-8. 

21. Gen George A. Joulwan, USA, commander in chief, US Southern 

Command, “Continued Engagement Needed in Southern Command Region” 

(Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee, 21 April 1993) Defense Issu

8, no. 24, 1. 

22. Ibid., 3. 

290 
yy , p

1993, the secretary of defense directed JCS to expand the responsibilities of 

LANTCOM, changing its designation to USACOM. In the process of the 

reorganization, FORSCOM was aligned under USACOM; however, it retained 

its operational responsibilities for counterdrug operation. Details regarding this 

realignment were taken from the Implementation Plan for Establishing United 

States Atlantic Command as the Joint Force Integrator, final draft (Norfolk. Va

Headquarters USACOM, September 1993), 1-1 through 1-7. 

24. Ibid. 

25. Adm Charles R Larson, commander in chief, US Pacific Command, 

“Pacific Command Cooperative Engagement Advances US Interests” 

(Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee, 21 April 1993) Defense Issu

8, no. 17, 3-4. 

26. Ibid., 4. 

27. Becky Colaw, “War on Drugs: Keeping Watch on the Golden Road,” 

Airman, May 1993, 35. 

28. National Drug Control Strategy, February 1991, 107. 

29. John Ahart and Gerald Stiles, “The Military’s Entry into Air Interdictio

of Drug Trafficking from South America,” Rand Corporation, 1991, 11. 

30. National Drug Control Strategy, February 1991, 77. 31. Andrews et al., 

111-19. 

32. See comments by Melvyn Levitsky, assistant secretary for International 

Narcotics Matters, “Progress in the International War Against Illicit Drugs,” U

Department of State Dispatch, 2 March 1992, 158-60. 

33. Andrews et al., 110. 

34. Lippman, A8. 

35. Andrews et al., 113. 

36. Ibid. 

37. Levitsky, “Progress in the International War Against Illicit Drugs,” 161

38. William W. Mendel, “Illusive Victory: From Blast Furnace to Green 

Sweep,” Military Review, December 1992, 76. Unless otherwise noted, the 

discussion of Operation Blast Furnace and Operation Ghost Zone is drawn from 

this article. 

39. Ibid. 

40. Randy J. Kolton, “Combating the Colombian Drug Cartels” Military 

Review, March 1990, 58. 

41. John T. Fiskel, “Developing a Drug War Strategy: Lessons from 

Operation Blast Furnace,” Military Review, June 1991, 64. 

42. Mendel, 76. 

43. Ibid., 78. 

44. Ibid., 80; also referred to in Levitsky’s comments, “Progress in the 

International War Against Illicit Drugs,” 160. 

45. Mendel, 80. 

46. See graphic in National Drug Control Strategy: A Nation Responds to 

Drug Use, January 1992, 100. 

47. Ahart and Stiles, 18. 

291 
, 

49. National Drug Control Strategy: A Nation Responds to Drug Use, 

January 1992,104. 

50. Ibid. 

51. Ahart and Stiles, 4-18. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion of the 

composite scenario is drawn from this article. 

52. Ibid., 4. 

53. National Drug Control Strategy: A Nation Responds to Drug Use, 

January 1992, 106. 

54. Ibid., 107-8. 

55. Ibid. 

56. Lippman. A8. 

57. Mendel, 81-84. 

58. Joulwan, 7. 

59. Williams, 13. 

60. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Breaking the Cycle of Drug 

Abuse: 1993 Interim National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

Executive Office of the President, September 1993), 22. 

61. Duncan, 7. 

292 
Supporting United Nations and 

Regional Peacekeeping Efforts 

Dr James S. Corum 

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are among the mo

important issues that will confront the US military in the next tw

decades. This chapter outlines the problems facing the US militar

in developing policies and doctrines for peacekeeping and peac

enforcement and offers some recommendations. 

Supporting and participating in multinational peacekeepin

operations have been part of American foreign policy for over 3

years. Since the United States provided air support for the UN

Congo operation in 1960, the US military has been ordered 

support more than a dozen peacekeeping operations, ranging 

scope from providing a handful of soldiers for a UN observatio

mission to landing over 30,000 troops in Somalia. 1

 Ever

presidential administration since Eisenhower's has involved the U

military in some form of support for peacekeeping. 

In the last decade American support for multinational peac

operations has increased. In 1982, the US organized the 14-natio

multinational observer force to serve as peacekeepers in support o

the Egyptian/Israeli peace agreement. Over 1,000 America

soldiers continue to serve as part of this very successf

peacekeeping mission in the Sinai. From 1982 to 1984, the Unite

States participated in a bloody and unsuccessful peac

enforcement mission in Lebanon along' with British, French, an

Italian forces. In the late 1980s the US supported the establishme

of a UN multinational observer force to assist in the Centr

American peace process in EI Salvador and Nicaragua. The U

also provided financial support for peacekeeping operations 

regions where the US and US-supported forces were militari

engaged. 

In June 1992, with the lessening of cold-war tensions, U

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined his vision of a

293 
expanded peacekeeping role for the UN. Boutros-Ghali asserte

that the UN should go beyond traditional peacekeeping missions 

peace-enforcement operations. The peace-enforcement missio

would commit troops under a stronger mandate than peacekeepin

Such troops would actively work to restore order in nations. 

Consider the utilization of peace enforcement units in clearly defined 

circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. 

...They would have to be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces 

and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their 

national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under 

the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of 

peacekeeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. 2 

In a speech before the UN General Assembly in Septemb

1992, President George Bush endorsed the secretary-general

peace-enforcement proposals. President Bush recommended th

special military units be developed and trained by UN memb

nations for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions and 

addition promised increased US support in the form of trainin

financing, and logistics for UN military operations. 3

 The Clinto

administration has also expressed support for the increased use o

UN forces. One of the first defense decisions of the Clinto

administration was to create a regular budget allocation fo

peacekeeping rather than depend on the previous expedient o

special appropriations. 

Despite a long and consistent US policy to suppo

peacekeeping operations, the American military has been relucta

to accept the peacekeeping mission or to establish a body o

peacekeeping doctrine. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs' 199

report on the roles, missions, and functions of the armed force

briefly mentioned “humanitarian operations” but contained n

reference to peacekeeping. 4 Until the end of the cold war the

was little interest in or study of peacekeeping in the US arme

forces. The 1993 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 3-07.

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) fo

Peacekeeping Operations, provides a brief description o

terminology and a few general guidelines on peacekeepin

294 
Though it is a useful starting point, it still does not resemble 

usable or developed doctrine. 

The peacekeeping mission is resisted by the military for sever

reasons. First of all, there is concern that peace operations wi

absorb too much of the operational funds of a declining militar

budget. This is a valid concern. The $350 million allocated fo

peacekeeping operations in the fiscal year (FY) 1993 defens

budget was quickly consumed by the Somalia operation, whos

cost to the United States quickly ran to several billion dollars. I

order to make up the budget shortfall, the Defense Department ha

to reduce funding for equipment programs. 5

 The cost of U

peacekeeping missions has grown from $233 million in 1987 to a

estimated $3.5 billion in 1993. The US is assessed 31.74 percent o

the UN's peacekeeping costs. This amount to a $1.11-billio

assessment for peacekeeping in addition to the costs of supportin

a large US force in Somalia. 

Another reason for US military resistance to this mission is th

large numbers of troops required for the new peace-enforceme

mission and by the expansion of traditional peacekeeping. The U

deployed over 30,000 troops to Somalia in late 1992 and ear

1993. The possibility of deployed 25,000 American troops a

peacekeepers to Yugoslavia was also discussed. Deployments o

this size, coupled with the necessary support troops and a furth

reserve to relieve the deployed troops, amounts to a majo

commitment of American war-fighting capability to peacekeepin

Deployments such as Somalia are liable to place a great stra

upon an ever-shrinking American military. 

The peacekeeping mission is resisted also due to a commo

attitude in the US military: that military forces lose their fightin

efficiency if employed on any but the traditional war-fightin

mission. A recent article in Parameters, the journal of the Arm

War College, offers one of the best illustrations of this aspect o

American military culture. 6 This article postulates a not-too

distant future in which the US military has lost its moral bearing

295 
and fighting ability due to its overuse for civilian missions th

started in the 1990s. Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions a

blamed for diverting the armed forces from training for wa

“Training is, quite literally, a zero-sum game. Each moment spe

performing a non-traditional mission is one unavailable fo

orthodox military exercises.” 7

 Author Charles Dunlap, Jr., argue

“In truth militaries ought to 'prepare for war' and leave the 'peac

waging' to those agencies of government whose mission is ju

that. “ 8 

One of the most serious problems in creating an America

policy and doctrine for peacekeeping is simply defining the term

Policymakers today may mean very different things when they us

the term peacekeeping since there is no common international o

legal definition of the word. 

I define peacekeeping in accordance with the meaning that 

has accrued during 40 years of UN and multinational operation

peacekeeping is a diplomatic method of placing neutral soldie

and observers between two or more parties or nations in conflic

with the intent of monitoring a truce or armistice agreement an

assisting the conflicting parties to maintain the truce an

eventually to arrive at a permanent, peaceful political settlemen

The peacekeeping mission can also be referred to as “truc

keeping,” “truce enforcement,” and “armistice enforcement.” 

As a general rule, peacekeeping comes into play when the peac

process is already well under way. The three most importa

traditional principles of peacekeeping are 

1. Consent. The warring parties agree to allow peacekeepin

forces to enter the conflict zone. Peacekeepers are allowed 

operate within a specific mandate that has been agreed to by all th

parties in the conflict. 

2. Impartiality. The peacekeepers are not to be parties to th

conflict or to join the conflict. They are obligated to impartial

report violations of the peace to their higher authority-usually, th

United Nations. 

296 
3. Self-Defense. Peacekeeping forces are authorized to use forc

only to defend themselves. 

Although peacekeeping duties are largely those of diplomac

and observation, neutral military forces have consistently proven 

be the best peacekeepers. There are several reasons why militar

forces are better than civilian diplomats in the peacekeeping rol

Military forces are already organized as units, and they can b

easily reorganized to meet the task at hand. Military units a

quickly deployable. The military has its own logistics and transpo

capability to access the area and execute its mission. Military uni

possess tight discipline-a characteristic necessary to operate in 

tense environment and still further diplomacy. Soldiers understan

military operations and tactics and are the best-qualified people 

determine, evaluate, and report compliance or violation of th

military terms of an armistice. Lastly, should the peace proce

break down, military units are capable of defending themselves. 

Traditional peacekeeping is a type of practical field diplomac

that holds only a tenuous relationship with the diplomacy o

international councils and chanceries. Peacekeeping units deplo

between combatant forces as a buffer. Junior officers an

noncommissioned officers are commonly required to meet dai

with soldiers and junior leaders of the combatant forces in order 

defuse tense situations and to allow for the passage of lines and th

movement of civilians. Mid-ranking officers negotiate local truce

and adapt armistice provisions to local conditions. When violenc

occurs, the peacekeepers are obligated to impartially an

accurately report the events to their military superiors as well as 

their international authorities. On this mission, junior officers mu

exercise discipline and restraint. To be effective, they mu

additionally possess superior analytical skills and the ability 

make rapid, on-the-spot decisions. The peacekeeping and observ

missions are among the most difficult missions an individu

soldier can execute. 

297 
Following the principles of consent, impartiality, and sel

defense, peacekeeping has built a remarkable record of succe

since the first UN military peacekeeping force was deployed 

Gaza and the Sinai in 1957. In several cases-notably, in Lebanon

peacekeeping efforts have broken down or been very short-live

Most of the dozens of peacekeeping operations of the last 40 year

however, have contributed greatly to reducing internation

tensions and resolving conflicts. 

Broadening the Concept 

The concept of peacekeeping has recently been broadened an

applied to multinational interventions to restore order. Secretary

General Boutros-Ghali refers to such operations as “peacemaking

to be carried out by “peace-enforcement units.” 9 Policymakers an

the press have generally referred to such operations a

“peacekeeping.” The US military is now limping bo

peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the general term peac

operations. There is a grave danger for policymakers in confusin

peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, for the tw

operations are fundamentally different. Peacekeeping operation

are normally conducted within a very clear diplomatic manda

regarding both the mission of the forces and the guidelines that th

forces operate under Peace-enforcement operations are not carrie

out under the principles of consent and impartiality nor is th

authority to e force limited to self-defense. 

Some of the differences between peacekeeping and peac

enforcement have been demonstrated in the actions and policie

US and international coalition forces operating in Somalia. I

Somalia, US and UN forces actively asserted a right to search for 

seize weapons held by various political factions. Peacekeepin

forces might supervise a negotiated disarmament, t they have n

right to carry out offensive operations to seize weapons. The U

forces also claimed the right to operate wherever in Somalia the

felt it necessary. Peacekeeping forces are normally limited 

specific areas of operations under the truce agreement the

298 
support. Another difference between peace enforcement an

peacekeeping is the rules of engagement. Peace-enforceme

troops may shoot if they feel threatened. Peacekeepers a

authorized to shoot only after being fired upon. Finall

peacekeeping forces claim no civil government authority and hav

very limited authority to arrest or detain civilians. Peace enforce

in Somalia essentially took over the role of civil governmen

worked to organize a government under their authority, an

asserted broad powers of arrest and detainment. Indeed, the U

has not acted to outline any real limits of authority in peac

enforcement. 

Although the United Nations and the United States hav

endorsed the peace-enforcement concept by committing force

Somalia in 1992-93, the concept remains undefined by practice o

international agreement. This is in contrast to the concept o

peacekeeping, which has acquired a tradition of law and preceden

Defining the concept of peace enforcement and creating a viab

military doctrine for carrying out such operations should be 

priority for American military policymakers. 

Operational Problems of Peacekeeping 

Peacekeeping may be a diplomatic/political operation, but it is 

true military operation as well. As such, the success of 

peacekeeping operation depends upon such military factors a

command and control, logistics, intelligence, training, and forc

structure. 

Peacekeeping forces operating under UN control have bee

plagued for decades with insufficient command, control, an

communications assets. The UN has never had a true military sta

capable of planning and coordinating all aspects of a militar

operation. Until 1993 the UN possessed no 24-hour militar

communications center. The minuscule UN military staff at the U

Headquarters-only a score of officers-did not possess th

manpower or funding to maintain a command center. Occasionall

299 
UN force commanders in the field had to contact headquarte

during New York working hours, often by commercial telephone. 

The lack of an adequate planning staff means that every U

peacekeeping operation is, by nature, an ad hoc operation. Th

Security Council authorizes an operation and UN officia

negotiate the scope and conditions of the operation. Member state

are then called upon to provide forces for the operation. Whi

many nations are capable of providing well-trained and discipline

light-infantry units, only a few (mostly Western) nations hav

adequate numbers of trained logistics troops, medic

communications specialists, transport units, engineer units, an

planning staffs to actually support a deployment of forces over 

great distance. 

Forces committed to UN peacekeeping have had to make d

with the units and equipment offered to the United Nation

Consequently, there has been a consistent shortfall in the logistic

support troops, and equipment necessary to carry out even smal

scale peacekeeping operations. Shortfalls in logistics support hav

on several occasions, crippled the effectiveness of UN operation

The UN mission for the referendum in Western Saha

(MINURSO) was established in September 1991 to verily th

cessation of hostilities between Moroccan and Polisario force

The military peacekeeping force was initially to consist of 1,69

personnel, of whom 550 were to be military observers. Only 35

troops from 26 nations were made available and deployed. Th

logistics battalion envisioned never arrived, so the small observ

group had to improvise its own support system. Consequently, 

had too little time and too few personnel to execute the mission. 

Although, the MINURSO mission has not failed, its effectivene

has been greatly limited by the lack of support. In this case, an

success has come by luck and improvisation than by planning. 

The recent UN peacekeeping mission to Cambodia, involvin

20,000 troops, was deployed without maps of the country sinc

maps were not available through UN channels. Eventually, th

300 
military obtained maps via the black market. 

 The U

commander of the Central American peacekeeping mission in th

1980s had no effective logistics support; he had to put observ

officers to work organizing a supply system using a fleet of local

obtained banana trucks. 12 Since UN peacekeepers often deploy 

parts of the world with little, if any, infrastructure, lack of logistic

support has become the primary difficulty in executing operations

Due to the culture of the United Nations, UN peacekeepin

forces are hampered by a lack of intelligence for planning an

executing operations. Most of the 183 member nations can b

classified as third world nations, and the very term intelligenc

conjures up for them images of nefarious Central Intelligenc

Agency (CIA) plots to interfere with and overthrow the

governments. Whether this is an accurate depiction of intelligenc

operations or of the CIA is beside the point. Third world diploma

and politicians cannot be seen to support something resemblin

military intelligence operations. Thus, while the UN itself collec

a great deal of information from around the world, its military sta

does not have an intelligence section to collate and analyze th

information that is available. The result is the deployment o

relatively large peacekeeping forces without adequate maps o

information about the combatant forces. 

The low level of support available to UN peacekeepers als

hampers one of the central missions of the peacekeeper: to observ

and report. Even the relatively unsophisticated tools o

information-gathering equipment common to most Wester

militaries are unavailable to UN peacekeepers. Much of the U

observation missions consist of observers with binoculars watchin

a cease-fire line. This is an inefficient use of the limited manpow

available. 

Basic items for intelligence collection, such as sensor device

ground radar, and signal intercept equipment; have been use

extensively by the US Army in order to enhance the efficiency o

the ground forces. With proper equipment a small intelligenc

301 
team can monitor and record movements over a large area muc

more effectively than can several observer posts. Add aerial an

space surveillance assets to the observation mission and th

efficiency of the observer force is multiplied yet agai

Nonetheless, due to the cultural bias of many UN officials again

intelligence gathering and the limited funds and support availabl

UN peacekeepers continue to conduct their mission with obsole

and minimally effective means. 

In discussing peacekeeping operations, American policymake

have been concerned with the amount of training necessary 

carry out peacekeeping and with whether specific units should b

assigned the peacekeeping task and given special training. Th

concern is perhaps indicative of the American military cultur

which sees the peacekeeping mission as a task somehow alien 

fighting forces: a task that requires a major re-education effort fo

the forces involved. Soldiers experienced in peacekeeping do no

however, share this concern over special training. The Canadia

Forces, the military with perhaps the most extensive peacekeepin

experience, use regular line units for peacekeeping. The Canadian

have found that well-trained, deployable combat units need only 

short two-week area-indoctrination training course in order 

deploy and effectively carry out a peacekeeping operation. 

A study by the Canadian Forces concludes that peacekeeping b

itself does not necessarily damage the operational effectiveness o

a military force. 13 Indeed, according to the Canadian study, 

peacekeeping deployment provides a military unit wi

opportunities to exercise its military skills. 

There were indications that peacekeeping may be having a positive 

impact on operational readiness in that it has provided occasions when 

the Canadian Forces could implement and try many of its standard 

operating procedures for personal and material deployment. 14 

The study also outlines some favorable training benefits fro

peacekeeping service. 

302 
y ppg, 

skill exercising, broadening of horizons, exposure to different cultures, 

exposure to the military approaches of other nations, and the foreign 

travel all contributed to the professional development of the Canadian 

Forces' member. Furthermore, the sharing of the experiences and lessons 

learned upon return to the parent unit or base had a cumulative effect. 15 

Training courses of five weeks' duration for officers involved 

peacekeeping and four weeks' duration for enlisted men have bee

sponsored by the UN since 1969. In the courses, which are offere

in Niinisalo, Finland, officers experienced in peacekeepin

supervise tactical exercises typical of peacekeeping operations. 16 

In general, training units and officers for peacekeeping dutie

does not seem to provide any major operational problems no

should deployment of units and officers on peacekeeping dutie

have a major impact upon the effectiveness of the combat forces a

a whole, as long as no more than a small percentage of the tot

force is deployed for peacekeeping at anyone time. 

The US Contribution to Peacekeeping 

During the cold war, the United States generally remained aloo

from direct or significant participation in UN peacekeepin

operations. As the world's primary opponent of communism, a

embodied by the Soviet Union, the US could scarcely be regarde

in the third world as an impartial force. Since peacekeepin

operations are approved by the UN Security Council, during th

cold war there was an unwritten understanding that the US wou

refrain from playing a major role in any particular peacekeepin

operation as long as Soviet involvement was limited. Had the U

desired to playa greater role, or had it even offered its services fo

peacekeeping, the USSR would have insisted upon an equal rol

Increasing Soviet military prestige and overseas involvement, eve

in a mission so innocuous as peacekeeping, was anathema to U

policymakers. As a result, the US and USSR agreed that the sma

powers and neutral nations would serve as peacekeepers. 

303 
With the end of the cold war, there is no longer a logic

political reason why the US should remain aloof fro

peacekeeping. American and Russian forces are now planning joi

training and operations. There are even discussions of possib

US/Russian peacekeeping operations. Fear of the Soviet Union

expanding its influence in the third world is no longer a polic

consideration for the United States. Instead, the US and Russia a

now working together to support UN operations in Bosnia. 

Given the improved climate of political and militar

cooperation among the larger powers, the conditions of politic

support for peacekeeping operations have improved. As more U

peacekeeping operations are likely to take place in the futur

determining the appropriate US contribution-and creating 

peacekeeping doctrine and policy-are among the most importa

challenges the US military will face in the near future. 

There is much that the US military can do to improve an

enhance the operational effectiveness of multination

peacekeeping. America's role in organizing and supporting a 14

nation multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai demonstrate

that the US military can effectively organize and condu

peacekeeping operations. The Sinai operation, part of th

Egyptian/Israeli peace accords, was not sponsored by the Unite

Nations. US/USSR rivalry in the UN in the early 1980s caused th

Soviets to veto a proposed UN mandate to supervise the Israe

withdrawal from Egypt and the Egyptian/ Israeli force-lev

agreements. Under US direction, a force of several thousand troop

from 14 nations was deployed in the Sinai in 1982. This forc

which contains over 1,000 American soldiers, has successful

observed the Egyptian/Israeli peace ever since. The peacekeepe

have encountered no serious incidents, and Egyptian/Israe

relations have steadily improved. 

Considering the factors of the changed political situation, th

success of America in peacekeeping in the Sinai, and th

operational problems facing UN peacekeepers noted in th

304 
previous section, there are several major contributions the U

military can make to improve and enhance UN and multination

peacekeeping efforts. The United States can best suppo

peacekeeping by playing to its operational and institution

strengths. The US military has superior and unique capabilities 

deployment planning, logistics support, and technology. U

support for peacekeeping should center on these strengths. Th

UN's institutional problem of inadequate staff planning can b

partially solved by an infusion of US and NATO personn

experienced in deploying units in multinational operations. Th

should be coupled with the expenditure of adequate funds 

provide a modem, secure, 24-hour communications system for U

peacekeeping operations. This would have to follow major chang

in the cultural bias of many UN officials, especially from thir

world countries, against collecting and analyzing intelligenc

When peacekeeping operations are contemplated, UN agencie

will have to cooperate fully with the military staff and mak

economic, geographical, and political information available to th

planning staff. If necessary, UN agencies should be required 

provide teams of translators and linguists to the military staffs 

assist them in basic intelligence analysis. This would preve

recurrences of the problems encountered during the initial U

deployment to Somalia in December 1990 when American force

moved into Somali cities without translators or interpreters. 

Logistics has been the UN peacekeepers' greatest operation

problem for decades. Making available the equivalent of three o

four logistics task forces, combined with engineering and medic

detachments, could provide effective support for three or fou

peacekeeping operations. Such a commitment would amount to n

more than 1 percent of the total US Army. This type of suppo

could spell the difference between success and failure of a U

operation. The US Air Force has provided airlift assets 

numerous UN peacekeeping operations since the Congo in 196

and it should continue to support such missions. 

305 
Modern US technology can also do much to improve th

efficiency of UN operations. A commitment of US tactic

intelligence teams equipped with sensor devices and groun

surveillance radar can enhance the efficiency of UN troops servin

in the observer role. UN peacekeepers should be able to reque

and receive US Air Force aerial surveillance and reconnaissanc

support when necessary and appropriate. The US could set up 

liaison committee to make satellite-derived photos and intelligenc

available to UN peacekeepers. Such a liaison committee cou

ensure that the most sensitive information and technology wou

be kept within a restricted circle while less-sensitive satelli

photos received a greater dissemination to the forces operating 

the field. 

A small number of staff officers, logisticians, and specialis

would do far more to enhance UN peacekeeping operations than 

large force of ground troops. In any case, there is no shortage o

well-trained, well-disciplined infantry units available for U

operations. Countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Banglades

have contributed effective infantry units to UN peacekeeping an

are likely to make such troops available for future operations. Th

third world countries, however, lack the staffs, logisticians, an

support troops necessary to support troop deployments. In view o

this, US support for peacekeeping is best focused upon th

qualitative rather than the quantitative. 

The US and Peace Enforcement 

Peace enforcement is not a new concept, and it did not origina

with the American and UN intervention in Somalia in 1990 an

1991. The United States had participated in two multination

peace-enforcement operations before Somalia: to the Congo 

1960-64 and to Lebanon in 1982-84. Both operations failed. 

As defined by the UN secretary-general, the peace-enforceme

operations are not carried out with the express consent of th

warring parties. Peace enforcement contains a far broader manda

306 
than peacekeeping; a mandate to restore peace and order. The U

and US have authorized a broader use of force in peac

enforcement than specified by peacekeeping rules. 

The secretary-general has recommended that UN member state

make armed forces available to the Security Council to act a

“guarantors of international security.” This represents a desire b

some in the UN leadership to greatly expand international militar

intervention. 

The three peace-enforcement campaigns by the United States-

the Congo, Lebanon, and Somalia-share many common element

US national interests in those areas were minimal. The U

supported the Congo operation out of a desire to keep Sovi

influence to a minimum in Africa. The Lebanon and Somal

operations were conducted primarily for humanitarian reasons 

help secure a permanent peace in lands torn by war. In all thre

cases, the UN or multinational mandate to intervene was couche

in vague terms: to “assist the Congolese” until they could set u

their own security forces; “to provide an interposition force...

assist the Government of Lebanon and Lebanon's armed forces 

the Beirut area [and to] facilitate the restoration of the Lebane

Government's sovereignty. “17 In Somalia the UN envisioned 

long-term mandate in which UN forces would “prevent violenc

maintain security and help restore the economy. “18 

In all of these cases, the soldiers on the spot were given vagu

guidelines as to the amount of force that was authorized. Initial

only self-defense was authorized, but in each case the rules o

engagement were quickly changed and expanded. American rule

of engagement changed at least three times during the first tw

weeks of the intervention in Somalia. In all three cases, use o

force so far as to include bombing, heavy gun employment, an

conventional attacks was authorized by the UN and multination

forces. 

Any pretense of impartiality, fundamental to the peacekeepin

mission, was quickly discarded in the peace-enforceme

307 
operations. In the Congo, Lebanon, and Somalia, UN an

multinational forces quickly took sides and began to engage 

conventional conflict with one or more of the national factions. I

no case was such a situation envisioned by the original peac

enforcement mandate. A further complication originated with th

UN charter, which forbids intervention in the internal affairs o

another nation. A strong case can be made that both the Congo an

Somalia operations are intrinsically in violation of the principles o

the United Nations. 

Each of the aforementioned peace-enforcement operation

resulted in heavy casualties for UN and multinational force

involved. 19 In Lebanon, 241 US marines and 58 French soldie

were killed in one day, 23 October 1983. More than 10 percent o

the multinational force in Lebanon became casualties on that da

20 The US/UN casualties in Somalia exceeded 200 soldiers in th

first 10 months of the deployment. 

The inability to justify peace-enforcement operations in term

of national interest, the vagueness of the mandate for suc

operations, and the heavy casualties involved have all served 

reduce political and public support for the peace-enforceme

mission. One of the fundamental problems has been to speak o

peace-enforcement operations in terms of peacekeeping; as note

however, the two operations are fundamentally different. Neith

the UN nor the US government has created a military doctrine fo

peace enforcement. Establishing a clear policy and doctrine fo

peace enforcement will remain one of the most important an

difficult tasks for the US military in the next decade. 

Conclusion and Recommendations 

The fiscal year 1993 US defense budget included, for the fir

time, $350 million for peacekeeping operations. This is at least 

first step in recognizing that peacekeeping is part of the overa

mission of the US military. Some tentative steps have also bee

taken to create a military doctrine for peacekeeping. While the

308 
are steps in the right direction, it is doubtful that $350 million 

anywhere near enough to properly fund US peacekeepin

operations. 

Traditional multinational peacekeeping operations have prove

to be a very useful tool for American foreign policy. It is also cos

effective. The UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus costs $50 millio

per year, a small price to pay for helping to keep the peace betwee

Greece and Turkey-both NATO allies of the US. The cost o

keeping approximately 1,000 US troops in the Sinai is minuscu

compared to the costs involved if hostilities broke out aga

between Egypt and Israel. The world has already seen th

Egyptian/Israeli conflict close the Suez Canal, cause a world o

crisis, and generate serious problems for American foreign polic

Peacekeepers have recently helped bring peace and order 

Cambodia. Peacekeepers have assisted the United States in endin

conflicts in Central America. Considering the benefits o

peacekeeping, it would not be unwise to commit a minimum of 1-

percent of the US defense budget to such operations. 

As pointed out earlier, the American military commitment 

peacekeeping need not be large in terms of troops committed. Sta

specialists, logistics support, and modem equipment will go far 

improve the effectiveness of multinational peacekeepin

operations. 

If the United States makes a firm policy commitment to suppo

international peacekeeping, then certain aspects of the US militar

policy and culture will need to be changed. A peacekeeping tou

should not hurt an officer's career. If peacekeeping is take

seriously, the US military should encourage its best officers 

volunteer for the mission. Promotions should be assured fo

officers who serve several peacekeeping missions. By changin

military personnel policies, the US can develop a cadre of office

with extensive knowledge of and experience in peacekeeping. 

The peace-enforcement mission is the thorniest problem for th

US military. It is a mistake to view such operations within th

309 
context of peacekeeping. Peace enforcement is essentially, militar

intervention. American policymakers need to decide under wh

circumstances and for which reasons they will commit US troop

in foreign civil wars. The UN has shown itself to be a poor agenc

for conducting military intervention operations, yet som

international response may be required for conflicts such as th

Congo and Somalia. One option for dealing with the dilemma o

the complete: breakdown of order within a country is to suppo

and encourage intervention by regional coalitions. When civil w

devastated Liberia in 1989, ECOMOG, a coalition of five We

African nations, intervened to restore order. The US has provide

diplomatic support and military aid for this intervention. In th

case of Somalia, it is possible that forces from the Organization o

African Unity or the Arab League might have been a better agenc

than the UN for intervention. Regional powers have a dire

national interest in keeping order in their part of the world. 

small, regional organization can create a more specific mandate fo

the use of force than the large, complex, and bureaucrat

apparatus of the United Nations with its 183 member states. 

310 
Notes 

1. Some of the peacekeeping operations that the US has supported are: UN 

operations in the Congo 1960-1964 (equipment and airlift); UN security force i

West New Guinea 1962-1963 (airlift); United Nations peacekeeping force in 

Cyprus 1964-1965 (airlift); multinational force and observers in the Sinai 1982

present (troops); UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara 1990-

present (observers); UN operations in Somalia II 1993-1994 (troops); UN 

protection force in Macedonia 1992-1994 (troops); and UN protection force in 

Bosnia 1992-present (airlift and air strikes). 

2. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace,” Repo

of the Secretary-General to the 47th Session of the UN General Assembly, 17 

June 1992, par. 44. 

3. President George Bush, address to the UN General Assembly, 17 June 

1992. 

4. Gen Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roles, Missions 

and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States (February 1993), 1.4-

1.5. 

5. Defense Secretary Les Aspin asked Congress to take $750 million out of 

about two dozen different budget accounts to pay for Operation Restore Hope i

Somalia, Federal Times, 17 May 1993, 20. 

6. See Lt Col Charles Dunlap, Jr., USAF, “The Origins of the American 

Military Coup of 2012,” Parameters, no. 28 (Winter 1992-1993): 2-20. 

7. Ibid., 11. 

8. Ibid., 12. 

9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace,” UN Chronicle, 

September 1992,3. 

10. Lt Col Bill Spracher in Military Implications of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations, ed. William Lewis (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 

1993), 61-65. 

11. Maj George Steuber in Military Implications, 67-70. 

12. Maj Gen J. C. Douglas in Military Implications, 54-58. 

13. Chief Review Services, Program Evaluation Division, Final Report on 

NDHQ Program Evaluation E 2/90 Peacekeeping (Ottawa: Ministry of Nationa

Defence, 30 June 1992), par. 4.31. 

14. Ibid., par. 4.38. 

15. Ibid., par. 4.34. 

16. Keith Greenberg, “The Essential Art of Empathy,” Military History 

Quarterly 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1992): 64-69. 

17. President Ronald Reagan, White House Statement (Washington, D.C.: 2

September 1982). 

18. US Department of State, Dispatch of April 5. 1993.209-10. 

19. UN Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets, 2d ed., 1990

435. 

20. Anthony McDermot and Kjell Skjelsbaed , eds., The Multinational Forc

in Beirut (Miami: University of Florida Press, 1991), 276. 

311 
Parallel Warfare 

Its Nature and Application 

John R. Pardo, Jr. 

By the morning of January 20 [1991], four days after U. S. Air Force 

stealth bomber opened the war with a 2,000-pound laser-guided bomb 

targeted precisely on the microwave dishes atop Baghdad's International 

Telecommunications Building, the city was crippled. There was no 

mainline electricity, no running water, and no working telephones. 

-Michael Kelly 

The New Republic 

That is how journalist Michael Kelly relates what he and th

other residents of Baghdad experienced during the opening days o

Operation Desert Storm. The excerpt from Mr. Kelly's article n

only describes the far-reaching effects of parallel warfare, but tw

of its main ingredients-stealth and precision weapons. Despi

having been the star of Desert Storm, parallel warfare is not a wel

known phenomenon. This chapter will not only define parall

warfare and discuss its history: it will describe the factors th

make parallel warfare work, some of the positive and negativ

aspects of this warfare, and why parallel warfare is important 

US armed forces. 

Parallel Warfare 

What Is It? 

Parallel warfare is a modus operandi-a way of employin

military forces. One working definition of parallel warfare is th

simultaneous attack of enemy centers of gravity to achiev

strategic paralysis. Strategic paralysis or strategic crippling, as it 

also known, is the state an enemy is in when he can no long

effectively resist. Along with the idea of simultaneous attacks 

the rapidity with which these attacks are unleashed. A

overarching objective of parallel warfare is not only to achiev

strategic paralysis but to do so quickly. Parallel warfare 

accelerated warfare, often referred to as hyperwar. By employing 

313 
one can reduce casualties (on both sides), reduce resourc

requirements, maintain support for one's cause (if time is a factor

and prevent the enemy from recovering or taking countermeasure

Parallel warfare differs greatly from what most people a

familiar with-serial or sequential warfare. Under serial warfa

targets are attacked in sequence, one after the other. Electric

engineering provides a good example of the differences betwee

serial and parallel warfare. Figure 1 displays two circuits; the fir

is a serial circuit in which the current must travel through eac

“target” before proceeding to the next. Meanwhile, on the parall

circuit, the current travels to each target simultaneously (fig. 1). 

Serial warfare has been the primary way of fighting wa

throughout history, at least at the strategic level. Obviously, whe

one looks at single battles, there are numerous instances of th

simultaneous employment of forces. The D-day landings are 

good example. The actual landings on the beaches were nea

simultaneous and were coupled with airborne landings, air attack

naval bombardment, and deception operations. However, the enti

Normandy operation was in fact a series of operations with th

314 
landings being one part. Additionally, strategic paralysis was n

achieved. 

Parallel Warfare 

The History 

Although many of the ideas espoused in parallel warfare such a

strategic paralysis, centers of gravity, and decapitation are not ne

to warfare, the term itself is relatively new. Ever since World W

I air power theorists had championed these ideas in conjunctio

with the supposed attributes of air power (range, precisio

invulnerability, and so on). While men like Giulio Douhet and Ge

William (“Billy”) Mitchell advocated fleets of bombers attackin

vital targets to cripple the enemy's ability to wage war, th

practicality of the matter turned out to be something far less. 

World War II provides plenty of examples of massive bombin

raids against key war-making industries that failed to halt, and 

some cases even reduce, the output of military products. While th

reasons for these failures are numerous, one of the key factors wa

a lack of bombing accuracy. As highly touted as the Norde

bombsight was, the fact is that high altitude, combined with poo

European weather and heavy enemy resistance resulted in poore

than-expected accuracy. Over half of the bombs dropped b

American bombers in Europe during World War II landed mo

than 3,000 feet from the intended target. 1 The large bomb

formations used to enhance survivability sometimes made up fo

the bombing inaccuracy. Another factor that compounded th

accuracy problem was poor battle damage assessment (BDA

capability. 

The raids on the ball-bearing factories in Schweinfurt are goo

examples of these problems. The first raid occurred in Augu

1943 and resulted in a production drop of 34 percent. Howeve

due to high American losses and an inability to accurately asse

damage, Schweinfurt was not hit for another two months. 2 Durin

those intervening months, the Germans were able to reestablis

315 
production rates, and although the follow-up attack in October als

did substantial damage and cut production by over 60 percent, th

losses incurred by the bomber force (20 percent) were prohibitiv

and all bombing was halted. As Albert Speer, German minister fo

production, put it, “As it was, not a tank, plane, or other piece o

weaponry failed to be produced because of lack of ball bearings.” 

This is not to say that the strategic bombing did not have a

impact on Germany's conduct of the war. The bombing forced th

Germans to redirect resources, disperse industries, and c

consumer production, in order to support war-materiel productio

However, the less-than-precise bombing, high-loss rates, poo

weather, inconclusive BDA, and changing target priorities (cause

initially by the North Atlantic submarine threat and later by D da

preparations) all combined to reduce the effectiveness of th

campaign. 

Strategic bombing did not have the effects envisioned by th

original theorists or planners. Much to the relief of the German

the previously mentioned factors often resulted in a lack o

persistency in attacking so-called vital targets. According to Spee

concentrated attacks on ball-bearing production would hav

brought armament production to a halt within four months. 4 Th

United States Strategic Bombing Surveys came to the sam

conclusion regarding several key industries in Germany. Th

European survey team concluded that continuous attacks against 

single industry were crucial for success. 5 

Korea and Vietnam did little to change the nature of “strategic

bombing. Although bombing accuracy improved dramatically, th

number of aircraft required to ensure target destruction sti

prohibited attacking more than one or two target sets (a target set 

a target such as an electrical generating plant that has several sub

targets or aiming points located within it) at anyone time. Toward

the end of the Vietnam War, a technological innovation great

improved bombing accuracy and decreased required sorties p

target. That innovation was the laser guided bomb, a subset of 

316 
group of bombs referred to as precision guided bombs (PGM

With these new laser guided bombs, planners and aircrews we

able to target and destroy the Paul Doumer Bridge using 32 sortie

That same bridge had previously been attacked by well over 20

sorties without being damaged. 6 

US forces next employed precision weapons against Libya 

Operation Eldorado Canyon, hitting several targets in high

populated areas with minimal loss of civilian life. The weapon

were used again, in conjunction with the newly revealed steal

fighter, during the invasion of Panama in 1989. The US now ha

an aircraft, the F-117, that could not only deliver PGMs, but cou

do so with impunity. Desert Storm planners remembered th

lesson. 

Using a combination of stealth, precision, and several oth

important factors, Desert Storm planners unleashed the first true a

campaign encompassing the tenants of parallel warfare. Figure 

shows the difference between a serial air campaign, similar to th

strategic bombing of Germany in World War II, and the parallel a

campaign seen in the Gulf War (fig. 2). Instead of attacking singl

target sets such as ball-bearing factories or aircraft plants, planne

could send attacking aircraft and missiles after targets across th

spectrum. No target set was immune. Stealth and precision made 

big difference, but they were not the only factors. 

317 
Parallel Warfare 

Other Factors 

Many current air-power advocates believe the Gulf W

vindicated the early air-power theorists. As noted air-pow

historian Richard P. Hallion put it, “Air power execution caught u

with air power theory.” 7 While this chapter is not included in th

book to vindicate the memories of Douhet, Mitchell, an

Trenchard, it is included to espouse the benefits of parallel warfar

Most observers of the Gulf War (military and civilian) sa

parallel warfare being employed without realizing what it was. A

the time of this writing, there was a plethora of informatio

concerning the air war in the Gulf, to include discussions o

PGMs, F-117s, and strategic targets; but the term parallel warfa

was conspicuously absent. The previously mentioned ter

hyperwar was seen a couple of times as was the term simultaneity

Parallel warfare is what the world saw unleashed against Ira

during the first days of the air campaign. It was an attempt b

coalition air forces to achieve strategic paralysis against Ira

Centers of gravity were identified and then attacked in paralle

Figure 3 illustrates how target sets are serviced during parall

warfare versus serial warfare (fig. 3). Note that in a parall

campaign targets from each set are attacked from the beginnin

while under serial campaigning, one target set is serviced befo

the next one is fragged. 

A discussion on the Iraqi integrated air defenses (IAD) provide

a good example of how this campaign differed from the past. Prio

to the Gulf War, IADs were normally among the first targets (if n

the first) hit in an air campaign. Destroying or degrading enem

IADs allowed friendly aircraft to operate in a less-threatenin

environment, using stealth, precision, and electronic-warfare (EW

assets to attack the Iraqi IADs during the opening hours of Dese

Storm did exactly the same thing but accounted for only a portio

of the initial onslaught. Targets of all types were attacked 

conjunction with air defenses. 

318 
Whether they called it parallel warfare or not, Americans like

what they saw. The air campaign against Saddam Hussein and h

armed forces was rapid, precise, and massive, and it resulted 

minimum casualties. Although the air war lasted a total of 39 day

(nine longer than planned), it was obvious to the world that a va

number of targets was destroyed and damaged in the first few day

of the battle. It was also obvious that great pains were taken 

ensure that civilian casualties were kept to a minimum, as wa

collateral damage to neighboring structures. Additionally, coalitio

losses were well below even the most optimistic prewar prediction

As with all of our past wars the most recent war sets th

example for our next battle; the Gulf War is no exception. Th

surgical application of air power with minimum loss of America

(and it now appears Iraqi) lives is the new standard. American

have never been “fond” of battle casualties, but their tolerance fo

319 
losses has been diminishing since the end of World War II. Th

most recent example of this intolerance, and its consequence, wa

the death of 18 Army Rangers in Somalia, the public outcry th

followed, and the subsequent decision by the president to remov

all troops by 31 March 1994. 

Parallel Warfare 

What Makes It Work? 

Although the underlying ideas behind parallel warfare hav

existed since the first air-power theorists started theorizin

technology has been the limiting factor in fully employing th

concept. From World War I until just recently, bombing accurac

has limited the number of targets that could be attacke

simultaneously. Precision weapons have increased that number b

a wide margin. The reason for this is simple-probability of ki

(PK). As already mentioned, lack of bombing accuracy durin

World War II resulted in half of the bombs falling over 3,000 fe

from the intended target. Even with improved accuracy of 100-fo

CEPs (circular error probable-a circle whose center is the intende

impact point and whose radius is the distance in which one-half o

all bombs will drop) during Korea and Vietnam, target destructio

required numerous sorties. Large force packages were sent aft

each target set in order to ensure a high PK The Paul Doum

Bridge was a good example. Hundreds of sorties flown ov

several years failed to do what 32 aircraft accomplished in a fe

days. 

Because the CEPs of current precision weapons are normally 

the 10-foot range, hitting the intended aiming point is almost 

certainty. If planners know that an aircraft attacking a microwav

tower has a 90 percent chance of rendering it unusable, then the

is no reason to use more than one aircraft to attack that targ

(unless the planners need a 99 percent probability of destruction, 

which case they would most likely have to send two aircraft). Th

is still a huge difference from having to send 300 B-17s after th

320 
ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt, or 44 F-l05s and F-4s aft

the steel mills at Thai Nguyen. 

Desert Storm provides an excellent example of how precisio

weapons can “multiply” the attacking force. This particul

example compares the abilities of non-PGM-capable aircraft flyin

out of Turkey with PGM-capable aircraft flying out of Sau

Arabia. While 12 non-PGM-capable F-111Es dropped a

impressive total of 168 Mk-82s (500-pound gravity bombs) on tw

separate targets, a combination of 12 PGM-capable F-117s and F

111Fs was able to attack 26 different targets while dropping just 

total of 28 precision bombs. 8

 Because precision weapons off

such a high probability of hitting the target, so many more targe

can be hit using the same lumber of aircraft; a critical factor 

parallel warfare. 

A note of caution before proceeding with this discussion, th

previous paragraph describes the capabilities of a like lumber o

precision-capable aircraft with nonprecision-capable aircraft. 

benefit of precision-capable aircraft is the reduced requirement fo

numbers. If 12 aircraft can attack 26 different targets, then six ca

attack 12 or 13 targets, three an attack six targets, and so o

However, if the number of aircraft is reduced significantly, at som

point the benefit vanishes and becomes a liability. The ability 

prosecute parallel warfare vanishes with the diminishing numbers

Precision weapons are a key and necessary element of parall

warfare, but they are not the only element. Another critic

component of parallel warfare is stealth. Stealth is the ability of a

object to avoid radar detection. The more stealthy something is, th

less likely it will be detected by radar. Our stealth aircraft, the F

117, displayed built-in ability to slip through Iraqi air defense

without being detected. In over 1,200 combat sorties flown, mo

of them in the heavily defended vicinity of Baghdad, not a sing

F-117 was hit, let alone shot down. 9 

This is not to say that the Air Force's stealth aircraft could hav

conducted parallel warfare on their own. Even with their ability 

321 
attack individual targets with individual aircraft, the F-117s we

far too few in number. However, their ability to fly the hosti

skies over Iraq with impunity allowed F-117 pilots to strike n

only the lost heavily defended targets but the command and contr

portion of the Iraqi air defense system as well. Coupled with th

work of nonstealthy EW assets, this reduced losses to coalition a

forces while rendering the whole air defense system ineffectiv

Once that occurred, any coalition aircraft flying at medium or hig

altitude became “stealthy” at night. F-111Fs with no steathiness 

all were able to drop their PGMs in a much more conduciv

environment thus increasing their effectiveness. 

While the combination of precision weapons and stealth aircra

renders parallel warfare a possibility, there are several other facto

that ensure its success. Air campaign planning, targeting theor

intelligence, aircraft-mission-capable rates, electronic-warfa

assets, and logistics all playa part in the parallel warfare equation. 

Loading F-117s with PGMs and launching them at strateg

targets does not make parallel warfare. An effective plan 

necessary in order to execute the strategy. Objectives need to b

determined, intelligence information obtained on potential target

centers of gravity identified, targeting (deciding what level o

damage needs to be inflicted on a target) accomplished, and 

master attack plan (MAP) devised. The MAP details how 

execute the air campaign. 

Campaign objectives should relate (and be subordinate) to th

political objective(s). After determining objectives, planners ca

then look for targets to attack whose destruction/damage will he

meet the objectives. Remember, the overarching objective o

parallel warfare is strategic paralysis. In any scenario whe

strategic paralysis is an objective, certain targets such as comman

and control, electrical power, transportation, and so on, should b

attacked. Any number of planning tools, such as Col Joh

Warden's five-ring model, can be used to help identify centers o

gravity and potential targets. 

322 
Warden

s model breaks down a system, whether it be the enem

country, an enemy's military forces, or even an individual enem

soldier, into five separate categories or rings. The innermost ring 

the leadership (to include communications) followed in sequenti

order by the mission essentials (electricity, oil, and so on

infrastructure (such as roads, railroads, and bridges), populatio

and fielded forces. Warden contends that the most effective an

easiest way to attack the enemy is to target the inner-most ring

first. In fact, effective employment of air power against the inn

rings can render attacks against the enemy forces unnecessar

This is the essence of parallel warfare-hitting selected targets in th

inner-most rings to force the enemy to do our will. 

After identifying targets, further information about them mu

be collected to determine aiming points and the desired level o

damage (targeting). Aiming points are critical because witho

effective knowledge of where bombs are going to do the mo

damage (or at least the desired damage), we are effectively back 

square one. For instance, without good intelligence on an aircra

factory, planners would have to virtually blanket the whole facili

with weapons in order to stop or slow down production. Howeve

with the proper information those same planners could send on

PGM-laden aircraft or a cruise missile after the one critical room 

the one critical building and achieve their desired results. Whi

some of this information will come from the intelligenc

community, a lot of it will come from subject matter experts lik

electrical engineers, communication specialists, and civ

engineers, and still more of it will come from contractors who bui

the factories or installed the communications systems. 

Just as important as determining aiming points is determinin

the desired level of damage or desired effects. In the past th

would often equate to destruction of the target, but as Col Dav

Deptula, one of the central planners for the air campaign in Dese

Storm, notes targeting theory for parallel warfare has changed th

equation. 10 The realization that total target destruction is n

always necessary, coupled with an ability to better access targ

323 
degradation, means that planners are now looking for desire

effects versus level of destruction. Effects-driven targeting 

another means of reducing weapon systems per target, allowin

planners to attack more targets and increasing one's ability 

induce strategic paralysis. 

For instance, if an objective is to cut off the flow of heav

equipment (tanks, self-propelled artillery, and so on) to the fron

and planners know that to destroy a bridge requires four 2,000

pound bombs, but to damage it so that heavy equipment cann

traverse it requires only two 2,000-pound bombs, then the sortie(

required to deliver those other two bombs can be flown again

additional targets. During World War II US planners believed th

crippling German ball-bearing production would in turn severe

degrade war-materiel production. They determined that productio

could be cut 43 percent by destroying three of the five ball-bearin

factories in Schweinfurt. In order to achieve that level o

destruction, 230 B-17s were launched on the August 1943 missio

11 If planners had known the location of certain critical componen

of the ball-bearing manufacturing process at Schweinfurt, few

bombers would have been needed. The other aircraft might hav

been used to attack ball-bearing plants in other parts of Germany. 

Once objectives, centers of gravity, and targets are identifie

then planners can construct their MAP. This is the operation

level plan—the “big picture.” The MAP is the basis from whic

the daily air tasking orders (ATO) are derived. 

The role of intelligence has already been mentioned, but i

importance cannot be overemphasized. Good intelligence is critic

to the success of parallel warfare. Without it, centers of gravi

may not be identified, vital targets missed or inappropriate targe

included, and targeting might be a crapshoot that eats up valuab

assets and renders parallel warfare impossible. Additionall

effective battle damage assessment is important to overa

campaign management. Poor BDA can create unnecessar

refragging that again reduces available resources. 

324 
While precision weapons and stealth aircraft are obvious by

products of technology, another important aspect of technology

role in parallel warfare is aircraft mission capable (MC) rates (th

percentage of aircraft available to fly combat sorties). High M

rates equate to high sortie rates that afford air campaign planne

the luxury of hitting more targets. Air Force MC rates durin

Desert Storm were at an all-time high, exceeding alread

impressive peacetime rates by more than 5 percent. 12 The A

Force’s overall MC rate was an astonishing 92.4 percent. 13 Th

technology involved in designing, building, and maintainin

aircraft like the F-15, F-16, A-10, and F-15E resulted 

unprecedented MC rates, which, in turn, resulted in the sort

capacity needed to execute parallel warfare. 

Electronic warfare is another important factor in the prosecutio

of parallel warfare. Although the F-117s slipped through the Ira

air defense system during the Gulf War, and the air and se

launched cruise missiles flew underneath most of it, all oth

aircraft were forced to face the threat (albeit in a diminished stat

head on. Electronic warfare assets such as the EC-130, EF-11

and EA-6 were crucial to their success and survival. The jammin

of command and control nets and ground-based air defense radar

coupled with the employment of lethal-suppression aircraft like th

F-4G and F/A-18, and the F-117’s bombing of air defense cente

and communication nodes allowed the nonstealthy attack aircra

(the vast majority), to complete their missions. This success, a

evidenced by the minimal coalition aircraft losses attributed 

surface-to-air missiles, was crucial to the air campaign pla

Minimal aircraft losses meant maximum numbers of aircra

available for sortie generation, which meant maximum numbers o

targets hit. Until every combat aircraft in the US military 

stealthy, EW assets will be critical to the success of parall

warfare. 

Logistics is the final key factor important to parallel warfar

Logistics is further divided into three subfactors—parts, a

refueling, and weapons. Parts are pretty straightforward and rela

325 
to the discussion of MC rates. An important aspect of maintainin

high MC rates is parts availability. Skilled maintenance personn

cannot overcome a lack of spare parts. To be able to generate (M

rate) the number of sorties needed to prosecute parallel warfare, a

effective supply system is essential. 

Another often overlooked aspect of logistics is air refuelin

One of the obvious effects of the current drawdown and pullbac

of US military forces is that in most plausible scenarios we a

going to have to deploy a fair distance before we start to emplo

the majority of our forces. Europe is relatively close compared 

many potential hot spots. One of the important lessons of Dese

Storm was how critical air refueling assets are-not only to g

forces to the area of operations but to sustain them once in plac

Except for aircraft based and operating near the Saudi/Kuwai

border, every combat aircraft that flew required aerial refueling. 

Without that capability, sortie generation rates again would hav

suffered. Adequate air refueling assets are critical to parall

warfare. 

The final subfactor under logistics is weapons. The importanc

of PGMs to parallel warfare has already been established. The nic

thing about PGMs is that because of their accuracy, you don’t nee

nearly as many total weapons to attack the enemy. A caveat here 

that planners need to ensure they have the weapons when they d

need them. Precision weapons will not be the suitable choice for a

targets, but when they are the suitable choice, they need to b

available. Prepositioning and early identification of requiremen

are important. 

This portion of the discussion covered important factors in th

parallel warfare equation. Precision, stealth, planning, targetin

theory, intelligence, aircraft MC rates, EW, and logistics all pla

an important part in the prosecution of parallel warfare. Obviousl

there are still other factors such as cruise missiles, remotely pilote

vehicles (RPV), basing, and command and control, to name a few

that might be important to effectively execute parallel warfare. Th

326 
point of this section is to highlight some of the more importa

factors in making parallel warfare work—the ingredients. Differe

scenarios might make several of these factors moot and introduc

entirely new ones, but for the campaign planner, knowing wh

makes parallel warfare work is critical to success. 

Parallel Warfare 

The Attributes 

Having defined parallel warfare and described its ingredients, 

is now important to discuss its attributes. Parallel warfare’s prim

attribute is its embodiment of the principles of war. Students o

military theory should love parallel warfare because it combines s

many of the principles of war into one neat package. Th

objective(s) is identified early in the planning process. Next come

the offensive, proactive, and dictating the pace of operations. Ma

is in evidence not by numbers of aircraft or weapons, but by th

impressive number of direct hits on targets. Economy of force 

obvious in the large number of targets attacked by individual o

small number of aircraft. Unity of effort is ensured by the Joi

Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). Finally, surprise is 

product of not only good planning but the employment of steal

aircraft, cruise missiles, and a combination of the aforementione

principles. 

Another attribute of parallel warfare is cost, both in lives an

resources. The objective of parallel warfare is to hit the enemy

centers of gravity simultaneously and en masse to strategical

paralyze him, creating a situation where he can no longer resist. 

successful, then not only will friendly losses be low, but th

conflict should be over quickly, further reducing losses on bo

sides. PGMs will ensure minimum collateral damage, reduce

enemy lives lost, and reduced resources required (both in weapon

platforms and bombs). 

Parallel warfare maximizes the use of advanced technologie

Stealth aircraft, precision weapons, global positioning syste

327 
(GPS), low-altitude navigation targeting infrared for nig

(LANTIRN), and cruise missiles are just a few of the man

technological gadgets that on their own pose formidable obstacle

to an enemy, and when combined with a strategy, overwhelm a

enemy. 

Because parallel warfare limits damage to an enemy in terms o

lives and resources, it can actually make for a better peace; a poi

often overlooked in past conflicts. During Desert Storm, the go

was not to destroy Iraq but to paralyze it. Upon returning 

Baghdad after the war, one journalist noted how little “World W

II urban destruction” there was. 15 Peter Arnett reported that Iraq

in most areas of Baghdad ignored the air raid sirens because the

knew they were in no danger. 16 Saddam might not have cared th

we were very selective in our targeting, but it appears the Ira

people did and that might be an important factor after Saddam 

long gone. The overarching objective of any conflict should be 

better peace, and reducing the price paid by the belligerent natio

may be important later on. 

Public support is a fickle thing, but it is a well-documented fa

that Americans do not like protracted wars or heavy losses. Th

Vietnam War illustrated both of these points well. Parallel warfa

offers the national leadership an instrument that, when proper

used, can greatly reduce the length of conflict and lives lost. Th

Gulf War proved that point. 

Parallel Warfare 

The Problems and Limitations 

Just as it has positive attributes, parallel warfare has negativ

aspects as well. For instance, parallel warfare is highly depende

on stealth and precision, a factor that leaves most nations incapab

of pursuing it as a form of warfare (perhaps another positive aspe

for the US). Stealth can be a hard sell even in relatively well-o

countries like the US. Witness the fight over funding for the B-

328 
an $825-million bomber whose planned purchase has shrunk fro

132 to 20, and is still in jeopardy. 17 

Another problem with parallel warfare is that it requires 

certain number of assets to prosecute. Most modern-day countrie

contain roughly 500 key targets (Iraq was assessed to have ju

under 400).18 Four to six aiming points for each target equates 

between 2,000 and 3,000 strategic aiming points. In order to hit a

of these aiming points in a relatively short time frame, a lot of ai

power assets are required. Realizing the limited hard-target ki

capabilities of cruise missiles and the limited numbers of steal

aircraft available, it is obvious that quite a few nonstealthy aircra

will be involved in the campaign. This not only limits the numb

of countries that can employ this strategy, but it means the U

must be very smart during the defense drawdown to ensure th

capability is maintained. Comparing the numbers from the late

Bottom Up Review with the plan to fight two major region

conflicts near simultaneously might reveal a gap in our capabili

to fight them using parallel warfare. 

One of the key factors of parallel warfare is an effective mast

attack plan—the road map for success. Two critical attributes o

the MAP are a good assessment of enemy capabilities and goo

intelligence concerning target locations and physic

characteristics. Both of these elements require often difficult-to

get-but-necessary information. Assessing the enemy’s capabilitie

is not a job for the layman. Subject-matter experts are critical 

the planning cell for both enemy assessment and information o

possible targets. Time-sensitive data collected from nationa

theater, and tactical resources has to be analyzed and assessed fo

possible use. In the long run, the intelligence community is a

important to prosecuting parallel warfare as are air-power asse

because without the information it provides, the weapons revert 

expensive gravity bombs. 

Another related, but probably more contentious problem, 

bomb damage assessment. Historically, aircrew reports hav

329 
exaggerated the effectiveness of combat missions. For instanc

during the Commando Hunt bombing camp in South Vietnam 

1968, crews reported destroying over 20,000 trucks along the H

Chi Minh highway. At that same time, the CIA estimated that th

North Vietnamese Army possessed only 6,000 trucks. 19 Ofte

compounding the exaggerated mission reports is the requireme

by intelligence agencies for solid proof of target damage (normal

in the form of a reconnaissance photo). The problem now is th

even though we have more accurate weapons, intelligenc

personnel still demand concrete proof. Coupled with the fact that 

2,000 pound bomb through the airshaft of a building or the side o

an aircraft shelter doesn’t always reveal the extent of intern

damage, it is easy to see why the conflict continues. However, th

problem needs to be solved. Refragging sufficiently damage

targets is a waste of resources. 

The physical environment can be another source of trouble fo

parallel warfare. Even as “user-friendly” as the environment wa

for coalition air forces during the Gulf War, the initial a

campaign was extended for nine days due to poor weather. Mov

the conflict to almost anywhere else in the world and the potenti

problems with not only weather, but terrain, foliage, and variou

other factors can complicate the parallel warfare equation. 

Finally, a major problem with parallel warfare is that it sound

so parochial. There is an obvious air-power smell to it and beyon

that a very strong taste of Air Force. The parallel warfare describe

in this chapter is of the aerial type, but the basic precepts o

parallel warfare—simultaneous attacks against key targets 

induce strategic paralysis—can be employed by other forces a

well. One could make a strong argument that the invasion o

Panama (conducted primarily by ground forces) in December 198

was parallel warfare. At the tactical level, parallel warfare 

routine in all mediums. The point being made here is that parall

warfare is a viable means of strategically attacking an enemy an

quickly bringing him to the negotiating table. 

330 
Against a modern, industrialized, and well-armed opponen

parallel warfare through air power makes sense. On the other han

there are instances, such as guerrilla wars, where parallel warfa

may not be an option. Additionally, negating or hindering any o

the previously mentioned “how-to-make-it-work” factors cou

impact the effectiveness, and even the viability of parallel warfa

(refer to the next essay for a detailed explanation of how to count

parallel warfare). 

Why Is Parallel Warfare Important

to US Armed Forces? 

There are two very important reasons why parallel warfare 

important to US armed forces. First, even though the US public 

often accused of having a short memory, it will remember certa

aspects of Desert Storm such as the massive air war, precisio

weapons, low casualties (on both sides), limited collateral damag

stealth, and the relatively short time it took to fight the war. All o

these aspects are directly related to parallel warfare. Desert Stor

set the standard for the next conflict we may find ourselves in. Th

armed forces will be expected to do as well and probably bette

Therefore, parallel warfare, its attributes and problems, should b

studied and restudied to ensure we are prepared to properly emplo

it during our next conflict. 

The second reason why parallel warfare is important to U

armed forces is because during the defense drawdown it offers 

viable means of reducing force structure and requirements whi

maintaining capability. Precision weapons allow for few

aircraft/weapons per target. Stealth aircraft require fewer suppo

aircraft (EW assets, escort aircraft, and so on). Both of thes

factors reduce the logistics requirements for the entire force whi

increasing its effectiveness and limiting exposure. 

331 
Conclusion 

The purpose of this chapter has been fourfold: to define wh

parallel warfare is; to describe how it is accomplished; to discu

its attributes, problems, and limitations; and to discuss why it 

important to US armed forces. Parallel warfare is the simultaneou

attack of vital enemy targets to achieve strategic paralysis. A

enemy is strategically paralyzed when he can no longer resist ou

will. Obviously, strategic paralysis can be achieved through mean

other than parallel warfare (witness Germany at the end of Wor

War II), but the goal is to do it quickly, “cleanly,” and wi

minimum losses. 

The how-to of parallel warfare includes stealth, precisio

weapons, and prodigious planning coupled with effects versu

destruction targeting, a massive intelligence effort, high mission

capable rates, effective EW systems, and special logistic

capabilities in the areas of air refueling, spare parts, and bom

supply. Not all of these factors will be critical in every scenari

and in some cases, other factors will become important. For th

present and near future stealth and PGMs appear to be necessar

An effective plan will always be a necessity. The other facto

coupled with such things as cruise missiles, basing, and RPVs a

scenario-dependent. 

The main attribute of parallel warfare is the way it embraces th

principles of war in an attempt to quickly obtain strategic paralysi

If successful, then the conflict should be less costly in both live

and resources on both sides of the battle lines. These facto

normally equate to the maintenance of public support, an importa

factor in modern conflicts. Additionally, by limiting damage to th

enemy, there is a better possibility of winning the peace. Finall

parallel warfare maximizes advanced technologies, an achieveme

which in turn plays an important part in all the other attributes. 

Every story has two sides and the parallel-warfare tale is n

different. The problems of parallel warfare are directly linked wi

332 
the capabilities required to execute it. This type warfare is ver

dependent on stealth and precision weapons. Also, it requires 

certain number of nonstealthy assets to ensure success. During th

planning phase, there is a critical need for effective assessment o

enemy capabilities as well as good intelligence information o

target locations and characteristics. Additionally, during th

prosecution of the air campaign, there is an essential need fo

effective BDA. The physical environment can hamper th

effectiveness of parallel warfare. Finally, the whole idea of parall

warfare and how it is defined relays a perception of parochialism. 

The American public liked what it saw during the Gulf War. 

was quick, effective, and relatively low cost with minimu

collateral damage. The standard has been set. Parallel warfare wi

not be the answer to every conflict the US engages in. What 

important, especially as our military forces continue to decline 

size, is that we understand what parallel warfare is and what it ca

do. With one-hundredth the bombs dropped in Vietnam and man

fewer lives lost, we managed to do in less than two months in Ira

what we totally failed to do in over 11 years in Vietnam. 20 W

can’t afford to miss that lesson. 

333 
Notes 

1. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, The Air Force and U.S. 

National Security: Global Reach—Global Power, white paper (Washington, 

D.C.: Department of the Air Force, June 1992), 12. 

2. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan Publishing 

Company, 1970), 285. 

3. Ibid., 286. 

4. Ibid., 285. 

5. Franklin D’Olier, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Europea

War), 30 September 1945, 26. 

6. A. J. C. Lavalle, The Tale of Two Bridges (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1974), 84. 

7. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq (Washington, D.C. and London: 

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 5. 

8. Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary (GWAPSS), 29 March 1993, 211

9. Ibid., 152. 

10. David A. Deptula, “Parallel Warfare: What is it?” (Briefing at Air 

Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 6 January 

1993), slide 19. 

11. Thomas M. Coffey, Decision over Schweinfurt (New York: David 

McKay Company, Inc., 1977), 3. 

12. Hallion, 197. 

13. Ibid. 

14. GWAPSS, 195. 

15. Milton Viorst, “Report from Baghdad,” The New Yorker 67, no. 18. (24 

June 1991): 58. 

16. Ibid., 199. 

17. Susan H. H. Young, “Gallery of USAF Weapons,” Air Force Magazine

May 1992, 139. 

18. Hallion, 143 and 267. 

19. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why 

(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, June 1991), 184. 

20. James W. Canaan, “Lesson Number One,” Air Force Magazine, June 

1991, 29. 

334 
Parallel Warfare 

Anticipating the Enemy’s Response 

Richard M. Kessel 

Parallel warfare, the ability to simultaneously attack strategic a

well as operational and tactical targets and thus cause a strateg

paralysis of the Iraqi forces, was displayed by the US-led coalitio

in the Gulf War. The US military must anticipate the futu

enemy’s response to parallel warfare to ensure similar succes

Expecting the same outcome from parallel warfare in the ne

military conflict without anticipating updated counters from futu

adversaries is to track toward defeat. Future adversaries a

analyzing the performance of the coalition forces in the Gulf an

learning from the failure of the Iraqi forces. This analysis wi

reveal centers of gravity, or possible weaknesses, that futu

adversaries can exploit in order to reduce the effectiveness o

parallel warfare. 

Future threats to parallel warfare can be divided into politica

technological, and operational responses. Although th

combination of these categories provides a limitless set of option

this study focuses on several of the most likely responses th

provide the biggest challenge. Furthermore, counters to parall

warfare can normally be divided into defensive or offensiv

measures. An understanding of these may provide a clearer view o

the enemy’s operational strategy. 

Political Response 

Political alliances and military coalitions formed for politic

objectives are important to any war effort and can mean th

difference between victory and defeat. A coalition formed 

resolve a temporary conflict can become a center of gravi

susceptible to an enemy’s political influence. The importance o

coalitions formed to resolve military conflicts is increasing. Th

end of the cold war brought about new budget priorities for most o

335 
the world

s, industrialized countries, which means decrease

military spending. The resulting downsized military forces of th

US and her allies means reduced military capabilities; therefor

cooperation among nations will be the key to successful militar

operations under fiscal restraint. The synergistic effect o

combining several countries’ monetary and/or military resource

including logistical support and forward basing rights, may b

required to conduct parallel warfare in the future. For this reaso

the US should expect attempts from any potential adversary 

degrade the ability of the US to form military coalitions to me

political objectives. 

The concept of undermining alliances, or coalitions b

exploiting a vulnerability goes back many years. Sun Tzu talke

about dividing the enemy’s allies and disrupting his alliances. 

There are several disadvantages to coalition warfare that ou

adversaries could exploit. Consensus is difficult to reach, whic

may mean compromising objectives among the coalition. Differe

political agendas can change the level of commitmen

Additionally, differences in culture and language can be 

significant hindrance to coordination and interoperability. Fo

example, the coalition in Desert Storm presented a wide array o

military hardware and capabilities; however, not everything wa

easy to use and coordinate. The coalition command structur

although under the overall command of Gen H. Norma

Schwarzkopf, was a complicated structure with Arab force

actually under the command of Saudi general Khalid bin Sultan b

Abdul-Aziz. 2 Missions had to be doled out based on politic

restrictions because the Egyptians and Syrians would not fight 

Iraq. This command structure, along with cultural and religiou

differences among the coalition, made a promising target for Ira

Although they were not successful in turning the coalition again

the US, the Iraqis tried by attacking Israel with Scud missiles 

bring Israel into the war. Had Israel made a counterattack, it 

likely that the coalition would have lost the Arab members. Th

could have been a large loss to the Americans if the forward base

336 
in Saudi Arabia had been unavailable. Also, the forward basing 

other Arab countries, as well as the overflight rights that reduce

the distance of logistical lines, could have been lost. This wou

have slowed down the tempo of the coalition operations by, addin

distance and time to combat sorties, making less sorties possibl

This reduces the effectiveness of parallel warfare. The effort 

affect adversely a coalition or alliance will normally be a defensiv

measure—in other words, a political action designed to deny th

US some form of military support or increased capability based o

support projected from a coalition. The important lesson here 

that an alliance or coalition can be the cornerstone of a militar

strategy and that we can expect these unions to be attacked in th

future. But why is an alliance or coalition important to parall

warfare? 

A look at Desert Storm will show the impact a coalition ca

have and will highlight the advantages of military coalitions. I

August 1990, Iraqi forces under the command of Saddam Husse

invaded Kuwait and overthrew the government. Almo

immediately, US air and ground forces deployed into the regio

What would have happened had the US not had the cooperation o

many other countries—some like Syria that were not normal

allied with the US? The answer is certainly a less efficient effort 

parallel warfare. The basing rights in Saudi Arabia may actual

have been the most important single asset in reversing Iraq

aggression. 

The US received direct support, troops, and ships from 3

countries during the Gulf War. Additionally, the US receive

basing and overflight rights from numerous countries. 3 The resu

was that the US-led coalition gained a considerable advantage 

basing and supply lines compared to the alternative of basin

outside the region. The forward bases in Saudi Arabia and Turke

allowed air operations the luxury of relatively short flights an

quick turns. This basing in the region provided the coalition force

the luxury of multiple missions per day by each aircraft. Th

ability for multiple missions per day translates directly in

337 
keeping up a constant pressure, one of the keys to parallel warfar

Also, the logistical lines inside the theater were shorter, reducin

the problem of resupply. Furthermore, shorter logistical line

offered a reduced opportunity to the Iraqis to attack these so

targets. Had Iraq succeeded in denying these bases to the coalitio

forces, and to the US in particular, the result would have bee

fewer flights per day, which could have prolonged the war. Finall

the biggest advantage of this coalition may turn out to be a foru

for increased cooperation in the future. In summary, would the U

have been able to conduct the same air campaign had those force

been made to operate from their home bases? 

The Vietnam War is a prime example of a belligerent political

achieving military-type objectives by influencing the publ

opinion and actions of the adversary’s people at home and also th

opinion of its allies. The US continually held back from a fu

bombing campaign primarily due to public opinion. Close allies o

the US questioned the Vietnam War and were concerned that 

large-scale bombing campaign would lead to escalation. Th

allowed the North Vietnamese to prosecute the war for yea

without having to endure the full combat air power of the US. Th

lesson here is that our adversaries will try to affect the opinions o

the American people and our allies. Our free society allows for th

type of political warfare. The danger of parallel warfare lies in i

turning public opinion against overwhelming commitment prior 

armed conflict, not after the fact as in Vietnam. Parallel warfare 

designed to work best when overwhelming force is used. Even 

parallel warfare would not have been effective in Vietnam, the fa

remains that public opinion was used to aid the enemy. For th

reason, we should expect future adversaries to attempt to affe

public opinion negatively so as to reduce our commitment to th

use of military force and resources. 

The Gulf War had other, far-reaching, political effects. Th

most profound was on the former Soviet Union, and the curre

Russia. As early as March 1991, Soviet defense minister Dmitr

Yazov stated that the Iraqi air defense system “failed in mo

338 
cases

 and what happened in Kuwait necessitates a review of ou

attitude to the country’s entire air defense system.” 4

 This review 

important because the Iraqi military forces were almost entire

equipped and trained by the former Soviet Union. The Russia

response to parallel warfare is important for several reasons. It

not that the Russians will be our expected threat in the future b

more that their response is a calculated military answer to war 

the future. Therefore, this response can be expected to be shared b

other potential adversaries. The Desert Storm experience ha

shown the Russians that US technology complements the strateg

of parallel warfare for the first time. The offensive strategy of 

preemptive strike seems to hold the best option for success 

countering parallel warfare, assuming that war is inevitabl

According to Professor John Erickson, director of defense studie

at Edinburgh University, “The Russians have seen the future and 

works. It has caused them to think again. They want to resto

overt offensive capability; they argue it can not be caged.” 5 

Other countries could adapt this philosophy as well. If th

political decision is made to enter into a conflict, then any futu

adversary will benefit from attacking the US in a preemptiv

manner. For example, General Schwarzkopf was concerned th

the initial influx of aircraft into Saudi Arabia was vulnerable 

attack from the air once they were parked on the ramps. 6 Strikin

these forces while they were marshaling would have been a blo

to the conduct of parallel warfare. It’s important to note that th

kind of attack, once the decision for war is reached, could be a

simple as individuals with satchel charges attacking parked aircra

before a combat launch capability is reached. Therefore, the U

should expect offensive strikes prior to being ready to condu

offensive warfare. 

The last political response to parallel warfare is a result of th

strategic effects that advanced conventional munitions had 

Desert Storm. The Russians contend that when political even

preceding war become irreversible, a preemptive strike that ma

include weapons of mass destruction may be the only viab

339 
defense. 

 The link between advanced conventional munitions an

a nuclear response is the strategic effects of the convention

munitions that mirror the effects of nuclear weapons. This lin

means that the US may have to contend with weapons of ma

destruction even when the US plans on using only convention

weapons. 

Technological Response 

The technological response to parallel warfare will be primari

designed to dilute the US superiority in technology. These can b

either low- or high-technology responses. The ability of a countr

to field a technologically sophisticated military force, one rough

equivalent to the US in capability, will usually dictate the type o

response to expect. This capability is usually associated wi

economically advanced countries with a significant industrial bas

Although all that is required is the ability to procure th

technology, having the capability to produce it at least ensures th

it is available. This is important only in that this economic pow

will give some advance warning as to how a country will respon

to parallel warfare. This must also be tempered with the objective

of any future adversary. Limited objectives will usually mea

limited response. This can be very different from country that 

fighting for survival or protecting a vital national interest. First, l

us analyze the country that has limited technology at its disposal. 

The high technology used for parallel warfare, based o

information and command and control systems, is not necessari

good for conducting operations against low-technology force

This means that the technology used to find hardened aircra

shelters and then destroy those shelters with precision guide

munitions is not always adaptable to fighting low-technolog

systems. For example, North Vietnam fought against a vast

superior US military. However, North Vietnam was able to count

many of the technological advantages the US held by usin

virtually no advanced technology. People carrying goods on the

backs or bicycles instead of trucks can be a suitable alternative 

340 
the amount of supplies required is low. Trucks and other motorize

vehicles provide a ready target for advanced convention

munitions, but people and mules do not. There will almo

certainly be fewer relevant targets for advanced convention

munitions in a low-technology society versus a high

industrialized country. 

Communications can be critical in war. However, radio an

satellite communications can be affected through electron

warfare. Simple underground telephone lines are easy to use, eas

to repair, and may be difficult to render ineffective. Separa

communication lines provided for military use, distinct fro

civilian telephone interchanges, may be effective. Communication

by messenger, such as audiotaped instructions, may be expected 

counter the electronic warfare spectrum of the US and oth

advanced nations. Lower technology communications may b

slower but are more immune to destruction or interruption. 

Deception and camouflage are relatively inexpensive and can b

very effective. For example, during Desert Storm, the Iraqis mad

use of deception to reduce the effectiveness of coalition airstrike

enhance survivability, destabilize the coalition, and increas

uncertainty about their intentions. Overall, Iraq met with som

amount of success in their deception program. 8

 They deploye

decoys, smoke, nets, fake bomb craters, and fake buildings 

counter the coalition efforts. Also, they used politic

disinformation to confuse the coalition. These deceptio

techniques were somewhat successful in complicating the coalitio

effort, but they were not designed with the modern concept o

parallel warfare in mind. 9

 The Iraqis were unprepared for th

extent, as well as the success, of the military effort of the US-le

coalition. The next adversary will realize that deception can pla

an important role in defeating the technology used in conductin

modern parallel warfare. 

Finally, mobility can also be used to an advantage against 

technologically superior adversary. The Iraqis used mobility 

341 
hide their Scud missiles with a good deal of success. The mobili

of these Scuds caused political difficulties and tied up a goo

number of coalition assets that could have been used against oth

targets. The fact that mobility caused the coalition problems wi

not be lost on any future adversary. Consideration should be give

to the fact that the most effective parallel warfare strategy 

combat some low-technology forces may actually be th

deployment of a unit of Army Rangers. The use of deception an

mobility is primarily a defensive strategy used to deny the effectiv

use of technology associated with parallel warfare. 

The US should expect an offensive type of response from 

technologically advanced adversary. This type of response wi

correspond more closely with the traditional force-on-forc

concept that the US has been trained to fight against. The

countries are usually the economically powerful nations that hav

invested in technology along with significant military capabilitie

The successful use of parallel warfare in the Gulf War highlighte

several concepts that future adversaries will note. 

The ability to effectively attack targets ranging from the tactic

to the strategic, including the critical industrial elements of 

country, is a leap forward in technological capability. The size o

the battlefield has been much expanded from previous wars. Th

response of a well-prepared adversary will not be the tradition

army-versus-army pitched battle of the past due in part to the siz

of the battlefield. Because the success of the coalition effort 

Desert Storm was founded on information, precision munition

and mobility, it is reasonable to assume that these will be th

targets of the future. These capabilities, manifested primari

through air power, will attract the majority of the responses fro

future adversaries that possess high technology. 

The first priority will be to attack forward bases before they ca

be made operational. As discussed earlier, the destructiv

capability of air power displayed in Desert Storm should convinc

all nations that stopping the air power of the US before it can b

342 
amassed is a better option than allowing it to become a

operational entity. Even destroying the bases before the aircraft a

deployed would be a useful strategy. The difference between 

technologically advanced country and one that is not advance

may be in the method of attack. The technologically advance

country will have air power, missiles, and even sea power availab

to launch preemptive attacks. One fallout from this will be mo

resources committed to defense by the US. 

The Russians have analyzed the US concept of operations 

Desert Storm and have changed their doctrine accordingly. The

now highlight the importance of the reconnaissance strike syste

that can be used for intelligence and guiding precision weapon

These will all be coordinated with a command and control syste

utilizing computer technology. It is the ability to proce

information from intelligence to targeting decisions to actual

coordinating the attacks that will define success in the future. W

should plan on these technologically advanced adversaries havin

the means of delivery and the precision weapons to be effective 

the future. This compounds the problem of conducting parall

warfare for the US. Now the US has to be concerned wi

information on a two-way basis. This means gettin

information/intelligence about the adversary while keepin

intentions and capabilities confidential. The extra resources used 

defend against this type of adversary will not be available fo

offensive actions. Because parallel warfare is an offensive strateg

resources kept from offensive missions will reduce th

effectiveness of parallel warfare. 

These problems will continue to mount when the technology o

any future adversary overcomes two large advantages the U

maintains over much of the rest of the world: the ability to opera

effectively in any weather and at night, and stealth technolog

Both of these attributes played a prominent role in Desert Storm

However, as with any technological edge, it will not last. Th

immunity displayed by the stealth fighter in the Gulf will b

overcome. Additionally, stealth technology will be developed b

343 
potential adversaries. Again, this will compound the defensiv

problem of the US and may actually tend to shift the focus of th

next war to the defensive. 

The Russians are also investing in futuristic weapons such a

directed-energy and nonlethal technology. 10 Coupled with spac

based systems for intelligence, command and control, an

guidance, these new technologies could again throw the concept o

parallel warfare back to a stalemate. This would occur if th

defensive side could inflict damage to air power at a rate th

would nullify the advantage of night operations combined wi

stealth technology. These problems would be compounded if thes

weapons are sold to other states. 

The other major advantage that highly developed nations hav

is mobility on a grand scale. Not just the ability to move a fe

missiles around but the kind of mobility that could move enti

divisions if not armies. The total effect of air power, includin

cruise missiles, has made the committing of ground forces 

secondary requirement. The primary defensive consideration fo

ground forces will be protection from air attack of all kind

Mobility will allow a greater freedom of action and also will allo

ground forces to be stationed far from the front. The concept o

mobility will provide ground forces better protection from attac

on a small and large scale. Yet, these forces will be able to react a

needed to any situation. This is not to imply that ground forces wi

be obsolete. They may be the best option for military actio

especially against a technologically inferior foe where high

technical precision munitions may not have the type of targe

available to be used effectively. The point here is that th

technology of air power may make the battle lines of old obsolet

and mobility can keep the ground forces from being a target whi

still allowing them to function as a combat force. 

If one assumes that the adversary will attack the forward base

of the US in order to delay the positioning of air power, it wi

leave one option open to the US for forward basing: the nav

344 
surface and subsurface assets. The world

s oceans have th

advantage of not requiring formal approval or alliances to u

them. Sea-launched cruise missiles can launch well out of range o

shore threats and can destroy any number of targets with accurac

For this reason, technologically advanced adversaries will attem

to engage these naval assets. Countries are developing antish

missiles that will have the range to engage naval assets farther ou

Additionally, technology will be developed that will locate an

then guide precision munitions to engage surface ships. These wi

be augmented by submarines. Although the US had virtu

immunity on the seas during Desert Storm, this will not last fo

close-in operations. The US should expect these assets to b

attacked because of their important role in conducting parall

warfare. The importance of attacking naval assets increases 

remote locations are involved and if forward land bases have bee

denied. 

Operational Responses 

Parallel warfare is an operational concept whose technologic

time has arrived. The anticipated operational response to parall

warfare is also linked to the technology possessed by a futu

adversary. Operational counters can be predicted based on the

purpose of denying the US the opportunity to employ advance

technology effectively, including force multipliers. The low

technology enemy will be more defensive in nature, and the high

technology enemy will be able to take an offensive approach. 

The adversary that is outclassed in hardware, the low

technology adversary, will be hard pressed to offer a force-on

force response. However, this does not imply that nothing can b

done. On the contrary, one can look at the successes of both Ma

Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh to see that it is possible to neutraliz

superior technology. The concept here is to expect a defensiv

response from the fielded forces of this type of enemy. Th

operational goals of this force will be based on survival, n

offensive action to destroy the fielded forces of the US and oth

345 
high-tech allies. The US center of gravity most likely to b

exploited in this case is the will to fight and sustain casualtie

against an enemy whose goal is simply to survive. Guerrillas an

insurgents, supported with little or no formal infrastructure b

with the political will to endure physical hardships, can pose a ver

real problem. The special forces of the future may well be th

answer in this type of warfare. 

The operational response from a technologically advance

enemy will offer the greatest insight into the weaknesses of parall

warfare. This response, aimed at our vulnerable centers of gravit

will be linked directly to the technological capability of the enem

As a result of lessons learned from Desert Storm, the Russian

have decided that future conflict will be one of maneuver, n

position as in the past. 11 This view is representative of futu

adversaries with advanced technology. There will likely be no har

and fast fronts where armies battle on the ground. Air power, an

air superiority in particular, will be paramount if success is to b

achieved. Therefore, there are several force multipliers that will b

attacked to defeat the effectiveness of parallel warfare. 

One such target could be command and control, highlighte

with intelligence, which will have to be denied to a large exten

This will mean devising the capability to deny satelli

information, and the communication channels to run the war effo

on a minute-to-minute basis. Also, the most effective way 

manage the operational side of the air war for the US is to manag

from airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) due to th

link between the command authority, intelligence, and th

warfighters. This link is one primary reason that parallel warfa

was effective in the Gulf War. These information and comman

and control platforms will be targeted from both electronic warfa

and conventional attack in an attempt to reduce their effectivenes

The concept here is to negate the capability to direct the operation

of a combined force. 

346 
Another strategic target that could be attacked is the a

refueling force. This force is a definite force multiplier, and 

gives a significant boost to the conduct of parallel warfare. Th

combination of information provided by AWACS and the ability 

stay airborne long enough to change targets based on update

information is a cornerstone to success. These systems are strateg

in nature and will likely be attacked by any adversary that has th

means. They are important enough that developing a means o

attacking them in the future is a priority. The air refueling system

the command and control systems, and the intelligence-gatherin

systems will be key centers of gravity at the operational level, an

we should expect adversaries to target these during future conflict

Mobility will be an important capability that high-tech enemie

will use operationally against the US-mobility for ground forces 

decrease reaction time and air forces to quickly strike and the

reposition where needed. The mobility of fielded forces will allo

increased offensive action against us while compounding ou

intelligence and targeting decisions. This will affect the conduct o

parallel warfare negatively. 

The conventional air forces of a future enemy will emphasiz

hitting strategic targets, which now will mean information cente

and possibly air defense objectives. Ground forces in the field wi

take on a secondary role because they will no longer be considere

the key. The decisive point, our critical center of gravity, will no

shift to the computer—in other words, to the ability to process an

disseminate information. A combination of electronic warfare an

maneuver of forces will therefore be used to deny both informatio

and easy targets to the US. Another way to look at the operation

response is to anticipate the use of parallel warfare against us. 

Conclusion 

The history of successful parallel warfare is short. It involve

one campaign (Desert Storm) in which the composition of th

adversaries, the capabilities of the US-led coalition, and th

347 
geography all contributed to a resounding success. I have show

that there are political, technological, and operational responses w

need to anticipate for the future. To expect future success witho

additional preparation will almost certainly mean failure. There a

many counters to parallel warfare. Politically disrupting alliance

technology, and updated operational strategies will have a defini

role in the outcome of any future conflict involving the Unite

States. 

Perhaps the hardest capability to predict, and potentially th

most important asset, is the political coalition formed to solv

military problems. These coalitions, which will be the catalyst fo

successful military operations, may actually become the center o

gravity that is vulnerable to a future enemy’s action. They combin

everything from military hardware to economic might. The sma

adversary will plan on affecting adversely our ability to form thes

alliances before we even see the need. Also, the technology o

future adversaries will be a direct indicator of the response we ca

expect to conducting parallel warfare. One important lesson is th

low technology may not translate into easy victory by militar

means. The low-tech adversary with political savvy and the will 

endure hardships may actually be the hardest enemy to take o

The technologically sophisticated enemy will present the force-on

force conflict for which our military normally trains. This wi

include updated information systems, updated air defense system

and the ability for preemptive strikes. The operational response 

the future will be linked directly to the enemy’s technologic

capability. Survival and avoiding force-on-force engagements ma

be the operational strategy of low-tech adversaries. The advanced

technology enemy may respond with a combination of weapon

and mobility aimed at negating our command and contro

intelligence, and refueling capabilities. We should anticipa

parallel warfare being used against us. 

Anticipating these political, technological, and operation

strategies against parallel warfare will provide a significa

challenge. Future enemies are learning from Desert Storm and wi

348 
adapt these lessons learned into countermeasures. Perhaps th

biggest key for the US is to maintain our technological edge. Th

outcome of two roughly equivalent adversaries conducting parall

warfare against each other may well be a defensive war o

attrition—a modern version of the trench warfare of World War 

The ability of the US to continue to win decisive and quic

military victories will depend on anticipating the enemy’s respon

to parallel warfare. 

349 
Notes 

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1963), 69-79. 

2. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War—Final Report 

to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 24-2. 

3. Ibid. 

4. James Adams and James Blitz, “Gloom for the Russians in Gulf Weapon

Toll,” The Sunday Times, London, 3 March 1991, 15. 

5. Ibid. 

6. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, General H. Norman 

Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take A Hero (New York: Bantam 

Books, 1992), 351. 

7. Mary C. Fitzgerald, The Impact of the Military-Technical Revolution on 

Russian Military Affairs, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 1993), 

216. 

8. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War-Interim Report 

to the Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991), 24-1. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Fitzgerald, 31-35. 

11. Ibid., 159-65. 

350 
Air Theory for the 

Twenty-first Century 

John A. Warden III 

War in the twenty-first century will be significantly different f

the United States from anything encountered before the Gulf Wa

American wars will be increasingly precise; imprecision will b

too expensive physically and politically to condone. Our politic

leaders and our citizenry will insist that we hit only what we a

shooting at and that we shoot the right thing. Increased use o

precision weapons will mean far less dependence on the multitude

of people or machines needed in the past to make up for inaccurac

in weapons. Precision will come to suggest not only that a weapo

strike exactly where it is aimed, but also that the weapons b

precise in destroying or affecting only what is supposed to b

affected. Standoff and indirect-fire precision weapons will becom

available to many others and will make massing of large numbe

in the open suicidal and the safety of deploying sea or land-base

aircraft close to a combat area problematic. 

We might hope that more accurate weapons would driv

potential enemy leaders to be less enamored of achieving the

political objectives with force; if we are very lucky, perhaps th

world will move in this direction. Of at least equal likelihoo

however, states and other entities will turn to other forms o

warfare-such as attacks on enemy strategic centers of gravit

These attacks may be via missiles, space, or unconvention

means, but all will recognize that they must achieve their objectiv

before the United States chooses to involve itself. This, in tur

will increase the premium on American ability to move with

hours to any point on the globe without reliance on en route bases

The advent of nonlethal weapons technology will expand ou

options over the full spectrum of war. These new weapons wi

find application against communications, artillery, bridges, an

internal combustion engines to name but a few potential target

351 
And of greatest interest, they will accomplish their ends witho

dependence on big explosions that destroy more property tha

necessary and that cause unplanned human casualties. Can thes

weapons replace traditional lethal tools? In theory they can, as lon

as we accept the idea that war is fought to make the enemy do you

will. What we will surely find, however, is that these weapons giv

us operational concepts and opportunities well beyond what wou

be possible if we merely substitute them for conventional weapon

The United States can achieve virtually all military objective

without recourse to weapons of mass destruction. Conversel

other states, unable to afford the hyper-war arsenal now th

exclusive property of the United States, will at least experime

with them. The challenge for America is to decide if it wants 

negate these weapons without replying or preempting in kin

Accompanying this question is the question of nuclear deterrenc

in a significantly changed world. Although deterrence wi

certainly be greatly different from our cold war conception of 

does it lose its utility in all situations? How should US nucle

forces be maintained? This entire matter deserves serious though

soon. 

Information will become a prominent, if not predominant, pa

of war to the extent that whole wars may well revolve aroun

seizing or manipulating the enemy’s datasphere.l

 Furthermore, 

may be important in some instances to furnish the enemy wi

accurate information. This concept will be discussed further in th

paper. 

The world is currently experiencing what may be the mo

revolutionary period in all of human existence with majo

revolutions taking place simultaneously in geopolitics, productio

technology, and military affairs. The pace of change is acceleratin

and shows no sign of letting up. If we are to succeed in protectin

our interests in this environment, we must spend more tim

thinking about war and developing new employment concepts tha

ever in our past. Attrition warfare belongs to another age, and th

352 
days when wars could be won by sheer bravery and perseveranc

are gone. Victory will go to those who think through the proble

and capitalize on every tool available-regardless of its source. L

us begin laying the intellectual framework for future air operation

All military operations, including air operations, should b

consonant with the prevailing political and physical environmen

In World War II the United States and her Allies impose

widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan an

Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant th

a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have m

overwhelming opposition from American and coalition politic

leaders. As late as the Vietnam War the general inaccuracy o

weapons required large numbers of men to expose themselves 

hostile fire in order to launch enough weapons to have some effe

on the enemy; now, the new physical reality of accurate weapon

means that few men need to be or should be exposed. 

Military operations must be conducted so as to give reasonab

probability of accomplishing desired political goals at a

acceptable price. Indeed, before one can develop or adopt 

concept of operations, an understanding of war and politic

objectives is imperative. 

For war to make any sense, it must be conducted for som

reason. The reason may not be very good or seem to make muc

sense, but with remarkably few exceptions, most rulers who hav

gone to war have done so with the objective of achievin

something—perhaps additional territory, a halt to offensive enem

operations, avenging an insult, or forcing a religious conversio

Very few have gone to war to amuse themselves with no concer

for the outcome or desire for anything other than the opportunity 

have a good donnybrook. 

This is not to say, however, that all those who have gone to w

have done so with a clear idea of their objective and what it wou

take to achieve it. Indeed, failure to define ends and means clear

has led to innumerable disasters for attacker and attacked alik

353 
First rule: if you are going to war, know why you are goin

Corollary to the first rule: have some understanding of what you

enemy wants out of the war and the price each of you is willing 

pay. Remember: war is not quintessentially about fighting an

killing; rather, it is about getting something that the opponent 

not inclined to hand over. Still another way to express this idea 

this: war is all about making your enemy do something you wa

him to do when he doesn’t want to do it—and then preventing hi

from taking an alternative approach which you would also fin

unacceptable. 

There are a variety of ways to make an enemy do what yo

want him to do. In simple terms, however, there are but thre

make it too expensive for the enemy to resist with “expensive

understood in political, economic, and military terms; physical

prevent an enemy from doing something by imposing strategic o

operational paralysis on him; or destroy him absolutely. 

The last of these options is rare in history, difficult to execut

fraught with moral concerns, and normally not very useful becau

of all the unintended consequences it engenders. We will pass ov

it in favor of concentrating on the first two. 

When we talk about making something so costly for an enem

that he decides to accept our position, we are talking abo

something very difficult to define or predict precisely. After a

human organizations typically react in an infinite number of way

to similar stimuli. The difficulty of defining or predictin

however, does not suggest that it is a hopeless task. Imprecise, ye

hopeless, no. 

We all know from our experience that we regularly mak

decisions whether or not to do something. We don’t go on a trip 

it costs more money than we are ready to pay; we don’t g

mountain climbing if we fear the cost of falling; and we don’t driv

above the speed limit if the probability of a ticket seems high, an

so on. Enemies, whether they be states, criminal organizations, o

individuals all do the same thing; they almost always act or don

354 
act based on some kind of cost-benefit ratio. The enemy may n

assess a situation the way we do, and we may disagree with th

assessment, but assessments are part and parcel of every decisio

From an air power standpoint, it is our job to determine what pric

(negative or positive) it will take to induce an enemy to accept ou

conditions. To do so, however, we need to understand how ou

enemies are organized. One might object that understanding ho

our enemies are organized is an impossible task, especially if w

don’t know in advance who they are. Fortunately, this is not th

case; as we shall see, every life-based system is organized abo

the same way. Only the details vary. 

Whether we are talking about an industrialized state, a dru

cartel, or an electric company, every organization follows the sam

organizational scheme. This is very important to us as militar

planners because it allows us to develop general concepts n

dependent on a specific enemy. Likewise, as we understand ho

our enemies are organized, we can easily move on to the conce

of centers of gravity. Understanding centers of gravity then allow

us to make reasonable guesses as to how to create costs which ma

lead the enemy to accept our demands. If the enemy does n

respond to imposed costs, then this same understanding o

organization and centers of gravity shows us how to impos

operational or strategic paralysis on our enemy so he become

incapable of opposing us. Let’s start with the basics o

organization (table 1). 

355 
Table 1 

System Attributes 

Body State Drug Cartel Elect

Comp

Leader 

Brain 

-eyes 

-nerves 

Government 

-communication 

-security 

Leader 

-communication 

-security 

Centr

Contr

Organic 

Essential 

Food/oxygen 

-conversion 

via 

vital organs 

Energy 

(electricity, oil,) 

food), money 

Coca source 

plus conversion 

Input (h

hydr

Outp

(electri

Infrastructur 

e 

Vessels, 

bones, 

muscles 

Roads, airfields, 

factories 

Roads, airways 

sea lanes 

Transm

n lin

Population Cells People 

Growers, 

distributors, 

processors 

Work

Fighting 

Mechanism Leukocytes Military, police, firemen 

Street soldiers Repair

As can be seen from the preceding table, a wide variety o

systems ranging from an individual to an electric company a

organized with remarkable similarity. This organizing scheme 

sufficiently widespread to make it an acceptable starting place fo

working out most military or business problems. It helps us p

into effect injunctions from ancient Greek and Chinese alike 

“know thyself” and “thine enemy.” In addition to simplifying th

“knowing” process, this organizational scheme gives us an eas

way to categorize information, which we must do if we are 

make real decisions. For practical purposes, the world contains a

infinite amount of information which by definition cannot b

totally correlated. Filters of some sort are a necessity; this system

approach provides an easy way to categorize information and 

understand the relative importance of any particular bit. 

Our primary interest is not in building a theory of organizatio

rather, it is to derive an understanding of what we might need 

impose an intolerable cost or strategic or operational paralysis o

356 
an enemy. To grasp the essence of this problem, it helps 

rearrange our table in the form of five rings (fig. 1). 

Rearranging the tabular table into the five rings diagram give

us several key insights. First, it shows us that we are dealing wi

an interdependent system. That is, each ring has a relationship wi

all of the others and all play some role. Seeing the enemy as 

system gives us enormous advantages over those who see th

enemy merely as an army or air force, or worse yet, see the enem

manifested in some quantity of tanks or airplanes or ships or dru

pushers without ever understanding what it is that allows thes

tanks or ships to operate and for what purpose. 

Second, it gives us some idea of the relative importance of eac

entity contained within a given ring. For example, the head of 

drug cartel (the leadership ring) has the power to change the cart

considerably whereas the street soldier (in the fielded militar

forces ring) assigned the job of protecting a pusher in a back alle

can have virtually no effect on the cartel as a whole. 

Third, it portrays rather graphically an ancient truth about wa

our objective is always to convince the enemy to do what we wa

him to do. The person or entity with the power to agree to chang

is the leader in the middle. Thus, directly or indirectly all of ou

energies in war should be focused on changing the mind of th

leadership. 

357 
Fourth, our rings clearly show that the military is a shield o

spear for the whole system, not the essence of the system. Given 

choice, even in something so simple as personal combat, w

certainly wouldn’t make destruction of our enemy’s shield our en

game. Contrary to Clausewitz, destruction of the enemy military 

not the essence of war; the essence of war is convincing the enem

to accept your position, and fighting his military forces is at best 

means to an end and at worst a total waste of time and energy. 

Fifth, and last, the rings give us the concept of working from th

inside to the outside as opposed to the converse. Understandin

this concept is essential to taking a strategic rather than a tactic

approach to winning wars. 

In using the rings to develop war ideas, it is imperative to sta

with the largest identifiable system. That is, if the immedia

problem is reversing the effects of an invasion, one would start th

analysis with the largest possible look at the system description o

the invading country. An example: when the Iraqis invade

Kuwait, Gen Norman Schwarzkopf quickly grasped the idea th

his problem was first with Iraq as a state and only secondarily wi

Iraq’s military forces within Kuwait itself. At some poin

however, we wanted to understand details about Iraq’s army 

Kuwait. Not surprisingly, we found that it was organized on th

five-ring principle and insofar as our objective with respect to th

army was something other than pure destruction, five-ring analys

gave us a good picture of what to strike. Had we so desired, w

could have continued our analysis down to the level of a

individual soldier because he is organized about the same way as 

his country. From a diagraming standpoint, then, we start out wi

the big picture of the strategic entity. 2 

When we want more information, we pullout subsystems lik

electrical power under system essentials and show it as a five-rin

system. We may have to make several more five-ring models 

show successively lower electrical subsystems. We continue th

process until we have sufficient understanding and information 

358 
act. Note that with this approach, we have little need for th

infinite amount of information theoretically available on a strateg

entity like a state. Instead, we can identify very quickly what w

don’t know and concentrate our information search on releva

data. 

For the mathematically inclined, it will be clear that we a

describing a process of differentiation as opposed to integration. I

a complex world, a top-down, differentiation approach is 

necessity. Important to note, however, is that virtually all ou

military training (and business training) starts us at the lowe

possible level and asks us to work our way up. Thus, we learn 

tactical approach to the world. However, when we want to thin

not about fighting wars but about winning them, we must take 

strategic and operation—or top-down—approach if we are 

succeed. 

So far, we have not talked explicitly about centers of gravit

but we have derived them by showing how we and our enemies a

organized. Centers of gravity are primarily organization

concepts. Which ones are most important become clear when w

decide what effect we want to produce on the enemy in order 

induce him to accept our position. Which ones to attack become 

matter of our capability. 

Let us review key concepts discussed to this point. First, th

object of war is to induce the enemy to do your bidding. Second, 

is the leadership of the enemy that decides to accommodate yo

Third, engagement of the enemy military may be a means to a

end, but the engagement is never an end in itself and should b

avoided under most circumstances. Fourth, every life-form-base

system is organized similarly: a leadership function to direct it; 

system-essential function to convert energy from one form 

another, an infrastructure to tie it all together, a population to mak

it function, and a defense system to protect it from attack. Fifth, th

enemy is a system, not an independent mass of tanks, aircraft, o

359 
dope pushers. And sixth, the five rings provide a good method fo

categorizing information and identifying centers of gravity. 

We said earlier that our goal in war would generally be to mak

the cost-political, economic, and military—to the enemy high

than he was willing to pay or to impose strategic or operation

paralysis on him so that he would become incapable of actin

Now, with an understanding of how enemies are organized, we ca

begin the process of determining how to accomplish either or bo

with air power tools. 

The object of war is to convince the enemy leadership to d

what you want it to do. The enemy leadership acts on som

cost/risk basis, but we can’t know precisely what it might be. W

can, however, make some reasonable guesses based on system an

organization theory. To do this, put yourself in the center of th

five rings as the leader of a strategic entity like a drug cartel o

state. You have certain rather basic goals that normally will tak

precedence over others. First, you want to survive personally (th

is not to say you won’t die for your system, but you probably se

yourself and the system as being closely tied together). To surviv

personally (in most instances) the system you lead must survive 

something reasonably close to its present form. 

Let us say that you are the leader of a drug cartel and an enem

threatens you credibly with the following (to which you cann

respond): your bank accounts will be zeroed, your communication

with the world outside your mountain retreat will be severed, you

cocaine processing facility will be destroyed, and your house wi

be converted to rubble. To avoid these nasty things, all you have 

do is agree to stop selling cocaine in one country. What do you do

If you are remotely rational, you agree immediately. Failure to d

so means your system effectively ceases to exist which leaves yo

personally in a precarious position and unable even to retire 

splendor because you can’t get at the billions you had socked awa

in a country with strict privacy in banking laws. 

360 
Suppose that only some of these dire events were threatened o

deemed likely. In this case, you might choose to negotiate. Perhap

you would agree to sell less cocaine in the target country. Perhap

you would agree to a moratorium on sales. Your enemy might o

might not accept these counterproposals; it would depend large

on how much he was willing to spend to create a cost for you. I

our ideal world we like to think we don’t negotiate with dru

dealers or tyrants like Saddam Hussein. In the real world we do s

all the time. Very rarely are we willing to invest the time and effo

required to achieve maximal results. 

Our discussion of costs has so far been oriented at a strateg

level. Does it also apply at an operational level—the level at whic

military forces are actually employed? The answer is an absolu

yes. Military commanders, with the exception of a few real

stupid ones, have always weighed costs as they were planning o

conducting an operation. Let’s take a hypothetical look at Georg

Patton and the Third Army in World War II. 

George Patton was an aggressive commander who believed th

speed of advance was key to success. Obviously, then, the Thir

Army needed to move quickly as a system-not just the tanks, b

the whole system that supported them at the front. From th

German side if moving fast was good from George Patton

perspective, it was bad from theirs. Now, let us do a quick fiv

ring analysis of the Third Army from just the cost standpoint. (W

will return to it later when we discuss operational paralysis.) 

Let us suppose that something catastrophic happened to Thir

Army’s fuel supply in mid-September of 1944. Let us assume th

someone tells General Patton at a staff meeting that all fu

deliveries to his Army will cease in two days. His choices a

basically two: slow down or stop the movement of his army so th

it can assume a reasonable defensive position, or tell everyone 

plunge ahead as far as possible until they run out of gas. Since th

latter is likely to leave the majority of the army in an untenable an

unplanned position and is unlikely to achieve anything final, Patto

361 
opts for the former because he has assessed the cost of continuin

as too high for the possible results. 

Realize also that unbeknownst to the commanding genera

every subordinate commander and soldier will start acting o

information about an impending fuel shortage as soon as he hea

about it. The effect is obvious; by the time the formal order to ha

comes down, forward movement would have already ceased an

hoarding of remaining fuel supplies would have becom

widespread. The principle is simple: at all levels, leaders mak

decisions based on a cost/benefit analysis. 

Before moving on to discuss imposition of strategic an

operational paralysis, we need to make two more points on th

subject of cost. The first is that the enemy leader may n

recognize how much attacks on him are costing at the time o

attack and in the future. This almost certainly was the case wi

Saddam Hussein who simply failed to comprehend for sever

weeks what the strategic air attacks against him were doing to h

future. Had he understood, he might have sued for peace the fir

morning of the war. His lack of understanding flowed fro

ignorance of the effect of modern air attack 3

 and from lack o

information. The coalition attack in the first minutes had s

disrupted communications at strategic levels that it was ver

difficult to receive and process damage reports. 4 

A similar event may have taken place in Japan in late 1944 an

into 1945. Japanese army leaders persisted in their desire 

continue the war even though their homeland was collapsin

around them as a result of strategic air and sea attacks. The

apparently lacked the in-depth understanding of war and the

country to appreciate what was really happening. Like Saddam 

half century later, the Japanese were stuck in a paradigm that sa

that the only important operations in war were the clashes o

armies. In the Japanese case part of the problem may hav

stemmed from the Bushido code of personal bravery that tended 

assume that success in war would be a function of agglomeratin

362 
many tactical successes. The concepts of strategic and operation

war were simply not there. 

Two lessons flow from these examples: you may have 

educate the enemy on the effect your operations are likely to hav

You may also have to give him accurate information on the exte

of his losses-and the long and short-term effects likely to flo

from them. 

As we have seen, we cannot depend on the his making th

concessions we ask because of a realistic cost/benefit analysis. I

the event we cannot educate and inform him properly, we must b

ready to consider imposition of strategic and operational paralysi

Fortunately, the effort we put into understanding how enemies a

organized and how to impose costs leads us directly into th

concepts and mechanisms of paralysis. 

The idea of paralysis is quite simple. If the enemy is seen as 

system, we need to identify those parts of the system which we ca

affect in such a way as to prevent the system from doing somethin

we don’t want it to do. The best place to start is normally at th

center for if we can prevent the system’s leadership fro

gathering, processing, and using information we don’t want him 

have, we have effectively paralyzed the system at a strategic level

Let us go back to the drug cartel example we earlier discusse

Suppose that the suppliers and pushers hear nothing fro

headquarters for some period of time. Their finances begin to dr

up, nobody protects them from competitors, and their stock

dwindle quickly. What do they do? They begin to look for oth

cartels to deal with or for other lines of work. In a short period o

time, but not instantly, the paralysis imposed at the strategic lev

of the cartel destroys the organization’s ability to sell the drugs i

opposition didn’t want it to sell. All while the overwhelmin

majority of the individuals in the organization are unharmed an

not even directly threatened. 

The obvious place to induce strategic system paralysis is at th

leadership, or brain, level. What happens, however, if the bra

363 
cannot be located or attacked? Although the leadership functio

always provides the most lucrative place to induce paralysis, it 

not the only possibility. Suppose that we can’t reach the drug lor

but we can reach and destroy one of his system essentials such a

his financial net? We are likely to have created a different level o

paralysis. The organization may still be able to function, and it wi

certainly search furiously to repair or replace its financial net. If 

doesn’t succeed, however, this paralysis in one part of the strateg

system is likely to cause much of the rest to atrophy and becom

ineffective. After all the majority of the organization’s supplie

and workers must eat and must pay for services rendered. If the

are not getting regular pay, they are going to be forced again 

find alternatives outside the organization that can no long

provide them with a system essential. 

At a big state level, one can imagine a similar outcome if th

state loses a system essential like electricity. Imagine the effect o

the United States if all of its electricity stops functioning. 

Let us return to our George Patton and Third Army example 

look at operational paralysis. Patton depended on speed for succe

but not unfocused speed. He needed to know where he was goin

what his troops were going to encounter, where to send the fu

and ammunition, and where to shift land and air forces as require

Suppose the Germans had succeeded in blinding Patton b

depriving him of his ability to gather and disseminate informatio

Under these conditions, Third Army would have been effective

paralyzed insofar as its ability to conduct rapid offensives simp

because offensives on the ground at any speed are extraordinari

complex and require huge amounts of good information. 

If the Germans were unable to blind Patton, what else cou

they have done to induce operational paralysis? Again, going fro

the center of the rings toward the outside suggests we should loo

next in the system-essential (or supply) ring for an answer. Mo

assuredly, Patton’s speed depended on fuel for his tanks an

trucks-no fuel; no speed. Thus, elimination of fuel, perhaps b

364 
interdicting the Red Ball Express, induces the desired form o

operational paralysis and converts Third Army into somethin

different. Before its fuel was cut off, Third Army was a fa

moving, dangerous threat to the Germans: after the fuel stops, 

becomes a slow, slogging beast significantly different in nature an

threat. 

So far we have discussed effects we might want to produce o

the enemy: untenable costs or paralysis at one or more level

Next, we must look at how we go about doing it. Befo

proceeding, however, it is useful to note that we have used quite 

few pages talking about air theory and have yet to discuss bomb

missiles, or bullets. The reason is simple; well before it makes an

sense to talk about mechanics, it is imperative to decide what effe

you want to produce on the enemy. Making this decision is th

toughest intellectual challenge; once decided, figuring out how 

do it is much easier if for no other reason than we practice th

necessary tactical events every day whereas we rarely (far to

rarely) think about strategic and operational problems. Let u

propose a very simple rule for how to go about producing th

effect: do it very fast. 

It may seem facetious to reduce the “how” to such a simple rul

and, indeed, we will now make it a little more complex by talkin

about parallel attack. Nevertheless, the essence of success in futu

war will certainly be to make everything happen you want 

happen in a very short period of time—instantly if possible. Why

And what is parallel war? 

Parallel war brings so many parts of the enemy system und

near-simultaneous attack that the system simply cannot react 

defend or to repair itself. It is like the death of a thousand cuts; an

individual cut is unlikely to be serious. A hundred, however, sta

to slow a body considerably, and a thousand are fatal because th

body cannot deal with that many assaults on it. Our best examp

of parallel war to date is the strategic attack on Iraq in the Gu

War. Within a matter of minutes the coalition, attacked over 

365 
hundred key targets across Iraq

s entire strategic depth. In a

instant, important functions in all of Iraq stopped working ver

well. Phone service fell precipitously, lights went out, air defens

centers stopped controlling subordinate units, and key leadersh

offices and personnel were destroyed. To put Iraq’s dilemma 

perspective, the coalition struck three times as many targets in Ira

in the first 24 hours as Eighth Air Force hit in Germany in all o

1943! 

The bombing offensive against Germany (until the very end

was a serial operation as virtually all military operations have bee

since the dawn of history. Operations have been serial becaus

communications made concentration of men imperative, th

inaccuracy of weapons meant that a great number had to b

employed to have an effect, and the difficulty of moveme

essentially restricted operations to one or two locations. I

addition, military operations have mostly been conducted again

the enemy’s military, not against his entire strategic or operation

system. All this meant that war was a matter of action and reactio

of culminating points, of regrouping, of reforming. Essentially, w

was an effort by one side to break through a defensive line wi

serial attacks or it was an attempt to prevent breakthrough. 

In any event the majority of the enemy system lay in relativ

safety through most of a conflict with the fighting and damag

confined largely to the front itself. Even when aerial bombardme

began to reach strategic depths, the bombardment tended to b

serial (again because of inaccurate weapons and the need 

concentrate attacking forces so they could penetrate an aeri

defensive line). This meant that the enemy could gather h

defenders in one or two places and that he could concentrate th

entire system’s repair assets on the one or two places which ma

have suffered some damage. Not so in Iraq. 

In Iraq, a country about the same size as prewar Germany, s

many key facilities suffered so much damage so quickly that it wa

simply not possible to make strategically meaningful repair. No

366 
was it possible or very useful to concentrate defenses; successf

defense of one target merely meant that one out of over a hundre

didn’t get hit at that particular time. Like the thousand cu

analogy, it just doesn’t matter very much if some of the cuts a

deflected. It is important to note that Iraq was a very tough countr

strategically. Iraq had spent an enormous amount of money an

energy on giving itself lots of protection and redundancy and i

efforts would have paid off well if it had been attacked serially a

it had every right to anticipate it would. In other words, the parall

attack against Iraq was against what may well have been th

country best prepared in all the world for attack. If it worked ther

it will probably work elsewhere. 

Executing parallel attack is a subject for another essay or even 

book. Suffice it to say here that those things brought under attac

must be carefully selected to achieve the desired effect. 

We have now provided the groundwork for a theory of a

power to use into the twenty-first century. To summariz

understand the political and technological environment; identif

political objectives; determine how you want to induce the enem

to do your will (imposed cost, paralysis, or destruction); use th

five-ring systems analysis to get sufficient information on th

enemy to make possible identification of appropriate centers o

gravity; and attack the right targets in parallel as quickly a

possible. To make all this a little more understandable, it is usef

to finish by mentioning the Gulf War’s key strategic an

operational lessons, which look as though they will be useful fo

the next quarter century or more. 

We can identify 10 concepts that summarize the revolution o

the Gulf War and that must be taken into account as we develo

new force levels and strategy: 

1. The importance of strategic attack and the fragility of state

at the strategic level of war 

2. Fatal consequences of losing strategic air superiority 

367 
3. The overwhelming effects of parallel warfare 

4. The value of precision weapons 

5. The fragility of surface forces at the operational level of war 

6. Fatal consequence of losing operational air superiority 

7. The redefinition of mass and surprise by stealth and precisio

8. The viability of “air occupation” 

9. The dominance of air power 

10. The importance of information at the strategic an

operational levels 

Let us look at each of these briefly. 

1. The importance of strategic attack and the fragility of state

at the strategic level of war: Countries are inverted pyramids th

rest precariously on their strategic innards-their leadershi

communications, key production, infrastructure, and population. 

a country is paralyzed strategically, it is defeated and cann

sustain its fielded forces though they be fully intact. 

2. Fatal consequences of losing strategic air superiority: When 

state loses its ability to protect itself from air attack, it is at th

mercy of its enemy and only the enemy’s compassion o

exhaustion can save it. The first reason for government is to prote

the citizenry and its property. When a state can no longer do so, 

has lost its reason for being. When a state loses strategic a

superiority and has no reasonable hope of regaining it quickly, 

should sue for peace as quickly as possible. From an offensiv

standpoint, winning strategic air superiority is the number on

priority of the commander; once accomplished, everything else is 

just a matter of time. 

3. The overwhelming effects of parallel warfare: Strateg

organizations, including states, have a small number of vital targe

at the strategic level—in the neighborhood of a few hundred wi

an average of perhaps 10 aimpoints per vital target. These targe

368 
tend to be small, very expensive, have few backups, and are har

to repair. If a significant percentage of them are struck in paralle

the damage becomes insuperable. Contrast parallel attack wi

serial attack where only one or two targets come under attack in 

given day (or longer). The enemy can alleviate the effects of seri

attack by dispersal over time, increasing the defenses of targe

that are likely to be attacked, concentrating his resources to repa

damage to single targets, and by conducting counteroffensive

Parallel attack deprives him of the ability to respond effective

and the greater the percentage of targets hit in a single blow, th

more nearly impossible is response. 

4. The value of precision weapons: Precision weapons allow th

economical destruction of virtually all targets-especially strateg

and operational targets that are difficult to move or conceal. The

change the nature of war from one of probability to one o

certainty. Wars for millennia have been probability events in whic

each side launched huge quantities of projectiles (and men) at on

another in the hope that enough of the projectiles (and men) wou

kill enough of the other side to induce retreat or surrende

Probability warfare was chancy at best. It was unpredictable, fu

of surprises, hard to quantify, and governed by accident. Precisio

weapons have changed all that. In the Gulf War, we knew wi

near certainty that a single weapon would destroy its target. W

moved into the predictable. 

With precision weapons, even logistics become simpl

destruction of the Iraqis at the strategic, operational, and tactic

levels required that about 12,000 aimpoints be hit. Thus, no long

is it necessary to move a near-infinite quantity of munitions so th

some tiny percentage might hit something important. Since th

Iraqi army was the largest fielded since the Chinese in the Korea

War and since we know that all countries look about the same 

the strategic and operational levels, we can forecast in advanc

how many precision weapons will be needed to defeat an enemy

assuming of course that we are confident about getting th

weapons to their target. 

369 
5. The fragility of surface forces at the operational level of wa

Supporting significant numbers of surface forces (air, land, or se

is a tough administrative problem even in peacetime. Succe

depends upon efficient distribution of information, fuel, food, an

ammunition. By necessity, efficient distribution depends on a

inverted pyramid of distribution. Supplies of all operation

commodities must be accumulated in one or two locations, the

parsed out to two or four locations, and so on until they eventual

reach the user. The nodes in the system are exceptional

vulnerable to precision attack. As an example, consider what th

effect would have been of a single air raid a day-even wi

nonprecision weapons-on the WWII Red Ball Express or on th

buildup behind VII and XVIII Corps in the Gulf War. The Re

Ball Express became internally unsustainable, and the VII an

XVIII Corps buildups severely strained the resources of the enti

US Army-even in the absence of any enemy attacks. 

Logistics and administration dominate surface warfare, an

neither is easy to defend. In the past these activities took place s

far behind the lines that they were reasonably secure. Such is n

longer the case-which brings into serious question any form o

warfare that requires huge logistics and administrative buildup. 

6. Fatal consequence of losing operational air superiorit

Functioning at the operational level is difficult even without enem

interference. If the enemy attains operational air superiority (an

exploits it)5 and can roam at will above indispensable operation

functions like supply, communications, and movement, success 

not possible. As with the loss of strategic air superiority, loss o

operational air superiority spells doom and should prompt quic

measures to retreat-which is likely to be very costly-or to arrang

for surrender terms. 

7. The redefinition of mass and surprise by stealth an

precision: For the first time in the history of warfare, a single enti

can produce its own mass and surprise. It is this single entity th

makes parallel warfare possible. Surprise has always been one o

370 
the most important factors in war-perhaps even the single mo

important because it could make up for large deficiencies 

numbers. Surprise was always difficult to achieve because 

conflicted with the concepts of mass and concentration. In order 

have enough forces available to hurl enough projectiles to win th

probability contest, a commander had to assemble and move larg

numbers. Of course, assembling and moving large forces in secr

was quite difficult, even in the days before aerial reconnaissanc

so the odds on surprising the enemy were small indeed. Stealth an

precision have solved both sides of the problem: by definitio

stealth achieves surprise, and precision means that a single weapo

accomplishes what thousands were unlikely to accomplish in th

past. 

8. The viability of “air occupation”: Countries conform to th

will of their enemies when the penalty for not conforming exceed

the cost of conforming. Cost can be imposed on a state b

paralyzing or destroying its strategic and operational base or b

actual occupation of enemy territory. In the past, occupation (in th

rare instances when it was needed or possible) was accomplishe

by ground forces-because there was no good substitute. Today, th

concept of “air occupation” is a reality and in many cases it wi

suffice. The Iraqis conformed as much or more with UN demand

as the French did with German demands when occupied b

millions of Germans. Ground occupation, however, is indicate

when the intent is to colonize or otherwise appropriate the enemy

homeland. 

9. The dominance of air power: Air power (fixed win

helicopter, cruise missile, satellite), if not checked, will destroy a

enemy’s strategic and operational target bases-which are ver

vulnerable and very difficult to make less vulnerable. It can als

destroy most tactical targets if necessary. 

10. The importance of information at the strategic an

operational levels: In the Gulf War, the coalition deprived Iraq o

most of its ability to gather and use information. At the same tim

371 
the coalition managed its own information requiremen

acceptably, even though it was organized in the same wa

Frederick the Great had organized himself. Cleat for the future 

the requirement to redesign our organizations so they are built 

exploit modem information-handling equipment. This also mean

flattening organizations, eliminating most middle managemen

pushing decision making to very low levels, and formin

worldwide neural networks to capitalize on the ability of units 

and out of the direct conflict area. 

The information lesson from the Gulf was negative; th

coalition succeeded in breaking Iraq’s ability to proce

information, but the coalition failed to fill the void by providin

Iraqis an alternate source of information. 6

 Failure to do so mad

Saddam’s job much easier and greatly reduced the chance of h

overthrow. Capturing and exploiting the datasphere may well b

the most important effort in many future wars. 

Beyond these Gulf War lessons, which have applicability we

into the future, it behooves the air planner to think of one oth

area: what can be done with air power that in the past we kne

could only be done with ground or sea power or couldn’t be don

at all? The question must be addressed for several reasons: a

power has the ability to reach a conflict area faster and cheap

than other forms of power; employment of air power typically pu

far fewer people at risk than any other form (in the Gulf War, the

were rarely more than a few hundred airmen in the air as oppose

to the tens of thousands of soldiers and sailors in the direct comb

areas); and it may provide the only way for the United States 

participate at acceptable political risk (use of air power does n

require physical presence on the ground). Let us look at just on

example. 

Suppose a large city is under the control of roving gangs o

soldiers, and it is American policy to restore some degree of ord

to the city. Normally, we would think that could only be done b

putting our own soldiers on the ground. But what if policymake

372 
are unwilling to accept the political and physical risks attendant 

doing so? Do we do nothing, or do we look for innovativ

solutions? 

If we define the problem as one of preventing groups of soldie

from wandering around a city, we may be able to solve it from th

air. Can we not put a combination of AC-130s and helicopters 

the air equipped with searchlights, loudspeakers, rubber bullet

entangling chemical nets, and other paraphernalia? When group

are spotted, they first receive a warning to disperse. If they don

they find themselves under attack by nonlethal, but unpleasan

weapons. If these don’t work, lethal force is at hand. It may b

very difficult to prevent an individual from skulking around a ci

or even robbing an occasional bank. Single individuals, howeve

constitute a relatively small tactical problem as they are unlikely 

be able to cause wide-scale disruption as can multiple groups. Th

latter problem is serious but manageable; the former is a polic

matter. 

By the same token, we know that we will be called on 

conduct humanitarian and peacemaking operations. If we thin

about food delivery as the same as bomb delivery and understan

that with food as with bombs our responsibility is to distribute it 

the right people, we should be able to do as well with food as w

do with bombs. To do so, however, will require putting as muc

effort into developing precision food-delivery techniques as we p

into developing precision bomb or cluster-bomb capabilities. Th

problem is the same and is theoretically susceptible to an air pow

solution if we are willing to think outside the lines. And indee

thinking outside the lines will be a necessity if air power is 

prosper and to play a key role in defending American interests we

into the next century. 

Indeed, there is a new world building around us and th

revolutions in politics, business, and war have happened and w

must deal with them, not ignore them. Of course, it is huma

nature to stay with the old ways of doing business even when th

373 
external world has made the old ways obsolete or even dangerou

So many examples come so easily to mind: the heavy knights 

Agincourt refusing to believe that they were being destroyed b

peasants with bows; the French in World War I exulting th

doctrine of “cold steel” against the machine gun and barbed wi

as the flower of a generation perished; and the steel and au

makers of the United States convinced that their foreig

competitors were inept even as their market positions plummete

Accepting the changes made manifest in the Gulf War will b

equally difficult for the United States but by no means impossibl

if we all resolve to think. 

374 
Notes 

1. A term introduced by Don Simmons in Hyperion (New York: Bantam 

Books, 1990). 

2. A strategic entity is any self-contained system that has the general ability 

to set its own goals and the wherewithal to carry them out. A state is normally 

strategic entity as is a drug cartel or a guerrilla organization. 

3. Saddam made the following statement shortly after his successful invasio

of Kuwait. “The United States depends on its Air Force and everyone knows 

that no one ever won a war from the air,” Thus, his preconceived notion (share

by many military officers around the world) made it difficult for him to analyze 

what was happening to him, 

4. As an aside, the planners had recognized that Saddam would not be able 

gather information, so they had intended to provide him accurate reports of all 

attacks by using psychological warfare assets. For a number of reasons, the 

planners were unable to make this happen; as a result, Saddam lacked 

information that the coalition really wanted him to have. 

5. Some would argue that the Mujahiden in Afghanistan lost operational air 

superiority and yet still prevailed. The latter is true; the former is not because th

Stinger antiaircraft missiles forced the Soviets to operate at an altitude that 

deprived them of the ability to hit anything. The Soviets simply did not have th

precision weaponry and detection capability the United States had in the Gulf 

War. 

6. The coalition provided Iraqi soldiers at the front great quantities of 

information and did so effectively; the same thing did not happen at the strateg

level inside Iraq for a variety of not very good reasons. 

375 
Waging Wars with 

Nonlethal Weapons 

Paul G. O’Connor 

The object of warfare since its inception has been to exa

casualties and impose physical destruction, with the expre

purpose of driving an opponent to capitulation. Contrary to th

assumption, recent developments in technology have demonstrate

methods of waging war in a nonlethal and nondestructive wa

This chapter addresses the background leading to nonlethal trend

in war fighting and discusses technology currently und

development that supports nonlethality. 

Modern warfare, starting with the American Civil War, marke

the addition of wholesale and deliberate destruction of proper

and infrastructure to the combat arena. This conduct was clear

evident in the Second World War, with casualties and destructio

achieving proportions unimaginable in prior conflicts. Th

culmination of such destructive trends was the relentle

conventional and incendiary bombing of German and Japanes

cities and ultimately the atomic attacks on Hiroshima an

Nagasaki. 

During the Vietnam conflict, incessant news coverage and i

subsequent delivery into American living rooms effected a cle

revulsion for the actual conduct and results of warfare. What bega

as mostly uncritical media reporting evolved into outrig

questioning of United States involvement in the war after the 196

Tet offensive. 1

 In contrast to the glamorous recounts of pa

heroes in the manner of Sergeant Alvin York or Audie Murphy o

the heavily propagandized newsreel footage of World War I

television molded attitudes that were manifest by home-fro

demonstrations and flag burnings, not victory gardens and ratio

cards. Criticism and debate abounded regarding the legitima

interest of the US in Vietnam. This galvanization of certain secto

of American society reflected the same conviction an

377 
commitment that had pledged support for the actions o

governments and leaders in the two world wars. Cessation o

hostilities and US withdrawal from Vietnam were viewed le

importantly as the loss of a war than as a means to halt the violenc

and death of an unpopular war that had grown so repugnant half 

world away. 

Body count, death toll, and relentless media coverage hav

channeled public opinion toward an intolerance for casualties an

materiel loss in engagements where US interests are questionabl

Conversely, support for the Gulf War was high, even when face

with estimates of thousands of conventional and chemical warfa

casualties. In reality, the casualties and aircraft loss rates we

minuscule compared with the dire predictions. Additionall

precision weapons allowed for victory without categoric

destruction of Baghdad, including strident coalition effort 

minimize Iraqi civilian casualties. 2

 These results foster a growin

faith in technology and the expectation that future wars will hav

equal or fewer casualties and aircraft loss, with the same concer

for lives among the opponent’s civilian population. 

Even the relatively low number of losses suffered by the Unite

States during the Gulf War may be viewed with incredulity an

dismay by an American public accustomed to the spectacul

technology now readily available and mostly taken for granted. U

citizens rely on technology to meet everyday needs, and the

expect the same scientific advances to cement this nation’s statu

and preeminent world position on the battlefield as well. The sam

engineering brilliance that provides satellite television, cellul

telephones, microwave cooking, and instantaneous facsimi

transmission should be immediately transferable to achieve victor

in the realm of warfare. However, this smug assurance an

confidence in technology as liberator and savior leads 

misconceptions about the actual nature of warfare, with i

accompanying confusion and unpredictability. The America

public may now expect wars to be fought quickly and cleanly, wi

378 
little or no damage to United States armament and equipment an

no casualties for American forces. 

The logical extension of such reasoning leads to warfare that 

both effective in achieving the goals of a nation while at the sam

time is acceptable to the populace. If a nation can force complianc

or acquiescence with minimal risk to both allied and enem

fighting forces and civilian populations, the object of warfare wi

have been achieved without the usually understood and accepte

prerequisites. Heretofore this arguably had been impossible, an

generally had not been a recommended method of waging wa

Carl von Clausewitz commences his treatise On War by assertin

precisely the opposite. 

Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillf

method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causin

great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art o

War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error whic

must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as War, the erro

which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. As th

use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means exclude

the cooperation of the intelligence, it follows that he who use

force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involve

must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigor in i

application. ...This is the way in which the matter must be viewe

and it is to no purpose. it is even against one’s own interest, to tur

away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair becaus

the horror of its elements excites repugnance. 3 

The question of why people and nations go to war has bee

argued for centuries and no resolution appears imminen

Therefore, as the debate proceeds and the bellicose tendencies o

nations appear unmitigated, a secondary question remains: Ho

can a nation wage conflict so as to impose its will on anothe

without putting its warriors in harm’s way? Further, can this b

accomplished without killing civilians and with only mino

damage to the enemy’s infrastructure? 

379 
One need only take a cursory look at the Marshall Plan 

postwar Europe and the infusion of money into postwar Japan 

see that the cost of rebuilding a country after a war can be a

staggering as the conduct of the war itself. The Marshall Pla

designed to resuscitate a virtually bankrupt Europe whi

simultaneously averting an American postwar depression hinge

on European recovery, required a $13-billion loan program fro

the United States. 4

 Currently, fiscal constraints in a countr

saddled with debt will not permit the expense of rebuilding 

country where previous attempts at annihilation have bee

pursued. This is unacceptable and probably financially impossibl

therefore, it appears plausible that a path be taken to reduce o

eliminate destruction and death at the outset. This direction 

desirable for fiscal reasons, if not as a moral imperative. 

The Gulf War brought to the fore weapons that had bee

developed during the preceding decades of the cold war, marke

by significant technological advances. This bolstered theories o

Western-cold-war technological superiority. A portion of thes

weapons are known as “smart weapons”-for example, those th

can target a particular building, or even a floor of that buildin

obviating the need for destruction of an entire city block to achiev

the objective, This is perhaps what the American public ha

become used to and will expect in future conflicts. Pilots an

ground forces should not be placed at undue risk when the sam

objective can be achieved with cruise missiles and other stando

smart weapons. Can this reasoning be carried to the point where 

nation can achieve its objectives with little or no casualties o

either side? 

Nonlethality is not a new concept, only one that is no

receiving more attention for the aforementioned reasons, sparke

primarily by interest in the advanced weapons of the Gulf Wa

This trend has possibilities and applications in urban settings an

low-intensity conflicts as well as war on a larger scale, Th

application of nonlethal weapons in a total war scenario, either a

380 
stand-alone weapons or those used in conjunction with mo

conventional weapons, requires further development. 

There has been a history of incorporating nonlethal aspects o

warfare with lethal weapons-those that kill people and additional

damage equipment and infrastructure. Examples of nonleth

integration with conventional warfare range from basic infiltratio

and human intelligence to the advanced technologies of sign

interception, signal exploitation, electronic countermeasures, an

electronic-surveillance measures. Recent examination, howeve

focuses on stand-alone nonlethal weapons and methods of actu

incapacitation rather than just adjuncts to conventional warfare. 

Janet Morris of the US Global Strategy Council advances th

requirement for the development of nonlethal weapons: 

Nonlethality’s allure is simple: between the moment when diplomacy 

fails and conventional military force is considered, the United States 

needs more options to either sending in a totally lethal force or accepting 

the status quo. Technology now offers such options, and they are lifeconserving, environmentally friendly, and fiscally responsible. 5 

Among the technologically advanced nonlethal weapons th

Morris identifies are laser radars or low-energy laser rifles that ca

blind optical sensors and targeting devices and temporarily blin

human operators. Very low-frequency infra sound generators cou

be employed to temporarily incapacitate human beings. Furthe

Morris discusses generators of nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse

possibly transported by truck, aircraft, or satellite, to paralyz

electronic systems and chemical agents designed to embritt

metal, destroy optics, and disable engines and equipment. 

Whether or not these technologies will make a difference in th

warfare arena is as of yet untested on a large scale. Morris sugges

that the success of nonlethal weapons will depend on th

circumstances. Scenarios can be envisioned where the introductio

of nonlethal technologies will alter the mission of the deploye

forces from actually destroying the enemy and his equipment 

simply capturing such equipment. This would aid in the subseque

381 
reverse engineering and development of countermeasures for th

equipment fielded by an enemy force. Urban raids are arguab

another circumstance in which the application of a nonleth

capability would add substantial flexibility to the range o

available options. 6 

This is especially important when considering the changin

nature of the role of the military. No longer is the military calle

on solely to perform actual war fighting. Now the roles extend 

counternarcotics operations, peacekeeping and peacemakin

forces, and humanitarian assistance. Having an array of weapon

with varying degrees of lethality would be of great benefit to tho

with unclear and indistinct assignments in burgeoning spheres o

military responsibility. 

In the realm of urban warfare, often associated with polic

departments but increasingly coming under the possible purview o

military forces, nonlethal aspects have been investigated an

attempted with limited success. Methods of imposing order in a

urban environment include the use of water pressure, rubb

bullets, and chemical sprays, although these are not witho

problems. Water pressure is not always effective and presen

problems in getting hoses where required. Rubber bullets hav

proven to be lethal at short range, and chemical agents may affe

different people in various ways, posing some risk to the deploy

as well as to unintended victims. Other immobilizing agents are th

“Taser,” which is a handgun-type device that fires two dartlik

electrodes connected to the Taser by small wires and delivers a

immobilizing shock. The stun gun is a handheld gun operating o

the same principle but only at arm’s length, thereby limiting i

range and effectiveness. Tasers have limitations through heav

clothing and near water. Criteria for the ideal urban nonleth

weapon should include a structure that is similar to a gun, effectiv

but not deadly and with varying degrees of power settings. 

Although these may seem more applicable to police and la

enforcement agencies, the possibilities extend to a military force

to do noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) and other form

382 
of extractions and engagements in cities where the possibility o

unintended collateral civilian damage is great and where there is 

risk of a subsequent outcry from the casualty-intolerant develope

nations. 

Strictly military-oriented weapons are also currently bein

developed by US scientists and engineers. These “disablin

technologies” as nonlethality is also known, could disable enem

soldiers with such weapons as lasers or acoustics as describe

above and render their weapons and support systems inoperativ

with methods such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generatio

Particularly susceptible are the heavily technologically depende

areas of command, control, communications, computers, an

intelligence (C4

I). 

The question of how far the military should go in developin

nonlethal technologies must be addressed, as well as the issue o

whether or not the four services should coordinate their effor

along the lines of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO

This would establish funding priority and facilitate training an

acquisition. Currently most nonlethal development is primarily th

work of the Army, with a lesser amount conducted by the A

Force. The Army’s Armament Research, Development an

Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jerse

directs a program called low collateral damage munition

(LCDM). According to an ARDEC statement, the research 

focused on technologies leading to weapons that can “effective

disable, dazzle or incapacitate aircraft, missiles, armored vehicle

personnel and other equipment while minimizing collater

damage.” 8 

Army officials are presently testing laser rifles that incapacita

enemy soldiers without necessarily inflicting harmful long-ter

health effects. These laser rifles are an outgrowth of an older Arm

research program that sought a means of blinding electronic an

optical sensors used by an adversary’s helicopters, tanks, missile

and artillery for target detection and tracking. Whether th

383 
antipersonnel variant uses the familiar low-power laser for sightin

and guidance or employs the advance technology such as a pulse

chemical laser or acoustic bullet is not known. It is also uncle

whether the effectiveness of these devices can be fine-tuned from 

disabling to a lethal degree. 9 

Lasers were employed in the battle arena in Vietnam and a

used presently in the munitions-guidance and range-finding role

The laser pulses are not lethal, yet they are strong enough to infli

permanent damage to a person’s eyesight. Since the laser bea

spreads out over distance, the closer to the laser, the mo

damaging they become to one’s vision. The effects are exacerbate

for those using binoculars or other similar optical device

Problems must be considered on the battlefield as well as in th

training environment. 

Some of the problems with actually fielding laser weapons an

their potential capabilities are described as follows: 

While the high powered lasers needed to destroy distant targets remain 

impractical, principally because they would be bulky and the atmosphere 

would distort their beams, lasers of much lower power are capable of 

destroying or disabling the sensors used to collect information and direct 

weapons. Sensors are vulnerable because they respond to light-and lasers 

can accurately deliver concentrated low-power light from a long range. 

Even if the lasers are not powerful enough to cause physical damage, 

they can make a sensor ineffective in the same way that blight headlights 

can overwhelm a driver’s night vision without harming the eyes. 10 

Targeting the eyes of opposing personnel specifically has bee

denied by both the former Soviet Union and the United State

while speculation abounds. There has been some evidence that th

British employed a shipboard device in the Falkland Islands th

caused three Argentine planes to crash. The system may b

designed to cause only temporary loss of vision or serious ey

injury. Either way the same desired result is achieved, whereas th

pilot must abandon his attack. 11 

A device known as a pulsed chemical laser is also bein

investigated by the US Army. This apparatus may be capable o

384 
producing energy from a pulsed laser that would project hot, high

pressure plasma in the air in front of a target. There is speculatio

that these pulsed lasers may be able to vary their effect o

personnel and materiel. 12 

In the area of acoustic weapons, Aviation Week & Spac

Technology (AW&ST) reported that technology und

development includes an acoustic generator capable of breakin

windows, incapacitating humans, and potentially damagin

internal organs at short ranges. Such a weapon would force th

intended recipient to either flee to escape injury or ris

incapacitation by remaining in the vicinity. This type of devic

would be relatively large in size and require substantial amounts o

fuel; however, it would be well suited for guarding installation

Plans are also being considered for smaller versions of the devic

that could disrupt the enemy for short periods of time. Fo

example, they could be used as point defenses or dropped in

critical areas such as airfields. 13 

A development at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is th

“optical-flash” 40-mm artillery shell, designed to temporarily blin

personnel or sensor systems. 

14 Both the acoustic weapon and th

optical-flash weapon are supported by policymakers recognizin

the need for a flexible array of weaponry, lethal as well a

nonlethal, particularly when considering the peacekeeping dutie

the military is now increasingly tasked to perform. Having a rang

of options will contribute to their capabilities as peacekeepers a

well as war fighters. 

Microbes that can turn aviation fuel in storage tanks to a usele

jelly and chemical sprays on roads and runways to damage rubb

tires are also projects currently being investigated, further sugges

that ceramic shards fired into the air could damage but not destro

aircraft engines or degrade stealth technology enough to mak

radar detection possible. 15 Further, AW&ST contends that on

nonlethal weapon was used in the Gulf War to minimize U

casualties and reduce long-term damage to Iraqi public utilities: 

385 
, p

missiles, dropped thousands of small reels of wire on the outdoor 

transmission grids of Iraqi power plants. The resulting electrical shorting 

and overloads temporarily put the power plants out of action, thus 

blinding centralized, computer-controlled air defenses and leaving radar 

and surface-to-air missile sites to be destroyed piecemeal. However, 

many of the Iraqi power plants were soon back in operation, thus 

softening the impact of the war on civilians. 16 

This capability to disrupt power generation in a nonleth

manner was also inadvertently demonstrated in 1985 when cha

dropped by a US Navy aircraft drifted in from a Pacific comb

range over San Diego. California. The small metallic strips cause

shorts in the city’s electrical grid, resulting in lost electrical pow

for 60.000 residents. 17 

Air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) are currently bein

retrofitted for use in a conventional role and possibly a nonleth

role. Some older variants, the AGE-86 for example, are bein

modified to carry a nonnuclear, electromagneticpulse (EMP

generator. As these missiles are removed from their obsole

nuclear-attack role, they are being made more stealthy in additio

to their other modifications. Such a deliverable weapon could hav

overwhelming effects on the modern battlefield. AW&ST repor

that “an EMP missile, flying at low altitude into an area with ke

enemy command and control sites, can explode, thus producing 

momentary burst of microwaves powerful enough to disable all b

special, radiation hardened electronic devices.” 18 

To produce a nonnuclear EMP burst, a magnetic field is create

in a coil. It is then “squeezed” by the detonation of convention

explosives. The pulse of microwave energy that is produced 

capable of being carried thousands of feet, along the wa

disrupting or damaging electronic components. EMP can damag

solid-state ignition on vehicles, detonators, communications, rada

and aircraft electronics. In the broad view, the disabling of vit

systems with an EMP weapon could disrupt electrical productio

and distribution as well as other vital resources without actual

damaging the production facilities on a long-term basis. 19 Anoth

386 
aspect of the nonnuclear EMP weapon is the development o

hardening for US systems that should continue coincidentally wi

EMP generator development. 

The US Army is also developing EMP weapons for the purpos

of disabling aircraft and vehicles. These weapons are focused o

attacking the aircraft “f1y-by-wire” system of electronic senso

and computers that operate the flight controls. If the comput

chips are destroyed while the aircraft is airborne, the result wou

be uncontrolled flight. If employed while the aircraft are still o

the ground, it would remove their ability to become airborne. Th

same technology could be employed against tanks, disrupting the

communication and navigation equipment and possibly inducin

engine failure, again targeting the electronic ignition. The Army 

conducting research on delivery systems for a variety of weapon

of various calibers including small arms, artillery, rockets, and a

defenses. 20 The implications of such weapons, should they prov

to be feasible and effective, would be enormous. Multiple aircra

groups could be disabled on the ground, and tanks and artiller

pieces would be rendered inoperative, all without the use o

conventional lethal weapons. 

The specific weapon systems described above are merely 

sample of the technology under development in this expandin

field. The realm of nonlethal weapons is one with multip

applications and possibilities in the disparate tasks assigned 

military forces. 

Clearly the United States is not the only country pursuin

developments in the nonlethal arena. The possibility that US an

allied forces could face many of these same weapons on th

battlefield of the future must be considered when planning the

employment and devising countermeasures. There is evidence 

suggest that Russia is engaged in the development of one suc

weapon. Jane’s Defence Weekly reports the discovery of high

powered “microwave weapons capable of paralyzing almost a

modem Western defence systems.” 21 

387 
Another consideration involving nonlethal weapons is the

applicability to international law in respect to both military use an

civilian proximity to such usage. The relatively recent evolution o

these devices dictates that they be examined and made subject 

international law. Laser weapons in particular are undergoin

scrutiny because of their potential indiscriminate application an

the possible permanent damage they may cause to the eye. 22 

The opposing viewpoint to the supposed quantum leaps an

possible applications of technology in warfare must be addresse

The military must recognize exaggerations and separate them fro

real capabilities. Regardless of public opinion and political o

budgetary pressure, the military must employ the fielded weapon

to the utmost advantage. Criticism has been raised regarding th

supposed phenomenal success of the array of weapons in the Gu

War-for instance, Patriot missiles. The distinction must be mad

according to actual verifiable results of the high-tech weapons, n

solely on media hype and unsubstantiated claims, howev

attractive they may be. John Condry of Cornell University opines 

The public still believes that the Patriot was the most effective weapon of 

the Gulf War for two reasons: primacy and the power of visual images. 

People saw the Patriots go into the sky, like a Nintendo game, blowing 

up the Scuds, they thought. Words to the contrary came later and failed 

to change those impressions. It is a psychological principle that primacy 

is critical to forming impressions, and the compelling nature of visual 

information is hard to deny, especially if it fits in with what we want to 

believe. 23 

This is not to say that the Patriots were ineffective; only that th

reliance on technology, while attractive, may not be the panace

some purport. 

However attractive developments in warfare technology ma

be, there is still the staggering reality that war fighting is chaot

and unpredictable. The success of technology in the Gulf W

leads to the possible conclusion that this technology will lead 

even greater precision weapons and, consequently, achievement o

objectives with less casualties and destruction. Nonlethal weapon

388 
rightly fit this thought progression. The challenge remains th

nonlethal weapons be integrated into existing arsenals and weapo

systems to be used perhaps at the interim stage in a crisis whe

diplomacy has failed, yet full hostilities are unwarranted. In the e

of increasingly complex roles for the armed forces, with line

blurred between peacekeeping, noncombatant operations, low

intensity conflict, and actual war fighting, it is imperative that a

options be thoroughly explored. 

389 
Notes 

1. Walter LaFeber, The American Age (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 

1989), 584-85. 

2. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 

Institute Press, 1992), 196-200. Hallion discusses the precision air attack and it

effect on civilians and the media and public perception. 

3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Anatol Rapoport (London: Penguin 

Group, 1968), 102. 

4. LaFeber, 455-56. 

5. Janet Morris, “Enter Nonlethal Weaponry,” IEEE Spectrum 28, no. 9 

(1991): 58. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Abraham N. Tennenbaum and Angela M. Moore, “Non-Lethal Weapons

Alternatives to Deadly Force,” The futurist 27, no. 5 (1993): 20-23. 

8. Mark Tapscott and Kay Atwal, “New Weapons That Win without Killing 

on DOD’s Horizon,” Defense Electronics 25, no. 2 (1993): 42-43. Tapscott and 

Atwal address nonlethal weapon development considerations as well as current 

programs. 

9. Ibid., 42. 

10. Jeff Hecht, “Lasers Designed to Blind,” New Scientist 135, no. 1833 

(1992): 27-28. 

11. Ibid., 28. 

12. Bill Harris, “Less-Than-Lethal Munitions to Give Army Greater 

Flexibility,” Ordnance, May 1993, 23. 

13. “Nonlethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility,” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology 137, no. 23 (7 December 1992): 50. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid., 51. 

16. David A. Fulghum, “US Weighs Use of Nonlethal Weapons in Serbia I

U.N. Decides to Fight,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 137, no. 7 (17 

August 1992): 62. 

17. “Nonlethal Weapons Give Peacekeepers Flexibility,” 51. 

18. David A. Fulghum, “ALCMs Given Nonlethal Role,” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology 138, no. 8 (22 February 1993): 20. 

19. Ibid., 20-21. 

20. “Army Prepares for Non-Lethal Combat,” Aviation Week & Space 

Technology 138, no. 21 (24 May 1993): 62. 

21. Nick Cook, “Russia Leads in Pulse Weapons,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 

18, no. 15 (1992): 5. 

22. Bengt Anderberg, Ove E. Bring, and Myron L. Wolbarsht, “Blinding 

Laser Weapons and International Humanitarian Law,” Journal Of Peace 

Research 29, no. 3 (1992): 287-97. A discussion of new weapons technology, 

particularly antipersonnel laser weapons, and the implications for international 

law and international lawmaking. 

23. John Condry, “TV: Live from the Battlefield,” IEEE Spectrum 28, no. 9

(1991): 48. 

390 
Economic Warfare 

Targeting Financial Systems 

As Centers of Gravity 

Dr H. David Arnold 

The purpose of warfare is to cause a change in the behavior o

an opponent. The mechanism of warfare throughout time ha

ranged from rocks to spears to muskets to armored divisions 

chemical weapons to airborne platforms. Warfare has also take

the form of economic sanctions, blockades, and the freezing of th

assets of foreign governments held in another nation-state. There 

a next step-an intensity of economic warfare over artillery or tan

warfare, an aggressiveness in economic warfare without larg

losses of human resources. This next step is a continuin

movement from low-intensity to no-intensity conflict. This is n

to imply that destructive activity against financial centers o

gravity is not intense-just that the intensity is targeted again

nontraditional military targets. Carl von Clausewitz said th

warfare is the pursuit of political aims by other means. This ca

well be applied to economic warfare as I much as “classic

warfare. 

This chapter is a partial reprint and synopsis of the Huki

Kennedy, Cameron (HKC) document published in 1993 at the U

Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College, 1

 a work that shou

become a critical piece in strategic national security planning. Th

hypothesis states that financial systems can be critical centers o

gravity in effecting a change in an opposing nation-state’s action

or stature. The HKC document explored (1) an empirical proce

to identify nation-states whose national power might be influence

through attacks on their financial centers and (2) the financi

elements of that nation’s financial system that have the greate

effect on its national power. The latter elements can then b

expunged as necessary to effect an intended change. 

391 
Interdependence of national economies is widely documented 

the literature. The late 1970s produced rapidly expanding an

generally nondiscriminatory trade, large-scale and rapid moveme

of funds from one financial center to another, and the rapid grow

of multinational enterprises. Advances in transportation an

communications technology have accelerated the interdependenc

This economic interdependence has made national an

international financial institutions critical to the smooth operatio

of nation-state economies. 

Financial institutions such as banks, stock exchanges, tradin

houses, and commodity exchanges are important for the re

factors of economic power-production, natural resources, and s

forth-of nation-states to operate at a maximum. Disrupting the

economies by attacking the financial institutions could reduce th

overall economic power of a nation-state and influence a chang

Of course, the aforementioned economic interdependencies ma

have a negative effect on one’s own economic elements. Th

downside risk is a consideration in the decision equation. 

Disrupting an adversary’s economy will affect the ability of i

infrastructure system to support its military forces and to provid

the nation with organic essentials (energy, food, minerals, an

other commodities whether they are natural resources or imported

and infrastructure (highways, ports, and railroads). Suc

disruptions could weaken the political base of the leader and mak

him or her more responsive to external influence. 

Methodology 

The HKC research identified those financial elements of th

nation-state that have the greatest effect on national power. Th

analysis reviewed five financial elements to examine their effe

on a nation’s gross domestic product (GDP): banks, stock market

foreign debt, value of exports, and value of imports. In an

industrialized and internationalized economy, banks are a critic

path that is necessary in the transfer and exchange of goods an

392 
services. Similarly, stock exchanges for capitalist economie

provide the necessary capitalization conduit for investment an

growth in production and services. National debt provides th

leverage for growth in contemporary economies and helps 

smooth out crests and valleys in business cycles. (Such leverage 

an economically weak nation-state may be a weakness or potenti

weakness.) Trade is an important sector of any modern econom

because it reflects specialization of resources. Trade’s “subsets

the relative value of imports and exports, are key contributors 

economic power and hence national power. 

Gross domestic product is the most comprehensive measure of 

nation’s total output of goods and services. It is a convenient an

widely accepted indicator of national power. 2

 In the HK

analysis, changes in GDP for 99 countries were correlated wi

changes in indicators for the five financial elements. For banks, th

study used total assets (a reflection, of course, of only assets liste

on financial statements without regard to their form or location. 

appropriate); for stock markets, total capitalization; for foreig

debt, the total amount “ held outside the country; and for trade, th

total value of ‘ imports and exports. 

HKC introduced a linear regression relationship between th

various financial elements and GDP for each of the samp

countries: 

GDP = α + βBB + βsS + βDD + βEE2 + βII

2 

In this equation, GDP is predicted by the sum of the products o

the value of the financial indicator (banks, stocks, foreign deb

imports, and exports) and the regression coefficients for eac

financial element (βn), plus the error component for the equatio

(α). Note that the data indicates an exponential relationsh

between GDP and both exports and imports. There are tw

important points. First, a quantitative relationship can b

established among the variables-quantification being a cornerston

in any impact analysis. Second, the financial indicators are on

derivative elements of real economic factors. For example, th

393 
stock market reflects certain underlying economic strengths and/o

weaknesses, and so on. 

Regression analysis was used to compute R2

-the coefficient o

determination that describes the proportion of the variation in 

determined, explained, or accounted for by variation in X-for th

above equation. This gave a measure of how much change in th

GDP was explained by changes in the five financial elements. I

short, if those financial elements that most directly affect 

country’s GDP can be ranked in quantified terms, an order o

targeting can be established. This is the first attempt, to th

author’s knowledge, to place economic targets in a framework of 

quantifiable measure of merit to gauge the results of action, o

potential action, against a nation-state’s economy. The possibilitie

of such targeting represent a breakthrough in the strategy o

influencing nations. 

Blockades, sanctions, and similar economic forces have lon

been included in history as part of an arsenal of one country

abilities against another nation-state. However, the normal attitud

has been to “put economic pressure on them and see wh

happens.” The HKC methodology provides some definitiv

quantification to the evaluation. In addition to being a majo

breakthrough in strategic planning, the methodology will prove 

be a tool for justifying critics who support actions identified a

“economic warfare.” 

Analysis 

The statistical analysis confirmed the hypothesis that GD

varies directly with the value of financial elements within th

country. While this hypothesis confirmation is nothing obvious, th

analysis does suggest quantitatively that disrupting financi

elements will have a negative effect on GDP and hence perhaps o

economic power. The author is not prepared to concrete the notio

that a leap from GDP to economic power, then to national powe

is natural or omniapplicable, regardless of the Kennedy and Olso

394 
books that directly link changes in GDP as an indicator of change

in national power. 3

 Indeed, the Peoples Republic of China has 

relatively high GDP. However, there are few that would argue th

it is a significant economic power. It may be one day, but n

today. All that is being suggested is that the leap may be credib

in some cases. In others cases, maybe a similar or close

resembling leap can be quantified. 

Furthermore, the analysis suggested a threshold level of GD

that warrants attention. Attacking the financial elements o

banking, stock exchanges, and foreign debt of countries whos

GDP falls below this level would be ineffective since changes 

the financial elements have little con-elation to changes in GDP

The quantifiable identification of such a threshold is a significa

event-witness Bosnia and Somalia. Sanctions against either hav

been ineffective. The GDP of both is basically zero. An establishe

and acceptable model defining a “waste-of-time” threshold wou

have saved a lot of energy expended against those two countries b

the United States and the United Nations. 

Shortcomings of the Analysis 

Several weaknesses of the initial model are noteworthy. Firs

there is no indication of a time-lag effect. A correlation might b

strong between banks and a country’s GDP, but how long until th

country feels the effect is reserved for future researc

Furthermore, the strength of the correlation tells us nothing abo

the vulnerability of the financial element to be attacked. Eve

though the element may be an important center of gravity, it cou

be well protected or widely distributed, making it invulnerable 

attack. Finally, the data represents a cross section of all countrie

The regression is a test of variation from country to country an

does not correlate changes in GDP with the five financial elemen

over time. While this preliminary study suggests some interestin

relationships, additional time-series data of individual countrie

would improve the model and allow for more detailed analysis. 

395 
The model does not replace the need for detailed countr

analysis because it does not account for specific peculiarities of 

single country. Two specific characteristics require independe

comment. They are (1) dependency on a few or a single export 

“monoeconomic culture” [MEC]), and (2) heavy econom

sponsorship by another country. 

Monoeconomic cultures are scattered throughout the world b

are most notable in developing countries. Many African countrie

are still dependent on one commodity, and the major energ

exporters tend to rely excessively on only oil or natural gas. Lat

American countries whose economies are more developed tha

many poorer areas of the world are also often overly reliant o

individual commodities. If the economy of one of these MECs 

integrally tied to a single commodity, then the financial center th

controls it would be a suitable target. 

The writer notes that the GDP of an MEC is irrelevant as a

indicator of evaluation for targeting success against such a countr

The very nature of a nation-state being a MEC lends itself 

economic vulnerability. The export(s) itself or themselves wou

be the critical center of gravity for that MEC country. GDP doesn

have a role. 

For example, Cuba is an MEC dependent on sugar. Sugar 

critical to the Cuban economy for several reasons. First, sug

made up two-thirds of export revenues in 1991, accounting for 2

percent of Cuba’s gross national produce (GNP), and prior to 199

was the key element in a subsidized trade agreement for oil wi

the former Soviet Union. Cuba received oil at very low prices 

return for selling sugar at above-market prices. In fact, the Cuban

would buy more of the cheap oil than they needed and sell the re

at the higher market price. It was through this process that the

received the majority of their hard currency. The impact of th

flow of sugar on the Cuban economy was demonstrated in realit

In 1991 Soviet subsidies dropped from $4 billion in 1990 to $

billion because of a lower price paid for Cuban sugar and a shar

396 
decline in Soviet exports to Cuba. These actions have crippled th

Cuban economy. Cuba, having put all its eggs in one basket, is 

trouble. It has lost its largest trading partner and can no long

acquire large amounts of cheap oil. This has caused an energy an

hard-currency shortage, which means it has no money to pa

market price for items such as oil, food, industrial raw material

and spare parts. The reduction of this sugar trade dropped th

aggregate output of the economy by one-fifth in 1991. 

Cuban leaders are trying to diversify the economy, but as of th

writing, Cuba is still dependent on sugar. If the export of sug

could be restricted even further, then the Cuban economy wou

grind to a halt. Cuba needs oil for its energy-intensive industri

sector, which accounts for 45 percent of total energy use. 

produces only 6.5 percent of its requirement and imports the res

Imported oil is traded for sugar with the former Soviet Union on 

much smaller scale than prior to 1991. A shortage of oil hur

industrial production, which accounted for 45 percent of GDP 

1989 and causes lower sugar production by reducing mechanize

harvesting and fertilizer production. A death spiral is establishe

no sugar means no oil, which means lower industrial and sug

production, which means less oil, and so on. 

The second characteristic warranting further comment 

economic sponsorship. Economic sponsorship occurs when 

developed country heavily subsidizes another country whether 

developed one (Israel) or an underdeveloped one (Haiti)-throug

foreign aid. There are two critical points to consider whe

somehow ranking the sponsored country’s aid by a “significance

factor. First, is economic aid commodity or cash, or both? (Ye

cash is a commodity!) Second, what is the GDP threshold of th

sponsored country? This measurement is determined without th

external aid included. Would the loss of the aid cause th

sponsored economy to collapse? Will the loss cause the sponsore

country to divert resources from internal capital development 

something else? Unlike in the MEC scenario, a country’s GDP is 

critical factor. This situation is not as prevalent since the end of th

397 
cold war /bipolar world order but was important in two previou

limited wars and may have future implications. 

A good example of this phenomenon is Vietnam. Looking at th

statistical data, the GNP of North Vietnam increased during th

height of the US bombing of the North from 1968 to 1972. Th

fact defies logic until one realizes that the real financial cente

affecting the leadership of North Vietnam lay outside of th

country. The leadership of North Vietnam could have bee

affected by attacking the financial centers in the Soviet Union an

China. However, expanding the target set beyond the focus countr

may not be acceptable based upon political objectives, but suc

targets must be considered analyzing centers of gravity. 

Lethal Attacks on Financial Institutions 

Financial institutions of just the developing countries ca

represent a single critical node. This makes them susceptible 

direct attacks. A well-Placed bomb in either a financial institutio

itself or a communication center used to carry out transactions ha

the potential to severely cripple such a country’s economy. If 

country’s financial institutions are suitable to attack, how can th

attack best be achieved? 

A few examples show the potentially disrupting impact on 

critical node financial institution. While the examples deal with th

United States-and its very sophisticated financial system (with ver

few critical nodes)-we can deduce the potentially negative impa

that an attack would have on a critical node financial institution. 

On 26 February 1993 a terrorist bomb was detonated in th

parking garage of New York’s World Trade Center. A rented va

packed with explosives, was casually driven into the undergroun

parking garage. The car bomb was detonated and extensiv

damage was done to one of the towers of the World Trade Cente

The building next to the Trade Center houses New York’s five b

commodity exchanges that deal predominately in oil, gold, coffe

cocoa, and sugar. While the commodity exchanges were n

398 
damaged by the blast, electrical power and air conditioning we

cut to aid in fire-fighting efforts. This resulted in 25 percent of th

exchanges’ transactions going unprocessed on the day of the bla

and a late start on opening the following Monday. The terrori

attack did not totally disrupt the financial system of the Unite

States. However, the attack was not without impact. The chairma

of the New York Mercantile Exchange stated that “a full day

closure of the exchange would have cost the oil trading communi

$25 million and an extended shutdown would have bee

devastating”. 4 

A direct attack on the commodity exchanges would have bee

catastrophic. Hohn Damgar, the president of the Futures Industr

Association, said that “the exchanges had decided previously th

having backup trading facilities at another location would be co

prohibitive.” 5 

However, after the blast, a secondary off-site location wa

sought. In addition, the computers that store the data for Ne

York’s automatic teller machines (ATM) were damaged in th

blast. The machines were unusable for approximately three week

This damage, while being predominately an irritant, attests to th

extremes of the results of a direct attack. As a side note, the owne

of the World Trade Center, the Port Authority of New York an

New Jersey, estimated that the cost of the damage will exceed $

billion. 

The disruptive nature of direct attacks on advanced financi

institutions has been well exploited for many years by terrori

organizations. The Irish Republican Army has made numerou

devastating attacks against London’s financial district. Thes

attacks, while causing civilian casualties and structural damage 

buildings, has only caused short-term disruption of financi

activities. Catastrophic destruction of the country’s economy ha

been avoided for a number of reasons. The London financi

community has anticipated these attacks and has prepare

elaborate contingency plans for backup facilities an

399 
communications. In addition, the financial institutions themselve

may not be the appropriate center of gravity for the optimu

disruption of the financial system. 

Contingency disaster plans are becoming the norm for almo

all commercial financial institutions. For years US financi

institutions felt isolated from the threat of terrorist activitie

However, during the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein sent 

clear message that international terrorism would be one of h

weapons as retaliation for US action in the Gulf. US financi

institutions were forced to develop security procedures an

contingency operations. Part of the contingency plans was 

simply curtail operations at overseas locations and reca

employees back to the United States. This practice basical

enforced the terrorist threats by cutting US profits at overseas site

and removing US presence. While the terrorist threat nev

materialized, the contingency plans were adopted and are here 

stay. The recent World Trade Center bombing drove home th

necessity of the plans. While bombing an individual bank o

financial center could prove to be nothing more than an irritant in 

well-advanced economic nation-state, there are nation-states whe

critical nodes are worthy targets. 

As financial institutions become more dependent upo

communications for fund transfers and transactions, th

communication centers themselves become the center of gravit

not the financial institutions. Paperwork transactions are becomin

a thing of the past with most financial transactions occurrin

electronically. In the US there are approximately 10 clearin

houses that handle all electronic fund transfers and financi

transactions for all the large US banks. When a bank draft 

submitted for payment at an overseas location, it is actually sent 

one of the clearing houses instead of going to the parent bank fo

payment, and the draft is debited electronically. This benefits th

banks in a number of ways. First, the operation is simplified so th

draft actually clears the system faster, and second, the bank doesn

have to pay for the overhead to manage the fund-transf

400 
operation. The clearing house is paid a fee to manage th

operation. Disrupting the activities at the clearing houses wou

virtually shut down operations at the banks that the clearing hous

services. From a targeteer’s perspective, it should be infinite

easier to disable a few clearing houses than to target multip

financial institutions, and this has the potential to be much mo

disruptive. 

As mentioned above, the communication process in financi

transactions may also be a critical node. If the electronic transfe

are handled over regular telephone lines, as is the case in the U

these lines themselves become valuable targets for a number o

reasons. Destroying a country’s communications makes th

country’s leadership blind, striking right at the heart of th

leadership center of gravity. It also eliminates the country

capabilities to communicate with the financial centers, stoppin

fund transfers and all other transactions, basically impeding th

country’s ability to function. Communication nodes are a valuab

target because one can affect many facets of a country

operations. Of course, highly advanced countries will hav

multiple communication networks that may render this aspect not 

critical node. 

In short, targeting a single financial institution may have 

short-term effect of disrupting a portion of a country’s finances. 

may also have a tactical effect as a terrorist function. However, 

will probably not have a long-term strategic effect. To achiev

strategic effect, one must disrupt a country’s capabilities 

conduct financial transactions. This could be achieved throug

disruption of the financial institutions’ clearing houses, but eve

more important, disruption of the communication process wou

achieve a longer-term, and a more devastating, effect. 

Nonlethal Attacks on Financial 

Institutions 

401 
Lethal attack on facilities containing banks and stock an

commodity exchanges is an indiscriminate way of affectin

national wealth and vitality. Such attacks risk collateral damage 

unintended targets, and, by their very nature, cannot be cover

Nonlethal attack can be more deliberate and discriminate. In som

forms they can also be more deniable and secret. 

Nonlethal attack falls into two general categories, convention

and unconventional. Conventional methods include embargo, ass

seizure and forfeiture, and other macroeconomic intervention

Such conventional, nonlethal methods are an indirect way to attac

financial institutions, but such actions can have a significant dire

effect on national wealth and vitality. Unconventional, nonleth

attack involves efforts to disrupt communications and financi

transfer systems, computer databases, and similar elements of th

financial trade by electronic means at specific nodes. 

Nonlethal Conventional Methods 

Nonlethal conventional attack can be very effective again

countries at certain levels of development. By targeting financi

institutions for attack, one can have a significant effect o

countries with a large gross domestic product. As suggested abov

disrupting trade, particularly for countries with high GDP and fo

MECs, can have significant effects on these countries’ econom

system. For example, in July 1941 the United States attempted 

disrupt Japan’s war” aims by freezing Japanese assets in the Unite

States and enforcing an embargo against shipments of aviatio

fuel. The embargo was soon expanded to include all types o

petroleum products. The financial freeze and termination of o

shipments left Japan with a choice of watching its oil reserve

drain away, withdrawing from China to appease the United State

or expanding its ambitions in the East Indies to achieve strateg

autonomy in petroleum. Japan chose an aggressive path. Oth

examples include the freezing of Iranian assets after the seizure o

the US embassy in Tehran in 1978 and the freezing of assets an

the embargo against Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. 

402 
Debt, particularly foreign debt, can be a lucrative target o

nonlethal attack at many levels of GDP. An attack on de

instruments can exacerbate national economic problems, Fo

example, many net-debtor countries finance accumulated budg

deficit-their national debt-through bonds issued by their nation

treasury. The United States is such a debtor country. Becau

Japan is a major purchaser of US Treasury issues that finance th

US national debt, 6

 Japanese investment decisions can play

significant role in our economy. If the Bank of Tokyo shou

decide not to buy their full share of US Treasury bills, Wall Stre

would respond with catastrophic sell-offs. The Federal Reserv

Bank and Treasury Department would have to stimulate investo

interest in short-term notes and would respond by drastical

raising interest rates to curb the money supply or risk spiralin

inflation. Either way the gradual US economic growth since 198

would be over, and we would ultimately face an extended period o

high unemployment, high inflation, or both. 

In fact, Yusuke Kashiwagi, chairman of Japan’s Bank of Toky

Ltd., speaking to the Japan Society in New York in January 199

noted that Japanese intervention may have been responsible for th

October 1987 crash of the US stock market. He said, “It was ver

clear that the termination of Japanese investment in US Treasuri

was a trigger for the (stock market) crash.” 7 

He warned that narrow spreads between interest rates o

Japanese and US Treasury issues “might trigger another kind o

difficult situation in the US” as Japanese investors chose treasur

instruments in their own country over investment in the U

market. 

Just as the US is vulnerable to Japanese pressure, similar

many third world countries are vulnerable to financial interventio

by the United States. Much of the debt in Latin America, fo

example, is controlled by US banks. In a crisis, such leverag

could be used to force concessions or to topple a regime. 

Nonlethal Unconventional Methods 

403 
According to the US Congress

 Office of Technolog

Assessment (OTA), the most serious problem related 

international banking is the increased payment risk o

telecommunications networks used for electronic funds transfer. I

shared networks, whether operated by central banks or consortia o

banks, the failure of one or more participants to settle end-of-da

deficits resulting from “daylight overdrafts” could result 

unacceptable demands on central banks as lenders of last resort o

in a cascade of settlement failures that would precipitate nation

or even international crisis. While the OTA study focuses o

accidental disruptions of electronic transfer communications, th

impact of a deliberate shutdown of funds-transfer systems wou

be equally disastrous. Because of the interrelated nature of suc

electronic data-interchange systems, care must be exercised 

minimize collateral damage to the data of friendly financi

systems. 8 

OTA notes that until recently, state-owned postal, telephon

and telegraph (PTT) services operated the publ

telecommunications networks in European countries, althoug

some of these have recently been privatized. These publ

networks afford universal access to highly standardized services 

regulated rates or tariffs. Private networks offer dedicated access 

select and usually tailored services at rates set by contract with th

users. US banks overseas primarily serve large corporations rath

than individuals, offering “wholesale” services such as cas

management, financial market data, and currency trading. Bank

have two needs for international communications: 

• As intracorporate business support: voice, voice mail, fax, 

mail, and data transmission; and 

• As a means to create and deliver financial products an

services: electronic transfer of funds, cross-border electronic lette

of credit, customer account information and cash-managemen

financial information. 

404 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, which merged with Chemic

Bank in January 1992, was fairly typical. This bank’s “Glob

Wholesale Bank” used international telecommunications primari

for internal bank business, while its operating services grou

(Geoserve) delivered electronic banking products and services 

corporate customers around the world. Geoserve customers usin

the network could access the bank’s computers to check the

account balances and to initiate funds transfers and letters of credi

In the 1980s, many large US commercial and investment bank

or security houses set up their own private telecommunication

networks made up of facilities leased from the PTTs. These lease

facilities included cable circuits and satellite capacit

interconnected to the public network, with some network an

terminal equipment owned by the financial institution. The ban

exercises full financial and managerial responsibility over networ

operations. While only very large financial institutions hav

elaborate international private data networks, many financi

institutions have a few point-to-point leased circuits to tie the

dispersed locations to larger operating centers. 

The existence of these independent telecommunications system

presents some questions for the campaign planner. If only th

financial system is targeted, these private networks allow selectiv

destruction of financial nodes while leaving public data network

for nonfinancial operations intact. However, in a generalized attac

to create strategic paralysis of the country, these private da

networks could provide redundant capability to the sta

telecommunications systems and should be included in th

strategic target set. Interestingly, as the OTA reports note, man

US banks control these private networks and could provide detai

on the arrangement of telecommunication facilities in targete

countries. 

The OTA reports that financial institutions in the industrialize

countries are shifting back to reliance on the public switche

network. The comparative cost of public and private networks a

405 
changing in Europe and North America, which have wel

developed and integrated public telecommunications system

Technology is allowing these public networks to provide bett

control and reliability and to offer value-added services. As priva

networks become less effective as product differentiators, cos

and reliability become the primary selection criteria. Ne

technologies are making private networks cheaper, but the sam

technologies are allowing public switched networks to off

customized “virtual network” services. In addition, the migratio

of financial institutions back to public networks may also b

greatly encouraged because there is a growing need for financi

institutions to be linked electronically with customer computer

The scope of internetworking among corporations is growing, an

banks may have to participate in electronic payments an

electronic data interchange in order to retain their tradition

customer relationships and avoid being bypassed. Private network

cannot always provide direct access to customers as can publ

networks. 

The appearance of private data networks parallels technologic

changes that have widely distributed the processing of informatio

As public telecommunication systems evolve from oligarch

networks of large centralized switching facilities to distributed o

geodesic networks, they will become increasingly difficult to targ

by conventional, lethal means. Distributed networks are inherent

survivable. In fact, they may reverse the effect of the militar

technological revolution (MTR) by denying the capabili

provided by advanced conventional/precision guided munition

Before this MTR, the inaccuracy of bombing technology require

bombardment of wide areas to ensure the destruction of specif

enemy centers. Now, when targeting science permits the selectiv

destruction of a particular room in an individual building, th

target of such attack can be distributed across a wide area an

become invulnerable. The best way to attack such systems may b

to enter the microcosm of high-technology electronics ourselve

406 
using software viruses and other malevolent technologies 

prosecute the attack electronically. 

Banks and other institutions are increasingly worried about th

problem of electronic intrusion. The National Academy o

Sciences noted in 1991 that the trends in computer use in busine

and industry suggest that whatever trust was justified in the pa

cannot be justified in the future. Networking and embedded da

systems are proliferating, and computers have become such a

integral part of business in developed countries that computer risk

cannot be separated from general-business risks. The ability to us

and abuse computer systems is becoming widespread. In additio

the international system is unstable, raising questions about th

potential for transnational attacks at a time when internation

corporate, financial, research, and other computer networks a

growing. 

There is an excellent basis for these fears. Celebrated cases o

intrusions into government and private computers have bee

recorded in the press and in fiction. The 1983 movie Wargame

recounted the fictional story of a teenage computer hacker wh

used the family telephone to break into a classified governme

computer and nearly start global thermonuclear war. Willia

Gibson’s 1984 novel Neuromancer introduced the term cyberspac

to describe a globe-circling, interconnected telephone networ

where “console cowboys” steal data and commit other mischief fo

hire. In real life 1986, members of a West German computer clu

using commercial telephone connections, broke into compute

associated with the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and took wh

they believed were critical files on the Strategic Defense Initiativ

The group had made contact with East German and Russian agen

and planned to sell the documents, but they were thwarted by U

and West German authorities. 9 

Access to the source code of the computer system-the bas

instruction set that turns a computer from lumps of silicon into 

working machine-is a necessary prerequisite for the skilled Viru

407 
maker. Most of the viruses infecting personal computers in the U

and Western Europe come from Bulgaria where computer hacker

sponsored by the state-reverse engineered Western computers an

software to build their own computer industry. In the late 1980

while Bulgarian factories built poorly manufactured clones o

Apple and IBM products, Bulgarian students and comput

scientists began copying Western programs, cracking any cop

protection schemes that stood in their way, and became mo

skilled at programming their way around any problem. The

learned the hidden routines and trap doors of the IBM and App

operating systems, assimilating all of the skills necessary 

become first-class virus writers. 10 

Such viruses could clearly have military utility. A persiste

rumor circulated during the 1991 Gulf War that coalition force

had infected Iraqi air defense computers with a virus that wou

impair their ability to react to allied air strikes. As the story wen

the virus was programmed into a French-made computer print

used by Iraq. While no confirmation was ever forthcoming fro

military sources, the possibilities of such weapons are intriguing. 

Financial systems, with their reliance on computers an

electronic data networks are particularly susceptible to such attac

Since many of the private financial networks operating around th

world are controlled by Western banks, it may be possible to g

access to system codes to enable the development of sophisticate

and subtle programs. 

Conclusion 

The development of a quantitative relationship between nation

power and financial elements (GDP, banks, stocks, foreign deb

exports, and imports) is the initial step in a long-term process o

exploring and exploiting economic warfare to a level not befo

deemed significant. This embryo study provides a simplified to

to identify nation-states that may be vulnerable to influence v

attacks against financial centers of gravity. Using a country

408 
current financial data, the military specialist can use the model 

determine if an enemy country is ripe for attack against i

financial centers of gravity. 

Future research should include an analysis of time-series data 

further validate the model developed. Time-series data on a pe

country basis would substantiate the regression model and indica

whether the relationships hold over time. In addition, th

methodology could be used to analyze data over time for eac

country to determine which of the financial elements is mo

closely related to GDP and national power. Furthermore, tim

series data would provide an empirical basis for an analysis of 

country’s specific vulnerabilities. Future studies need also to loo

more closely at the details of those nation-states that a

economically sponsored. Finally, an extension of the HK

regression analysis evaluating per capita GDP would prove mo

informative. 

409 
Notes 

1. Majors Jeffery B. Hukill, John J. Kennedy, and Arthur B. Cameron III, 

USAF, Targeting Financial Systems as Centers of Gravity: “Low Intensity” to 

“No Intensity Conflict, May 1993. 

2. See, for example, Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers 

(New York: Vintage Books, 1989); and Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline o

Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982). Olson and Kennedy 

both use changes in GDP to indicate changes in national power. Kennedy’s bes

seller defines national power as the rate of growth in GDP and gross national 

product. 

3. Guy Halverson, “Financial Markets Deal with Explosion Aftermath,” Th

Christian Science Monitor, 1 March 1993, C1-3. 

4. Jeanne Iida, “Wall Street to Build an Emergency Site, The American 

Banker 157, no. 15 (23 January 1992): 3. 

5. According to Drexel Burnham Lambert, 14 percent of US government 

bonds were held by foreign investors as recently as January 1990. Japan has 

been the biggest source of that liquidity. In the late 1980s, Japanese and other 

foreign investors at times purchased as much as 40 percent of the US Treasury 

notes and bonds sold at government auctions. 

6. Values for exports and imports are based on regression of GDP against th

squared volumes of exports and imports. 

7. Constance Mitchell and Michael R Sesit, “Foreign Buyers Could Pull 

Back on Treasurys,” The Wall Street Journal, 22 January 1990. C1, C19. 

8. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Banks and 

International Telecommunications (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printin

Office, 1993). 

9. Clifford Stole, The Cuckoo’s Egg: Inside the World of Computer 

Espionage (New York: Double, 1989). 

10. Paul Mungo and Bryan Clough, Approaching Zero (New York: Random 

House, 1992). 

410 
Changing Status of Nuclear Forces 

Thomas J. Stark 

In the January 1993 National Security Strategy of the Unite

States, President George Bush wrote just before leaving office th

America “stands at a crossroads in history.” 1

 Bush wrote of 

world that had changed dramatically during the past five year

Democracies and free market institutions and values hav

flourished. “Our former nemesis, the Soviet Union, ...is gone.” Th

threat of a thermonuclear war has been “radically” reduced. Th

dangerous nuclear arms race between the US and the former Sovi

Union is over. “The Communist ideology ...is today, in most of th

world, discredited, despised, and discarded.” The preside

asserted that “our collective victory in the Cold War fundamental

changed the strategic environment.” Moreover, the US an

coalition victory in Iraq has also shaped the internation

environment as the Gulf War demonstrated the regional volatili

of the new world. These events and subsequent changes are a cle

indication that the US has moved into a new historic period. 

These changes and events have had a tremendous impact on U

nuclear policy. A dynamic arms control process has produce

initiatives calling for deep reductions in strategic nuclear force

America is rethinking its overall nuclear requirements. With U

nuclear weapons being removed from Europe and South Korea, th

concept of extended nuclear deterrence, known as flexib

response, is evolving. However, the proliferation of nuclear an

ballistic-missile technology, as well as other weapons of ma

destruction, continues at an alarming pace and is one of th

greatest future threats to US national security. In this new histor

period, America also stands at a crossroads with its nuclear polic

and strategic forces. In this new era of great opportunities and gre

dangers, America must decide on a new nuclear strategy and a

appropriate strategic force structure. 

411 
Former secretary of defense Les Aspin described the ne

historic period. ‘There is a terrible irony associated with this ne

world. We face a greatly reduced chance of seeing many nucle

detonations, but perhaps an increased chance of seeing one nucle

detonation.” 2 Secretary Aspin pointed out three propositions th

can help us deal with the new nuclear age. The first is that th

traditional concept of deterrence, the policy for handling nucle

superpowers, may no longer work. In the past, nuclear deterrenc

was based on rational actors operating on a similar logic with eac

side putting at risk something the other side holds dear. Can we b

sure that this concept of deterrence will work in the future? Th

second proposition is that the US has undergone a “comple

reversal” in its interest regarding nuclear weapons. During the co

war, the US depended on nuclear weapons to offset numeric

inferiority of conventional forces. But with the disintegration of th

Soviet Union, the US finds itself as the world’s biggest and th

most capable conventional power and no longer in need of 

nuclear equalizer. The final proposition is that the US needs “

new set of answers” for the new nuclear threat. Aspin warned th

this will not be easy. 

No single policy, like deterrence, will meet our needs, nor will the US be 

able to “go it alone,” as we did under Cold War deterrence. Most 

interestingly, the US can no longer count on the old left-right wing 

political divisions in American politics to guide solutions. Solutions will 

have to be borrowed, such as missile defenses and the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty, from both the right and the left. The distinguishing 

characteristic of policies today is whether they are suited for the new 

world. Whether a policy is favored by the right or the left no longer tells 

you where it fits in the real world. And the pertinent axis is not right-left, 

it’s a new-old, because it really is a new world. 3 

Overview 

The purpose of this analysis is twofold: first it examines th

evolving US nuclear policy and strategic force structure; and the

it addresses the issue of nuclear proliferation in the new strateg

environment. In looking at US nuclear policy, it describes how th

412 
military is attempting to reshape its nuclear forces and strateg

Then, the following questions will be addressed. What is the ne

US regional defense strategy, and what role does strateg

deterrence play in it? What weapons make up the strategic forc

and how are they being reduced? Is there a need to modernize th

strategic force? And finally, how is the US strategic deterrenc

force organized? In looking at nuclear proliferation, this analys

describes the new strategic environment. And it answers th

following questions. Why do states seek nuclear weapons? Wh

role does Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent State

(CIS) play in nuclear proliferation, and why is Ukraine determine

to keep its nuclear weapons? Does Russia’s new military doctrin

have significant nuclear implications? What role does North Kore

play in nuclear proliferation? Lastly, this examination describes th

new American response to global nuclear proliferation. 

US Nuclear Policy Under Review 

In September 1992 the Air Staff at the Pentagon issued a whi

paper entitled Nuclear Sufficiency in the 19905 and Beyond: Th

New Strategic Equation. The paper assessed the general directio

of change in US nuclear policies. It also proposed new criteria fo

judging the adequacy of US nuclear forces. Trends were identifie

that permit the US to consider deep reductions in existing nucle

arsenals. One trend is “a decline in the perceived utility of U

nuclear weapons.” 4 Factors that contribute to this perceptio

include the following: 

Many emerging threats to US national security may not be deterred by 

nuclear weapons: and new non-nuclear weapons technologies (including 

precision guided conventional munitions and ballistic-missile defenses) 

have given, or will give, the US the capability to accomplish most 

strategic war-time missions without the use of nuclear weapons. 5 

The paper asserted that the disintegration of the Soviet Unio

and the “revolution in conventional weapons technolog

potentially renders obsolete” 6 many of the traditional strateg

planning assumptions. In the absence of a Soviet threat, there is n

413 
longer a need to have large numbers of nuclear weapons on ale

poised for immediate launch. With the threat of large-scale nucle

war reduced, crisis-warning time has increased. If the US can us

advanced conventional weapons to deter or control escalation an

to retaliate decisively in battle, nuclear weapons may not b

needed. 

In rethinking nuclear sufficiency, the paper stated sever

hypotheses for consideration. They are: 

First. distinctions between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are 

disappearing. 

Second. the term “strategic” may, in the future, refer to a broad range of 

forces, including ballistic-missile defenses and certain advanced 

conventional weapons. 

Third. nuclear sufficiency can no longer be calculated in isolation from 

the potential contributions of other strategic weapons. 

Fourth. as future strategic forces assume roles beyond mere deterrence 

[one example is extended defense instead of extended deterrence], or as 

nuclear weapons become less relevant to desired security outcomes, 

measures of ability to limit damage, rather than inflict damage, may be 

more relevant yardsticks of sufficiency in the future. 

Fifth. there is an enduring lexicon of strategic sufficiency that will 

probably be retained [a secure nuclear reserve] even as their traditional 

definitions are revised or modified. 7 

The Air Staff white paper concluded that the new strateg

equation “calls for a strategy of Damage Limitation at the strateg

level, to replace Second Strike Counterforce, and a policy o

Decisive Force (the application of overwhelming convention

power) to replace Flexible Response at the theater level.” 8

 Th

required strategic force structure to implement the new strateg

equation would include advanced conventional weapons; ballisti

missile defenses, and a small secure nuclear reserve. 

Secretary Aspin authorized the first comprehensive review o

the nation’s nuclear doctrine since the end of the cold war. R

Jeffrey Smith wrote in an October 1993 Washington Post article: 

414 
, ypg

of all such arms remaining in the US arsenal, with the aim of producing 

“a new national policy” that will eventually be submitted to President 

Clinton for his approval. 9 

Smith cited the anomaly that exists with the current US nucle

weapons policy. The number of nuclear warheads has bee

reduced dramatically in recent years. But US targeting an

employment policy based on a massive Soviet threat has remaine

unchanged since 1981. 

The purpose of the Department of Defense review is to desig

the long-term structure of the US nuclear arsenal. Questions aske

concern the basic purpose of nuclear weapons, the rationale fo

keeping them, how many weapons in the US arsenal should b

kept on alert, and whether the weapons should be targeted 

advance. In a related January 1994 Los Angeles Times article, 

was reported that the US is preparing a plan to aim its nucle

missiles away from targets in the CIS and point them at desola

spots in the open seas. 10 Russia and Ukraine are preparing simil

plans. It is a “symbolic” move that will slow the now immedia

response time for launching nuclear weapons and could reduce th

dangers of accidental launchings. Another related policy revie

conducted by the staff of the National Security Council will decid

on the total level of nuclear weapons that the US should seek in 

future round of arms control negotiations. 

Two of the most controversial policy questions are as follows: 

Whether Washington should adopt a policy of “no first use” by pledging 

it will not employ nuclear arms first in a conventional conflict. 

And whether US military doctrine should include planning for potential 

nuclear strikes in response to attacks against US forces by chemical or 

biological weapons. 11 

Some analysts argue that if the US adopted a no-first-us

doctrine, it might discourage nonnuclear nations from attemptin

to acquire nuclear arms. Moreover, the superior Sovi

conventional threat, which initially led to the US option of usin

415 
nuclear weapons first, is gone. Other military analysts believe th

nuclear arms can be used as a new sort of “equalizer” to det

chemical and biological attacks. 

New Regional Defense Strategy 

The disintegration of the Soviet Union ended the tradition

cold-war threat of global conflict. But the world remains 

dangerous place. R. James Woolsey, Director of Centr

Intelligence (DCI), sees “a more lethal version of the world tha

existed before 1914.” 12 Woolsey cites “virulent” nationalism

international uncertainty, and the “risk of cross-border spillovers

as key concerns. Multiple threats to US security remain, typifie

by Saddam Hussein’s attempt to dominate Kuwait and the strateg

oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. “Today’s challenges are mo

complex, ambiguous, and diffuse than ever before. They a

political, economic, and military: unilateral and multilateral: shor

and long-term.” 13 Consequently, the focus of the new nation

security strategy is on meeting the regional threats, opportunitie

and challenges that the US is more likely to face in the futur

According to the secretary of defense’s 1993 Annual Report to th

President and the Congress, the most fundamental goal of the ne

regional defense strategy is to deter or defeat attack from whatev

source, against the US, its citizens and forces, and to honor ou

historic and treaty commitments. 14 The new regional defens

strategy contains four critical elements to guide defense plannin

and military force structure: strategic deterrence and defens

forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The

fundamental elements will remain valid for the foreseeable futur

This analysis focuses on the first element, strategic deterrence an

defense. 

Strategic Deterrence and Defense 

The 1993 National Security Strategy of the United State

clearly defines strategic deterrence and defense. 

416 
g p pyp

modern strategic nuclear forces and a reliable warning system. We must 

develop a system for global protection against limited ballistic-missile 

attack. We must maintain responsive, highly trained, technologically 

sophisticated, and broadly capable conventional and unconventional 

forces. We must maintain and improve space systems integral to strategic 

and tactical operations worldwide. 15 

The defense secretary’s Annual Report to the President and th

Congress is the primary source for outlining strategic deterrenc

and defense. It states that US strategic forces must rema

survivable and flexible to deter against strategic nuclear attack. “A

the same time, US nuclear targeting policy and plans have change

and will continue to change in response to developments in th

former Soviet Union.” It asserts that the US welcome

“opportunities to reduce the numbers of strategic nuclear weapon

and increase the stability of the strategic balance by eliminating th

most destabilizing types of weapons.” The combination of the Ju

1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), former Preside

George Bush’s September 1991 and January 1992 nucle

initiatives, and the January 1993 START II treaty will reduce th

size of US nuclear forces to about one-quarter of the 1990 level b

the year 2003. START II limits the US and Russia to 3,50

warheads each. The elimination of all multiple warhea

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), called for by START I

will greatly enhance nuclear stability. “The remaining strateg

forces will continue to support America’s global role an

international commitments,” including maintaining the nucle

umbrella for NATO, Japan, and South Korea. The US “mu

continue to prepare to deal with threats of limited attack.” Th

threats come from countries which seek to acquire nuclea

chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver the

and from accidental or unauthorized missile launch from unstab

nuclear states. To counter the threats, the US must deploy ballisti

missile defenses (BMD) to protect the US and shield its allies an

its forward-deployed forces. The element of strategic deterrenc

and defense requires the US “to maintain a balanced deterre

force with both tactical and strategic capabilities.” The secretary

417 
report concluded by noting that the US must develop 

a proper m

of offensive and active defense capabilities to deter or defeat th

threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.” 16 

US Strategic Forces 

The strategic force structure implements the deterrence an

defense element of the regional defense strategy. The strateg

force structure is one of the four force packages of the base force, 

total force structure designed to meet the requirements of futu

regional security challenges. The other three force package

include Atlantic, Pacific, and contingency forces. The base forc

must be credible, but it must take into account the realities o

reduced defense budgets and the domestic imperative. US strateg

deterrent and defense forces primarily counter nuclear threat

Joint Publication (Pub) 3-11, Joint Doctrine For Nuclea

Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense, states that th

fundamental purpose of US strategic nuclear forces is to det

aggression that threatens the basic security interests of the US an

its allies. 17 Strategic forces include a triad of nuclear offensiv

forces; strategic command, control, communications, an

intelligence (C3I) systems; and ballistic-missile defenses. Eac

component plays a unique role in deterring and defending again

nuclear attacks. Since the scope of the present examination 

limited to nuclear forces, it will not provide discussion of strateg

defenses. 

Modernization of US Strategic Forces 

While the START and START II treaties will dramatical

reduce US nuclear offensive forces, “residual” nuclear forces mu

provide “an effective and robust deterrent to nuclear attack.” 

This will require continued maintenance, a reliable comman

control, communications, and intelligence network, and mo

importantly, appropriate modernization. According to Gen Georg

Butler, USAF, commander in chief, US Strategic Comman

“Critical modernization decisions loom that have vital implication

418 
for future force levels.

 

 The currently planned modernizatio

efforts were summarized by former secretary of defense Dic

Cheney in his annual report before he left office. 

Efforts to extend the service life of the existing Minuteman III ICBM 

force, along with the previously authorized introduction of the B-2 

stealth bomber in the mid-1990s and completion of the 18-ship Ohioclass ballistic-missile submarine force in 1997, are the extent of 

modernization efforts currently planned. 20 

US Nuclear Offensive Forces 

US nuclear offensive forces are made up of three element

long-range bombers, land-based ICBMs, and sea-based ballist

missiles. These elements are known as the three legs of th

strategic triad. In testimony to the House Armed Service

Committee in February 1991, former secretary of the Air Forc

Donald Rice and Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak state

the rationale for the continued validity of the strategic triad. 

The triad concept remains fundamental. Each leg of the triad possesses 

unique and complementary characteristics which synergistically provide 

a retaliatory capability that no adversary could hope to successfully 

overcome. 21 

The triad concept served the US well in the cold war. 

provided a secure second-strike capability to counter a surpris

Soviet nuclear attack. It also provided redundancy sufficient 

offset system failures or possible technological breakthroughs th

could render one leg of the triad ineffective. Today, in a world o

great uncertainty, the triad remains essential to deter potenti

adversaries not to launch an attack against the US or its allies. 

US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) has mad

recommendations for a post-START II strategic force structure th

are currently under review by the secretary of defense. The

recommendations, if accepted, will preserve the strategic tria

According to General Butler, the recommended force structur

based on the triad, “will provide a sound conceptual basis fro

which to pursue further reductions, ...or to achieve a more robu

419 
posture, should political outcomes in the former Soviet Union s

dictate.” 22 General Butler cautions against force structu

decisions based purely on fiscal factors. Survivability and plannin

flexibility are characteristics of the triad that must be maintained. 

The crucial point here is to avoid eroding the deterrent value of the 

strategic forces by budget-driven decisions that ignore vital planning 

considerations or depreciate the carefully conceived rationale that 

underpinned our objectives in the START negotiations. 23 

Long-Range Bomber Force 

The US long-range bomber force is made up of B-52, B-1B

and B-2 aircraft. All three bombers are capable of delivering eith

conventional or nuclear weapons to any point on the earth

surface. Bombers provide stability and flexibility to the tria

According to Secretary Rice and General McPeak: 

In the nuclear arena, the bomber enhances the stability of the nuclear 

balance. Its high survivability promises any aggressor that an attack will 

be met with devastating retaliation, while its relatively slow speed 

compared to ballistic missiles means that the bomber does not pose a first 

strike threat. Because it can be generated, dispersed, launched under 

positive control and then recalled and redirected, the bomber also 

provides our nation’s leaders with a highly flexible means of sending a 

variety of unmistakable messages to an adversary messages that can help 

defuse and stabilize crises. 24 

In the nuclear role, the bombers can deliver a combination o

standoff weapons and gravity bombs. The START II treaty wi

result in far fewer nuclear bomber warheads than allowed by th

START treaty. START II permits each party to exempt up to 10

heavy bombers from its warhead limits by reorienting them to 

conventional role. The B-1Bs will be reoriented to a convention

role. The planned post-START II US nuclear long-range bomb

force will consist of 20 B-2s equipped with gravity bombs and 9

B-52Hs equipped with standoff air launched cruise missile

(ALCM) and advanced cruise missiles. B-52Gs and the short-rang

attack missiles (SRAM) are being retired at an accelerated rat

420 
These changes will result in a smaller, but highly potent, an

modernized nuclear bomber force.” 25 

In the dynamic strategic environment, the bomber force 

becoming increasingly available for conventional missions. B-52

operating out of various worldwide locations, effectively applie

combat power in Operation Desert Storm. According to Gener

Butler, the B-52s demonstrated “the value of long-range heav

bombers in major regional conflicts.” The B-1B, an aircraft wi

untapped potential, will form the core of future US convention

bomber capability. General Butler cautions, “Realizing [the B-1B

potential calls for better organic maintenance capability, enhance

weapon system survivability and an expanded scope o

conventional weapons carriage.” 26 The B-52H and B-2 are als

scheduled for conventional upgrades. 

Land-Based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles will b

significantly reduced by the end of the century. Uniqu

characteristics of the ICBM force include promptness, reliabilit

accuracy, and low operating cost. Five hundred silo-base

Minuteman III missiles, downloaded from three to one warhea

each, will be the only deployed US ICBM under the START 

treaty. Planned upgrades and modifications to the 50 silo-base

Peacekeeper missiles, the nation’s most modern missile force, hav

been canceled in light of its anticipated retirement under STAR

II. Age and survivability are two key problems with this leg of th

strategic triad. President Bush’s unilateral initiatives include

cancellation of both the small ICBM and the Peacekeeper Ra

Garrison, the two proposed solutions to the survivability problem

According to the secretary of defense’s 1993 Annual Report to th

President and the Congress, the US must now “focus on ensurin

that the service life of the Minuteman III can be extended to th

year 2010 and beyond.” Specific areas of concern are the missile

“aging components in the guidance computer and associate

electrical systems and refurbishment of the second and third-stag

421 
rocket motors.

 

 The aging ICBM fleet is an immediate proble

that demands near-term solutions. 

Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles 

Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN) a

playing a greater role in providing strategic deterrence. The abili

to remain virtually undetected at sea for long periods of tim

makes the SSBN force “the most survivable and enduring” leg o

the strategic triad. Under the START II treaty, the US will deplo

eight Trident I SSBNs, each capable of being armed with 24 C-

missiles, and 10 Trident II SSBNs, each capable of being arme

with 24 D-5 missiles. The D-5 missile, “with its increase

accuracy, range, and payload, gives the force the capability to ho

at risk essentially the entire range of potential strategic targets no

and in the foreseeable future.” START II also calls for submarin

missiles to be downloaded from eight to four warheads eac

Modernization of the C-4 missile is a current key issue. Accordin

to General Butler, options include backfitting the eight Trident I

with the newer D-5 missile or extending the service life for the C

4. 28 

Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence (C3

I) Systems 

In 1992, President Bush’s secretary of defense Dick Chene

wrote, “As US forces shrink and increasingly relocate fro

overseas locations, and as alert levels are lowered and the ballisti

missile threat proliferates, the ability to detect and assess attack

against the United States becomes even more critical.” 29 Warnin

sensors, command centers, and communications systems make u

the strategic C3I systems. The Defense Support Program (DSP

space sensors provide timely, accurate, and unambiguous attac

information. Intelligence provides critical warning and assessme

of attack. Command centers are a vital part of decision making an

effective control of strategic forces. Communications system

422 
provide connectivity between warning sensors, command center

and combat forces. 

Modernization efforts center around improving satellite warnin

capabilities. The follow-on early warning system, a new system

will offer “worldwide coverage, enhanced detection capabilit

greater survivability, and faster reporting.” This system wi

provide warning and assessment of both long and short-rang

ballistic-missile attacks. If the US decides to deploy nation

ballistic-missile defenses, the current command and contr

infrastructure at the Cheyenne Mountain complex and oth

locations must be modified to handle the new capabilities. Finall

new Milstar communications satellites will provide strategic force

with “two-way, low-data-rate communications links that are high

resistant to jamming and nuclear effects.” 30 

US Strategic Command 

USSTRATCOM is the unified combatant command th

commands and controls the nation’s nuclear forces. It is organize

to deter a major military attack on the US and its allies, and shou

deterrence fail, employ forces. Based on the recommendation o

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and secretary of defens

USSTRATCOM was established on 1 June 1992, thus mergin

Navy and Air Force strategic nuclear forces. The commander 

chief of the United States Strategic I Command (USCINCSTRAT

will be the military’s advocate for strategic nuclear forces, nucle

force structure, and modernization issues. USCINCSTRA

assignments will rotate between the Navy and Air Force. Specif

duties include establishing force requirements, conductin

integrated strategic operational planning, and participating 

establishing strategic nuclear deterrent and targeting policies. 

As outlined in the Implementation Plan for Integration of u

Strategic Command, USCINCSTRAT responsibilities include: 

423 
ppg y jg

Employing assigned forces, as directed. 

Providing support to other combatant commanders, as directed. 

Conducting appropriate worldwide strategic reconnaissance. 

Ensuring command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3

I) for 

strategic force employment. 31 

USSTRATCOM is assigned forces from service compone

commands to include long-range bombers, strateg

reconnaissance aircraft, and battle management assets from A

Combat Command, intercontinental ballistic missiles from A

Space Command, and ballistic-missile submarines and comman

and control aircraft from US Atlantic and US Pacific fleets. 

Gen George Butler, the first USCINCSTRAT, has stated th

“the shift to unified command of strategic forces we

smoothly....” The reorganization has already “reaped fisca

operational and planning dividends,” General Butler uses the ter

strategic disengagement to describe the prolonged period that th

US has entered into with the former Soviet Union. 

Given the sheer size of their respective nuclear arsenals, the length of 

arms control implementation schemes and the turbulent politics in Russia 

and the other republics holding nuclear weapons, the path ahead offers 

much to hope for but also leaves much to be seen. Nuclear policymaking 

must be informed by a rigorous assessment of the complex interaction 

among force posture, arms control entitlements and constraints, funding 

requirements and targeting directives. 32 

In its first 18 months of existence, USSTRATCOM ha

completed “landmark” analysis on alternative force structure

consolidated command, control, and communications airborn

assets; and activated the Joint Intelligence Center to assess th

growing threat of global proliferation of weapons of ma

destruction. Moreover, it is working with other regional unifie

commands to explore the transfer of planning responsibilities fo

employment of nuclear weapons in theater conflicts. 

424 
Proliferation of Nuclear Arms 

In the 1993 edition of Games Nations Play, Professor Joh

Spanier wrote that the immediate future will witness a “ne

strategic environment” for the nation-state system, characterize

by the proliferation of nuclear arms. 33 Today, there are fiv

declared nuclear powers: the US, Russia and the Commonweal

of Independent States, China, France, and Great Britain. There a

also four probable nuclear states: India, Pakistan, Israel, and Sou

Africa. In March 1993, President F. W. de Klerk declared th

South Africa was abandoning its nuclear weapons program

Probable nuclear states are perceived as dangerous because of the

undeclared intentions and capability to quickly assemble and/o

employ nuclear weapons. Several other third world states ma

acquire nuclear weapons in the future: North Korea, South Kore

Indonesia, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Iran, Iraq, Egyp

Libya, Algeria, and Syria. 34 

New Strategic Environment 

The new strategic environment is influenced by several ke

factors. One factor is the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is no

replaced by the CIS. According to Spanier, “About 80 percent o

the Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were in Russia; the othe

were in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.” 35 The Sovi

disintegration will be studied in greater detail in the case study 

follow. 

Another factor is the breakdown of the bipolar East-We

security structure. States once protected by the US and Sovi

Union are now seeking their own nuclear arsenals. In Disord

Restored, Professor John Mearsheimer wrote that bipolarity will b

replaced by multipolarity. As the bipolar barriers to proliferatio

come down, great regional powers will emerge. They includ

Germany, France, Britain, and perhaps Italy in Europe, and Chin

India, Japan, and possibly Pakistan in Asia. Russia will be a gre

power in both Europe and Asia. The US will certainly remain 

425 
great power capable of influencing events worldwid

Mearsheimer described the falling proliferation barriers: 

First, none of the great powers in the new multipolar world is likely to 

have the preponderance of military power necessary to extend its nuclear 

shield far and wide, like the Americans and Soviets did in the Cold War. 

Second, great powers will face credibility problems if they attempt to 

extend nuclear deterrence. Alliance patterns are typically much more 

fluid in multipolarity than in bipolarity, where rigid alliance structures 

are the rule. ...Consequently, “fair weather” friends are more 

commonplace in a multipolar than a bipolar system, a situation that will 

work to reduce the credibility of nuclear commitments proffered by great 

powers. Third, future great powers will not have as much bargaining 

leverage vis-á-vis Third World states as the superpowers did in the Cold 

War. 36 

Like Spanier, Mearsheimer concluded that the most probab

scenario in the new strategic environment is further nucle

proliferation. 

Mearsheimer warned that nuclear proliferation is particular

dangerous for the third world. Powerful incentives may exist fo

intensely hostile nuclear states to strike nonnuclear power

Furthermore, “Third World states are not likely to build survivab

retaliatory forces, the sine qua non of nuclear stability.” Finall

will all third world leaders “fully appreciate the destructiveness o

nuclear weapons,” and can the third world guarantee the require

security and safeguards for nuclear weapons? 37 

Another factor influencing the new strategic environment is th

diffusion of nuclear technology. According to Spanier, “49

civilian nuclear reactors are in operation or under construction 

32 nations to produce energy to meet legitimate economic an

industrial needs.” 38 Also, greater advances in technology hav

been made that make it easier for third world states to build th

bomb. This does not mean that these states will automatical

produce nuclear weapons, but if a political decision were made 

develop the bomb, the reactors and the needed technical skills a

in place. 

426 
A discomforting proliferation trend in the new strateg

environment is that several nuclear weapons programs hav

escaped detection from the international nonproliferatio

mechanisms. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Internation

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), London Nuclear Suppliers Grou

and intelligence gathering failed to detect or stop the nucle

program in Iraq. In the early days of the NPT, the sure sign of 

nuclear weapons program was an easily detectable nuclear tes

Today, the situation is much more complex. In his article, 

Proliferation Primer, David Albright reported, “The cases o

Pakistan and South Africa show that it is not necessary to condu

a full-scale nuclear test to be a nuclear-armed power.” 39 Despi

the tremendous cost, security, and national sacrifice required for 

nuclear weapons program, these states covet nuclear arsenals. 

Why Do States Seek Nuclear Weapons? 

Spanier provided three reasons why states seek this “dangerou

and expensive” power: national security considerations, status an

prestige, and domestic politics. 40 In terms of national securit

nuclear weapons may give states an increased ability to deter o

threaten other states. Despite the US pledge for protection o

Western Europe from the Soviets, Britain and France felt the nee

to acquire nuclear capabilities. China acquired nuclear weapon

after Sino-Soviet relations soured in the 1960s. India’s 197

detonation of the bomb undoubtedly was a response to China

acquisition. And Pakistan soon followed with a nuclear program 

counter India. Spanier cited Israel and Taiwan as good examples o

states trying to enhance their security by acquiring nucle

arsenals. Israel, “often isolated politically and pressured by friend

to settle conflicts,” has acquired a sizable nuclear arsenal. 

Taiwan’s interest in the bomb was stimulated in the late 1970

when the US officially recognized China and dropped its securi

treaty with the Nationalists. And if North Korea gains nucle

status, can South Korea or Japan be far behind? 

427 
Nuclear weapons are seen by many states as symbols of prestig

and strength. A third world state may see nuclear weapons and th

acquisition of a credible delivery system as symbolic acts 

establish itself as a major regional power and increase i

international status. While the Israeli nuclear arsenal is reaso

enough for an Arab bomb, Iran, “potentially the strongest Gu

Power, and Algeria may be seeking the bomb” to realize the

potential power. 42 

States also seek nuclear arms because of domestic politic

Spanier asserted that “such considerations may reinforce the oth

two reasons.” A nation with economic, social, and mora

problems may, if it is technically capable, seek the bomb “to boo

morale, restore national confidence, divert attention from domest

problems, and, of course, mobilize popular support for th

government.” 43 And a government may have economic incentive

to develop nuclear technologies in order to generate export sales. 

The Case of Russia and the CIS 

The disintegration of the Soviet Union created four nucle

states: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The Bulletin o

the Atomic Scientists estimated the former Soviet nuclear stockpi

at 33,000 warheads, with 15,000 deployed and 18,000 awaitin

disassembly. 44 Immediately after the Soviet collapse, Russ

offered to take possession of all strategic weapons located in th

other three republics. After the CIS was established, the leaders o

the nuclear states decided in December 1991 that a decision to us

nuclear weapons would be “made by the president of the Russia

Federation” in agreement with the heads of the other thre

republics and in consultation with the heads of the other memb

states of the Commonwealth. 45 And under the terms of side lette

to the Lisbon Protocol, signed in May 1992, Kazakhstan, Belaru

and Ukraine became parties to the START treaty and agreed 

accede to the NPT as nonnuclear weapons states in the shorte

possible time. Russia would be the only nuclear power in the CI

START II is only between the US and Russia since the other thre

428 
parties to START are obligated by that treaty to eliminate all of th

strategic nuclear weapons on their respective territories. 

The Ukrainian Factor 

There are dangers that threaten to unravel this disarmame

process. One danger is the new republics’ “strong sense o

nationalism, especially Ukraine’s.” 46 When the Soviet Unio

collapsed in late 1991, Ukraine instantly became the world’s thir

largest nuclear power. At stake are 130 six-warhead SS-1

strategic missiles and 46 10-warhead SS-24 strategic missiles an

an estimated several hundred nuclear-tipped cruise missiles carrie

on heavy bombers. 47 In all, Ukraine had about 1,700 ex-Sovi

warheads on its soil. 48 There is strong nationalistic sentiment 

the Ukrainian Parliament where mistrust of Russia’s intentions ha

grown. Since its independence, Ukraine has sparred with Russ

over stewardship of nuclear weapons, control of the strategic Blac

Sea fleet, and the port of Sevastopol-a navy base on Ukrainian so

Ukraine’s nuclear politics have caused controversy. Som

members of the parliament say that Ukraine should keep all o

some of its nuclear weapons. Perhaps the lawmakers feel th

nuclear weapons add to Ukraine’s national prestige an

independence; a perception that represents another danger in th

disarmament process. Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk ha

called his nation’s nuclear weapons “material wealth” and has sa

that Ukraine would “demand material compensation” befo

relinquishing them. 50 And it is the US, and to a lesser exte

Russia, that will pay the material compensation. A militar

cooperation agreement was signed between the US and Ukraine 

July 1993 in which America promised $175 million in aid. 51 I

return, Ukraine has begun deactivating and dismantling a portio

of its 130 SS-19 missiles. In January 1994 the US, Russia, an

Ukraine signed an agreement to eliminate all of Ukraine’s nucle

arms over the next seven years in exchange for US and Russian a

and promises for security. Pavel Polityuk of the Associated Pre

429 

49 
reported in a Washington Times article that in addition to the $17

million for nuclear weapons dismantling, now authorized b

Congress, the US has promised $155 million in direct econom

aid to Ukraine. 52 Moreover, the US will purchase the extracte

uranium from the Ukrainian warheads at a price tag of $1 billio

And Russia has agreed to sell oil and natural gas to Ukraine 

cheap prices. Both the US and Russia have promised not to launc

a nuclear attack at Ukraine. But this latest agreement must still b

ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament. Polityuk concluded that man

of Ukraine’s lawmakers are “likely to oppose giving up” th

nation’s nuclear arsenal. Will Ukraine honor its pledge to get rid o

the weapons? Is Ukraine merely stalling as it seeks addition

economic aid? Does Ukraine have the right to keep its missiles 

ensure its national security? And, if Ukraine decides to keep i

weapons, can it deter the Russians? These are tough questions wi

no clear answers. Clearly, a nuclear Ukraine could upset the NP

regime and START II. 

In November 1993 Ukrainian Parliament agreed, in principle, 

ratify START, but it attached conditions to stretch out the proce

of giving up its warheads. 53 The Ukrainian government repor

that it desires to join the NPT and supports all the provisions, b

its actions seem determined to buy time in an attempt to ga

additional financial incentives. Ukraine may try to join the NP

with the “special status of a transition country” with nucle

weapons. 54 Ultimately, Ukraine will do what is best for Ukrain

In his article, US Anxiously Eyes Ukraine Atomic Arsenal, Pet

Grier of The Christian Science Monitor wrote, “In exchange fo

renouncing its nuclear weapons, Ukraine’s parliament wan

extensive security guarantees from the West.” 55 Ukrainians view 

as matter of national survival. US efforts must center aroun

“playing honest broker” between Moscow and Kiev, persuadin

Ukraine to join the NPT and dismantle its nuclear arsenal, an

obtaining the strongest possible security guarantees for Ukraine. 

Ukraine’s role in the new international environment must b

430 
acknowledged. The January 1994 agreement between Washingto

Moscow, and Kiev represents a step in the right direction. 

Russia (CIS) Strategic Nuclear Forces 

At the end of 1992, Russian (CIS) strategic nuclear forces we

approximately the same size as the Soviet forces were in 1991. 

The mobile single warhead SS-25 ICBM is the only weapo

system in production, and it continues to be fielded. The START 

treaty will facilitate the Russians’ reducing to a level of relativ

parity the 3,000 to 3,500 warhead range that each side is permitte

If ratification and implementation of the START treaty stays o

track, SS-18 missile silos in Kazakhstan and SS-19 missile silos 

Ukraine will be destroyed. 

A notable feature of the START II treaty is that all SS-1

missiles must be destroyed. The SS-18 missile is the world

largest and most powerful ICBM. Since it is silo-based, the missi

is not survivable. Thus, it is considered a destabilizing weapo

The retirement of this heavy ICBM has begun. Additionally, a

land-based multiple warhead ICBMs must be downloaded to sing

warheads. 

In March 1993 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reporte

that between 1990 and 1994 Russia will have reduced its nuclea

powered ballistic-submarine fleet from 62 to 27 SSBNs. 58 I

January 1992 former director of Central Intelligence Robert Gate

told the Senate, “We see for the first time in decades the tot

absence of any SSBN under construction.” 59 Work continues on 

new SLBM to replace the SS-N-20 on Typhoon-class submarines

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists also stated that th

Russian bomber force is “practically immobile, and reportedly 

low rates of readiness.” 60 The Russian bomber force is made up o

75 Tu-95 Bear and 25 Tu-160 Blackjack bombers equipped wi

short-range attack missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, an

gravity bombs. Most of Russia’s newest bombers, the Blackjack

are not operational. 

431 
Russia

s New Military Doctrine 

and Nuclear Implications 

In November 1993 Russia published a new, more assertiv

military doctrine that “sanctions the use of troops beyond Russia

borders to protect national interests and their use at home to quas

civil conflicts or terrorism.” 61 The new doctrine was adopted b

President Boris Yeltsin immediately after troops loyal to him pu

down a hard-line revolt in October. The timing of the new doctrin

seems to indicate a strengthening of the Russian military’s politic

position. 

Natalie Gross, a researcher at the US Army Institute, wrote 

Jane’s Intelligence Review that the threats to Russia’s nation

security interests include the West, the third world, and the fragi

CIS. The Russians “view with apprehension an impressive array o

military capabilities amassed by Western powers.” Western rap

deployment and mobilization forces pose a potential danger 

Russian security. New global and regional powers, such a

Germany, Japan, Iran, and Turkey are watched with anxiet

Dangers, such as political concessions against national interest

which the “leverage of Western economic aid may create,” are ke

concerns. Political instability, nuclear proliferation, and terroris

are also identified as threats. According to Gross: 

Closer to home, the military establishment has defined the rules for what 

it would consider a legitimate use of military force in the successor states 

or inside the Russian federation, From a military viewpoint, the use of 

force could be authorized when the civil rights of Russian citizens or of 

persons maintaining a Russian identity have been violated. The Russian 

army will view as a serious breach of its security arrangement a direct 

projection of military power by other countries into neighboring states or 

any force deployment close to Russia’s borders. 62 

The distinct local aspects of the doctrine will certainly rai

eyebrows in the CIS republics. The message is clear. Th

suppression of the rights and freedoms of the millions of disperse

Russians is viewed as a military threat to Russia itself. 63 Will a

432 
overhauled Russian army be settling bloody conflicts in the form

Soviet Union on Moscow’s terms? 

The new military doctrine has a significant impact on Russia

nuclear policy. The most noticeable feature of the new doctrine 

the reversal of the promise not to use nuclear weapons first. This 

a reversal of former Soviet president Gorbachev’s vision of 

nuclear-free world. (The US has also not pledged a no-first-us

policy,) The new doctrine promises that nuclear weapons will n

be used against nonnuclear states that have signed the nuclear NIT

unless they are operating in alliance with nuclear states. 64 The ne

doctrine views nuclear arms, the most capable part of Russia

military, as the basis of the nation’s future defense. This could b

another signal of a “rightward shift of Russia’s foreign and militar

policy.” 

Russia’s new military doctrine views nuclear war as a

extension of large-scale conventional war. Strikes by convention

precision guided munitions (PGM) at elements of Russia’s nucle

forces such as early warning centers, command and contr

facilities, chemical and biological weapon storage depots, an

nuclear energy and research facilities represent a threshold beyon

which nuclear escalation remains a real possibility. 65 This doctrin

has significant implication for US combatant commanders an

campaign planners. We may be seeing a reversal of role betwee

the fanner superpowers with Russia now depending on the nucle

equalizer to counter America’s superiority in convention

capability. 

Other Russian (CIS) Nuclear Concerns 

Another potential danger that fallows the disintegration of th

Soviet Union and reduction of its arms industry is that thousand

of unemployed nuclear scientists and technicians might try to se

their knowledge to the highest third world bidder. 

There were an estimated 900,000 military and civilian personnel in the 

nuclear weapons community. Of these, about 2.000 have a knowledge of 

433 
pg

enrichment and plutonium production. 66 

Spanier cited an alarming example of a group that is sellin

“peaceful nuclear explosives” for such commercial applications a

the incineration of toxic wastes and breeder reactors. Anoth

example is Iran’s secret nuclear program. It has been reported th

Iran has assembled several nuclear bombs with the help of nucle

experts from Kazakhstan. There are other reports of nucle

scientists and technicians from the former Soviet Union earnin

high salaries in India, Iraq, Brazil, and Pakistan. This type o

activity has serious implications for nuclear proliferation. Th

security of tactical nuclear weapons is another major challeng

Rodman Griffin, writing for CQ Researcher, stated that there a

about 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons in the former Soviet arsena

67 These weapons are stored at some 200 depots. This presents 

tremendous security risk. The sale of a “small nuke” to a crimin

or terrorist organization or a rogue nation is a dangerous potenti

threat. 

The sale and control of nuclear materials is another majo

concern as well. In two documented incidents in 1991, sma

amounts of plutonium were seized in Europe. Both seizure

involved plutonium produced in the former Soviet Union an

headed to the Middle East. 68 James Woolsey, new CIA directo

attempted to minimize the alarm during testimony before th

Senate in February 1993: 

So far, we have detected no transfers of weapon-grade material in 

significant quantities. We have no credible reporting that nuclear 

weapons have left CIS territory, and we do not believe that nuclear 

weapons design information has been sold or transferred to foreign 

states. 69 

President Clinton has announced that as part of h

nonproliferation and export control policy, the US will purchas

highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons an

civil nuclear programs from the former Soviet Union. 

434 
The Case of North Korea

s Nuclear 

Program 

North Korea is one of the last totalitarian regimes of the co

war. This society has been isolated from outside influences for fou

decades. By 1984 the US had learned of North Korea’s sma

reactor at Yongbyon. A secret plutonium reprocessing plant soo

followed. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985, but it has refuse

full IAEA safeguard inspections. The US and South Korea hav

taken action to apply pressure on the North. In 1991 all US nucle

weapons were removed from South Korea and inspectio

procedures were granted to the North. South Korea also pledged 

remain nonnuclear. 

During IAEA inspections in 1992, the agency discovered th

North Korea had separated plutonium at the Yongbyon reactor. B

early 1993 the IAEA announced that it could not account for th

North’s total amount of separated plutonium. Under mountin

international pressure, North Korea threatened to withdraw fro

the NPT. In December 1993 the IAEA stated that the agency ca

no longer verify that the North’s nuclear activities remain peacefu

David Kyd, a spokesman for the IAEA, said that since the agenc

cannot perform its duties in North Korea, the UN Security Counc

is free to take up the issue at any time. 70 

Since then, the US policy towards the North has been a series o

threats and concessions. President Clinton has offered econom

incentives and cancellation of the annual Team Spirit militar

exercise with South Korea in exchange for the North’s assurance

to forego development of nuclear arms and fulfill its NP

obligations. A US push in cooperation with China, South Kore

and Japan for United Nations economic sanctions is the next like

step. The North has responded that US-led sanctions will be see

as an act of war. Mr. Woolsey told the Cable News Networ

(CNN) in a television interview that the possibility of a Nor

Korean attack could not be excluded. 71 He also added that U

435 
intelligence believes that the North Koreans have enoug

plutonium for one or two bombs. 

With tensions mounting, some analysts call for an end to th

nuclear hype in North Korea. These analysts argue that there is n

reliable proof that the North has the technical means to buil

deploy, and employ a nuclear device. Furthermore, they assert th

all parties benefit from a reduction in Korean tensions. Edwar

Olsen, a writer for The Christian Science Monitor, stated, “Th

punitive American economic card is as risky for the US as th

North Korean nuclear card is dangerous to Pyongyang.” 72 What 

needed is more “diplomatic sophistication” than either sid

normally displays. Why is the administration determined 

prevent the North from developing an atomic weapon? 

Fear of nuclear proliferation in Asia is the primary concer

North Korea’s secret program has spurred talk in South Korea an

Japan about acquiring a matching nuclear deterrent. In a relate

matter, the US announced in December 1993 that it will assi

Japan in deploying a missile defense system for protection again

possible North Korean ballistic-missile attacks. Responses fro

other Asian states could be asymmetrical, creating complicate

diplomatic and security concerns. Another concern is for th

integrity of the nonproliferation mechanisms, particularly the NP

and the IAEA. North Korea’s snubbing of the control mechanism

is seen by the international community as grievous an

unacceptable behavior. There is a limit to how much Washingto

will be able to tolerate. Moreover, North Korea has a history o

supplying arms to the world’s hot spots. There is a growin

concern that “North Korea might become a conduit fo

technologies related to chemical, biological, and even nucle

weapons.” 73 Finally, the administration would like to see a

immediate end to this threat because time is on the side of Nor

Korea’s nuclear program. As each month passes, North Kore

certainly gets closer to perfecting the bomb. In his 1993 Securi

Dialogue article on North Korea, Ronald Lehman concluded, “Th

North Korean nuclear program poses a fundamental challenge 

436 
the nonproliferation objectives of the world community in the pos

Cold War era.” 74 

America’s Response to Nuclear 

Proliferation 

On 27 September 1993, in an address to the UN Gener

Assembly, President Clinton announced a new proliferation an

export control policy. He outlined three principles that will guid

US nonproliferation policy: 

Our national security requires us to accord higher priority to 

nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of our relations with 

other countries. 

To strengthen US economic growth, democratization abroad, and 

international stability, we actively seek expanded trade and technological 

exchange with nations, including former adversaries. that abide by global 

proliferation norms. 

We need to build a new consensus-embracing the executive and 

legislative branches, industry and public, and friends abroad-to promote 

effective nonproliferation efforts and integrate our nonproliferation and 

economic goals. 75 

One key element to the policy includes a comprehensiv

approach to control the growing accumulation of fissile materia

Another key element concerns nuclear proliferation. “The US wi

make every effort to secure the indefinite extension of the NPT

The US will ensure that adequate IAEA resources are in place 

implement nuclear inspections. And the US will work to improv

the IAEA’s ability to detect secret nuclear activities. Region

nonproliferation initiatives are another critical part of the polic

The US will “make special efforts to address the proliferatio

threat in regions of tension...including efforts to address th

underlying motivations for weapons acquisition, and to promo

confidence-building steps.” 76 Proliferation will also get a high

profile in military planning and doctrine. 

437 
In December 1993 new military efforts to counter weapon

proliferation were announced by the Pentagon. Efforts includ

better intelligence gathering and development of nonnucle

“penetrating munitions” capable of destroying deep undergroun

weapons facilities, theater missile defenses to protect again

hostile launches, better defenses against biological weapons, an

new sensors to locate mobile missile launchers. 77 A critical aspe

of the new military approach is in identifying strategies an

weapons for coping militarily with proliferation threats aft

diplomacy fails. The president tasked regional combata

commanders to “develop detailed plans for thwarting proliferatio

threats in their area.” This new approach appears to be a

admission that the US and its allies “could not win the war again

global nuclear proliferation.” 78 The US plan is to increase relianc

on technology to defend against the development and use o

nuclear and other mass destruction weapons. 

Conclusion 

America has entered a new period of challenge and opportunit

US nuclear policy is evolving and traditional concepts an

assumptions are being challenged. Although START and STAR

II represent an excellent opportunity for deep strategic forc

reductions, there is no guarantee that they will be implemente

Economic, social, and political chaos in the former Soviet Unio

presents a real danger to the START process. The full implicatio

of the new Russian military doctrine, with its emphasis on th

nuclear deterrent, is yet to be seen. The Soviet disintegration ha

also complicated the nuclear proliferation problem. 

It is imperative that the US demonstrate leadership in dealin

with the changing status of nuclear weapons. The US must tak

strong steps to preserve the START process and the NPT regim

Resources are needed to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA

Other nuclear states could be involved in the arms control proces

A comprehensive test-ban treaty is another step that can reduce th

threat of nuclear weapons. Even if deep reductions continue belo

438 
the START II levels, the need for a secure, small, but modern U

nuclear reserve force seems appropriate. 

Concerning nuclear proliferation, President Clinton’s ne

proliferation and export control policy appears sound. It remains 

be seen if Congress will provide the money needed to ensu

effectiveness of the policy’s comprehensive initiatives. Ne

military efforts to counter proliferation will enable the US 

defend against the manufacture and use of weapons of ma

destruction. Because nuclear proliferation poses a great threat 

international peace and security, America must develop th

military strategy and capability and more importantly possess th

will to deal with the new world threat. 

439 
Notes 

1. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, Janua

1993 (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), i. 

2. Les Aspin, editorial, Star Tribune. 29 July 1992. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Air Staff, “Nuclear Sufficiency in the 1990s and Beyond: The New 

Strategic Equation,” White Paper (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, USAF, 2 

September 1992), ii-vi. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid. 

9. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Nuclear Arms Doctrine to be Reviewed,” Washington 

Post, 19 October 1993, 17. 

10. Art Pine, “US Missiles to Be Re-Aimed at Distant Seas,” Los Angeles 

Times, 13 January 94, 1. 

11. Smith, 17. 

12. John Prados, “Woolsey and the CIA,” The Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, July-August 1993, 34. 

13. The White House, 1. 

14. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the 

Congress, January 93 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1993),3

15. The White House, 14. 

16. Department of Defense, 4. 

17. Joint Publication 3-11, initial draft, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, 

Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense, September 1992, 11-12. 

18. Department of Defense, 67. 

19. Gen George Lee Butler, “Refocusing the Nation’s Nuclear Arsenal,” 

Defense 93, no. 314 (1993): 53. 

20. Department of Defense, 69. 

21. Donald B. Rice and Merrill A. McPeak. “FY92 Air Force Posture 

Statement,” presented to the House of Representatives Armed Service’s 

Committee, 26 February 1991, in Air Force Update, Secretary of the Air Force

Office of Public Affairs, 26 February 1991, 4. 

22. Butler, 51-54. 

23. Ibid. 

24. Rice and McPeak, 5. 

25. Department of Defense, 70-71. 

26. Butler, 53. 

27. Department of Defense, 69-70. 

28. Butler, 53 

29. Department of Defense, 71. 

30. Ibid. 

31. Secretary of Defense, Implementation Plan for Integration of US 

Strategic Command, 1992 (Washington, D.C.: 1992), 1. 

32. Butler, 51-54. 

440 
p, y, (g, 

Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1993), 594. 

34. Joint Pub 3-11, initial draft, A-1. 

35. Spanier, 594. 

36. John J. Mearsheimer, “Disorder Restored,” in Rethinking American 

Security, ed. Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (New York: W. W. 

Norton & Company, 1992), 227-35. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Spanier, 598. 

39. David Albright, “A Proliferation Primer,” The Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, June 1993, 15. 

40. Spanier, 595-98. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Ibid. 

44. “Nuclear Notebook,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1993, 

48. 

45. “Commonwealth Agrees on Unified Nuclear Command,” Arms Contro

Today, January-February 1992, 39. 

46. Spanier, 599. 

47. “Ukraine’s Lawmakers Claim Nuclear Arsenal,” Baltimore Sun. 3 July 

1992, 4. 

48. Peter Grier, “US Anxiously Eyes Ukraine Atomic Arsenal,” The 

Christian Science Monitor, 2 December 1993, 3. 

49. Jane Perlez, “Ukraine May Ask Special Status in Atomic Pact,” New 

York Times, 26 July 1993, 8. 

50. “Ukraine Calls Arms ‘Material Wealth’,” Washington Post, 1 Decembe

1993,21. 

51. “Taking Ukraine Seriously,” Sacramento Bee, 1 August 1993, F-4. 

52. Pavel Polityuk, “Ukrainians Upset At Missile Deal,” Washington Time

18 January 1994, 15. 

53. “Ukraine Calls Arms ‘Material Wealth’,” 21. 

54. Perlez, 8. 

55. Grier, 3. 

56. “Taking Ukraine Seriously,” F-4. 

57. “Nuclear Notebook,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 199

49. 

58. Ibid. 

59. Ibid. 

60. Ibid. 

61. Fred Hiatt, “Russia Shifts Doctrine on Military Use,” Washington Post, 

November 1993, 1. 

62. Natalie Gross, “Reflections on Russia’s New Military Doctrine,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, August 1992, 339-40. 

63. James Sheir, “Russia’s New Threat to Neighbors,” Wall Street Journal. 

17 December 1993, 14. 

441 
, 

65. Gross, 340. 

66. Spanier, 600. 

67. Rodman D. Griffin, “Nuclear Proliferation,” CQ Researcher 2, no. 21 (5 

June 1992): 40. 

68. From statements of Roman Dolce, an assistant prosecutor in Rome, Ital

in Dunbar Lockwood, “US Seeks to Avert Ex-Soviet Nuclear-Expert ‘Brain 

Drain’,” Arms Control Today, January-February 1992, 40. 

69. Quoted in Dunbar Lockwood, “CIA Shed Light on Nuclear Control in 

CIS,” Arms Control Today, March 1993, 21. 

70. John J. Fialka, “North Korea’s Nuclear Moves Go Unwatched,” Wall 

Street Journal. 3 December 1993, 5-E. 

71. Bill Gertz, “US Intelligence: North Korea Could Have Nukes,” 

Washington Times, 2 December 1993, 3. 

72. Edward A. Olsen, “Navigating North Korea’s Nuclear ‘Straits’,” The 

Christian Science Monitor, 29 November 1993, 23. 

73. Ronald F. Lehman II, “A North Korea Nuclear-Weapons Program, 

International Implications,” Security Dialogue 3, no. 24 (1993): 269. 

74. Ibid. 

75. Message, 280345Z Sep 93, Secretary of State to all diplomatic and 

consular posts, 28 September 1993. 

76. Ibid. 

77. John Lancaster, “Aspin Pledges New Military Efforts to Counter 

Weapons Proliferation,” Washington Post, 8 December 1993, 7. 

78. Steven Robinson, “America’s Set to Hunt Down the World’s ‘Loose 

Nukes’,” London Daily Telegraph, 8 December 1993, 14. 

442 
Developing Space Assets 

Victor Janushkowsky 

Before the nineteenth century, the size and structure of 

nation’s land forces determined the potency of its militar

instrument of power. During the nineteenth century, sea powe

were dominant. In the twentieth century, air power asserted itse

and began to dictate supremacy. In the coming twenty-fir

century, according to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A

McPeak. control of space assets will be the primary measure of 

nation’s power. l 

Much of the past writing on space needs reflects the bipol

United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) worl

and how to counter the significant nuclear missile, bomber, an

submarine forces of the former Soviet Union. This essay reorien

to a multipolar world and shows space in a snapshot. It first gives 

short history of space and shows recent examples and lesson

learned from the use of space assets in an actual conflict-the Gu

War with Iraq. It then forecasts the future needs of space, includin

new technology applications as the new world unfolds while th

year 2000 approaches. 

The old world was relatively predictable; if the Soviets becam

aggressive, the US countered with a flexible response that wa

programmed to get the word to US forces using a system th

ranged from early warning and indications satellites and spac

sensors to the Satellite Communications System (SATCOM) an

Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR). No

the former states of the Soviet Union, including those clie

countries such as Cuba that depended on the Soviets for their ca

and feeding, are on their own without support and, needless to sa

without space support. The newly independent countries of th

former Soviet Union, to keep up with the rest of the world, wi

want to secure their own space assets. The US, on the other han

443 
must now react to regional crises between these states, n

knowing where the next one will erupt. 

Fundamentally, the US needs to improve upon the capabilitie

of existing highly valued, force-enhancing satellite systems an

should apply new space systems utilizing new technologies helpin

the nation open up and retain access to and the use of space. Suc

capabilities will give the US instantaneous presence anywhere 

the world by providing situational awareness as well as th

command and control needed to deal with current and futu

unpredictable crises. 

Basic Assumptions and Definitions 

Space assets are employed across strategic, operational, an

tactical levels of warfare. There are three basic elements in a spac

operation: the orbiting vehicle, the link to the earth, and the groun

station. A weakness in anyone of these is a weakness in the system

which is connected with the air and surface mediums to provid

information and communication connectivity . 

Space is a unique medium. Scientists and specialists live the

only for relatively short periods of time. Yet vehicles operatin

from space allow a line-of-sight view of very large portions o

earth and therefore can provide connectivity between two place

on earth that cannot see the other. A constellation of satellites ca

scan simultaneously and cover the entire earth. This aspect o

space makes it a logical and suitable location to watch and listen 

all the world’s activities. 

Space vehicles can sustain altitude for long periods without fu

expenditure because of the lack of gravity. The average li

expectancy of earlier (1970s Vintage) satellites is from three 

five years, although many have lasted much longer, especially wi

space maintenance and replacements of limited life component

The latest Defense Satellite Communication Satellite (DSCS) I

has a nominal life expectancy of 10 years. 2 

444 
More countries will exploit space in the future. Currentl

approximately 21 countries use space, either independently or b

purchasing rights, commercially. A growing demand for spac

infrastructure is evident since more of the world’s nations are ab

to make use of space because of their political, military, and, mo

important, economical growth. 

Notably, vehicles in space (at lower orbit) are highly vulnerab

to interception by a hostile nation. However, there is no specifie

identified threat to satellite vehicles at the time of this writing. 

This is an area to be watched, especially by the nation

intelligence agencies. Also, it will soon become possible to reduc

vulnerability by more fully utilizing a maneuver capability in dee

space or by deploying active defensive measures-that is, to active

defend satellites with weapons on board to guard against attacks. 

The current national and military space organization is bein

changed so it can respond to the changes in the military structu

and the world order. Air Force Space Command (AFSPACECOM

, the first service space command, was established in 1983. U

Space Command was established in 1985 as a unified war-fightin

command, combining the strength of all three services, althoug

the Air Force provides over 90 percent of the personnel to th

command, performs nearly all launches, controls the main satelli

systems on orbit, and pays most of the space budget. 4 Preside

George Bush established the National Space Council in 1989 

oversee space policy-making and activity. 5 However, it wa

disbanded early in 1993. 6 Interestingly, AFSPACECOM took o

an offensive mission in its space arsenal when it assume

responsibility for the US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM

forces in 1992. This was viewed by some as essentially a first ste

toward putting weapons in space and moving from a total

“benign” to a “threatening” mission since this was the first time a

offensive “space” military capability was assigned to the spac

command. 7 

445 
Although they have integrated space operations in the joi

arena, the three services have retained separate responsibilities fo

significant portions of the space missions. The Air Force provide

ballistic missile warning, protection from and negation of enem

space systems, satellite operations through ground command an

control, and space lift. The Army commands and manages DSC

satellites and operations centers, the Strategic Defense Syste

(SDS), and antisatellites (ASATS) in event of future deploymen

The Navy provides ultra high frequency (UHF) communication

through operations of its Fleet Satellite Communications Syste

(FLTSATCOM) and provides a backup to Cheyenne Mountain

Space Surveillance Center and alternate Space Defense Operation

Center (besides upgrading the UHF communication system). 8 

Numerous other organizations are involved, includin

commercial enterprises, consortiums, the National Reconnaissanc

Office (NRO), the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO

the old Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, SDIO), th

Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), service and nation

laboratories, Joint/AF Space Applications and Warfare Cente

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and th

Space and Missile Systems Center. Integration of all these an

other entities providing space planning will ensure that spac

assets are created and deployed so they can respond to th

challenges that confront the US. 

History of Space 

Human use of space has a history of just over 50 years, whe

Germany’s short-range ballistic missiles transited space in th

early 1940s. Since then the Soviets and the Americans have bee

the dominant players in the arena. Other countries, includin

Canada, France, and India, have joined in space activities. 

Incredibly, the first man was put into space in 1961, only 3

years ago. Other nations have dabbled in space activity since th

time, but the greatest number of space launches and controllab

446 
satellites continue to be those of the United States, European Spac

Agency, Russia, and other consortiums. Russia has assumed th

Soviet role of leadership in space, even though their intern

transitional problems may not allow extravagant ventures in

space. Most agree that the Russian space activity and capabili

will remain robust. 9 

The US space shuttle program is now back on track after th

Challenger disaster. The recent repair of the embarrassing faul

lens in the Hubbell Space Telescope showed the ability of th

shuttle to recover an ineffective satellite and fix it in space wi

only 35 hours of space work. Space assets of most importance 

the military, however, are the capabilities of space that serve as th

“force enhancers” discussed below. 

Communication 

Their line-of-sight position allows space satellites to serve as 

communication link or relay. Two types are voice and data. Voic

satellites are primarily SATCOM, which are dual use civilian an

military, and Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM

which provide voice communications for tactical forces throug

UHF. Data is sent via the 1970s technology DSCS, whic

processes data at very high speeds. MILSTAR is the moder

technology data communication system designed for reliab

strategic nuclear force communication, although it is slow and ha

a low capability. 

Navigation 

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is the newe

navigational tool. It provides 24-hour, real-time pinpoint accurac

using 24 evenly spaced satellites that cover the entire land mass o

the earth. GPS uses an atomic clock and a triangulation of thre

GPS satellites to notify a user of his exact coordinates within fee

Two modes are available, one for military use and one for civ

navigation. The best attribute of GPS, besides accuracy, is its sma

447 
size (some versions are as small as a pack of cigarettes, enablin

the field soldier to use it as well). 10 

Indications and Warning 

This most important capability notifies command authorities o

imminent attack by a hostile country using missiles, rocket

airplanes, or other airborne or spaceborne vehicle. It has th

technology to assess the attack, to forecast when and where attack

are likely, and to assist the command authority in preparing 

proper response. The Defense Satellite Program (DSP) has bee

the primary missile warning asset. Using infrared monitors, DS

watches the earth for any heat-producing events and is qui

capable of detecting the launch of an intercontinental or shorte

range ballistic missile. 

Weather 

Basic use of space capability can be easily observed by viewin

television weather reports. The Defense Meteorological Suppo

Program (DMSP) has had three satellites in orbit for some tim

This capability is being supported by additional “environment

monitoring” capabilities such as land satellites (LANDSAT) an

other such multispectral imagery (MSI) satellites. Weath

satellites play an important role in mission planning, since arme

forces can be greatly affected in varying weather phenomenon. 

Reconnaissance and Surveillance 

Space photographs, signals, and other earth emissions ca

increase situational awareness and understanding while providin

targeting information, bomb damage assessment, and enem

military data to the theater commanders. 

Lessons Learned in the Gulf War 

Operation Desert Storm was a showcase of space asset

demonstrating the capabilities of all the various force enhancer

448 
and proving US reliance and ability to handle high technology. Th

conflict also showed some limitations and deficiencies, primari

that space is generally useless without ground terminals in th

hands of those who need them. It was a testing ground as we

Prototype MILSTAR terminals were deployed and used ver

successfully as a national command authority (NCA)-United State

Central Command (USCENTCOM) communications link. One ke

lesson that needs to be highlighted is the fact that no fight wa

required for control of space. The adversary in this case had n

space assets or offensive space capability, while the coalition ha

control in space. In the future, this may not be the case. In order fo

the US to be better prepared for the next major conflict, six lesson

from Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm are discussed below. 

Good Warning but Poor Defense against Ballistic Missiles 

Within minutes, space satellites evaluated and warned Centr

Command (CENTCOM) forces of Scud launches. This warning o

attack had some value since those in targeted areas were able 

don chemical defensive gear and retreat to protective shelter

However, on the defensive side, the Scud missiles were relative

successful in inflicting terror. The Patriot missile system on

intercepted 60 percent of the missiles, and those it did destroy 

the terminal phase of the missiles’ flight scattered remnants ov

the intended target area, inflicting some collateral damage an

casualties. If these Scuds had carried weapons of mass destructio

(nuclear, chemical, biological, or some other future technolog

capable of destroying large groups at one time), further casualtie

would have rained down upon the coalition or its allies even if th

missiles had been shot down in the terminal phase. 11 What 

badly needed is the capability to negate the threat of a missi

before it enters the atmosphere of friendly territory. 

Shortage and Vulnerability of Communication Channels 

The demand for quick, long-haul communications put stress o

the available satellites. The sheer numbers of personnel deploye

449 
to the Gulf stressed the system. Twenty-five percent of the A

Force, 50 percent of the Army, and 66 percent of the Marine Corp

were deployed to fight Iraq. Ninety percent of all communication

to, from, and within the Gulf moved through space. Half of th

long-haul communications used commercial satellites because th

military system had a heavy drain on it. A DSCS satellite on orb

had to be moved into a needed location by giving it commands an

modifying its software from Falcon Air Force Station (AFS

Colorado. Remotely, they turned the motor on and ordered th

satellite to move into a required orbit. After the satellite move

into proper orbit, it provided vital communication with th

American embassy in Kuwait until the evacuation. A more capab

enemy could have exploited these communications usin

beaconing, lamming, intercepting, and monitoring. 

“Information Dominance” Importance Recognized 

Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall said, “In the futur

meeting our political and military objectives will increasing

hinge on what’s being called ‘information dominance,’ with spac

playing an expanded role.” 12 

Iraq relied heavily on Cable News Network (CNN) for the

view of the events unfolding. The coalition utilized this use o

satellites by propagating information of an impending marin

amphibious attack from the beaches of the Persian Gulf. While th

enemy was fortifying for such an assault, Gen H. Norma

Schwarzkopf was engineering the “Hail Mary” envelopme

maneuver from the western flank to surprise and overwhelm th

enemy. We could see; Hussein could not. The recognition of th

importance of information dominance applies to intelligence a

well. The greatest source of information is Intelligence, and mo

of the usable intelligence today comes from space assets in th

form of photographs, signals, communication intercepts, and oth

valued pieces of information. Situational awareness was exploite

in the Gulf War at the expense of the Iraqi military. 

450 
No Single Organization Responsible to Coordinate Spac

Support 

Operational planning for the use of space assets was not we

developed when Iraq invaded Kuwait. 13 Assets were deployed a

hoc instead of in a concerted, preplanned manner. In sever

instances during the war, CENTCOM’s staff had to call th

continental United States (CONUS) to resolve problems and crea

work-arounds and fixes to communication problems. There was n

space staff deployed to the theater of operations to assist in th

matter. Since the war, US Space Command has begun planning 

accordance with the Joint Chiefs of Staffs mechanism to have 

place plans for deployment of certain; space assets and will deplo

to a theater of operations to assist he commander on space matter

Weather Was Critical to Operations and Bomb Damag

Assessment 

Weather in the Gulf was the worst in 16 years. This was crucia

especially in the desert, where many coastal fogs and sandstorm

could reduce visibility to zero and rain could turn sands into bog

This could have been a problem, but sensors from space were ab

to perform three-dimensional analysis of the environment usin

multispectral imaging and DMSP satellites. At worst the weath

delayed bomb damage reports because of the inability to tak

pictures of buildings through clouds. DMSP allowed analysis o

sandstorms and was instrumental in planning attack package

through brief breaks ill the cloud cover. There was a shortage o

DMSP ground terminals to fielded forces and ships; field uni

could never get enough information, especially when waiting an

planning for battle. 

LANDSAT and the French SPOT (Satellite Probatoi

d’Observation de la Terre) multispectral imagery satellites we

successful, as they were able to ascertain Iraqi command an

control, troop movements, and natural underground hazards suc

as mud. MSI was able to show depth of water and heat on th

451 

14 
ground from enemy movement. It assisted in updating bad

needed maps often 10 to 30 years old, which helped locate moder

airfields, roads, trails, and water. The US MSI resolution wa

roughly 30 meters, whereas the French SPOT satellites were 1

meters and the Soviet Meteor Proida system had a resolution dow

to five meters. Merged with national imagery, MSI produce

detailed, unclassified maps. 15 

F-111 pilots used MSI in preparing for their missions to bom

Iraqi oil well heads that were pumping oil into the Persian Gul

After the mission was successfully completed, the pilo

commented that it seemed as if they had flown the mission befo

they ever climbed into the cockpit. 

Navigation Equipment Critical to Fighting Forces 

GPS provided highly precise, all-weather, and thre

dimensional position, velocity, and timing data to the militar

Unfortunately, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, only five percent o

USAF aircraft had GPS installed. Since 1982, the Navy has ha

GPS on virtually all its ships. It was eventually used mo

extensively than planned because of the perceived utility of th

technology in the barren desert environment. Unfortunatel

insufficient military versions were available, requiring thousand

of civilian versions of the GPS receivers that did not hav

“selective availability” (SA), an option reserved for military u

that increases accuracy and performance. GPS success in Dese

Shield/Desert Storm was evident in many ways: first, it has take

the accuracy of determining position from miles down to feet. GP

led an F-16 and a search-and-rescue (SAR) helicopter to find 

downed American F-16 pilot behind enemy territory. Second, 

increased the lethality of standoff munitions like the Navy’s se

launch attack missile (SLAM) and the Tomahawk cruise missi

and increased the accuracy of air assets. Air Force helicopters le

the first wave of Army attack helicopters into Iraq because th

Army’s helicopters did not have GPS receivers installed. Thir

GPS has revolutionized logistics. It is much easier today to locate 

452 
position on earth, therefore easier to get the meal trucks, supplie

ammunition, fresh troops, and the like to that position. Finally, it 

very popular with the troops, so they will use it! It is a passiv

device, that is, it doesn’t give off any signal but just reads th

signal from the satellite; therefore, it does not make the troop

vulnerable to interception. Their portable nature made thes

devices so popular that fielded units “passed the hat” in order 

buy more hand-held units to be used in the Gulf. Some paren

bought units for their sons and daughters deployed in the war, ju

as a personal item, knowing it might help them. 

While listed as the final lesson learned from the war, th

importance of GPS to the coalition’s victory cannot b

underestimated. Furthermore, the availability of at least the civilia

version of GPS to future enemies of freedom will complica

America’s plans for decisive, quick, low-casualty crisis resolutio

16 Since Space Command has the ability to distort GPS signals 

keep wartime enemies from taking advantage of them, its contr

of GPS satellites into the future will be essential. 17 

Future Space Requirments 

What is our future in space? Since the base force, bottom-u

review, and downsizing analysis began after the end of the co

war with the former Soviet Union, several space programs we

changed, added, canceled, and/or postponed, and some cancele

programs have been given new life. Rather than identify wh

specific space assets are still alive, which are dying, and which a

dead, this paper focuses on what the author believes the country

direction in space ought to be. It will consider the budg

environment the military will work with and current gener

thought. Some assumptions and forecasting can be made based o

what we know today. Below are eight general prognostications o

what should, and probably will, happen in space in the interest o

national security. 

Better Support to Conventional Forces 

453 
The number one priority of the current commander of US Spac

Command is “putting space into the fox hole, cockpit, or comb

information center in real time.” 18 Following are several ways 

do this. 

First, the Defense Department must create more handheld spac

link miniaturized information-processing equipment th

incorporates MSI, navigation aids, and any other real-tim

information needed by the holder of such a device. Informatio

dissemination in-theater could be improved and made muc

tighter. 

Second, navigation aids must continue to be improved usin

GPS and other pinpoint accuracy tools for cargo drops and SA

missions. 

Third, robotics must be more appropriate in future conflict 

avoid direct human-to-human confrontation and the risk o

excessive casualties. Satellites are essentially robots that do n

require manned presence. Therefore, interfaces with air and land

based robots will be required in future conflicts. 

Fourth, continued search for devices that will disable weapon

of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical) will be desire

and accepted by the world community. Most agree that a theat

ballistic-missile threat persists in many areas of the world. At th

time of this writing, 20 nations either control or seek short-term

medium-range ballistic missiles. A defense against this from spac

may be a logical development. The free world needs a ballisti

missile defense that is supportable, reactive, able to destroy sho

and medium range missiles in the near term and long-rang

missiles in the long term. It must be able to intercept missiles in th

boost phase (those six or so minutes from launch until entry in

the upper atmosphere) in order to prevent collateral damag

currently suffered in terminal-phase defensive-missile system

such as Patriot. The replacement for the DSP early warnin

satellites, the follow-on early warning system (FEWS), and th

454 
Brilliant Eyes satellite will improve the tracking and intercept o

ballistic missiles if funding for the programs is continued. 

Continued Search for Better Technology 

The military technology revolution continues unabated, wi

better and brighter ideas still to come. Acquiring the be

technology will continue as a national objective, albeit in a mo

budgetary-critical perspective. Identified below are four bas

technological improvements that will change the way space asse

are employed. 

First, those sensors currently deployed in space will b

improved so the information processed will be sharper, cleare

more resolute, easier to hear, and easier to identify. Thes

improvements will gradually change the nature of the da

collected. 

Second, better computers will result in better artifici

intelligence (AI). This will help the military by allowing fas

accurate threat forecasting using reliable automation. 

Third, there will probably be less reliance on kinetic ki

weapons and more use of directed-energy weapons (DEW). Las

weapons are faster and more accurate and cause less collater

damage. Inevitably, space devices will incorporate such means 

protect itself and possibly to be used in an offensive role. 

Fourth, “virtual reality” aids will come closer to realit

Computers are merely scratching .the surface of virtual realit

where visual aids recreate key maps and other realist

representation for the use of targeting, navigation, and other suc

uses for armed forces to be more effective. Information from spac

will be an important component since much information come

from space and offers a view or angle different from any other se

land, or air perspective. 

Deployment of a Trans-Atmospheric Vehicle 

455 
The current record holder as the world

s fastest airplane is th

SR-71, which was clocked at about Mach 3 (2,100+ mph). Th

National Aerospace Plane (NASP) would be capable of Mach 15 

25, enabling it to achieve a temporary orbit in space and return 

earth in record time. The NASP makes possible a flight from Ne

York to Japan in about two hours. The military implications o

such a vehicle that can transport troops and special operation

personnel around the globe are that it will reduce response time 

minutes and add another flexible response to a localized conflic

In fact, many predict dual use for this new transportatio

technology in the twenty-first century . 19 Economic wars with th

budding nations of the Far East may demand such a quick transpo

to get goods to market before the competitors do so. 

On a related note, advanced engines may be developed an

incorporated in this vehicle. There are unlimited possibilitie

including research into engines or nuclear-powered aerospac

engines, and even the famous antimatter engines enabling “war

drive.” 20 The military technological revolution (MTR) wi

continue to produce such paradigm-shifting ideas of spac

transportation, and the nations that incorporate the good ideas a

the ones that will retain the high ground, militarily an

economically. 

Manned Space Presence 

Space is a rough environment, without breathable air and with 

temperature of approximately 200 degrees below zero. Howeve

inevitably there will be an international space statio

incorporating the US Freedom Space Station, Russia’s Mir spac

station, and the contributions of a consortium of other countries. 

Unilaterally, the US continues to explore long-term manne

presence. The areas in space known as the “Lagrangian Points” a

one reason for this. These points are located between the earth an

the moon, and between the earth and the sun. From there a

adversary could access any satellite in geosynchronous orb

thereby potentially blocking both communications and a field o

456 
view of earth. 

 The US must continue to explore manned an

unmanned presence in space to ensure continued access in th

environment. These two “high grounds” of space make friend

control of the points a necessity. 

Standardized, Multipurpose, Dual-Use Launch Infrastructure 

Currently, each launch of a satellite into orbit is like building 

Rolls-Royce automobile-one at a time. Each satellite is married 

a unique Titan, Delta, or Atlas rocket booster that was special

designed to fit only that satellite. Each launch is a custom even

costing an average of $85.5 million (the space shuttle average

$650 million). The average time on a launch pad for a rocket is 4

days, with launch crew members numbering from 100 to more tha

a thousand. It has been reported that Gen Charles A. Horne

commander in chief, Air Force Space Command, wants 

standardize procedures and enforce discipline in the design o

future satellites, much like foreign space organizations are doin

in order to add operational robustness and forgiving margins, thu

in some cases reducing the costs in half. Furthermore, eve

Congress has asked for rugged, cheap, reliable “trucks,” n

complicated, fragile, high-strung “race cars.” 22 

The secretary of the Air Force stated, “Any future launc

program will have to be dual-use-meeting the needs of governme

and commercial users.” 23 The Air Force budget, the largest of th

services, runs about $6 billion per year. While almost all oth

mission areas are reducing budgets, the space mission is growin

The nation will need fast-launch capability to put up satellites a

needed for crises. This may mean a US military launch capabilit

but interestingly, the Senate told the Department of Defense 

1993 to consider using foreign launch capabilities to launc

national security payloads. 24 For example, Russia’s need for har

currency and her strong capability for putting satellites in orb

may be tapped. During fall 1993, Vice President Al Gore signe

numerous agreements in this area with President Boris Yeltsin, an

although most are civil ventures, there is a possibility of using the

457 
infrastructure for quickly and efficiently launching satellites fo

communication. navigation, or other uses, as the needs arise. 

Commercial, nonstate consortiums are another source fo

launch assistance. Rather than developing unique US launc

capability, the climate exists to contract out the launches, securi

permitting. 

More International Agreements/Cooperation 

The move from the bipolar to the multipolar world ha

expanded the importance of the world community in space matter

Following are several specific areas in which the world of nation

will come together cooperatively for common goals. 

First, there will be more lending of support to civil authorities 

areas of instability. This may mean sharing of information gathere

from space assets. 

Second, arms control agreements will be expanded to includ

much more intrusive monitoring, much of it from space, 

enhance the concept of “transparency.” whereby countrie

demonstrate openly that they have only peaceful, defensiv

intentions, and nations monitor world activities using remote earth

sensing devices. Agreements such as Open Skies, permittin

overflight of aircraft over a nation’s airspace, will need to be mad

so space assets can communicate and pass information through. 

Third, the rising number of countries getting involved in spac

may require an international body like the International Civ

Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a form of space “traffic contro

to prevent mishaps, especially where there is manned activity 

space. Satellites in orbit travel about 25,000 feet per second, whic

is about 17,000 mph. Out of the 190 or so countries of the worl

25 to 40 will have their own payloads by the end of the twentie

century. In orbit today are approximately 2,154 payloads, and th

number of launches is increasing. 25 This, combined with the risin

volume of space debris from satellites, may require mo

458 
international activity in combined monitoring. This complex tas

requires the highest technology. 

Fourth, the proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout th

world may require the community of nations to share ballist

missile warning information, be it information about terrori

movements, weapon sales, or possibly intelligence to be share

with another nation. Sharing of intelligence is not a new concep

as we have shared secrets even with Russians in 1991, 1992, an

1993 concerning the Persian Gulf crisis, and other region

concerns. The rising world concern about threats from weapons o

mass destruction may eventually allow some form of intercepto

from space to knock out missiles during the boost phase of flight. 

Fifth, some countries may buy or sell space-originate

information. In Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein attempted 

purchase space-based information, but through diplomatic effor

of the coalition, he was denied. Maps, photograph

communication information, and other information from space a

viewed by many as invaluable. 

Need for Space Surge Capability 

Related to the last area above is the need to surge in a time o

crisis. As seen during the Gulf War, the need for expande

communication channels rose in direct proportion to the number o

personnel deployed to the area. Some regions of the world wi

require more satellite coverage to meet the demand. Civil an

commercial space industries should be signed up to provide th

surge. Much like the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF), to assi

the nation’s security in its time of need. Costs would be reduce

since a large-standing space force would not be required if suitab

guarantees are available elsewhere. 

Weapons in Space 

Other than ballistic missiles traversing space, apparently n

country has deployed any form of weapons in space...yet. Th

459 
Outer Space Treaty forbids weapons of mass destruction in spac

and perhaps current “customary law” forbids any type of deploye

system. 26 However, an arms race in space may require the natio

to quickly develop the capability to protect itself and retain acce

to space and its assets. Carl Sagan and other scientists hav

expressed interest in military assistance in using a space-base

device to defend the earth from an asteroid collision, much like th

collision that is assumed to be the cause of the demise o

dinosaurs. A huge deflector, using directed energy or a nucle

explosion, would be used to deflect an asteroid. 27 Besides th

asteroid-deflector idea, the two other potential weapons in spac

are offensive (ASAT) and defensive-satellite (DSAT) weapon

The US decision on satellite weapons was recently kicked dow

the road, but could return quickly. Whether to station such 

system in space may be answered by the capability to deploy suc

a system on the ground. Testing is being continued at White Sand

Missile Range on a triservice high-energy laser. 

The offensive satellite weapon can be one of two type

destructive and nondestructive. The nondestructive type could b

used to temporarily disable an enemy’s satellite but not destroy 

using jamming, interference, or interception of its signal. Th

destructive type would use kinetic or collision destruction or mo

modern directed-energy weapons to permanently disable th

satellite. One such proposed system is the Broad Area Destructiv

Antisatellite System, or “BADASS.” The DSAT has a bett

chance of gaining world acceptance. 

Conclusion 

Air and space capability will dominate future wars. The U

must now concern itself with many areas of the globe versus ju

one adversary, the former Soviet Union. However, the proliferatio

of weapons will give a growing number of nations an opportuni

to increase their national power and lead them to eventual

attempt to exploit space as well as the more traditional mediums o

land and sea. Since the world’s economy is spreading, mo

460 
countries will be able to better exploit space and develop, bu

rent, and steal space assets for, their own use. 

Customary international law may be difficult to overcome 

developing needed space assets of the future, but there will be 

host of bad actors in the world with the means and capability to d

so, thereby wreaking havoc on US interests and objectives. U

space agencies and organizations must look for opportunities 

develop the right assets at the right time and have them available 

deploy rapidly in crisis situations. 

The current space force enhancers will need continu

refinement and modernization to keep up with the militar

technological revolution and its advantages. New missions o

space, space transportation, and defensive satellites, for exampl

will require incorporation into the new Air Force and joint doctrin

(Air Force Manual 2-25 and Joint Publication 3-14. respectively

currently being developed. 

The main lesson from the Gulf War is that space has its plac

on the winning side, with much room for improvement. Th

winning coalition forces showed how important it is to use asse

from not only the US but its many allies to respond to crises. Th

applies to the space environment as well. The US, with its state

demonstrated, and proven support of freedom throughout the ne

world, must provide the leadership in the realm of space that othe

will follow down the peaceful course. The US must also be able 

quickly observe any hostile intentions in space and aggressive

control, eliminate, or convince the hostile nation to desist in i

actions. 

The organization of space forces is an important consideratio

for our nation’s leaders. Should all services be responsible for 

piece of the pie, or is one service better suited to provide th

country the assets it needs? Perhaps a separate service, a “spac

force,” should be designated the fourth military arm. Gen Col

Powell has said, “If there is one thing I learned in the past tw

years, space is a new frontier of warfare. Land, sea, air, and space

461 
 Parochialism runs rampant in the military and often run

contrary to the best interests of the nation as a whole. Identifyin

an optimal service of responsibility is beyond the scope of th

chapter, but the idea of how best to organize space assets is on

that needs exploring and reexploring. Control of the “high ground

will remain possible only with continual advancement in spac

activity. 

462 
Notes 

1. Quoted in John T. Correll, “Slipping in Space,” Air Force Magazine 76 

(October 1993): 2. 

2. Jeffrey Rowe, “US Space Command: Managing Critical Military Assets 

Space and on the Ground,” Defense Electronics 24 (March 1992): 41. 

3. Alan D. Campen, “Gulf War’s Silent Warriors Bind US Units Via Space

Signal Magazine 46 (August 1991): 81. 

4. John T. Correll, “Fogbound in Space,” Air Force Magazine 77 (January 

1994): 22. 

5. National Space Council, Final Report to the President on the U.S. Space 

Program (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, January 1993), 

91. 

6. The National Space Council’s function was transferred into the vice 

president’s Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

7. Susan Koch, assistant director for strategic programs, US Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency, interview with author, February 1992. 

8. Rowe, 35. 

9. Gen Charles Horner, “Space Seen as Challenge: Military’s Final 

Frontier,” Defense Issues 8, no. 34 (1993): 1-10. 

10. Bruce D. Nordwall, “Imagination Only Limit to Military, Commercial 

Applications for GPS,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 135 (14 October 

1991): 60. 

11. “Scud Success,” New York Times, 21 November 1993, 13. 

12. Sheila Widnall, secretary of the Air Force, address to the Women in 

Aerospace Convention, El Segundo, Calif., 26 August 1993. 

13. James W. Canaan, “A Watershed in Space,” Air Force Magazine 74 

(August 1991): 32. 

14. Lt Gen Thad A. Wolfe, interview with author, 16 November 1992. 

15. Canaan, 36. 

16. Nordwall, 60. 

17. Correll, “Fogbound in Space,” 28. 

18. Horner, 34. 

19. “Patriot Missiles Less Successful Than Reported,” Los Angeles Times 

(Washington edition), 22 November 1993, B-7. 

20. Interim report of the Spacecast 2020 study group to Lt Gen Jay Kelley, 

commander, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 20 November 1993. 

21. Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz, eds., Space Mission Analysis and 

Design, 2d ed. (Torrance, Calif.: Microcosm, Inc.; Boston: Kluwer Academic 

Publishers, 1991), 185. 

22. Correll, “Fogbound in Space,” 25. 

23. Widnall, 2. 

24. Correll, “Fogbound in Space,” 22. 

25. Ibid., 24. Figures are taken from TRW’s Space Log. 

463 
y pg 

Exploration of and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestia

Bodies (also called the Outer Space Treaty) entered into force on 10 October 

1967. 

27. Carl Sagan, speaking with the Spacecast 2020 study group, Air War 

College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., via telelink from Cornell University, Ithaca. N.Y

1 November 1993. 

28. Quoted in “Air and Space Doctrine: Enduring Attributes and Emerging 

Opportunities.” USAF Air and Space Symposium, Maxwell AFB. Ala., May 

1993. 

464 
Conflict Termination 

Every War Must End 

Mario A. Garza 

Warfare has been a fascinating phenomenon in man’s histor

and the primary instrument of social change. Empires and sing

states have risen or fallen based on how they fared on th

battlefield. However, it is usually not the outcome of battles but th

way the conflict is terminated that has a long-term impact on th

future of the warring parties. 

There is no lack of literature on the study of waging war an

why wars were fought. However, historians and military strategis

have not devoted much literature to the complex and elusiv

concept of conflict termination. Fred Ikle, who wrote one of th

most thought-provoking books on the subject, stated: 

This imbalance in the understanding of past wars affects how political 

leaders and military planners will approach questions of war and peace in 

the future. Regarding the beginning of wars, they can call on historic 

data, rich concepts, and extensive prior planning: how to deter 

aggression, how diplomacy might avert the outbreak of war, how to 

mobilize forces, and how to design the initial military campaigns. Much 

less is known about how to bring a war, once started, to a satisfactory 

end. l 

Conflict termination may mean different things to differe

nations. When Americans go to war, we want to roll up ou

sleeves, rush into battle, crush the enemy, dust ourselves off, an

proceed with life as before. We tend to view war as an interruptio

of the normal state of peace. As Russell Wiegley seems to sugge

in The American Way of War: A History of United States Militar

Strategy and Policy, Americans want an unambiguous start, a sho

war, and total victory. 

2

 Unfortunately, our earnest desire for 

“better state of peace” frequently confronts the reality o

unanticipated political and social change. This has led to numerou

incongruencies between the national aims and the military mean

to achieve those aims. Some examples include the post-World W

465 
II Communist occupation in Eastern Europe, political and militar

failures during the Vietnam War, and continued hostilities an

military intervention after Operation Desert Storm. That our wa

haven’t ended neatly is frustrating, yet we have often eager

embraced minimally satisfying “settlements” to conflicts durin

the last 40 years. 

Conflict termination conjures up thoughts of peace, tranquilit

and the restoration of the peaceful conditions prevalent in th

preconflict period. This, however, oversimplifies the comple

nature of conflict termination. This chapter presents some bas

concepts on the nature of conflict termination and the cessation o

hostilities. It examines the issues involved in the confli

termination process. Finally, it covers what the campaign plann

must consider when planning a military campaign in terms o

conflict termination and the post-hostility activities. 

Nature of Conflict Termination 

The objective of the conflict termination phase is to restore th

peace found prior to the conflict. Conflict termination involve

more than merely ending hostilities. If this were the only criterio

then the nation’s leaders could simply decide to stop fighting. Fre

Ikle, in his seminal work on war termination, Every War Mu

End, states that military officers often fail to perceive that it is th

outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within 

that determines how well our campaigns serve the nation

interests. 3 An example from history illustrates this point very we

Three months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the emperor o

Japan asked the army chief of staff, Sugiyama, how long it wou

take the army to finish the war against the United States. Sugiyam

answered that the Japanese military would terminate operations 

the Pacific in three months. The emperor, knowing this could n

possibly be done in only three months, pointed out that Sugiyam

had previously told him the Manchurian campaign would be ov

in one month. The campaign had then been going on for over fou

years. Ikle observes: 

466 
p

gradually nor inadvertently, but by a considered and clear-cut decision, 

one would expect the Japanese military to have had some ideas about 

how they would reach a successful conclusion in the gigantic undertaking 

that they proposed. 4 

The Pearl Harbor attack was one of the most successful militar

operations in history. However, the attack did little to serve Japan

interests in the war. For Japan the outcome of the war wa

certainly not successful. Nations often devote great resources an

effort developing great militaries (means) and spend little effo

relating the means to their national aims and objectives (ends). 

Another example is Germany’s reaction after defeating Franc

in 1940 and driving the British forces from the Continent. Fie

Marshal Erich von Manstein states that “Hitler and O.K.W. foun

themselves wondering ‘What next?’ ...It was quite obvious th

prior to-or even during-the offensive in France, Germany

supreme command had no kind of ‘war plan’ to determine wh

measure should be taken once the victories it hoped for had bee

won.” 5 

One might question whether the Japanese and Germa

examples were the military’s failure or the politicians’ failure. Th

answer is both. The national political leaders determine the “ends

the national strategic objectives and. to some extent, the “means

the resources used to achieve the specified ends. Obviousl

decisions at this level are always political decisions. However, 

terminate the conflict on favorable terms, one must first consid

the nature of the conflict and one’s national objectives. A sta

would not risk its survival or commit all its resources for limite

political objective. Carl von Clausewitz wrote: 

War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single 

operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all 

particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his 

senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he 

intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The 

former is its political purpose: the latter its operational objective. This is 

the governing principle that will set its course, prescribe the scale of 

467 
q, g

down to the smallest operational detail. 6 

Next, a state must have a strategy to achieve its nation

strategic objective. This often “where the strategic process break

down because the national strategic objectives are obscure... 

Indeed, while the national policy goals often are reasonably we

articulated, rarely are these translated into strategic politica

military objectives expressed as end-states and attainab

supporting objectives.” 7 Next, the military leaders must develo

strategic and operational strategies that link the national strateg

objectives and military operational objectives. Basil H. Lidde

Hart, in his book Strategy, stated: 

Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and 

coordination of the ends and means. The end must be proportioned to the 

total means, and the means used in gaining each intermediate end which 

contributes to the ultimate must be proportionate to the value and the 

needs of the intermediate end—whether it be to gain an objective or to 

fulfill a contributory purpose. 8 

Furthermore, the military leaders must translate these “end

into executable military objectives and allocate the resources 

achieve the overall ends—the national strategic objectives. 

Conflict termination, then, should be viewed as the bridge ov

which armed conflict crosses into more peaceful forms o

interaction. Consequently, conflict termination is the study of ho

to connect military means and military ends to the larger politic

objectives of conflict. For the campaign planner, the issue is, Ho

does the operational commander translate the political or militar

objectives of a conflict into campaign termination conditions to b

achieved as the product of a campaign? 

Conflict Termination Process 

Conflict termination is a process in which each warring par

interacts with other belligerents to achieve its policy objective

within the limits of acceptable costs. Gay M. Hammerma

describes the beginning of the war-termination process as th

468 
point at which an informed, objective outside observer cou

predict the outcome of the war.” 9

 By this he means that w

termination’ is the point at which one side seems clearly destine

to achieve its national strategic objectives at the expense of i

adversary. The objective of the conflict termination phase is 

restore the peace found before the conflict. 

Conflict is a fact of international relations. Conflict at a

international level occurs when there is a disagreement of ideas o

national interests. For our purposes, we will use Bruce Clarke

definition: conflict is that “portion of a dispute where the use o

military power is contemplated or actually employed. Suc

disputes will go through a series of phases. Within each phas

there are forces at work that will cause the dispute to either mov

toward termination or toward hostilities.” 10 

The first phase of the conflict is the dispute. This occurs whe

two groups’ objectives are not compatible concerning some issu

For example, two states may disagree about the control ov

resources each side views as nonsharable. At this point, the dispu

is not “normally perceived in military terms by either party.” 11 T

solve the dispute, states will employ economic, political, o

diplomatic means, not military means. When a dispute arises, th

United States has historically emphasized the political an

economic solutions. For example, the United States offered gre

economic incentives to Egypt and Israel as part of the Camp Dav

Accords. Many times, the United States has a tendency to off

economic incentives or to deny the potential adversary econom

benefits as an inducement to act in the desired manner. 

When political and economic instruments of power a

ineffective in producing the desired results, the next step is 

either change our objectives or transition to the second phase-th

prehostility phase. In this phase either of the parties to the dispu

introduces the military option. This may include a show of forc

movement of military units, increased levels of readiness, parti

mobilization, and so on. Clarke states that the introduction’ of 

469 
military option does not mean that hostilities have begun, only th

the possibility exists that they may begin sometime in the future. 

Clarke states that ‘‘as objectives become more firmly held an

the possibility of compromise lessens, the conflict may transitio

to the third phase-the commencement of hostilities.” 12 During th

hostilities phase, armed conflict occurs with the aim of achievin

military objectives. Thus, if objectives still do not change, th

probability of continued hostilities increases and settleme

decreases. If both sides change their objectives, the dispute wi

move toward settlement. 

Next, once hostilities are terminated, the conflict moves to th

fourth phase, posthostilities. Clarke observes that during the “pos

hostility phase the conflict may well continue, but the fighting i

at least temporarily, suspended. ...If the quarrel cannot mov

toward some form of nonviolent resolution, it can return to th

hostility phase. However, once in use, or consideration, of militar

means ceases, the conflict ends.” 13 

In the fifth stage, the dispute stage, the state discards th

military option, but there are still issues in dispute. The warrin

states have ended the conflict but not the dispute. 

The sixth and final phase is the settlement. Historically, warrin

states rarely settle their conflicts. Clarke also states lat “frequent

the dispute cycles back to the beginning of the process. Often th

seeds of the next conflict are sown in the resent one.” 14 This 

especially true if there is no clear vision [the desired end stat

Within each phase “there are forces at work that will cause th

dispute to either move toward termination or toward hostilities.” 

Herein lies the challenge campaign planners must deal with 

conflict termination. 

Types of Conflict Termination 

There are several ways conflicts can be ended, according 

William O. Staudenmaier. The first is that states can termina

470 
conflicts by armistices, truces, and cease-fires. Surrenders a

usually preceded by a cease-fire or an armistice. The second majo

way that conflicts end is a formal peace treaty. However, due to th

time required to negotiate them, formal peace treaties are le

likely to be the vehicle for ending conflicts. The Camp Dav

Accords are a recent example of such a peace treaty that attemp

to manage the Arab-Israeli dispute. The third major way of endin

a conflict is the “joint political agreement.” This type of agreeme

between the warring parties usually stipulates how they will en

the conflict and maintain peace. One example of such a politic

agreement is the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restorin

Peace in Vietnam” that provided for a cease-fire througho

Vietnam, withdrawal of US troops, release of prisoners of wa

restoration of the demarcation line between North and Sou

Vietnam, and the creation of an international body to supervise th

truce. The fourth major way of terminating a conflict 

capitulation. The final form of conflict termination is th

unilaterally withdrawal of a belligerent from active participation 

the conflict. Somalia’s withdrawal from Ethiopia in 1978 in th

wars for the Ogaden region and China’s withdrawal fro

Vietnam’s border regions are examples of this form of terminatio

Obviously, the nature of the national objectives in the conflict an

the nature of the dispute will determine the method of confli

termination. It is also possible that terminating a conflict ma

involve a combination of methods. 16 

Environmental Factors 

To get a better idea of what is necessary and possible, one mu

understand the environment of the conflict. The nature of th

environment is a direct result of, and is defined by, several factor

The first factor is domestic politics, including public support fo

the objectives being sought. The influence of domestic politic

affects the conflict objectives (ends) and public opinion. Recall th

turmoil in the United States during the Vietnam War and ho

471 
internal politics affected the way the nation prosecuted the wa

Michael Handel wrote: 

Most of the historical accounts of the process of w

termination refer in great detail to the inner struggles betwee

those who want to continue the war and those who advocate i

conclusion. Among the forces that participate in this process, w

can cite the government and its leaders, the opposition parties, th

military elite and the rank-and-file armed forces, and publ

opinion. 17 

A second factor is the degree of third-party involvement in th

conflict. An example is the influence of international organization

such as the United Nations. Furthermore, in earlier times, befo

the universal impact of mass media, nations were less constraine

by world opinion. Aggressive states could prepare and comple

their offensive actions before organized multinational oppositio

could be formed. For example, Japan’s aggression again

Manchuria in 1931 went unnoticed by most of the world, includin

the League of Nations, because communications from such 

distant area were slow and not very accurate. Today, partly due 

the influence of the mass media and instant worldwid

communications, no nation is an island unto itself. 

A third major environmental factor-whether the war is foug

unilaterally or by a coalition-has a tremendous influence on th

postcombat phase. The old adage, the enemy of my enemy is m

friend, is a truism that binds together unlikely bedfellows whe

common national interests are threatened. When the commo

enemy is defeated, however, the reasons for cooperation an

harmony among members of the coalition become less importan

According to Stuart Albert and Edward Lucke: 

In the immediate post-war period it is likely that in certain areas harmony 

will prevail, while in others the situation will be one of dissension. The 

mixture of discord and cooperation will fall somewhere along a 

functional continuum. It is as possible for an alliance to continue in name 

with little real content as it is to imagine an end to formal ties followed 

by extensive cooperation. 18 

472 
The wartime alliance against Germany in World War I is a goo

example. After the war, England and the United States wanted 

rebuild Germany and reestablish their prewar commercial an

financial relationships. They reasoned that this would be the be

way to bring Germany back into the community of nations. Franc

however, in view of its security concerns and the ill will created b

the 1870 German-imposed peace conditions, wanted a hars

retributive and militarized peace. 19 The result was a treaty th

sowed the seeds for World War II. 

A fourth major environmental factor is the conflict objective

which will affect how states terminate the conflict. A confli

objective should clearly state what the peace should look lik

immediately after the conflict. Clausewitz told us that war is a

extension of politics by the use of arms. He points out that all o

our efforts should focus on creating the conditions that will allo

the state to achieve its political objectives. If we keep in min

Liddell Hart’s warning to look beyond the battlefield with th

purpose of creating a “better state of peace,” it will require 

strategic vision of the desired end state. The desired end state 

what we envision the postconflict environment to look lik

politically, socially, and militarily. 

At the political level, a state is victorious when it accomplishe

its political objectives. One should also bear in mind Liddell Hart

views on victory: 

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after 

effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost 

certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another 

war. This is a lesson supported by abundant experience. The risks 

become greater still in any war that is waged by a coalition, or in such a 

case a too complete victory inevitably complicates the problem of 

making a just and wise peace settlement. Where there is no longer the 

counterbalance of an opposing force to control the appetites of the 

victors, there is no check on the conflict of views and interests between 

the parties to the alliance. The divergence is then apt to become so acute 

as to turn the comradeship of common danger into the hostility of mutual 

dissatisfaction-so that the ally of one war becomes the enemy in the next. 20 

473 
Again, the key is to be able to clearly define the politic

conditions of the envisioned end state. Next, the military leade

must translate the political conditions into a set of national militar

objectives. As Clarke states, “This is not as easy as it sounds, On

must be able to envision what is necessary to do to cause th

opponent to change his political and resultant military objectives

21 Thus, one must overcome the adversary’s will to resist. If th

military leaders know the environment, the opponent, and th

objectives in the conflict, their strategists will have a more realist

chance to overcome the enemy’s will to resist. 

The best test of a successful conflict-termination plan 

whether the “vanquished” party embraces the outcome. Unle

total annihilation of the enemy is achieved, as in Rome’s last w

with Carthage, conflict termination must consider the needs of th

defeated, both domestically and internationally, H. A. Calaha

writes, “War is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by th

vanquished. Therefore, to determine the causes of peace, it 

always necessary to take the vanquished’s point f view.” 22 Failu

to structure the postconflict peace with the vanquished’s needs 

mind is the first step towards starting the next war. 

Implications for Conflict Termination 

If its interests are directly threatened, the United States 

willing to use military force in pursuit of its objectives. “A stron

US military posture, backed by domestic, political, and popul

support as well as resolve to protect US interests, conveys th

firmness of US commitments to allies and friends, thereb

enhancing deterrence and increasing the incentives for adversarie

to seriously negotiate toward favorable outcomes.” 23 Th

challenge for the campaign planner is to define the militar

conditions and relate those conditions to the national objective

based on the nature of the conflict scenario. Consequently, a

James Reed points out: 

474 
ppy y g 

important one, since it requires careful dialogue between civilian 

(strategic) and military (operational) leadership that may, in turn, offer 

some greater assurance that the defined end state is both politically 

acceptable and militarily attainable. 24 

For the campaign planner, conflict termination is a phase o

military operations that must be considered early in the campaign

planning process. Furthermore, campaign planners must plan th

conflict-termination issues in full coordination with war fightin

As John Fishel points out, the state’s political and military leade

need to define the political and military objectives in clear

defined end-state terms with supporting objectives that are bo

military and civil-military in nature. 25 One must ask, What do w

want the situation to look like after the conflict phase? What is th

nature of the settlement that we seek? If the campaign planner doe

not know the answers to these questions, he or she must ask! 

As Michael Rampy points out, “Effective conflict terminatio

requires a continuous discussion and decision process betwee

[sic] political decision makers, military strategists and the theat

commander.” 26 The national political leaders will ultimate

decide when and, many times, how to terminate a conflic

However, these decision makers rely on senior military leaders fo

advice on terminating the conflict, The theater command

translates the political objectives into the operational design 

coerce the adversary and induce conflict termination. He is in th

best position to assess what is possible in the theater of operation

and whether his forces can achieve the desired end state, 

The campaign planners must identify a distinct confli

termination phase in their plan. They must not wait until aft

hostilities cease to begin thinking about termination issues an

posthostility activities. Fred Ikle warned that military planne

should not take the first steps toward war without considering th

last steps. Consequently, every aspect of the campaign plan such 

target selection, rules of engagement, forces employed, an

psychological operations should be designed and evaluate

475 
according to contributions made or the effect upon the clear

defined end state to be achieved. 27 Furthermore, the campaig

planner must, according to Reed, “define the operation

conditions to be produced during the terminal phase of th

campaign in explicit, unambiguous terms. The absence o

definition or detail in operational objectives may produc

unintended consequences in the course of a campaign,” 28 Th

should prompt increased communication between the civilian an

military leadership, ensuring congruence between operation

objectives and the larger policy aims of a campaign. 

Rampy also states that once military forces engage in conflic

the political leaders must provide direction for the “operation

design” without interfering with military operations. Conversel

the military leaders must maintain a broad-minded view o

strategic and operational design: 

Many roads lead to success, and ...they do not all involve the opponent’s 

outright defeat, They range from the destruction of the enemy’s forces, 

the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to 

projects with an immediate political purpose.... Anyone of these may be 

used to overcome the enemy’s will: the choice depends on 

circumstances....bear in mind how a wide range of political interests can 

lead to war, or think for a moment of the gulf that separates a war of 

annihilation, a struggle for political existence, from a war reluctantly 

declared in consequence of political pressure or of an alliance that no 

longer seems to reflect the state’s true interests. Between these two 

extremes lie numerous gradations. 29 

The military is only one element in conflict termination. It mu

cooperate with other government agencies to deal with th

political, economic, and informational issues arising in 

posthostility situation. 

Postconflict Activities 

The cessation of hostilities is not the last step in confli

termination. The last step is the effective implementation o

postconflict activities. As mentioned above, warring states hav

rarely achieved the sixth phase of conflict termination-settlemen

476 
Many times the underlying causes of the dispute remai

Postconflict activities occur in this type of environment. Militar

postconflict activities may include humanitarian assistance, natio

assistance, civil affairs, and possibly peace operations. “Th

objective of these activities is to restore order and tranquility to 

previously hostile environment,” 30 These postconflict activities tr

to meet the needs of the noncombatants. 

Critical to the success is the unity of effort by three main group

of players. The first group of players are the government agencie

such as the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA

Agency for International Development (AID), US Informatio

Agency (USIA), Justice Department, Commerce Department, an

others. The second group of players includes allies, coalitio

partners, United Nations, intergovernmental organizations (IGO

and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Unity of effort amon

these groups of players is essential for successful planning an

execution of civil-military operations. Interagency coordination 

an absolute must. As always, the fundamental question that shou

be asked is. What do we want the situation to look like after th

conflict when order is restored? The answer to this will dictate th

level of involvement and planning requited for conductin

postconflict activities. 

To be successful in conflict termination, the military mu

provide a secure and stable environment for the conduct o

postconflict activities. As Rampy points out: 

Therefore, post-conflict activities will most likely begin with a 

predominance of military control and influence and progressively move 

toward civilian dominance as hostilities wane. Conflict termination must 

be an element of operational design to prevent an uncontrollable situation 

during post-conflict activities. While the political decision makers have 

the official responsibility for conducting post-conflict activities, the 

military’s organizational ability in applying resources rapidly in a crisis 

means that they will have the most de facto lead in most post-conflict 

activities until a smooth transition can be made to civilian control. 31 

This was certainly the case in the post-Desert Storm activitie

especially with Operation Provide Comfort. According to Fishel, 

477 
gg 

Hussein gave the Kurds of northern Iraq just the impetus they required to 

rebel. But when Iraqi forces assumed an offensive posture and the United 

States led coalition took no action to stop Saddam, the rebellion fell 

apart. Jubilation turned to panic as hundreds of thousands of Kurds 

abandoned their homes and sought refuge over the borders of 

neighboring Turkey and Iran. 32 

The Kurdish refugees in Turkey fled above the snow line on th

grounds that the Iraqi forces would not follow them. Thousand

would die each day due to disease, malnutrition, and exposur

After media reports of the Kurdish refugee situation attracted th

world’s attention, President Bush directed US forces to beg

humanitarian assistance operations to help the Kurds. Besides th

military organizations, the USAID, State Department, IGO, NGO

and other agencies got involved. The military had to stop the dyin

and “stabilize the situation,” According to Fishel, “providin

security for the refugees was a major part of the story of Operatio

Provide Comfort.” 33 Thus, Operation Provide comfort represen

one of the postconflict operations that the United States ha

embarked upon in the recent past, postconflict activities are a

essential part of conflict termination. 

Conclusion 

Conflict termination involves more than merely ending th

hostilities. It involves the transition from war to peace. The go

after any conflict should be a better state of peace. For us, confli

termination is the study of how to connect military means an

military ends to the larger political objectives of a conflict. 

To avoid Ikle’s criticism, military officers should recognize th

it’s the outcome of the war, not the outcome of their operation

campaigns, that determines how well the campaigns serve th

nation’s interests. The military must translate the initial politic

and military objectives of a conflict into conflict-terminatio

conditions that will achieve the desired end state of the campaign. 

478 
This is the challenge for the campaign planners, who mu

identify a conflict-termination phase early in the campaign

planning process. Every aspect of the campaign plan shou

contribute to achieving the desired end state. By taking th

elements of conflict termination into account, campaign planne

will contribute to the successful termination of future conflicts. I

the future these planners will realize that the effective conflic

termination plans will contribute to outcomes that serve th

nation’s interests. 

479 
Notes 

1. Fred C. Ikle, Every War Must End, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1991), vii. 

2. Russell Wiegley, American Way of War: A History of United States 

Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 

1973). passim. 

3. Ikle, 2. 

4, Ibid., 3. 

5. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, ed. and trans. Anthony G. Powell 

(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), 152-53. 

6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). 

7. John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination an

Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 2. 

8. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Meridian, 1967), 322

23. 

9. Gay M. Hammerman, Conventional Attrition and Battle Termination 

Criteria: A Study of War Termination (Loring, Va.: Defense Nuclear Agency 

Report no. DNA-TR-81-224, August 1982), 11. 

10. Bruce B. G. Clarke, “Conflict Termination: A Rational Model,” in 

Terrorism (Bristol, Pa.: Taylor & Francis, 1993), 28. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Ibid., 31. 

17. Michael Handel, “War Termination—A Critical Survey” in Termination 

of Wars: Processes, Procedures and Aftermaths, ed. Nissan Oren (Jerusalem: 

Hebrew University Press, 1982), 75. 

18. Stuart Albert and Edward Lucke, On the Endings of Wars (New York: 

Kennikat Press Corp., 1980), 75. 

19. Ibid., 86. 

20. Hart, 366. 

21. Clarke, 34. 

22. H. A. Calahan, What Makes a War End? (New York: Vanguard Press, 

1944), 18. 

23. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Th

War, final draft (Washington, D.C.: Defense Printing Service, 1993), B-2. 

24. James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaig

Planning,” Parameters, Summer 1993, 14. 

25. Fishel, 69. 

26. Michael R. Rampy, “The Endgame: Conflict Termination and PostConflict Activities,” Military Review, October 1992, 50. 

27. Reed, 49. 

28. Ibid. 

480 
, 

30. Rampy, 53. 

31. Ibid., 54. 

32, Fishel, 51. 

33. Ibid., 56. 

481 
Contributors 

Lt Col Anthony D. Alley is a 

USAF command pilot with tours 

in RF-4C and T -37 aircraft. He 

currently serves as the Chief, 

Curriculum Development 

Division, Associate Programs, Air 

Command and Staff College. He 

holds a MEd from the University 

of Oklahoma and is a graduate of 

the Royal Air Force Staff College 

Advanced Staff Course. 

Dr H. David Arnold is a 

professor of defense economics at 

the Air Force Air Command and 

Staff College. His current 

academic concentration lies in the 

economy of the Russian 

Federation and the aligned 

political stability. 

Dr James S. Corum holds 

graduate degrees from Brown and 

Oxford universities and a PhD in 

history from Queen’s University, 

Canada. Dr Corum is professor of 

comparative military studies at the 

USAF School of Advanced 

Military Studies at Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama, where he 

teaches courses in air power 

history and low-intensity conflict. 

Lt Col Bradley S. Davis is 

currently on the faculty of Air 

Command and Staff College. He 

holds a BA in history from U

and an MS in organizational 

behavior and human resource 

management from Chapman 

University and has completed 

Squadron Officer School, Ma

Corps Command and Staff 

College, and Air War College

Most recently, he worked at 

Headquarters, USAF, with 

responsibility for the policy a

implementation of arms contr

treaties for the Air Force. 

Maj Rail M. Dobberstein, A

Command and Staff College, 

received her MA degree in 

sociology in 1983 from Arizo

State University. She is an 

intelligence operations officer 

specializing in imagery 

interpretation. 

Maj Martin L. Fracker is a 

member of the faculty at the A

Command and Staff College. 

holds a degree in cognitiveexperimental psychology, 198

from the University of Illinoi

Urbana-Champaign. Previous 

assignments are Sheppard 

Technical Training Center, A

Force Occupational Measurem

Center, and Harry G. Armstro

Aerospace Medical Research 

Laboratory. 

483 
Lt Col Mario A. Garza is the 

course director for campaign 

termination studies at the Air 

Command and Staff College and a 

former assistant professor of 

military studies at the US Air 

Force Academy. He was a B-52 

radar navigator instructor and is a 

graduate of Squadron Officer 

School and Air Command and 

Staff College. 

Dr Paul Hacker is a foreign 

service officer detailed for the 

1993-94 academic year as a 

visiting instructor to the Air 

Command and Staff College, 

Maxwell AFB. He has served 20 

years in the US Foreign Service 

specializes in East European 

affairs. His last assignment was as 

first charge d’affaires at the US 

Embassy in Slovakia. 

Maj Victor Janushkowsky is a 

student at the Air Command and 

Staff College. He began his career 

in the Minuteman missile 

program. He was assigned to the 

National Security Agency, Fort 

Meade, Maryland; US Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency 

(State Dept); Headquarters USAF; 

and Secretary of the Air Force/ 

International Affairs, the 

Pentagon, as Russia/Eurasia 

country director. He holds a BS 

from California State University, 

Sacramento, an MBA from th

Force Institute of Technology 

Minuteman Education Progra

and is working on a masters 

degree in political science at 

Auburn University. 

Maj Richard M. Kessel is a 

graduate of Embry-Riddle 

Aeronautical University and w

awarded an MBA from Golde

Gate University in 1988. He i

senior pilot and has logged ov

3,000 hours in F-15s, AT-38B

and helicopters. His assignme

prior to the Air Command and 

Staff College include stints at 

Eglin AFB, Florida; Holloma

AFB, New Mexico; Minot AF

North Dakota; Elmendorf AF

Alaska; and a staff tour in MP

Randolph AFB Texas. 

Maj Joseph W. Kroeschel is 

student at the Air Command a

Staff College. He received a B

management from Texas; 

Lutheran College and a MS in 

management from the Naval 

Postgraduate School. Major 

Kroeschel is a 1981 Officer 

Training School graduate and 

worked as a personnel officer 

base level, the Air Staff, and A

Force Manpower and Personn

Center. 

Dr Karl P. Magyar is profes

of national security affairs at 

484 
Air Command and Staff College. 

He studied in Mexico and 

Germany, and obtained a BA in 

philosophy from Michigan State 

University, and a PhD in political 

science from John Hopskins 

University. He has held academic 

posts in the US, Japan, and South 

Africa; served in the US 

government in Washington, D.C., 

and Africa; and served as 

Economic Development Adviser 

to an African government. 

Lt Col Maris McCrabb is 

assigned as a department chairman 

at the USAF Air Command and 

Staff College. He is a command 

pilot with over 3,000 hours in F-4 

and F-16. He has MS degrees in 

business management and public 

administration. He has completed 

Squadron Office School, Air 

Command and Staff College, and 

Air War College. 

Lt Col Albert U. Mitchum, Jr., 

is a member of the staff at Air 

Command and Staff College. He 

served as International Officer 

Liaison, chief of the Nuclear 

Warfare Branch of resident school 

curriculum, and finally as Dean of 

Associate Programs at Air 

Command and Staff College. He 

received his doctorate in public 

administration from the University 

of Alabama in 1994. He is 

attending the Argentine War 

College for the academic year 

1994. 

Lt Comdr Paul G. O’Conno

an Air Command and Staff 

College student, class of 1994

Comdr O’Connor is a Naval F

Officer, having flown the E-2

Hawkeye early warning aircra

He is a 1981 graduate of Sien

College, N.Y., and received a 

masters degree in political sci

from Auburn University of 

Montgomery in 1994. 

Maj John R. Pardo, Jr., rece

a bachelor of science degree i

military history from the USA

Academy in 1979 and a maste

science degree in internationa

relations from Troy State 

University in 1990. He is a se

pilot with over 1,500 hours in 

F-4 and F-16. He is a graduat

Air Command and Staff Colle

where he is currently on staff

Maj Thomas J. Stark is a se

pilot with over 1,000 hours of 

instructor experience in the K

135 and KC-10 aircraft. He h

a bachelor of science degree i

international affairs from the 

USAF Academy and a master 

business administration degre

Aviation from Embry-Riddle 

Aeronautical University. 

Currently, Major Stark is the 

chief, War and Conflict Branc

485 
for the Air Command and Staff 

College nonresident program. 

Col John A. Warden III is 

commandant, Air Command and 

Staff College. He is the author of 

the Air Campaign, was a major 

Gulf War planner, and has been a 

wing commander and special 

assistant to the vice president of 

the United States. 

Dr Lewis B. Ware is course 

director for the war, conflict and 

military objectives block of 

instruction at the Air Command 

and Staff College and former chief 

of the Political-Military Affairs 

Division at the College of 

Aerospace Doctrine, Research, 

and Education, Air University. He 

is a Middle East specialist with 

research interests in Islamism and 

Arab North Africa. 

Maj Steven W. Zander (BS in 

government, University of 

Maryland, 1985; BS/MA 

architecture, University of 

Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 

1975/1980) was an Air Command 

and Staff College student in 1994. 

After attending Officer Training 

School in 1979 he has had tours in 

civil engineering, including beddown of the air launched cruise 

missile at Griffiss AFB, N.Y.; 

working air base survivability 

issues at Headquarters USAFE, 

Ramstein AB, Germany; bedd

of the ground launched cruise 

missile at Florenes AB, Belgi

working rail garrison basing a

Norton AFB, California; and 

served as executive officer to 

civil engineer, Headquarters 

USAFE, Washington, D.C. 

. 

486