Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards

June 1977

NTIS order #PB-275843
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C. OLIN E. TEAGUE, TEX.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN. MoRRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ. W ASHINGTO N, D.C. 20510

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.

RICHARO S. SCHWEIKER, PA. CLARENCE E. MILLER, OHIO

TED STEVENS, ALASKA LARRY WINN, JR., KANS.

EMILIO Q. DADDARIO

Honorable Abraham A. Ribicof f

Chairman, Committee on Government

Af f airs

United States Senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Board of the Office of Technology Assessment,

we are pleased to forward this report Nuclear Proliferation

and Safeguards.

The report consists of two volumes: the first covers the

findings and analysis, the second consists of the appendices

of supporting

of Technology

request.

In accordance

and impartial

documentation. It was prepared by the Office

Assessment in response to your Committee’s

with OTA policy, this report provides a balanced

analysis of the various initiatives proposed

to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons proliferation.

The technical, institutional and political options discussed

in the report are set in the context of both alternative energy

perspectives and the various nuclear reactor fuel cycles to

which they relate. We hope that this report will be useful to

your Committee and the entire Congress in debating and resolving

the best course for the country in prevention of the spread of

nuclear weapons capabilities.

cc : Honorable John H. Glenn

Honorable Charles H. Percy

ii
T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT B OAR D

EDWARd M. KENNEDY, MAsS., CHAIRMAN

MARJORIE S. HOLT, MD., VICE CHAIR MAN OFFICE

ERNEsT F. HOLLINGS, S.C. OLIN E. TEAGuE, TEX.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, M INN. MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ.

CLI FFORD P. CASE, N.J, GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER , PA. CLARENCE E. MILLER, OHlO

TED STEVENS , ALASKA LARRY wINN. JR., KANS .

EMILIO Q. DADDARIo

DIRECTOR

OF TECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT DANIEL V . DE S I MO N E

WASHINGTON , D.C. 20510 D EPUTY DIRECTO R

June 30, 1977

Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

Chairman

Technology Assessment Board

Off ice of Technology Assessment

United States Congress

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The enclosed report, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, presents

OTA’s analysis of the risk of further spread of nuclear weapons,

and the relation of that risk to the peaceful use of nuclear

technology.

This assessment, prepared under the direction of the OTA Energy

Program, was requested by Senators Abraham Ribicoff, John Glenn,

and Charles Percy of the Senate Committee on Government Operations.

The purpose was to provide a comprehensive analysis of technological

factors and potential options to assist Congress in evaluating

national and foreign policy relevent to nuclear proliferation.

In addition to extensive internal review, the report has been

reviewed by the Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards Advisory

Panel, the Energy Program Advisory Committee, the Technology

Assessment Advisory Council, and others. The report addresses the

motivations for nations and non-state groups to obtain nuclear

weapons and the routes they could follow in doing so. A balanced

analysis of the policy options available for combatting the problem

is presented. The options are arranged to correspond with the

responses that follow from three different perceptions of the risks

of proliferation relative to the need for nuclear energy: energy

priority, non-proliferation priority, and shared priority.

The study concludes that the complex and difficult problem of

proliferation is controllable only by hard and controversial choices

111
Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

Page Two

by many nations over which the U.S. has only limited influence.

Within these limits, however, there are many options for reducing

the probability of proliferation. The desirability of these

options depends not only on their effectiveness and feasibility,

but also on perceptions of the importance of non-proliferation

relative to other national choices.

Proliferation has emerged as a major concern in both the Congress

and the Executive Department. Several bills have already been

introduced in Congress, and the President has elevated non-proliferation to one of his highest foreign policy objectives. The

OTA report should prove useful to the Congress in its consideration

of these bills.

Director

Enclosure - 1

iv
Acknowledgments

This report was prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment Energy

Program Staff. The staff wishes to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of

the following contractors and consultants in the collection of information.

Jerry J. Cadwell

Barry M. Casper

Robert Clark

Thomas Cotton

L. Douglas DeNike

John Deutch

Warren H, Donnelly

Richard Garwin

Theodore Greenwood

The Hudson Institute Jack Ruina

AlIan Krass Science Applications, Inc.

John R. Lamarsh O. F. Schuette

Barbara G. Levi Benjamin Snavely

Sarah J. Miller Stanford Research Institute

C. Bradley Moore Lorin Stieff

Robert Mullen Alan Westin

John N. O’Brien

The Rand Corporation

Task Force on Nuclear Weapons

J. Carson Mark, Chairman

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Thomas B. Cook

Sandia Laboratories

George B. Kistiakowsky”

Harvard University

*Also a member of the advisorvJ panel.

The

The

The

The

The

The

The

The following government agencies also

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Department of Defense

Department of State

Robert W. Selden

Lawrence Livermore University

Theodore B. Taylor*

Princeton University

provided assistance:

Energy Research and Development Administration

European Atomic Energy Community

International Atomic Energy Agency

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

v
Office of Technology Assessment

OTA ENERGY ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Milton Katz, Ckairrnm

Director, International Legal Studies, Harvard Law

Thomas C. Ayers George E. Mueller

President and Chairman

of the Board

Commonwealth Edison Company

Kenneth E. Boulding

Professor of Economics

Institute of Behavioral Science

University of Colorado

Eugene G. Fubini

Fubini Consultants, Ltd.

Levi (J. M.) Leathers

Executive Vice President

Dow Chemical USA

School

President and Chairman of the Board

System Development Corporation

Gerard Piel

Publisher, Scientific American

John F. Redmond, Retired

Shell Oil Company

John C. Sawhill

President

New York University

Chauncey Starr

President, Electric Power

Research Znstitute

Wassily Leontief

Department of Economics

New York University

OTA Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Energy Program Manager

Alan T. Crane, Project Director

A. Buyrn

Marvin C. Ott

Support Staff

Linda Parker, Joanne Seder, Lisa Jacobson

vi
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS ADVISORY PANEL

Thomas L. Hughes, Panel Chairman

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Frederick S. Carney Herbert Scoville

Southern Methodist Llniversity Consultant

Thomas B. Cochran Henry De Wolf Smyth

Natural Resources Defense Council Princeton University

David D. Comey George J. Stathakis

Citizens for a Better Enviironment General Electric Company

Chester L. Cooper Theodore B. Taylor

Institute for Energy Analysis Princeton University

William A. Higinbotham Alvin M. Weinberg

Brookhaven National Laboratory Institute for Energy Analysis

Leonid Hurwicz Mason Willrich

University of Minnesota University of Virginia

George B. Kistiakowsky Cyrus R. Vance*

Harvard University Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett

George Quester

Cornell University

*Resigned effective January 1, 1977
Preface

This study has been undertaken in response to a request from the Senate

Committee on Government Operations (now the Committee on Governmental

Affairs) to help provide Congress with the capability to “independently evaluate

the policymaking activities of our Government and other nations and be prepared to take legislative actions” with regard to nuclear proliferation and

safeguards.

This report has been prepared by the Energy Program of OTA with the

assistance of an advisory panel of 16 members from industry, Government, and

academia, who have reviewed draft material for each section of the report and

have periodically met to comment on the course of the study and provide guidance to the staff. The advisory panel provided advice and critique throughout the

assessment, but does not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse the report,

for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

The Technology Assessment Board approves the release of this report, which

identifies a range of viewpoints on a significant issue facing the U.S. Congress.

The views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Board, OTA

Advisory Council, or of individual members thereof.

vii
Contents

II

CHAPTER

I INTRODUCTION ... *.. ... ... **. **. ... ..** ... * **9*....*

PAST APPROACHES TO PROLIFERATION CONTROL. .

KEY FACTORS FOR NEW POLICY INITIATIVES. . . . . . . .

DEFINITION OF PROLIFERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THIS STUDY. . . . . . . . . . . . .

ISSUES, FINDINGS, AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . .

PROLIFERATION ISSUES AND FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Problem—Issues 1 through 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Control—Issues 15 through 24. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Incentives and Disincentives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Non-State Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sources of Nuclear Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Diversion from Commercial Nuclear Power Systems.

III

Dedicated Facilities. . . . . .

Purchase and Theft. . . . . .

Control of Proliferation . . . .

Safeguards. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Institutions,

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Agreements, and Sanctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of Routes to Nuclear Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Nuclear Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

POLICY IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ENERGY PRIORITY PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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SHARED PRIORITY PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Policy ..,...... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ... ..$..

A NONPROLIFERATION POLICY INVENTORY

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Demand Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supply Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technological Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime . . . . . .

Global and Regional Arrangements . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

..s.$ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Measures Concerning Non-State Adversaries (NSAS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Policy Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Iv INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR PROLIFERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GENERAL INCENTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Deference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Increased International Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Domestic Political Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Economic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Increased Strategic Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Strategic Hedge Against Military and Political Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“A Weapon of Last Resort” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

As an Instrument of the Third World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GENERAL DISINCENTIVES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Diversion of Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Adverse Public Opinion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Disruption of Assured Security Guarantees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unfeasibility of a Desired Nuclear Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Adverse International Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Adverse Reactions by Adversaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Advocacy of Neutralist Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MOTIVATIONS OF EXISTING WEAPONS STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The U.S. and Soviet Programs . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Case of Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Case of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Case of the People’s Republic of China

The Case of India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Net Assessment of Existing Nuclear States.

CASE STUDIES OF NTH COUNTRIES. . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v THE NON-STATE ADVERSARY

THE NATUREOFNON-STATE ADVERSARIES AND THEIR ACTS. . . . . . . . . . . .

The Spectrum of Potential Nuclear Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Record of Nuclear Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Origins of Increased Concern About the Non-State Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Growth of International Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Potential Nuclear Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Organized Crime as a Potential Nuclear Non-State Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear Hoaxes: Psychotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assessment of Threat Credibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS . . . . . . . . .

A Brief Framework of Civil Liberties Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Most Likely Size of a Plutonium Recycle Industry in the Near Future . . . .

Safeguard Measures for a Plutonium Industry and Their Civil Liberties Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Three Positions Held in U.S. Society as to the Civil Liberties Risks of Plutonium

Recycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VI NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NUCLEAR FISSION EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Low-Technology Nuclear Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Second Stage of a National Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Thresholds of Fissile Material forgetting Physical Security Requirements. . . . .

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VII SOURCES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

DIVERSION FROM COMMERCIAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Fuel Cycle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Light Water Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Canadian Deuterium Reactor (CANDU). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Thorium Fuel Cycles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

High-Temperature, Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Light-Water Breeder Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of Reactors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Research Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alternate Fuel Cycles and Nonproliferating Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

105

108

111

115

115

115

116

117

118

121

123

124

125

125

127

128

128

129

131

139

139

139

141

142

143

144

146

151

151

151

152

158

159

160

161

162

163

169

169

xi
DEDICATED FACILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

Weapons Program Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Level I Plutonium Production Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

Level I Reprocessing Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Level II Plutonium Production Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Level land Level II Enrichment Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Advanced Isotope Separation Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Detection of Dedicated Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

PURCHASE AND THEFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Black Market......,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Gray Market. ...,..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Countermeasures to Black and Gray Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Theft of Nuclear Weapons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

VIII CONTROL OF PROLIFERATION ● ...0.. ...0..,. ...0..0. . . . . . . . . ● .0.0,.. . . . . . 193

IX

x

SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

U.S, Domestic Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Domestic Safeguards Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Physical Security Outside the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

IAEA Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF PROLIFERATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

International Atomic Energy Agency, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Euratom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

The Role of Sanctions in Nonproliferation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Multinational Fuel Cycle Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

The Suppliers’ Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

The Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Conclusion and Prognosis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

COMPARISON OF ROUTES TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

PROJECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT.... . . . . . . . . 245

Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

Enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

Reprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

U,S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

GLOSSARY 261

INDEX 267

xii
LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE NO. PAGE

1l–l—Light-Water Reactor Fuel Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

11–2—Reactor Systems Resistance to Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

1ll–l—Previous Policy and Future Policy Priorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

111–2—Scope for Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

111–3—Selection Criteria for Policy Priorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

V–la—Total Number of Incidents of International Terrorism, 1968-1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

V–lb—Total Number of Deaths in Incidents of International Terrorism, 1968-1976. . . . . . 119

V–2—International and Translational Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-75. . . . . . . . . 120

V–3—Number of Deaths per Incident of Terrorism Involving Any Deaths 1968-1976 (October 6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

V–4—The Projected LWR Industry, 1980-2000 with U and Pu Recycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

VII–l—Power Reactor Characteristics (For Units > 500 MWe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

VI1–2—Summary of the Diversion Points in the LWR Fuel Cycle...,.....,,.. . . . . . . . . . 157

VI1–3—Reactor Diversion Report Card. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

VI1–4—Reactor Systems Resistance to Proliferation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

VIII–l-Organizational Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

VII1–2—1AEA Member Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

VIII–3—Safeguards Costs in Relation to Total Agency Expenditure Under the Agency’s

Budget 1971-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

IX–l-Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

IX–2-Country Case Studies I-III, Salient Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

X–l—Relation of GNP and Energy Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

X–2—U.S. Energy Consumption Patterns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

X–3-hanging Use of Energy Resources in the Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

X–4-Oil Consumption for Selected Groups of Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

X–5—World Estimated Ultimate Crude Oil Recovery, January 1,1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

X–6—Solid Fossil Fuel Resources by Continents, and Nations with Major Resources . . . . 242

X–7—World Nuclear Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

X–8—Nuclear Power Growth Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

X–9—Projected Distribution of Installed Electric Capacities in Developing Nations by Plant

Type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

X–lO—Worldwide Distribution of Reactors and Their Supporting Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

X–ll—Principal Suppliers of Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

X–12—World Nuclear Capacity Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

X–13—Uranium Reserves and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

X–14—Reactor Characteristics for 1000MWe Plants.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

X–15-Cumulative Lifetime Uranium Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

X–16-Curnulative Consumption of Uranium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

X–17—WorId Annual Separative Work Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252

X–18—Enrichment Plants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

X–19—World Reprocessing Plants, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

X–20—World Annual LWR Fuel Reprocessing Potential Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

X–21—Suppliers of Exported Reactors, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Xlll
Chapter I
Chapter I

Introduction

Since the first detonation of a nuclear explosive, the world has lived with the

spectre of nuclear proliferation. Thirty-two years later, six nations have

demonstrated their possession of nuclear explosives and perhaps two dozen

more have the economic and technical prerequisites to soon follow suit if they so

choose. In the decade following 1964, an intangible barrier held the number of

nuclear weapons states constant and separated the nuclear-armed great powers

(symbolized by the five permanent seats of the United Nations Security Council)

from the rest of the international community. In 1974, India breached this barrier

by detonating its own nuclear device.

Several recent international trends have aroused concern that other nations

may adopt India’s example. The growing demand for nuclear energy, partly as a

result of the 1973-1974 quadrupling of world oil prices, has resulted in the dissemination of nuclear facilities and technology whose complex and ominous

relationship with nuclear weapons has become increasingly clear. The general

spread of scientific and technical knowledge has also increased the availability of

information on nuclear-weapons design and fabrication. At the same time, the

international political influence of the great powers has declined as part of the

erosion of the post-war alliance system, the emergence of new, ambitious

regional powers, and the widening split between industrialized and nonin -

dustrialized countries. Finally, the appearance of increasingly violent and

sophisticated terrorist groups has added another element of fear and uncertainty

to the nuclear proliferation issue.

This combination of phenomena has spawned a widespread feeling that

time is running out; that unless decisive action is taken in certain critical areas

very soon, an inevitable chain of events will lead to a gathering proliferation momentum. This concern is reflected in the decision of the new Administration to

make proliferation control a very high-priority objective. Similarly, Congress

already has under active consideration a number of bills designed to address one

or another aspect of the problem.

At the root of the concern over proliferation is the fear that the spread of

nuclear weaponry poses a grave and mounting threat to global stability. This

threat could materialize in at least four ways. First is the obvious danger that

nuclear weapons might actually be used. As is frequently pointed out, the

statistical probability of use increases with the spread of weapons, other things

being equal. Second, newly established nuclear powers could enter a nuclear

arms race which might be politically destabilizing and, in itself, increase the

Preceding page blank
likelihood of an outbreak of war. Third, the expanding quantity and distribution

of weapons will increase the opportunities for theft, illicit sale, and sabotage.

Finally, proliferation could undermine the present structure of the international

political system as the acquisition of weapons alters the distribution of power.

Nuclear weapons proliferation may thus heavily impact U.S. foreign policy,

whose overriding objective in recent years has been the maintenance of global

political stability. This goal has been viewed as the basic precondition for the

pursuit of other U.S. interests. Efforts to control proliferation may conflict with

normal U.S. foreign relationships; they may raise specific and contentious issues

with other nuclear supplier states, most of which are U.S. allies, and with user

states, mostly in the Third World. Ironically, the one major set of relationships

which is largely unaffected by proliferation is that between the United States and

its Communist adversaries.

Past Approaches to Proliferation Control

Although concern over nuclear proliferation has reached new heights,

recognition of the need to control it is not new. U.S. foreign policy has exhibited

three relatively distinct phases in its posture toward nuclear weapons control.

The first U.S. response to nuclear weapons was essentially to try to close the

lid to Pandora’s box. This so-called “secrecy-denial” stage was typified by a bill

introduced in September 1945 by Senator Brien McMahon. It sought “to conserve

and restrict the use of atomic energy for national defense, to prohibit its private

exploitation and to preserve the secret and confidential character of information

concerning the use and application of atomic energy.”

It quickly became apparent that such a total monopoly on nuclear technology for the indefinite future was not feasible. Instead of the McMahon bill,’

Congress passed the somewhat more flexible Atomic Energy Act of 1946. This

Act declared that until “effective and enforceable international safeguards

against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established,

there shall be no exchange with other nations with respect to the use of atomic ,

energy for industrial purposes.” The Act imposed heavy penalties for disclosure

of military or industrial nuclear information, thus cutting off cooperation with

Great Britain and Canada despite their assistance in the wartime development.

International control was also proposed by the United States in June 1946, in

what came to be known as the “Baruch Plan. ” The main points called for were:

● The creation of an International Atomic Development Authority which

would be entrusted with all phases of the development and use of

atomic energy.

● Cessation of the manufacture of atomic weapons and disposal of existing bombs. These steps would be taken upon the establishment of an

adequate system for the control of atomic energy, the renunciation of

the bomb as a weapon, and the formulation of a procedure for handling

violations of the rules of the control.

4
 .

The U.S.S.R. countered the Baruch Plan with a ban-the-bomb approach. The

Soviet draft convention as introduced by Gromyko contained provisions for the

prohibition of the production, storage, and use of atomic weapons and for the

destruction of all such weapons within 6 months after the entry into force of the

convention. Although discussions concerning the Baruch proposals continued

for several years, irreconcilable differences between the United States and the

U.S.S.R. made agreement impossible.

By the end of 1953 it was clear that the secrecy-denial policy had failed in

both denial and control. Great Britain had exploded its first atom bomb and both

the United States and U.S.S.R. had tested hydrogen bombs.

When its initial nuclear policy proved inadequate, the United States shifted

its emphasis from denial to active promotion of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The new policy was initiated on December 8, 1953, by President Eisenhower in a

speech before the United Nations General Assembly. That speech, whose theme

stressed exploiting the good rather than the evil inherent in the atom, became

known as the “Atoms for Peace” proposal. The “Atoms for Peace” program required safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, and assistance

would not be diverted from peaceful to military purposes. The International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which came into force in July 1957, was assigned

the responsibility for administering safeguards. The intent was to channel the

apparently inevitable spread of nuclear technology into controlled nonmilitary

uses.

An unintended consequence of the “Atoms for Peace” program was a blurring of the line between the peaceful and military exploitation of atomic energy.

Nuclear technology and materials which are intended for peaceful purposes can

be utilized, to varying degrees, in making the nuclear weapons. Accumulated

technology and experience from the acquisition of nuclear power reactors has

significantly lowered the technical barriers to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

With time, it became apparent that a major international effort to prevent

proliferation was essential. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was put into

effect in 1970 as a response to that critical requirement, and represents the third \

stage of U.S. policy toward proliferation.

Despite its successes to date, the NPT is not by itself a complete solution for

effective control of proliferation. Among the approximately 50 nations that have

not yet ratified the NPT are a number of those considered to be the most likely

candidates for proliferation (the so-called “Nth countries”). International

speculation already attributes a clandestine nuclear weapons capability to Israel

and possibly South Africa. There is, moreover, considerable concern that some

countries may ratify the NPT as a way of acquiring nuclear technology and

facilities. Having obtained the prerequisites for producing weapons, they may

then abrogate the treat y when it suits their purposes. As a consequence, there is a
renewed

standing

sense of urgency on behalf of efforts to gain a more adequate underof this complex phenomenon. The result may be a new set of policy initiatives so distinct from those of the past as to constitute a fourth phase of

proliferation control.

Key Factors for New Policy Initiatives

As yet, political leaders and analysts of proliferation have reached no real

consensus as to the content of the next stage of policy. Three major factors or

issues appear to be at the crux of the debate.

The first issue concerns the likelihood and rate of proliferation. This in turn

rests on

(1)

(2)

(3)

The

judgments concerning:

the strength of incentives and opportunities for potential Nth countries

to “go nuclear” compared to the strength of disincentives and barriers;

the relative likelihood of alternative routes to proliferation (diversion of

nuclear material from commercial power systems, construction of indigenous facilities to produce weapons material, and direct purchase or

theft); and

the capability and will of non-state adversaries to procure and use

nuclear weapons.

second issue concerns the nature and seriousness of the consequences of

proliferation. Despite widespread concern over nuclear proliferation, some still

contend that it will have a comparatively benign impact on international politics

by, in effect, foreclosing resort to military force in conflict situations. Alternatively, it can be argued that proliferation will proceed at a slow to moderate

rate and may jeopardize regional, but not global, stability. Even the majority

who view the possibility of a proliferated world with foreboding may disagree

on the precise dimensions of the threat.

The third issue relates to differing assessments of the political and economic

costs and benefits of particular policy options. The matter is made more complex

by the fact that some proposed policies involve fundamental transformation of

domestic political, economic, and social systems, plus equally drastic international innovations, including the endowment of global institutions with significant governmental authority. Judgments concerning the desirability of any of

these options will hinge not only on their specific merits but also on other factors, such as the need for nuclear energy, the ethics and advisability of intervening in the domestic affairs of other nations, and widely varying assessments of

the extent of U.S. influence, real and potential.

Definition of Proliferation

No real consensus exists even on the interpretation of the word “proliferation.” The phrase is a deceptively simple one. By implication the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) defines proliferation as the manufacture or acquisition of

6
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by countries which do not

now possess them. Conventionally, the actual detonation of a device has determined the transition from non-nuclear weapons to nuclear weapons status. Recently, this approach has been questioned on the grounds that there are many

stages in the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. A nation can make all

the preparations for the construction of a weapon or the testing of a device without actually “proliferating. “ If it is possible to come within hours of a bomb and

still not violate the NPT, the traditional definition conceals more than it reveals.

In this report, the definition of proliferation has been broadened to encompass any country that has acquired the capability to very rapidly produce a

nuclear explosive device, i.e., a nation that has all the components of an explosive

on hand ready for assembly. The critical element is political will. A country

which has decided to acquire the components of a nuclear weapon, and has done

so, is a nuclear weapons state even if the mechanics of assembling, arming, and

detonating the device remain to be completed.

This does not mean, however, that the actual detonation of a device has no

significance; quite the contrary. In the case of some potential Nth countries, there

might be some doubt as to whether an assembled, but untested, device would actually explode. Even where no such doubt exists, there are other important considerations. The very fact that a nation has decided not to demonstrate its

capability communicates a certain restraint to nervous neighbors, allies, and adversaries. As long as a device remains untested, its existence is surrounded with

doubt and ambiguity—a matter of some political consequence.

Purpose and Nature of This Study

Proliferation constitutes one of the most complex and difficult issues in the

public policy domain. This study seeks to facilitate an understanding of the

problem and its implications, in terms of both a comprehensive overview and a

detailed indepth analysis of key elements. Technological, institutional, economic,

and political aspects, and the linkages among them, are examined. Policy options

are outlined and analyzed in terms of three major perspectives corresponding to

different weighings of the key factors discussed above. The objective is not to

recommend a particular perspective or policy, but to provide the reader with the

tools for informed policy choice. This report is, in particular, intended to lay the

groundwork for an informed consideration by Congress of possible legislative

action concerning proliferation. It is not a study of nuclear power or a comparison of its economic, social, or environmental impacts vis-a-vis alternative

energy sources.

The entire report is summarized in chapter II, along with the major issues

and findings. This chapter also includes an introduction to nuclear technology

designed to provide a background for the nontechnical reader.
Chapter III draws on the material presented in the subsequent chapters and

summarized in chapter II to present policy options available to the U.S. Government. These are analyzed as a function of different perspectives of the key factor

discussed above.

An examination of the motivations for acquisition of nuclear weapons by

other nations, now and in the future, is presented in chapter IV. The motivations

for non-national groups to obtain nuclear weapons are explored in chapter V,

along with the likelihood and nature of use by such groups. This chapter also examines the civil liberties implications of various measures that might be undertaken to control this threat.

A nation or non-national group must be able as well as willing to construct a

nuclear fission explosive device. The requirements are discussed in chapter VI.

Also examined are the ramifications of one possible excuse for weapons testing—

peaceful nuclear explosions.

The fissionable nuclear material required to construct a weapon might be

obtained by three possible routes, as described in chapter VII. One is to divert the

material from a commercial nuclear power facility either covertly or by abrogation of safeguards agreements. A second is to build facilities (probably clandestinely) to produce the required material. A third is to purchase or steal either

the material or actual weapons.

Safeguards play a critical role in the control of attempts to acquire nuclear

weapons material. The technology and procedures of both domestic and international safeguards are analyzed in the first part of chapter VIII. The second part of

the chapter deals with the international institutions involved in detecting and

controlling attempts to develop nuclear weapons. An analysis of factors that

could influence a nation in its selection of a route to weapons, i.e., objectives,

abilities, and political situations, is presented in chapter IX.

Any control measures must also be cognizant of the characteristics of the international nuclear industry, as described in chapter X.
Chapter II

Issues, Findings, and

Executive Summary

.

.
Chapter II

Issues, Findings, and

Executive Summary

This chapter is comprised of three sections: issues and findings; a description of nuclear technology; and an executive summary. The first section presents

selected issues and findings of the report under the following headings:

● The Problem—the desirability and accessibility of nuclear weapons;

and

● The Control—possible control measures.

PROLIFERATION ISSUES AND FINDINGS

The Problem

Issue 1 

Are More Countries Likely To Acquire

Nuclear Weapons, and If So, Will This

Proliferation Jeopardize U.S. and Global

Interests?

Findings

The technical and economic barriers to

proliferation are declining as accessibility to

nuclear weapons material becomes more

widespread. Consequently, the decision

Whether or not to acquire a nuclear weapons

capability has become increasingly a political

one. The choice will turn on whether a nation

views the possession of such a capability as

being, on balance, in its national interest.

That balance will be affected by certain

global trends. The diffusion of global power

and the erosion of bipolar alliance systems

and great power security guarantees tend to

increase the incentives to proliferation. On the

other hand, a number of states have long had

the capability to acquire nuclear weapons but

have been persuaded by a variety of political

considerations to refrain. These disincentives

may also be persuasive in the future to the

growing number of countries which find

nuclear weapons within their capability. With

internationally derived incentives and disincentives broadly offsetting one another, the

decision on acquiring a nuclear weapons

capability will tend to hinge on the particular

circumstances of each Nth country and the

policy pursued by present nuclear weapons

states, especially the United States.

Press reports indicate that at least two states

(Israel and South Africa) are at the verge of acquiring or have already acquired nuclear

weapons. Several other countries are close to a

weapons capability and a few may choose to

attain it over the next few years.

As for the consequences of proliferation, it

can be argued that proliferation will have a

stabilizing effect on international politics due

to the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. The

alternative, and more persuasive possibility, is

that further proliferation will jeopardize

regional and global stability, increase the

\

11

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likelihood of nuclear war (local or general),

exacerbate the threat of nuclear armed nonstate terrorism, and greatly complicate U.S.

relations with new (potential or actual)

nuclear weapons states. The extent to which

proliferation has a disequilibrating effect on

international politics also impacts directly on

American foreign policy, which has had the

maintenance of global stability as its overriding objective in recent years. From this

perspective, the threat to American interests

derives not so much from the mere number of

Nth countries but from the probability that

proliferation will tend to be greatest in regions

with the highest potential for international

conflict, e.g., the Middle East, Southern Africa,

and East Asia. (See chapters 111 and IV.)

Issue 2

What Will Be the Proliferation Impact of

the International Spread of Plutonium

Recycle Facilities?

Findings

Reprocessing provides the strongest link

between commercial nuclear power and

proliferation. Possession of such a facility

gives a nation access to weapons material

(plutonium) by slow covert diversion which

would be difficult for safeguards to detect. An

overt seizure of the plant or associated

plutonium stockpiles following abrogation of

safeguards commitments could, if preceded by

a clandestine weapons development program,

result in the fabrication of nuclear explosives

within days, Furthermore, such a plant

reduces a nation’s susceptibility to international restraints (sanctions) by enhancing fuel

cycle independence. Finally, plutonium recycle is the most likely source for both black

market fissile material and direct theft by terrorists,

Most nations expect to have their nuclear

fuel reprocessed despite these obvious complications for the task of preventing further

proliferation, and several (none of them Nth

countries) are constructing large reprocessing

plants. There have been increasing doubts as

to the economic feasibility of reprocessing in

the United States, but other countries perceive

reprocessing as being attractive. Their more

limited energy resources make the energy of

plutonium more valuable, and possibly lessstringent regulatory requirements may make

the facilities less expensive. In addition, if

nuclear energy is to be a long-term option,

reprocessing will eventually have to be an integral part of the fuel cycle, although uranium

resources may be adequate to last until about

the year 2000 even without reprocessing.

Hence, nonproliferation strategies that involve a total renouncement of reprocessing

will be difficult and probably expensive to implement.

Reprocessing in the United States and other

weapons states is not a direct proliferation

issue (except for terrorists). Other supplier

states such as West Germany and Japan are

also unlikely to use their commercial facilities

to procure weapons material. The less advanced countries that might misuse facilities

have been precluded from importing them by

supplier agreements (except for Brazil and

Pakistan who already have contracts and are

resisting pressure to cancel them). The technology is uncomplicated enough for some Nth

countries to develop on a commercial basis,

but this endeavor would almost certainly be

commercially uneconomical if other energy

sources are available. A double standard approach to reprocessing would further strain

relations between suppliers and importers.

Multinationally controlled facilities may be

necessary to alleviate this tension if reprocessing does become widespread in the supplier

states (see chapters III, V, and X).

Issue 3

How Will U.S. Decisions on Domestic

Plutonium Recycle Affect Efforts To

Curb the International Spread of

Reprocessing?

Findings

Decisions on the future of reprocessing and

plutonium recycle in the United States must

be made in the near future because of the imminence of operation of the large plant at

12
Barnwell, S.C. Nonproliferation will clearly be

best served if no one reprocesses. Other nations, however, have a stronger interest in

reprocessing (as described in Issue 2) and will

be unsympathetic to efforts to convince them

to refrain. If the United States alone refrains,

the nonproliferation effort could actually be

damaged because the resulting unavailability

of fuel cycle services would induce more nations to build their own facilities. If the United

States does not refrain, however, the credibility of its efforts to dissuade others will be

diminished, There is general agreement that

Nth country possession of reprocessing plants

would be inconsistent with efforts to contain

proliferation. The key factors shaping positions on this issue are:

. The effect of a double standard, where

supplier states build their own reprocessing plants but deny exports to other nations: Importing states have expressed

resentment over discriminatory export

policies, and this policy would be certain

to annoy some. It is significant, however,

that few Nth countries will have enough

reactors in this century to make an indigenous reprocessing plant more

economical than having the service provided by a supplier state.

. The ability of the United States to persuade other nations to forgo reprocessing: A U.S. decision to refrain would

have slight impact on other suppliers

unless accompanied by costly political

and economic pressure. Their commitment to reprocessing and to early deployment of breeder reactors (which require

reprocessing) is much stronger than that

of the United States. Importing states,

however, are more likely to be impressed

by such a gesture (see chapters III, VII,

and X).

Issue 4

Would Deployment of Fast Breeder

Reactors (LMFBRs) Be Compatible With

a Policy To Curtail Proliferation?

Findings

The LMFBR is the highest priority energy

development program in most nuclear supplier states. It was chosen because, of all the

long-term options for essentially inexhaustible energy, it may well be most economic. It is

also in a relatively advanced state of development, and thus the most likely to be available

for widespread deployment by the end of the

century.

Proliferation, however, was not a major

consideration in the elevation of the LMFBR to

its present priority. Certain characteristics of

the LMFBR system as presently envisaged will

conflict with efforts to control proliferation.

These are:

●

●

●

●

National possession of a full LMFBR cycle would eliminate all technical barriers

to acquiring weapons material. It would

also provide virtual immunity to an international embargo on fuel shipments

because the LMFBR produces more than

enough plutonium to refuel itself.

Even a national LMFBR tied into an international fuel cycle (e.g., fuel leasing or

multinational fuel centers) increases the

opportunity for proliferation. Many nations could eliminate their dependence

on the international or foreign fuel services by constructing indigenous fuel

fabrication and reprocessing plants or by

processing the fresh fuel or partially

spent fuel within the reactor.

Some of the plutonium produced by the

LMFBR is of extremely high quality for

weapons.

The LMFBR requires reprocessing, which

creates opportunities ‘for dive;sion of

plutonium by nations or non-state adversaries.

An overall assessment of the desirability of

the breeder must weigh its benefits as an

energy source against its liabilities relative to

proliferation, as well as other problems in

comparison with alternative energy sources

(see chapter VII, “Diversion From Commercial Power Systems”).

13
Issue 5

Do Uranium Enrichment Facilities Have

a High Potential for Proliferation?

Findings

Any enrichment plant can theoretically be

used for the production of weapons material

while simultaneously providing immunity

from international nuclear fuel embargoes,

but only one type of enrichment plant—the

centrifuge type—increases opportunities for

proliferation on the same scale as reprocessing

plants. Diffusion plants are economical only

on a very large scale, so this enrichment route

is out of the question for all but the largest and

most highly developed countries.

The nozzle method is currently under

development in South Africa and Germany. It

promises to cost less than diffusion and be

fundamentally simpler. It does demand highly

precise manufacturing techniques, and its

operation requires about twice as much power

as a diffusion plant of the same capacity. This

makes it commercially impractical for nations

lacking low-cost power such as hydroelectricity, Despite its simplicity, it does

not appear to be a good choice for a small

facility dedicated to weapons material production.

By contrast, centrifuge plants may be sufficiently economical in small sizes for many nations to find them commercially attractive.

These plants could only be developed by technically advanced nations, but could be

purchased and operated by less advanced nations.

If sold to less advanced nations, centrifuge

plants would be exceptionally vulnerable to

clandestine diversion. Moreover, as with a

reprocessing plant, a centrifuge facility could

be seized and used to produce weapons

material in a short time.

Advanced enrichment techniques could not

be developed except by technically advanced

countries. Barring an unforeseen breakthrough, commercial laser isotope separation

(LIS) facilities will probably not be feasible for

even advanced countries until the late 1980’s

or early 1990’s, and then only if a number of

very difficult problems are solved. The United

States, U. S. S. R., and France, among others, are

actively developing LIS technology. The

proliferation potential for LIS and other advanced technologies stems from the high

enrichment achieved per stage. Thus, it may

be possible to produce weapons material in a

very few steps. In addition, LIS facilities may

be economical on a very small scale, making

them attractive purchases for nations with

small nuclear programs. The United States, by

guaranteeing enrichment services at a low fee

or at cost might slow down the spread of advanced enrichment technologies (see chapter

VII, “Dedicated Facilities”).

Issue 6

How Feasible Would it be to Use Commercial Nuclear Reactors as a Source of

Weapons Material?

Findings

●

●

●

The power reactors presently available

for export (LWR and CANDU) do not involve material that could be used directly

for nuclear explosives. A nation would

also have to have a reprocessing or

enrichment facility to use its nuclear

system as a source of weapons material.

Spent fuel from either reactor type does

contain plutonium, which could be

recovered in a small indigenously

developed reprocessing plant. This opportunity can be decreased by fuel leasing or buy-back arrangements which

prevent the long-term storage of spent

fuel by Nth countries. This would restrict

the availability of spent fuel to that in the

reactor, the use of which would probably

result in the loss of the reactor as a power

source.

Reactors and short-term spent-fuel

storage facilities can be effectively

safeguarded. Consequently, diversion

from them would have to take the form

of overt nationalization (i.e., seizure).

14
● The additional expertise a nation acquires

in operating its own reactor would be

useful should if

weapons.

Abandoning nuclear

but not eliminate, the

weapons moliferation.

decide to develop

power would reduce,

possibility of further

Countries could still

construct facilities dedicated to the production

of weapons material or, alternatively, they

might be able to purchase or steal either

material or a finished weapon (see chapter

VII) .

Issue 7

Could a Nation Acquire Nuclear

Weapons Without Diverting Fissile

Material From Its Commercial Nuclear

Power Facilities?

Findings

None of the countries which now have

nuclear weapons diverted fissile material from

their power facilities. They all built facilities

specifically dedicated to the production or

reprocessing of nuclear weapons material.

The only dedicated facility option open to a

nation which is not technologically advanced

is a small, natural uranium-fueled plutonium

production reactor, producing about 10 kg of

weapons-grade plutonium per year (enough

for one or two explosives), and a small

reprocessing plant. The total capital costs of

these facilities would be several tens of

millions of dollars. Such a facility might

escape detection, especially if the nation were

not considered to be among the five or six

most likely Nth countries.

A technologically advanced nation would

be able to build a dedicated facility to support

a large weapons program, but it is unlikely

that the existence of such a facility could be

kept secret (see chapter VII, “Dedicated

Facilities”).

Issue 8

How Plausible is the Direct Acquisition

of Fissile Material or Weapons by

Purchase or Theft?

Findings

If plutonium becomes a commonly traded

commodity, minimal intermittent black

market transactions seem plausible, simply

because the large amounts of material that

could be circulating would be difficult to

safeguard perfectly. Theft of existing weapons

would be more probable if proliferation continues and security in the new nuclear states is

lax. (See chapter VI.)

Issue 9

How Critical is Nuclear Power to Future

Global Energy Requirements?

Findings

Projections of growth in global nuclear

energy use have been repeatedly revised

downwards in recent years. The lowest projections presently available are the most

plausible. Nevertheless, many governments,

especially in Europe and Japan, still feel that

nuclear energy will be crucial to their wellbeing as global oil and gas reserves are

depleted. Many developing countries are also

counting heavily on nuclear energy. Coal,

another major alternative to oil and gas, is

abundant in some countries but fraught with

environmental hazards. The economics of

other resources (e.g., solar) are more speculative. Hence, nuclear power is likely to be a significant factor for at least the next few decades

(see chapter X).

15
Issue 10

How Difficult Would It Be for a Nation

To Construct a Nuclear Weapon?

Findings

Many nations are capable of designing and

constructing nuclear explosives which could

be confidently expected, even without nuclear

testing, to have predictable and reliable yields

up to 10 to 20 kilotons TNT equivalent (using

UZSS, UZSS, or weapons-grade plutonium) or

in the kiloton range (using reactor-grade

plutonium).

A national effort to achieve the above objective would require a group of more than a

dozen well-trained and very competent persons with experience in several fields of

science and engineering. They would need a

high explosive field-test facility and the support of a modest, already established, scientific, technical, and organizational infrastructure. If the program is properly executed, the

objective might be attained approximately 2

years after the start of the program, at a cost of

a few tens of millions of dollars. This estimate

does not include the time and money to obtain

the fissile material or to establish the infrastructure assumed above.

The success or failure of a national effort

will depend more on the strengths and weaknesses of the particular people involved in the

effort than on specifics of the technological

base of the country (see chapter VI, “Nuclear

Fission Explosive Weapons” for further

details.)

Issue 11

Is a Non-State Adversary Group Likely

To Turn to Nuclear Means of Extortion

or Violence?

Findings

There is no evidence that any non-state

group has ever made any attempt to acquire

weapons material for use in a nuclear explosive. The incidents that have occurred to

date involving nuclear material or facilities

have mostly been low-level incidents of vandalism or sabotage. However, the present

record of nuclear incidents was assembled in

an era when nuclear reactors were relatively

few. The expansion of nuclear power, the advent of plutonium recycle, and trends towards

increased violence could lead non-state adversaries to attempt large-scale nuclear threats or

violence.

Non-state adversary groups have not yet

gone to the limits of their ability to cause harm

by non-nuclear means. Historical analysis of

adversary tactics suggests reasons for this

restraint. However, non-state adversaries,

particularly terrorists or revolutionaries, may

not behave in the future as they have in the

past. The psychological impact of the threat or

use of nuclear weapons would be enormous,

and an adversary group may decide to attempt

to exploit this leverage.

The entire subject of adversary actions involving massive threats or destruction has apparently just started to receive systematic

study. When considering if non-state adversary groups will turn to massive extortion or

violence, all routes to the same end--conventional explosives, other chemicals, nuclear and

biological agents-should be considered. (See

chapter V.)

Issue 12

How Difficult Would it be for a NonState Adversary Group To Acquire

Nuclear Material for a Nuclear Explosive Device?

Findings

It would be extremely difficult, verging on

impossible, for a non-state adversary group to

convert material diverted from LWR or CANDU fuel cycles to explosive’s material, unless

the spent fuel is commercially reprocessed to

recover and recycle the plutonium.

In the LWR with plutonium recycle as presently planned, material suitable for nuclear

explosives or easily convertible to weaponsuseable material will be found at the

16
reprocessing plant, in transit between the

reprocessing plant and the fuel fabrication

plant, and at the input area of the fuel fabrication plant. There are technologies and configurations (coprecipitation and collocation)

under consideration that could eliminate most

opportunities for the diversion of material

easily converted to weapons material.

In the United States at present, the NRC is

reportedly in the process of upgrading

security at licensees handling plutonium or

highly enriched uranium, requiring them to

meet a threat of two or more insiders in collusion with several heavily armed attakers from

the outside. Present safeguards and physical

security may place undue reliance on one element of physical security-armed guards. It is

not clear how well presently designed

safeguards system can handle the problem of

several insiders acting in collusion, or outsiders attacking with guile and deception

rather than straightforward armed assault.

Some observers have also expressed doubts

about the effectiveness of guard forces in handling diversion attempts, partly because of the

questionable status of their exact legal powers.

The subject of a Federal security force to protect plutonium and highly enriched uranium

should be reopened, especially in view of the

increased threat levels licensees are being required to meet.

Both ERDA and NRC have very promising

safeguards programs in the development

stage, but their ultimate effectiveness cannot

be assessed at this time.

A vital point to note is that non-state adversaries are highly mobile, and capable of finding and attacking the weakest targets. No nation, however invulnerable its own facilities,

can feel secure against non-state adversary

nuclear threats and violence unless all

facilities handling weapons-grade material

worldwide are equally well protected. Physical security is generally left to the discretion of

the individual nation, although supplier states

are insisting on a minimum level as a condition for export. The International Atomic

Energy Agency has no physical security

enforcement powers, (see chapters V and

VIII).

Issue 13

Could a Non-State Adversary Design

and Construct Its Own Nuclear Explosive?

Findings

Given the weapons material and a fraction

of a million dollars, a small group of people,

none of whom have ever had access to the

classified literature, could possibly design and

build a crude nuclear explosive device. The

group would have to include, at a minimum, a

person capable of searching and understanding the technical literature in several fields,

and a jack-of-all-trades technician. They

would probably not be able to develop an accurate prediction of the yield of their device,

and it could be a total failure because of either

faulty design or faulty construction. If a member of the group is careless or incompetent, he

might suffer serious or fatal injury. However,

there is a clear possibility that a clever and

competent group could design and construct a

device which would produce a significant

nuclear yield (see chapter VI “Nuclear Fission

Explosive Weapons” for details).

Issue 14

What Are the Civil Liberties Implications of Safeguarding Nuclear Power, in

Particular, Plutonium Recycle?

Findings

The civil liberties implications of safeguards

turn on the scope of a security clearance

program, the standards and procedures used

in employee clearance, the scope and intrusiveness of domestic intelligence activities,

and the nature of a recovery effort should a

diversion occur.

There is disagreement among experts as to

whether a safeguards program can be adequate for security without fundamentally infringing upon civil liberties. One position

believes adequate safeguards will necessarily

violate basic liberties for employees and

17
political dissidents. A second position treats

safeguards as an acceptable extension of existing clearance programs and blackmail threat

responses in other fields of high security. A

third position believes safeguards could be installed without doing serious damage to civil

liberties, but only if a “least intrusive

measures” approach is adopted and a zerorisk goal is rejected.

Although a safeguards system that would

be extremely respectful of civil liberties can be

designed, three potential dangers exist:

1.

2.

3.

A gradual erosion of civil liberties as the

safeguards system is “strengthened,”

A shunting aside of civil liberties during

a recovery operation if weapons material

were diverted and a convincing threat

received; and

A public demand for Draconian

safeguards in the future, even at the expense of civil liberties, if a diversion

followed by a convincing threat or an actual act of destruction occurred.

Measures can be envisaged that would

reduce the probability of the above three occurrences. Continued public monitoring of

safeguards systems for civil liberties infractions, new technologies or configurations

(e.g., coprecipitation or collocation), and

response planning integrated at the local,

State, regional, and Federal levels with

authority clearly delineated could reduce the

probability of civil liberties infractions in a

strong safeguards system.

The Control

Issue 15

What is the Outlook for Control of

Proliferation?

Findings

It is not too late to contain proliferation at a

level which can be assimilated by the international political system. However, there are no

single or all-purpose solutions; no short cuts,

A viable nonproliferation policy will require

the coordinated, planned use of a wide variety

18

of measures: (a) political, economic, institutional, technological; (b) unilateral, bilateral,

multilateral, international; and (c) executive

and legislative.

Components of a nonproliferation policy

would include: (a) Steps designed to tip the

balance of political incentives and disincentives regarding the acquisition of weapons in

favor of disincentives; (b) A comprehensive

safeguards regime to prevent the diversion of

nuclear material from civilian energy

programs to weapons use; (c) Controls over

exports, particularly with regard to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, in conjunction with arrangements for the return of

spent fuel to the supplier or any international

repository; (d) A broad range of domestic and

foreign policy supporting actions, including

steps to upgrade physical security measures to

prevent theft of nuclear materials, expansion

of reactor-grade uranium production to obviate the need for reprocessing, and arms control negotiations; and (e) Steps to assure that

other countries can meet their energy requirements without resorting to enrichment and/or

reprocessing national facilities.

Moreover, because each Nth country is to

some degree unique, policy must be tailored to

fit particular national circumstances. This is

especially true because of the potential for

serious conflict between nonproliferation and

other foreign policy objectives. The nature

and severity of that conflict will vary from one

Nth country to another, a fact which policy

must take carefully into account, (Chapters 111

and IV.)

Issue 16

What Influence Can the United States

Exert Upon Potential Weapons States?

Findings

In the long run two general rules apply: (a)

Solutions to the proliferation problem will

have to be found primarily, though not exclusively, through multilateral actions, and

(b) The extent of U.S. influence will vary from

country to country.
As American preeminence in the international market for nuclear fuel, facilities, and

technology has been allowed to erode, the

ability of the United States to unilaterally

determine the ground rules of international

nuclear cooperation has diminished. With the

entrance of other suppliers into the market,

importers have the option to turn to non-U.S.

sources. If the United States were to remove itself from the global market entirely, other

suppliers could quickly replace the withdrawn

capacity. As a consequence American actions

will tend to be most effective in a multilateral

context—particularly in conjunction with

other suppliers. The effectiveness of this approach has been demonstrated in the negotiations which led to the NPT, and more recently

in the Suppliers’ Conference.

There remains, however, significant scope

for the unilateral assertion of U.S. influence—

both in terms of positive inducements and

negative sanctions. The recent successful U.S.

effort inducing South Korea to abandon plans

for purchasing a French reprocessing facility

is an instance of the effective use of unilateral

influence. Some of the more obvious levers

available to Washington include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

The

security guarantees;

assistance to civilian nuclear energy

programs;

foreign economic aid (including U.S. influence in international lending institutions);

military assistance programs;

political pressures and diplomatic persuasion;

mediation of international disputes

with proliferation implications;

controls on the export of sensitive

nuclear technology;

assistance concerning non-nuclear

energy sources; and

domestic policy initiatives (e.g., concerning reprocessing) which might

enhance the credibility of U.S. efforts to

persuade other countries to take similar

steps.

single most effective instrument of U.S.

influence would be the capability to guarantee

adequate low-enriched uranium exports to

meet the needs of overseas users while, at the

same time, providing for the collection and

return of spent fuel.

An effective effort to assert U.S. influence

will combine the carrot and the stick, with

principal reliance on the former for the longer

term. Such an effort wiIl also take into account

the wide variation in leverage available to

Washington when dealing with one Nth

country or another. Thus U.S. influence with

nations dependent upon American military or

economic assistance (e.g., South Korea) is very

substantial but where such dependence is

lacking (e.g., Argentina) U.S. influence

declines.

Issue 17

What Influence Can the United States

Exert Upon Other Supplier States?

Findings

Efforts by the United States inducing other

supplier states to pursue policies supportive of

nonproliferation will generally be most effective if they are formulated in a multilateral

context and emphasize positive inducements.

Possible measures include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

political-diplomatic persuasion (e.g., the

Suppliers’ Conference),

tie-in agreements guaranteeing U.S.

enrichment services at nondiscriminatory prices to reactor customers of other

suppliers,

joint-venture enrichment and/or

reprocessing facilities,

market sharing agreements,

multinational enrichment and/or

reprocessing facilities,

international fuel storage repositories,

and

a multilateral study of alternatives to

reprocessing.

The problem of reprocessing is extremely

difficult for two reasons. First, other supplier

states (such as Germany) have already made a

basic national decision in favor of reprocessing and the breeder. They regard this policy as

a vital element in their efforts to assure” adequate energy in the future. European breeder

19
technology is the most advanced in the world.

Second, other major suppliers are also

America’s principal allies and trading

partners. The linkages of mutual interest and

dependence are so extensive as to render most

attempts to apply coercive pressures selfdamaging. Consequently, U.S. efforts to obtain

a global moratorium on reprocessing will encounter stiff European and Japanese resistance. The one area where agreement is

demonstratively possible concerns control on

exports of reprocessing facilities.

Issue 18

How Effective Are International Atomic

Energy Agency Safeguards?

Findings

(a)

(b)

(c)

Safeguards for reactors can be very

effective. Nuclear material is contained

in a relatively small number of discrete

items, the fuel elements. Exact item accountability can be accomplished without great difficulty.

Safeguards procedures for reprocessing

plants, enrichment plants, and other

fuel-cycle facilities which handle very

large flows of nuclear material are in the

experimental stage. It will be difficult to

detect significant diversion of uranium

or plutonium using nuclear material accountancy alone, even if the most advanced analytical techniques and accountancy methods are used. The task is

further complicated by restrictions on

IAEA inspection effort, inspector access,

and the full use of IAEA surveillance

devices.

Containment and surveillance must

play a key role in safeguards and must

be regarded as more than supplementary to materials accountancy. Effective

safeguards systems for enrichment and

reprocessing plants will have to include

the most advanced online monitoring

and real-time accounting systems as

well as highly reliable, instantaneously

reporting, tamper-indicating surveillance equipment.

(d)

(e)

Issue

A credible safeguards system provides a

significant deterrent to diversion, by

both increasing the chances of detection

and establishing standards of legal

behavior that buttress the position of

political groups opposed to proliferation.

No safeguards system can prevent an

overt national seizure of a facility and its

operation for weapons purposes.

19

Are Multinational Fuel-Cycle Facilities

(MFCFS), on Balance, a Useful Approach

for the Control of Proliferation?

Findings

The primary intent of MFCFS is to remove

sensitive facilities (particularly enrichment

and reprocessing) from national control. A

part owner/operator of such a facility will find

it much harder to tamper with equipment for

purposes of diversion or to seize the plant outright even if on its own territory. It also offers

economies of scale to nations with only a few

reactors and improved security against nonstate adversary actions.

A great many political, economic, and institutional questions must be resolved before

the concept can be considered viable. Member

nations may not find acceptable sites in other

members’ territory. Another problem is the

possibility that membership in a sensitive

facility could provide sufficient access to the

technology for members to recreate it indigenously. Thus MFCFS could spread the

very problem they are intended to prevent.

Issue 20

Are Sanctions a Useful Instrument of

Nonproliferation Policy Toward Nth

Countries?

Findings

Provisions for modest sanctions (e.g., the

cutoff of nuclear assistance) already are contained in U.S. and IAEA nuclear agreements

20
with nonweapons states, and a variety of

stronger sanctions can be postulated. To be

most effective, sanctions should be applied

jointly or multilaterally rather than

unilaterally. Threats should be accompanied

by inducements and rewards designed to

relieve the pressures toward proliferation. A

sophisticated approach will also combine

automatic with more discretionary and flexible sanctions,

Depending upon the prospective proliferator, a significant degree of vulnerability to one

or more of the available levers is likely to be

present. In cases such as Taiwan, where the

Nth country is dependent on the United States

for security support as well as nuclear imports, the scope for the imposition of

unilateral U.S. sanctions is substantial. In

other cases, such as that of Brazil, resort to

sanctions could probably prove futile. Sanctions could be more effective in all cases as an

instrument to prevent proliferation than as a

means to punish or “roll back” proliferation

after it has occured. The most effective channel for imposition of unilateral sanctions will

probably be the Suppliers’ Conference.

Because user states comprise a majority of

IAEA membership, there are serious questions

as to whether the agency could muster the

political will to impose sanctions on a recipient—particularly if the circumstances surrounding the alleged violation are at all ambiguous.

Issue 21

Would an Arms-Reduction Agreement

by Present Nuclear States Significantly

Strengthen the International Norm

Against Proliferation?

Findings

A meaningful multilateral

by the nuclear weapons

arms reduction

states would

demonstrate a commitment to the objective of

nonproliferation and, in particular, to the

Non-Proliferation Treaty, The extent of the

impact of this demonstration is not clear, but

the public stance of some of the non-weapons

states indicates that it could be substantial. A

corollary benefit might be a reduction in the

prestige attached to nuclear weapons.

Issue 22

To What Extent Can Improvements in

Technology Help Contain or Limit

Further Proliferation?

Findings

There is no technological fix that can eliminate the problem of proliferation, but concepts

under development could, if successful, make

diversion from commercial facilities much

more difficult or even close to impossible.

One of the most promising medium-term

approaches is the nonproliferating reactor.

This concept is a fundamental y new approach

both to reactor design and to nonproliferation.

By incorporating nonproliferation requirements into the design of the reactor, the diversion routes which are present in current and

projected power reactor systems could be

largely eliminated. This approach deserves a

thorough assessment and open-minded comparison with other alternatives to determine if

it should be funded at an expanded scale.

Less radical changes are alternate fuel cycles

(thorium) and modifications to present fuel

cycles (e.g., coprecipitation and tandem cycles). New approaches are also being

developed in safeguards technology. Integrating safeguards systems into facility designs

would considerably strengthen safeguards

effectiveness. Greater R&D emphasis on nonnuclear energy sources, especially those most

appropriate for developing countries, could

reduce the dependence on nuclear power and

postpone or even eliminate the eventual need

to move to more sensitive systems (such as

fast breeders).

Issue 23

Can the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Play a Useful Role in Containing

Proliferation?

21
Findings

The NPT has important weaknesses. It lacks

universal adherence and a party can, under

some conditions, legally withdraw with only 3

months notice. Nonparties to the treaty include a number of the strongest candidates for

the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Moreover,

the sanctions provided for in the treaty are not

particularly impressive and there is a serious

question whether even they could be enforced

in the event of a violation.

Nevertheless, the NPT remains a key component of an effective nonproliferation policy.

The fact that there have been no known violations of the treaty suggests that it acts as an

important constraint upon Nth countries. It

embodies a basic international consensus that

proliferation poses a serious threat to global

well-being and should be contained. It also

provides an agreed framework of mutual

rights and obligations constituting a fundamental bargain between supplier and user

states. As such, it sets forth a standard by

which to measure and perhaps influence the

behavior of states. For example, the NPT may

provide some of the impetus behind current

efforts by the superpowers to negotiate a new

arms control agreement.

Two additional features of the NPT give it

particular significance. First, by allowing the

IAEA to impose safeguards on their domestic

nuclear programs, the nonweapon parties to

the treaty relinquish a significant measure of

their sovereignty. This establishes an important principle upon which to build stronger

international arrangements for controlling

proliferation. Second, in addition to providing

a statement of principles and objectives, the

NPT encompasses an institutional mechanism

(IAEA) for their implementation. The NPT is

more than a treaty: it is an ongoing program.

(Chapters 111 and VIII “International Control

of Proliferation.”)

Issue 24

What Issues Require Priority Attention,

i.e., What Developments Threaten to

Foreclose Future Options?

Findings

The following subject areas require immediate consideration by policy makers and

legislators if the course of proliferation is not

to be determined by default.

Domestic (U. S.) reprocessing.

US. enrichment capacity.

Upgrading of supplier (export) controls.

Sanctions and inducements to be applied

to Nth countries.

Research and development priorities

(LMFBR vs. other breeders and nonnuclear sources).

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY DESCRIPTION

Strong forces bind together the basic particles—protons and neutrons-that constitute the

nucleus of the atom. Some of this binding

energy is released when a neutron strikes a

heavy nucleus and causes it to split, or fission,

into two lighter elements plus more neutrons.

The total mass of the products is slightly less

than that of the original nucleus, This mass

difference is converted into energy according

to the relationship E=mc2. The neutrons may,

in turn, initiate other fissions, (Neutrons that

have been slowed down by a moderator such as

water or graphite are more likely to cause fissions.) Thus, a chain reaction can begin. In a

nuclear reactor, the chain reaction is controlled

22

to be just self-sustaining, with one of the extra

neutrons, on the average, initiating a new fission. In a nuclear explosive, the chain reaction

is carried on by fast neutrons in a multiplicative and uncontrolled mode. These different

conditions-sustaining or multiplicative-depend on a number of parameters, including

the quantity, chemical form, concentration,

and geometrical arrangement of the fissile

material and the amount, properties, and arrangement of the nonfissile material which is

present.

Most materials, even when in pure chemical

element form, contain a mixture of isotopesatoms of the same element that have different
numbers of neutrons in their nuclei and hence

different masses. ] Only a relatively few

isotopes are fissile, and, in fact, only one fissile

isotope occurs in nature—uranium-235, or, as

it is usually written, U235. Two other fissile

isotopes are important in any discussion of

nuclear power—uranium-233 (U

233 ) and

plutonium-239 (Pu239). These isotopes do not

occur in nature, but are bred when the fertile

nuclei U238 and thorium-232 (Th232) absorb

neutrons to become U239 and Th233, and then

undergo two successive radioactive decays to

P U 239 and U

2 3 3

.

The power reactors in common use today

use uranium as fuel; the fissile concentration

is well below that necessary for a nuclear explosive. Specifically, it is impossible, not

merely impractical, to use a light water reactor

(LWR) or a Canadian CANDU reactor

uranium fuel in a nuclear fission explosive

without an expensive and technologically advanced enrichment facility. (See chapter VII

for further discussion of this point.)

Uranium fuel goes through many operations both before and after its use in the reactor. These operations constitute the nuclear

fuel cycle. Figure 11-1 shows the fuel cycle for

the most common reactor, the light water

reactor (LWR).

From the mine, the uranium ore is sent to a

mill where uranium is recovered from the ore

in the form of an oxide. The next step, after

conversion of the oxide to uranium hexafluoride, is enrichment. At the enrichment

plant, the concentration of U235 is increased

from the naturally occuring value of 0.7 percent to about 3 percent. Most present-day

enrichment plants use the gas diffusion process, but most new plants in the construction

and planning stage will use the gas centrifuge

method. After enrichment, the uranium goes

to a fuel fabrication plant to be formed into fuel

elements which will be combined into fuel

assemblies and inserted into the reactor.

llsotopes are specified by the total number of

neutrons and protons they contain and a symbol indicating the chemical elements. For instance, the isotope

with 92 protons and 143 neutrons is uranium – 235, or,

as it is usually written, U~~s.

After the fuel has been in the reactor for a

time (typically several years), it contains too

little uranium-235 and too many neutron-absorbing (and radioactive) fission products to

be useful. The fuel is then removed and placed

into pools of water for cooling. In an LWR, the

spent fuel does not have to be reused, but it still

has about 0.9 percent uranium-235, a higher

concentration than occurs in nature, plus

about 0.5 percent plutonium-239 which is

bred from the abundant uranium-238. If it is

deemed economical and desirable to recover

the unused fissile material, the spent fuel will

be sent to a reprocessing plant. There, the

uranium and plutonium are chemically separated from waste products and (under present

plans) from each other. The uranium may be

reenriched while the plutonium is sent

directly to a fuel fabrication plant, The

plutonium is then mixed with uranium (both

uranium and plutonium being in oxide form),

to form mixed oxide fuel.

The fuel cycle for other reactors may differ

in the necessity for, and nature of, the various

stages in the light-water reactor fuel cycle just

described, For example, the Canadian CANDU reactor uses natural uranium, and recovery of plutonium from its spent fuel is not at

present economical. Hence, the CANDU fuel

cycle excludes both the enrichment and

reprocessing steps.

A future reactor concept is the breeder, a

reactor that would create more new fissile fuel

than it burns to produce power. Most

development work has concentrated on the

liquid metal fast breeder reactor, (LMFBR)

which will yield enough plutonium to refuel

itself and excess plutonium to contribute to

the fueling of new reactors. The breeder fuel

cycle would eliminate the enrichment step but

absolutely requires the reprocessing step.

All the reactors mentioned so far use

uranium as a fuel, with fissile uranium–235

to produce power and with fertil e

uranium–238 to breed another fissile isotope,

plutonium –239. Another fuel cycle may be

based on the element thorium, The isotope

thorium–232 is fertile and breeds fissile

uranium–233.

In most of the fuel cycle for commercial

nuclear power reactors, the concentration of

23
Figure 11-1.

Light-Water Reactor Fuel Cycle

Spent fuel to

FUEL

ASSEMBLIES

Dilute P

ENRICHED

UF6

Enriched

uranium

LWR POWER REACTORS

FABRICATION

FUEL FABRICATION

PLUTONIUM

Enrichment

NATURAL UF6 t

‘ CONVERSION

TO UF6

Natural

uranium to

enrichment plant

I URANIUM MINES

AND MILLS ORE

STORAGE/lNVENTORY

RECOVERED URANIUM

Ptutonium

I

WASTE STORAGE

Potential

Diversion Path

[

SOURCE: OTA

24
fissile fuel is low. By contrast, the concentration of fissile material in a nuclear weapon

is quite high—typically pure plutonium, or

uranium enriched to about 90 percent in the

isotope uranium–235. (See chapter VI for a

discussion of the minimum concentration of

fissile material that can be used to construct a

nuclear explosive of practical weight.) The object in designing a weapon is to initiate a chain

reaction that will cause a large number of

nuclei to fission in a very short period of time.

This condition will be obtained only if a certain minimal amount of nuclear material

called the critical mass is present. With less

than this quantity, an explosion will never occur. No specific number can be assigned to the

critical mass—it varies with a number of

parameters, including, for example, the particular fissile isotope and its concentration and

chemical form. A nuclear weapon initially

contains one or more subcritical masses of

fissile material. Detonation of the weapon requires a means of rapidly moving the subcritical mass or masses into a condition of

supercriticality sufficient to produce a significant nuclear yield before it blows itself apart.

There are two basic methods of assembling

the fissile material in a nuclear weapon. The

first is to shoot two (or more) subcritical

masses into each other. This is a gun-type

weapon. The second is to surround a subcritical

configuration of fissile material with high explosives and use them to compress the

material into a supercritical mass. Such a

device is called an implosion weapon.

Note that the highly concentrated fissile

material required for weapons is exposed at

only one portion of the nuclear fuel cycle

described above-at the reprocessing and fuel

fabrication plants and the transportation link

between the two. These areas are thus the

most vulnerable to the diversion of nuclear

material from a power program to a weapons

program. However, there are other possible

crossovers between peaceful and destructive

uses of nuclear energy that are not that direct

and obvious as described in chapter VII.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Incentives and Disincentives

As the technological and economic barriers

to proliferation have diminished, the decision

whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons

has become principally political. It will hinge

on a complex balance of incentives and disincentives which, though unique for each country, exhibit sufficient similarities to permit

generalization.

General incentives that might lead a

government to select the nuclear weapons option include the following:

1) Deterrence.—Several states on every list

of potential new nuclear weapons states (Nth

countries) have reason to fear direct attack or

long-term deterioration of their security vis-a -

vis neighbors or regional adversaries.

2) Increased International Status.—As a

symbol of modernity and technological competence, nuclear weapons are often viewed as

a source of status, prestige, and respect. Aside

from its symbolic significance, a nuclear

weapon capability will augment national military and political power in real terms,

3) Domestic Political Requirements.—

Nuclear weapons may bolster a government’s

domestic political support for many of the

same reasons they can enhance a nation’s international reputation. The Indian detonation

may have been motivated in large part by

such considerations.

4) Increased Strategic Autonomy .—Even

if it is already protected by an alliance, a nation may feel it has more options to pursue

national objectives as a nuclear state than as a

non-nuclear state. France is an example of this

reasoning.

5) Strategic Hedge Against Military and

Political Uncertainty.—Uncertainty about the

reliability of allies and the intentions and

capabilities of adversaries may make nuclear

weapons attractive,

6) Possession of “A Weapon of Last

Resort.” —Nuclear weapons may be perceived

25
by a state such as Israel as offering an ultimate

guarantee against extinction.

7) Leverage Over the Industrialized

Countries .—Certain developing countries

may conclude that acquiring nuclear weapons

is a means of compelling the advanced nations

to take more serious account of the interests of

the less developed.

General disincentives that might discourage a state from acquiring nuclear

weapons include the following:

1) Resource Diversion.—It is argued that a

nuclear weapons program is not an optimal

use of limited national resources, and that the

loss of the opportunity to pursue economic or

social programs outweighs the benefits of a

nuclear weapons program.

2) Adverse Public Opinion.—In a number

of countries (e.g., Japan) prevailing public

opinion appears to oppose development of

nuclear weapons,

3) Disruption of Established Security

Guarantees.—Reliance on security guarantees

constitutes one of the most important elements in many countries’ strategy for coping

with adversaries. If the acquisition of nuclear

weapons jeopardizes that guarantee, the effect

may be counterproductive in terms of national

security.

4) Infeasibility of a Desired Nuclear

Strategy .—The nation may be unable to attain

the desired nuclear capability in an appropriate time frame, or because of a lack of

resources.

5) Adverse International Reactions.—Anticipation of censure from the international

community (including the superpowers)

would constitute a significant disincentive.

6) Adverse Reactions by Adversaries.—

Proliferation may stimulate an adversary to

take a variety of measures, including the acquisition of a countervailing nuclear force.

7) Advocacy of Neutralist Aims.-Countries like Sweden and Switzerland eschew a

nuclear weapons capability, in part because it

would be perceived as degrading their arms

control and neutralist positions.

A review of the existing nuclear weapons

states suggests that the desire to maintain or

enhance the nation’s security and international influence were the primary incentives

behind their original weapons programs.

Economic disincentives, even for less

developed nations such as China and India,

were not compelling, Similarly, for Nth countries, security and political influence are the

dominant incentives. Thus far, however, these

have been offset by disincentives, notably concern about adversary responses, the economic

costs of diverting resources to weapons

development, and possible alienation of the

superpowers with a resulting loss of nuclear

and economic development assistance.

The Non-State Adversary

Subnational groups might be as interested

as nations in obtaining nuclear weapons. Potential nuclear non-state adversaries span a

wide spectrum, from the isolated lunatic, to

the criminal, to the organized revolutionary

group. The actions they might conceivably undertake range from hoaxes to the construction

and detonation of a crude nuclear explosive

device. Strictly speaking, token acts of

violence do not constitute nuclear adversary

actions, although it is useful to study such occurrences for indications of trends towards

more serious acts.

Concern about the potential nuclear nonstate adversary has continued to grow since

the late 1960’s, although incidents involving

nuclear material or facilities that have occurred so far have been mostly low level acts

of vandalism or sabotage. There is no evidence

that any non-state group has attempted to acquire weapons material for use in a nuclear

explosive.

However, the lack of serious malevolent

nuclear actions is not a cause for complacency

about the future. The expansion of nuclear

power, the advent of plutonium recycle, and

trends towards increased violence could lead

non-state adversaries to attempt large-scale

nuclear threats or violence.

Terrorist groups might decide to use

nuclear means to cause widespread damage or

kill large numbers of people, but so far terrorists have not even gone to the limit of their

non-nuclear capability to destroy and kill. On

26
the basis of the historical record and the theory of terrorism, it is not clear that causing

massive casualties is attractive to terrorists;

indeed it could even be regarded as counterproductive. Therefore, some experts have

argued that mass murder will probably not be

contemplated by terrorist groups capable of

making elementary political judgments.

Several factors could cause terrorists to

break the previous patterns. A desperate insurgent group might decide to strike one

catastrophic blow, Nihilist groups may

emerge, whose goals would be well served by

pure massive destruction. On the other hand,

the primary attraction for terrorists to go

nuclear may not be to cause mass casualties.

Almost any nuclear action by terrorists would

cause great alarm, attract widespread attention, and possibly win concessions.

Whether organized crime should be

counted among likely nuclear non-state adversaries remains a matter of debate, centering

around its interest in doing so rather than its

capability to undertake nuclear actions. The

acquisition of a nuclear capability of its own,

however, would mean that organized crime

had decided to defy the nation in which its

normal and highly profitable activities take

place. It is easier to imagine organized crime

playing a middleman role in a nuclear

materials black market. Some observers have

argued that organized crime would steer clear

even of supplying nuclear material for nuclear

weapons, because this activity might evoke a

level of response that would jeopardize all

their activities.

Some perpetrators of nuclear hoaxes have

manifested desires of becoming nuclear nonstate adversaries, but none have demonstrated

the required capabilities. If hoaxers did have

access to nuclear material, it is not clear that

they would escalate from hoax to action.

Psychotics have probably been responsible

for many of the low-level nuclear incidents

and hoaxes that have occurred so far. Psychotics have also been the perpetrators of

many known schemes of mass murder. Thus,

in terms of intention alone, some psychotics

are potential nuclear non-state adversaries. In

terms of capability they probably rank lowest

of all the categories of potential non-state adversaries. However, there are some brilliant

psychotics who have technical knowledge and

skill. If such an individual had the will to

cause mass destruction and had access to

nuclear material, he would constitute a formidable adversary.

Whether any of the current potential nonstate adversaries will decide to go nuclear cannot be answered at this time. There is a vast

area of uncertainty between what can be done

and what will be done. This area could be

reduced if analysts had a better understanding

of how potential adversaries themselves perceive the usefulness of nuclear actions.

Moreover, in the case of terrorists, there is at

present no clear understanding of how they

could exploit a nuclear action or threat to

effect an irreversible political gain of magnitude comparable to the action or threat.

The nuclear non-state adversary might not

arise from those groups currently identified as

potential nuclear adversaries. International

terrorists are a new entity that emerged in the

past decade. It is difficult to say what new entities may emerge in the coming decade. It is

disquieting to realize that most new terrorist

groups have not been detected prior to their

first terrorist act.

Among current adversaries, new tactics

may be invented to effectively exploit the

leverage that a nuclear capability would give.

If an individual or a group did successfully

carry out a scheme of nuclear extortion or

violence, other individuals or groups would

probably try to imitate their act.

Moreover, the growth of a transnational

terrorist network over the past several years

means that no nation, however invulnerable

its own nuclear facilities, can regard itself as

invulnerable to nuclear non-state adversary

action.

27
Civil Liberties Implication of Safeguards

Whether a safeguards program to protect

special nuclear material in a plutonium industry would jeopardize civil liberties has been a

growing topic in the plutonium recycle

debate. The concern is not only to protect

rights of privacy, free expression, and fair procedure for employees of a plutonium recycle

industry, but also to ensure that residents of

nearby communities, political critics, and

society at large are not subjected to unacceptable levels of surveillance in order to prevent

diversion attempts, or to even more harsh and

intrusive techniques if recovery of diverted

material had to be undertaken. Judgments on

what safeguards measures would be reasona -

bly required and what their civil liberties implications would be is, in the first instance, a

matter of public policy for elected officials and

the public, and only later an issue that might

produce judgments of constitutionality or interpretive modifications from the courts.

Concern over the civil liberties implications

of plutonium recycle first arose when projections of the size of the industry were much

higher than they are now. It now appears that

only about 20,000 employees will be required

to have clearances for work in the fuel cycle.

Transportation of pure plutonium could

possibly be eliminated by arrangements such

as collocation or coprocessing. Both lowered

growth and potential technological innovations affect perceptions of civil liberties

problems.

It is generally accepted that protecting

plutonium facilities from diversion efforts

would represent a genuine security need, that

there is no way to structure an adequate

safeguards program that would not actually

or potentially have some civil liberties impact,

and that there is no way for society to eliminate all the motivations under which terrorists or deranged persons might try to divert

plutonium for their purposes. As a result,

safeguard measures of the kind used in other

high-security contexts would have to be applied here.

Such safeguards fall into four categories:

employee screening, material protection,

28

threat analysis, and recovery measures. In

each, there are possible techniques ranging

from those raising minimal threats to civil

liberties to those that, if used, would raise far

more serious questions,

The debates over what safeguards would be

needed and how these would affect civil liberties has produced three main positions:

Position One maintains that a plutonium

economy would require such extensive

security safeguards and have such high impact on civil liberties that basic freedoms

would be jeopardized. It assumes that Congress and the public would insist upon a

rigorous, virtually zero-risk program,

especially if actual incidents heightened concern. Furthermore, preventive intelligence

programs would inevitably be expanded to

cover anti-nuclear groups and protest movements and lead to a rise in surveillance,

databanks, and infiltration of dissenters, not

just terrorists. Finally, should there be a successful diversion and blackmail threat, sweeping incursions of personal and press freedoms

would take place. To avoid creating risks of

such dangers, and because it is believed there

are alternative ways of conserving and securing energy that do not raise comparable

threats to civil liberties, advocates of this position call for a rejection of plutonium recycle in

the United States on civil liberties grounds.

Position Two maintains that safeguards

can be adopted that would be both effective

for security purposes and acceptable in terms

of civil liberties, just as other high-security activities are now safeguarded. Believing that

plutonium is a necessary and safe energy

source, the notion is rejected that threats from

a handful of terrorists or deranged persons

should force this nation to forgo plutonium

recycle. Because persons working in this industry would do so voluntarily, there would

be nothing improper in using techniques such

as personnel clearances or on-the-job surveillance. Diversion and bomb threats should

be treated with the same professional skills

that would be used for other terrorists threats,

whether with chemical, biological, or nuclear

material or in hostage situations. Preventive

intelligence activities would be put under

clear legislative guidelines and supervisory

checks. Position Two concludes that
plutonium recycle should be allowed to proceed and that continually improved

safeguards systems should be developed as

the industry grows.

Position Three would also go ahead with

plutonium recycle but only if the philosophy

of a safeguards program were that some small

risks of diversion would be accepted in order

to avoid major risks to civil liberties. They

would limit safeguards measures to those

meeting specific criteria of effectiveness,

limitation, and capacity for control against

abuse. A least intrusive measure standard

would be followed. This position would require such standards to be developed in public

proceedings, written into legislation,

monitored by independent review, and

regularly audited.

These sets of assumptions and judgments

could be significantly affected by alterations in

a plutonium system or in safeguards options.

Transportation risks might be reduced if the

policy of collocating reprocessing and fuel

fabrication plants were adopted. Coprecipitation of plutonium and uranium at the

reprocessing plant would also eliminate the

transport of pure plutonium. Such measures,

coupled with the use of hardened facilities,

could reduce the pressures to use intrusive

preventive intelligence measures.

However,

fundamental

still remain,

tion.

some observers believe that the

civil liberties problems would

especially in a recovery operaThese three approaches on civil liberties not

only rest on sociopolitical judgments about

liberty and security but also mirror the main

positions on plutonium recycle in terms of

safety and economy. Thus, the civil liberties

aspect is one portion—though a very important part-of the total judgment about

plutonium recycle. If plutonium recycle does

go forward, a most important task will be the

close and steady monitoring of the safeguards

program to keep it consistent with United

States civil liberties.

Nuclear Weapons

Assuming that a nation or a non-national

group had the will to design and construct a

nuclear weapon, would it also have the

ability? This chapter examines the manpower,

time, money, and equipment necessary to

design and construct the explosive, assuming

that enough fissile material had been obtained

by one of the routes discussed in chapter VII.

These requirements depend upon the complexity of the nuclear weapon. An assessment

of the minimal program necessary to produce

a nuclear weapon is of special relevance to

nuclear proliferation. This chapter will examine only relatively small weapons development programs and thus will consider only

low technology designs, i.e., equivalent to

1945 U.S. technology.

A minimal national program is an effort to

produce, without nuclear testing, a first weapon

which is very confidently expected to have a

substantial nuclear yield, This program will call

for a group of more than a dozen well-trained

and competent persons with experience in

several fields of science and engineering. They

would need a high explosive field test facility

and the support of a modest, already

established, scientific, technical, and organizational infrastructure.

If these requirements are met and the

program is properly executed the objective

might be attained approximately 2 years after

the start of the program, at a cost of a few tens

of millions of dollars. This estimate does not

include the time and money to obtain the

fissile material or to establish the infrastructure assumed above.

Some details of the effort would depend on

which of the two general types of weapons—

gun or implosion—were built. Contrary to

common belief, the construction of a gunassembly weapon presents difficulties roughly

equivalent to those of an implosion weapon.

The success or failure of producing a

militarily effective nuclear explosive, via the

29
effort described above, is far more dependent

on the competence of the people involved than

on the technological problems themselves. In

trying to evaluate the potential of a specific

nuclear weapons development program a

detailed knowledge of the strengths and

weaknesses of the personnel is more valuable

than details of the technological base of the

country. However, some general statements

can be made about what it is possible to

achieve with the national effort described

above.

The material for a nuclear weapon might be

plutonium, or uranium with a high concentration of either one of two uranium

isotopes—U 233 or U235. Using either form of

uranium or weapons-grade plutonium it is

possible to design low-technology devices that

would reliably produce explosive yields up to

the equivalent of 10 or 20 kilotons of TNT.

With reactor grade plutonium it is possible to

design low-technology devices with probable

yields 3 to 10 times lower than those mentioned above (depending on the design), but

yields in the kiloton range could be accomplished.

Militarily useful weapons with reliable

nuclear yields in the kiloton range can

therefore be constructed using low technology

and reactor-grade plutonium.

The national program just described is at

the upper end of a range of minimal efforts to

construct a nuclear fission explosive. At the

low end, a small group of people (possibly terrorists or criminals), none of whom have ever

had access to classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive

device. They would not necessarily require a

great deal of technological equipment or have

to undertake any experiments. The group

would have to include, at a minimum, a person capable of searching and understanding

the technical literature in several fields, and a

jack-of-all-trades technician. Again, it is

assumed that sufficient quantities of fissile

material have been provided.

The actual construction of even a crude

nuclear explosive would be at least as difficult

as the design itself. In contrast to the national

effort, the small group of people described

above would probably not be able to develop

30

an accurate prediction of the yield of their

device. It could be a total failure, because of

either faulty design or faulty construction. A

great deal depends on the capability of the

group; if it is deficient, not only might the

device itself be a total failure, but a member of

the group might suffer serious or fatal injury.

However, there is a clear possibility that a

clever and competent group could design and

construct a device which would give a significant nuclear yield.

Sources of Nuclear Material

A nation that wants nuclear weapons must

develop an appropriate source of fissile

material. The amount of material needed for

an explosive is about 5 to 10 kg of plutonium

or uranium-233 or 15 to 30 kg of highly

enriched uranium, that is, uranium that contains about 90 percent or more of the isotope

uranium-235. Uranium enriched to as low as

20 percent could be used in nuclear weapons,

but much more material would be required.

The exact quantity of uranium depends on its

form and on the type of weapon—implosion

or gun assembly.

Fissile material might be obtained by one of

three general routes. Most attention has recently been focused on diversion of material

from a civilian nuclear power program. A nation might evade safeguards on a nuclear

facility or use an unsafeguarded facility, possibly after the abrogation of safeguards agreements.

The second route is the construction of

facilities specifically designed to produce

nuclear weapons material. Examples of such

dedicated facilities are a small reactor to produce plutonium or an enrichment plant to

yield highly enriched uranium. A third route

is the purchase or theft of fissile material or

even a complete weapon. Each of these routes

is subject to constraints, and will be evaluated

differently by different nations or groups depending on their resources, capabilities, political situations, and intentions.

DIVERSION FROM COMMERCIAL

NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS

Although a nation could remove the fissile

material needed for nuclear weapons from its
commercial power systems, no present

nuclear weapons state has followed this path.

The difficulty of such diversion depends on

the type of reactor system and the safeguards

applied to the system. The reactor type determines the necessity for and nature of various

fuel-cycle facilities. These facilities might include enrichment, fuel fabrication, and

reprocessing plants to separate plutonium and

uranium from spent fuel. The opportunities

for diversion from all such facilities will be

assessed here as a function of the reactor

system.

The two classes of nuclear power reactors

available on the world market today are light

water reactors (LWRS) developed by the

United States and Canadian heavy water reactors (CAN DUS). Others which could be

deployed in the near future are the high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) and the

advanced gas cooled reactor (AGR). Most

development effort is being focused on the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR), but

commercialization is not expected for at least

10 years.

Light Water Reactors

Nuclear fuel convertible to weapons-grade

material could be diverted from any point in

the LWR fuel cycle, but the difficulty of conversion (chemical or isotopic separation), and

hence the usefulness of the material to the

diverter varies markedly from point to point.

The most attractive points are those where

plutonium appears in separated form: in the

reprocessing plant; in transport to a mixedoxide fuel fabrication plant; and at the input

area of the fuel fabrication plant. These steps

are necessary to the LWR fuel cycle only if

plutonium, in the spent fuel is to be recycled

back into the reactor. Plutonium recycle is not

essential to the operation of LWRS, but may be

undertaken to reduce the demand for

uranium and the need for enrichment.

If spent fuel is not reprocessed, the LWR

fuel cycle includes only the steps through

spent fuel storage. This is known as a oncethrough or throwaway cycle. Theft of spent

fuel, followed by subsequent extraction of the

plutonium, is only barely credible for a highly

organized, well-financed, and technically

competent non-state adversary group with a

secure base of operations. This action would

expose the group to radiation hazards, and to

a significant possibility of discovery because

of the time required for chemical processing.

Isotopic enrichment of fresh fuel to weapons

material is not credible for a non-state adversary.

In the LWR cycle without commercial

reprocessing, the national diverter would

have to divert spent fuel for reprocessing or

fresh fuel for enrichment. A small reprocessing plant capable of separating enough

plutonium for several explosives per year is

within the capability of many countries even

if an economical commercial plant is not (see

section on “Dedicated Facilities”). Removal of

the spent fuel could probably not be done

covertly, however, since effective safeguarding of LWRS and their spent fuel pools appears feasible with relatively straightforward

improvements in IAEA techniques and procedures. If a nation did decide to divert spent

fuel openly, it would have to choose between

maintaining normal power output from the

reactor and producing so-called weaponsgrade plutonium. When operated normally, a

1000 MW(e) LWR discharges about 240 kg of

plutonium in 31,000 kg of spent fuel annually.

Because this plutonium contains about 25 percent of the isotope Pu240 it is not ideal for

weapons, although reliable weapons can be

made using such material. The nation that

wanted weapons-grade plutonium (with 7

percent or less Pu240) would have to operate

the reactor differently, sacrificing around onehalf the power and producing about onequarter as much plutonium per kg of fuel.

This mode of operation approximately triples

fueling requirements.

The front end of the once-through cycle

contains only natural- and low-enriched

uranium. Enrichment to a considerably higher

fraction of U235 would be necessary for

weapons. This would be expensive and

difficult for most nations, which lack commercial enrichment facilities. Nations possessing a

commercial facility (especially a centrifuge

plant) could covertly dedicate a portion of it to

weapons grade enrichment, use the same technology to construct another facility for

31
weapons grade production, or abrogate

safeguards and overtly convert some or all of

the plant to the production of highly enriched

uranium. Covert diversion from a centrifuge

enrichment plant would be difficult to detect

with safeguards alone, judging by present

constraints on safeguards procedures (see

chapter VIII “Safeguards Technology”). Overt

conversion of a commercial centrifuge plant

could quickly yield large amounts of highly

enriched uranium.

In a LWR fuel cycle that includes plutonium

recycling, the material at the output of the

reprocessing plant, the first stages of the

mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant, and the

transportation link between the two plants, is

vulnerable to both the national and non-state

diverter. As presently envisaged, this material

is pure plutonium oxide (Pu02

) which can be

used directly in a nuclear explosive. Once

plutonium oxide is mixed with uranium oxide

at the fuel fabrication plant, the material

becomes significantly less attractive to the

non-state diverter, because of both the timeconsuming chemistry required to separate the

plutonium and the logistics of diverting a

large mass of material.

For the national diverter, a reprocessing

plant provides immediate access to weapons

material. A large reprocessing plant will be

extremely difficult to safeguard effectively

against covert diversion by the national

diverter. Enough plutonium for several explosives per year could be extracted from the

process stream within the error limits of

material accountancy. Furthermore, however

effective international safeguards may become

in their job of detecting covert diversion, they

cannot prevent a nation from seizing its own

reprocessing plant. Once the political decision

is made to seize the plant or its plutonium

stockpile the nation can have a reliable explosives in a matter of days to weeks, even

using reactor-grade plutonium.

The CANDU

Separated fissile material is not exposed

anywhere in the CANDU fuel cycle because

no reprocessing occurs. The diversion points

in the CANDU cycle are the reactor itself and

the spent fuel storage pool. As in the case of

the LWR, nonstate theft of spent fuel followed

by reprocessing is only barely credible. National diversion and subsequent reprocessing

of CANDU spent fuel, however, is technically

possible for many nations.

Whether a nation wishes to remove

material openly or secretly, it will find the

CANDU more vulnerable to diversion than

the LWR without plutonium recycle. The

CANDU is refueled continuously without

having to be shut down, and the fuel bundles

are small. Thus, fuel bundles need only be

pushed through the reactor faster than normal

to obtain weapons-grade plutonium.

International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards systems for CANDU reactors and

storage pools (possibly involving resident inspectors) can probably be designed and implemented so that significant diversion of spent

fuel bundles will be extremely unlikely to remain undetected. Thus, diversion from the

CANDU is also likely to be overt.

A nation that decides to divert openly from

a CANDU reactor may be less vulnerable than

the operator of a LWR to such sanctions as

withholding of fuel services. The CANDU

uses natural uranium and does not need

enrichment. However, it does rely upon a supply of heavy water, which might be subject to

an embargo.

The LMFBR

The diversion-prone points in the LMFBR

cycle are qualitatively the same as those in the

LWR cycle with plutonium recycle, but its

plutonium is more abundant and concentrated. Moreover, weapons-grade plutonium

is produced in one portion of the LMFBR. An

additional advantage to the national prolifera -

tor is that the breeder gives it an independent -

supply of fuel, making it less vulnerable to

sanctions. Another breeder reactor concept—

the gas cooled fast reactor (GCFR)—may be

even more attractive to the nation that wants

nuclear weapons because it breeds slightly

more plutonium than the LMFBR.

32
Thorium Fuel Cycle

Power reactor fuel cycles starting with

thorium as the natural resource have received

much less attention than the uranium/

plutonium fuel cycles discussed above, In this

fuel cycle the thorium produces a fissile

isotope, uranium-233. Except for the HTGR,

light water breeder reactor (LWBR), and the

molten salt breeder reactor (M SBR),

thorium/uranium fuel cycles have involved

only paper studies. Yet thorium cycles offer a

number of potential advantages, such as the

possibility of more efficient use of resources

through thermal breeders or near breeders.

Thorium fuel cycles also present barriers to

diversion. The fresh fuel can be rendered

unuseable for weapons by denaturing, that is,

by mixing uranium-233 with the non-fissile

isotope uranium-238. In addition, separated

U233 is dangerous to handle because of the

penetrating gamma radiation emitted by one

of the decay products of U232, an unavoidable

impurity in U233

.

5. Ease of conversion of diverted material

to weapons material; and

6. Opportunities for covert diversion.

Figure II-2 ranks the various systems in

terms of their resistance to each of these

proliferators.

Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies

A substantial diversion or theft potential

exists outside the commercial power industry,

because of (a) the large number of research

reactors throughout the world that are either

fueled with highly enriched uranium or produce significant amounts of plutonium, and

(b) the critical assemblies in several countries

that use plutonium. (Critical assemblies are

experimental facilities that run at zero power,)

Critical assembly plutonium is essentially uncontaminated by fission products and is of

high quality for use in weapons.

Alternate Fuel Cycles

Comparison of Reactor Systems

The relative value of these opportunities for

diversion depend on the intention and

capability of the diverter. Four general categories of proliferators can be envisioned:

1. Nations desiring a major weapons

force;

2. Nations satisfied with a small and not

necessarily sophisticated nuclear

capability;

3. Nations wishing the option of rapid

development of nuclear weapons in the

future; and

4. Non-state adversaries limited to a few

crude devices.

The factors that these diverters would consider include:

1. The production rate and quality of

fissile material;

2. Ability to withstand international embargoes and sanctions;

3. Impact of diversion on the fuel cycle;

4. Cost of the facilities;

Present commercial and near-commercial

fuel cycles have been conceived and developed

with essentially no thought given to their implications for proliferation or to the

difficulties of safeguarding them. However,

ERDA has recently set up a study in the Office

of Nuclear Energy Assessments, Division of

Nuclear Research and Applications, to investigate and evaluate alternate fuel cycles.

The criteria for evaluation of alternate cycles

are: (a) potential for preventing proliferation;

(b) safeguard potential; (c) technical

feasibility; (d) economics and resource utilization; (e) commercial feasibility; and (f) introduction date. In evaluating the potential for

preventing proliferation, the study will

emphasize deterrence to diversion or theft of

nuclear material for the purpose of making an

explosive weapon. Both domestic and foreign

applications will be considered.

The schedule calls for a final report in October 1978, with a developed set of proliferation

criteria and an assessment of selected alternate

fuel cycles. Supplemental funds of $4 million

33
Figure II-2.

Reactor Systems Resistance to Proliferation

(Note that a high rank means the system is least susceptible to diversion.)

—

2 a . 2 b .

1.

Reactor Major Non-State

System Availability Force Option Adversaries

Light Water

Reactor (enrichment) Present 5 6 7 1 “1 —- 

Light Water

Reactor (spent fuel) Present 4 3 1 4 4

— .

Light Water Reactor

(reprocessing) Present 6 5 8 5 6

CANDU Present 8 7 2 2 2

——.” . — . . ——

High Temperature Near

Gas Reactor Term 7 4 6 6 7

. — — —— —— — .—

Advanced Gas Near

Reacto r Term 3 2 3 3 3

Liquid Metal Fast R&D

Breeder Reactor (advanced) 9 9* 9 9 9 —.——. —— — —

Gas Cooled Fast

Reactor R&D 10 10’ 10 10 10 ——- . —..—. —-— — — .

Light Water

Breeder Reactor R&O 1 1 4 7 8

— _ .— . — . —

R&D)

Molten Salt (present

Breeder Reactor inactive) 2 8* 5 8 5

— — — —— — ——.— .

“May not be an opbon for cost or technological reasons. SOURCE: OTA
for FY 77 have been requested from Congress

by ERDA, and the program has been budgeted

at $7 million for FY 78.

In order for the results of this program to be

most useful, the alternates that are selected for

study should be balanced between relatively

short-term payoff technical modifications of

existing cycles and radically new approaches,

specifically including continuation of study on

the nonproliferating- reactor concept discussed below.

Nonproliferating Reactors

One of the most intriguing concepts being

studied by ERDA is funded at $250,000 for FY

77 by the Division of International Security

Affairs (ISA). This is the concept of nonproliferating reactors through strict design requirements, this approach seeks to eliminate

the diversion paths available in current and

projected reactor systems and their associated

fuel cycles. Several key design criteria are: (a)

the system shall contain only a small amount

of fissile material at any given time after startup; (b) there shall be no access to the fuel

during the lifetime of the reactor; (c) any

diversion of fuel will cause the reactor to shut

down; (d) the reactor shall be refuelled by the

addition of fertile (i.e., nonfissile) material

only; (e) the reactor shall not operate as a

breeder, but as a sustainer producing only

enough fissile material to keep itself running.

Conceptual studies of three reactor systems

have been funded by this program. This

program is the first attempt to design reactors

with nonproliferation as a specific design criterion. As such, it deserves continued funding

at an expanded scale, a wide hearing, a

thorough assessment, and an open-minded

comparison with other alternatives. There are

apparently no plans by ISA to continue funding this program in FY 78. If this promising

new approach is to receive further attention it

apparently must do so under aegis of the

Alternate Fuel Cycle Program, described

above.

DEDICATED FACILITIES

All nations which now possess nuclear

weapons have obtained the fissile material

from facilities specifically dedicated to the

production or separation of this material,

Thus, a commercial nuclear power program is

not a prerequisite for a nuclear weapons

program. The main advantage of a dedicated

facility is that it provides a reliable, possibly

secret and/or legal source of weapons

material. As safeguards are improved and extended over all imported nuclear facilities, and

as greater restraints are placed on the sale of

enrichment and reprocessing plants, nations

embarking on a nuclear weapons program

may be constrained to follow this route.

Construction of a dedicated facility (which

is, of course, not safeguarded) constitutes a

violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) by parties to that treaty. Nations that

are not party, however, can quite legally build

and operate weapons facilities, even while importing safeguarded nuclear material or technology from NPT nations,

A nation which decides to build a dedicated

facility has two basic options:

1. Construct a plutonium production

reactor plus a reprocessing plant to separate the plutonium from the spent

fuel.

A variant on this option is to feed a

dedicated reprocessing plant with spent

fuel from an already existing research

or power reactor. (This is the route India took with the unsafeguarded Cirrus

research reactor. )

2. Construct an enrichment plant to produce weapons-grade uranium from

natural or low-enriched uranium.

The choice between these options depends

upon a number of factors peculiar to each

country, including its technological base, production schedule, the existence of any civilian

nuclear facilities, and the number of weapons

35

92-592 0 - 77 - 4
wanted. These factors, especially the technological base, will also affect the time, personnel, and cost required for construction of

dedicated facilities.

Dedicated facilities are smaller and can be

simpler in design than corresponding commercial facilities. The technology for reactors

and reprocessing plants is not classified, with

several detailed plans of such plants available

to the public. These facts make construction of

certain dedicated facilities within reach of

many nations. In particular:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The construction of a reactor producing

about 10 kg of plutonium per year and

a small reprocessing plant is within the

capabilities of many developing nations. The total capital cost would be

several tens of millions of dollars, and

about 5 years would be required to construct the facilities and produce and

separate the first 10 kg of plutonium.

The reactor would be fueled by natural

uranium, moderated by graphite, and

cooled by air. Very pure Pu239 would be

produced.

Crude, imperfectly shielded, but technically feasible reprocessing plants based

on the techniques of solvent extraction

or ion exchange can be built for a quick

emergency response program at a cost

of one to several million dollars. The

nation would have to have access to

spent fuel from a reactor to feed into

such a plant. Such a facility would not

be suitable for a sustained weapons

program.

A low-cost, low-detection-risk option

for a nation already possessing a commercial centrifuge facility may be to

build a small “add-on” centrifuge

facility, either on or off the site, for the

production of highly enriched uranium.

A reactor producing about 100 kg of

plutonium per year and fueled by

natural uranium would be a suitable

dedicated facility for an open weapons

program in an at least moderately advanced nation.

There are no enrichment techniques

presently suitable for dedicated

facilities in any but technically advanced nations. (An exception might be

an “add-on” to a purchased commercial

centrifuge facility, as discussed in #3,

above.) Laser isotope separation (LIS) is

unlikely to be feasible for use as a dedicated facility (barring an unforseen

break-through) before the late 1980’s or

early 1990’s and then probably only for

technically advanced nations.

In brief, many nations might be able to

build a dedicated facility to produce fissile

material for a weapons program, For example,

about 40 nations already possess one or more

research or power reactors and thus have experience with nuclear programs. (See appendix V of volume II.)

It is unlikely that a dedicated facility to support a large weapons program (about 10 explosives per year) could remain undetected.

However, a dedicated facility to support a

small weapons program (one or two explosives per year) could present a detection

problem for intelligence agencies, especially if

the nation were not among the five or six Nth

countries most likely to be under intensive

surveillance.

PURCHASE AND THEFT

A third potential route to proliferation is by

the direct acquisition of weapons or fissile

material from another country. A nation or

group could purchase these items from an illegal black market, covertly buy or trade them

from a friendly nation in what is termed a

gray market, or steal another nation’s

weapons. Any of these methods bypasses the

need for the expensive and demanding technologies entailed by the commercial power

and dedicated facilities routes. If this type of

transaction emerges, the scope of proliferation

could be extended to technologically limited

nations and non-state adversaries who would

otherwise have found the task difficult and

risky. The pace of proliferation could be

further accelerated by the relative ease of obtaining weapons, a general sense that the nonproliferation regime was crumbling, and a

specific concern that one’s enemies might be

covertly arming.

36
Nuclear black market commodities might

be fissile material, weapons designs, or

weapons. Of these, the most likely to drive a

black market is the fissile fuel plutonium: If

plutonium is extensively recycled numerous

opportunities would exist to divert this substance. Only a very small fraction of the

plutonium need be taken from a full

plutonium fuel cycle to produce material for

many bombs per year. An alternative source

might be material intended for research purposes and military weapons.

The most probable customers for material

used directly in a nuclear weapon are less

developed nations or countries faced with an

emergency that foreclosed other routes to

nuclear weapons. This material might also interest terrorists or criminals bent on extortion.

The suppliers might be employees of a

reprocessing plant who gradually withdraw

amounts below safeguards detection limits, or

criminals or non-state adversaries who stage

armed attacks on plutonium shipments or

stockpiles. The size of a nuclear black market

would be small compared to that of the illegal

drug market, but profits could still be large

enough to make emergence of such a market

credible. Establishment of contact between

diverse suppliers and buyers for isolated

transactions would be difficult. Once initiated,

however, this contact could be the nucleus for a

sustained market, especially if supply and demand are high.

In a gray market, transactions are technically legal but are kept secret because of anticipated negative responses, including sanctions

and preemptive attacks. In order for the transaction to be legal, the buyer will always be a

government. The nation might be interested in

such commodities as weapons, fissile material,

or technical assistance, although weapons

would probably be supplied only under extreme national emergencies. The country

might more commonly receive nuclear technical assistance,

One potential supplier would be another

nation motivated by the need to obtain a vital

resource such as oil or by the desire to curry

favor with a key nation. Another supplier

conceivably could be a corporation that is subjected to pressure to assist a nation in which it

has considerable investments or sales expectations. Most corporations, however, will have

high resistance to such pressure in matters as

serious as nuclear weapons proliferation. A

third supplier could be an appropriately

trained individual, peddling himself as a

scientific mercenary.

The gray market involves more natural

partners (national allies) than the black

market, and it may be more easily established

although less widely spread. Participants in

both markets must take high risks and thus

must have strong motivations. Both markets

may be detected by enhanced intelligence activities, and once located, could be halted only

by the cooperative efforts of many nations.

The black market in plutonium might be

largely eliminated by a ban on reprocessing.

An adverse feature of this ban, or any other

measure that decreases employment in the

nuclear industry, is its tendency to create a potential supply of scientific mercenaries.

Theft is the most direct route to nuclear

weapons. A detailed assessment of military

security was not made for this report, but

some observations can be made. Weapons are

protected internally against unauthorized use

in the United States, but might be rebuilt to

bypass these mechanisms. The psychological

value of a successful theft would be considera -

ble even if the weapons were actually unusea -

ble. Security for weapons is considerably

more stringent than for commercial facilities,

but even so, the need for upgrading is recognized by the Department of Defense. A welltrained Commando raid of about 8 to 20 attackers using an imaginative plan and assisted

by insiders could be difficult to resist without

rapid reinforcement. Intelligence activities

could make an important contribution by providing warning of such an attack. Massive attacks that are essentially acts of war would be

even more likely to succeed, but would be

easy to track, Strong political or military

responses would be required to assure return

or destruction of the weapons. Physical

security used by other weapons states seem to

present about the same obstacles to theft as

those of the United States, but new nuclear

states may be more vulnerable.

37
Control of Proliferation

Attempts to acquire nuclear weapons by

any of the three routes just discussed are subject to four general levels of control effort. The

first is detection of the attempt, either by

safeguards which watch for diversion from

commercial nuclear material flows, or by intelligence activities which can spot dedicated

facilities or illegal nuclear transactions. The

second level is the response to the detection of

such activity in order to force its reversal and

deter others from like actions, Sanctions administered by other nations are one method of

response. The third level is the restriction of

nuclear systems to those that present the

lowest risks for proliferation. Supplier agreements can coordinate a ban on sales of enrichment and reprocessing plants and emphasize

the development of new systems. The final

level is creation of an international climate,

through treaties and commitments, wherein

nations will not want to proliferate or will

find it difficult to do so for political reasons.

Each of these levels has produced institutions

and arrangements to perform the needed

functions. Many of the components would

benefit from strengthening, but together they

present an effective, though not insurmountable, barrier to proliferation,

The first part of this chapter will survey the

safeguards technology to detect diversion, The

second part will discuss the various institutions and arrangements that assist in the levels

of proliferation control.

SAFEGUARDS

The objective of domestic safeguards in the

United States is to detect, deter, prevent, and

respond to theft or sabotage by a non-state adversary. The objective of international

safeguards such as those applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to

detect diversion of nuclear material by a nation from its own nuclear facilities. In addition, international safeguards should assist

the national safeguards system in detecting

nonstate diversion.

United States Domestic Safeguards

The three basic elements of the U.S. system

are physical protection, material control, and

material accountancy. Physical protection elements are those that prevent unauthorized

outsiders from entering a facility or seizing

control of a transport vehicle, and prevent

nuclear material from leaving by an

unauthorized route. Examples are armed

guards, barriers, and portal monitors.

Material control measures consist of procedures for access to and transfer of special

nuclear material. They are aimed at preventing any two insiders acting in collusion from

removing nuclear material from the facility.

Materials accounting for nuclear material is

similar to accounting systems for other valuable materials, involving complete records of

the movement of material and the taking of

periodic physical inventories. The physical

protection and material control systems are

the primary safeguards measures in the

United States.

Safeguards were not given high priority by

the public or the Government until recently.

Several years ago, safeguards began to attract

widespread interest and increased funds were

provided, but, a sudden surge of interest and

money cannot quickly compensate for years of

complacency.

The United States has three major nuclear

programs, and three agencies (ERDA, NRC

and the Department of Defense) with

safeguards responsibility for these programs.

Because NRC has primary responsibility for

commercial nuclear facilities, it has been the

focus of this report. The NRC safeguards tasks

can be considered in four classes; the first

three are of present concern but the fourth

allows time for further study.

1. Protection of Shipments of Privately

Owned Strategic Nuclear Material.—The

Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements on shipments of strategically significant

amounts of special nuclear material (i.e., 5 kg

or more of highly enriched U235 or 2 kg or

more of plutonium or U233) are currently less

stringent than those recently adopted by

38
ERDA for shipment of its own material. One

critical element of effective safeguards is

secure communication during transportation.

ERDA has such a system (SECOM), but its use

is at present restricted to transport of ERDA

material. There appear to be no serious legal,

economic, or institutional reasons why shippers of privately owned nuclear material cannot employ the ERDA communications and

control system. Transportation security for

NRC licensees would be further upgraded by

the use of specially designed, penetration

resistant tractor-trailers similar in performance to ERDA’s and accompanied by escort

vehicles.

2. Protection of Production Facilities That

Possess Strategic Special Nuclea r

Materials.—NRC sets requirements to protect

those privately owned facilities licensed for

possession of strategic quantities of plutonium

or highly enriched uranium. NRC also inspects the facilities to ensure licensee compliance to its regulations. Controversy over

whether or not safeguards are presently adequate at these facilities centers around what

level of threat safeguards should meet.

Although this report has not assessed

safeguards at specific facilities, it can make

some observations about the methods of

assessment now being used.

In current assessments, more attention has

been given to the size of a potential non-state

adversary group than to any other single attribute. Although some historical data on size

of threats are useful as a guide, an estimate of

the numbers of attackers is inescapably a matter of judgment. A study in progress at the

RAND Corporation suggests a range of anywhere from 7 or 8 to about 15 attackers as a

prudent estimate, without speaking in terms

of a maximum threat. NRC has reportedly ordered its licensees to upgrade physical

security to meet a threat of two or more insiders acting in collusion with several heavily

armed attackers from the outside.

In addition to numbers, other important

parameters to consider are armament, tactics,

and the characteristics of the facility itself.

Present safeguards and physical security may

place undue reliance on one element of physical security-armed guards, It is not clear how

well presently designed safeguard systems can

handle the problem of several insiders acting

in collusion, or outsiders attacking with guile

and deception rather than straightforward

armed assault.

Moreover, guards at nuclear facilities presently have only civilian arrest powers, which

are quite limited and vary from state to state.

Serious consideration should be given to ways

to clarify the power of the guards. The question of using a Federal security force to protect

nuclear material needs reopening, particularly

in light of the increased threat levels licensees

are being required to meet.

It should also be recognized that there could

be an alternative to reliance on onsite guards

for standoff of an armed attack, A crucial

question, which deserves serious review, is

the extent to which safeguards systems can be

designed to sufficiently delay attacking adversaries so that the burden of engagement and

arrest falls on off site response forces rather

than onsite guards.

3. Protection of Power Reactors Against

Sabotage.—The question of reactor sabotage

was judged peripheral to the main focus of

this study: the proliferation of nuclear

weapons. This report has therefore not

assessed the adequacy of U.S. domestic

security at power reactors.

4. Protection of Future Facilities That

Would Process Plutonium-Containing Fuel

or Other Concentrated Weapons Material.—

It is not clear whether NRC will decide to

license plutonium processing facilities, or if

so, when. The only such plant which could

start operations within the next few years is

the Allied-General Nuclear Services spent-fuel

reprocessing plant at Barnwell, S.C. Other

facilities to produce plutonium oxide or to

fabricate plutonium for breeder reactors exist

only on paper and are 5 to 10 years from completion.

Several safeguard concepts have been put

forth in recent years to meet the problems

posed by large-scale concentrated weapons

material in processing and fabrication

39
facilities. These are listed and briefly assessed

below :

a. Massive Spiking

Massive spiking is the addition of

lethal amounts of radioactive material to

fresh fuel as a barrier to theft. Studies indicate that this technique is not cost effective compared to massive containment

and stringent physical security for

domestic safeguards use. Massive spiking

would not be useful at all in restraint of

national proliferation.

b. Light Spiking

Spiking of highly enriched

with low levels of radioactive

should be given further study.

c. Denaturing of Plutonium

uranium

material

The concept of denatured plutonium—

plutonium which, because of its isotopic

composition, is not suitable for explosives—is fallacious. (See chapter VI

“Nuclear Fission Explosive Weapons”.)

d. Storage and Transport of Plutonium in Dilute

Mixed-Oxide Form

If plutonium dioxide were always

mixed with a large quantity of

uranium oxide, when stored and

transported, its usefulness to the nonstate adversary would be considerably

reduced. A group would have to steal

large amounts of mixed-oxide material

and undertake time-consuming chemistry to separate the plutonium. However,

the dilute mixed-oxide form would constitute much less of a barrier against national diversion.

e. Collocation of Reprocessing and Fuel Fabrication Plants

The collocation of reprocessing plants

and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants

would eliminate the transport of pure

plutonium oxide. The advantages and

disadvantages of this safeguard measure

have not yet been assessed in any

systematic way. However, if coprecipita40

f.

g.

tion is employed at the reprocessing

plant so that its output is dilute

plutonium oxide in uranium oxide, colocation would probably not offer significant additional safeguard advantages.

Advanced Materials Accounting System

No substantial economical improvement in the sensitivity of materials accountancy can be expected unless realtime material control can be implemented. Two such systems are being

developed: DYMAC at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and RETIMAC by NRC

at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Considerable development work and in-plant

demonstration is required before the

effectiveness and costs of real-time

material control can be reliably assessed.

However, even once developed, such

systems could not do the entire

safeguards job, Physical security, containment, and surveillance will still play

crucial roles in both domestic and international systems.

Integrated Safeguard Systems

The most effective safeguard systems

would be those in which the various elements are integrated with one another

and into the design of new facilities. Such

systems demand not only development

of hardware and computerized control

but, also, development of methodologies

to assess their effectiveness against both

outside attack and embezzlement by insiders. The input to this assessment must

be reliable data on the individual elements of the system. It is therefore important to continue experimental

programs to provide information on the

penetration resistance of barriers, the

reliability of alarms, and the efficacy and

safety of techniques such as foams and

reactive sensors that delay and confuse

the adversary.

IAEA Safeguards

The objectives of the IAEA safeguard

systems is to detect national diversion.
Materials accountancy is considered to be the

safeguards measure of fundamental importance by the IAEA. Containment and surveillance are regarded as important complementary measures.

The materials accountancy system is based

on records and physical inventories made by

the facility operator and subsequently verified

by the IAEA inspector. Containment is the use

of physical barriers to restrict and control access to or movement of nuclear material. Surveillance means instrumental or human observation to detect access to or movement of

nuclear material. It is generally accepted that

there are unavoidable limitations on material

accountancy due to measurement errors: containment and surveillance will therefore have

to be assigned much greater importance in the

design of safeguards.

The role of IAEA in the issue of physical

security is an advisory one. Physical security

systems are the prerogative of the individual

nation. As part of an effort to upgrade physical security worldwide, ERDA physicalsecurity review teams visited a large number

of countries in 1975-76. The result of the visits

are classified by ERDA because of the

classified nature of physical security measures

in foreign states: ERDA further stated that

laws, regulations and factors peculiar to each

nation made it difficult to draw even general

observations about the visits.

IAEA Safeguarding of Power Reactors.—It

is difficult to evaluate the present effectiveness

of IAEA safeguards on power reactors because

information about critical IAEA procedures

and policies is either not available outside the

Agency or is classified by the IAEA as

“Safeguards Confidential.” Some of this information may become available in the Director

General’s proposed Special Safeguards Implementation Report to the Board of Governors.

The report is expected in September 1977,

after several delays totaling over a year.

On the basis of the available information, it

appears credible that IAEA will develop and

implement improved equipment and techniques to make undetected diversion from

light water reactors or their spent fuel storage

pools very unlikely. Safeguarding onload

reactors, such as the CANDU which is

refuelled without being shut down, is substantially more difficult.

A great deal of research is being done on

surveillance and containment to safeguard

CANDU reactors, but not enough information

is available at present for a reliable assessment. The IAEA may decide to request the

right to station resident inspectors at these

reactors. Such a move would greatly increase

IAEA costs and workload.

IAEA Safeguarding of Enrichment and

Reprocessing Plants.—To date, IAEA has not

safeguarded any type of enrichment plant (including pilot plant), nor has it undertaken the

routine application of safeguards on a longterm basis to any commercial reprocessing

plant.

As now proposed, IAEA inspection procedures for enrichment plants (especially

centrifuge plants) leave open a path for a nation to obtain highly enriched uranium for

weapons. The nation might convert one section of its centrifuge plant to a high enrichment loop. Detection of this loop would be

difficult: the IAEA inspector is currently

denied access to the cascade area (that is, the

area where the actual enrichment takes place),

and is not allowed to monitor any new equipment that goes in and out of this area. Reconfiguration of the plant would have to be

deduced from measurements of other inputs

and outputs to the cascade area. Furthermore,

materials accounting is currently not accurate

enough for a Iarge plant to assure the inspector that a significant diversion has not taken

place. Despite objections that permitting IAEA

inspectors inside the cascade area will expose

commercial secrets, doing so would greatly

enhance the effectiveness and credibility of

IAEA inspection.

Present material accounting systems (both

U.S. and IAEA) for use in large commercial

reprocessing plants are not sensitive enough

to reliably detect diversion of the order of tens

of kilograms of plutonium. More importantly,

detection may occur weeks or months after

the diversion. The IAEA requires materials accountancy to be supplemented by containment and surveillance measures. Advanced

41
containment and surveillance systems are currently in the conceptual design stage. The aim

is to develop systems that will be effective and

reliable, indicate attempts to tamper, and

eventually be able to report in real time to

both a central inspector station and IAEA

headquarters in Vienna. Such systems are essential to the credibility of IAEA safeguards

on reprocessing plants.

The IAEA will not be immediately confronted with the safeguarding of very large

enrichment or reprocessing plants. Given adequate manpower, and technical and financial

support, the safeguards system should be able

to improve as the size of facilities under

safeguards increases. It is not, however, possible to conclude at this time that this effort will

be successful. There are a number of

unresolved technical and political problems,

any one of which might preclude truly credible safeguards against covert diversion for

these types of plants.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS,

AGREEMENTS, AND SANCTIONS

Safeguards on nuclear facilities can be only

as strong as the agencies that apply them, and

only as effective as the responses that enforce

them. The entire climate for international

safeguards is governed largely by the institutions and agreements that are described

below.

International Atomic Energy Agency and

Euratom

The International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) operates a safeguards inspection

system required for all nuclear material of

non-nuclear weapons states party to the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), and on all exports

by members to nonmembers. Thes e

safeguards are aimed at detecting whether a

nation has diverted nuclear material from its

own facilities, so an adversary attitude toward

the nations is assumed. The IAEA has no

power to enforce physical protection, recover

diverted material, or detect dedicated facilities

or illegal transactions.

IAEA response to possible evidence of a

national diversion is limited. The evidence initiates a sequence of reports and efforts to

42

resolve the discrepancy. If these fail, the matter is referred to the Board of Governors, who

must weigh the evidence and such factors as

the effectiveness of the Agency’s procedures

and inspectors, the quantity and quality of

missing material, and political factors within

the state in order to decide whether a nation

has indeed removed some nuclear material. If

the Board decides this is the case it sends a

report to its members and to the UN, but it has

essentially no other recourse.

This noncompliance path has not yet been

tested. If governments perceive the risks of

detection to be low, however, they may be enticed to try to divert. Some of these attempts

would be detected, even in an enrichment or

reprocessing plant. Once a state is caught in an

attempted diversion, it may apply political

pressure or attempt to stall the Agency’s

efforts to reconcile the problem. The Agency’s

response to the first attempt will be especially

crucial and must be strongly supported by its

member states.

Besides the limited response to violations,

IAEA safeguards face other problems: they are

somewhat restricted by proprietary interests

of many nations; they are hampered by failure

of facility designs to integrate the application

of safeguards; they are dependent upon inspector quality and morale. On the other

hand, the very acceptance by nations of Agency inspectors in their nuclear facilities represents a considerable concession, The IAEA

safeguarding efforts are certainly not perfunctory and they are making a credible effort

to prepare for the expanded work load ahead.

Eurakmn is the multinational agency of the

European Economic Community that performs the safeguards functions for its member

states. The Euratom safeguards system is less

formally structured than the IAEA system,

and Euratom’s inspection access rights are

stronger and still exercised by its inspectors.

Euratom and the IAEA have been moving to

coordinate their inspections, but important

differences remain to be resolved,

Sanctions

Sanctions can be used either to deter or

reverse a nation’s efforts to obtain nuclear

weapons. To be effective, sanctions must enjoy
firm and widespread support within the international community, especially by the nuclear

suppliers. Sanctions lose their credibility if

they are not applied or are successfully

flouted. Sanctions could include the termination of nuclear assistance or trade, a cessation

of economic assistance, a general trade embargo, or termination of military support or

security guarantees. Because these measures

will impact differently on different countries,

they must be applied on a selective basis. The

history of sanctions in other cases is not encouraging but, given a strong international

norm against proliferation, the threat can be

made credible. Sanctions will be an important

element in proliferation constraint, but their

deterrent effect can be overcome by sufficient

incentives such as a threat to national survival. The defusing of proliferation pressures

therefore remains a critical concern, no matter

how severe the sanctions.

The Suppliers’ Conference and Multinational Facilities

In 1974, after extended negotiations, 10

nuclear exporting nations announced agreement on export procedures designed to coordinate fulfillment of supplier obligations

under the NPT. The designated procedures

and the so-called “Trigger List” of sensitive

exports represented the first major agreement

on uniform regulation of nuclear exports by

actual and potential nuclear suppliers. It

established the principle that nuclear supplier

nations should regulate the international

market for nuclear materials and equipment

in the interest of nonproliferation.

In response to the Indian nuclear detonation a second series of supplier negotiations

began. On January 27, 1976, the seven participating nations exchanged letters endorsing

a uniform code for conducting international

nuclear sales. The provisions strengthened the

1974 agreement with regard to the Trigger List

equipment, retransfer of exports, and physical

security requirements for the protection of exported materials and facilities. The new agreement indicated the importance that nuclear

supplier states attach to strengthening the international barriers against proliferation. The

Conference also served to elevate the issues of

nonproliferation and nuclear exports to the

highest political levels within participating

governments. Subsequent to the agreement,

there has been a notable strengthening of the

nonproliferation posture of Canada, West

Germany, and even France. Previous agreements to export reprocessing facilities to

Pakistan and Brazil have been cast into doubt.

There is a danger that the success of the

Suppliers’ Conference could lead user states to

view it as a cartel designed to preserve the

continued preeminence of the supplier states

in the international nuclear market. The result

could be a weakening of the sense of bargain

which makes the NPT acceptable to many

non-nuclear states.

Multinational Fuel Cycle Facilities (MFCF)

have been proposed as a way to supply

reprocessing services without having the

plants under national control. This would

greatly reduce opportunities for diversion by

any one nation. However, MFCFS might

weaken the arguments against reprocessing in

general and disseminate the technology to do

it. Nevertheless, MFCFS do show promise as a

means of forestalling national reprocessing. A

number of economic and political issues must

be resolved first. The IAEA is presently conducting a study addressed at many of these.

Another application of the MFCF concept

would be for spent-fuel storage, which would

be much easier to implement than reprocessing. It would also make a clear contribution to

nonproliferation while not foreclosing eventual multinational reprocessing.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

A major factor constraining nations from

nuclear weapons development has been the

NPT. The Treaty was designed to prevent the

diversion of nuclear material in commercial

power systems to weapons purposes by the

imposition of safeguards, and to gain a formal

commitment by the nonweapons states to remain weaponless. These considerable intrusions into national sovereignty were obtained

by guaranteeing access to peaceful nuclear

technology and obligating the weapons states

to pursue disarmament. Over 100 nations

have ratified the NPT, but some of the key

43
countries have not. The greater restrictions on

nonweapons states compared to weapons

states has caused some discontent, as has the

lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament. The NPT prevents only its ratifiers from

developing weapons, and parties can, under

extraordinary circumstances, withdraw on

only 3 months notice and quite legally produce their own. Nevertheless, it is a significant

deterrent in that most members would find it

politically difficult to resign, and it has helped

create a climate that makes proliferation an act

outside the pale of international propriety.

Comparison of Routes to Nuclear

Materials

The two previous sections have described

three routes to obtain fissionable nuclear

material suitable for weapons, and the

restraints on those routes. The route that

would be selected by a particular nation or

non-state adversary will depend on various

characteristics of the country concerned.

1)

2)

3)

4)

Technological Capability: If its ability is

high, a nation can consider any route. A

low capability limits the proliferator to a

purchase or theft.

Availability of Nuclear Facilities: The

ability of a proliferator to divert nuclear

material depends on the type of facility it

owns or can readily acquire.

Urgency of Need: If the proliferator must

have the weapons on a short time-scale,

it may have to openly abrogate

safeguards on its own nuclear facilities or

obtain weapons by purchase or theft.

Critical Resources: If a nation has large

quantities of uranium, it would be less

vulnerable to sanctions if caught diverting and less liable to be detected if it constructs a dedicated facility.

5) Political Relationships: Acceptance of

safeguards or vulnerability to sanctions

will, at least, force a nation to travel a

route with the least chance of detection.

On the other hand, alliance with a more

advanced nation may provide the nation

with technology or resources for a dedicated facility.

44

6) Perceptions of Controls: If a nation perceives safeguards to be effective, it will be

less likely to attempt diversion.

The interaction of all these factors will

determine the optimal pathway each nation or

subnational group would use to obtain

nuclear weapons. This interaction will be

strongly influenced by the particular objectives a nuclear weapons program is designed

to serve. In chapter VI, four such objectives

were identified,

a) Nations desiring a major weapons

force.

b) Nations satisfied with a smaller,

perhaps less sophisticated force.

c) Nations wishing the option of rapid

development of nuclear weapons in

the future.

d) Non-state adversaries limited to a few

crude devices.

A major weapons program can be defined

as one that produces at least 10 high-quality

weapons per year. Only a country with a

relatively extensive technological base can

realistically consider such a program. Such a

nation would not select a route as unreliable

or intermittent as an illegal nuclear market. It

could pursue either of the other two routes,

but would probably be unable to keep its intentions secret for long. The diversion of sufficient quantities of nuclear material from a

commercial nuclear power program would

necessitate open abrogation of safeguards,

unless the nation already had an un -

safeguarded facility. Sanctions such as nuclear

embargoes might effectively hamper a nation

from continuing along this route unless it had

its own uranium reserves and a natural

uranium or fast breeder reactor. Construction

of a plutonium production reactor dedicated

to production of weapons material might have

more appeal, in that it would be legal for a nation that is not a party to the NPT, and its production capabilities could be kept secret even

if the existence of the facility itself could not

be.

The nation that wants a small number of

unsophisticated weapons might procure the

material from any of the three routes, If it

needed the weapons quickly it might purchase
the required goods on a black or gray market,

if available, or might consider overt diversion

from a reprocessing or enrichment plant. If its

needs are not urgent, a country might be able

to obtain the nuclear materials secretly. If it

owned a reprocessing plant it might be able to

covertly divert sufficient material. The country might, however, be unwilling to risk

detection if it perceived the safeguards to be

effective. In that case it could construct a

plutonium production reactor, especially if

uranium were available. The reactor would be

on such a small scale that it could easily escape

detection. A final alternative for a country that

possessed a centrifuge enrichment plant

would be to rework a portion of it into a high

enrichment loop or to build a small “add on”

to the existing plant.

The nation wishing only an option for

future nuclear weapons development might

require commercial nuclear power reactors

with eventual diversion in mind. A reprocessing plant would be essential for it to extract

the weapons material from spent reactor fuel.

If it could not obtain such a facility, it might

build one of it own to hold in reserve. A small

reprocessing plant for weapons is far easier to

design and build than a commercial plant.

The non-state adversary can obtain nuclear

material either by black market transactions

or by armed attack on shipments or stockpiles

of plutonium in commercial power program.

The non-state adversary would probably not

be able to use material from other points in

the fuel cycle because construction of the

facilities required to convert such material to

weapons grade most likely would be beyond

the group’s capabilities.

This brief analysis shows that all three

routes are plausible under some conditions.

The least predictable is purchase/theft. If such

a route comes into existence, it could satisfy

three of the four categories of proliferators. It

might also serve the major force nation wanting a few bombs in hand to forestall the

preemptive attack that might occur if its intentions became known before its program was

complete. Hence, a high priority must be

given to controlling this type of transaction.

Diversion from commercial power systems

can be largely controlled if Nth countries do

not have their own reprocessing or enrichment plants. A reprocessing plant in particular provides instant access to weapons

material for any nation willing to abrogate its

safeguards agreement and many opportunities for covert diversion by those that are

not. The dedicated facility route is the least

subject to control. Many nations are capable of

this route because of ready access to sufficiently detailed plants and the availability of

the modest resource requirements. One of its

few disadvantages is its high cost which is not

offset by power production. More attention

should be directed to possible means of detecting those nations embarked upon a dedicated

facility route.

International Nuclear Industry

Control of nuclear weapons proliferation

depends to a large extent on the nature and

scope of the future international nuclear industry. Key factors to understand are the real

and perceived need for nuclear energy in

general, and for proliferation-prone facilities

(such as breeders or reprocessing plants) in

particular. Also important are the motivations

of and relationship between the nuclear suppliers, as these will determine the efficacy of

any attempts to control proliferation.

Nuclear power has been widely expected to

replace oil and gas as a major energy source to

meet the growing consumption of most nations, especially as production of these fossil

fuels decline and their prices rise. Expectations

for nuclear energy were boosted by the oil

price increases in 1973, but have fallen sharply

since then; costs for nuclear plants and fuels

have risen as demand has fallen, and opposition to them has grown in many countries.

Nuclear energy is mainly suited to the production of electricity, the form of energy with

the highest growth rate. Although electricity

may be inappropriate for many applications,

such as low temperature heat, the very high

growth rate worldwide results from strong

social and economic forces that will not be

quickly and easily reversed. Some nuclear

powerplants can be replaced by coal plants.

World coal resources are many times that of

oil, but the costs of extracting, transporting,

45
and using vastly increased quantities of coal in

an environmentally acceptable manner may

be very high.

The perceived need for nuclear power

varies from country to country and depends

on many factors. Nuclear power is chiefly appropriate for a nation having a large and

growing electricity demand and no cheap

alternatives, including conservation. A number of industrialized nations fit this description. Less developed countries (LDCS) may

want nuclear power to diversify their energy

sources or to provide for a future when there

may be no alternative. However, the LDCS

may also find that their financial resources are

too limited, their electric grids too small, and

their technical infrastructure too immature to

support such a large and complex power

source. The disadvantages may be great

enough so that LDCS should be encouraged to

find alternatives (such as imported coal),

especially those LDCS that are considered high

proliferation risks,

In the face of such variable factors governing the need for nuclear power, projections of

its growth are very uncertain. The most recent

official estimate is one that ERDA produced in

1976, by modifying downward a projection by

the IAEA and the Office of Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD). The

results are as follows:

World Nuclear Capacity

(1000 MW)

Us.- – ––– –39 67 145 250 510

Other

Nations– -–29 100 230 425 1030

Total 68 167 375 675 1540

These figures are considerably lower than previous projections, and many observers expect

this trend to continue. Actual installed

capacity could be substantially lower. Those

LDCS with a heavy commitment to nuclear

power are Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India,

Iran, Taiwan, and Korea. Several others expect

to be heavily dependent by 2000.

Possession of a nuclear reactor alone,

especially if it is safeguarded, does not greatly

facilitate the acquisition of nuclear materials

for a national weapons program (see chapter

VI). Other elements in the nuclear fuel cycle

impinge more heavily on proliferation control: the availability of uranium supplies

affects the need for reprocessing plants and

the breeder reactor; the capacity for enriching

uranium will influence such measures as

guaranteed fuel supplies; the dissemination of

enrichment and reprocessing facilities gives

their operators the means to produce weapons

materials and also reduces their vulnerability

to international sanctions. The supply and demand for all those items must be well understood.

Uranium reserves as presently estimated

should not constrain the nuclear power

growth projected above until about 2000. At

about that time, it may become impossible to

guarantee a lifetime supply for new reactors

unless a new source of fuel has been determined. This could come from breeder reactors

or from new technology that permits the extraction of low grade ores not now counted as

economically recoverable. If growth in the demand for nuclear power is substantially lower

than presently anticipated or if, as some expect, uranium resources are much larger than

projected by the IAEA, there will be no constraint until well into the next century,

More enrichment capacity may be needed

by the late 1980’s, but there appears to be no

inherent difficulty in supplying this. The timing of the need for spent fuel reprocessing is

much less clear. Plants are now being built in

the United States, Europe, and Japan, but

capacity is far below need if all fuel is to be

reprocessed, Unlike enrichment, reprocessing

is not a vital part of the LWR fuel cycle.

Justification for reprocessing as a means to extend fuel supplies may evaporate if nuclear

growth slows or if uranium reserves prove

adequate. The plants could be indigenously

developed by many countries if desired,

however. Consequently, export bans on

reprocessing plants would be less effective

than those on enrichment facilities.

The U.S. share of the total reactor export

market has dropped sharply in recent years,

as other suppliers have emerged and as U.S.

policy has both restricted certain exports and

engendered doubts as to the reliability of

American commitments. The competition

46
among the nuclear suppliers is quite keen,

especially as many of them need a foreign

market to fill their excess manufacturing

capacity. If the United States unilaterally withdrew from the market, the other suppliers are

capable of quickly filling the void.

The suppliers of reactors and enrichment

services are as follows:

U.S.A.

Canada

West Germany

United Kingdom’

France

Sweden]

Italy’

Japan]

U.S.S.R.

U.S.A.

U.S.S.R.

France

United Kingdom

Nether lands[’

Japan (proposed)

South Africa (proposed)

Brazil (proposed)

“Not expected to be major exporter.

bLocatlon of URENC() tri htera] ‘aci]it)r.

If the United States, as expected, continues

to export reactors and associated equipment as

well as engineering, construction, and enrichment services, the export value will total

about $2 billion per year until 1990, with

possible variations depending on the policies

of other supplier and importing nations.

Policy Implications

Perspectives

The growing debate over policy concerning

proliferation hinges in large part on differing

perceptions of the problem. There are three

basic issues in dispute.

1) Is reliance on nuclear power to meet national and global energy needs unavoidable,

or can adequate alternative sources of energy

be developed?

2) Must the spread of nuclear power inevitably result in the proliferation of nuclear

weapons, or can that potential linkage be

broken?

3) Does proliferation really constitute a

serious problem from the perspective of U.S.

interests? Based on different answers to these

questions, three major overviews or perceptions of the proliferation problem can be identified.

The first perspective rests on the basic

assumption that reliance on nuclear energy is

unavoidable and proliferation may be inevitable, but the latter need not pose a serious

threat to vital U.S. interests. There is a corollary view that proliferation will occur only

slowly, if at all. In either case, exaggerated

fears concerning proliferation should not be

allowed to jeopardize real U.S. interests,

which involve the development of nuclear

power as an energy source and the restoring

of American preeminence in the global market

for nuclear facilities, fuel services, and technology. This would require the United States,

infer alia, to initiate commercial reprocessing,

and to expand its enrichment capacity to service overseas customers and encourage rather

than constrain nuclear exports. Moreover, if

the United States seeks to exert effective

leverage in support of nonproliferation objectives, it must do so from a position of predominance in international nuclear commerce.

The second perspective begins by accepting

the proposition that there is an indissoluble

link between the spread of civilian nuclear

energy and proliferation. Where the previous

perspective adjudges the need for nuclear

energy as overriding and imperative, this

perspective disagrees and assigns primary importance to containing proliferation—which

is seen as posing a lethal threat to U.S. and

global security. Since proliferation can only be

stopped if the growth of the nuclear industry

is curtailed, the primary task of policy is to

reemphasize the use of nuclear power as an

energy source and to develop alternatives. The

alternatives would consist of developing coal

as a transitional fuel, and long-term reliance

on such renewable and environmentally

benign energy sources as solar, wind, and

organic conversion supplemented by conservation and recycling.

The third perspective assumes that the potential linkage between civilian nuclear energy

and proliferation can be broken, i.e., it is

possible to obtain the benefits of the commercial atom without entering into a Faustian

47
bargain involving the spread of nuclear arms.

This will require policies designed to:

(1) Promote an international political climate in which the incentive to “go nuclear” is

minimized.

(2) Improve national and international institutions and procedures through which

nuclear facilities and materials can be effectively safeguarded against national and subnational diversion.

(3) Strengthen national and international

controls over the availability of weaponsgrade nuclear material and the technology and

facilities required to produce it.

(4) Develop and apply sanctions designed

to reverse any proliferation which does occur

and to deter other would-be proliferators.

(5) Develop reactors and facilities which,

due to their technological characteristics, are

inherently less susceptible to use for weaponsrelated purposes.

Pursuant to these objectives, a wide range of

policies have been proposed or actually implemented (enumerated below). While some of

the following policies will be congenial to advocates of all three major perspectives, this inventory is associated primarily with proponents of the third perspective, because the

premise that nuclear energy and weapons can

be decoupled opens the way for a detailed

consideration of policies to achieve that result.

To be successful, policies must affect either

the motivation of a Nth country contemplating the nuclear weapons option or the

availability of materials and technology required. The former class of policies will be

designated demand policies and the latter supply policies.

Demand Policies

One group of demand policies are those

designed to weaken the incentives toward

proliferation by non-weapon states. These include efforts to:

(1) Strengthen the security of Nth countries by means of a declaration by the nuclear

weapon states foreswearing the use of such

weapons against any non-nuclear state,

security guarantees, alliances, deployment of

U.S. troops and military facilities overseas,

military assistance, and the overseas deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery

systems.

(2) Reduce the prestige associated with a

nuclear weapons capability by superpower

arms control agreements; by dampening the

rhetoric of the strategic balance and the accompanying impression that the United States

views nuclear weapons as the sine qua non of

its own security; and by attempts to increase

the salience of conventional armaments and

nonmilitary instruments of power.

(3) Resolve international disputes in which

one of the protagonists might conclude that a

favorable outcome could be achieved with the

acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Attempts to implement these proposals will

encounter a number of difficulties, the most

serious being that they may conflict with

other important U.S. foreign policy objectives,

including attempts to scale down American

military and security involvements overseas,

Other demand policies seek to strengthen

the disincentives that confront Nth countries

contemplating the nuclear weapons option.

These include efforts to:

(1) Maintain the high technical and

economic costs of acquiring nuclear weapons

by subjecting all transfers of sensitive nuclear

technology, materials, and facilities to strict

controls.

(2) Increase the political costs by reinforcing the existing international norm against

proliferation,

(3) Provide the external conditions (e.g.,

economic assistance) that would tend to

strengthen the hand of those domestic political forces within Nth countries opposed to the

nuclear weapons option.

(4) Develop sanctions designed to raise the

costs (economic, political, or security) of any

decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Examples include a cutoff of nuclear materials and

assistance, a curtailment of bilateral economic

and military assistance, a U. N.–imposed trade

embargo, and even the threat of military force.

48
A variety of difficulties will confront any

effort to implement these policies—the most

serious being a nationalistic reaction on the

part of the target states. This will be particularly true in the case of sanctions imposed

by one or both of the superpowers. Under the

circumstances, accusations of imperialism,

neocolonialism, and great power hegemony

will be unavoidable. These considerations

suggest the limitations of unilaterally imposed

disincentives and sanctions. Sanctions will

generally make their most effective contribution to a nonproliferation strategy if they are

applied in the context of a collaborative effort.

The effectiveness of even multilateral disincentives and sanctions is not assured. For the

majority of nations possessing limited

economic and technological capabilities and

lacking an indigenous uranium supply, strong

multilateral measures will probably suffice to

foreclose the nuclear option for the foreseeable future. On the other hand there are nations, like Argentina, which possess or soon

will possess the requisite capabilities and indigenous uranium sources. If Argentina

decides to produce nuclear weapons, the international community can raise the cost but

probably cannot prevent it short of a resort to

military coercion.

Supply Policies

There are several major categories of supply

policies. The first involves controls over exports of nuclear materials, technology, and

facilities. The major provisions agreed to at

the Suppliers Conference have already been

outlined. A number of steps might be taken to

strengthen that agreement, including a requirement that importers accept full fuel cycle

safeguards (or NPT membership) and that a

combination of automatic and presumptive

predetermined graded sanctions be imposed

in the event a recipient state violates or abrogates the terms of an export agreement. Related steps might involve the creation of an international exporters’ cartel with guaranteed

market shares, so as to prevent export competition at the expense of safeguards, and the

imposition of particularly stringent controls

over exports to high risk areas (e.g., the Middle East).

Export controls are difficult to implement

successfully. Not only must the natural rivalry

of exporters be dampened, but importers must

be persuaded that the terms are fair and the

burden acceptable. If not, they may evade controls by constructing national nuclear

facilities—the worst possible outcome from a

nonproliferation perspective. In areas prone

to conflict and instability even extraordinary

safeguards and other precautions may prove

ineffective.

A second major category of supply policies

encompasses efforts to control the spread of

reprocessing plants. It is generally agreed that

diffusion of national reprocessing facilities

will significantly increase opportunities for

proliferation, but there are two schools of

thought concerning what policies should be

adopted to deal with the situation. The first, a

“containment” view, rests on the assumption

that the growth of a global reprocessing industry is virtually inevitable and can only be

contained and managed. Specifically,

reprocessing plants can be confined to the

present supplier countries and multinational

fuel cycle centers. A strategy designed to

achieve this outcome might include some of

the following elements: (1) Steps to

reestablish the United States as a reliable international supplier of low-enriched reactor

fuel and spent fuel services; (2) An agreement

by all suppliers to refrain trom the export of

both plutonium and reprocessing facilities

and technology; (3) Establishment of an international spent fuel regime under existing

IAEA statutory authority. If the containment

approach is judged inadequate, the logical

alternative is to eliminate reprocessing entirely. Proponents of this approach are

generally convinced that the spread of

reprocessing/recycle is not inevitable, and that

its proliferation-related costs outweigh any

energy benefits. A policy to implement this

approach would comprise the same elements

as for containment, with two exceptions. (I)

Plans for domestic civilian reprocessing

would be suspended until the exhaustion of

commercially useable uranium reserves, and

(2) Alternate fuel cycles, alternate reactor

types, and technologies for extracting the

energy in spent fuel without separating

plutonium would be explored on a high

priority basis.

49
Both these approaches will have to overcome major obstacles with regard to waste

disposal and political resistance on the part of

U.S. public opinion (e.g., with regard to the

expense of the program). An attempt to institute a global moratorium on reprocessing

will encounter strong objections from European supplier nations and Japan which are

already committed to reprocessing.

Enrichment controls constitute a third type

of supply policy. Like reprocessing, enrichment technology and facilities provide a

means of acquiring bomb-grade material.

Unlike reprocessing, maintenance of an adequate enrichment capacity cannot be avoided

if the civilian nuclear energy industry is to

meet the rising demand for electrical power.

The proliferation potential in an expansion of

enrichment capacity can be dealt with in two

ways: by supplier controls over exports of

technology and facilities, and by confining

enrichment plants to the existing supplier

states or multinational centers.

A fourth set of supplier policies concerns

efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation

regime. This would involve policies designed

to make a commitment to nonproliferation

more attractive to non-nuclear weapon states

on the one hand, and steps to strengthen the

control aspects of the regime on the other, In

the former category are the following initiatives: (1) Negotiate a comprehensive test ban

and a new strategic arms control agreement

by the superpowers; (2) Accord preferential

treatment to NPT signatories (e.g., concerning

enrichment services); (3) Expand the participation of non-nuclear states in decisions

regarding peaceful nuclear activities within an

international framework. Policies in the latter,

or control, category include: (1) Link nuclear

exports and economic aid to adherence to the

NPT by the recipient state; (2) Strengthen

IAEA safeguards (e.g., by extending the application of existing safeguards to prevent intelligence efforts and capabilities with regard

to proliferation; and (3) Encourage the creation of nuclear-free zones in appropriate

regions.

Other major types of supply policies include: (1) Global and regional arrangements,

including multinational fuel cycle centers and

50

schemes for the internationalization of

various stages of the fuel cycle; (2) Assistance

to other countries in the development of nonnuclear energy sources; (3) Technological

measures including efforts to develop a nonproliferating reactor; and (4) Measures to

neutralize the non-state adversary threat, including efforts to upgrade physical security

measures in the United States and abroad.

Policy Implementation

A taxonomy of available policies has been

presented. The next logical step is to order

those policies in terms of either their priority

or the logical time sequence in which they

might be addressed. In a simple three-stage

time sequence, the criteria for distinguishing

between the categories might be urgency, time

required for implementation, and feasibility

(in terms of technical difficulty, economic and

political cost, and whether the desired initiative can be taken unilaterally by the United

States or whether it requires collateral actions

by other governments).

A preliminary effort to categorize major

policy areas in terms of these criteria produced the following ranking (in terms of

priority):

Stage I

Export controls

Enrichment

Strengthen national intelligence

capabilities

Forego plutonium recycle

Stage II

Contain plutonium recycle

Weaken incentives

Strengthen disincentives

Neutralize non-state adversaries

Assistance regarding non-nuclear energy

sources

Strengthen the nonproliferation regime

Sanctions

International spent-fuel storage regime

Stage III

Global and regional arrangements

Existing bilateral and international agreements impose constraints upon policy.
Nevertheless, the choice, both at general and major options. It will constitute a major

specific levels of policy, remains open to a sig- failure of our public institutions if the choice

nificant degree. However, projected growth is made by default-a mindless product of the

rates in the global nuclear industry, trends in course of events. When the stakes are so high,

international politics, and imminent tech- it is imperative that the choice be conscious

nological innovations threaten to foreclose and informed.

51

92-592 0 - 77 - 5
Chapter Ill

Policy lmpIications

Preceding page blank

1
Chapter Ill

Policy Implications

INTRODUCTION

It is the task of this chapter to examine possible

proliferation phenomenon. To date, disagreement over

policy

policy

responses to the

has stemmed, in

large part, from fundamentally different perceptions of the problem.

Most agree that global interest in, and demand for, nuclear energy will probably increase. Many governments see the atom as vital to meeting their future

energy needs and economic growth objectives. Thirty-three countries have or are

building nuclear power stations. At the same time, expressions of public opposition or reservations regarding nuclear power have become more widespread and

articulate. In the absence of ameliorative policy measures, the spread of civilian

nuclear energy will increase the potential for weapons proliferation. Technological, economic, and time barriers to acquiring nuclear weapons are declining, and

prospective innovations in enrichment technology promise to accelerate the

process. A number of nonnuclear countries already have the industrial capability

to produce their own nuclear arms.

General agreement on these observations ceases when certain basic issues

arise. Is civilian nuclear power an unavoidable and necessary means of meeting

national and global energy needs or can viable alternative sources of energy be

developed? Must the spread of nuclear power inevitably result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or can that linkage be disrupted? Does proliferation

really constitute a serious problem from the perspective of U.S. interests?

One can delineate three major overviews of the proliferation problem from

different evaluations of these issues. The first case assigns clear priority to energy

supply, the second to nonproliferation, and the third assumes a shared priority.

In each case, U.S. objectives can be defined, available policy options outlined, and

probable costs and gains assessed.

It should be noted that these perspectives are not monolithic. They are

umbrella categories encompassing diverse groups and viewpoints which,

nevertheless, share a dominant orientation with regard to proliferation. The discussion of each perspective begins with an explication of the rationale, objectives, and

ends with

policy prescriptions set forth by proponents of the perspective, and

a critique of that material.

Preceding page blank 55
ENERGY PRIORITY PERSPECTIVE

Rationale

To the extent that proliferation control and

increased nuclear energy output prove incompatible, priority must be assigned to the latter.

If nuclear power and proliferation are

unavoidably linked, as many adherents of this

viewpoint believe, the world will have to live

with proliferation.

This perspective rests on three basic

assumptions. The first is that substantial

proliferation is probably unavoidable for a

variety of reasons:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

If the world is to make a successful

transition from oil and gas to other

energy sources, increasing reliance

upon nuclear power is unavoidable.

The facilities and knowledge required

to develop this energy source have an

inescapable potential for application to

weaponry.

A large and growing number of countries have the technical and economic

resources to construct reactor and

reprocessing facilities for the purpose

of fabricating nuclear weapons.

Powerful political incentives, including

considerations of national security,

prestige, and self-sufficiency, operate in

support of a decision to acquire a

weapons capability.

Any nation that decides to establish a

nuclear weapons program can probably purchase the necessary fuel,

facilities, and expertise from a choice of

foreign suppliers. Efforts by the United

States to impede the sale of such items

will probably result in the American

share of the nuclear export market

being captured by other suppliers who

may impose less stringent safeguard requirements upon importers. Some also

export reactor types more vulnerable to

diversion.

The second assumption is that further

proliferation can have stabilizing, and

therefore constructive, consequences for international politics. Possession of nuclear

weapons should have the same sobering effect

on new nuclear powers as it has had upon the

superpowers. It is argued that the principal

result of proliferation will be to largely eliminate military aggression as a national foreign

policy option. If countries such as Israel,

Yugoslavia, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan,

and Kuwait, which may have credible reasons

to fear military attack by a neighbor, were to

possess even a rudimentary nuclear

capability, their security would be measurably

enhanced. The result would be to at least partially defuse some of the globe’s most volatile

flashpoints.

According to the third assumption, even if

proliferation resulted in the actual use of

nuclear weapons by one or more of the new

nuclear powers, the conflict need not escalate

to include involvement by the great powers.

The erosion of cold war alliance systems and

post-Vietnam doubts in the United States over

the desirability of expanding, or even maintaining, security guarantees overseas, tend to

both stimulate proliferation and to reduce the

likelihood of American involvement in a local

nuclear conflict. Proliferation itself tends to

reduce the need for security guarantees and

accompanying overseas military installations,

and with them the danger of escalation.

Finally, the virtually invulnerable deterrent

capability maintained by the superpowers

renders a deliberate attack against them by a

nascent nuclear power unambiguously suicidal, thereby obviating the necessity of a

panicky or hair-trigger U.S. response to a

localized nuclear flareup.

There is a variant of this perspective which

is of at least equal importance. Though based

on somewhat different assumptions, it shares

the priority accorded nuclear energy production as compared to proliferation concerns.

Proponents argue that disincentives to

proliferation have proven strong in the past

and appear to be getting stronger. The first

decade of the nuclear era (1945-1955) witnessed the advent of three nuclear weapons

states, the second decade two, and the third

decade one. Consequently, supporters of this

56
viewpoint contend that any further proliferation will probably occur at a rate sufficiently

moderate to be assimilated by equilibrating

processes of the international political

system—just as past proliferation has been.

Arguments that proliferation can be a source

of international stability and that it need not

lead to escalation of local conflicts further buttress this viewpoint.

Objectives

The basic policy objective from this

perspective is to prevent exaggerated fears

over proliferation from jeopardizing real

U.S. interests, which include developing

nuclear power as an energy source and

preserving American access to the global

market for nuclear facilities, fuel services, and

technology. Moreover, if the United States

seeks to exert effective leverage in support of

nonproliferation objectives it must do so from

a position of predominance in international

nuclear commerce.

Policy

On the basis of these assumptions and objectives, strenuous superpower efforts to stuff

the proliferation genie back into the bottle are

deemed costly, futile, and even unnecessary.

Proponents of this perspective do not advocate an immediate and wholesale abandonment of efforts to impede proliferation. They

do urge that the United States recover its

former position as a reliable supplier of

nuclear reactors, fuels, and services, From a

position of preeminence in the expanding

global nuclear market Washington can

bargain for political and economic benefits,

including the imposition of safeguards.

The President of the American Nuclear

Energy Council, Craig Hosmer, has contended

that the proliferation threat is confined to a

few countries and should not be exaggerated.

With a view to strengthening the U.S. position

in international nuclear markets, the Council

and the Atomic Industrial Forum have

argued, inter alia:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

The United States should initiate commercial reprocessing, expand its enrichment capacity, and develop waste and

storage facilities so as to be able to offer

overseas customers full fuel-cycle services.

“Self-imposed unilateral constraints”

on nuclear exports are “counterproductive and ineffective” and should be

avoided.

Government-sponsored nuclear export

financing should be provided.

A further tightening of export licensing

criteria and procedures is inadvisable.

Multinational fuel-cycle facilities are

less desirable than U.S. national

facilities. The basic contention is that all

steps required for the full commercial

development and exploitation of the

peaceful atom should be taken. Government regulations that would inhibit

this enterprise should be kept to a

minimum.

While a strengthened American position as

a global nuclear supplier offers an opportunity to attempt to exert influence on behalf

of nonproliferation, such an effort is

realistically regarded as a holding action

which might delay, but not prevent, the

spread of nuclear weapons.

Critique

The problems associated with this approach

are not difficult to identify. Most analysis find

it hard to view the prospect of “life in a

nuclear-armed crowd” with equanimity. The

most obvious danger is that these weapons

will come under the control of a national

leader who is irresponsible, fanatic, or psychopathic. A government led by such an individual may not feel the same constraints

upon the use of these devices as have the present nuclear powers.

57
Many prospective Nth countries would

probably be unable to provide adequate

physical security for nuclear materials even

with responsible leadership, thereby increasing the danger of theft or sabotage by terrorists. Similarly, they would be unable to apply elaborate permissive action links or failsafe devices if a sophisticated delivery

capability were available—thereby increasing

the danger of an unauthorized or accidental

nuclear strike. The prospect of coups d’etut and

civil wars provides further grounds for concern. In addition, several potential Nth countries (e.g., Israel, South Korea, South Africa,

and Taiwan) are, or perceive themselves to be,

facing a clear and present threat to their very

existence, It is difficult to be confident that any

nuclear-armed state, pushed to the brink of

extinction, would not choose to use those

weapons. Even if the resulting conflict remains localized, the damage both to the immediate arena of conflict and to the global environment may be severe indeed. If, contrary

to prior expectations, the conflict does draw in

the superpowers, the possible consequences

need no elaboration. In addition, if the impression becomes widespread that the United

States has resigned itself to further proliferation, the result may be a self-fulfilling

prophecy. Such a posture might tip the political balance in favor of “going nuclear” in a

number of countries where that decision

might otherwise be postponed indefinitely.

If extensive proliferation does occur, adjustments across the whole range of U.S. foreign

policy will be required. Professor Robert

Tucker of Johns Hopkins University has suggested that the emergence of localized

balances of terror will permit U.S. foreign

policy to revert to a modified form of isolationism. At a minimum, continued

proliferation would seem to necessitate a

careful review of U.S. overseas defense commitments and a very cautious approach to

military intervention if the United States is to

avoid being drawn into regional nuclear conflicts.

Moreover, as one analyst suggests, costs to

U.S. foreign policy may be considerably more

severe than implied in the benign term isolationism: “The spread of nuclear weapons

will reduce our ability to control events. It will

have a dissolvent effect on alliances, expose

our own overseas forces to huge risks, and

ultimately impose large costs in shaping our

own offense and defense to protect the continental United States against small terror attacks by national, as well as subnational,

groups.”

He also points out an evident discrepancy

in the argument that U.S. nuclear exports are

required to give this country leverage on

behalf of nonproliferation objectives: “There

is an obvious muddle in the. . . view that we

can’t influence events on the one hand, but on

the other hand that we do have an important

influence that we can retain only by continuing to export. . . In short, we can retain our

leverage only if we never use it.” Finally,

material presented elsewhere in this study

suggests that in the foreseeable future international nuclear exports will not be as large as

has been generally predicted. Consequently, it

becomes more difficult to argue that the

economic benefits from nuclear exports will

outweigh the proliferation liabilities.

A final criticism concerns the assumption of

some adherents of this perspective that there

is a necessary link between the spread of

nuclear energy and proliferation. This connection is unproven; to state that the opportunities for proliferation will increase is not to

demonstrate that those opportunities will actually be used. None of the present nuclear

weapons states used a civilian nuclear energy

program to provide material for weapons. The

same general comment applies to the next major perspective analyzed below.

58
NONPROLIFERATION PRIORITY

Rationale

This viewpoint begins by accepting the

proposition underlying the first perspective:

that there is an indissoluble linkage between

the spread of civilian nuclear energy and

proliferation. However, where the Energy

Priority Perspective adjudges the need for

nuclear energy as overriding and imperative,

the Nonproliferation Perspective disagrees

and assigns primary importance to containing

proliferation —which is seen as posing a lethal

threat to U.S. and global security.

Proliferation cannot be stopped unless the

growth of the nuclear energy industry is curtailed. Such a development is deemed desirable, both for its effects on proliferation and in

its own right. The possible consequences of

heavy reliance upon civilian nuclear energy are

judged to include environmental damage,

severe waste disposal problems, inefficiency

(e.g., low capacity factors), potentially

catastrophic accidents, a massively expensive

energy infrastructure, increasingly centralized

electrification with a concomitant centralization of political and economic power, the

emergence of a garrison state necessary to

secure nuclear facilities from theft and

sabotage, proliferation, and eventually—a

nuclear war. In view of this grim menu of external costs, nuclear energy is held to be unacceptable, now or in the future, as a successor

to oil and gas. This is particularly true because

nuclear energy opponents deem it possible to

develop adequate non-nuclear alternatives to

petroleum at an acceptable economic and environmental cost.

In addition, nuclear power as a high-technology, capital-intensive, centralized energy

source is seen as particularly ill-adapted to the

needs of the majority of the world’s population in the predominantly poor and agrarian

Third World. Extensive reliance on nuclear

energy would be inconsistent with efforts by

these countries to reduce their economic and

technological dependence upon the industrialized nations.

If the

PERSPECTIVE

United States turns away from

nuclear energy, it is assumed that other nations will follow. The assumption is made

because of traditional U.S. leadership in this

field, and because of the continued dependence of other countries’ nuclear

programs upon American material and political support, The international market is dominated by U.S. reactor designs, and the United

States is still the principal global supplier of

nuclear fuel. An American rejection of nuclear

energy could be expected to strengthen antinuclear political forces within other nuclear

supplier states.

It is contended that it is not only possible to

discontinue the spread of civilian nuclear

energy but essential that it be done, for

reasons related to the security, safety, environmental, and political effects of this mode

of power generation.

Objectives

The objective is to reduce the prospect for

further proliferation by deemphasizing the

use of nuclear power as an energy source and

by developing alternatives.

Policy

From the above assumptions, it logically

follows that the problem of proliferation can

best be attacked indirectly by: 1) curtailing the

further growth of civilian nuclear energy

programs or, if this fails, 2) phasing out those

programs entirely. Appropriate policies in

support of the first, less dramatic, alternative

might involve a decision to cease Government

support of domestic nuclear industry expansion and redirect public resources toward the

following:

. A program to develop coal as an environmentally acceptable fuel.

. A national energy conservation effort.

. The development of ‘‘soft” energy

sources. These would involve such

59
renewable and environmentally benign

sources as solar-thermal, wind, and

organic conversion supplemented by

conservation and recycling. Other

characteristics of such a “soft path”

might include reduced use of electricity;

energy technologies appropriate to the

end use; small decentralized systems;

pricing of energy to reflect true replacement and distribution costs in order to

encourage conservation; and a target of

eventual zero or negative growth in aggregate energy consumption.

An offer to assist other countries to pursue the same soft path.

The maintenance of a nuclear energy

research program with particular

emphasis upon fusion, nonproliferating

reactors, and waste disposal.

A decision to forgo any new contracts for

nuclear exports except under the strictest

limitations and safeguards. Existing contracts would be honored, but energetic

rewrite efforts would be made to incorporate stricter safeguards (e.g., a requirement that the importing country accept

full fuel cycle safeguards).

Efforts to directly impede proliferation,

including steps to weaken the incentives

and strengthen the disincentives of potential Nth countries vis-a-vis the nuclear

option; actions designed to strengthen

the NPT “regime;” agreements among

nuclear exporters concerning joint controls; and steps to curb the non-state adversary threat (see below for a detailed

presentation of these measures).

Policies appropriate to an actual phase-out

of nuclear energy would include all those actions just mentioned with two modifications:

1) the civilian nuclear energy infrastructure

would be dismantled; and 2) no future export

commitments would be undertaken.

Critique

Any effort to implement this perspective

will confront several formidable obstacles:

1. The initial effect of even a partial U.S.

withdrawal from the nuclear energy

60

market might be counterproductive with

regard to proliferation. American export

markets would presumably be taken

over by other suppliers, possibly with a

more relaxed attitude toward safeguards

and other export controls. Only if all

suppliers could eventually be persuaded

to join in renouncing nuclear power, or

at least exports, would U.S. actions prove

useful as a curb on proliferation.

2. There is no guarantee that a combination

of coal, conservation, and soft energy

3.

4.

5.

sources can provide an adequate energy

source at acceptable economic and environmental cost. Crucial technical and

economic points are in dispute among

relevant specialists and among governments-especially those of the industrialized world. If a major commitment to the soft path is made and supply

proves inadequate, a severe electric

power shortage could result. Coal is

abundant, but environmental considerations may severely curtail its use.

The sheer magnitude of the investment

in nuclear energy made to date has created a formidable array of economic and

political interests having a stake in

nuclear power. These will constitute a

powerful obstacle to any attempt to

phase out the nuclear industry.

Any shift away from nuclear power carries the risk of antagonizing the Third

World countries, many of which view

nuclear power as their best long-term

hope for economic development.

Moreover, those countries which had

signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty

could credibly claim that the Treaty’s

promises of assistance in developing

peaceful nuclear energy had been violated. At a minimum, it would be necessary to accompany a domestic switch to

non-nuclear sources with a major increase in foreign aid to assist Third

World countries in making their own adjustment.

The link between centralized energy production and centralized political

authority is speculative. In fact, features

of the soft path (e.g., a ceiling on energy

consumption) may require a n

authoritarian economy and polity.
6. A strategy of greatly increased reliance

on coal and conservation may prove inadequate in carrying the industrialized

countries through a transition from oil

and gas to essentially limitless sources

(e.g., fusion) without major sacrifices or

dislocations. If coal and conservation

prove inadequate or unsatisfactory the

burden will fall upon soft energy

sources. Successful implementation of

the soft path will probably require concomitant and profound, though not

necessarily undesirable, changes touching nearly all aspects of national life.

These might include a transition to a

planned “organic growth” or even

“steady state” economy, zero population

growth, decentralization, income

redistribution, changes in the industrial

infrastructure with major social implications, and a substantial modification of

such prevailing values as individualism,

materialism, and growth. Clearly, some

SHARED

Rationale

This perspective rests on three

tions:

. The potential link between

PRIORITY

A

such changes may occur under alternative “hard path” (i.e., high energy, heavy

reliance on central station electricity production) energy scenarios. However, the

hard path is designed to preserve, insofar as possible, existing lifestyles.

decision to dismantle the domestic

nuclear industry and reject all further export

commitments would incur all the difficulties

listed above in an intensified form. A

thoroughgoing commitment to a soft path

would also probably require a substantial

reduction in projected rates of growth in

global energy production and use in the

foreseeable future. This in turn may imply

steps toward world income redistribution, a

global ceiling on population growth, and

other comparable measures. Finally, even the

complete abandonment of civilian nuclear

energy would not entirely foreclose other

routes (dedicated facilities, purchase, and

theft) to obtaining a weapons capability.

assumpcivilian

nuclear energy programs and proliferation can be disrupted, i.e., it is possible to

obtain the benefits of the peaceful atom

without entering into a Faustian bargain

involving the spread of nuclear arms.

. Proliferation beyond the current roster of

weapon states is undesirable in terms of

U.S. interests and international peace and

stability.

. United States policy can contribute significantly to international efforts to curb

proliferation.

It is the first assumption that particularly

distinguishes the Shared Priority

Perspective. The question facing

policy makers is how to minimize the risk

that the spread of nuclear weapons will

accompany the growth of civilian nuclear

facilities and technology.

PERSPECTIVE

Objectives

The basic goal of this perspective is to

decouple civilian nuclear energy and

proliferation, i.e., to inhibit proliferation

while proceeding to exploit the commercial

atom. This will require policies designed to:

Promote an international political climate in which the incentive to “go

nuclear” is minimized and the disincentives maximized.

Improve national and international institutions and procedures through which

nuclear facilities and materials can be

effectively safeguarded against national

and nonstate diversion.

Strengthen national and international

controls over the availability of weaponsgrade nuclear fuel and the technology

and facilities required to produce it.

61
. Develop sanctions designed to deter and

even reverse steps toward acquiring

nuclear weapons.

Policy

Pursuant to the above objectives, a wide

range of policies have been proposed or actually implemented. These will be examined

in detail in the next section. A critique of the

Shared Priority Perspective will be subsumed

under a critique of these individual policies.

There is broad agreement over the general

advantages and drawbacks of most of these

options. However, on the question of

plutonium reprocessing and recycling there is

a fundamental divergence. The first, or

moratorium, school of thought contends there

is a basic incompatibility between reprocessing and nonproliferation: civilian nuclear

energy and proliferation can only be effectively decoupled if there is an international

agreement to forgo reprocessing, at least until

commercial uranium supplies are nearly exhausted,

The alternative, containment, school argues

that a complete moratorium on reprocessing

is unnecessary and impractical, given the

presumed attractions of the breeder. The

development of reprocessing facilities can be

controlled and managed so as to prevent a

proliferation spinoff. This would be achieved

primarily by locating reprocessing plants only

in the present supplier countries and in

multinational fuel-cycle centers in supplier

and, perhaps, user states.

Specific policies designed to implement

these two approaches will be outlined and

analyzed below.

A NONPROLIFERATION POLICY INVENTORY

Introduction

The following is a taxonomy and analysis of

specific policies which hold promise as part of

a comprehensive effort to curtail further

proliferation. Some of these policies will be

congenial to proponents of all three of the major perspectives previously outlined.

However, this inventory is associated primarily with proponents of the third Shared

Priority Perspective. The logic of the first

perspective suggests that the sort of detailed

menu of policies that follow is probably ineffective and/or unnecessary. The second

perspective would tend to view them as

perhaps desirable, but as insufficient and thus

ultimately ineffective. The premise that

nuclear energy and weapons can be

decoupled, which underlies the third perspective, opens the way for a detailed consideration of policies to achieve that result.

To be successful, policies intended

weaken the link between commercial nuc

power and proliferation must affect either

motivation of a potential Nth country to

62

to

ear

the

acquire nuclear arms or the availability of

materials and technology required. The

former class of policies will be called demand

policies and the latter supply policies.

The discussion of these policies will be

organized according to the following topic

outline:

Demand Policie s

Weaken Incentives

Strengthen the security of Nth countries

Reduce the prestige attached to nuclear

weapons

Resolve international disputes

Critique

Strengthen Disincentives

Maintain technical and economic costs of the

nuclear option

Increase the political costs

Strengthen domestic antiproliferation forces

in Nth countries

Sanctions

Critique

Supply Policies

Reprocessing

Containment
Critique

Rejection of plutonium recycle

Critique

Enrichment

Critique

Export (Supplier) Controls

Multilateral Approaches

Special Precautions

Critique

Assistance re Non-Nuclear Energy Sources

Critique

Technological Measures

Strengthen the Nonproliferation Regime

Nuclear weapon states arms control

Improve the benefits available to an NPT sig

natory

Evaluate PNE’s

Enhance the role of the non-nuclear states

Link nuclear exports to NPT

Link economic aid to NPT

Strengthen IAEA safeguards

Expand IAEA functions

Intelligence capability

Nuclear free zones

Critique

Global and Regional Arrangements

International management

Multinational (regional) fuel cycle facilities

Critique

Measures Concerning Non-State Adversaries

Critique

Policy Implementation

Demand Policies

Weaken Incentives

The following initiatives are designed to

weaken the incentives toward proliferation on

the part of nonweapon states.

Strengthen the Security of Potential Nth

Countries.—Actual or perceived vulnerability

to external threat has been identified as an important possible incentive to proliferation.

Each of the present nuclear weapon states was

at least partially motivated by security concerns in deciding to exercise the nuclear option.

For purposes of nonproliferation, the task is

to find non-nuclear mechanisms to strengthen

the security of potential Nth countries. These

might include the following:

●

●

●

●

●

●

A declaration by each of the nuclear

weapon states foreswearing the use of

such weapons against any non-nuclear

state. A contributing step would be a

unilateral or joint “no-first-use” pledge

by the nuclear weapon states.

The deployment overseas of U.S. troops

and military facilities. Beside s

strengthening the host country’s military

capability, such deployments serve as a

“tripwire” to increase the likelihood of

American involvement should any attack

occur.

The provision of conventional weapons

under military aid and sales arrangements.

The overseas deployment of nuclear

weapons and their delivery systems.

America’s NATO partners pilot nucleararmed fighter bombers and man tactical

nuclear weapons, while the warheads for

these systems remain under U.S. control.

Alliances, which provide explicit, comprehensive, binding, and credible

guarantees to the partners. Examples include the extension of the American

nuclear umbrella to Western Europe

through NATO, and the mutual assistance treaty with Japan.

Security guarantees extending the

nuclear umbrella of one or more nuclear

weapon states to protect a potential Nth

country against an attack or threat of attack by another nuclear power. From the

perspective of a non-nuclear state, the

general guarantee presently offered by

the United States is unsatisfactorily

vague. Former Secretary of State Dean

Rusk stated the American position that a

non-nuclear country ‘‘specifically

threatened with the use of nuclear

weapons would have the entire international community, including the United

States, register its support in whatever

appropriate way would be necessary in

the circumstances. ”

63
The joint obligations incurred by the United

States as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty are equally unimpressive. The treaty is

silent concerning security guarantees. United

Nations Security Council Resolution 225 provides that assistance to any non-nuclear nation threatened with nuclear aggression will

be given “in accordance with the Charter, ”

i.e., through the Council, where each of the

guarantors (as well as France and China) has a

veto. A non-nuclear state (e.g., West Germany) that feels threatened by one of the

guarantors (i.e, the Soviet Union) will take little comfort from this arrangement.

Reduce the Prestige Attached to Nuclear

Weapons.—Prestige considerations have been

identified as an important possible motivation

for proliferation on the part of non-nuclear

states. Consequently, the incentive to

proliferation can be lessened by reducing the

prestige and symbolic importance attached to

nuclear weapons in international politics.

Possible means of doing so include the following:

. Eschew statements which suggest that

nuclear weapons accord the United

States, or other weapon states, a special

claim to influence or respect. Try to

dampen the rhetoric of the strategic

balance and the accompanying impression that the United States views nuclear

weapons as the sine qua non of its own

security.

. Attempt to increase the salience of conventional as opposed to nuclear weaponry by such steps as revisions in NATO

force structures and military planning.

. Attempt to increase the salience of nonmilitary instruments of power—most

notably economic power. A step in this

direction might be a proposal to give explicit recognition to the importance of

Japan by creating a sixth permanent seat

on the U.N. Security Council for that

country, with analogous gestures in the

direction of another economic great

power—West Germany. The emergence

of new economic powers like Saudi

Arabia might be acknowledged by expanding the Group of Ten to include

them, and by providing them an impor64

tant voice in the governance of the International Monetary Fund and World

Bank.

. Initiate new efforts to achieve superpower arms control agreements, The

relevance of strategic arms limitation and

a comprehensive test ban to nonproliferation will be discussed subsequently.

Resolve International Disputes.—A third

set of incentives for proliferation relates to the

existence of international disputes in which

one of the protagonists might conclude that a

favorable resolution could be achieved if it acquired nuclear weapons. The response from a

nonproliferation standpoint is easy to conceptualize but very difficult to implement. What

is required is the identification and resolution

of such disputes through mediation and other

forms of diplomatic interposition. This would

seem to require, at a minimum, a policy of

placing special emphasis on settling disputes

with a proliferation potential, and of seeking

(when appropriate) to impartially dampen

conflicts rather than strengthening one party

against another.

Critique.—The difficulties which would

confront any attempt to implement these proposals are well known. Security guarantees,

alliances, and the overseas deployment of

troops require, at a minimum, the willingness

of the United States to undertake the requisite

responsibilities. But the noninterventionist

mood of post-Vietnam American foreign

policy (e.g., the Nixon Doctrine) makes any

significant expansion of Washington’s global

security role very problematical. The dilemma

is intensified by the fact that the United States

is particularly reluctant to enter into closer

ties with several of these prominent Nth countries. Alternatively, the nationalism of some

other potential weapon states make it difficult

for them to accept the sort of entanglement

with the great powers implied in alliances,

guarantees, and the presence of foreign

troops.

Similar concerns bear on military weapons

assistance. Congress has exhibited increased

uneasiness regarding the emergence of the

United States as the world’s leading exporter

and donor of arms. It is difficult for a nation to

avoid embroilment in the quarrels of others if
it is a principal arms supplier to one or more

of the parties involved. Even a policy of assisting in the peaceful resolution of international

disputes can lead to a new or increased commitment of American money, men, and

prestige in diverse theaters. This is not an outcome that many modern critics of American

globalism would welcome.

This suggests that a U.S. effort to control

proliferation may conflict with other national

goals and priorities. It may, in fact, conflict

with other concerns of American foreign

policy in a very direct way. The new Administration has suggested that it will try to

reemphasize U.S. identification with some of

those governments particularity insensitive to

civil liberties, but several of the nations which

might fall into this category are also the most

likely Nth countries, e.g., South Korea, Chile,

and South Africa. This creates a difficult

dilemma. Should the United States provide

military and security assistance to such

regimes in the interests of nonproliferation, or

should it act upon the principles of a

democratic foreign policy even if the result is

to stimulate proliferation? The potential for

Nth country extortion of the United States in

this situation is obvious. The solution is not.

The higher the priority accorded nonproliferation, the higher the potential costs in

terms of other foreign policy objectives.

Moreover, the proliferation issue promises to

further complicate the already difficult relationship between the United States and the

developing Third World. The situation is

somewhat analogous to that which arose as a

consequence of increased U.S. concern over

assured oil imports. Some Third World nations have benefited immensely, but they are

few in number and tend to be countries that

were relatively well-off (e.g., Saudi Arabia).

Similarly, the beneficiaries of rising American

concern over proliferation will also be few

and, almost by definition, among the most

successful and advanced of the Third World

states (e.g., Taiwan). They will often be states

with an acute security problem, and therefore

with the potential for drawing the United

States into a possibly dangerous conflict situation.

Other proposed initiatives for the reduction

of the symbolic importance of nuclear

weapons and pledges of no-first-use present a

different set of difficulties. If conscientiously

implemented, they would require far-reaching

changes in American foreign policy, including

higher priority to arms control, greater attention to the developing Third World, and a

probable diminution of American influence,

power, and perhaps even wealth relative to

the non-nuclear states. Moreover, it will not

be easy to diminish the political and symbolic

importance attached to nuclear weapons.

Power remains the principal arbiter of international relations, and the contribution of

nuclear weapons to national power in real

terms is undeniable. Even if the entire

catalogue of initiatives (above) designed to

reduce the prestige associated with a nuclear

weapons capability were implemented, the

impact might be minimal.

These considerations help explain why nofirst-use pledges have generated little

enthusiasm on the part of non-nuclear

weapon states, that rely on an alliance relationship with the United States for their

security. The net effect of such a pledge would

seem to be to diminish the deterrent effect of

the American nuclear umbrella. By the same

token, an offsetting Soviet pledge would lack

credibility in the eyes of these states. Steps to

give allies access to nuclear weapons, even

under ultimate U.S. control, must be undertaken with extreme care. They may otherwise

serve to validate the utility of such weapons,

and thus confirm an incentive for proliferation.

Strengthen Disincentives

Other types of demand policies seek to

strengthen the disincentives that confront potential Nth countries contemplating the

nuclear option. Possible initiatives for this

purpose include the following.

Maintain the High Technical and

Economic Costs of the Nuclear

major disincentive for any nation

ing a weapons program has been

and technological sophistication

Option.—A

contemplatthe expense

required to

65
obtain weapons-grade material and fabricate a

bomb. The spread of commercial nuclear

power and the evolution of reactor fuel-cycle

technology threaten to erode such restraints.

The policy response to this situation can take

three forms:

. Prevent, insofar as possible, the international dissemination of enrichment and

reprocessing facilities and technology.

This would probably require development in the near future of multi-national

enrichment facilities (see below) and/or

an expansion in production capacity of

American, Soviet, and European enrichment plants. Increased enrichment

capacity would make it possible to ensure

those states contemplating or augmenting light water reactor programs a longterm secure supply of reactor fuel at

reasonable prices, thus obviating the

need to construct national facilities. Curtailing the spread of sensitive nuclear

capabilities would also require conscientious implementation of the suppliers

agreement banning the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants. An agreement to institute a moratorium on the

construction of commercial reprocessing

and breeder reactor facilities, if feasible,

would also help preserve existing technological barriers to proliferation.

. Subject all transfers of nuclear technology, materials, and facilities to strict

safeguards. Such safeguards, if effective,

may compel a nation covertly seeking a

weapons capability to construct dedicated fuel-cycle facilities (including a

reactor, enrichment, and/or reprocessing

plants) using its own resources and technology, and at its own expense. If full

fuel-cycle safeguards are in effect, as with

NPT signatories, any dedicated facilities

will have to be clandestine, with a consequent increase in the difficulties and

costs.

. Institute strict controls on the replication

or retransfer of

technology.

Increase Political

preach to strengthen

crease the political

66

“ exported facilities or

Costs.—A second apdisincentives is to incests of selecting the

nuclear option. This means, in the first instance, initiatives designed to reinforce the existing international norm against proliferation. Specific examples would include a

United Nations General Assembly resolution,

an appropriate public declaration by a group

of (preferably nonweapon) states, efforts to

obtain additional signatures and ratifications

to the NPT, and any other steps which would

tend to strengthen the NPT “regime”-a subject that will be examined subsequently. Other

political costs can be more stringent, involving

outright hostility and retaliatory or compensatory actions by other states. Ways of confronting would-be proliferators with the more

severe costs will be examined in the section on

“sanctions” below.

Strengthen Domestic Antiproliferation

Forces.—In addition to the climate of international opinion, it is argued that a nonproliferation strategy must be cognizant of the

domestic political situation within key Nth

countries and how that situation might be

affected by external (i.e., foreign) influences.

For example, if it seems clear that a decision to

“go nuclear” will be followed by various

negative economic consequences (e.g., a cessation of foreign aid), the result may be to

stimulate domestic interests concerned with

economic development to oppose any nuclear

weapons program. Similarly, if the same nation is offered ready access to international

sources of safeguarded nuclear fuel, technology, and facilities for electrical power

generation, the effect may be to reinforce an

incipient division between a nuclear energy

lobby and a bomb lobby or to inhibit the latter

by imposing a web of political and institutional constraints. The task of American

policy would be to provide the external conditions to strengthen the hand of those domestic

political forces opposed to the nuclear

weapons option.

Sanctions.—A fourth means of strengthening disincentives involves the use of sanctions.

Sanctions and disincentives, while closely related, are not synonymous. Disincentive is a

broader term referring to the whole range of

constraints that confront a government considering the nuclear option. These include

such general factors as technological and

economic considerations, characteristics of the
international system, domestic political influences, and the like. Sanctions, on the other

hand, refer to those disincentives which are

the product of an active policy to inhibit

proliferation. Sanctions are deliberately

designed measures to augment and strengthen

other disincentives. Sanctions can have three

functions: as a deterrent prior to a proliferation decision, as a punishment in response to a

proliferation decision, and as an example to

deter other would-be proliferators in the

future.

Sanctions can take a multitude of forms;

what they have in common is the imposition

of a penalty designed to raise the costs

(economic, political, or security) of any decision to “go nuclear”. Possible sanctions include the following:

Economic penalties, including the discontinuation of economic assistance,

restrictions on investment, reduced access to overseas (e.g., American) markets,

and financial pressures exerted through

international banks.

Political pressures, including a possible

joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. declaration stating

that the acquisition of a nuclear weapons

capability by a non-nuclear state would

constitute a serious threat to world peace

and security, requiring consultation concerning possible joint action by the two

superpowers.

A clear message to the allies and clients of

each superpower that the continued extension of security guarantees would be

jeopardized if they acquired or attempted

to acquire nuclear weapons.

A cutoff of nuclear materials and a withdrawal of U.S. technical personnel from

nuclear-related projects.

A curtailment of U.S. military and technical assistance.

International sanctions ranging from a

termination of IAEA nuclear assistance to

a U. N.-imposed trade embargo.

The unilateral or multilateral application

of military power, including the forcible

removal or destruction of Nth country

nuclear weapons facilities.

● A threat (or pledge) by one or more

nuclear states to provide offsetting

nuclear weapons to the adversary of any

non-nuclear nation that selects the

nuclear option.

Critique.—The policy options available to

strengthen disincentives are easier to enumerate than to implement. Almost any attempt to

raise barriers to proliferation will tend to provoke a nationalistic reaction, particularly

when such actions are initiated by one or both

of the superpowers. Under such circum -

stances rices, accusations of imperialism,

neocolonialism, and great power hegemony

will be unavoidable. Any efforts to influence

or manipulate the domestic political process

within Nth countries will be particularly

difficult without arousing a counterproductive nationalist backlash. Some options, at

best, offer only limited possibilities. Efforts exerted through alliance systems will have little

impact on major Nth countries outside such

systems (e.g., South Africa). There is little

foreseeable prospect for significant additions

to the NPT now that Japan has ratified. In addition, efforts to manipulate the domestic

political situation in an Nth country, besides

being a high-risk tactic, may prove ineffective

simply because significant organized antinuclear sentiment is lacking. Moreover, the

postulated distinction between a nuclear

energy lobby and a bomb lobby may prove

more theoretical than real. This is not to suggest that antinuclear sentiment is an unimportant factor in some countries, e.g., Japan and

Sweden, but simply that foreign manipulation

of that sentiment, even where it is substantial,

is very difficult.

The most serious difficulties involve the application of sanctions. Some, particularly

those requiring the use of military force

and/or other joint action by the U.S. and

U. S. S. R., lack credibility. This is important

because the primary value of sanctions is their

deterrent effect. Once an Nth country has

defied a threatened sanction and constructed a

weapon, sanctions serve only as punishment

and to set an example for future offenders.

The damage, i.e., the spread of nuclear

capability to another state, has been done—

unless the sanctions include actual military

action to remove the weapons facilities. If a

67
threatened sanction is defied with impunity,

all sanctions will tend to lose their credibility.

Ironically, the very prospect of coercive sanctions may cause an Nth country to proliferate

so as to reduce its vulnerability to such external pressures. In that case, the more credible

the sanction, the more likelihood that it will

stimulate precisely the response it was

designed to forestall.

Another serious problem will arise if implementation of sanctions proves incompatible

with other important policy objectives and

principles. The hazards of trying to manipulate security guarantees, in this regard, has

already been suggested. These difficulties

reach their most acute form with regard to

counterproliferation strategies and military

sanctions. Many would view proposals or

promises to supply nuclear weapons to adversaries of a proliferator as tantamount to more

proliferation. From this viewpoint, the superpowers would, and should, eschew any such

pledge, Military sanctions for the purpose of

enforcing international safeguards appear

contrary to the major principles of American

foreign policy and diplomatic conduct. Other

limitations on the imposition of sanctions may

involve ambiguities or extenuating circumstances surrounding the offending act, the

danger of a damaging counterreaction by the

target country, a lack of public (and congressional) support for sanctions. These and other

related considerations are reviewed elsewhere

in this report.

These considerations suggest the limitations

of unilaterally imposed disincentives and

sanctions. In circumstances where the United

States can exert overwhelming leverage,

unilateral pressures will be effective, as the recent successful effort to induce South Korea to

rescind its order for a French reprocessing

plant suggests. But where such leverage is not

present (e.g., with regard to Argentina), attempts to impose unilateral sanctions may be

ineffective or worse. The conclusion is obvious; sanctions will generally make their

most effective contribution to a proliferation

strategy if they are applied in the context of a

collaborative effort. Attempts by the United

States to exert economic pressure would be of

limited utility without the approval and

cooperation of the OECD countries. Credible

American threats to resort to military action

in extreme cases are almost inconceivable

without at least the tacit acquiescence or support of the U.S.S.R. In the early 1960’s, the

U.S.S.R. was reliably reported to be contemplating a military strike against Chinese

nuclear facilities. After Soviet inquiries

revealed that the United States would view

such an action with disfavor, the project was

abandoned.

Efforts to raise the political costs of building

nuclear weapons will be successful in direct

proportion to whether an Nth country can expect the condemnation of the United States

alone, the United States and U.S.S.R. together,

or the preponderance of the international

community. A clear international consensus

will, by itself, constitute an important disincentive, but it will also serve as the necessary

context or framework for specific sanctions.

The task of policy is therefore to generate such

a consensus and then to formulate specific

policies, which utilize and build upon that

agreement.

It should be noted that the effectiveness of

even multilateral disincentives and sanctions

is not assured. For the majority of nations

possessing limited economic and technological capabilities or lacking an indigenous

uranium supply, strong multilateral measures

would probably suffice to foreclose the

nuclear option for the foreseeable future, On

the other hand are nations, like Argentina,

which possess or will soon possess the requisite capabilities and indigenous fuel

sources. If Argentina decides to produce

nuclear weapons, the international community can raise the cost but cannot prevent

it, short of military coercion.

Supply Policies

Reprocessing

Because they provide access to bomb-grade

nuclear material, reprocessing technologies

and facilities have been the focus of much recent attention. It is generally agreed that the

68
diffusion of reprocessing plants will significantly increase the opportunity for proliferation. Therefore, from a nonproliferation

perspective it is unfortunate that a state might

decide to acquire such a capability for a

variety of reasons. These include: an assured

nuclear fuel supply; anticipation of commercialization of the breeder and the depletion of

uranium reserves; a “hard sell” competition

among suppliers involving reprocessing as a

“sweetener’ and a desire for nuclear

weapons. These motivating factors must be

countered with policies adopted by suppliers

if the spread of reprocessing plants to an increasing number of countries is to be prevented. Such policies might aim to manage the

fuel at both ends of the fuel cycle either within

the supplier states or within some multinational body, or else to forego plutonium recycle altogether and eliminate the need for

reprocessing. Both options need further

elaboration.

Containment.—This approach is based on

the assumption that the growth of a global

reprocessing industry is virtually inevitable

for reasons cited above. If the spread of

reprocessing cannot be halted, it can be contained and managed. Specifically, reprocessing plants can be located in the present supplier countries and in multinational fuel-cycle

centers in supplier and user states. The objective would be to prevent the emergence of national facilities within the user states—particularly those of the Third World, A policy

strategy designed to achieve this outcome

might include some or all of the following elements:

First the United States would reestablish itself as a reliable supplier of enrichment services, and other supplier states would be encouraged to do the same. An adequate guaranteed fuel supply would be offered as a quid

pro quo for restraint (i.e., a moratorium on

the construction of national reprocessing and

enrichment facilities) on the part of user countries. Steps to upgrade U.S. supply capabilities

might include:

. Increase domestic uranium exploration

and production, and augment stockpiles

with added imports.

●

●

●

●

●

If

Us.

eyes

fuel

Expand enrichment capacity, beginning

immediately with the Portsmouth addon or its equivalent (e,g., a centrifuge

plant).

Maintain R & D and demonstration

programs concerning the technological,

economic, and safeguards aspects of

reprocessing, with a view to future commercialization.

Facilitate exports of reactors and reactor

fuel by establishing a consistent and

easily understood set of procedures and

criteria for export licensing.

Provide user states with guaranteed fuel

supplies under binding letters of commitment.

Provide fuel to user states at nondiscriminatory or even concessionary

prices.

these efforts are insufficient to restore

credibility as a reliable supplier in the

of the importing states, an international

bank or “extraterritorial SWU” reserve

might be established under international control.

Second, all supplier states would agree to

refrain from the export of plutonium, highly

enriched uranium, and enrichment or

reprocessing facilities and technology.

Third, suppliers would offer spent fuel

services. These might include:

●

●

●

Fuel leasing, buy-back, or exchange provisions. The basic concept in each case is

to obtain the return of spent fuel containing unseparated plutonium. The user

state would receive a new supply of lowenriched uranium fuel in return.

Assistance to user countries in arranging

for spent fuel storage and waste disposal

in the United States or overseas. This

would require expansion of U.S. spent

fuel repositories, and the development of

the technology and facilities required for

permanent waste disposal,

Access to reprocessing in order to dispose

69
of spent fuel, This assumes the initiation

of commercial plutonium reprocessing

and recycle.

. Demonstration projects for spent fuel

and reprocessing technologies.

An international spent fuel regime could be

established under existing IAEA statutory

authority. Spent fuel or excess national stocks

of separated plutonium would be placed in

IAEA custody pending use. The United States

has already approached other suppliers and

the IAEA Secretariat in support of this concept, and a working group of nuclear suppliers has been studying it. This will require,

in turn, the construction of international fuel

storage facilities (the United States could provide the first site).

To induce other suppliers to cooperate in

these measures the United States could offer

them tie-in agreements, guaranteeing enrichment services at nondiscriminatory prices to

their reactor customers, opportunities to invest in new U.S. private-sector plant capacity,

and joint-venture reprocessing facilities.

Competition in the provision of fuel-cycle

services and facilities could be moderated

through market sharing agreements, the provision of such facilities and services to all

users on equal terms, establishment of

multinational reprocessing facilities, and

possible mechanisms for international supervision.

The spent fuel issue is rapidly emerging as

one that requires urgent attention. Most nations with nuclear power reactors in operation

or on order lack adequate spent fuel repositories. That fact, plus any fuel return requirements imposed by suppliers, makes it necessary to transfer the fuel to locations where it

can be stored and perhaps reprocessed. England has shown some interest in receiving

spent fuel from other countries (e.g., Spain),

but only if allowed to reprocess it. The United

States currently faces the problem of whether

to permit the transfer for reprocessing of spent

fuel derived from U.S. supplied material. The

bilateral agreements under which fuel was

originally exported give the United States a

veto over its ultimate disposal (see below).

70

Critique.—An analysis of the containment

approach suggests a number of potential

difficulties. First, its applicability may be constrained in the short term by limitations on

U.S. enrichment capacity and in the long term

by possible limitations on U.S. domestic supplies of uranium, The Administration’s decision to construct a centrifuge facility in lieu of

the previously planned Portsmouth add-on

using the proven diffusion technique, introduces another element of uncertainty.

Centrifuge facilities of this size exist only on

paper. Consequently, their reliability and

other performance characteristics have yet to

be verified in practice. Second, the costs of an

integrated program encompassing expanded

enrichment capacity, fuel buy-back, and provision for adequate storage and waste disposal

facilities would be impressive, Domestic

political resistance to the price tag and to provisions for making the United States a global

repository of spent nuclear fuel and wastes

may be very strong. Third, it may be difficult

to persuade nuclear importing states to accept

arrangements which will keep the present international nuclear oligopoly intact, Present

suppliers would retain both their market

preeminence and technological leadership.

Steps to strengthen the United States as a

“reliable supplier” by concessionary exports

of fuel will have the effect of subsidizing the

global spread of nuclear energy-a somewhat

ironic outcome from a nonproliferation

perspective. The final and perhaps most important criticism from a nonproliferation

standpoint is that a containment approach

tolerates the growth of a global reprocessing

industry, and thereby tends to legitimize the

use of plutonium as a commercial fuel.

Against this background, nascent weapons

states may find it easy to argue that their own

reprocessing facilities are essential for energy

independence. The containment approach also

tends to diminish the incentive to develop

technological alternatives to reprocessing.

Rejection of Plutonium Recycle.—If the

containment approach is judged inadequate,

the logical alternative is to eliminate

reprocessing entirely, The Carter Administration has apparently opted for this course by

deciding to cease Federal Government support

of civilian production and use of plutonium.
Proponents of this approach tend to assume

that the spread of reprocessing/recycle is not

inevitable; that the proliferation-related costs

outweigh the energy benefits; that the

economic rationale for reprocessing is questionable in any case; that reprocessing and

plutonium storage cannot be safeguarded;

that U.S. policy can serve as an example to

other states; and that other countries are

unlikely to forgo reprocessing unless the

United States does so.

A policy to implement this approach would

comprise the same elements as for containment, with two exceptions. (a) Plans for

domestic civilian reprocessing would be suspended until commercially useable uranium

reserves are exhausted or the breeder is successfully commercialized. Alternatively, both

reprocessing and the breeder could be abandoned permanently. (b) An effort would be

made to develop technologies for extracting

the energy in spent fuel without separating

plutonium, e.g., tandem cycle and coprecipitation. Such research might be undertaken as

part of an international study. If the results

were successful, the benefits of the new technology could be made available to other countries. If the technology proves unworkable,

the nuclear industry would resort to a

throwaway cycle.

Critique. —A policy to forgo plutonium

recycle will encounter difficulties analogous,

but more intense, than those involved with a

containment approach. Demands on enrichment capacity will be increased. Thus uncertainties concerning uranium supply projections cast some doubt on the viability of a

reprocessing ban beyond the immediate

future. The political task of persuading other

nuclear suppliers to abandon their reprocessing plans will be very difficult indeed.

The waste disposal and spent fuel storage

problems will clearly be exacerbated. The

problem is illustrated by the Administration’s

current dilemma over spent fuel transfer. To

the extent that efforts to dissuade other supplier states from reprocessing succeed, a

means for elimination of plutonium in spent

fuel is lost, or at least indefinitely postponed.

The United States would also be forgoing a

known technology (reprocessing) in favor of

untried ones (e.g., tandem cycle) which, at the

very least, would mean the deferral of our

ability to recover the energy value from spent

fuel should reprocessing prove economical. It

would also mean relinquishing leadership in

technology development of direct relevance to

IAEA safeguards, multinational fuel-cycle

facilities, and the breeder. Furthermore, a

decision to forgo reprocessing would probably be the death knell for the LMFBR, the most

technologically advanced of all the inexhaustible energy sources.

The most serious obstacle to a reprocessing

ban or moratorium is a political one. Pressure

by the United States to put a halt to reprocessing will encounter strong resistance from

Japan and those European suppliers that have

already committed themselves to reprocessing

and have small facilities in operation or under

construction. These nations view reprocessing

and the breeder as a vital element in their

effort to assure adequate energy supplies in

the future. Unlike the United States, they do

not have substantial domestic reserves of

uranium. Controlling the export of such

facilities and technology is the one area in

which agreement has proven possible. Beyond

this, the present Administration’s approach is

apparently to seek agreement from other suppliers to at least impose a moratorium on

commercial reprocessing and on the construction of new facilities. Agreement in even this

limited area will be difficult. Moreover,

mutual interest and dependence among the

United States, Europe, and Japan are so extensive that most efforts to apply coercive

pressures become counterproductive.

Enrichment

Like reprocessing, enrichment technology

and facilities provide a means of acquiring

bomb-grade material. The spread of national

enrichment facilities would therefore have

ominous implications for proliferation, similar to those associated with reprocessing. Both

have been the focus of supplier export control

negotiations. As with reprocessing, motives

for acquiring an enrichment plant can include

an assured fuel supply (energy independence)

and a desire for nuclear weapons.

71
There are important differences. First,

enrichment is a considerably more difficult

and demanding technology. Consequently,

the inherent technological and economic barriers to its spread are somewhat higher than

with reprocessing. This situation may erode,

depending upon the outcome of technological

innovations still in the development stage.

More important, commercial reprocessing

could be deferred for perhaps two or three

decades without greatly damaging the nuclear

energy industry. There is enough uranium to

meet industry’s needs for that period, but an

increase in enrichment capacity cannot be

delayed if the civilian nuclear energy industry

is to keep pace with the rising demand for

electrical power.

The proliferation potential inherent in an

expanded enrichment capacity can be dealt

with in two ways: by supplier controls over

exports of technology and facilities, and by

confining enrichment plants to the existing

supplier states or multinational centers,

Critique.—There are a number of possible

difficulties associated with the establishment

of multinational facilities; these will be dealt

with subsequently. Efforts to control the

spread of enrichment facilities and technology

will encounter difficulties similar to those for

reprocessing.

Export (Supplier) Controls

Bilateral Agreements.1—The fundamental

mechanisms for international nuclear

cooperation between the United States and

other nations or international organizations

since the mid-1950’s have been Agreements

for Cooperation, commonly known as

“bilateral agreements.” A variation, which involves commitments by the United States and

another specified nation to the IAEA, is

known as a trilateral or tripartite agreement.

These agreements provide the framework for

technical cooperation and export of U.S.

lsee “united States Agreements for Cooperation in

Atomic Energy: An Analysis, ” prepared for the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, by the

Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,

January 1976, pp. 36-53.

nuclear materials and facilities to other countries, and for safeguarding of exported items

against theft, diversion, or illicit use. Provisions have varied from one country to another

and over time, More recent agreements tend to

include stricter constraints.

The principal provisions of recent agreements for cooperation relevant to proliferation are the following:

(1) Exchange of information: The agreements

provide for the exchange of information dealing with peaceful applications of atomic

energy relating to reactors, radioactive

isotopes and source material, special nuclear

material, and health and safety considerations. Restricted data (i.e., classified information) and associated materials and equipment

cannot be exchanged.

(2) Access to special facilities: The agreements for research and development commit

the Parties to make specialized research

facilities and reactor testing facilities available

for mutual use if it can be conveniently arranged.

(3) Cooperation between persons; Provisions

of the agreements permit companies in the

U.S. nuclear industry to deal directly with the

governments, nuclear industries, and utilities

of the agreement nations on matters concerning nuclear exports.

(4) Transfer of materials and equipment:

Research agreements provide for the transfer

of specified amounts of source material, heavy

water, byproduct material, radioisotopes, and

special nuclear material for purposes other

than reactor fueling.

(5) Supply of special nuclear materials (SNM):

Research and power agreements provide for

contracts under which the United States will

either supply enriched uranium from U.S.

ores or will enrich natural uranium supplied

by the agreement nation. The agreements set

general limits on the amount of SNM (e.g.,

manium-235) to be transferred. There is

usually a further restriction that the quantity

of enriched uranium transferred shall be

limited to the amount needed for the full loading and efficient operation of the reactors

covered under the agreement. Some agreements also provide for the transfer of

72
plutonium under terms and conditions to be

agreed upon.

(6) Reprocessing of spent fuel: Agreements

require that reprocessing of fuel supplied or

enriched by the United States shall be performed only in facilities acceptable to both

parties, and only upon a joint determination

that the safeguard requirements of the agreement can be effectively applied. Further, any

alteration of spent fuel elements removed

from a reactor must take place in mutually acceptable facilities. Pending the required joint

determination, the agreement nations can

only remove and store spent fuel.

(7) Guarantees: Agreements include two

guarantees. The first is an assurance of

peaceful use, which typically provides that:

No material, including equipment and

devices, transferred to the government of . . .

or authorized persons under its jurisdiction

by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this

Agreement or the superseded Agreements,

and no special nuclear material produced

through the use of such material, equipment

and devices, will be used for atomic weapons,

or for research on or development of atomic

weapons, or for any other military purpose.

The second guarantee refers to retransfer of

exported materials and facilities. Typically,

the agreements provide that:

No material, including equipment and

devices, transferred to the Government of . . .

or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this agreement or the superseded agreements will be transferred to

unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of . . . except as

[ERDA] may agree to such a transfer to the

jurisdiction of another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of

[ERDA], the transfer is within the scope of

an agreement for cooperation between the

Government of the United States and the

other nation or group of nations.

(8) U.S. safeguard Tights; Under the agreements the United States is entitled to review

the design and operation of facilities and to

apply safeguards—including the right to send

U.S. inspectors into the territory of the agreement nation. The agreements typically specify

the rights of the United States as follows:

To designate, after consultation with the

Government of ..., personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of. ...,

shall have access in . . . to all places and data

necessary to account for the source material

and special nuclear material which are subject to . . . this Article to determine whether

there is compliance with this Agreement and

to make such independent measurements as

may be deemed necessary.

In the case of noncompliance with these

provisions, the United States is empowered to

suspend or terminate the agreement and to require the return of any materials, equipment,

and facilities provided under the agreement.

(9) IAEA Safeguards: An early purpose of

U.S. agreements for cooperation was to provide the IAEA with experience in the application of safeguards. Consequently, the agreements included a commitment by the Parties

to apply IAEA safeguards to materials, equipment, and facilities transferred from the

United States. These international safeguards

are carried out either under a trilateral agreement among the Parties and the Agency, or as

provided in an agreement between the agreement state and the Agency pursuant to the

NPT. The United States will suspend its own

safeguard rights only if it determines that the

international safeguards are adequate.

As noted above, recent bilateral agreements tend to contain stricter provisions

regarding proliferation than do earlier ones.

Further steps in this direction might include

the following. First, earlier agreements could

be renegotiated in at least some cases, to make

them consistent with the guidelines agreed to

at the London Suppliers Conference (see

below). Second, the agreements might be

further upgraded to include provisions similar to the list of suggested measures for

strengthening the Suppliers Agreement

(below). The most important of these would

be requirements for full fuel cycle safeguards

and provisions for spent fuel return, in conjunction with guaranteed supplies of reactor

fuel,

73
Multilateral Approaches.—Export controls

have been frequently identified as a potentially fruitful area for a multilateral approach.

The recent agreement under which West Germany will export an entire fuel cycle to Brazil

(with safeguards) has generated widespread

concern that competition among nuclear suppliers will lead to the uncontrolled spread of

sensitive nuclear materials, technology, and

facilities, To prevent a competitive dilution of

safeguards, the nuclear supplier states began

negotiations in London to define uniform

standards and controls to be applied to exports. Reportedly, the Suppliers’ Conference

resulted in an agreement on eight such criteria

or conditions to be applied on a “best effort”

basis. These include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

a requirement that IAEA safeguards be

applied to all exports;

a requirement that recipients give

assurances that exports will not be used

to make explosives;

a requirement that recipients provide

adequate physical security for exported

nuclear facilities and materials;

a requirement that recipients apply the

above conditions to any retransfer of exports to a third country;

the exercise of “restraint” regarding the

possible export of “sensitive” items

(relating to fuel enrichment, spent fuel

reprocessing, and heavy water production);

encouragement of multilateral facilities

for reprocessing and enrichment;

assurances that facilities constructed

from sensitive technology exports be

safeguarded; and

a requirement that the supplier’s consent

be obtained prior to any retransfer of

sensitive facilities, materials, or technology.

Subsequently, Ottawa announced that it

would require recipients of Canadian nuclear

exports to accept full fuel-cycle safeguards—

the first supplier state to do so. In a dramatic

change of policy, France decided to ban future

exports of enrichment and reprocessing

facilities and technology. A large question

mark hangs over the existing French agreement to supply a reprocessing plant to

Pakistan. The United States has threatened to

cut off further economic assistance to Pakistan

if the deal is not canceled. Pakistan has

publicly defied this demand and France has

said it will proceed with delivery if Rawal -

pindi insists. However, the French Government has not objected to U.S. efforts to change

Pakistan’s position.

The principal American representative to

the Suppliers’ Conference has characterized

the negotiations as “an evolutionary process, ”

and it is not hard to identify a number of ways

in which the existing agreements might be

supplemented and strengthened.

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Replace the present “best effort” formula

with a formal binding agreement or a

more compelling informal understanding.

Follow the Canadian lead and insist on

full fuel-cycle safeguards or NPT ratification as a condition for all nuclear exports.

Expand the recipients’ pledge not to use

imports for making weapons to a general

unqualified pledge to forgo nuclear

weapons.

Draw up a joint plan of action incorporating graded sanctions to be imposed

in the event a recipient state violates or

abrogates the terms of either an export

agreement or the NPT (if it is a signatory).

Require that safeguards apply for the

useful life of facilities built as a result of

exported technology, and to any application of exported technology to other

nuclear facilities.

Apply uniform safeguards to the provision of fuel-cycle services.

Require participation in an international

(IAEA) storage regime for spent fuel if,

and when, it can be established.

Establish multinational enrichment sites.

Forestall the construction of national

reprocessing plants. Steps towards this

end might include a ban on all exports of

reprocessing facilities and technology, a

ban on nuclear exports to any country

planning or implementing reprocessing,

and a requirement that any reprocessing

take place in the supplier state. Spent fuel

would have to be returned to the supplier

74
under fuel-leasing or buy-back arrangements. In exchange, the user state would

receive low-enriched uranium already

fabricated into new fuel elements. Recent

U.S. agreements to buy back irradiated

fuel constitute an important step in this

direction.

U.S. Government influence over nuclear exports is also exerted through decisions by the

Export–Import Bank with regard to export financing, insurance, and guarantees. Since

nuclear exports are publicly subsidized or financed in each of the supplier states, it might

be useful if the directors of the national export

credit associations of the supplier nations met

to coordinate policies.

A final approach to export control would

involve an effort to diminish competition

among supplier states by creating an international exporters’ cartel, with a guaranteed

market share for each exporter. As an inducement to other suppliers, the United States

could settle for less than the 50 percent share it

would receive if shares were apportioned according to manufacturing capacity.

Special Precautions.—There are certain nations or regions which, because of regional

conflict, national instability, or irresponsible

leadership, appear to warrant special concern

with regard to nuclear exports. In such instances it may be desirable for the nuclear exporting states to either require special precautions besides conventional international

safeguards and physical security measures, or

avoid all nuclear exports to the territory. The

area of greatest immediate concern with

regard to regional conflict is the Middle East

(Egypt and Israel), where Washington has

already imposed special export conditions including a fuel buy-back option, the right to

veto reprocessing of spent fuel from U.S. supplied facilities, and a requirement that any

reprocessing that is permitted must take place

outside the recipient country.

Critique. —Policy proposals involving supplier cooperation and coordination confront

formidable political obstacles. Exporting states

will have to perceive sufficient common interest and danger to overcome initial rivalry

and suspicion. Each will have to curb its desire

to capture as large a part of the export market

as possible, and restrain the inclination to

view nuclear exports as a source of political

influence and prestige. The problem was illustrated in the negotiations that led to the recent

suppliers’ agreement. From the perspective of

other suppliers (notably Germany and

France), U.S. efforts to control exports appeared suspiciously like an attempt to protect

its dominant share of the international

nuclear market against rising foreign competition. Nevertheless, the modest success of the

London negotiations, in conjunction with recent Canadian and French policy changes,

offer grounds for some optimism in this

regard. Moreover, both Great Britain and the

U.S.S.R. have exhibited consistent support for

supplier safeguards.

Export controls, if pushed too hard, could

prove counterproductive, and U.S. negotiators

insist that the Suppliers’ Conference has

progressed as rapidly as political realities will

permit. A premature attempt, for example, to

substitute a formal public and binding agreement for the present informal understanding

would probably result in no agreement of any

kind being reached.

The reaction of nuclear importing nations is

of an even greater concern. If the conditions

attached to the purchase of nuclear facilities,

materials, and technology are thought to be

too onerous, an importing nation may opt for

a national nuclear industry (including enrichment and/or reprocessing facilities) which

will permit increased independence from

overseas suppliers. Brazil has already chosen

this path. If the country in question has not

ratified the NPT, these indigenous facilities

would be entirely exempt from safeguards—

with obvious implications for proliferation.

Furthermore, steps to hedge the availability of

civilian nuclear exports with growing restrictions and conditions could be construed as a

violation of NPT Article IV. More important

than the legalities is the possibility that such

restrictions would be widely viewed as

analogous to the resented unequal allocation

of benefits and costs between nuclear and

non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT

75
regime (see below). Cartels are seldom popular with their customers: witness the tensions

between OPEC and industralized oil consumers. While OPEC can attempt to justify its

price exactions by stating that they ameliorate

or at least modify global power and income

inequalities, a nuclear cartel could not make

the same claim.

As a consequence, the political viability of

export controls for more than the short term is

very much in doubt. The minimum requirements for success would seem to be: (1) a perception by suppliers that the opportunity

costs of controls are equitably distributed

among them, and (2) a perception by importers that controls do not unreasonably hinder

diffusion of the benefits of civilian nuclear

energy-either in terms of energy supply or

cost .

A second problem area concerns sanctions

and enforcement. At present, the basic U.S.

position on sanctions remains the same as articulated by then Secretary of State Kissinger,

i.e., that violations of bilateral agreements or

IAEA safeguards should lead to a cutoff of

nuclear assistance to the offending country

and the return of supplied material and equipment. This conforms to the standard provisions in U.S. Bilateral Agreements for

Cooperation. The credibility of this threat was

not enhanced by either the mild U.S. reaction

to India’s nuclear explosion, or the subsequent

proposal by the Ford Administration to

resume limited exports of nuclear fuel to India. What seems required at the outset is a

joint suppliers’ statement that any violation of

a safeguards agreement would be viewed as

an extremely grave matter, resulting in consultations among suppliers and leading to the

coordinated application of prearranged sanctions. Sanctions might include, in addition to a

cutoff of nuclear assistance by the suppliers

and a withdrawal of IAEA assistance, a

severance of all economic ties with the offender, a suppliers’ initiative to obtain a formal condemnation of the violation by the

United Nations General Assembly, and

Security Council consideration of possible

further punitive actions. These sanctions

should be enumerated in at least general terms

in each export agreement. More drastic sanctions are reviewed elsewhere in this study.

Agreement on, and enforcement of, even

the relatively mild sanctions listed above will

be very difficult. To be viable, sanctions must

fulfill four criteria: they must be credible; they

must be strong enough to serve as an effective

deterrent; they must enjoy the support of the

suppliers who will enforce them; and they

must be sufficiently acceptable to the recipient

states to be incorporated in export agreements

in the first instance, Such conditions are not

easily met.

In theory, sanctions could also be applied

against a supplier that fails to implement an

agreed course of action following a safeguards

violation. In this instance, all the difficulties of

implementing sanctions are compounded. If

the offending supplier is an ally, the United

States will be extremely reluctant to jeopardize a vital political and security relationship; if

the U.S.S.R. is the culprit, any attempt to impose sanctions will be dangerous and probably futile.

Another difficulty arises from the fact that

export controls ideally should be retroactively

applied to the 30 existing nuclear export

agreements of which the United States is a

party. All nuclear exports require a NRC or

Commerce Department license, and this in

turn provides a lever to institute the new criteria. Even so, unilateral, retroactive revision

of a bilateral agreement is hazardous. The

danger is that such action would antagonize

importing states and further undermine the

already damaged reputation of the United

States as a reliable supplier. The problem

would be ameliorated to the extent that the

United States moved in concert with other

suppliers, and the licensing lever is used to

initiate negotiations with importing states

concerning the proposed revisions rather than

to simply impose those provisions on a

unilateral, take it or leave it, basis, Moreover,

bilateral agreements are increasingly being

supplanted or supplemented by multilateral

institutions and processes, e.g., the Suppliers’

Agreement and IAEA safeguards.

The proposal that extraordinary precautions be taken with exports to particular countries or regions poses its own set of difficulties,

In an area prone to international conflicts,

76
civil wars, and coups, safeguards may be irrelevant. Safeguards applied to the reactor

provided South Vietnam would probably not

have constrained the present Government had

the facility been captured with its fuel supply

intact. Where terrorism has reached military

dimensions, as in the Middle East, it is hard to

imagine how any set of physical security

safeguards can be entirely credible. Governments and even nations are most likely to face

threats to their very survival in unstable areas.

As previously noted, a regime in extremis is

unlikely to be inhibited by safeguards or other

nominal disincentives to proliferation. In such

an area, there may also be more than the usual

quota of extremely ambitious or fanatic

leaders—with indeterminant but unreassuring implications for proliferation. Such areas

have the added liability of possibly being the

focus of U.S,-Soviet rivalry, with the consequent danger that the superpowers will be

tempted into a competitive dilution of

safeguards requirements in the quest for

regional influence. Finally, the notion of

special safeguards is inherently discriminatory, i.e., it contravenes the concept of

uniform safeguard standards uniformly applied which underlies all blueprints for

multilateral export controls. If the principle of

uniformity is eroded by special exceptions, it

will be difficult to avoid a competitive erosion

of safeguards by suppliers.

Assistance Regarding Non-Nuclear Energy

Sources

Nonproliferation will be abetted to the extent that potential Nth countries can be induced to rely upon non-nuclear energy

sources. There are both general and specific

policy initiatives available to the United States

for this purpose. Items in the former category

include:

● R & D programs regarding energy

systems appropriate to the decentralized,

low capital, low maintenance requirements of the less developed countries.

. International collaborative efforts to explore the potential of conservation and

renewable energy sources. Recent proposals for an international energy conference would be appropriate in this

regard.

. Establishment of an International Energy

Institute (possibly as an IAEA adjunct) to

serve as an ongoing institutional focus of

such efforts.

More country-specific steps might include:

●

●

●

●

Assistance to individual governments in

assessing their present energy needs and

in devising energy development and

delivery strategies.

Technical assistance in developing

whatever non-nuclear energy sources are

most appropriate to a particular country’s situation.

Steps to ensure that foreign assistance

and export credit arrangements are

equally favorable for non-nuclear and

nuclear energy sources. In each of these

instances, preference could be accorded

those states prepared to accept export

restraints.

Guaranteed supplies of U.S. coal.

The impact of these measures could be

enhanced if some means were devised to assist

nations choosing among nuclear and nonnuclear energy sources. This might involve

creating a new international organization,

possibly as an adjunct to the World Bank,

which would systematically assess the comparative technological, economic, and administrative characteristics of alternative

energy systems and provide technical assistance to requesting countries. That assistance

could take three forms: a data bank, help in

evaluating the relative utility of alternative

systems in terms of specific national requirements and characteristics, and assistance in

constructing the system or systems selected. If

such a process helps stimulate increased interest in, and reliance on, non-nuclear energy

sources, the pressures for proliferation may be

eased.

Critique. —While development of nonnuclear energy sources has clear utility with

regard to a diversion route to proliferation, its

relevance to dedicated facilities and

purchase/theft routes is less direct. Similarly,

to the extent that proliferation is motivated by

such factors as national security and prestige,

provision of alternative energy supplies will

be an ineffective response.

77
Technological Measures

It is clear from chapters VII and VIII that

there is no “technological fix” that can eliminate the proliferation problem. Nevertheless,

technological barriers can be raised both by

enhanced safeguards and by an emphasis on

nuclear systems that are inherently less

vulnerable to diversion.

Safeguards technology could be quickly

upgraded by both the IAEA and NRC. Possible improvements include a more extensive

use of multiredundant cameras, seals, and

portal monitors, with full-time remote alarm

systems monitoring by inspectors. Controls to

prevent procedural lapses can be made more

stringent; no safeguards system can be fully

effective if the equipment is inadvertently left

off or doors left unlocked.

A new generation of safeguards technology

now under development also shows promise.

This includes advanced versions of seals,

cameras, isotopic analyzers, and portal monitors. Real time accounting systems would also

enhance the timeliness of detection at

reprocessing plants.

Development and implementation of new

reactor and fuel cycle systems that are inherently less vulnerable to proliferation will

be more difficult and take longer than

developing new safeguard systems. The first

step might be to redesign the LWR core of existing reactors for a throwaway cycle. Changes

in enrichment or core design could optimize

performance for a cycle without reprocessing.

The HTGR might also be considerably improved from a nonproliferation standpoint if

designed for low enriched (6 percent) fuel. A

cycle using denatured UPSS in LWRS coupled

with multinational reprocessing and breeding

centers appears to substantially reduce opportunities for diversion, Reprocessing could be

made less vulnerable if techniques such as

coprecipitation are used. The gas-core nonproliferation reactor mentioned in chapter VII

seems to have the greatest promise of all technological developments, but is also one of the

most problematical. Thorium thermal

breeders are clearly superior to the plutonium

fast breeders in resistance to diversion.

Most of these R & D programs could be performed quite effectively by ERDA or NRC if

they are given the mandate. International implementation may be considerably more

difficult. The IAEA is bound by present agreements as to the level of safeguarding. Improvements in existing equipment can be

made fairly easily, but such modifications are

subject to negotiation with the host country.

New reactor systems would have to be clearly

superior to existing or planned systems on

many counts besides nonproliferation before

other suppliers would turn to them.

The most difficult question concerns the

LMFBR. It is a nearly ideal instrument for the

production of large quantities of high-grade

SNM, It may also be the best hope for virtually

unlimited quantities of moderate-priced

energy. A fundamental reassessment of the

entire LMFBR program on an international

scale may be warranted, but given the enormous effort already invested in this enterprise, any reexamination will encounter

major political, bureaucratic, and budgetary

obstacles-side from the technical questions

of reactor design.

Strengthen the Nonproliferation

Regime

The NPT constitutes the centerpiece of what

may be labeled the international nonproliferation or safeguards regime. The treaty is not

without its critics—including those governments, like India and Brazil, which have

refused to become signatories. The most persistent objection by the non-nuclear states is

that the treaty is inherently discriminatory,

allocating the bulk of obligations to the nonnuclear weapons states and the privileges to

the nuclear weapons countries. Other critics,

generally within the nuclear nations, have

complained that the safeguards system provided for in the treaty is too weak to provide

an effective barrier to proliferation. They note

that a number of Nth countries have not

ratified the NPT, nor are they likely to do so.

Even with regard to NPT parties, constraints

78
upon the IAEA with regard to inspector access, the lack of power to search for clandestine facilities and stockpiles, and the inability to pursue and recover stolen material

leave the present safeguards system with

limited authority.

Policy proposals for strengthening the nonproliferation regime are diverse and reflect

each of these viewpoints. The first four

subheadings that follow address ways of making the Treaty more attractive to non-nuclear

states. The next three constitute means of

strengthening the Treaty’s control aspects,

and the last three fall in a gray area between

these two categories.

Nuclear States Arms Control

The nuclear weapons states have a commitment under the NPT to “pursue negotiations

in good faith on effective measures relating to

the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an

early date and to nuclear disarmament”, including a Comprehensive Test Ban. At a

minimum, this would seem to require both an

agreement in the next round of SALT negotiations providing for some actual reduction in

armaments, and a ban on underground

nuclear explosions. The apparent relaxation of

Russian opposition to onsite inspection offers

grounds for some optimism concerning a test

ban.

Improve the Benefits Available to an NPT

Signatory

The United States has taken a few steps in

the direction of preferential treatment for NPT

parties since late 1974, in the areas of IAEA

medical research and technical assistance

programs. Article IV of the NPT recognizes

the “inalienable right” of all parties to full

participation in all peaceful nuclear activities.

The same article obligates those parties “in a

position to do so” to contribute to civilian

nuclear applications in the non-nuclear states,

with particular attention to the needs of the

developing countries. In practice, however,

the nuclear nations have provided more

nuclear technology and materials to states

which are not full parties to the NPT (e.g.,

Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan,

Brazil, and Argentina) than to the signatories.

If adherence to the treaty is to be made more

attractive, this situation must change, Equipment, materials, services, information, and

technical assistance would be provided on a

preferential basis—including concessions or

other appropriate financial arrangements—to

NPT parties.

Evaluate Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

The NPT contains a provision that “benefits

from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions will be made available to nonnuclear weapon states party to the Treaty . . .

through an appropriate international body. ”

This paragraph has been inoperative, primarily because of differing perceptions of the

value and practicality of PNEs. To resolve the

issue, it has been suggested that an international moratorium on PNEs be instituted

pending the completion of a study on their

desirability by the U,N. Secretary General or

some other neutral and prestigious entity. An

international institutional framework could

be created, depending upon the outcome, to

provide and regulate PNE services or to ban

them altogether.

Enhance the Role of the Non-Nuclear States

Participation by non-nuclear weapon states

in decisions concerning peaceful nuclear activities—within an international or multinational framework—may be enhanced in order

to reduce the sense of discrimination many of

them feel under the NPT. Means to achieve

this end are described below.

Link Nuclear Exports to NPT

Another previously mentioned means of

strengthening the NPT regime involves a link

between nuclear nation exports and the

Treaty, i.e., a condition for the export of

nuclear materials and technology would be

adherence to the NPT by the importing state.

Alternatively, the nuclear weapons states

could decide to permit exports of nuclear

79
materials and technology to non-NPT signatories only if they accept the application of IAEA

safeguards, both to the imported material and

to all nuclear facilities and activities within

their borders,

Link Economic Aid to NPT

On a broader level, it has been suggested

that the United States and other industrialized

countries condition all their economic assistance on the recipient nation’s adherence to the

NPT, and agree to curtail all exports of nuclear

fuel, technology, and facilities to any NPT party found in violation of the Treaty. This would

complement a general tightening of safeguard

requirements on exports by nuclear supplier

nations, (See above for a discussion of export

controls.)

Strengthen IAEA Safeguards

IAEA safeguards constitute another important dimension of the nonproliferation

regime. The ideal safeguards system would

provide a universal and uniform set of requirements, standards, and procedures both

for international exchanges of nuclear

materials and technology and for national

nuclear energy activities. Although the ideal

probably remains beyond reach, a significant

upgrading of the existing system can be envisioned.

. Assure that IAEA funding, staffing, and

technical competence are augmented at a

rate commensurate with the global expansion of civilian nuclear energy production. This will require, inter alia, a

high-quality recruitment and training

program for inspectors and salaries sufficient to attract the best people available.

It may also require a substantial and sustained increase in U.S. financial support

for the Agency.

. Develop new funding mechanisms to

augment existing annual assessments

and voluntary contributions, e.g., an

IAEA tax levied on the output of all

nuclear powerplants.

●

●

●

●

●

●

Provide the IAEA with authority to

search for “undeclared” nuclear facilities,

i.e., to conduct unannounced field investigations with full access to the territory of non-nuclear states. The Treaty

of Tlatelolco2 provides a possible model

in this regard. With regard to “declared”

facilities the objective would be to secure

maximum inspection frequencies and access rights for inspectors. In the case of

reprocessing facilities, resident roundthe-clock inspection will be necessary.

Obtain the agreement of the U. S. S. R.,

France and China to allow IAEA inspection of their civilian nuclear facilities—

inspection of U.S. and U.K. facilities has

already been authorized in principle.

Extend the application of existing

safeguards to prevent the acquisition,

through imports or diversion, of

plutonium for military non-weapons

purposes (e.g., a nuclear submarine propulsion program).

Consider a U.N. General Assembly

resolution calling for political sanctions

against NPT violators, e.g., a suspension

of the offending country’s membership in

the United Nations and its specialized

agencies.

Seek prior international agreement on a

common plan of action and graded sanctions to be applied in the case of a

safeguards violation or the abrogation of

an agreement. The present limited repertoire of sanctions available to the IAEA

would be strengthened.

Institute a standard text for multilateral

and bilateral safeguards agreements, as

zThe Treaty of Tlateloleo (The Treaty of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) was opened

for signature in 1967. 1t establishes the first nuclearweapon-free zone in a densely populated area. The

treaty has been ratified by 21 Latin American states. In

addition the United States, Great Britain, France, and

China (but not the U. S. S. R.) have signed Protocol II

whereby they pledge themselves to respect the zone and

not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries

within it.

80
was done in the case of NPT safeguards

agreements. Such standardization would

be an essential concomitant of any effort

by the supplier states to require recipients to submit all their peaceful nuclear

activities to safeguards.

. Improve the interface between IAEA

safeguards and national materials accounting systems, e.g., by developing and

applying standardized measuring and accounting systems.

. Develop improved standardized seals

and monitors, and lift current restrictions

on operation of cameras and recording

devices.

. Reserve U.S. safeguard rights with regard

to American nuclear exports as a fallback to international safeguards.

Expand IAEA Functions

In addition to strengthening the IAEA’s

capability to perform existing safeguard tasks,

the Agency might be upgraded through the

assignment of new or expanded functions.

These might include the following:

Develop techniques and facilities for the

international transport of nuclear fuel,

waste storage and disposal, and storage

of excess plutonium in conjunction with

national governments.

Draw up standards for the design, construction, and operation of reactors and

other fuel-cycle facilities.

Establish and manage an international

storage regime for fresh and spent fuel.

Develop safety, environmental, and

health standards for multinational fuelcycle facilities (parks),

Establish standards and designs for

physical security systems and devices.

The agency might provide physical

security for its own facilities, and evaluate and approve the plans of individual

countries for national facilities.

Provide technical assistance, including

applied research services, to civilian

nuclear programs in the less developed

countries.

Provide an international clearing house

both for nuclear energy and safeguards

data and technology.

Assess the environmental effects of

nuclear facilities near international

boundaries.

Intelligence Capability

A necessary, though not sufficient, condition for an effective nonproliferation regime is

possession of timely and accurate information

about actual or prospective proliferation.

Safeguards are designed to provide this information with regard to diversion of SNM.

Efforts to foreclose dedicated facility and

purchase-theft routes to proliferation will

necessitate some reliance upon covert intelligence-a capability that rests almost entirely with national governments. The principal sources of information in this area include political reporting from embassies,

other human intelligence, monitoring of communications, overflights, and satellites. For

example, one method of trying to detect a

clandestine reprocessing facility consists of atmospheric sampling for Krypton–85. The adequacy of the existing U.S. (and foreign)

capability in this field cannot be judged without extensive access to classified material.

Clearly, however, an effective nonproliferation policy will require an intelligence

capability sufficient to cope with the magnitude of the threat at any particular time.

Moreover, if effective international (as opposed to merely national) responses to clandestine proliferation are to be developed,

some sort of pooling or coordination of

nuclear intelligence may be necessary.

Nuclear Free Zones

Nuclear Free Zones constitute another approach to strengthening the NPT regime. They

totally ban the presence of nuclear weapons

within the prescribed geographical area.

Although a large number of such zones have

been proposed, the only one presently in

81
existence applies to Latin America under the

Treaty of Tlatelolco. Whereas the NPT is seen

as a product of the great powers, most nuclear

free zone proposals, including that for Latin

America, have been initiated by the nonnuclear states of the region concerned-a

political fact of some importance. A nuclearfree zone proposal has some chance of success

if it enjoys general acceptance in the area concerned, does not significantly alter the

regional balance of power, and is based on a

genuine search for common interest. At present, only portions of Latin America, Africa

(excluding Egypt and South Africa), and

possibly Southeast Asia fulfill such criteria.

Critique

Formidable political obstacles will confront

efforts to implement many of the above proposals. Nationalism will pose a formidable

barrier to the intrusion of an international

agency in search of undeclared facilities, and

political resistance on the part of the Soviet

Union, France, and China to proposals for

IAEA inspections may be insuperable. The

political difficulties involved in coordinating

policies among nuclear exporters and in imposing conditions upon importing countries

have already been noted. Similarly, agreements to coordinate nuclear intelligence on

the part of two or more governments will require political and diplomatic acumen of a

high order. Any attempt to penalize an NPT

violator by suspending it from membership in

the United Nations and its related agencies

carries with it the danger of weakening what

global institutions we have. It must be noted,

however, that the international community

has demonstrated an increased willingness to

take that risk with regard to some of the present Nth countries, e.g., South Africa and

Taiwan. As the recent Senate confirmation

hearings on the new Director of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency suggest,

arms control agreements that successfully

bridge the gap between international adversaries and domestic constituencies are extraordinarily difficult to negotiate. The fact that

only one partial nuclear free zone agreement

has been achieved despite a profusion of proposals is indicative of the difficulties of overcoming divergent political interests and outlooks, Finally, the success of efforts to bolster

IAEA safeguards with new and stronger sanctions will depend on whether governments

have the political will to take action when a

violation is detected. As of yet, that will remains untested.

These problems reflect a basic political

reality —the weakness of international

organizations within a nation-state system.

Safeguards can presently be applied only with

the cooperation of the subject state; they cannot be imposed. Truly compulsory safeguards

would require a substantial diminution of

sovereign prerogatives in the nuclear field-a

formidable task. In fact, the IAEA may be

hardpressed to simply maintain its existing

technical standards and integrity in an international environment conditioned by political

pressures and constraints.

The difficulties with proposals to bolster the

nonproliferation regime are not all political.

The assumption concerning a link between

horizontal and vertical proliferation, which

underlies the arms control proposal outlined

above, cannot be verified. All that can be said

with certainty is that a number of nonweapons countries have cited continued vertical proliferation as grounds for possibly

reevaluating their commitment to the NPT. At

a minimum, successful SALT and CTB agreements would remove one possible justification for an Nth country selecting the nuclear

option. Proposals to study PNEs also raise

grave doubts in the minds of many who see

this as injecting new life in a concept which is

slowly dying a well-deserved death. It can be

persuasively argued that the best approach to

PNEs is to continue efforts to convince nonweapons states that such devices hold no

benefits for them.

Global and Regional Arrangements

Until very recently, the bulk of the policy

proposals designed to curb proliferation have

fallen in the category of negative or denial

strategies. There is a growing recognition,

however, that any durable solution to the

82
problem will have to be built on an affirmative, voluntary consensus. Suggestions

regarding how such a consensus may be

achieved have centered on proposals for

multinational or international control over

various phases of the nuclear fuel cycle.

International Management

A recent blueprint for internationalization

proposed the following steps to be accomplished sequentially:

. International management and control of

reprocessing, plus international regulation and protection of plutonium

transport.

● Creation of an international PNE facility,

to explore the utility of this technology

and to provide PNE services to nonnuclear nations if and when they prove

feasible and useful.

. Definition of enriched uranium and

plutonium as international “public

goods” to be produced only under international licensing and regulatory

authority. Such a step would become

possible only with the prior ending of

production of all fissionable material for

military purposes.

● Management of enrichment facilities as

an international public utility with national facilities operating under international license and regulation.

Multinational (Regional) Fuel-Cycle

Facilities

Proposals for multinational arrangements

tend to emphasize the creation of regional

nuclear fuel-cycle facilities or “parks” in

which critical elements of the fuel cycle would

be colocated. Precedents already exist in

Europe for multinational enrichment and

reprocessing facilities. With their regional

emphasis, proposals for multinational arrangements can be regarded as a half-way

house between bilateralism and internationalism. Multilateralism and internationalism are

not mutually exclusive, and the concept of collocation plays an important part in both.

The advantages and limitations of multinational centers are analyzed in chapter VIII.

Two features deserve further emphasis,

however.

First, by calling for joint participation and

shared responsibility by nuclear and nonnuclear states in the international or multinational management of nuclear activities, these

approaches offer to correct the discrimination

and paternalism which burden the existing

NPT regime. In exchange for an agreement to

forgo the nuclear weapons option the nonnuclear nation is offered a seat at the top table

of nuclear institutional diplomacy. Durable

nonproliferation becomes possible if the

nuclear nations are willing to pay for it in the

coin of shared power and prestige. The underlying assumption is that the nationalistic

desire for equality and status will be a principal motivation for future proliferation,

nuclear weapons being valued primarily for

their political impact as symbols of power and

modernity.

Second, multinational and international arrangements are also synonymous with

strategies of interdependence, as opposed to

“independence” (autarchy), in the effort to

meet global energy needs. This has crucial implications for nonproliferation. The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards will be greatly augmented if the electric power of the nation

being safeguarded is dependent on outside

services or supplies. With a nation’s power

supply hostage to good behavior, few, if any,

other nonproliferation sanctions would be required.

Critique.—The difficulties which will be

encountered in any effort to internationalize

management and control of civilian nuclear

activities are self-evident. Internationalization

will require a substantial derogation of national authority over a matter generally considered to be among the most vital of national

interests-energy supply. A decision by the

U.S. Government to move decisively in this

direction would require considerable courage

and imagination.

Regional fuel-cycle facilities would encounter many of the same difficulties,

although they might not be as severe,

92-592 0- 77 -7 83
Regional arrangements would generally not

run as clearly contrary to nationalistic tendencies and might not arouse the same degree of

opposition from industrial and commercial

interests that internationalization probably

will in some advanced nuclear nations.

Nevertheless, even where the objective is accepted in principle by all the major participants in a multinational enterprise, major disagreements can arise. These may concern, inter

alia, allocation of production benefits and

management/operations responsibilities, wide

variations in industrial and industry-government relations within countries, technology

transfer, and waste disposal, A fundamental

problem of multinational facilities involves

siting. Participating nations may feel they are

less than full partners if the facility is located

in another’s territory. Moreover, the concept

has encountered skepticism from some Third

World states uncomfortable with the complexity of such centers and suspicious that

these facilities will be dominated by the advanced nuclear supplier countries. With all

this in mind, it may be advisable to confine the

first multinational centers to one stage in the

fuel cycle, possibly spent-fuel storage. This

would provide a relatively modest and noncontroversial means of testing the viability of

the concept. An interim measure might involve designating existing storage sites in the

supplier states as IAEA repositories under the

Agency’s management.

Measures Concerning Non-State

Adversaries (NSAS)

The emergence of international terrorism

by non-state entities in recent years has

spawned nightmare images of nuclear highjackings and blackmail. The danger is increased by the fact that IAEA safeguards are

not designed to deal with such a threat. Existing physical security measures are inadequate

in many countries, and there are no agreed

standards or methods to which such measures

must conform. To deal with this situation, initiatives in at least four areas bear consideration:

● Creation of a U.S. technical assistance

program for other nations, designed to

●

●

●

●

upgrade their physical security

measures;

Negotiation of a convention establishing

uniform international standards and

methods with regard to physical security

devices;

Negotiation of an international convention to control terrorism and hijacking;

Consideration of steps which might be

taken to alleviate the grievances of dissident groups with terrorism potential;

and

Contingency planning with regard to actions which might be taken in response to

an actual NSA event.

Critique. -Of these four proposals, the last

three pose special difficulties. The United Nations has been the scene of strenuous efforts

for several years to negotiate an international

convention against terrorism—without success. If a more explicit link develops between

terrorism and nuclear proliferation, perhaps

the situation will change. Attempts to satisfy

the grievances of radical groups are fraught

with the danger of blackmail, but the matter

may still be worth exploring, Possible

responses by governmental authority after a

nuclear incident pose another potential

peril—to civil liberties.

Policy Implementation

Thus far we have presented a taxonomy

and analysis of available policies under three

basic perspectives. The next logical step is to

order those policies in terms of their priority,

or the logical time sequence in which they

might be addressed. What follows is a sample

categorization of available policies arranged

in terms of a three-stage time sequence. The

criteria for distinguishing between the categories are urgency, time required for implementation, and feasibility (in terms of technical

difficulty, economic and political cost, time required, and whether the desired initiative can

be taken unilaterally by the United States or

requires collateral actions by other governments). Stage I, for example, includes items

judged to be urgent and feasible at a relatively

low cost in the near term. They tend to require

initiatives that the United States can take

84
Figure Ill-1 Previous Policy and Future policy Prioritie s

—. .-— — . -

Previous Policy (“The basic premise of U.S. nuclear cooperation for over 20 years has been worldwide cooperation in the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective controls.”)

Weaken incentives of Nth countries

● mediation of disputes

● security guarantees (limited)

● maintain high technical and economic costs of nuclear

option

Sanctions: political pressures (selective)

Strengthen national intelligence capabilities

Export controls (seek agreement with other vendors):

● ban on export of facilities or technology for enrichment or

reprocessing

● exports subject to IAEA safeguards

● ban on reexport of exported fuel and facilities

● require importers maintain adequate physical security

measure s

Prohibitions against use of assistance for any nuclear explosion s

Encouragement of multinational regional facilities concept

Support for NPT and IAEA

Stage I

Export Controls

Enrichment

● reliable supplier

● fuel services (e.g., spent-fuel storage)

Strengthen national intelligence capabilities

Forego plutonium recycle

Stage II

Contain plutonium recycle (If rejecting Pu recycle proves

infeasible)

Weaken incentives

● non-use pledge regarding non-nuclear weapons states

● security guarantees

. reduce the prestige and symbolic importance of nuclear

weapons

Strengthen disincentives

. strengthen the international political norm against proliferation

● strengthen anti-proliferation domestic political forces

Neutralize non-state adversaries

Assistance regarding non-nuclear energy sources

Strengthen the nonproliferation regime

● more adequate implementation of SALT and CTB

agreement

● study of PNE practicability

• increased participation indecisions concerning peaceful

nuclear activities by non-nuclear states within an international framework

● link U.S. nuclear exports to NPT adherence

● nuclear free zones

• increase benefits of NPT adherence

• strengthen IAEA safeguards capabilities

Sanctions

International spent-fuel storage regime

Stage Ill

Global and regional arrangements

● enriched U and Pu as international “public goods”

● enrichment plants as international public utilities

• MNFCFS

● international reprocessing facilities SOURCE: OTA

Figure III-2.

Scope for Congressional Action

(legislative and budgetary powers)

——— -— .. ——.—..—-——— — —

Export Controls

Criteria (require, resolve/reoommend)

Unilateral and multilateral

Immediate and delayed

New and old bilateral agreements (i.e., renegotiation

requirements)

Licensing procedures

Sanctions

Unilateral

Multilateral

Organizational authority and responsibility

Establish presidential authority to change or delay

application of criteria

Executive branch authorization/veto

Executive branch reorganization and allocation

of authority

Congressional review export decisions (licensing)

International Negotiations

Resolutions re bilateral and multilateral agreements

Content

Timetable

Allocate negotiating authority among executive departments

Require reports to Congress re negotiating progress

Statements of U.S. Policy (“sense of Congress”)

Arms Control and CTB

Resolutions

Senate Treaty Approval/Disapproval

U.S. as a Reliable Supplier

Enrichment capacity appropriations

Commercial reprocessing appropriations

Privatization

Improve International Safeguards

Appropriations to strengthen IAEA

Appropriations for ERDA safeguards and physical security

training and R & D

Investigations of Executive branch performance

Plutonium Reprocessing

Authorize or reject budget support

Licensing

SOURCE: OTA — - — —— —.——. . -—.—-

>

85
unilaterally. Stage I focuses on export controls conducive to nonproliferation and to

and services intended to forestall develop- strengthening the NPT framework; and Stage

ments that might make proliferation un- 111 on multinational and international armanageable in the short term; Stage 11 on rangements.

establishing an international political climate

Figure HI-3. Selection Criteria for Policy Priorities

Export Controls 1 1 2 1

Enrichment 1 2 2 1

— reliable supplier

—fuel services

Strengthen National Intelligence Capabilities 1 (?) 1 (?) 1(9) 1(?)

Forego Pu Recycle 1 1 1 1

Contain Pu Recycle 2 2-3 2 2

Weaken Incentives 1 1-2

— non-use pledge

— security guarantees

— reduce prestige of nuclear weapons

— strengthen security of nth countries through alliances etc.

Strengthen Disincentives

—strengthen international political norm

—strengthen anti-proliferation domestic political forces

Non-State Adversaries

Assistance re Non-Nuclear Energy Sources

Strengthen NPT Regime

— increase benefits of NPT adherence

—strengthen IAEA safeguards capabilities

—implement SALT and CTB

— increase participation in international

decisions re peaceful nuclear activities

—link U.S. exports to NPT

— nuclear free zones

— PNE’s

Sanctions

International Spent Fuel Storage Regime

1

2

2

2

2

2-3

2

2

3

2-3

1-2

1

1-3

2

2

2

2

2

2 2 3 2

2 2 3 2

Global and Regional Arrangements 3 3 2-3 3

— international reprocessing facilities

— enrichment plants as international public utilities

— MNFCF’S

— enriched U and Pu as international public goods SOURCE: OTA — — .—— -

86
CONCLUSIONS

The preceding discussion indicated that a

broad range of general and specific policy options are presently available to help control

proliferation. Major options may soon be

foreclosed by projected growth rates in the

global nuclear industry, trends in international politics, and imminent technological innovations. It will constitute a major failure of

our public institutions if the choice is made by

default—a mindless product of the course of

events. Where the stakes are so high, policy

must be conscious, informed, and deliberate.

There is, as yet, no consensus regarding

such basic issues as the role of nuclear power

in meeting future global energy needs, the

relationship between civilian nuclear power

and proliferation, and the implications of

proliferation for U.S. national interests.

Different judgments on these issues will lead

to different perspectives concerning the overall problem and different policy prescriptions.

Despite this lack of consensus, some general

propositions concerning policy can be identified:

. There is scope for policy; proliferation is

still amenable to an intelligent, determined response, A permanent cutoff at

the present number of nuclear weapon

states is probably unachievable, but a

curtailment after two or three additional

states is not.

. There is no single solution, no short cut.

An effective policy response to proliferation must be devised along political,

economic, institutional, and technological dimensions. Such a policy will require

unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, and international approaches.

. Because there is no generic Nth country,

a nonproliferation policy must be country-specific to a significant degree. In this

regard, the State Department might

develop (and keep current) a nonproliferation strategy paper for each Nth

country.

Solutions will have to be found primarily, though not exclusively, through

multilateral actions. The scope for effective unilateral action by the United States

is declining as part of a relative diminution of U.S. global influence and its fading preeminence in the international

market for nuclear reactors, fuel, and fuel

services. Nevertheless, the United States

is, and will remain, in a position to exert

considerable influence—particularly in

coordination with other suppliers. It is

worth noting, in this regard, that the

joint-suppliers approach has already

recorded some significant achievements.

Policy regarding proliferation will probably conflict with other foreign policy objectives, particularly concerning efforts to

limit U.S. commitments overseas. A major task will be to reduce the extortion

potential seemingly inherent in the

possibility an Nth country might decide

to acquire nuclear weapons. How this

conflict is resolved will depend in large

part on the relative priority assigned to

nonproliferation as compared to other

foreign policy concerns.

Sanctions can serve to deter proliferation

in advance and, to a much lesser extent,

remedy it after the fact. But they have

limited utility if applied unilaterally. Attempts by one state to coerce another

almost inevitably generate resistance and

a nationalistic backlash. Sanctions are

more likely to be effective when applied

jointly or multilaterally and when combined with incentives and inducements.

When employed in such a sophisticated

manner with regard to both suppliers

and/or users, sanctions can contribute

importantly to a nonproliferation policy.

There is no nuclear system or technological device available now or under

development which can, in itself, prevent

proliferation. There has been little effort

in this direction, however, and potential

87
technological innovations can contribute

importantly to a solution. Promising

areas for research and development include nonproliferating reactors (e.g., gas

core), uranium-thorium cycles, and

safeguard systems integrated into the

design of the plant.

● A decision with regard to closing the

●

88

nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., reprocessing and

recycle) has profound implications for

nonproliferation policy. Three basic

policy options confront the United States

with regard to reprocessing: (1) whether

to initiate domestic reprocessing; (2)

whether to export reprocessing facilities

and technology (under safeguards), and;

(3) whether to discourage reprocessing

exports by other suppliers. Dissemination of reprocessing facilities to nonweapon states will not only give their

operators the means to produce weapons

material, but also will reduce their

vulnerability to international sanctions.

If reprocessing spreads to a large number

of countries and plutonium becomes a

common article in international commerce, opportunities for proliferation

will be unavoidable, Whether an international agreement to control reprocessing

will require suppliers to forgo their own

domestic reprocessing is a matter still in

dispute. A viable compromise between

national reprocessing and no reprocessing might involve multinational fuel-cycle facilities.

An effective policy designed to prevent

proliferation through diversion or

takeover of civilian nuclear power

facilities will include arrangements for

the return of plutonium-bearing spent

fuel. Methods include fuel leasing, buyback, and exchange. Serious consideration will have to be given to the

possibility of making the return of spent

fuel a requirement of all bilateral and international nuclear assistance agreements. This in turn will necessitate the

development of codified “rules of

return. ” Spent fuel collected by the

United States could be stored in IAEAmaintained repositories, as envisaged in

Article XII (a) (5) of the Agency’s statute.

If the incentive for other nations to acquire national reprocessing plants is to be

reduced, the United States will have to

establish itself as a “reliable supplier” of

low-enriched uranium. Other suppliers

could be encouraged to take similar steps.

Reliable supplier status presupposes a

willingness to enter into binding agreements both to provide uranium enrichment services and to construct any additional enrichment capacity required. The

more attractive the terms under which

enrichment services are offered, the more

likely their success in forestalling national facilities.

The decision to accord the breeder reactor high priority in government-sponsored R & D will have to be carefully

reconsidered in light of its proliferation

implications, The unfavorable characteristics of the breeder from a proliferation standpoint will have to be weighed

against its potential as an energy source

in determining the future of the program.

It may be necessary to establish new institutional structures on the international

level to:

—manage selected stages in the nuclear

fuel cycle;

—govern future user-supplier arrangements;

—implement sanctions and possibly

facilitate cooperation in the detection

of violations;

—provide nonweapon countries with an

opportunity for participation and influence in the international development of civilian nuclear energy.

Although the exact relationship between

vertical and horizontal proliferation is

uncertain, progress on arms control by

the weapons states could remove an incentive, or at least an excuse, for

proliferation.

Policy regarding proliferation must be

formulated in conjunction with national

security, foreign, and energy policies. It

will also cut across the division between

domestic and foreign policy. Consequently, it is important to determine the
priority to be accorded proliferation concerns as compared to major issues within

these other policy areas.

. NO system of safeguards against diversion is perfect. A good safeguards system

can raise the costs and risks of diversion

to the point where it becomes unattractive to a potential proliferator compared

to other routes.

. The NPT remains an important component of an effective nonproliferation

policy. The fact that there have been no

known violations of the Treaty suggests

that it acts as an important political constraint upon Nth countries. It also provides an agreed framework of mutual

rights, obligations, and expectations constituting a basic bargain between supplier

and user states.

. An effective nonproliferation policy will

be expensive. Some items:

—lost revenues from providing uranium

enrichment services at nonprofit or

concessionary terms;

—costs of fuel buy-back;

—costs associated with re~’recessing

moratoriums or abandonment (including waste management);

—compensation to Brazil and Pakistan in

return for voiding reprocessing contracts;

—lost revenue from foregone exports.

. A viable nonproliferation policy will

have to determine how these costs are to

be allocated. It should be noted, however,

that because the economics of reprocessing are unclear a reprocessing

moratorium might save more money

than it would cost.

. The United States should make contingency plans to deal with nuclear

thefts, extortion attempts, and other

nuclear emergencies due to the activities

of terrorists and other non-state adversaries.

This chapter began by outlining three

perspectives toward proliferation and energy,

From a policy makers viewpoint, the implication of the Energy Priority Perspective is that

the problem, while significant, is not of compelling importance. Consequently, there is

only a modest need for policy devoted exclusively to containing proliferation. The

Nonproliferation Priority Perspective, on the

other hand, assigns the highest importance to

such a policy. Virtually, all of the measures

discussed in the preceding policy inventory

would be endorsed by proponents of this outlook. But, at the same time, these measures

would be condemned as inadequate; policy

must go much further to encompass the actual

curtailment of the nuclear industry.

Both the Ford and Carter Administrations

have developed policies based explicitly or

implicitly, on the Shared Priority Perspective.

Thus, the present Administration has set as its

dual objective obtaining the benefits of the

peaceful atom while preventing proliferation.

This is an immense and complex task with a

successful outcome anything but assured.

Still, the broad components of a policy to

control proliferation are reasonably clear.

There would be steps designed to tip the

balance of incentives and disincentives confronting potential weapon states in favor of

disincentives. This would be an attempt to

modify the political calculus governing Nth

country policy-making. Efforts would be

made to develop a comprehensive international safeguards regime, sufficient to virtually foreclose the diversion route to nuclear

weapons, The viability of safeguards rests on

the belief that any violation will entail high

political and other costs. Consequently,

safeguards serve as a close complement to disincentives. Export controls, particularly with

regard to enrichment and reprocessing

capabilities, would be instituted in conjunction with arrangements for the return of spent

fuel to the supplier or an international

repository, Such restraints serve to restrict a

nation’s physical access to sensitive nuclear

materials. As such, they erect obstacles to the

construction of dedicated facilities and reinforce the impact of incentives, disincentives,

and safeguards. Sanctions would be devised to

deter and even reverse proliferation occurring

by any route. Sanctions would thus serve as a

backup to each of the controls listed above, as

well as a deterrent to future would-be

proliferators. Technological remedies would

be explored, including alternate fuel cycles,

89
nonproliferating reactors, and more sophisti- cluding steps to upgrade physical security

cated safeguards equipment. Finally, these in- measures, expand reactor-grade uranium proitiatives will require a broad range of support- duction, and emphasize arms control negotiating domestic and foreign policy actions, in- tions.

90
Chapter IV

.

Incentives and Disincentives

for Proliferation

.

.

.

4
Chapter IV

Incentives and Disincentives

for Proliferation

An analysis of proliferation suggests a number ot broadly applicable incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The usefulness of those generalized incentives (or disincentives) for gaining insights into

the motivations of specific Nth countries varies from country to country.

Moreover, such a list can be representative, but not exhaustive. In the majority of

instances, however, the decision to proliferate will, explicitly or implicitly, be

based on some composite of the factors listed below. This composite varies over

time with the unique characteristics of each country and the evolution of its national affairs.

Before examining general incentives and disincentives it may be helpful to

identify specific countries of particular importance in assessing the past and

future course of proliferation. This includes states in three categories: weapon

states, major refrainers, and Nth countries. The list of countries under the latter

two headings is necessarily selective.

Weapon States

Us.

U.S.S.R.

UK

France -

China

Indiab

Selected

Major Refrainers

Sweden

Japan

Fed. Rep. of

Germany

Selected

Potential Weapon States

(Nth Countries)

Argentina

Brazil

Israel a

South Africa

Iran

Pakistan

Taiwan

South Korea

a Widely reputed to already possess one or more weapons.

b Ha5 exploded a nuclear device but apparently has not converted that device into an actual WeaPOn.

A

93
GENERAL INCENTIVES

Deterrence

The primary incentive for many states to

acquire nuclear weapons would be to deter external efforts to undermine or destroy the existing regime or governmental system. A state

would have a particularly strong incentive to

acquire a nuclear capability if it feared it could

not succeed in sustaining its independence by

conventional military or diplomatic means.

Several countries on every list of potential

new nuclear weapons states (e.g., South

Korea, Israel, and South Africa) have had

reason to fear direct attack or long-term

deterioration of their security vis-a-vis nonnuclear neighbors or regional adversaries. On

the same list are other countries (e.g., Taiwan

and Pakistan) that are concerned about threats

to their security from states that have demonstrated a nuclear weapons capability.

For many Nth countries, the effectiveness of

nuclear weapons as a deterrent to adversaries

seem questionable. This is because of the

likelihood that a small number of nuclear

weapons would have limited effectiveness in

regional conflicts between Third World states.

This would seem particularly true where the

bulk of the population is dispersed in rural

villages and where the terrain lends itself to

small unit guerrilla-type operations.

Despite such considerations, the relatively

less sophisticated political and military

strategies of the majority of Nth countries

do not preclude the acquisition of a capability

for deterrent purposes, one that U.S. analysts

would judge as ineffective by Western standards.

Increased International Status

There can be little doubt that a nuclear

weapons capability is an important symbol of

modernity, technological competence, and

thus a source of status and prestige. In a world

in which a minority of states control most of

the wealth, power, and expertise, the rest

struggle for economic independence, self-

-respect, and a place in the sun. Nuclear

weapons may serve to bolster a nation’s self-

-confidence and win respect from or engender

fear in neighbors, adversaries, and the world’s

great powers. By some readings, though not

all, the single Indian explosion contributed

materially to many of these objectives.

Aside from its symbolic significance, a

nuclear weapons capability may also be an actual source of power. Over time a new nuclear

state could probably increase its influence

within regional security arrangements, in

U.N. Security Council and General Assembly

deliberations, and other international forums.

This would probably not happen rapidly or by

conscious choice of other participating states,

Instead, it would be a rather natural evolutionary result of enhanced prestige and subtle

alterations in the psychological orientation

toward the emergent nuclear nation. The

translation of military power into political

power may be gradual and subtle, but it is real

nonetheless.

Domestic Political Requirements

This point is closely related to the preceding

in that international status can serve to bolster

a government’s domestic political standing.

Moreover, the demonstration of technological

and administrative achievement associated

with the construction of nuclear weapons may

offset or distract from the frustrations of national poverty and the difficulties of economic

and political development. Benefits of a

nuclear program might range from enhanced

political stability to the retention of qualified

scientists (not only in the nuclear field) who

would otherwise be tempted to emigrate to

countries with stronger scientific establishments. Many analysts have interpreted the Indian detonation as being motivated in large

part by domestic political considerations.

94
Economic Considerations

In the past, a nuclear weapons program has

sometimes been characterized as having a

technology-forcing function, in that it stimulated the development of related economically

beneficial technologies. This proposition carries less weight today because of the enlarged

global commitment to civilian nuclear energy,

i.e., the commitment to nuclear energy is adequate by itself to realize any technology

spinoffs.

Economic concerns generate pressures

toward proliferation in another way. In the

future, some states that are unwilling to rely

on the United States or the Soviet Union for

security may develop global or at least continental economic interests. They may conclude

that the protection of expanding economic interests requires enhanced military c a -

pabilities —including nuclear weapons.

Paradoxically, the success of the development

programs of some large Third World states

could provide proliferation incentives as.

strong as those caused by their present

frustrations.

Increased Strategic Autonomy

It is a truism that sovereign states seek to

achieve and maintain freedom of action, even

with regard to allies. Within an alliance, a

nuclear-armed nation may perceive itself (or

be perceived by others) as having more options for pursuing national objectives than a

non-nuclear state, This relative autonomy

differs by situation and objective. It can be

argued, however, that a nuclear capability

generally contributes to the enhancement of

strategic autonomy. This is one of the central

reasons ascribed to the development of

France’s nuclear force.

Strategic Hedge Against Military

and Political Uncertainty

Uncertainties concerning the capabilities

and intentions of both adversaries and allies

can generate a sense of political and military

vulnerability y. States may seek nuclear

weapons as a hedge against such an apprehension. Concerns about the cohesiveness of

Western alliances have increased during the

past decade, as there has been less convergence of political interests and increased

stress due to differing economic situations and

policies. The nuclear parity of the United

States and the U.S.S.R. has seemingly lowered

the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee in

many Western capitals.

“A Weapon of Last Resort”

In an extremely adverse situation where a

nation is on the verge of defeat, a limited

number of nuclear weapons could be used as a

“weapon of last resort.” The objective would

be to terminate hostilities on terms other than

total defeat or, perhaps, to employ punitive

measures at the moment of defeat. Nuclear

weapons are valued not only for their deterrent effect, but also for their actual battlefield

utility. Isreal is often cited as a country which

might desire (or have) nuclear weapons not to

prevent the outbreak of a conflict as much as

to place ultimate limits on military operations.

The “weapon of last resort” concept may be

the most broadly acceptable rationale for

nuclear weapons because it is directly related

to the survival of the nation in a specific and

clearly defined situation.

As an Instrument of

the Third World

Frustrated Third World nations may view

nuclear weapons as “equalizers” in their relations with the industrialized world. The

emergence of additional nuclear weapons

states will complicate the ability of existing

nuclear countries to calculate political outcomes, tending to make them more restrained

when pursuing their national interests,

Moreover, it is argued, concern about the

escalation of a regional nuclear conflict into a

global conflict will make developed countries

more receptive to the economic development

concerns of the Third World.

No one would pretend or expect a nuclear

explosion to actually solve any of the very

serious economic and social problems of the

95
less developed countries or remove the basic

inequity of the world’s economic system. Still,

the acquisition of nuclear weapons might be

perceived by some governments and political

elites as a means of commanding the attention

of the industrialized world. The frustrations

of national poverty and the difficulties of

economic and political development might

therefore prompt a government to seek a

nuclear “solution. ” Explicit threats to proliferate if aid or reform of the world economic

system is not forthcoming seem unlikely, but

not inconceivable. It is also possible to imagine a scenario in which an impoverished

nuclear weapons state falls into desperate

economic straits and tries to use its nuclear

capability to coerce the international community into rendering aid.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

The potential benefits of peaceful nuclear

explosions (PNEs) were aggressively stressed

in the late 1950’s in the United States. This

view has been subsequently and vigorously

echoed in the Soviet Union. These statements

by the superpowers, coupled with the conclusions of several international conferences during the 1960’s and early 1970’s on the peaceful

uses of atomic energy, fueled the expectation

of numerous developing nations concerning

the benefits of nonmilitary nuclear explosions,

However, enthusiasm has waned rapidly in

the United States as additional studies and

tests concluded that the expense and environmental hazards of PNEs are not matched by

economic or scientific benefits. The U.S.S.R.

has continued a PNE program, claiming a

variety of possible applications, although their

enthusiasm for such a program may be declining. Despite these trends, many developing

countries retain a view that the benefits of

such devices exceed their costs. Consequently,

the desire to obtain such benefits provides an

incentive to develop a nuclear explosive

capability. However, a low-technology device,

which would be the initial product of a

weapons program, is not credible as a PNE for

cost and radiological reasons described in

chapter VI.

GENERAL DISINCENTIVES

As with the preceding incentives, the

general disincentives which inhibit or constrain the proliferation process apply with

varying degrees of importance to any particular Nth country.

Diversion of Resources

The classic argument in developed and

developing countries is that a nuclear

weapons program is not an optimal use of

limited national resources. The opportunity

cost of foregone economic or social programs

are thought to significantly exceed the benefits

of acquiring nuclear weapons. The growth of

the nuclear power industry and the concurrent decline in the incremental cost associated

with a weapons program has tended to somewhat reduce the strength of this disincentive

in many countries, Moreover, the diversion of

resources argument did not prevent either the

Peoples Republic of China (PRC) or India

from acquiring a nuclear explosive/weapons

capability.

Adverse Public Opinion

While domestic public opinion adverse to

nuclear weapons development is far from

universal, it remains one of the most important constraints on the acquisition of nuclear

arms. Examples most often cited are Japan,

Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada, The almost

monolithic public opposition to nuclear

weapons in Japan is attributable largely to the

use of two weapons on that country during

96
World War II. A strong tradition of neutrality

and advocacy of humanitarian ideals characterize the basis for Swedish and Swiss public

opinion against the acquisition of a nuclear

capability. Such traditions have also characterized India, illustrating that these constraints are not absolute but can be expected to

change as national circumstances dictate.

Disruption of Assured Security

Guarantees

The disruption of established security

guarantees is another disincentive to going

nuclear. Reliance on nuclear guarantees constitutes one of the most important elements in

many national strategies for coping with the

superior military capability of adversaries. In

this situation, operating under the umbrella of

a superpower’s nuclear armaments constitutes

a logical and strategically sound approach.

Some proliferation analysts are concerned that

the erosion of U.S. nuclear guarantee credibility (due to perceived shifts in the political

will to employ a military response in situations in which the United States is not directly

threatened), has decreased the strength of this

disincentive.

Infeasibility of a Desired Nuclear

Strategy

The inability to attain a desired nuclear

weapons capability within a given time or

resource limitation is another disincentive to

the acquisition of nuclear arms. While a

token- or modest-force deployment may have

political utility in some instances, it may not

solve a country’s requirement of deterring a

rival through deployment of a survivable second strike force. A rudimentary, highly

vulnerable nuclear force usable only for a first

strike may even tempt an adversary to launch

a preemptive attack. Other disincentives

associated with the infeasibility of a desired

nuclear strategy may derive from limitations

associated with delivery systems. Range,

penetration requirements, and command-control limitations may lead to the conclusion

that a nuclear force is not sufficiently effective

to warrant development and deployment.

Adverse International Reactions

Another disincentive to proliferation could

be the anticipated adverse reaction by other

nations, especially the superpowers .

However, the United States and the U.S.S.R.

have not developed an agreed position or even

made arrangements for consultations with

regard to any future proliferation events. The

reaction of Washington and Moscow to a

near-nuclear country’s crossing the threshold

therefore could vary from mild to strong and

positive to negative. In the case of India, the

United States voiced mild disapproval but did

not undertake any clearly linked diplomatic

response or attempt to develop a multilateral

forum for the condemnation of the act. There

was no apparent condemnation from the

Soviet Union at all. The lack thereof was interpreted in most quarters as a judgment on

the part of the U.S.S.R. that a nuclear-armed

India was a useful factor in constraining

Chinese actions. Nevertheless, the prospect of

a strong negative response to proliferation by

one or both superpowers may restrain some

of the near-nuclear countries. Fear of such an

adverse response is most effective with Nth

countries which are dependent to some degree

upon at least one of the superpowers for military, economic, or technical aid. Judging from

the Indian experience, a potential proliferator

need not fear censure from the international

community as a whole. If such a reaction

could be expected, it might constitute a significant disincentive.

Adverse Reactions by Adversaries

One of the greatest disincentives is the anticipated response by an adversary—a response

that might range from a diplomatic protest to

a preemptive attack designed to destroy a

nuclear weapon manufacturing capability or

to inflict a military defeat. The adversary

might also acquire its own nuclear force. This

could be very destabilizing in a regional context, since the majority of nuclear states would

probably not have the resources to develop a

full second strike capability and token forces

might thus encourage preemption in crisis

situations.

97
Advocacy of Neutralist Aims

Near-nuclear countries, such as Sweden or

Switzerland, that advocate neutralist positions eschew the acquisition of a nuclear

weapons capability because they see it as

seriously degrading the credibility of their

arms control and neutralist positions. Judging

from the actions of India and the Peoples

Republic of China—both self-proclaimed

leaders of the nonalined—the need to be

consistent in this regard is questionable. New

Delhi and Peking rationalized their decision to

acquire nuclear-weapons with the

MOTIVATIONS

General

that their effectiveness in arms control

negotiations would be enhanced and the

Third World strengthened if they possessed

nuclear arms.

There is an additional concern in those Nth

countries where domestic political stability is

a serious problem. A national nuclear

weapons stockpile would be a national target

for seizure by revolutionary groups, terrorists, or coup factions. If such a group obtained possession of all or part of a nations

nuclear arms, its potential for coercing the

argument government would be very substantial. -

OF EXISTING WEAPONS STATES

This section reviews the motives that led

the existing nuclear weapons states to acquire

such a capability. After a brief description of

the origins of the U.S. and Soviet programs,

four case studies are developed describing the

considerations that led the United Kingdom,

France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC),

and India to justify acquisition of nuclear

weapons. The common features and outstanding differences among them are identified in a

brief concluding net assessment. Brief

analyses of the factors which influenced the

Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Japan,

and Sweden to decide not to proceed with

nuclear developments are included in appendix 1, volume II.

The U.S. and Soviet Programs

The United States Decision To Acquire

Nuclear Weapons

The decisionmaking process by which the

United States acquired its initial nuclear

weapons capability shows the influence of

strategic (i.e., military-security) considerations, scientific and technological factors,

economic motives, and other drives. There can

be little doubt that the dominant motives were

strategic with respect both to the initial fission-bomb decision and to that involving the

H-bomb somewhat later. Although it is true

that President Roosevelt had to be persuaded

that the nascent American nuclear program

held sufficient scientific promise to warrant

the investment of men, money, and technological resources necessary for its successful

completion, he made it clear from the onset

that it was the military potential of nuclear fission vis-a-vis the Axis Powers which most interested him.

So too with President Truman’s decision to

build the H-bomb. After the explosion of the

Soviet “Joe I“ A-bomb in 1949, it was clear

that the nuclear program of the U.S.S.R. had

progressed more rapidly than many had expected. In the context of the prevailing international climate of the postwar world, Truman believed that a U.S. failure to proceed

rapidly with the development of thermonuclear weapons would amount to a surrender of leadership in the nuclear field to the

Soviet Union with resulting dangers for

American security.

The Soviet Decision “To Acquire Nuclear

Weapons

Like that of the United States, Soviet nuclear

decisionmaking has been dominated by -

strategic considerations, especially by the

/

98
dynamics of the postwar bipolar competition.

It is worth recalling that Soviet military

doctrine and practice have always stressed the

necessary connection between the possession

of superior military power and the successful

achievement of political objectives. It was thus

untenable that Western developments in military technology should not at least be

paralleled by developments in the U.S.S.R.

Consequently, a nuclear research program

was initiated in the Soviet Union as early as

1942. The first Soviet graphite reactor went

into operation in December 1946, and, following several earlier claims that Soviet scientists

had solved the problem of the atomic bomb,

the first U.S.S.R. atomic device to be fully

tested was exploded on August 29, 1949.

Work on thermonuclear weapons was already

underway, and the Soviet’s first such device

was detonated only 4 years later. Stalin has

been accused by his critics, both in the West

and within the U. S. S. R., of failing to appreciate the significance of nuclear weapons for

military strategy. His repeated stress on “the

permanent operating factors” of war helped to

prolong the preeminence of ground-force

oriented military thinking in the U.S.S.R. Still,

in retrospect it is clear that he was at least implicitly aware of the importance of nuclear

weapons for the future world “correlation of

forces,” and acted accordingly.

The Case of Britain

The Decisions

In April 1940, the British Government

established the Maud Committee to explore

the feasibility of constructing a uranium

bomb. Based upon the committee’s affirmative

findings and prediction that the bomb’s

destructive power could prove decisive in

war, the Government decided to proceed with

development; but the press of war caused Britain to defer its independent quest in favor of

cooperative development with the United

States. After the war the Attlee Government

sought to perpetuate Anglo-American nuclear

s Part of the following material has been dra,wn from

a report submitted to the DOD.

cooperation, but was rebuffed by the passage

of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which

explicitly prohibited the transfer of nuclear

weapon materials or information to any other

nation. The British responded by initiating

their military nuclear program in 1947. The

first British nuclear explosion was recorded

on October 3, 1952, followed by their first hydrogen bomb test on May 5, 1957.

The Rationale

The British decision in the late 1940’s to acquire nuclear weapons was dominated by

considerations of security and international

influence.4

Nuclear weapons were thought to provide a

powerful military deterrent, constituting a potent instrument of national security. They

were seen as giving Britain a voice in world

councils and have been seen as enabling London to exert some leverage over its powerful

American ally within NATO. Their development was also viewed as maintaining the

country’s scientific and technological momentum.

The strongest motivation for acquiring

nuclear weapons was probably British uncertainty about its American alliance. The memory of American isolationism in the interwar

period led thoughtful Britons to question if

they might once again have to face great odds

alone. s Concern over U.S. reliability surfaced

again in 1956, when the Suez Crisis demonstrated that there could be a wide divergence

between American and British policies. The

1957 Defense White Paper noted that the national nuclear force would provide protection

against the day when American and British

policies might diverge as they had in 1956.

Special Circumstances

The British decision to acquire nuclear

weapons can be traced to the U.S. decision to

terminate the Anglo-American sharing of

b Andrew J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Ex-

~erierzce with an Independent Strategic Force 19.?9-1970,

(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 1.

SRobert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus. Nuclear

Proliferation: Phase 11 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of

Kansas Press, 1974), pp. 2-4.

.

92-592 0- 77 - ti 99
nuclear technology that had developed during

World War 11. In all probability, however,

London would have eventually opted for

some sort of independent nuclear weapons

capability regardless of Washington’s policy.

The British moved to acquire national nuclear

arms, in part to reestablish themselves as an

international force just at the time the empire

was beginning to crumble, and in part to

demonstrate their continued progress and

value to a powerful American ally. While the

first goal proved elusive, the second was partially realized with the 1958 Bilateral Agreement for Nuclear Sharing between the United

States and the United Kingdom. Preservation

of that special relationship has been a continuing goal of British foreign policy.

The Case of France

The Decision

Although the French force de dissuasion is

linked to President De Gaulle in the public

mind, the decision to develop a nuclear arsenal was made under the Fourth Republic.

The French Atomic Energy Commission, created in 1945, had developed the expertise and

facilities to begin a weapons program by 1954.

We know comparatively little about how the

decision was actually made, but a major role

was apparently played by lower-level scientists and officials who took important steps

toward a bomb capability without being

clearly directed to do so from the Government

above. The first French nuclear-test detonation took place on February 13, 1960.

The Rationale

The French public rationale for acquiring a

national nuclear force is highly sophisticated

and was developed after the fact in the 1960’s.

As articulated by President De Gaulle and

others, it holds that a small nuclear force is

capable of deterring nuclear attack by a superpower under certain circumstances. Such

arguments contended that it was unrealistic to

assume that America would risk nuclear

destruction, except in response to a direct

Soviet threat to the continental United States.

French strategists therefore contended that

France should have the capability of “tearing

off an arm, ” that is to deliver nuclear strikes

against a limited number of Soviet cities. This

would presumably accomplish three objectives. First, it would compel Soviet planners to

contemplate the cost to the U.S.S.R. of any aggression against Europe. Second, it could,

under certain circumstances, trigger an

American strike against the Soviet Union to

preempt a Soviet attack. Third, a French national force would, by its very existence, make

it impossible for the superpowers to fight a

limited nuclear war in Europe without risk to

their respective homelands.

Some French theorists made even more

elaborate claims for French nuclear forces in

the 1960’s. General Pierre Gallois argued that

the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly the French national force, would

contribute to international stability by constraining the aggression of existing nuclear

powers.6

The arguments in the Gallois book have

been widely quoted and cited around the

world, showing up particularly in India

before that country’s nuclear explosives decision.

In addition to such strategic formulations,

French spokesmen also advanced the rationale

that the possession of nuclear weapons would

give Paris a voice in NATO Councils at least

on a par with London’s. Anglo-American

amity, as reflected by the special working relationship established between the United States

and the United Kingdom in nuclear matters,

was a persistent source of irritation and resentment to the French. An illustration of this

phenomenon was France’s response to the

Nassau Agreement between the Anglo-Saxon

Powers in 1962. The French perceived that

agreement both as a manifestation of a U.S. attempt to perpetuate dominance over its NATO

partners, and as a reflection of the British

proclivity to accord higher priority to their

U.S. connection than to the goal of European

cooperation in security matters.

6 Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror, (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1961).

100
Other arguments for a French nuclear force

voiced by French officials in the 1960’s included the need to offset West German

economic dominance of the European

Economic Community, and the importance of

maintaining a high-level scientific and technological capability.

Special Circumstances

The postwar period had been difficult for

France. Defeat and occupation in World War

11 were followed by the loss of the colonial

empire in Indochina, North Africa, and

elsewhere, and the retreat from Suez under

U.S. and Soviet pressure. President De Gaulle

felt these stings to French pride acutely, and

viewed the acquisition of a nuclear weapon

capability as a means of restoring national

elan.

The Case of the People’s Republic

of China

The Decision

We know much less about the Chinese decision than about our other cases. The Chinese

exploded their first bomb on October 16, 1964,

and it is reasonable to assume that they had

already attached high priority to a nuclear

weapons project seven or more years earlier.

In the aftermath of the Peking-Moscow split,

oblique references were made to a 1957 SinoSoviet nuclear cooperation agreement, which

may have been intended to include assistance

on weapons. In any case, in 1963, the Chinese

charged that the U.S.S.R. had abrogated the

1957 agreement and that Soviet technical

assistance had been phased out in 1959– 1960.

Although this disruption and withdrawal of

key personnel delayed Chinese progress, the

nuclear weapons program received priority

attention and culminated in the 1964 detonation.

The Rationale

Chinese public statements have at all times

tended to deprecate the significance of nuclear

weapons. While this might be taken to show

an ignorance about military strategy, Chinese

investment in nuclear and thermonuclear

bombs suggests that other explanations for

these statements must be found. At times, it

has simply made sense for Peking to present

this view because it saw its own nuclear arsenal as not yet comparable to that of an

American or Russian adversary. At other

times, it served domestic political and

ideological purposes to stress “man over

weapons, ” or “red over expert. ” Denigration

of nuclear weapons as “paper tigers” served to

bolster the morale both of Chinese forces and

Third World revolutionary movements (e.g.,

in Vietnam) confronting adversaries with

superior military equipment, including

nuclear arms.

The Chinese rationale for acquiring nuclear

weapons must be inferred as there has been

no open discussion of how Chinese weapons

might be employed. Initially, they were probably sought to deter American attack and

neutralize the ability of the United States to

use nuclear threats in confrontations with

China, notably during the Korean War, the

Taiwan Straits Crisis (1954-55), and the

Quemoy and Matsu Crisis (1958). Peking’s

determination to acquire a nuclear weapon

capability was hardened by the realization

that the U.S.S.R. was not prepared to risk military confrontation with the United States to

achieve purely Chinese objectives in Asia.

Later, nuclear weapons came to be viewed primarily as a deterrent to Soviet attack. China

has focused its ballistic missile program upon

intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)

with the range to strike Soviet, but not overseas, targets. They serve other purposes as

well, notably as support to China’s drive for

great power status and international influence, and as a deterrent to the introduction

of nuclear weapons in any local Asian conflict

by an outside power.

The Chinese reject the NPT as an instrument of the “imperialist nuclear monopoly,”

and prior to obtaining their own capability,

encouraged other “progressive” countries to

acquire nuclear weapons in the interest of

breaking that monopoly. Since 1964, however,

such endorsements of nuclear proliferation to

other states have disappeared. Also, China has

101
gone beyond other weapon states i n

repeatedly affirming that it will never be the

first to introduce nuclear arms into a conflict.

Special Circumstances

The Sine-Soviet split had a profound effect

on the Chinese nuclear program. Withdrawal

of Soviet assistance forced the PRC to fall back

on its own resources, and no doubt slowed the

development of a nuclear arsenal, Meanwhile,

deterioration in Sine-Soviet relations caused a

change in China’s reasons for acquiring such

an arsenal. The force that was once seen as a

deterrent to U.S. aggression and a means of

perhaps forcing a withdrawal of U.S. forces

from Asia came to be viewed principally as a

deterrent to a Soviet attack.

The Case of India

ing the nuclear weapon option. Some of these

may be taken at face value, but others may

mask deeper motives, It is sometimes contended that India needs nuclear weapons to

maintain a strategic military balance against

China, which could otherwise be achieved

only by sacrificing India’s position of nonalinement (i.e., by dependence on the Soviet

Union’s nuclear guarantee).7 Another argument has been directed at an alleged double

standard on the part of the superpowers, who

seek to deny nuclear weapons to India but not

to themselves. Two at least equally serious

motivations involve the acquisition of a

weapon, first, as a source of domestic political

prestige for the regime by rekindling national

pride through a demonstration of Indian technological achievement, and second, as a

means of providing at least symbolic confirmation of Indian preeminence in the subcontinent, vis-a-vis Pakistan.

Special Circumstances

The Decision

An understanding of Indian motives in

detonating a nuclear explosion on May 18,

1974, may provide a better insight into the

phenomenon of proliferation than the other

case studies outlined above. This is due in part

because of the recentness of the Indian explosion, but also because many of the nearnuclear countries most likely to acquire

weapons before 1985 are developing countries

like India. It should be noted, however, that in

certain important aspects India is atypical of

the Third World, e.g., its very large cadres of

scientific manpower.

Although officials in New Delhi declare

that India has no intention of developing

nuclear weapons, the 1974 “peaceful” nuclear

explosion raises the possibility that India

could acquire a modest nuclear weapons

capability within a very few years. The major

constraint would appear to be the availability

of special nuclear material (SNM).

Rationale

Various official and unofficial arguments

have been advanced in favor of India exercisThe inherent difficulty in maintaining

governmental authority over so vast and disparate a nation may have inclined the regime

towards dramatic initiatives to command

popular attention and support; the detonation

of 1974 may have been such a move.

India has prided itself on a pacifist tradition, having effectively used Gandhi’s nonviolent tactics to win independence from Britain. It was one of the earliest states to

proclaim a policy of nonalinement and has

long been a recognized leader of that movement. On the other hand, India was one of the

first nations in the less-developed world to invest in a major nuclear research program. The

incipient tension between these two developments is reflected in India’s present

anomalous status as a nuclear explosive, but

not nuclear weapons, state. The tension is reinforced by the fact that India, as one of the

largest Third World states, is a natural

aspirant to great power status. The recent

change of government in India would seem

likely to shift the political balance in favor of

T K. Subrahmanyam, “India: Keeping the Option

Open,” in Lawrence and Larus, op. cit., p. 133.

102
the former tendency and against the latter for

the time being.

Net Assessment of Existing

Nuclear States

A review of the cases presented above suggests that two incentives stand out: securitydeterrence considerations, and the desire for

international influence and status. Only China

among these six countries can be said to have

initially developed nuclear weapons in direct

response to a threat of attack, For the others

the more credible danger was a deterioration

in their security over time vis-a-vis possible

adversaries. The result could have been a

growing vulnerability to coercive diplomacy,

and with it a loss of international influence

and freedom of action. The culmination of this

process, short of war and actual conquest,

could be victimization by nuclear blackmail.

Beyond these two basis concerns, the motivations for selecting the nuclear weapons option

become more diverse befitting the particular

circumstances of the nations concerned.

It is noteworthy that none of these states

were dissuaded by economic costs or by possible international censure associated with

nuclear weapons. The emergence of China and

India as nuclear weapons is of particular relevance to the future course of proliferation,

since most Nth countries are to be found

among the roster of Third World nations. The

fact that two poor and modestly industrialized

countries could embark on an explosives

program indicates the accessibility of the new

technology and the extent to which even a

relatively undeveloped nation can command

the resources for its application.

A thorough assessment of proliferation

should give some attention to those nations

that clearly possess the capability to construct

nuclear weapons but, for one reason or

another, have not done so. Appendix I of

volume II contains brief case studies of three

major “refrainers”: The Federal Republic of

Germany, Japan, and Sweden.

CASE STUDIES OF NTH COUNTRIES

Introduction

As previously noted, a viable analysis of the

prospect for future proliferation must take

into account factors peculiar to each potential

weapons state. What follows are brief illustrative assessments of three Nth countries:

Argentina, Pakistan, and Taiwan. Additional

case studies are included in appendix I,

volume II.

Argentina

Background

Argentina is a country of 25 million people

living in territory extending almost half the

length of South America and including an

area of over 1 million square miles. It is the

second largest nation in South America in area

and population, surpassed only by Brazil.

Argentina is a Republic and has been

variously ruled by a President and National

Congress or by a military junta. There have

been 11 presidents since 1955, of which 6 have

been deposed in coups d’etat. Political violence

and terrorism are frequent to the point of

being traditional, and government alternates

between popularly elected leaders and self-appointed ones. Argentina has at times been a

federal republic with delegated power on the

state and local level, and at times a unitary

government with provincial officials holding

power at the pleasure of the central government. The population is generally literate,

education is compulsory and free, and is

available from the primary

doctoral level of training.

Although industrialized,

through the postArgentina derives

its chief- income from agriculture and

livestock. The country is equipped with the

103
administrative, commercial, and transport infrastructure typical of a modern industrial

state. However, many types of machinery and

equipment (including most heavy machinery)

employed within the country are not

manufactured domestically and must be imported. There is a moderate standard of living

with considerable variation between the very

poor and the very rich. Labor unions are very

active among the working force, which comprises close to a third of the population.

Cereals, beef, and wheat are the principal exports and serve to pay for those items that

must be imported for industrial use. Per capita

GNP is second only to Venezuela in South

America and is about 30th in the world, yet

Argentina is constantly burdened with inflation which affects domestic policy as well as

foreign trade.

Argentina shares a long common border

along the Andes with the Republic of Chile,

while its northern and northeastern frontiers

are shared with the much smaller nations of

Paraguay, Bolivia, and Uruguay, as well as

with Brazil, a much larger country in population and area. Uruguay can be considered a

kind of buffer-zone between Brazil and

Argentina, countries which tend to be rivals

with one another. While Argentina participates in worldwide trade and requires imports

to maintain its economy, its chief interests lie

within the continent of South America and in

the Antarctic.

Argentina’s armed forces are adequate for

national defense and the navy has the strategic

reach to operate some distance beyond coastal

waters,

The nature of government in Argentina is

such as to permit fabrication of nuclear

weapons without an expression of national

consensus on the issue.

Incentives for Acquisitions of Nuclear

Weapons

●

●

104

The desire for a modern, powerful armed

force, capable of maintaining Argentina

as an important power in South America.

Belief that the strength of the regime will

be enhanced domestically if Argentina

●

●

enjoys the prestige of being a nuclear

power within the international community.

Rivalry with Brazil. Concern that Brazil,

with its larger population, national territory, and greater resources, may one

day attempt to dominate its neighbors.

The determination to maintain an independent policy in world affairs, requiring

both international prestige and an impressive military capability.

Disincentives to Proliferation

●

●

●

●

Anticipation that foreign nuclear assistance and exports to Argentina would be

embargoed.

Concern that Argentine proliferation will

alarm Brazil and Chile, and trigger a

nuclear arms race within South America.

Fear that nuclear weapons may fall into

the hands of terrorists or extremists and

be used for purposes of extortion.

Anxiety that the control of nuclear

weapons will become the means of

achieving power domestically within

Argentina.

Technical Capabilities

As a moderately industralized nation,

Argentina is fully capable of recruiting the

scientists and engineers required for the

development of nuclear weapons. While the

Argentine financial situation often appears

precarious, exports of grain and beef furnish a

reliable source of capital for acquiring those

materials not available within the country.

In terms of nuclear technology and

facilities, Argentina is the most advanced

country in Latin America. Argentina enjoys a

fairly plentiful supply of natural uranium

from which its first nuclear power reactor has

been fueled, a natural uranium reactor which

is now onstream. Argentina also has three

research reactors, a pilot heavy-water plant,

and a laboratory-scale reprocessing facility,

There are unconfirmed reports that the latter

is being expanded. The first power reactor at
Atucha was constructed by the German firms

of Siemens, Kraftwerk Union, and Ruhrstahl.

A second reactor is being built with Canadian

and Italian participation, and is projected to

go onstream by 1979. It is hoped that at least

six nuclear reactors will be in operation by

1985.

There appears to be no technical or administrative impediment to Argentina’s acquiring nuclear weapons. In fact, the chairman of the country’s National Atomic Energy

Commission has stated publicly that Argentina has the capability to construct weapons,

although it is not presently attempting to do

so. It is noteworthy that officers or former

officers of the armed services have occupied

positions on the Commission.

Argentina has been trying to obtain a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including full-scale

heavy water and reprocessing facilities. Efforts

thus far to import these facilities have been

rebuffed by potential suppliers.

Argentina’s choice of natural uraniumfueled reactors and the studies and experiments on plutonium appear to be an effort to

avoid dependence on foreign sources for

enrichment of uranium. It must be assumed

that Argentina itself will eventually acquire,

with or without foreign assistance, the means

to reprocess fuel from its power reactors. In

the meantime, Argentina has taken the first

step toward becoming a nuclear supplier in its

own right by signing an agreement to assist

Peru in the development of a research reactor.

Net Assessment

Incentives and disincentives seem to be

roughly in balance, but with a slight advantage to the latter for the foreseeable future.

The availability of the materials and technology necessary to become a nuclear power

is onIy a moderate constraint. The most compelling disincentive is that an Argentine decision to proliferate would almost certainly

stimulate a similar action by Brazil, which has

the capability to become a more formidable

nuclear power, i.e., Brazil could “win” any

nuclear arms race on the continent. On the

other hand, the prospect of being the first

nuclear power in South America, and the second in the Western Hemisphere is a tempting

one. From an Argentine perspective it would

be a source of prestige, strengthening the

regime at home and enhancing status abroad.

The preeminence of prestige motivations is

perhaps the most noteworthy factor in the

Argentine case. The Republic faces no credible

external threat to its security.

Circumstances That Might Alter the

Relationship Between Incentives and

Disincentives

There is small likelihood that public opinion in Argentina would oppose the acquisition

of nuclear weapons. In any case, the Government is capable of acting contrary to prevailing public sentiment. The political composition of the government will be a much more

important factor. For example, the domestic

political pendulum might swing back to a

civilian and more liberal regime which would

militate against nuclear weapons.

The views of Argentina’s weaker neighbors

are unlikely to be decisive in any decision

regarding nuclear explosives. On the other

hand, clear evidence of a Brazilian intent to

construct nuclear weapons would greatly increase Argentina’s incentive to do likewise. It

is noteworthy that neither Argentina or Brazil

has ratified the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco

which established a Latin American nuclearfree zone. But neither country has the practical

option of becoming the only nuclear weapons

state in South America. Consequently, they

must determine whether sufficient benefits

would be gained if both possessed nuclear

weapons, and if possession would offset the

new tensions and costs these weapons might

entail. The likely condemnation of any moves

toward proliferation by the rest of Latin

America, as exemplified by the attitude of

Mexico and the widespread endorsement of

the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, is suggestive of one type of cost.

Pakistan

Background

Pakistan is a country of 65 million people

living along the valleys and tributaries of the

Indus and Jhalum Rivers and on the foothills

and slopes of the Himalayas, It is bounded on

the South and East by India, the Northeast by

105
Indian Kashmir, the North by Afghanistan,

the West by Iran, and the South by the Arabian Sea. Pakistan is a Federal Republic led by

a president who governs through a prime

minister and a cabinet based on a bicameral

parliament.

Pakistan is a partly industrialized state

capable of shipbuilding and similar work. It is

largely dependent on foreign sources for

machinery, transport equipment, chemicals,

electrical equipment, and petroleum, which it

must pay for by the export of the products of

cottage industries, some minerals, cotton, fish,

and rice. The standard of living within the

country ranges from that of hill peoples and

subsistence farmers, through a small middle

class to a tiny upper class of entrepreneurs

and industrialists. While Pakistan can sustain

itself at a subsistence level, its industrialization depends on the acquisition of capital and

materials from abroad.

Internal political circumstances are exceedingly unstable, characterized by

numerous divisions and centrifugal tendencies including outright separatist movements

(in Baluchistan and Pushtoonistan) supported

from abroad.

The separatist movement in Baluchistan is

mirrored within the adjacent Iranian province

of Baluchestan, while Pakistan’s northern

boundary with Afghanistan is subject to

Afghani pressure. The loss of East Pakistan in

the 1971 war with India, the dispute over

possession of Kashmir, and the persistent

border tensions over the Rann of Kutch are

symptomatic of the pervasive hostility in

Pakistan-India relations and of Pakistani

weakness in the face of its stronger neighbor.

Pakistani armed forces may not be adequate

to deal with the numerous border problems

and near insurrections in border areas—to say

nothing of any renewed conflict with India.

Close relations with Iran and Turkey have

assisted Pakistan’s economic development but

have contributed little toward the nation’s

security.

Pakistan depends on foreign manufacturers

and governmental assistance from abroad for

its weapons and military equipment. Since the

United States ended military aid, China has

supplied much of the newer equipment for

106

Pakistan’s armed forces. According to press

reports, the most recent Chinese assistance

has included some submarines and

destroyers. 8

A number of events in recent years have

given impetus to serious Pakistani consideration of the nuclear option. India’s successful

intervention in the civil war in East Pakistan,

with the consequent emergence of an

independent Bangladesh, demonstrated the

weakness of Islamabad’s position. Pakistan’s

ally, China, was unable to intervene because

of the Soviet-Indian alliance, while covert

efforts by the Nixon Administration to bolster

Pakistan proved futile. Public opinion in the

United States tended to support the independence of Bangladesh.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Bhutto, has said

that he would prefer to rely on conventional

weapons for security but that Pakistan would

develop a nuclear capability if it could not acquire sufficient conventional arms.9 India’s

detonation of a nuclear device, absorption of

Sikkim, and flirtation with authoritarianism

have not reassured Pakistan about its own

security. The general dearth of criticism from

the international community (save for that

from China) in response to these events has

been a further source of uneasiness and has

contributed to Pakistan’s sense of isolation.

The Canadian decision to withhold assistance

to Pakistan’s nuclear programs under its new

nuclear export policy seemed aimed directly at

Pakistan, despite (or because of) Canadian

assistance to India’s nuclear development

eventuating in that country’s test of a nuclear

device. l0 Islamabad has found Ottawa’s requirement that shipments of nuclear materials

be restricted to countries willing to ratify the

NPT or to accept safeguards on their entire

nuclear program unacceptable. Pakistan has

adhered closely to past agreements with

Canada on safeguards attached to the Canadian-supplied nuclear powerplant at Karachi,

s See “Intelligence,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.

94, No. 51, Dec. 17, 1976, p. 5.

g See “Bhutto Talks of Going Nuclear, ” south China

Morning Post (Hong Kong) Dec. 21, 1974, p. 3.

10 See k“canada’s Nuclear Export Policy: Statement

by Secretary of States for External Affairs in the House

of Commons, ” Dec. 22, 1976, Information Canadian Embassy, Dec. 28, 1976.
but has declared it will not “accept totally

unreasonable conditions as the price for

Canada’s continued cooperation.”

U.S. attempts to tie the sale to Pakistan of

conventional weapons to an agreement not to

purchase a French fuel reprocessing plant has

generated additional resentment.11 Pakistan

has not, however, given up the contract with

France for acquisition of the plant, and Paris

had declared it would honor the agreement.l2

Whether the deal will, in fact, be implemented

remains to be seen. The Soviet Union’s decision to supply India with a 6-year supply of

heavy water for its nuclear program merely

confirms Pakistan’s view that nonproliferation is one-sided on the Indian subcontinent.

Pakistan has neither ratified or signed the

Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Incentives for the Acquisition of Nuclear

Weapons

●

●

●

●

●

A history of tension and warfare with India, culminating in the loss of East

Pakistan in 1971, which raises the spectre

of further armed conflict in the future.

The Indian-Soviet defense agreement of

1971, that seems aimed at Pakistan as

much as at China.

The inability of China and the unwillingness of the United States to assist

Pakistan in an Indian war, a s

demonstrated in 1971.

The urge to acquire some means of unifying the country, countering the process of

political fragmentation, and overawing

foreign supporters of domestic tribal

separatists.

The goal of becoming the leader of the

Moslem world.

Disincentives to the Acquisition of Nuclear

Weapons

● The probable alienation of potential

sources of international support and

arms.

ll~e “PakiStan: BhUttO Bows to NUClear pressure,”

Fur Eastern Economic Rez~iew, Vol. 94, No. 5, Dec. 17, 1976,

p. 27.

12 we “Canada to End Nuclear Power with Taiwan,”

Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1974, p. 2.

●

●

●

The magnitude and cost of the effort to

acquire nuclear weapons.

The prospect that such a program would

divert technicians and capital away from

the vital task of industralization.

The possibility that proliferation would

make any diplomatic settlement with India impossible.

Technical Capabilities

Pakistan has successfully brought two

nuclear power reactors onstream with outside assistance. One of those reactors, at

Roopur, was lost to Bangladesh in the war

with India in 1971. The second reactor has

been onstream since 1971. Before the loss of

East Pakistan and the detonation of an Indian

nuclear device, the chief motive for development of nuclear energy was to modernize

Pakistan by exploiting the most advanced

energy technology available where accessible.

However, other forms of electrical generation,

notably hydroelectric, have proven more

fruitful.

Pakistan lacks enrichment, fuel fabrication,

and fuel reprocessing facilities. It also lacks

significant uranium deposits. There are sufficient technicians and engineers to staff a

nuclear weapons effort, although that would

be to the detriment of other important

programs. The principal shortcoming is the

lack of the administrative skill needed to bring

together the resources, personnel, and money

required to embark on a weapons program independent of outside help. It appears that

Pakistan could not expect to produce a nuclear

device before the early 1980’s, if it is dependent on its yet-to-be-acquired fuel

reprocessing plant in order to obtain

plutonium.

Net Assessment

The technical capability to acquire nuclear

weapons at this time is far less than the incentive to do so. It would be possible, with

stringent organization of capital, personnel

and administration, to establish a promising

program for weapons development. But

Pakistan must first obtain a fuel reprocessing

107
facility or otherwise acquire the special

nuclear material for weapons. Nevertheless,

Pakistan’s determination to preserve its

security and territorial integrity cannot be ignored as a motivation to overcome what

otherwise appear to be important obstacles to

the development of nuclear weapons. Consequently, much will depend on Pakistan’s perception of the dimension of the Indian threat.

The principal disincentive is the cost of a

weapons program for Pakistan’s economic

development effort —both in terms of

domestic opportunity costs and possible

reductions in foreign assistance.

Circumstances That Might Alter the

Relationship Between Incentives and

Disincentives

Among the circumstances that could alter

the relationship between incentives and disincentives are the following:

●

●

●

●

A radical increase or diminution in the

perceived threat from India.

Pressure from Iran and China to forego

nuclear weapons development.

A guarantee by the nuclear powers of the

territorial integrity and defense of nonnuclear powers in general, or a guarantee

of the security of Pakistan by a nuclear

power (preferably the United States).

The breakup of Pakistan as a national entity (the question becomes moot).

Taiwan

Background

Taiwan is an island with over 16 million inhabitants, governed from Taipei as the

Republic of China (ROC). The head of State of

the ROC is a president ruling through a premier and cabinet. The principal representative

body is the Legislative Yuan, part of whose

members hold office for life, the rest being

elected. Governmental power may rest in the

hands of either the president or the premier,

depending on the political and military

following of the individuals involved. High

government posts are virtually monopolized by

108

the Mainland Chinese minority who fled to

the island in the wake of the defeat of the Nationalist regime at the hands of the Communists in 1949.

The ROC still claims to be the legal government of all of China and remains in a formal

state of belligerency vis-a-vis the People’s

Republic of China (PRC). The PRC, for its

part, lays claim to Taiwan and pledges to

“liberate” the island. While the ROC, in the

past, has been firmly tied to the United States

for defense, this relationship has been greatly

weakened with the American failure in Vietnam and with the opening of diplomatic and

trade relations between the PRC and the

United States.

The ROC’S ground, naval, and air forces are

presently adequate to provide a credible deterrent to PRC attack. Over the long term,

however, the conventional military balance

will probably shift heavily in favor of Peking.

Taiwan is prosperous, with light to medium

industry. Its prosperity depends on importexport and entrepot trade, foreign investment

in Taiwan, and ROC investment abroad. Outside of Japan, Taiwan enjoys the highest per

capita GNP in Asia. Foreign trade excludes

any commerce with communist powers, but

otherwise extends throughout the world.

The diplomatic emergence of the People’s

Republic of China, its assumption of U.N.

membership in place of the ROC, and the

U.S.-Chinese rapprochement have all contributed to the increasing international isolation of the Taipei regime. Those countries

courting the People’s Republic of China for

commercial or diplomatic advantages have

shown a willingness to abandon their formal

diplomatic relations with Taiwan, although

they have tended to maintain their commercial interests in that country.

As a consequence of the above-mentioned

factors, Taiwan’s long-term security prospects

are problematical. Continued erosion of the

regime’s diplomatic position could lead to increasing international economic pressures.

Militarily, ROC forces may be unable to obtain needed assistance from abroad in the

event of an attack from the Mainland—

although at present the PRC probably lacks
the amphibious capability to launch an effective assault.

Because it is dependent on foreign suppliers, the ROC’S nuclear program is vulnerable to disruption. Withholding nuclear technology and material from the ROC could be a

result of suspicion that Taipei is seeking

nuclear weapons, but may equally come from

an unwillingness to offend China (as was the

case when Canada cancel led its nuclear

program with Taiwan). However, other

countries, less concerned about proliferation

or hostile to Mainland China, may see some

advantage to assisting Taiwan’s nuclear

program. A country like South Africa, which

possesses the technology and is considered a

pariah in the international community anyway, might well see some advantage to

cooperation with Taiwan.

Taiwan has ratified the Non-proliferation

Treaty. If that ratification was in the interest of

maintaining good relations with the United

States, weakening of those relations could also

weaken Taiwan’s commitment to the treaty.

Incentives for the Acquisition of Nuclear

Weapons

●

●

●

●

●

Anxiety that at some point the PRC will

attempt the conquest of Taiwan by force.

Concern about the credibility of the U.S.

defense commitment to Taiwan.

Belief that nuclear weapons in the hands

of the ROC could be used to deter or

defeat a PRC attack.

Hope that Taiwan’s capacity to initiate

nuclear war would induce the international community to restrain the PRC

from the use of force against Taiwan.

Belief that the possession of even a token,

nuclear force would give the ROC

Government greater psychological force

and political credibility in its claim to be

a legitimate and viable alternative to the

present regime in Peking.

Disincentives for the Acquisition of Nuclear

Weapons

●

●

●

●

●

Fear that acquiring nuclear weapons

would alienate the United States and

other powers upon whose goodwill

Taiwan depends for security and trade.

Lack of domestic supplies of uranium

and other nuclear materials, rendering

Taiwan dependent on foreign sources for

development of its nuclear power

program.

Nonproliferation pressures resulting

from Taiwan’s adherence to the NPT and

the imposition of IAEA safeguards.

The risk that possession of nuclear

weapons by Taiwan would expose

Taiwan to nuclear attack without a commensurate increase in Taiwan’s defense

capability.

The burden of acquiring nuclear weapons

and delivery means sufficient to act as a

deterrent to PRC attack.

Technical Capabilities

While the ROC is not an advanced industrial nation, it possesses all of the basic

technology for the development of nuclear

weapons. Although it lacks its own means of

producing some of the special materials for a

nuclear program, the ROC does possess within its shipbuilding, metallurgical, chemical,

and electronic industries the capability to

develop those means. Scientific, technical, and

engineering personnel are numerous now and

increasing in number.

The development of nuclear technology has

its impetus from an extensive nuclear research

program and the introduction of nuclear

energy for the generation of electricity. The

latter is a result of the increasing demand for

electricity and competing demands between

the electric power industry and other industries for the domestic supplies of fossil fuels.

The ROC has already acquired one nuclear

power reactor that will come onstream during

1978. It also has a fuel-fabrication facility.

109
The technical barriers to nuclear proliferation include the lack of a domestic uranium

supply and reprocessing facilities. Taiwan is

dependent on foreign suppliers for nuclear

fuel, fuel reprocessing, uranium enrichment,

and reactors. In the light of a strong international reaction to published reports that it was

planning to build or was building a

plutonium reprocessing plant, Taiwan has

pledged not to proceed with such an undertaking.

There is no reason to suppose that Taiwan

is less capable of mastering nuclear technology than was the PRC, nor may it be supposed that the administrative organization of

the Taiwan government is not equal to the

task of developing nuclear weapons.

The ROC intends to have six nuclear power

reactors onstream by the mid 1980’s. These

are boiling water reactors fueled with

enriched uranium, not appropriate for the

efficient production of plutonium. However,

Taiwan does have a Canadian-supplied NRX

research reactor, of the same type as that used

by India to produce plutonium. It is significant that the Government’s principal military

ordinance, research, and development facility

is colocated with the Institute of Nuclear

Energy Research.

Taiwan has a proven capability of separating plutonium from spent fuel on a laboratory

scale. A small reprocessing laboratory was

constructed in Taiwan but is presently disassembled.

It would appear that Taiwan could have a

nuclear device in a relatively short time, if the

Government were to abrogate the NPT and

repudiate its pledge not to reprocess spent

fuel. An alternative, but less likely scenario

might see Taiwan follow the Israeli model and

create the widespread impression that it

possesses nuclear weapons—without overtly

confirming it. Already the ROC has publicly

claimed the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons while pledging not to

implement that capability.

Net Assessment

The pressure on Taiwan from the PRC, and

the ROC’S relative diplomatic isolation, render

110

Taipei less sensitive than some other governments to antiproliferation views in the international community. The possibility that

nuclear weapons would either ensure the

ROC’S continued independence, lend strength

to any opportunity to reestablish a Nationalist

regime on the Mainland, or facilitate an accommodation with the PRC not unfavorable

to the ROC all lend incentive to proliferation.

The ROC has adhered to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. But the risk of alienating

Japan and the United States through proliferation may be balanced by the prospect that

ROC nuclear weapons might incline the international community to restrain the PRC from

acts against Taiwan that would threaten

nuclear war. Adherence to the nonproliferation treaty may, therefore, be contingent on

the perceived strength of the U.S. commitment

to the defense of Taiwan.

Technological considerations do act as

restraints. The principal constraint is the dependence on foreign suppliers for reactor

components, uranium, and reprocessing. If

there is a concerted effort to deny the ROC

such materials and technology, then proliferation will be impeded. Because the United

States is both the ROC’S principal nuclear supplier and its only major military ally,

Washington has very substantial influence

over the future course of Taipei’s nuclear

policy.

Circumstances That Might Alter the

Relationship Between Incentives and

Disincentives

Among the circumstances that could alter

the relationship between incentives and disincentives are the following:

●

●

●

A sharp change in the pace and/or direction of the movement toward normalization of relations between Washington

and Peking.

A change to a firm and materially substantial commitment by the United States

to the continued independence of the

ROC.

Acquiescence, however indirectly, by the

ROC to Mainland control.
The major variable in the situation is the

course of U.S.– PRC relations. If the normalization of U.S. relations with Peking

evolves in such a way that the ROC feels it

cannot depend on any continuing relationship

with Washington, the result may be desperation in Taipei and a decision to opt for nuclear

weapons.

The other striking feature of this case is the

strength of the ROC’S incentive to acquire

nuclear weapons. Like Israel and South Korea,

the ROC faces a serious, clearly defined, external military threat to its existence. Under the

circumstances, nuclear weapons could serve

as a deterrent and weapon of last resort,

Moreover, several major states with interests

in the area, e.g., the U. S. S. R., Japan, and the

U. S., might see some benefits resulting from

an ROC nuclear weapons capability. For the

United States, it might permit the disengagement from any remaining security commitments to Taiwan without precipitating a PRC

conquest of the Island. This is not to suggest,

however, that any of these states would view a

nuclear-armed Taiwan as being, on balance, in

their best interest.

CONCLUSION

One approaches with caution any attempt

to integrate the diverse factors influencing

nuclear proliferation into a global assessment

of incentives and disincentives to acquire

nuclear weapons. However, a review of the

Nth country case studies suggests that the

principal incentives influencing nations

operating at the threshold are the following.

1.

2.

3.

The need to counter perceived local and

regional threats.

The desire to accrue the political status

that seems to accompany a weapon

capability.

The desire to hedge against political and

military uncertainties while increasing

the capability to exert regional influence.

The principal disincentives operating on the

same countries are the following:

1. Concern about adversary responses, including the stimulation of regional

nuclear arms races,

2.

3

Possible alienation of the superpowers

and suppliers, principally the United

States, with resulting loss of nuclear imports and economic development assistance.

Diversion of resources from needed industrial development and social welfare

programs.

What particularly stands out is the central

role of regional conflicts and contests for influence. An effective policy to inhibit

proliferation will have to address the almost

universal aspiration for security, influence,

and prestige, and the disputes these aspirations engender. It will also have to address

means of encouraging a response to proliferation on the part of allies, suppliers, adversaries, and the international community as a

whole, which will maximize the costs and

penalties associated with proliferation.

Specific policy options to achieve these purposes were analyzed in chapter III.

111
Chapter V

The Non-State Adversary

-----

-.
Chapter V

The Non-State Adversary

This chapter discusses potential nuclear non-state adversaries and the

civil liberties implications of measures to deter their actions against nuclear

facilities or involving nuclear materials. In the context of nuclear proliferation, potential nuclear non-state adversaries encompass individuals or nongovernmental groups that might take advantage of the spread of nuclear

material, facilities, or weapons to harm or threaten society.

THE NATURE OF NON-STATE ADVERSARIES

Nuclear non-state adversaries include those

who might attempt to steal a nuclear weapon;

to steal nuclear material to sell, ransom, or use

to make a nuclear explosive or dispersal

device; to purchase illegally, or smuggle,

nuclear material, or otherwise participate in a

nuclear blackmarket; or claim that they

possess nuclear devices to extort concessions

or cause alarm. The term also includes those

who might undertake serious malevolent actions against nuclear facilities. They might

threaten or actually attempt to sabotage a

nuclear facility or transport vehicle, or seize

temporary control of a nuclear facility.

These adversaries are often referred to collectively as criminals and terrorists, although

all are criminals in that their actions would

violate existing laws. The term criminal

however, generally implies a purely profit

motive while the term terrorist (in current

usage) implies political objectives. The

spectrum of potential nuclear non-state adversaries is much broader. It includes profitminded criminals, political extremists, a dissident faction within a government, violent foes

of the manufacture of nuclear arms or of

civilian nuclear power programs, disgruntled

employees of the nuclear industry, or individual lunatics. The actions that might conceivably be carried

groups range from

and detonation of

AND THEIR ACTS

out by such individuals or

hoaxes to the construction

a nuclear explosive device

which could kill hundreds or ‘thousands of

people and deny the use of large areas of land.

Strictly speaking, nuclear adversary actions

should not include minor incidents (such as

vandalism), although it is useful to study

minor incidents for indications of trends in

the direction of more serious actions.

The Spectrum of

Potential Nuclear Actions

The non-state threat compromises a

spectrum of potential actions, with varying

degrees of difficulty to complete and varying

degrees of consequences.

At the low end of this spectrum are bomb

threats, nuclear hoaxes, and token acts of

violence not aimed at producing serious

casualties or damage. These in general pose

little direct danger to public safety and require

a minimum of skill, resources, and organization to carry through.

Further up the scale are actions such as lowlevel sabotage which could result in serious
damage to a nuclear facility and could endanger onsite personnel, although they would

not necessarily pose a threat to public safety.

At the high end of the scale are actions such

as theft of weapons material followed by the

construction of a nuclear explosive device, or

sabotage of a reactor which succeeded in causing a core-melt and breach of containment.

The sabotage of a reactor was judged

peripheral to the subject of this report: the

proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore,

this report has not assessed the difficulty of

reactor sabotage.

Chapter VI assesses the resources required

to construct a nuclear explosive device, and

concludes that some clever and competent

non-national groups could possibly design

and construct a crude nuclear explosive having significant nuclear yield.

The effective design of security systems for

nuclear facilities requires an understanding of

the threat to be defended against. Defined

threat levels can be used to gauge, as a first approximation, the difficulty of obtaining

weapons material. Until recently, however,

threat levels were not defined by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In

January 1976, the NRC began a special review

of the safeguards at 15 facilities licensed by it

to possess significant amounts of highly

enriched uranium or plutonium. In March

1976, the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) began participating in the reviews. The threat levels

defined for this review consisted of:

“An internal threat of one employee occupying any position, or an external threat comprised of three well-armed (legally obtainable

weapons), well-trained individuals, including

the possibilities of inside knowledge or assistance of one insider.”]

Of the 15 NRC licensed facilities involved in

the safeguards reviews, 8 were judged adequate to withstand both the threats defined

above.

I NUREG-O095/ERDA 77-34; Joint ERDA-NRC Task

Force on Safeguards (U) Final Report July 1976;

Unclassified Version; p. ii.

116

More recently, NRC has required these

facilities to begin upgrading their security to

guard against an increased possible threat.

This potential threat could involve a conspiracy of two or more insiders acting in collusion with an outside group of several attackers armed with automatic rifles, recoilless

rifles, and high explosives. As part of the

upgrading, full-field investigations and other

security checks will be required for licensee

employees who might effectively conspire to

steal or divert weapons-grade material. The

subject of physical security at nuclear facilities

possessing material of weapons grade is discussed in more detail in chapter VIII

“Safeguards Technology”,

In the section which follows, it will be seen

that the nuclear incidents to date have all been

low level.

The Record of Nuclear Incidents2

Between 1969 and 1975, the AEC and then

ERDA recorded 288 threats or incidents of

violence in the United States directed at

nuclear facilities or buildings or offices that

were in some way related to nuclear activities,

(This figure does not include nuclear hoaxes,

of which there were 38 in roughly the same

period. See the section on nuclear hoaxes

below). Of these, 240 were bomb threats; 14

were bombings or attempted bombings; 22

were incidents of arson, attempted arson or

suspicious fires; and 12 were cases of forced

entry or other breaches of security. There was,

in addition, one possible case of diversion of a

minute quantity of plutonium. A number of

incidents were directed against university

research facilities or Federal office buildings.

There were no casualties. The ERDA list is apparently not complete. Moreover, it seems

unlikely that no incidents took place before

1969. A case of low-level reactor sabotage

resulting in considerable onsite damage is not

contained on the list. In addition, a night

watchman was reportedly wounded by an intruder at the Vermont Yankee plant in 1971.

This was the only known casualty in an adversary nuclear incident in the United States.

Several known thefts of radioactive material

Zsee appendix 111, volume 11 for details.
(but not radioactive waste or special nuclear

material) do not appear on the list. (None of

the material was used to endanger the public.)

There are no complete chronologies of incidents involving nuclear facilities or material

elsewhere in the world. Those incidents that

have been reported in the foreign press consist

mainly of bomb threats, hoaxes, vandalism,

low-level sabotage, a few thefts of lowenriched uranium, and one verified incident

of non-lethal radioactive dispersal of material

possibly stolen from a hospital. There have,

however, been serious incidents of bombing

and sabotage in Europe causing considerable

damage to property. Demonstrations against

the construction of new nuclear powerplants

in West Germany, where antinuclear forces

appear to have merged with extremist political movements, have resulted in violent confrontations with the police.

The combination of antinuclear elements

with political extremists has led to violence in

Europe where further violence and perhaps

some escalation seems possible. There is no

evidence in these incidents that any group has

so far attempted to acquire plutonium, highly

enriched uranium, or radioactive waste for

use in an explosive or dispersal device.

Most of the nuclear incidents worldwide

have been low-level and have not imperiled

public safety. More such incidents can be expected as the nuclear industry expands. The

record suggests that the nuclear industry will

not be immune to the problems of bomb

threats, low-level sabotage, and pilferage,

which are common to other industries.

Publicity surrounding the incidents was not

great, attracting international attention in

only a few cases. The perpetrators included

disgruntled employees, common thieves,

political extremists, foes of nuclear power, and

a few lunatics. Their motives included protest,

greed, revenge, or desire for attention.

For the most part the perpetrators were individuals; a few consisted of small groups.

The low-enriched uranium smuggling ring in

India, involving contacts in at least three

countries, showed the most organization. (See

appendix III, volume II.)

Although all nuclear incidents to date have

been of a relatively minor nature, this gives no

excuse for complacency in the future. The

present record of nuclear incidents was

assembled in an era of relatively few nuclear

reactors. In the future, nuclear power will be

greatly expanded, even in low-growth projections, and plutonium recycle may afford potential non-state adversaries a number of

highly visible targets. This fundamental

change, coupled with marked trends towards

increased violence, makes the past an uncertain predictor of the future.

Moreover, in many developing countries,

internal coups, guerrilla wars, insurgent

movements, and military regimes are common. One can imagine, for example, how a

military coup could involve a struggle for control of a nuclear reactor or, even more serious,

a reprocessing plant with its stocks of separated plutonium. Another factor gives cause

for concern in the Third World. Developing

countries may not have the resources necessary to provide adequate security around their

newly acquired nuclear facilities. Thus, as the

nuclear industry expands into the Third

World, as it is apparently going to do over the

next several decades, these facilities may

become more attractive targets for insurgent

and terrorist groups.

Origins of Increased Concern

About the Non-State Adversary

Although only minor nuclear incidents

have occurred so far in the United States,

public concern about the possibility of nuclear

adversary actions, particularly nuclear terrorism, has been increasing in recent years. There

appears to be a number of reasons for this.

First among these are the rapid growth, actual

and projected, of nuclear power plants

throughout the world and the projected use of

plutonium as a fuel. Increased demands for

energy in both the industrialized and developing nations and the impacts of the oil embargo

in 1973-1974 spurred the development of

nuclear power.

Concurrent with the expansion of nuclear

power, a national environmental movement

grew in the United States. In their criticisms of

117
nuclear energy, many environmentalists have

been giving increasing attention to the

possibilities and consequences of deliberate

malevolent actions by terrorists and criminals.

Moreover, the great increase in violent crime

and international terrorism, reported in detail

by the mass media, have made malevolent acts

seem more commonplace and closer to home.

Expectations of violence are probably also increased by regular exposure to violence in fiction, particularly in movies and television.

Finally, many of the events of the past 15

years have reduced public confidence in our

social, political, and economic institutions,

Whereas the citizens of the United States

might have once accepted their leaders’ statements that strong and sufficient measures

were being taken to prevent nuclear adversary

actions, the public now tends to be more skeptical of such assurances.

The Growth of

International Terrorism3

One of the reasons mentioned in the previous section for the growth of public concern

about potential nuclear adversary action is the

great increase in international terrorism.

Terrorism can be described as the use of actual or threatened violence to gain attention

and to create fear and alarm, which in turn

will cause people to exaggerate the strength of

the terrorists and the importance of their

cause. Since groups that use terrorist tactics

are typically small and weak, the violence they

practice must be deliberately shocking.

Terrorism has become an international

phenomenon in recent years. Modern air

travel provides terrorists with worldwide

mobility, and mass communications provides

them with a worldwide audience. New

weapons have increased their capacity for

violence, while society has become increasingly vulnerable because of growing dependence on complex systems and technology

that can be exploited malevolently (e.g.,

nuclear energy, civil aviation).

lc+e appendix III, volume 11 for details.

118

During the last few years, small groups of

extremists have repeatedly demonstrated that

terrorist tactics can create international incidents causing national governments to negotiate before a worldwide audience.

In the presentation of data which follows,

international terrorism is defined as terrorism

that has clear international consequences. It

includes incidents in which terrorists go

abroad to strike their targets (as in the Lod

Airport massacre), or select victims or targets

because of their connections to a foreign state

(as in the assassination or kidnapping of a

diplomat), or attack international lines of

communication and commerce (as in the hijacking of an airliner). It does not include incidents of domestic terrorism.

Since the late 1960’s, international terrorism has been on a sharp upward curve,

whether one measures such a curve on the

basis of the number of terrorist incidents each

year or on the basis of the number of

casualties inflicted. (See figures V– la and b.)

Figure V–2, taken from an unclassified CIA

report “International Terrorism: Diagnosis

and Prognosis, ” breaks international terrorist

incidents down into several categories. (The

totals in figure V–1, taken from data collected

by the RAND Corporation differ slightly from

the totals in figure V–2, because of slightly

different reporting criteria.). All told, more

than 140 terrorist organizations—including a

number of fictional organizations created to

shield the identity of the true perpetrators of

some particularly shocking or politically sensitive acts—from nearly 50 different countries

or disputed territories have thus far engaged

in international terrorism. About 1,000 persons have died in international terrorist incidents since 1968; another 2,000 have been injured. If the casualties of domestic political

violence are added, the number of deaths may

reach 10,000, For comparison, 20,000 persons

are murdered every year in the United States.

Some observers have been encouraged by

an apparent decline in international terrorism

in 1976. However, figures V– la and b show

that this apparent decline was not real; international terrorism rose in 1976. The apparent

decline of international terrorism in 1976 can

be explained by the fact that 1976 saw more
Figure V-1 a.

Total Number of Incidents

of International Terrorism, 1968-1976

Number of Incidents Based upon data supplied by the RAND Corp.

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

o I I I I I 1 I t

1968 ’69 ’70 ’71 ’72 ’73 ’74 ’75 ’76

Figure V-1b. Year

Total Number of Deaths in

Incidents of International Terrorism, 1968-1976

Number of Deaths Based upon data supplied by the RAND Corp.

225

200

175

150

125

100

75

50

25

0 I I I 1 1 I I I

1968 ’69 ’70 ’71 ’72 ’73 ’74 ’75 ’76

Year

119
75

so

25

Figure V-2,

TOTAL: 913

I

Bombing

TOTAL: 375

0

I I I I I

1968 ’70 72 ’74

Assassination

TOTAL: 48

75

50

2a

I

1968 ’70 72 ’74

Armed Assault

or Ambush

75

t

TOTAL: 95

l00

75

50

25

Barricade and Hostage

TOTAL: 31

19 ’70 72 ’74

Hijacking

(Air and Non-Air)

75 TOTAL: 137*

I

1969 70 72 ’74

l00

Other

TOTAL: 45

75 - -

50 —

25 —

120
assassinations and murders and fewer hostage

incidents than the preceding year. Hostage incidents may be in the news for days or even

weeks; murder is usually in the news for a day

or two.

Although any forecasts about terrorism in

the future are conjectural, some trends are discernible.

Although few terrorists have reached their

stated long-range goals, terrorism has proved

useful in getting publicity and occasionally

obtaining some political concessions. T h e

record to date might even be considered

reasonably positive from a terrorist perspective. Terrorist groups have been notably successful in avoiding capture and escaping

punishment.

With the exception of a number of bilateral

agreements providing for a greater exchange

of intelligence and technical assistance, the international response to terrorism has been

relatively weak and ineffective.

Terrorists will remain highly mobile, able

to strike targets anywhere in the world. Recent developments in explosives, small arms,

and sophisticated man-portable weapons will

provide terrorists with an increased capacity

for violence. They appear to be getting more

knowledgeable in their tactics, their weapons,

and their exploitation of the media. They will

continue to emulate each other’s tactics,

especially those that win international

publicity. Terrorist groups appear to be

strengthening their links with each other,

forming alliances, and providing mutual

assistance. One result is the emergence of

multinational freelance terrorist groups willing to carry out attacks on behalf of causes

with which they are sympathetic, or to undertake specific operations or campaigns of terrorism on commission from client groups or

governments. Nations or groups unable or

unwilling to mount a serious challenge on the

battlefield may employ such groups or adopt

terrorist tactics as a means of surrogate warfare against their opponents. Moreover, there

are signs that some international and domestic

terrorist groups are beginning to recruit individuals who are attracted to violence not for

political ideals, but for money or the lure of a

clandestine lifestyle.

Terrorism can be expected to persist and

perhaps increase as a mode of political expression,

Potential Nuclear Terrorism

There is substantial disagreement among

experts as to the likelihood of terrorist attempts to acquire a nuclear capability. A

nuclear capability would greatly increase their

potential destructive power. The detonation of

a crude nuclear device in a carefully selected,

heavily populated area could kill tens of thousands of people.

The historical record shows that in no

single incident in the past 50 years have terrorists killed more than 150 people, and incidents involving more than 20 deaths are rare.

(See figure V–3). This is not because of lack of

capability. Terrorist groups could have acquired the means to kill many more people

than they have, even by using only conventional explosives.

On the basis of the historical record and the

theory of terrorism, it is not clear that causing

mass casualties or widespread damage is attractive to a terrorist group. By using terrorist

tactics, political extremists have created alarm,

attracted worldwide attention to themselves

and to their causes, compelled governments to

negotiate and often grant concessions, while at

the same time forcing governments to spend

an unequal amount of resources for protection

against terrorist attacks. Terrorists have contributed to the downfall of a few governments,

aggravated North-South and East-West relations, kept the Palestinian question at the

forefront of international concern, introduced

strains in the Western alliance, and adversely

affected the quality of life in many open or

formerly open societies. They have achieved

these results without resorting to mass

murder.

Mass murder might actually be counterproductive. It might alienate sympathizers

and potential supporters, provoke severe

crackdowns that public opinion would demand and support, and threaten the survival

of the organization itself. For these reasons,

any scheme of nuclear destruction may create

disagreement and dissension within the

121
(

80

60

40

r

Number of Deaths

(See appendix III-A for more information on the death incidents.) Based upon data supplied by the RAND Corp.

organization contemplating it, and expose the

operation and the organization to betrayal.

For these reasons, a number of experts have

argued that mass murder appears unlikely to

be contemplated by terrorists groups capable

of making elementary political judgments.

However, there is no assurance that terrorists will continue to behave in the future as

they have in the past. A desperate group

might decide to strike one catastrophic blow,

Moreover, as Roberta Wohlstetter has suggested “. . . familiar political ends . . . sometimes involve a means like the Red Army terror in Lod Airport, a careless slaughter of innocents that may indeed be an omen of the

sort of random killing we see in nuclear

destruction. ”4

In addition, it should be recognized that

pure massive destruction would serve the

goals of nihilistic groups, should they emerge

in the coming years.

4Roberta Wohlstetter, Terror on a Grand Scale, Survival, May/June 1976.

122
The primary attraction for terrorists to go

nuclear may not be to cause mass casualties.

Almost any nuclear action by terrorists would

attract widespread attention. For example, if a

terrorist group seized control of a nuclear

power reactor or a nuclear weapons storage

site, they would create a frightening situation

and achieve worldwide publicity by the

seizure alone. As another example, it might

not be necessary for terrorists to actually

design and construct a nuclear explosive

device in order to achieve the effect they want.

Extortion based on a credible nuclear threat

would require less technical skill and risk but

would still receive publicity, inspire fear, and,

possibly, succeed in obtaining concessions.

In addition, as pointed out in appendix III

of volume II, even nuclear explosions need not

be equated with mass slaughter. The detonation of a nuclear explosive at any one of a

number of important sites at a time when very

few people would be about could have a stunning effect, while minimizing the number of

deaths.

The whole area of motivations, incentives,

demands and negotiations in the area of

nuclear blackmail by terrorists (and other

non-state adversaries) deserves systematic examination, which it has not received. At present, the published literature contains only

speculations about the types of demands terrorists can, cannot, and are most likely to

make. Many of these speculations are extremely ingenious, but their main focus is on

the terrorist nuclear action itself; few attempt

to come to grips with the much harder question of how a terrorist group could exploit the

enormous leverage a nuclear device would

give to effect a commensurate irreversible

political change.

Organized Crime as a Potential

Nuclear Non-State Adversary

In this discussion, organized crime means

an organization dedicated to illegal activities;

its existence transcends any single act; the

organization survives its members. Organized

crime should be distinguished from individual groups of criminals that organize

themselves to carry out specific crimes.

Whether organized crime should be considered a likely nuclear non-state adversary

remains a matter of debate. Several studies

and commentaries on the subject are summarized in appendix 111 of volume II. L. Douglas

DeNike concludes that it is credible that

organized crime would engage in nuclear activity:

“Armed with plutonium or high level waste,

organized crime might demand Federal

assurances of non-interference with their

operations. Punishment for non-cooperation

might be the loss of Washington, D. C., as a

habitable center. Nuclear thieves could demand large sums of cash, control over policy

or special concessions from national governmerits.”5

Considering the possibility of theft of

nuclear material, the MITRE study concludes:

“They (organized crime) are interested solely

in acquiring more money and power for

themselves. , . They are involved in almost all

the hijacking that goes on in the United

States, and have been able to exert considerable control over substantial parts of industry,

labor, and government. Their business is

often international and they have longstanding and secure links in Europe, the Middle

East, Latin America, and the Far East. There is

little question that, for a sufficient amount of

money, members of organized crime would

take a contract to acquire special nuclear

material for another party.”6

Other experts disagree that nuclear extortion or theft would be a likely activity for

organized crime. This point of view has been

summarized by Brian Jenkins:

81

. . . one should be cautious about overestimating the attractiveness of engaging in

nuclear extortion or trafficking in fissionable

material to the criminal underworld,

especially to organized crime. . . organized

crime is a conservative, service-oriented industry. It provides gambling, prostitution,

and narcotics. The profits from the provision

of these services are good and, perhaps more

important, steady, . . There is a willing market

for such services, and despite the social harm

they cause, they may not be perceived by the

~L. Douglas DeNike, Radioactive Malevolence,

l?ullefi}~ of fhe Atomic Sciu~fists (February 1974) .

h T}lt~ Thrrflf t[~ L,icctlst’d Nz(cltw r Facilities, M TR -7022,

95, The Mitre Corporation, September 1975.

123
public as a direct threat to individual or collective security. Indeed, the existence of

organized crime depends a great deal on tacit

public acceptance or at least indifference and

therefore it has tended to avoid criminal ventures—for example, in this country kidnappings for huge ransoms—that are likely to

arouse public anger. Nuclear blackmailing

would bring tremendous heat on the

organization and provoke crackdowns that

could interrupt the flow of large steady

profits from socially more acceptable

crimes.”7

There is, however, one area of consensus

within the debate. No one who has commented on the topic seriously believes that

organized crime lacks the resources, skills, patience, or force necessary to steal special

nuclear material or engage in an illicit international trade of material. The deterrents, if they

exist, would possibly lie in fears by the leaders

of organized crime that such actions would

provoke public outrage and lead to severe

responses that would seriously damage

organized crime’s other profitable enterprises.

If organized crime attempted to deter such

counter-measures with a nuclear threat, it

would mean, in effect, that the leaders of

organized crime had decided to challenge the

sovereignty of the nations in which their normal activities take place. This would require a

fundamental change in the objectives of

organized crime, which typically up to now

has sought to make money and to acquire

political influence to protect its investments

and operations but not to directly acquire

political authority at the highest levels or provoke political reaction.

At the same time, even those who believe

that the risks to organized crime of involvement in nuclear theft or nuclear extortion

probably exceed the perceived benefits, appear

to find it credible that if a worldwide market

for nuclear material develops, and if the price

is right, organized crime (perhaps without

becoming directly involved in the theft of

nuclear material), might act as a fence or

broker for the stolen goods. Plutonium or

uranium could be stolen or fenced for their

monetary value as commodities, that is, as

~Br ia n Jenkins, “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear ?,” Paper

#64, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign

Policy, Santa Monica, October 1975.

reactor fuel or, in the case of low enriched

uranium, as feed for dedicated facilities. (See

chapter VII “Diversion From Commercial

Power Systems” and “Dedicated Facilities”. )

There are some indications that theft of lowenriched uranium for reactor fuel may have

already happened in India. (See appendix III,

volume II.) Thus, as nuclear power spreads

worldwide, and especially if plutonium comes

into widespread use as a reactor fuel, it is

possible that organized crime might become

involved in all aspects of black and gray

markets in nuclear material as commodities.

Such a development would be extremely

dangerous. It is difficult to see how such a

market could for long resist developing into a

market for plutonium as bomb material.

Some observers argue that organized crime

would not get involved in a black market in

plutonium for bombs (or in assembled

nuclear weapons), for the same reasons, discussed above, that they would not be likely to

attack nuclear facilities or engage in nuclear

extortion. Thus, organized crime might also

steer clear of trading in special nuclear

material as commodities, if they perceived the

commodities market and the bomb market as

closely linked. (See also chapter VII “Purchase

and Theft” and appendix VII of volume 11.)

Nuclear Hoaxes; Psychotics

A nuclear hoax is defined as a threat to detonate a nuclear explosive or to disperse radioactive

material, when the threatener lacks the

capacity or the dedication to carry out the

threat. No such threat to date has been judged

credible, and no perpetrators have had the

capability of which they boasted, therefore all

have been classed as nuclear hoaxes. There

have been 38 nuclear hoaxes between 1970

and 1976. The characteristics of nuclear

hoaxes are discussed in some detail in appendix III of volume II.

Hoaxes demonstrate that there are people

who are thinking about using nuclear material

to cause harm or as the coercive basis of a

threat. It is not clear how many hoaxers, if

they had access to nuclear material, would

choose to mount a real threat rather than a

hoax. There continue to be many conventional

124
—

bomb hoaxes even though dynamite is easy to

come by. However, the interpretation of the

available data, both nuclear and non-nuclear,

suggests that there are those who would carry

out a real nuclear threat if they had the

nuclear material and the capability to use it.

It appears, from a study of hoaxes, that psychotics may be more attracted to nuclear

threats than politically or criminally motivated persons. Psychotics may also be responsible for many of the low-level nuclear

incidents that have occurred so far. Most psychotics would probably not attempt to do anything more serious than cause disruption. On

the other hand, lunatics have been the perpetrators of many known schemes of mass

murder. Thus, some psychotics would have

the will to carry out the most destructive of

nuclear adversary actions. In terms of actual

capabilities, however, they of all the categories

of potential nuclear non-state adversaries are

usually the least competent. However, there

are some brilliant psychotics who have technical knowledge and skill. If one such also has

the will to cause destruction and has access to

weapons material he would constitute a formidable adversary.

Assessment of Threat Credibility

It is a vital and potentially difficult problem

to distinguish a hoax from a real threat—that

is, a threat backed up by capability and determination.

The FBI by Federal statute is the lead investigative agency in all cases where threats

are made involving radioactive material. The

nuclear aspects of threat assessment have been

delegated to ERDA.

Current assessment of a nuclear threat consists of both a technical evaluation of the

alleged nuclear device by ERDA and a

behavioral evaluation principally by the FBI,

of the threat message and the context in which

it originated. So far, no perpetrators have

backed up their allegations of a nuclear

capability by any sort of evidence,

The usual approach has been to rule out the

possibility of a credible threat. If the assessment found that the threat was not credible,

an assumption was usually made that it was a

hoax. Positive criteria for establishing that a

threat is in fact a hoax are being developed.

At this time, a great deal of emphasis is

placed on evaluating technical aspects of the

threat and accounting for the supplies of

special nuclear material. However, even if all

U.S. special nuclear material could be perfectly accounted for, a foreign source of special

nuclear material could be used in a threat

mounted in the United States.

The cost of evaluating, investigating, and

reacting to nuclear threats is not insignificant.

An increasing number of persons are acquiring information and technical expertise in

nuclear matters. If a person very knowledgeable about nuclear matters were to initiate a

hoax it would be difficult to negate its credibility from a technical and behavioral assessment alone. In such cases, the ability to assess

the adversary’s dedication to carry out the

threat would be critical.

If the time should come when an adversary

of verified capability presents a credible

threat, then the ability to assess motivation,

intent, and dedication will be essential if it is

decided to establish communications.

Summary

There are probably groups at large in the

world today that possess or could acquire the

resources necessary to become nuclear adver -

saries, if they wanted to. That is, they might be

able to sabotage a reactor, steal fissile material,

build a dispersal device, or possibly even a

crude nuclear explosive device. Presently

these include organized crime, certain terrorist groups who might undertake such actions with or without the assistance or complicity of a national government. Arguments

arise less in the area of theoretical capabilities,

but more in the area of intentions.

The historical record provides no evidence

that any criminal or terrorist group has ever

made any attempt to acquire fissile nuclear

material or radioactive waste material for use

in an explosive or dispersal device.

125
One ought to take little comfort from this

fact, however. The lack of intelligence or visible evidence does not mean that the option

has not been discussed; that some group

might move in this direction without providing clues or warning. It is disquieting to realize that, in the past, most new terrorist groups

have not been detected before their first terrorist act.

There is no logical progression that takes

one easily from the existing pool of potential

nuclear non-state adversaries to actual nuclear

non-state adversaries, or from the nuclear incidents that have occurred to nuclear actions

of greater consequence. Terrorist groups, as

they presently exist, might be among future

nuclear non-state adversaries, but their acquisition of a nuclear capability would not be

a simple escalation of what has been

demonstrated in terrorist actions thus far.

It is also a long conceptual jump from the

present activities of organized crime to their

acquisition of a nuclear capability.

Some authors of nuclear hoaxes have

manifested desires of becoming nuclear nonstate adversaries but none have demonstrated

the required capabilities, and it is not certain

that all hoaxers, even if they had access to

nuclear material, would be anything more

than hoaxers. In terms of intentions alone,

some psychotics are potential nuclear nonstate adversaries. In terms of capabilities they,

of all the categories of potential nuclear nonstate adversaries, are usually the least competent. To acquire a nuclear capability would require a quantum jump in capabilities for the

vast majority of psychotics or an environmental change that would make the task much

easier to accomplish.

Whether any of the current potential

nuclear non-state adversaries, or other as yet

undefined adversaries, will decide to actually

go nuclear, cannot be answered at this time,

Potential adversaries can be identified, their

objectives, their capabilities, and the likely

modes of operation if they do decide to go

nuclear can be described.

There is left a vast area of uncertainty between what can be done and what will be

done. The area of uncertainty could be

126

reduced if society had a better understanding

of the possible motivations and utilities of

nuclear action to potential adversaries; not

how society assesses its utility, rather how potential adversaries might. Although a growing

body of literature on terrorism exists, much

less is known about how they reach their decisions to do or not do something, how they

weigh the various factors involved, how they

judge risks and benefits. Likewise, in the area

of crime little is known how organized crime

would address a decision in this area, nor is it

known if the issue has ever come up.

The nuclear non-state adversary may not

arise from those groups currently identified as

potential nuclear non-state adversaries; there

may already be, or there may appear in the

future, new kinds of adversaries, or special

subclasses of existing adversaries, that have

not yet been identified who might be more

likely to use nuclear means to achieve their

objectives. Threats to nuclear facilities or involving the malevolent use of nuclear material

may emerge on a different organizational or

mental plane. In the past decade, international

terrorists have become a significant problem.

They are a new entity which has emerged in

the past decade, and although they have not

yet given any indication of going nuclear, they

could transform into entities that might, It is

difficult to say now what new entities may

emerge in the coming decade.

The origin, level, and nature of the potential

nuclear non-state threat may change. Among

the current adversaries, new tactics may be invented to effectively exploit the leverage that a

nuclear capability would give and achieve a

goal commensurate with the threat. If an individual or group successfully carried out a

scheme of nuclear extortion or destruction,

other individuals or groups would probably

imitate the act. Thus, the probability of a second incident occuring, especially after a success, would seem to be greater than the probability of the first. The growing ties among international terrorist groups, referred to earlier

in this chapter, increase the possibility of imitation.

The political context may change. Terrorists

with the capabilities for acquiring a nuclear
explosive may be placed in a desperate situation that will begin to erode the political arguments against nuclear action. The potential

profits could become so enormous that

organized criminal groups could be attracted

to the nuclear industry. A war between two

small nuclear powers may occur in which

nuclear weapons are used, inviting further use

by nations and subnational groups .

Plutonium could become widely obtainable if

adequate safeguards and physical security are

not implemented, giving more entities the

material with which to construct nuclear explosives.

Finally, the entire subject of adversary actions involving massive threats or destruction

has apparently only started to receive

systematic study. The imaginative use of

chemicals or biological agents or even conventional explosives as the basis of a massive

threat has apparently not caused much concern in the public mind, although such

materials may be more easily obtainable than

nuclear material and require less skill to cause

large loss of life. The origins of the nuclear age

may have much to do with this; the word

nuclear recalls Hiroshima, not PeachBottom.

Nevertheless, although the concentration on

potential non-state nuclear violence to the

neglect of other forms of potential mass

violence may be strictly speaking irrational, it

may be intuitively correct. If non-state adversary groups with the will to threaten or carry

out large-scale violence do appear, they may

choose nuclear means, even if it is somewhat

more difficult, because they understand the

public fascination and fear, and know that the

nuclear threat or act will have the greatest im -

pact.

CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS

Civil liberties issues have recently moved to

a prominent position in the public consideration of nuclear power development. The

growth of concern over the impact of nuclear

power on civil liberties would probably have

occurred even without consideration of

plutonium reprocessing. As incidents of nonnuclear terrorism have mounted worldwide

there has been an increased program to guard

nuclear facilities against possible sabotage.

Such increased security measures raise some

issues of civil liberties impact, but the

development of plutonium recycle and other

nuclear technologies using material that

could, if diverted, be made into nuclear explosives has set off the current debates.

Plutonium reprocessing offers the greatest

opportunity for potential non-state adversaries—terrorist groups, profit-oriented criminal organizations, deranged persons, and disaffected employees of nuclear facilities—to obtain special nuclear material. Therefore, this

section devotes its major attention to the civil

liberties impact of safeguard measures necessary to prevent the theft of plutonium and to

effect its recovery if stolen.

To analyze the potential impact of

plutonium recycle on civil liberties, this section

●

●

●

●

●

will:

Provide a brief

ties concepts.

Describe the

framework of civil libermost likelv size of a

plutonium recyle industry’ in the near

future.

Analyze possible safeguard measures for

such an industry and discuss their civil

liberties implications,

Present three widely held positions about

the acceptability of civil liberties risks in

a plutonium-safeguards program.

Provide observations on the underlying

assumptions and relative strengths and

weaknesses of these three positions.

Of necessity, this discussion must treat both

background issues and policy arguments in

compact form; a full treatment of these matters can be found in appendix III of volume II,

along with an extensive bibliography.

127
A Brief Framework of Civil

Liberties Concepts

U.S. society regards protection of individual

freedom and limitations on the exercise of

Government power as fundamental tenets of

the Republic. Some civil liberties interests,

such as the right of religious belief and exercise, receive very broad, near-absolute status;

other civil liberties interests, because their exercise has impact on public health and safety,

the rights of others, or national security, have

to be defined and applied by balancing competing social interests or conflicting civil liberties claims. The rise of new social and

economic settings, new technologies, and

complex urban life also require constant adaptation of the civil liberties concepts framed in

the 18th century Bill of Rights.

What distinguishes U.S. society from many

others, including some other democratic

systems, is the belief that protection of civil

liberty is so central to moral, political, and

legal values that serious limitations on liberty

should always be shown to be clearly necessary; that measures having such effects should

be kept to the minimum required in a given

circumstance; and that U.S. courts will weigh

the need for such measures and are empowered to declare unconstitutional any laws

or executive actions which transgress basic

liberties.

In the context of plutonium recycle

safeguards, the two aspects of civil liberties

which would be most directly involved are

free expression and fair procedure.

Free expression involves the guarantees of

free speech, press, assembly, association,

religion, and privacy protected by the First

Amendment to the Federal Constitution and

its State counterparts. Fair procedure, or due

process, involves the standards by which

Government investigatory activity should be

conducted and the procedures under which

Goverment makes formal determinations

about individuals, in both administrative proceedings and criminal trials.

While courts

and enforcing

United States,

128

play a central role in defining

constitutional rights in the

it is also tradition that the

legislatures and executive branches of Federal

and State governments are expected to be, and

often have been, strong guardians of the

citizen’s liberty. This means that debates over

the civil liberties implications of Government

programs such as plutonium recycle are

policy matters for elected officials and the

public to consider. What is good civil liberties

policy, therefore, is not merely a matter of

what the courts may have held to be constitutional law in prior-related situations. It is also

what elected officials and the American public

believe to be the best balance between liberty

and other social interests in a particular context. This public responsibility is especially

important in situations-of which plutonium

recycle is one—where it may be unlikely that

the courts will pass judgment in the early

phases. (The role of the courts in assessing the

civil liberties impacts of nuclear safeguards is

discussed in greater detail in appendix III of

volume II.)

Potential terrorist threats to obtain and use

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons pose

especially knotty problems of civil liberties

policy, Since dangers to human life and public

safety could be great, safeguards against such

activities must be strong and effective if public

confidence is to be preserved. Yet safeguard

measures which would sweep so widely as to

curtail basic liberties for substantial numbers

of people or for broad sectors of public life

could move our society toward the kind of

garrison-state environment that political terrorists hope to force upon democratic nations

to undermine the vitality of their social orders. Walking the line between underreaction

and overreaction is the goal of democratic

societies, and careful examination in advance

as how to draw that line is the context in

which we must examine both the decision to

develop and safeguard a plutonium industry

and the likely impact of various safeguard

measures on civil liberties.

The Most Likely Size of a

Plutonium Recycle Industry in the

Near Future

When the consideration of

and plutonium recycle first

civil liberties

arose during
1974-76, critics and supporters based their

arguments on projections that envisaged a

very large plutonium recycle industry in the

next 25 to 50 years. By the year 2020, these

early projections indicated that there would

be some 60 plutonium fabricating and

reprocessing plants and 2,000 reactors in the

United States, an extraordinarily large number of shipments per year of special nuclear

materials between fabricating plants ,

reprocessing plants, and storage sites; and a

plutonium work force of over 1 million persons.

Official and unofficial projections have

been scaled sharply downward during the

past year. The following table (figure V-4),

drawn from the Generic Environmental Statement on the use of Mixed Oxide Fuel

(GESMO), indicates the current projections of

components for a light water reactor industry

using uranium and plutonium recycle.

GESMO estimates that in 2000, 27,000 people

would be employed in the fuel cycle and

55,000 people in the nuclear electrical power

industry. Of these people, a maximum of

20,000 persons in the fuel cycle would be in

positions requiring clearances, 13,000 of

which would require full-field investigations.8 

The size of the employment force needed to

transport special nuclear material between

fabricating and reprocessing plants has

become a matter of uncertainty rather than

firm projection. If the decision were made to

colocate fabricating and reprocessing plants,

this would eliminate the need for shipping

pure plutonium offsite. Coprecipitation of

plutonium oxide and uranium oxide at the

reprocessing plant would also eliminate

transportation of pure plutonium.

The size and distribution of a plutonium industry is now seen as much smaller than

when the civil liberties impacts were first examined, and several major technological

~In March 1977, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

announced a proposed rule to require 4,000 employees

in 63 private nuclear reactors to get a security clearance

requiring full-field investigation, and 2,000 employees

in such plants to get the equivalent of a “confidential”

clearance, requiring a name check against national agency files. This program is aimed primarily at protecting

against reactor sabotage.

aspects remain either uncertain or are open to

choice rather than being technologically determined. How this affects the civil liberties

problems will be discussed later,

Safeguard Measures for a

Plutonium Industry and Their

Civil Liberties Implications

Current Federal law forbids th e

unauthorized possession of special nuclear

material or efforts to obtain it illegally, Extensive personnel and physical security programs

are used in military nuclear facilities, and in

Government shipments of special nuclear

material. The NRC’s recent announcement of

its intention to instaIl a clearance program for

employees of private nuclear reactors has

already been noted. There are comparable personnel and physical security programs outside

the nuclear industry to safeguard sensitive

facilities (gold depositories, intelligence

facilities); to screen out dangerous objects

(airports scanning for weapons); and

safeguard shipments of valuable or dangerous

objects (bank currency shipments, nerve gas).

This leads some commentators to conclude

that plutonium safeguards would differ only

in degree and not in kind from protective

programs that our society already employs.

However, other commentators point to the

extremely high level of harm that would be

done if a nuclear diversion and explosion

were successful (in numbers of deaths and

long-term radiation effects), and to the immense public fear of nuclear explosion that a

blackmail threat itself would generate. They

conclude that these risks are so great that a

plutonium safeguards program would have to

be different in kind, not merely degree. It

would have to be far more intense, permanent, and put more people outside the

plutonium industry under preventive or

responsive intelligence than anything presently in force.

There are several important points of agreement between these two views:

—If plutonium recycle is initiated, there

would be a genuine need for highsecurity measures. In other words, this

129
Figure V- 4

The Projected LWR Industry, 1980-2000* with U and Pu Recycle

I —

LWR Industry Components Number of Facilities 1

LWR’S

Mines**

Mills

UF6 Conversion Plants

Uranium Enrichment Plants

UO2 Fuel Fabrication Plants

Reprocessing Plants

MOX Plants

Federal Repositories for Storage

Plutonium Shipments in metric tons**

Commercial Burial Grounds —

“From Table S-10 of Final GESMO NUREG 0002, Vol. 1 Summary

● gFrom Page Xl-35 of Final GESMO NUREG 0002

would not be an instance where responsible critics would allege that there was

no need for any strong measures, as they

denied the presence of security risks

serious enough to justify passage of the

Alien or Sedition Laws in the 1790’s, the

Palmer round-ups of aliens in the 1920’s,

or the Joseph McCarthy investigations of

the 1950’s.

—In the general public debates over broad

police powers of arrest, search, and

seizure, some argue that work should be

done on the underlying problems that

cause high crime-such as unemployment or racial discrimination—rather

than allow police to use intrusive or

harsh techniques. In the case of potential

threats against plutonium plants,

however, there are no real prospects in

the foreseeable future of adopting national or international policies to remove

the causes of all political terrorism, individual derangement, or criminal conspiracies, thereby obviating the need for

high-security measures.

—No complete technological solution is

available, or is foreseen, that could entirely eliminate the need for other

safeguards measures which could raise

civil liberties issues.

1980

71

416

21

2

3

6

1

1

0

5 tons

6

1990

269

1,856

56

4

3

6

3

3

2

273 tons

6

507

4,125

77

5

5

7

5

8

2

1,170 tons

11

For example, the machine scanners used in

airport searches have made it unnecessary to

require pat-down searches of millions of air

travelers, thus providing a technological

measure of high acceptability to the courts

and the public. However, searches to recover

plutonium, if diverted, could not presently be

accomplished by radiation detection alone,

and it would be necessary to use some

measures that would have potential for violating civil liberties,

Having noted these areas of general agreement among observers of the safeguards

problem, the types of safeguards used in the

past in high-security contexts are described

and their civil liberties implications discussed.

These can be grouped under four headings:

employee screening; material production;

threat analysis; and recovery measures.

1. Employee screening ranges from

minimal national agency name checks

and questionnaires asking for detailed

personal histories to full-field investigations asking neighbors, forme r

employers, and associates about the

background, loyalty, character, and lifestyle of applicants for employment.

Screening may also entail the use of

polygraphs to measure physical and

emotional responses to questions about

130
2.

3.

suitability characteristics (use of drugs,

thefts, lying about previous activities) or

the use of psychological tests to investigate emotional and mental instability. All

of these techniques could be directed at

identifying employees who might use

their position to steal or sabotage nuclear

material. There are serious civil liberties

concerns over both the standards of conduct employed in such screening (such as

current denials of sensitive employment

to homosexuals) and the verification

techniques used (polygraphs and psychological tests, which have been attacked both as unreliable and as violations of privacy).

Material protection involves measures to

control access to or misuse of special

nuclear material. Some of these-such as

mechanical detection of radioactive

material, inspection of hand-carried

items, and personal identity checks-do

not raise serious civil liberties issues.

Other techniques, such as visual or audio

surveillance of workers on the job or patdown searches (frisking) of individuals

entering or leaving an area do raise civil

liberties issues.

Threat analysis would involve efforts to

obtain advance warning of diversion or

sabotage attempts, or to guide recovery

efforts should a successful diversion take

place. Overt intelligence checks of potential assailants usually entail investigative

techniques such as background inquiries,

checks of law enforcement intelligence

files, and physical surveillance. Covert

intelligence measures may include

electronic surveillance, surreptitious entries, use of informants and undercover

agents, mail openings, and similar

methods. While overt intelligence techniques may be both necessary and acceptable if limited to genuine potential terrorists, the classic civil liberties danger in

such activity is that the investigative net

is cast too widely, and covers large numbers of ideological dissidents. The covert

intelligence techniques also raise this

danger, exacerbated by the covert nature

of the privacy-invading methods.

Whether covert techniques are used

4.

under administrative controls or are subject to either judicial or legislative committee supervision, bears on the degree of

potential injury they will inflict.

Recoverv measures are potentiallv the

most dangerous to civil liberties. At the

low end of the spectrum in potential

harm are quarantines of the facility, fullscale searches of personnel, and searches

of surrounding areas by mechanical

(radioactivity) detectors. At the high end

of the spectrum, should other measures

fail, could be large-scale roundups of

suspects, room-by-room physical

searches by hand, wholesale evacuation

of populations from target areas, censorship of the press, and harsh interrogation

of persons strongly believed to be members of the diversion groups or who

know the location of stolen material.

With this brief overview of the kinds of

measures involved in safeguard

programs, the following section discusses

the estimate of civil liberties risks and

tradeoffs in the context of three main

positions about plutonium and civil

liberties developed over the past few

years.

Three Positions Widely Held in

U.S. Society as to the Civil Liberties

Risks of Plutonium Recycle

The positions described below have been

constructed from an analysis of public statements made by industry representatives,

scientific and legal experts, executive-agency

officials, members of Congress, public-interest

groups, and similar commentators. The

sources for their statements can be found in

appendix III of volume II.

Position One: A Plutonium Economy Would

Require Such Extensive Safeguards and

Curtailments of Civil Liberties That Its

Creation Would Jeopardize Free Society in

the United States.

This position makes a number of key

assumptions:

131

92-592 0- 77 -1 0
a. The presence of hundreds of thousands

of pounds of plutonium in reprocessing plants

or in transit—when 20 pounds would be

enough to make a nuclear explosive, and with

prevailing conditions of domestic and international terrorism—poses a situation so perilous

to public safety that only a far-reaching, zerorisk safeguards program would be sufficient

to protect the public. Therefore, that kind of

sweeping safeguard program is the one to envisage.

b. The immense potential consequences of a

nuclear diversion from inside or an assault

from outside would probably lead the courts

to uphold sweeping preventive intelligence

measures. The courts would be even more

likely to decline to interfere if Government

took Draconian measures in response to a

blackmail threat or nuclear incident. The

release of intelligence agencies and security

investigators from constitutional limits would

not only be harmful in itself but would also be

likely to stimulate surveillance and dossierbuilding in non-nuclear fields.

c. Even if a safeguards program were

originally set up with strong civil liberties

protection written into legislation or executive

orders, public reaction to foreseeable incidents

of diversion and blackmail, and certainly to

any successful explosion, would lead to the

dropping of such limitations and the adoption

of a maximum security program. Thus no

safeguards program can be expected to stay

limited as a plutonium economy continues for

any length of time.

d. The growing political movement opposing nuclear power will produce protest

demonstrations focused on highly visible

targets such as fuel-cycle facilities and

transportation. This will require harsh protective responses and produce serious confrontations.

e. Giving industrial security forces and corporate managements a role in collecting data

and managing security programs about

employees would be harmful to sound

employer-employee relations.

f. Given these likely consequences, and the

fact that alternative energy sources such as

coal or solar power require no such safeguard

measures, proponents of plutonium recycle

132

must prove to Congress and the public that no

other energy sources or conservation

programs can be developed to meet American

energy needs, even at higher but not unbearable economic costs.

Based on these assumptions, Position One

concludes:

. On civil liberties grounds alone, Congress should reject plutonium recyle.

. The United States should not export

plutonium recycle technology. This is

partly to diminish the threat of diverted

plutonium being smuggled into this

country by terrorists, thus creating the

need for extensive customs-search procedures. It is also urged in order to avoid

having the United States export a technology that would inhibit the evolution

of greater civil liberties in developing nations.

Position Two: Safeguards Can Be Adopted

For a Plutonium Industry That Would Be

Both Effective Against Threats and

Acceptable in Terms of Civil Liberties.

Position Two proceeds from the following

primary assumptions:

a. Operators of military and commercial

nuclear facilities have been managing

safeguard programs successfully for decades;

adapting these to the new scope and requirements of a plutonium economy would

therefore represent an expansion of present

operations, not a totally new venture.

b. It is unacceptable for a strong society

such as the United States to let potential

threats from a few terrorists, criminals, or disturbed people deprive the American economy

and the public of badly needed energy supply.

Nuclear power is economically competitive

with other sources, capable of safe use, and

environmentally sound. The need to

safeguard nuclear power facilities is no more a

reason for rejecting nuclear power than potential threats against other vulnerable

facilities, such as natural gas facilities, dams,

city water reservoirs or subway systems constitute good reason to close them down.

c. Whether the size of a plutonium work

force would be 20,000 or 1 million, it is
justified to set clearance standards for persons

who choose to work in that industry. This

deprives no one of her/his rights to pursue

gainful employment, even in the nuclear field,

as there will be many other nuclear research

and operating facilities beside the commercial

plutonium industry, The same justification of

voluntary choice with advance knowledge is

presently seen to justify other personnel

security measures in highly sensitive operations outside the nuclear field.

d. The intrusions into personal liberties of

workers, community residents, and diversion

suspects that would take place if a diversion

were detected or a nuclear blackmail threat

made—a wesome as those situations are—are

really no different than if nerve gas or a highly

dangerous bacteriological agent were stolen

from a civilian or military site. In all such

cases, preliminary investigation by professionals would establish the credibility of the

danger, negotiations would be weighed, and a

response pursued appropriate to the situation.

There is simply no way a democratic society

can eliminate the possibility of such episodes.

e. Regarding intelligence-gathering about

potential diverters, there is a need for obtaining intelligence about terrorist organizations

and other groups whose actual conduct indicates that they might use nuclear means of

violence. Legislation and regulations would

carefully spell out the operational limits of

such intelligence programs, both as to the

range of groups on which data would be collected and the methods used to do so.

Based on these assumptions, Position Two

reaches the following conclusions:

. After full public participation in a rulemaking proceeding addressing both

safeguards requirements and civil liberties considerations, the United States

should proceed with a plutonium licensing program.

. The United States should also proceed

with sales of plutonium recycle facilities

abroad, under a safeguards program that

would meet both U.S. and IAEA standards.

Position Three: An Acceptable Program of

Plutonium Safeguards is Possible But Only

If American Society is Willing to Run

Some Permanent Risks of Diversion In

Order to Keep Civil Liberties Risks at a

Low Level.

These assumptions underlie Position Three:

a. To adopt a zero-risk approach to

safeguards, or even to speak of holding threats

to negligible proportions, is to ensure that the

civil liberties costs of such a program will be

unbearably high. Once it is assumed that

reducing threats to near zero is the objective,

managers of a safeguards program would be

driven to adopt highly dangerous techniques

of personnel security and preventive intelligence.

b. Instead of this standard, there should be

adoption of a standard that would trade-off

some small risks of diversion against heavy

risks to basic civil liberties. Americans should

see the creation of a reasonable, efficient, and

freedom-respecting network of safeguards as

the approach to plutonium security.

c. This would mean deliberately rejecting

some widely proposed techniques of personnel screening, employee monitoring, and preventive-intelligence gathering on anti-nuclear

groups, not merely because many of these

techniques are of doubtful effectiveness but

because their civil liberties costs are too high.

In balancing slightly greater risks of diversion

against very heavy risks to basic freedoms, the

decision would have to be made to protect

freedoms.

d. A least restrictive alternative test can be

applied to each component of a safeguards

program. As a recent report to the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission put it:

We think it vital that such a “least restrictive alternative” approach be the keystone of

the NRC’s approach to the selection and

shaping of safeguards measures. In approaching a particular safeguards problem, the Commission should evaluate the impact on civil

liberties of each of the ways of solving that

problem. The factors to be considered in

evaluating the impact of various safeguards

measures on civil liberties should include the

following: (1) the extent of the intrusion on

personal liberties; (2) the frequency and per133
vasiveness of the intrusion on civil liberties

(Will it be part of a daily routine or will it

only occasionally be employed? Will its

effects be temporary and limited or long lasting?); (3) the number and types of individuals affected (employees in nuclear

plants, members of suspected terrorist

organizations or dissident groups, “innocent” members of the public); (4) the likelihood that a particular safeguards measure

will actually be employed; and (5) the likelihood that the same or similar invasions of

civil liberties will take place even if the

safeguards measure under consideration is

not employed.

e. For plutonium recycle to go forward,

such a set of fully articulated tradeoffs would

have to: be set out as the philosophy of a

safeguards program; be tested before the

public in a variety of hearings and proceedings; be fully accepted by the commercial

firms and Government regulatory agencies

most directly concerned; be written explicitly

into legislation and implementing regulations; be subjected to firm annual reporting

duties and legislative reviews; and have procedures created for both administrative appeals and judicial review.

f. It would be especially important to a

proper safeguards program that the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission not simply turn over

to the discretion of the FBI the conduct of preventive intelligence for plutonium security, or

leave the decisionmaking responsibility in a

recovery effort or diversion response to ad

hoc developments among Federal, State, and

local officials. These activities, because they

are among the most important for civil liberties, should be defined and supervised by the

NRC, possibly with a congressional oversight

role.

g. Holding to this line would involve continually reaffirming the bargain in the face of

probable low-level and possible high-level incidents. This would mean that the American

public would have to hold the line of moderation, refusing to let itself be stampeded by

gTimothy B. Dyk, Daniel Marcus, and William J.

Kolasky, Jr., Civil Liberties Zmp/ications O) a Safeguards

Program for Special Nuclear Material in the Private Nuclear

Power Industry, a report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 31, 1975.

demagogues, and forcing sufficient public

supervision to prevent the program being

subverted by secret government.

Based on these assumptions, Position Three

draws the following policy conclusions:

●

●

Congress should go forward with a fulldress review of the need of plutonium

recycle to meet America’s future energy

demands, and of whether this process

can be made environmentally and

physically safe. If the answer to these inquiries is yes, then Congress should

receive from NRC a fully worked out

plan for safeguards, which then would be

publicly reviewed and implemented.

Position Three takes no stand on the

desirability or civil liberties risks of selling plutonium technology abroad.

Observations and Comments on the Three

Positions

The effort to isolate key differences among

the three major positions obviously produces

some rigidity in stating premises and conclusions. Someone may share one or more premises of a position without reaching the same

final conclusion as the advocates of that position. For example, a person may believe that

the voluntary nature of employment in a

plutonium industry justifies personnel

clearances without concluding that it justifies

more intrusive techniques, such as polygraph

examinations. Also, the differences between

Position One (which would forego plutonium

recycle because of civil liberties concerns) and

the other two positions (which would go forward with plutonium recycle with different

steps to solve civil liberties problems) are

clearly more marked than the differences between Positions Two and Three.

There is also a sense in which each of the

three positions outlined is partially right.

— Position One points correctly to the

dangers of so much plutonium being

handled in a world of terror and

mishap; the public pressure that could

be created to use Draconian safeguards

measures; and the highly optimistic

assumptions as to unbroken national

134
responsibilities and moderation on

which both Positions Two and Three

rest their faith,

— Position Two reminds us that the year

2020 will come gradually, allowing a —

plutonium economy to develop slowly;

safeguards could therefore be developed

step by step, modifying the technology,

physical locations, plant design, shipment procedures, and many other elements as it went along.

— Position Three suggests persuasively

that it has been a traditional feature of

American pragmatism to resist either/or

choices, seeking ways to trade off one

set of risks against another to preserve

both liberty and order.

It is helpful also to examine the effect of

some altered assumptions of safeguard approaches on these positions, and some of their

weaker points.

— The concerns of Position One about

diversion of special nuclear material

during transportation would be greatly

reduced if collocation of reprocessing

and fabrication facilities or coprocessing

(without collocation) completely eliminated transportation of weapons

material. Similarly, concerns about

assaults by outsiders would diminish if

facilities containing material usable in

weapons were convincingly designed to —

prevent removal of weapons material

even by a large, heavily armed band.

Such successful defenses for colocated

facilities could reduce or eliminate the

need for offsite security measures such

as surveillance and dossier-building on

members of the public. Finally, if the

number of people in the plutonium industry who would be subjected to full

background investigations and would

be periodically subjected to on-job surveillance were very limited in number

(such as several tens of thousands), the

number of people affected is less than

presently exists in the defense industry

or other sensitive private activities. It is

not clear, however, what number of

employees must be affected in order to

reach a point of civil liberties concern;

some people would regard 20,000 as an

acceptable number for such intensive

security measures; others might accept

only lower numbers.

The assurances contained in Position

Two would be disputed by many

knowledgeable persons. It is not proven

that the past and present safeguards

system has been totally successful,

Because of the significant amounts of

unaccounted for material accumulated

over the last 20 years, the possibility

that diversions have already occurred

cannot be dismissed. However, none of

this material has ever been involved in a

weapons threat. (Note that all weapons

threats received to date have been hoaxes. See chapter V and appendix III,

volume II.) Nor is it clear that Position

One is correct in saying that an expanded plutonium industry merely

represents a difference in degree, not in

type. In cases where a plutonium facility

becomes a major or dominant employer

in a community, there is less freedom of

choice for residents as to whether they

accede to the security restrictions or

refuse to work at the facility. In small

rural communities the company-town

syndrome may appear, making it

difficult for employees to resist extensive security measures.

As for Position Three, past experience

with security officers makes many persons doubtful about the possibility of

containing a security program to least

restrictive security procedures, Security

personnel are prone to seek tighter

measures; professionally, they tend to

seek foolproof techniques that threaten

infringement of civil liberties. Even with

tight internal security and strong

perimeter defenses, it is likely that

security personnel would want to

employ positive intelligence (e.g., surveillance and informers to identify potential attackers or critics). Also, the addition of ombudsmen or public advocates to the system to protect against

unwarranted security intrusions is subject to the well-known danger that constant proximity to security processes

135
render them too sensitive to the needs of

the security forces. Finally, Position

Three may be ignoring the resulting

effect of a successful diversion if

followed by major threat or actual

casualties. It is not clear that the original

limited safeguards system contemplated

by Position Three would survive the

pressures of an outraged public determined to prevent any further incidents.

In trying to decide which one or combination of these views is right and therefore

should be used in policymaking, it should be

recognized that this is not a problem that can

be put to the tests of either logic or empirical

investigation. The reality is that each of these

positions rests, fundamentally, on sociopolitical judgments as to how the U.S.

Government and public opinion have dealt in

the past with threats to national security (real

or assumed); how Government and commercial security forces would be likely to carry

out a safeguards program; how much privacy,

dissent, protest, and cultural diversity our

civil liberties traditions demand or our society

should encourage; and how the American

public would probably respond to diversions,

blackmail threats, or a nuclear explosion, in

terms of its shocked post-incident attitudes

toward the scope of safeguards measures.

There is also no good decision guide in the

way other industrialized democracies are

dealing with the plutonium recycle issue. In

Britain, for example, the debate over

plutonium and civil liberties is in almost exactly the same stage as in this country. There is

support in British Government documents,

parliamentary reports, commercial industry

materials, and civic-group literature for each

of the three positions outlined above.

In conclusion, the choice between the total

ban on plutonium advocated by Position One

and the acceptance of plutonium recycle by

Positions Two and Three (though with

different conceptions of how to conduct a

safeguards program) is likely to be made on a

total package basis by U.S. society, not on the

basis of the civil liberties considerations alone.

Indeed, the civil liberties aspects really tend to

reinforce the existing orientations of each of

the main contending parties debating the

value and risks of plutonium recycle as an

energy source.

The single most important conclusion suggested by this review is that if a plutonium industry as described earlier in figure V-4 were

to be pursued in the near future, steady attention would need to be paid by Congress, the

executive agencies, public-interest groups,

and the courts to the way in which safeguards

are defined, administered, monitored, and

reviewed. Keeping a plutonium safeguards

program consistent with civil liberties would

become an important, continuing task of those

who cherish American freedom.

136
—

Chapter VI

Nuclear Weapons
—

Chapter VI

Nuclear Weapons

The resources required for the design and construction of nuclear explosives

are examined in this chapter. Peaceful nuclear explosives (PNE) are also

analyzed to understand their practicality in view of the possibility of weapons

tests conducted under a PNE guise. Finally the potential use of nonexplosive

nuclear weapons is described under “Radiological Weapons” in this chapter.

NUCLEAR FISSION EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS

A nation that decides to develop nuclear explosive weapens must commit certain

resources to the program. The requirements

depend on the complexity and quantity of the

weapons desired, but a minimal weaponsdevelopment program is of particular relevance to proliferation control. This chapter examines the manpower, money, equipment,

and time required for such a program. The

level of effort required for a non-state adversary to produce a crude nuclear explosive is

also considered.

Fissile material is the critical component of

a nuclear explosive. Several different materials

are considered: U

233 and U235 in varying

enrichments, and Pu239 with various concentrations of plutonium isotopes, particularly Pu240

. Large amounts of all these

 materials are, or may be, involved in the

worldwide nuclear power industry. Two

fissile byproducts of nuclear operations, Np237

and Pu238 are also considered. This chapter

analyzes the quantities of various materials

required for a practical nuclear explosive and

reviews the threshold quantities at which

physical security safeguards are required by

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Resources

The minimal weapons program described

here is necessarily restricted to designs of

relatively low complexity. Devices depending

on thermonuclear components have been excluded, and attention has been devoted to

those straightforward patterns of assembly

that would be the easiest to realize.

A range of minimal efforts exists. At the upper end of this range is a national effort whose

aim is to produce a small stockpile of nuclear

explosive weapons. An important class of national programs to consider is a clandestine

effort to produce, without nuclear testing, a first

weapon which is very confidently expected to

have a substantial nuclear yield.

At the lower end of the minimal range is a

small non-national group (for example, a terrorist or criminal group) whose objective is

the crude fabrication of a single nuclear explosive device.

In the discussion which follows, it has been

assumed that adequate supplies of fissile

material have been made available.

Preceding page blank 139
National Program

A minimal national program would call for

a group of more than a dozen well-trained

and very competent persons, having experience in many fields of science and

engineering and access to the open technical

literature. They would need a staff of technicians, diverse laboratory facilities, and a fieldtest facility capable of handling experiments

with large high-explosive charges. This group

would further need the financial and

organizational structures to fabricate or

purchase on the open market a variety of

items required for the assembly mechanism

and for the (non-nuclear) test instrumentation.

If these requirements are met, and the

program is efficiently and competently carried

out, the objective could be attained approximately 2 years after the start of the program

at a cost of a few tens of millions of dollars.

This estimate does not include the time and

money to obtain the fissile material or to

establish a modest scientific, technical, and

organizational infrastructure. The estimate

also does not include the cost of a delivery

system. It should be realized, however, that in

many circumstances the delivery system could

be quite crude.

Some details of the effort, including composition of the technical group, would depend

on whether a gun-assembly weapon or an implosion weapon were built. However, the expenditures of manpower, money, and time

would not differ significantly for the two

types of weapons. (See the discussion of lowtechnology design below.)

The success or failure of the effort described

above in producing a militarily effective

nuclear explosive is far more dependent on

the competence of the people involved than on

the technological problems themselves. In trying to evaluate the potential of a specific

nuclear weapons development program,

detailed knowledge of the strengths and

weaknesses of personnel is more valuable

than details of the technological base of the

country.

In the context of the national effort discussed

above, competence involves more than the

140

proper credentials (i.e., university degrees).

For the group to be competent, the members

must have a degree of creativity and intuition.

However, a high degree of inventiveness is

not required. Geniuses are not needed. What

is needed is a group that has the ability to do

absolutely sound work, both theoretically and

experimentally, and independently arrive at

correct judgments.

The level of technological effort put forth in

the minimal national program can be called

low technology. Low technology encompasses

the sort of nuclear device designs that would

likely be produced for a first use or first test.

This requires techniques which allow high

confidence without prior nuclear test experience. This could be characterized as 1945

U.S. technology. A discussion of low-technology design is given below.

Non-National Program

At the low end of the minimal range of

effort, a small group of people, none of whom

have ever had access to the classified

literature, could possibly design and build a

crude nuclear explosive device. They would

not necessarily require a great deal of technological equipment or have to undertake any

experiments. Only modest machine-shop

facilities that could be contracted for without

arousing suspicion would be required. The financial resources for acquisition of necessary

equipment on open markets need not exceed a

fraction of a million dollars. The group would

have to include, at a minimum, a person capable of searching and understanding the technical literature in several fields and a jack-ofall-trades technician. Again, it is assumed that

sufficient quantities of fissile material have

been provided,

The actual construction of even a crude

nuclear explosive would be at least as difficult

as the design itself. The small non-national

group described above would probably not be

able to develop an accurate prediction of the

yield of their device. The device could be a

total failure, because of either faulty design or

faulty construction. Here again, a great deal

depends on the competence of the group; if it
is deficient, not only is the chance of producing a total failure increased, but the chance

that a member of the group might suffer

serious or fatal injury would be quite real.

However, there is a clear possibility that a

clever and competent group could design and

construct a device which would produce a significant nuclear yield (i.e., a yield muchI greater

than the yield of an equal mass of high explosive).

Low-Technology Nuclear

Explosives

Low-technology devices can be fabricated

from any fissile material that has sufficient

concentrations of U235, U233, or plutonium.

The different critical masses of these materials

require different amounts of fissile material

for constructing nuclear explosives of

basically similar design. Other significant distinctions of these materials are their radioactivity and their inherent neutron background.

These two properties affect their handling and

fabrication, the variety of assembly schemes

available for use, and, to some extent, the yield

potentials of low-technology devices.

With respect to radioactivity and handling

characteristics, U235 clearly offers the least

difficulty. U233 is considerably more radioactive, and this problem is compounded by a

small impurity content of U232, which decays

through a long chain to thallium–208 which

emits penetrating and intense gamma radiation. Plutonium presents serious handling

problems, principally because intense alpha

radiation causes it to be very toxic when inhaled as a dust, Reactor-grade plutonium is

several times more radioactive than weaponsgrade plutonium but the radiation levels encountered with either are practically the same

compared to the much lower radiation levels

encountered with U

235 . 1 Radioactivity

problems are manageable for all these sub1 The material commonly called weapons-grade

plutonium contains primarily plutonium–239 and less

than 7 percent of the undesirable isotope

plutonium–240. Reactor-grade plutonium has a larger

percentage of this isotope and is produced in most commercial power reactors under normal operating conditions.

stances, especially for anyone with reactorfuel handling capability.

The impact of neutron background requires

discussion. The neutron background can come

from many sources. There are neutrons present at all times because of cosmic ray activity,

but this background is quite small. The major

source in fissile material is from spontaneous

fission. For one kilogram of U235, spontaneous

fission produces approximately one neutron

per second. The spontaneous fission rates of

weapons-grade plutonium and typical reactor-grade plutonium are 60,000 and 300,000

times higher, Another source of neutrons is

the alpha-n reaction. In this case, radioactive

decay of the fissile isotope yields alpha particles, some of which then collide with impurities such as boron, carbon, or oxygen to

yield neutrons.

The classic problem presented by background neutrons is that of prenitiation of the

nuclear-fission chain reaction. In order to

assemble fissionable material to produce a

nuclear explosion, a subcritical mass (or

masses) of material must be rapidly moved

into a configuration which has a level of

supercriticality sufficient to produce a significant nuclear yield before it blows itself apart.

Preinitiation in a nuclear explosive is defined

as the initiation of the neutron chain reaction

before the desired degree of supercriticality

has been achieved. Because the nuclear yield

depends upon the degree of supercriticality at

the time the chain reaction is initiated,

preinitiation will result in a lower yield.

However, initiation is a statistical process and

can be understood using statistical techniques.

Preinitiation, by itself, does not necessarily

make an explosive unreliable. Preinitiation

does result in a statistical uncertainty in the

yield. Another way to state this is that the

probable nuclear yield is statistically distributed between predictable upper and lower

limits, which are likely to be more than a factor of 10 apart. For a well-understood design

properly constructed, however, the most

probable yield range could be predicted within much closer limits.

In some low technology assembly designs,

preinitiation can cause the nuclear yield to be

141
so low that it is effectively zero. However,

there are low-technology assembly designs

where the lowest yield because of preinitiation

is still militarily significant.

It is widely known that there are two basic

methods of assembling fissile material in a

nuclear explosive. The first method is to

assemble two (or more) subcritical masses by

the use of gun propellants. This is commonly

referred to as a gun-assembled nuclear

weapon.

In a gun-type device, the velocities of

assembly that can be obtained in practice,

although high in everyday terms, are still so

small that unless the neutron background is

low, all or most of the nuclear yields realized

will be virtually zero.

A second method is to compress a subcritical configuration of fissile material into a

supercritical mass by use of a high explosive

surrounding the material. This assembly is

commonly referred to as an implosion

weapon and can be used to assemble the fissile

material very rapidly. The velocity of assembly is much higher than can be achieved in

gun assemblies, Also, because of the material

compression, less fissile material is required to

reach any given level of supercriticality. The

very rapid assembly allows use of fissile

material with higher neutron background

than can be used in gun-assembled devices.

Said another way, for a given level of neutron

background in the fissile material, the probability of preinitiation is reduced by use of the

faster implosion assembly.

Highly enriched U235 or U233 or plutonium

can be used to produce effective weapons by

use of low-technology implosion designs. A

low-technology gun-assembled system would

give effectively zero nuclear yield if

plutonium were used.

It is widely believed that gun assembly is

the simpler way to produce a nuclear explosive. Although the gun assembly may be

conceptually simpler, the difficulty of actually

constructing a nuclear explosive is roughly

equivalent whether a gun or implosion assembly is used. The difficulties of the gun assembly are often not appreciated: a large mass of

high density must be accelerated to a high

speed in a short distance, putting quite

unusual requirements on the gun design.

Yields of Low-Technology Nuclear

Explosives

Using low-neutron background materials

(i. e., U235, U233 , and weapons-grade

plutonium), it is possible to design low-technology devices to produce yields reliably up to

the equivalent of 10 or 20 kilotons of TNT. For

high-neutron background materials (e.g.,

reactor-grade plutonium), low-technology

devices will have probable yields lower than

those where low-neutron background

materials are used. The probable yields could

be lower by a factor of 3 to 10 or more (depending on the design); but yields in the

kiloton range could be accomplished.

Thus, militarily useful weapons with reliable nuclear yields in the kiloton range can be

constructed with reactor-grade plutonium,

using low technology.

The

After

plosive,

courses

Second Stage of a National

Program

the construction of its first nuclear exa country might follow one of several

in its weapons-development program.

It might merely choose to continue making

and stockpiling weapons similar to its first,

with no nuclear testing or expansion of its

program.

Alternatively, the nation might proceed to

develop weapons that are militarily more

useful than its first low-technology explosive.

From purely technical considerations, this second course is entirely possible.

A likely objective of a second-stage national

program would be the development of

weapons of similar yield to its first low-technology explosive, but with one or more of the

following improvements:

(a) markedly smaller physical size;

(b) composed of significantly less fissile

material;

(c) narrower range of uncertainty of yield,

Alternatively, a nation might concentrate on

142
producing weapons with significantly higher

yield than its first explosive. These objectives

could be achieved using reactor-grade

plutonium.

The greater complexity of such designs

would require greatly expanded resources of

manpower, funds, and equipment. A few

nuclear tests would be an essential part of the

expanded program.

The expanded program could not be clandestine and would require several years to

achieve significant advances.

Thresholds of Fissile Material for

Setting Physical Security

Requirements

Materials containing U

235 , U233 , and

plutonium can be used for making fission explosives only if these isotopes are sufficiently

concentrated. For each isotope, a minimum

concentration of that isotope in U238 can be

specified, below which the mixture is not usable in a practical nuclear explosive. The

minimum concentration for U235 has been

specified at 20 percent (i.e., one part U235 to

four parts U238) for many years. There appears

to be no reason to change this.

The bare-sphere critical mass of metallic 20

percent U235 and 80 percent U238 is about 850

kg (i.e., about 1,900 pounds). This critical

mass can be reduced by a factor of two or

three by surrounding the sphere of fissile

material with some substance, such as iron,

uranium, or beryllium, in order to reflect

neutrons back into the fissile material.

However, the size and weight of the combination of reflector and fissile material will not be

substantially less than that of the bare sphere,

and may even be greater. Finally, the assembly

system, whether gun or implosion, adds substantially to the size and weight of a nuclear

explosive.

Thus, if any fissile material is mixed with

U238 with such low concentration of the fissile

isotope that the bare-sphere metallic critical

mass is greater than about 850 kg, the material

could not be used to construct a nuclear explosive of practical weight.

Detailed calculations show that the above

criterion sets the following thresholds for

U

2 3 5

, U

2 3 3

, an d

U

235 to U2 3 8

U

233 to U2 3 8

P U

239 to U

2 3 8

reactor-grade

plutonium to

U

2 3 8

plutonium mixed with U238:

2

1:4

1:7

1:7

1:6

(i.e. 20 percent concentration of U235)

(i.e. about 12 percent concentration of U233)

(i.e. about 12 percent concentration of Pu239)

(i.e. about 14 percent concentration of reactor-grade

plutonium)

Below these concentrations, the total weight of

the explosive would be so large as to make it

impractical.

The United States currently requires physical security on strategic amounts of uranium

enriched to 20 percent or more in U235. The

850 kg bare-sphere metallic critical mass criterion provides a basis for consistent

safeguard requirements for U233 or U235 i n

U

2 3 8

.

For other materials such as plutonium in

U

238, and for U235, U233, or plutonium mixed

with Th232, the criterion is still applicable for

safeguards requirements. s In these cases,

however, highly concentrated fissile material

could be obtained by chemical rather than

isotopic separation. Chemical separation is

considerably less difficult than isotopic

separation, and is likely to remain so despite

potential advances in enrichment technology.

The United States currently requires physical protection for 2 kg or more of plutonium, 2

kg or more of U233, and 5 kg or more of U235

(contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent

or more). There appears to be no compelling

technical reasons to change these mass

thresholds for physical security. However,

consideration has been given to these

thresholds only in the context of use of

materials for fission explosives, and not in the

2 Private communication, Robert W. Selden, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

3 Because uranium is not soluble in thorium, a metal

alloy is not possible; the criteria thus should be applied

to powder mixtures or mixtures of oxides.

143
context of use in dispersal weapons. (See do not constitute a problem at this time. The

“Radiological Weapons,” end of this chapter.) isotope P

2 3 8

, which is widely used for

isotopic power sources, is also a fissile

Similar safeguards threshold properties material (comparable to Pu229 in this respect).

should be formulated for other fissile However, it is so intensely radioactive and

byproducts of peaceful nuclear operations, generates so much heat that it would be ennotably neptunium–237, when and if they tirely impractical for use in a nuclear-fission

become generally accessible. They probably explosive weapon,

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

A nation that has clandestinely developed a

nuclear weapon may require a test to confirm

its design or to collect data for a more

sophisticated weapons program. Because

bomb tests larger than 10 10 kt are unlikely to

escape detection, the nation might be deterred

by the spectre of international repercussions—

except for one loophole. The nation could

claim that the explosion was for peaceful purposes, exactly as India did. Even existing

nuclear states might use peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) as a cover for weapons tests

because the two are technically indistinguishable. Thus, PNEs have been a major obstacle in arms-control negotiations for a

comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). Such a

treaty could in itself deter proliferation by

providing an example of self-restraint on the

part of the nuclear powers. A double effect of

PNEs, therefore, is to detract from disincentives to proliferation and provide a cover for

those who do proliferate.

Only recently have such concerns over the

abuses of PNEs begun to outweigh the hopes

for benefits from them. Beginning in the late

1950’s, the United States actively researched

and promoted domestic applications of

nuclear explosions under its Plowshare

Program. Many non-nuclear weapons states

grew so interested in the promises of the technology that a PNE provision in the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) became an important incentive for their signature. In return for

their agreement to refrain from developing

any kind of nuclear explosion, these nations

were guaranteed access to any benefits of

PNEs on a nondiscriminatory, low-as-possible-cost basis,

A look at some of these possible beneficial

applications of nuclear explosions is war144

ranted to understand if they are fulfilling their

original promise and if they are worth

preserving or promoting, The technology of

PNEs is reviewed in appendix II of volume II.

In brief, the applications fall into two categories: excavations and contained explosions.

The United States abandoned its plans for excavation projects in 1969 because the technology was immature and inflexible, and the

radiation release constituted both a health

hazard and a violation of the Limited Test Ban

Treaty. The U. S. S. R., however, created a reservoir with a nuclear explosion and is seriously

interested in using them to make more reservoirs and to excavate mountainous portions of

a canal route, The PNE applications mentioned by non-nuclear weapons states have

been mainly excavations. Among these are

canal projects studied by Egypt and Thailand.

The applications of contained nuclear explosions include several that would help exploit energy and mineral reserves. Examples

are stimulation of gas and oil recovery (including oil shale), creation of storage cavities,

and fracture of ore bodies to permit mining by

leaching. A comprehensive study of contained

PNE applications in the United States was

completed in 1975 for the Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency (ACDA) by the Gulf

Universities Research Consortium, Their

charge was to project the use of PNE technology up to the year 1990. Their report indicates that some of the proposed projects might

be economically attractive, but not in the next

decade and not before a great many technical

unknowns and adverse environmental effects

are resolved. The only application—albeit a

limited one—that does not seem to have nonnuclear alternatives is the use by the U.S.S.R.

to seal runaway gas-well fires.
Because of these many difficulties, the

United States has ceased its former role of promoting PNEs. After having spent $160 million

on the Plowshare Program, the United States

currently allots about $1 million per year and

has shown a willingness to forgo PNEs

altogether. The Soviet interest on the other

hand has increased as that of the United States

has waned, although they appear to have entered a period of questioning now.

Implementation of the PNE provisions of

the NPT has been assigned to the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which seems

to see a limited role for itself. It acts as an information clearinghouse and proposes to

assist with feasibility studies. (It recently conducted a preliminary review of the Egyptian

canal project. ) An ad hoc advisory group has

been assembled to consider future activities.

Very few requests for information have been

received by the IAEA, and this apparent lack

of interest in PNEs by non-nuclear weapons

states perhaps parallels the slow maturation

and diminished promise of the technology.

Nevertheless, even an NPT nation with no

previous plans to use PNEs might legitimately

want to keep open the option or resent the discriminatory approach of the NPT, which

allows the development of PNEs only to

weapons states.

The slow implementation of the PNE services can also provide justification for a nonsigner to stay outside the NPT and even to

develop its own “peaceful nuclear explosion. ”

This veil is quite transparent, however. The

nation would have to make its claim credible

by manifesting a carefully planned agenda of

potential PNE applications. Interestingly, India has only vague plans and has not requested any IAEA assistance. These PNE plans

would have to justify the large and sophisticated development program required for a real

PNE: An effective PNE must be inexpensive,

physically small, and yield minimal amounts

of radiation, in contrast to the “low-technology” nuclear weapon described earlier.

A more indirect but nonetheless substantial

effect of PNEs on the NPT results from their

impact on arms control negotiations. Since the

1968 signing of the NPT, wherein the nuclear

weapons states agreed to move towards disarmament, the only test bans that have been

negotiated between the United States and the

U.S.S.R, are the 1974 Threshold Test Ban

Treaty (TTBT) and its associated 1976 Treaty

on Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET, still unratified). The PNET

places the same upper limit of 150 kilotons on

explosions as the TTBT because both sides admitted that no one can verify that PNEs are

not being used for weapons development,

even with the unique PNET feature of onsite

inspections. This limit places very little

restraint on weapons testing. The separate

status accorded to PNEs will make further

reductions more difficult to achieve and will

hinder progress toward a comprehensive test

ban. The separation was made at the insistence of the U.S.S.R.

In the face of such technological and political ambivalence, the present U.S. course has

been to proceed with a low level of research

on major uses of PNEs and move slowly and

cautiously toward providing PNE services to

NPT signees. This course appears neatly to encompass all three major dangers of PNEs: hindering progress toward a CTB, retarding

membership in the NPT, and providing excuses for nations to develop their own nuclear

bombs.

An alternative course could be to temporarily ban all testing of PNEs pending a less

ambiguous demonstration of a beneficial and

viable application. Research could continue

on non-nuclear aspects of the applications. International opinion is not conducive to a permanent ban at this time, but that could change

if the promise of the technology continues to

be limited. Even a temporary ban could ease

progress toward a CTB,

A step in the opposite direction would be to

establish an international service to provide

PNEs to all nations regardless of their membership in the NPT. This action would eliminate the excuse for development of an indigenous PNE. The very existence of such a

service, however, would tend to condone

nuclear explosions in general.

Until international agreement can be

reached on some action, PNEs will remain a

difficult problem.

145
RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Radiological weapons are defined to be

devices for dispersal of radioactive materials,

produced a substantial time before their dispersal (e.g., not in a nuclear explosion) for any

of the following purposes:

a.

b.

c.

d.

Killing people within a short time (less

than a few weeks).

Killing people, or causing severe illness,

after a long time (weeks to many years).

Damaging property through short-term

contamination to levels that require

evacuation to prevent severe effects on

occupants.

Damaging property through long-term

contamination, to low levels that would

deny access to or use of an area if present

occupany or use standards for the

general population were enforced.

Targets for dispersal could be:

a. High concentrations of people inside

buildings; dispersal as aerosol introduced into air-conditioning or ventilation systems.

b. High concentrations of people outside

(e.g., crowded urban streets or sports

events),

c. Urban areas as a whole, with highpopulation density, to affect people and

property inside and outside buildings.

d. Large urban, suburban, or rural nonagricultural areas, primarily to deny access and require expensive decontamination. The dispersal might even be

designed specifically not to produce any

significant acute health effects.

e. Agricultural area, primarily to deny access and use.

In principle, any radioactive substance

could be used in a radiological weapon. A

number of radioactive isotopes are in

widespread use outside the nuclear power industry, in hospitals, universities, research institutions, and industrial research and

manufacturing facilities. Most of these applications have nothing to do with nuclear

power research or applications. For example,

cobalt–60 is widely used in treatment

facilities in hospitals; strontium–90 and

146

cesium– 137 are used in measuring gauges in

several industrial applications; radioactive

sources of all kinds, some of them quite

strong, are kept in university laboratories.

Several incidents of theft of such sources have

occurred in the United States and abroad, and

at least one incident of deliberate (although

not lethal) dispersal has occurred. (See appendix III of volume II.)

Most theoretical attention, however, has

focused on the use of plutonium, spent fuel, or

waste from spent fuel in radiological

weapons. Such materials could be dispersed

either by an aerosol generator (perhaps after

dissolution), or by the use of attached chemical explosives, depending on the material, the

objective, and the target.

Small quantities of nuclear material not subject to physical security safeguards could be

dispersed in ways that would cause many

prompt and/or delayed deaths and require expensive decontamination. However, there are

also many generally available, publicly

described, chemical and biological agents that

could be as effective, or more so, than radioactive agents as weapons for killing people

and/or contaminating property.

No known cases of deliberate dispersal of

plutonium, U

233, spent fuel, or waste from

spent fuel have occurred in the United States,

at least since 1969, when the AEC began compiling complete statistics of such nuclear incidents.

The available records from the rest of the

world are less complete; one case of spent-fuel

waste dispersal may have been plotted, but

was not executed.

Radiological weapons could be the subject

of a hoax as well as the basis of a real threat.

Although threats to detonate a nuclear explosive have proved more popular with

hoaxers to date than threats to disperse

radioactive material, the latter type of hoax is

potentially more troublesome. It would be

easier to mount a technically credible dispersal

hoax than a nuclear explosive hoax. However,

hoax identification does not rely on technical

,
assessment alone. (See appendix III, volume

II.)

In conclusion, a large number of toxic substances, including plutonium and other

radioactive isotopes, could conceivably be

used by groups or individuals for effectively

attacking large numbers of people or causing

considerable property damage by denial of

use or expensive decontamination. The question of imposing effective physical security

safeguards to prevent theft or diversion of

nonradioactive toxic substances in widespread

use has apparently not been assessed, but appears on the surface to be extraordinarily

difficult and perhaps not feasible. It does not

appear reasonable to require safeguards for

small quantities of nuclear or other radioactive materials in the absence of consideration

of safeguards on nonradioactive toxic substances.

147

92-592 0-77 - 11
Chapter Vll

I

Sources of Nuclear Material

Preceding page blank
Chapter VII

Sources of Nuclear Material

A nation planning the development of nuclear weapons has several options

for obtaining fissile material. Diversion from commercial nuclear power facilities

has received the greatest attention recently: nuclear material could be obtained

through the evasion of safeguards or the use of unsafeguarded facilities, possibly

following abrogation of safeguarding agreements. The other routes are the construction of dedicated facilities, such as a small plutonium production reactor or

a weapons-grade enrichment plant, and purchase or theft of weapons material or

complete weapons. Each of these routes is subject to constraints and each country will weigh the options differently depending on its own resources,

capabilities, political situation, and intentions.

DIVERSION FROM COMMERCIAL POWER SYSTEMS

Although none of the nations that have

nuclear weapons have obtained them by this

means, it is possible that a nation could extract

the fissile material needed for nuclear

weapons from its commercial nuclear power

systems. This section will examine existing

reactors and several under development,

along with their complete fuel cycles. With

this background, the relative difficulty of

diversion from each system can be understood

and compared. In the past, resistance to diversion has not been a parameter in the design of

nuclear power systems. As diversion is increasingly seen as a problem, research is

beginning on reducing the vulnerability of existing systems. Some preliminary conceptual

work has also been done on reactor systems

that are inherently resistant to diversion,

The Fuel Cycle

The flow of nuclear material in a commercial power program—from the mine, through

the reactor, to disposal or reuse—is called the

nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear materials of interest for either an explosive or a powerplant

are those that release extra neutrons and

energy when they fission, or split apart. Such

fissile isotopes are not abundant in nature,

although some are produced as a byproduct of

power production: neutrons striking certain

nuclei will convert them, after a short decay

chain, to fissile isotopes.

Two general fuel cycles exist, each based on

a different element. In the uranium cycle, the

isotope U238 does not fission easily but does

breed a fissile isotope of plutonium, Pu239. A

fissile isotope U235 is also present in natural

uranium. In the thorium cycle, the thorium

isotope Th232 breeds the fissile isotope, U233

.

Within each of these fuel cycles, quantities and

concentrations of various isotopes, and the

procedures for processing them, vary with the

particular reactor type.

The two types of nuclear power reactors

available on the world market today both use

151

Preceding page blank
the uranium fuel cycle. These are light water

reactors (LWRS) developed by the United

States and Canadian heavy water reactors

(CANDU). Others which have been largely

developed and could be deployed in the near

future are the high-temperature gas reactor

(HTGR), and the advanced gas-cooled reactor

(AGR). Most development effort in several

advanced countries is focused on the liquid

metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR), but commercialization is not expected for at least 10

years. Development of another breeder reactor, the light water breeder reactor (LWBR) is

proceeding at a slower pace.

All these reactors, plus a few others that

could become important, are described in

detail (along with their fuel cycles) in volume

II, appendix V. Because they are of immediate

interest, the fuel cycles and diversion potential

of LWRS and CANDUS will be summarized in

this section. The LMFBR, LWBR, and thorium

cycle in general will also be examined briefly

in this chapter. Research plans on alternate

fuel cycles are briefly summarized. Conceptual studies on inherently nonproliferating

reactors are described at the end of this section. Safeguards to prevent and/or detect

diversion are discussed under “Safeguards” in

chapter VIII.

Light Water Reactors

Technical Description

The common types of light water reactors

differ in the coolant they use-either boiling

water (as in BWRS) or pressurized water (as in

PWRS). They present identical problems for

proliferation prevention, and will be considered together here. Key characteristics of

these reactors and their fuel cycles are given in

figure VII-1.

The first stage in the LWR fuel cycle is the

mining of ore, which contains about 1,500

parts-per-million uranium. The milling

operation then concentrates the uranium by

straightforward chemical processes into

yellowcake (U3 O

8

). By far the largest percentage of natural uranium (99.3 percent) consists of the isotope U238. Only 0.7 percent is

U

235, the isotope that will fission in a LWR.

Because LWRS are designed to operate with a

U

235 concentration of about 3 percent, natural

uranium must be enriched. In preparation for

enrichment, yellowcake is converted in a

special plant to uranium hexafluoride (UF6

),

which is a gas at a sufficiently low temperature to permit easy handling.

Although several enrichment techniques

are known, the only full-scale plants built to

date use the principle of gaseous diffusion.

The separation achieved in one stage of a

diffusion plant is small, so a series of stages,

called a cascade is required to raise the U235

concentration to the desired level of enrichment. A gaseous diffusion plant must be very

large to be economical. Commercial plants are

built to. serve at least 50 large (i.e., 1000

MW(e)) reactors. Each plant costs several

billion dollars and consumes a large amount

of electrical power (about 3 percent to 5 percent of the energy produced by its enriched

product). Another enrichment technique-gas

centrifuge-can achieve a greater separation

factor between the isotopes in each stage. It

appears to be economical on a smaller scale

and requires much less electrical power. This

technique has ‘not yet progressed beyond the

pilot plant stage, but several new commercial

plants of this type are in the planning stage.

Other enrichment methods are much

further from commercialization. Such new

technologies should be watched as they

develop, since they may become inexpensive

and simple enough to be attractive to many

countries.

After enrichment, UF6 is converted to

uranium dioxide (U02

) and fabricated into

fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies are

shipped and loaded into the reactor, where

they remain for several years. One third of the

fuel assemblies are replaced each year in a

pressurized water reactor (PWR), and one

fourth in a boiling water reactor (BWR).

Refueling involves shutting down the reactor,

allowing it to cool, removing the reactor head,

and transferring the spent fuel underwater to

a storage pool. The entire process takes 4 to 6

weeks. 

At present, spent fuel is simply stored at the

powerplant or in spent-fuel pools at other

locations. The intention of the industry is to

152
I w ’

,

A\

. .

. — . . .

153
reprocess spent fuel to recover unfissioned

U

235 and plutonium that was generated from

U

238. plutonium can directly replace U235 a s

fissile material in fuel, thus reducing demand

for uranium ore and the need for enrichment.

If it is found undesirable for economic, political, or safety reasons to reprocess spent fuel,

the cycle can terminate at this point. If this is

the case, long-term storage facilities or a permanent disposal method for the spent fuel

rods must be planned.

If reprocessing does occur, spent-fuel elements are sent to the reprocessing plant in

large, heavy shipping casks designed to provide both shielding against intense radiation

and cooling to remove decay heat. At the

reprocessing plant, the fuel elements are

chopped up and the contents dissolved in

acid. Solvent extraction is then used to separate plutonium and uranium from the fission

products, which are stored for eventual disposal. The plutonium and uranium emerge in

separate streams. The uranium is converted to

UF6 for reenrichment, and the plutonium to

plutonium dioxide (PuO2 either for stockpiling or recycling. All operations in the

reprocessing plant must be performed by

remote control, because of the intense radioactivity of spent fuel and the toxic nature of

plutonium.

If the plutonium is to be recycled, the PU02

is shipped to a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication

plant, where it is combined with U02 so that

the final mixture will contain the desired fraction of fissile isotopes. A mixed-oxide fuel

fabrication plant is more expensive than a

uranium fuel fabrication plant, because

remote handling is required for plutonium.

Diversion From the LWR Fuel Cycle

Material convertible to weapons grade

could be diverted at any point of the LWR cycle, but the difficulty of conversion, and hence

the attractiveness of the diverted material

varies markedly from point to point. This section will provide an estimate of the amount of

material that must be diverted at each stage of

the LWR fuel cycle in order to produce one

nuclear explosive, give a summary of the

operations that must be performed upon the

material to convert it to a form that can be

directly used in a nuclear weapon (process

details are given in volume II, appendix V),

and assess the feasibility of (a) a nation and

(b) a non-national group performing these

operations.

The safeguards that a diverter or thief

would have to evade or surmount are

described under “Safeguards” in chapter VIII,

and are only briefly mentioned in this section.

The resources required to construct a nuclear

weapon once weapons material has been obtained are discussed in chapter VI.

Yellowcake (i.e., U

3

0

8

) from a uranium

mill, after a few chemical steps, could be

enriched to weapons-grade uranium or partially transformed to Pu239 in national dedicated facilities, as described in the “Dedicated

Facilities” section of this chapter and in

volume II, appendix VI.

Approximately 6.5 metric tons o f

yellowcake would have to be fed to an enrichment plant to yield 30 kilograms of 90 percent

U

235 (enough for one or two explosives). Approximately 75 metric tons of yellowcake

would be required to supply enough natural

uranium to fuel a dedicated production reactor that would produce 10 kilograms of Pu239

per year (enough for one or two explosives).

In the latter case, it would not be necessary to

refuel the dedicated production reactor more

than once every 10 years or so. However, the

nation probably would prefer to refuel every

year or two in order to obtain weapons

material quickly and steadily.

The capital cost of a reactor and reprocessing plant that could produce one or two explosive’s worth of plutonium per year, starting with yellowcake, is in the tens of millions

of dollars. This effort is within the capabilities

of many (perhaps close to 50) nations, but is

entirely impractical for a non-state adversary.

The cost of a small enrichment facility is more

complex to assess; it is discussed under “Dedicated Facilities” in chapter VII. It is also entirely impractical for a non-state adversary.

International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) and Euratom safeguards exist for

yellowcake (in fact, Euratom safeguards start

with uranium ore), but a country in the

154
market for yellowcake to supply a dedicated

facility would probably have little difficulty in

clandestinely purchasing a sufficient amount.

Moreover, many countries have considerable

resources of uranium ore, and in these countries a dedicated mine and mill could be used

to supply a dedicated facility. (See chapter X.)

An enrichment plant presents a more attractive target to the diverter. Although the

design output of commercial enrichment

plants is only 3 percent to 4 percent U235, and

completely impossible (not merely impractical)

to use directly in a nuclear fission explosive,

much of the work to raise the enrichment to

weapons grade has been accomplished. For 30

kg of 90 percent LWs, nearly 8000 kg of

natural uranium hexafluoride feed and 6900

separative work units (SWU) are required, but

if 3 percent U235 is the feed, only about 1500

kg of uranium hexafluoride and about 2500

SWU are required.

Several options are possible for a nation

which elects to divert from its own commercial enrichment plant. The components of the

entire plant could be reassembled so that the

product would be highly enriched uranium.

The change is not difficult for a centrifuge

plant, but is complicated and time consuming

for a diffusion plant. Nevertheless, the

Chinese appear to have followed this route in

converting a U.S.S.R. supplied diffusion plant.

This change is too drastic to be done covertly

if the plant were safeguarded.

If the nation had a large, safeguarded

enrichment plant, it might choose to convert

one section of the plant to a high-enrichment

cascade. Again, this would be difficult to do in

a diffusion plant and relatively easy in a

centrifuge plant.

An alternate option would be to divert part

of the low-enriched uranium product and feed

it into a separate, small enrichment plant to

boost it to highly enriched uranium. The additional small plant could be either inside the

large plant or at another site. Only about 400

centrifuges of European design would be required to produce 30 kg of 90 percent U235 per

year from 3 percent LWs feed. For comparison, an enrichment plant of near-competitive commercial size to supply ten, 1000

MW(e), LWRS with low-enriched uranium

would have a capacity of 1,300,000 SWU per

year and contain approximately 200,000

centrifuges of European design. Enrichment

plant safeguards are discussed under

“Safeguards” in chapter VIII, but it should be

noted here that the scenarios sketched in this

paragraph are not implausible as long as inspectors are limited to monitoring the

perimeter of the facility and unmonitored input and output paths are permitted.

As already discussed, enrichment is not an

option for the non-state adversary. However,

low-enriched uranium could be an attractive

target for embezzlers if a criminal black

market in low-enriched uranium developed.

The black market could conceivably supply

low-enriched uranium merely as a fuel for

power reactors (see chapter V “Non-State Adversaries and volume 11, appendix 111 for a discussion of a case of low-enriched uranium

smuggling), or more ominously, as feed for a

dedicated national enrichment plant designed

to produce weapons material.

From the output of the enrichment plant to

the loading of the reactor the only target in the

LWR fuel cycle (without plutonium recycle) is

the low-enriched uranium itself, which must,

as discussed above, be boosted to highly

enriched uranium in a dedicated enrichment

plant to be useable in nuclear weapons.

Because of the long time required for refueling a LWR, national diversion of irradiated

fuel could not take place without considerable

economic and power penalties, except at a

normal discharge and loading operation, or

from the spent-fuel storage pool.

Light water reactor fuel (without

plutonium recycle) of typical burnup contains

about 0.8 percent plutonium, of which about

25 percent is Pu240 plus Pu242. With plutonium

recycle, high burnup LWR fuel would contain

about 1 to 2 percent plutonium of which about

35 percent would be Pu

240 plus P u2 4 2

(Detailed data is given in volume II, appendix

v.)

A high Pu249 plus Pu242 content is widely—

but incorrectly—believed to render plutonium

unsuitable for militarily effective weapons. A

high content of these isotopes is a complication; given a free choice, a weapons designer

155
would prefer plutonium with a low Pu240 content, but it should be realized that effective

nuclear explosives can be made with

plutonium of the Pu240 content described

above. This point is discussed in greater detail

in chapter VI.

With a plutonium content of 0.8 percent,

approximately 1.4 metric tons of spent fuel in

the form of uranium dioxide (UO2 must be

reprocessed (at 100 percent recovery) to obtain 10 kg of plutonium. In a PWR, this is contained in three fuel assemblies. Stated another

way, 1 year’s fuel discharge from a PWR consists of about 31 metric tons of U02 containing

about 240 kg of plutonium.

As discussed in the “Dedicated Facilities”

section of this chapter and in appendix VI,

volume II, it is well within the capability of

many developing countries to construct their

own reprocessing plant to extract plutonium

from spent fuel for use in weapons. However,

it appears probable that the IAEA will develop

the capability to safeguard LWRS and LWR

storage pools so that it will be very unlikely

that a diversion could take place undetected.

Thus, national diversion from a safeguarded

LWR or LWR storage pool would probably be

overt.

If the operator arranges a series of plausible

reactor problems leading to extensive

downtime for the year preceding the diversion, low burnup fuel with a low Pu240 content will result. For example, at 5000 MW

days/metric ton burnup, the plutonium content of the last reload would be about 70 kg, of

which only 10 percent would be Pu240

.

Theft of spent fuel by non-state adversaries

is just barely credible. The theft itself and subsequent transportation of the highly radioactive fuel (which would have to be cooled and

shielded in transit) would require a number of

armed and highly organized adversaries,

some of whom would have to be willing to accept considerable, possibly lethal, radiation

exposure. Reprocessing of spent fuel by nonstate adversaries is also just barely credible,

even if the group were very well financed and

possessed practical chemical engineering experience. A crude but technically feasible solvent extraction or ion-exchange system can be

imagined, but it would require several

months of process time for extracting 10 kg of

plutonium, During that time the group would

be immobile and vulnerable to an intense

search.

From the point of view of both the national

diverter and the non-state adversary, a large

commercial reprocessing plant is an attractive

target. Appendix V of volume 11 discusses the

diversion points in a model reprocessing

plant. Plutonium nitrate stolen from the nitrate blending area would require only a simple precipitation to be converted into weapons

material; plutonium dioxide from the conversion area could be used directly in a nuclear

explosive. A national diverter would probably

take the further step in either case of conversion to plutonium metal. The safeguarding of

a reprocessing plant is discussed under

“Safeguards” in chapter VIII, but the point

will be noted here that materials accountancy,

by itself, has neither the sensitivity nor the

promptness to assure timely detection of

covert diversion from a large reprocessing

plant, either by a nation or by non-state adversary. Other safeguard measures are

therefore employed, such as portal monitors

which can detect gram amounts of plutonium.

(See chapter VIII.)

A model mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant

is diagramed in appendix V of volume II. The

output of the model plant consists of fuel rods

with a mixture of uranium dioxide and up to

3.5 percent plutonium dioxide. To obtain 10

kg of plutonium, about 300 kg of mixed oxide

would have to be diverted or stolen. The

logistical problem of removing so much

material is a significant deterrent, but the biggest obstacle to the non-state adversary is

chemically separating plutonium from

uranium. Although conceptually simple, involving dissolution followed by ion exchange,

the task would need someone with practical

chemical engineering experience and would

require perhaps several weeks to several

months, depending on the details of the adversary’s separation facility. For the national

diverter, the chemical separation problem

would be minor and could probably be accomplished in one to a few days.

In the portion of the fuel cycle between the

output of the reprocessing plant, and the

156
Figure VII–2.

Summary of the Diversion Points in the LWR Fuel Cycle

IS THE MATERIAL

USEFUL TO THE

NATIONAL DIVERTER?

IS THE MATERIAL

USEFUL TO THE

FACILITY MATERIAL NON-STATE ADVERSARY?

Natural uranium

(0.7 percent U235 as

ore (0.2 percent uranium)

U

3

0

8

UF6

YES, but only as feed for a

dedicated facility (plutonium

production reactor or enrichment

NO (but criminals might engae in

black market in these materials)

Mine

Mill

Conversion Facility

plant)

low enriched uranium

(3 percent U235 as

UF6

U02 YES, but only as feed for a

dedicated enrichment plant

Nation would eventually have

replace fuel

NO (Criminals might engage in

black market in these materials)

Enrichment Plant

Uranium Fuel Fabrication Plant

Transportation to

Reactor

Temporary Storage

at Reactor

U02 in fuel assemblies to

Pu

YES; dedicated reprocessing

facility required

NO except Yes for large, very

well financed, technically competent group with a secure base of

operations and a few members

willing to risk radiation injury

Reactor Spent

Fuel Storage

Pu —about 0.8 percent in

highly radioactive spent

fuel

YES; Nation would probably

convert material to metallic

plutonium

Reprocessing Plant*

Transport to fuel

fabrication plant

Input area to

fuel fabrication

plant

Plutonium Fuel

Fabrication Plant

Pure Pu(N03

)4

or

pure Pu02

YES; If Pu(N03)4, simple conversion to PuOA 2 equmd. It

Pu02, material directly usable in

explosive

YES, Chemical separation of

from mixture only a minor

Pu02 (3 percent to 7 Yes, BUT chemical separation a

percent) mixed with over

90 percent U02

time consuming operation.

obstacle. Logistics of diverting

100 to 300 kg of material for one

explosive troublesome.

YES, as above.

(Nation would eventually have to

replace fuel)

Logistics of stealing or diverting

100 to 300 kg of material for one

explosive cause problems.

Transport to Reactor

Temporary Storage

at Reactor

About 1 percent Pu as

Pu02 mixed with U02 in

Yes, BUT chemical separation a

time consuming operation.

fuel assemblies Logistics of stealing complete

fuel assembles present significant obstacle.

“With copreclpttatlon, however, dwerslon potential at these pants would be slmllar to dwerslon potential at plutoruum fuel fabrication plant. I e considerably less for the non-state

adversary and somewhat less for the national diverter SOURCE OTA
mixed-oxide blending area of the mixed-oxide

fuel fabrication plant, plutonium would exist

in the form of plutonium dioxide. This

material is directly useable in the fabrication

of nuclear weapons, although a nation would

probably convert it to plutonium metal. This

portion of the fuel cycle, which includes

stockpiled plutonium, presents the most concentrated target for diversion. Although one

can conceive of very stringent safeguards

against covert diversion even in this exposed

portion of the cycle, safeguards, by their

nature, cannot prevent a nation from seizing a

plutonium stockpile attached to its own

reprocessing plant. As discussed in chapter VI,

a modest national weapons development

program can attain a high degree of confidence in

the performance of its weapon without

nuclear testing. Once the political decision is

taken to seize the stockpile, the nation can

have a reliable explosive in a matter of days to

weeks, even using reactor-grade plutonium.

Summary of Diversion Points in the LVVR Fuel

Cycle. —The preceding discussion has

described the diversion points in the LWR fuel

cycle, specified how much material would

have to be stolen or diverted at each point to

yield material for one or two explosives, and

has evaluated the difficulty of chemical and

physical processing necessary to convert the

diverted material into weapons material.

Figure VII-2 briefly and qualitatively summarizes this discussion.

The Canadian Deuterium Reactor

(CANDU)

Technical Description

The Canadian Deuterium Reactor (CANDU) is able to operate with natural uranium

because heavy water absorbs fewer neutrons

than does ordinary water, leaving more to

carry on the chain reaction. This eliminates

the need for the entire enrichment process, including UF6 conversion. The mining and milling processes are the same as for LWRS, but

reactor operation is substantially different.

The CANDU is designed for ondoad refueling.

Instead of shutting down and opening the

reactor to change a batch of fuel, a refueling

machine opens both ends of one of the many

tubes throughout the reactor. These tubes contain several short fuel rods, A fresh rod is inserted in one end and a spent rod removed at

the other. The tube is then resealed and

repressurized with cooling water.

There are no plans at present to reprocess

CANDU spent fuel. More plutonium is produced than in an LWR of the same power

level, but it is more dilute because of the

greater amount of U238. The fraction of U235 in

the spent fuel is very low (actually less than in

the tails from present enrichment plants), and

reprocessing would be less likely to be

economical than for the LWR cycle. The spent

fuel is now being stored indefinitely, pending

development of a final waste disposal method.

Diversion From the CANDU Fuel Cycle

The CANDU fuel cycle presents considerably different opportunities for diversion than

does the LWR cycle. Separated fissile material

is not exposed anywhere in the CANDU fuel

cycle, in contrast to the LWR cycle with

plutonium recycle. The enrichment and

reprocessing facilities are totally absent. The

only diversion points in the CANDU fuel cycle are the reactor itself and the spent fuel

storage pool.

As in the case of the LWR, non-state theft of

spent fuel from the storage pool followed by

reprocessing is just barely credible.

As discussed for the LWR, reprocessing for

weapons purposes, spent fuel that has been

diverted from a reactor or spent-fuel storage

pool is within the capabilities of many nations. The quantity of fuel that must be

diverted from a CANDU to yield 10 kg of l%,

and the quality of the Pu obtained under

various conditions, is discussed below.

CANDU fuel of normal burnup (about 7500

MW days/metric ton) has a plutonium content

of about 0.4 percent of which about 25 percent

is Pu240 . As described in appendix V of

volume II, CANDU is refueled continuously

and some fuel bundles could be pushed

through more rapidly for lower burnup and

lower Pu240 content. At a burnup of 2500 MW

days/metric ton (one-third normal) the

158
plutonium content is about 0.2 percent, of

which only 10 percent is Pu240. To obtain 10

kg of plutonium at least 5700 kg of low burnup uranium-oxide fuel would have to be

diverted, or about 260 fuel bundles, For normal burnup fuel about 2800 kg, or 130 bundles, would have to be diverted, For comparison, in the CANDU-600 model, about 12

fuel bundles are normally pushed through the

reactor per day.

In contrast to the LWR, production of low

pu240 plutonium in the CANDU does not involve a significant loss of power output.

Safeguard systems for a CANDU reactor

and storage pool can probably be designed

and implemented so that repeated covert

diversions of fuel assemblies cannot take place

undetected during either normal or accelerated refueling. Diversion from the CANDU is

therefore also likely to be overt,

Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor

(LMFBR)

Technical Description

The LMFBR is expected by the industry in

every nuclear supplier nation except Canada

to be the successor to the LWR reactor since it

would essentially eliminate uranium

resources as a constraint. The reactor is somewhat analogous to a PWR, except that it uses

liquid sodium at low pressure as a coolant and

has no moderator. The fuel is mixed

plutonium (10 percent to 20 percent) and U238

oxide. Radial and axial blankets of U238 surround the core to capture escaping neutrons

and breed plutonium, The LMFBR is expected

to produce as much as 15 percent more fuel

each year than it consumes. This excess (about

250 kg per year) can be used to fuel other reactors or diverted to a weapons program with

no impact on the fuel cycle. Refueling is similar to LWRS, with about one-half the core and

one-third the blanket replaced each year. No

enrichment is required, except possibly for the

initial core, because the plutonium that is bred

can be used in subsequent cycles. Reprocessing, however, is central to the LMFBR cycle.

The bred plutonium cannot be recovered

without reprocessing, and the whole point of

the LMFBR is that it can breed enough

plutonium to refuel itself and to start up new

reactors.

Diversion From the LMFBR Cycle

The diversion points in the LMFBR cycle

can perhaps be best explained by comparing

them to those of LWR cycle with plutonium

recycle.

The mining and milling stages can be virtually eliminated, because the depleted

uranium contained in the tails from present

enrichment plants can be used. Enrichment is

superfluous, except possibly for the intial

core.

As in the case of LWR recycle, the

reprocessing plant, fuel fabrication plant, and

fresh-fuel storage area at the reactor, including the transportation links between them, are

the points most vulnerable to diversion.

Diversion from the reactor itself is not credible and the material in the spent-fuel

storage pool, in transit to the reprocessing

plant, and in the input stages of the reprocessing plant is highly unattractive to the diverter

because of its fierce radioactivity. However, as

in the case of the LWR, handling and

reprocessing diverted spent fuel in a small

reprocessing plant dedicated to the task is

within the capability of many nations.

The input to the fuel fabrication plant

would consist of depleted or natural uranium

dioxide and pure plutonium dioxide from the

output of the LMFBR reprocessing plant, with

possibly an additional contribution from a

LWR reprocessing plant or stockpile. The

uranium dioxide and plutonium dioxide will

be mixed at the fabrication plant and compressed into fuel pellets. The ratio of

plutonium to uranium in the fresh fuel varies

with the exact design proposed, but would be

in the range of 1:10 to 1:5. At 1:5, the material

would be of only marginal usefulness in a

nuclear explosive; at 1:10 the material could

not be used directly in a practical nuclear explosive. However, only 55 to 110 kg of fuel

would have to be stolen to obtain 10 kg of

plutonium. Fresh fuel for the LMFBR would

be a factor of 2- to 6-times more concentrated

in plutonium than fresh fuel in the LWR cycle

with plutonium recycle, depending on the

details of both schemes.

159
Details on LMFBR reprocessing are not firm

as yet. In general, diversion opportunities at

an LMFBR reprocessing plant would be similar to those at an LWR reprocessing plant,

heightened by the fact that the throughput of

plutonium per metric ton of fuel input would

be greater by a factor of approximately 10.

In general, approximately 5 times as much

plutonium would flow through the LMFBR

cycle as through the LWR cycle, for the same

amount of electricity generated. (LMFBR fuel

gives about twice as much electricity per

metric ton as does the LWR.)

In addition to the quantitative differences

between the two cycles (there is more

plutonium in the LMFBR cycle and it is more

concentrated), there is also a potential qualitative difference. A significant amount of the

plutonium produced in the blankets will contain less than 5 percent Pu240, i.e., it will be

weapons-grade plutonium in a normal fuel

cycle. (See’ chapter VI.) In the LWR cycle,

plutonium of this quality is produced only by

operating with frequent, very costly refueling.

Thorium Fuel Cycles

Power-reactor fuel cycles employing

thorium have received much less attention

than uranium fuel cycles. The thorium fuel cycle uses U233 as the fissile isotope and Th232 as

the fertile isotope. Several reactors have been

proposed that might employ thorium. A hightemperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) is

operating, and a demonstration light-water

breeder reactor (LWBR) is presently being

constructed.

Thorium fuel cycles that have been studied

include:

. High-Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR);

. Light-Water Breeder Reactor (LWBR);

. Light Water Reactor (LWR);

● Heavy Water Reactor (HWR);

. Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR); and

. Thorium and mixed thorium/uranium

fuel cycles in fast breeder reactors (FBR).

The limited availability of uranium is often

cited as a major reason for considering the

thorium cycle. However, although it is

assumed that thorium is 3- to 5-times more

plentiful than uranium throughout the world,

160

the actual quantity of thorium,

concentration of the ores, are in

and the likely

fact uncertain.

In thermal reactors the thorium fuel cycle

may permit (1) a more efficient use of

resources, possibly including the operation of

a breeder, which is impossible with the

uranium/plutonium cycle. (U233 produces, on

the average, 2.28 neutrons per thermal

neutron capture, versus 2.11 for Pu239. This

provides just enough extra margin so that

breeding may be possible.); (2) more

economic power generation than that from

LWRS (uranium cycle) if uranium costs continue to increase (provided thorium costs are

low); and (3) a delay in the need for fast

breeder reactors (FBR) and a lower eventual

demand for them because the demand for

uranium would not be as great with thorium

fuel cycles supplying some power.

In fast breeder reactors a thorium or mixedfuel cycle may permit (1) a larger margin of

safety in the control of the reactor; and (2)

production of a fuel which could be employed

for both fast and thermal reactors. (Thermal

thorium-based reactors have a breeding ratio

near one, so they produce little, if any, excess

fuel.)

The thorium fuel cycle has both dangers

and inherent safeguards from the proliferation point of view. The fuel that it breeds, U233

is an excellent weapons material, with a critical mass approximately one-third that of U235

.

It is comparable in weapons-material quality

to Pu239. However, some protection against

diversion is offered by the unavoidable production of U232 when U233 is produced. U232 is

the first in a chain of radioactive decays which

eventually yields thallium-208, which emits a

penetrating 2.6-MeV gamma ray. The fabricated fuel and fuel materials are radioactive

and present a definite health hazard a few

days after separation. After several years, the

radiation dose from kilogram quantities of

U

233 becomes high enough to rapidly deliver a

lethal dose to anyone in direct contact.

Anyone diverting U233 fuel would have to

overcome radiation hazards to obtain and

transport the material, and to fabricate a

weapon. The radiation also results in two indirect safeguards advantages. First, access to

the material is limited by the requirement for
remote handling behind radiation shielding.

With little likelihood of any hands-on operations, access to the material for diversion purposes is much more difficult. Secondly, the

penetrating 2.6-MeV gamma ray enables portal monitors to detect extremely small

(milligram) quantities of U233

.

However, the radioactivity of U233 fuel is

primarily a safeguard with respect to non-national adversaries. A national diverter could

easily provide the radiation shielding necessary to handle the material. Indeed the country would have to provide the shielding to

utilize the thorium fuel cycle in its power

reactors,

The radiation hazards of U232 unfortunately

create problems for safeguard inspectors as

well as potential diverters. The necessity for

remote handling may limit the accuracy of

safeguard ‘measurements.

A key feature of the thorium fuel cycle relative to proliferation control is the fact that

U

233 can be denatured. That is, it Can be mixed

with the abundant U238 in concentrations of

about 12 percent or less in order to make it

unuseable in a practical nuclear explosive. By

contrast, Pu239 cannot be denatured, as there

are no plutonium isotopes that could be mixed

with Pu239 that would preclude its use as a

nuclear weapons material. (See chapter VI

“Nuclear Fission Explosive Weapons”.)

The number of gas centrifuges necessary to

enrich U233 that has been mixed with U238 is

significantly less than that required to enrich a

mixture of U235 and U238 to the same degree.

As a practical matter, however, the enrichment of denatured U233 would be difficult due

to the significant radiation danger involved.

Contact maintenance would be very hazardous. The costs and technology required for

remote maintenance on a gas-centrifuge

enrichment facility would be high.

The characteristics of reactors that might

use thorium fuel cycles are not well defined

because most have only been studied on

paper. High-temperature gas reactors are the

most advanced of all these concepts, with a

small commercial plant (the 330 MW(e) Fort

St. Vrain plant) in operation. However, as discussed in the following section, HTGRs expose

highly enriched uranium throughout their

fuel cycle. An LWBR demonstration plant is

now being completed. A very small MSBR has

been operated successfully, The others are still

design concepts. High capital costs associated

with HWRS, due to the use of pressure tubes,

large cores, and heavy water, and with LWBRS

(including the costly prebreeder), may be a

significant disadvantage.

Conclusions on the Thorium Cycle

Thorium cycles look attractive from a nonproliferation point of view, and they are

especially resistant to diversion by non-state

adversaries. Selected thorium cycles should be

further studied to better define their

economic, technical, and safeguards promise

(e.g., see section on “Alternate Fuel Cycles and

Nonproliferating Reactors” below).

High-Temperature, Gas-Cooled

Reactor (HTGR)

A small (330 MW(e)) commercial HTGR is

now operating near Fort St. Vrain, Colo. West

Germany is constructing a 300 MW(e) plant

based on a variation of this concept. Both are

cooled by helium and moderated by graphite.

The outstanding feature of the HTGR from

a proliferation standpoint is its use of highly

enriched (93 percent U235) uranium fuel particles. These fissile particles of uranium carbide,

with a hard coating of carbon and silicon carbide, are mixed with fertile particles of

thorium dioxide in the fuel elements. This

fresh fuel would be attractive to a diverter.

Separating the uranium from the manufactured fuel should be possible, even for a subnational group, although their process would

probably be clumsy and inefficient.

The HTGR must be shut down for refueling,

Recycling is required to recover the bred U233

and the remaining U235. As discussed in

volume II, appendix V, the relative economic

merits of various HTGR reprocessing and

recycling programs have not been fully evaluated, but they may favor a one-time recycle.

Developers of the HTGR are studying alternate designs that would use lower enriched

fuel.

161
Light-Water Breeder Reactor

(LWBR)

Technical Description

The light-water breeder reactor (LWBR)

relies extensively upon LWR technology and

has the major purpose of producing as much

fissile material as it uses. The present concepts

are based on the pressurized water reactor

(PWR), and maybe implemented by placing a

different reactor core and control system in

present PWR reactor plants. A demonstration

operation in the Shippingport reactor is

scheduled for the late 1970’s.

The LWBR is a thermal reactor which

would convert thorium to U233. Because the

breeding (conversion) ratio is near one,

prebreeders are required to produce enough

U

233 for the first few breeder cores.

The basic core design utilizes the seedblanket concept, in which each fuel module

contains fissile regions (seeds) and a fertile

blanket. A low-water content in the core is required to minimize neutron capture in hydrogen, so a water-to-metal ratio of about

one-tenth that of the standard PWR has been

proposed. Safety problems are exacerbated by

this difference.

To avoid parasitic neutron capture in control rods, control is achieved by axial movement of the fuel modules in relation to each

other. Fertile blankets increase the size of the

core but capture neutrons that would otherwise be lost to the system.

It is expected that the reactor will be

refueled in a manner similar to the LWRS. The

reactor will be shut down for a period of up to

30 days, and the pressure vessel head taken off

and a portion of the fuel removed.

Diversion From the LWBR Fuel Cycle

For the prebreeder, the first point at which

the diversion potential differs from the LWR

cycle is at the enrichment plant. Prebreeder

fuel will contain 10 percent to 13 percent U235

.

Although this enrichment is too low to be

used directly in a nuclear explosive, it provides excellent feed for a dedicated enrichment plant. About 440 kg of 10 percent U235

hexafluoride feed would be required to produce 30 kg of 90 percent U235, and about 180

centrifuges of European design could produce

this quantity of highly enriched uranium per

year from 10 percent feed.

Fuel modules for the prebreeder will contain uranium dioxide rods and thorium dioxide rods. No chemical separation of the fresh

fuel would have to be done to acquire 10 percent LWs.

A total fuel discharge from a 1000 MW(e)

prebreeder would contain about 100 kg of

plutonium concentrated to about 1 percent in

the uranium dioxide rods, about 300 kg of

U

233 concentrated to about 1 percent in the

thorium-dioxide rods, and about 800 kg of

U

235 at an enrichment of nearly 8 percent. NO

isotopic separation would be required to obtain pure plutonium or pure U233 . Only

chemical reprocessing would be needed to acquire material that could be directly used in

nuclear weapons. As for the LWR, this task is

within the capability of many nations, but impossible for all but very technically competent

and well financed non-state groups.

The above numbers should be regarded

with caution. Detailed data have not been

published for a commercial-sized plant.

Two separate reprocessing plants might be

used to reprocess LWBR prebreeder fuel. The

diversion potential for the facility reprocessing the uranium-dioxide rods would be very

similar to that for the LWR facility. In the case

of the thorium-U233 reprocessing plant, a major difference would be the intense and

penetrating gamma radiation from U232 (as

discussed in the previous section), rendering

diversion more difficult.

Fuel going back into the prebreeder could

either be reenriched uranium dioxide plus

thorium dioxide, or, more likely, mixed

plutonium dioxide plus thorium dioxide, plus

uranium dioxide, In the second case the diversion potential for fuel fabrication and mixedoxide fuel assemblies would be similar to that

for the LWR.

162
The uranium fuel for the breeder is presently seen as being 90 percent U233 and 10 percent U235, A reactor load for a 1000-MW(e)

core would contain 2,000 kg of this 100 percent fissile fuel and 93,000 kg of thorium. The

fuel would consist of mixed uranium dioxide

and thorium dioxide pellets. The mixed pellets

would contain about 5 percent uranium dioxide and 95 percent thorium dioxide. Fresh fuel

could therefore not be directly used in nuclear

explosive weapons, but only chemical separation would be required. This chemical separation would be a time-consuming process for

the non-state adversary.

Pure fissile uranium would be available at

the reprocessing plant.

The LWBR differs from the LMFBR in an

important point. The LMFBR produces a distinct surplus of plutonium over what is required to refuel itself. The LWBR, with a

breeding ratio of close to one, produces only

enough to refuel itself. Thus, fissile material

diverted by a nation from the LWBR cycle

would have to be replaced from prebreeder

output or stockpiles. The most likely penalty a

country with an expanding LWBR economy

would have to pay for diverting from its

breeder cycle is a slowdown of expansion. For

a country with a static LWBR system and no

prebreeding, replacing the diverted fissile

material would present a serious problem.

Comparison of Reactors

The discussion of diversion from the

different reactor fuel-cycle systems has shown

large differences in the levels and locations of

vulnerability. The vast number of variables,

varients, and unknowns make an attempt at

quantifying these differences premature.

Figure VII-3 presents a qualitative evaluation

of opportunities presented by the systems discussed above and in volume 11, appendix V.

The ranking is on the basis of the usefulness of

the fissile material as follows:

A—No significant diversion potential.

B—Highly dilute AND substantially

radioactive material. Diversion is

barely credible for the non-state

adversary,

C—Concentrated material, but contains

sufficient radioactive isotopes to

require heavily shielded processing.

Highly diluted

large quantities

Not impossible

versary to steal and convert to

weapons material, but difficulty

provides a substantial deterrent.

material, so that

must be diverted.

for non-state adD—As F, but substantial chemical and/or

mechanical processing needed.

Possible for non-state adversary to

convert to weapons material.

or

As F, except material required for

continued operation of fuel cycle.

F—Material in concentrated form suitable

for straightforward conversion to

weapons, with modest radioactivity. Easy for non-state adversary

to use as, or convert to, weapons

material.

The relative value of the opportunities for

diversion as summarized in figure VII-3 depends on the intentions and capabilities of the

diverters. Four general categories of proliferators can be envisioned.

Nations Desiring a Major Nuclear

Weapons Force

A major nuclear force might be required by

an industrialized or emerging country intent

on becoming a world or regional power. A

large and reliable supply of high-quality fissile

material would be needed. Covert diversion

from safeguarded facilities would probably be

precluded by these criteria and by the incompatibility of this method with the goal of international prestige. Some non-weapons states

(such as Germany and Japan) are capable of

building their own facilities with the dual

purpose of power and fissile material production. India is developing this capability, but

few others will if economic power is a requirement (discussed in chapter X). Nations party

163

92-592 0- 77 -12
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or subject to safeguards on imported reactors would

have to abrogate safeguard agreements after

the necessary facilities were in place.

System characteristics that would be

especially important for this category of

proliferator are:

. a high-production rate of high-quality

fissile material;

. immunity to international embargos and

sanctions; and

. minimum impact on the fuel cycle.

The specific paths which this type of

proliferator could follow to obtain the

strategic nuclear materials are at present:

(1)

(2)

Enrichment: A plant with more capacity

than needed for domestic LWRS could

be built. The excess could be rationalized as being for export if it were

necessary to keep the intentions secret

during construction. In fact, no LWRS

are needed in countries (such as South

Africa and Australia) that could become

major uranium exporters and prefer to

supply enrichment services also. The

amount of highly enriched uranium

that could be produced without impacting on the fuel cycle would depend on

the excess enrichment capacity. A large

supply of uranium, either domestic or

from a secure source, would be needed

to keep reactors and weapon programs

supplied. The cost would primarily be

the loss of enrichment revenues from

the previously exported low-enriched

uranium. This would amount to approximately $20,000 per kg highly

enriched uranium.

Reprocessed LWR Fuel: An entire LWR

fuel cycle would probably be required to

resist nuclear embargos. The output of

one reactor operated to optimize the

quality of the plutonium would be sufficient for 30 to 40 weapons per year. The

frequent shutdown would result in the

loss of one-half to one-third of the

power output, which is a high penalty,

but after several years a substantial arsenal would be available and the reactor

(3)

could be returned to normal operation.

The plutonium lost to the fuel cycle

would have to be replaced by enriched

uraniums, but the cost would not be

high if the uranium is recycled.

Reprocessed CANDU Fuel: A reprocessing plant would have to be built, but

this could be done covertly prior to the

safeguards abrogation. If plutonium

output is maximized, about 40 to 60

weapons could be derived from each

600 MW(e) reactor. Feed would have to

be increased considerably, since

uranium recycle would be less attractive

than for the LWR. Full-power production could be maintained. Even if the

feed is not increased, 20 to 30 weapons

could be produced annually. Access to

heavy water would have to be maintained in either case. About 10 metric

tons are required per year for normal

operation, more if refueling is accelerated. A small, unsophisticated plant

might produce heavy water at about

double the normal cost of about $130

per kg. This cost increase could add

$1,300,000 or more per year for the

quantity required for the operation of

the reactor.

Comparison. —The third route is clearly

preferred if heavy water is not a problem. The

plutonium production rate is high, and

vulnerability to international restrictions

almost nonexistent. The total cost of the full

CANDU cycle should be less, though the reactor is 10 percent more expensive, because a

heavy water separation plant is cheaper than

an enrichment plant.

Future Developments.—The near-term future

reactors (HTGR and AGR) do not present

markedly different opportunities. The HTGR

uses high-enriched fuel, which means that if a

nation has a full fuel-cycle capability it also

has another direct route to weapons material.

The fresh fuel itself would not be of interest, as

then the reactor would have to shut down.

The HTGR breeds more fuel than the LWR,

and recycle is a virtual requirement. The

HTGR has somewhat more potential for

diversion than the LWR, but probably less

164
Figure VII-3.

Reactor Diversion Report Card

Fabrication Reactor, including Spent Fuel

and Transport Fuel Storage at Transport and

of Fresh FUel the Reactor Storage

LWR No Reprocessing A B

LWR, Reprocessing,

No Pu Recycle A B

LWR, pu C (Onsite Fresh

Recycle c MOX)

B (Spent Fuel)

LWR, Denatured

U-Th

HWR (CANDU), NO

Reprocessing

Uranium gas cooled

Reactors (AGR)

HTGR

LMFBR and GCFR

LWBR

A A

A B

A B

D D (Fresh Fuel)

C (Spent Fuel)

D D (Fresh Fuel)

C (Spent Fuel)

D B

MSBR A A

See figure VII-2 for a summary discussion of diverson points m the LWR fuel cycle

“Nonexistent

B

B

B

B

B

B

c

c

B

(A)*

Reprocessed Stockpile

Fuel-Fabrication of Excess

Reprocessing (including transport)

(A)* (A)*

F A

F (if fuel not blended at

F Repro. Plant)

C (if fuel blended at

Repro. Plant)

D A

(A)* (A)*

F A

F c

F F

D (National diverter) D (National diverter)

F (Non-state F (Non-state diverter)

diverter)

F (A)*

SNM

(A)*

F

(A)*

(A)*

(A)*

F

(A)*

F

(A)*

F

SOURCE: OTA
than the CANDU. The AGR appears less appropriate for proliferation than the LWR.

Fresh fuel has a lower enrichment and the

spent fuel contain relatively little plutonium.

Recycle is not expected, even if the fuel is

reprocessed.

Some of the more distant reactors present

more difficult problems. The LMFBR and the

similar gas cooled fast reactor (GCFR) will

both produce copious quantities of high-grade

plutonium, and both are relatively easy to

make independent of international interference since the cycles are self-supporting except for a supply of depleted uranium. The

fuel-cycle impact of diversion is negligible

because of the excess of plutonium.

The LWBR is not attractive to this type of

proliferator since the entire production of U233

is required to continue operation. The

prebreeder cycle could be supported, but most

of the fissile material produced is U233 which

is diluted in U238. This cycle would probably

be considerably more expensive than the PWR

cycle for weapons-material production. The

molten salt breeder reactor would be only

marginally better in that the breeding ratio is

slightly higher, thus producing an excess of

U

233 which would be adequate for producing

4-8 weapons per year.

A qualitative ranking of the resistance to

proliferation for all these systems is shown in

figure VII-4.

Nations Desiring a Small, Not Necessarily

Sophisticated, Nuclear Capability

In this case, covert diversion is a possibility

but may not be a necessity. If the facilities are

not safeguarded, the important characteristics

would be as follows:

●

●

●

Immunity to international embargos and

sanctions—this type of nation is less

likely to have full-fuel cycle facilities.

Minimum impact on the fuel cycle-a

substantial power loss would be harder

to absorb.

Initial cost—nuclear reactors are already

very expensive, These nations may not be

●

●

If

able to afford a more sophisticated one

even if it is more vulnerable to diversion.

Ease of conversion to weapons material

—the lesser sophistication of this type of

nation makes major processing difficult.

Production rate and quality of fissile

material—this is less important than for

the previous case. Little material is

needed and the yield of the weapon is

much less important than the fact of its

existence.

the facilities are safeguarded, a different

set of factors apply.

High rate of material flow—to make

diversion less noticeable.

Many vulnerable points to make

safeguarding difficult.

Minimum impact on fuel cycle.

Initial cost.

Ease of conversion.

The enrichment option of the previous case

will be plausible only if techniques other than

diffusion become viable. Diffusion is simply

too big and expensive for this type of nation.

Covert diversion of low-enriched uranium

could be improbable since the country might

not have the capability of building a small

dedicated weapons-grade enrichment plant,

even using low-enriched uranium as the feed.

Therefore, part of the plant itself would probably have to be modified to yield highenriched uranium.

The LWR reprocessing route is particularly

good for the covert diverter because of the

large number of vulnerable points. The impact

on the fuel cycle need not be large, because the

diverted plutonium can be replaced by

slightly more enriched uranium or slightly

less power output. It would not be necessary

to possess an enrichment plant. If there is no

commercial reprocessing, however, spent fuel

would have to be diverted to a small dedicated

reprocessing plant. It would be difficult to

evade safeguards for long, so this path is improbable. The overt diverter would need a

166 -
Figure VII4.

Reactor Systems Resistance to Proliferation

(Note that a high rank means the system is least susceptible to diversion.)

Reactor

system

Light Water

Reactor (enrichment)

Light Water

Reactor (spent fuel)

Light Water Reactor

(reprocessing & recycle)

CANDU

High Temperature

Gas Reactor

Advanced Gas

Reactor

Liquid Metal Fast

Breeder Reactor

—

Gas Cooled Fast

Reactor

Light Water

Breeder Reactor

Molten Salt

Breeder Reactor

Small

Force 1 .

(unsafeguarded

Availability Force facilities)

Present 5 6

Present 4 3

Present 6 5

Present 8 7

Near

Term 7 4

Near

Term 3 2

R&D

(advanced) 9 9*

R&D 10 10*

R&D 1 1

R&D

(presently inactive) 2 8*

Small

Force

(safeguarded

facilities) Option

7 1

1 4

8

2

5

2

6 6

3 3

9 9

10 10

4 7

5 8

Non-Sate

Adversaries

1

4

6

2

7

3

9

10

8

5

“May not bean Option for cost or technological reasons SOURCE: OTA
complete fuel cycle—including enrichment—

in order to thwart embargos. This might be so

expensive as to be impractical.

The CANDU would be excellent for the

overt diverter who would simply process the

normal spent fuel. The covert diverter would

have to smuggle out his own spent fuel. This is

not an impossible task, as up to 10 years of

spent fuel could be in the pool in the form of

thousands of bundles. Accounting for all of

them will be a formidable, but not impossible,

task.

Comparison. —The overt diverter will prefer

the CANDU, again assuming access to heavy

water. An LWR with Pu recycle would be better suited to the covert diverter because of the

greater number of vulnerable points. The

static nature of the source (spent-fuel rods) in

the CANDU or LWR without reprocessing

tends to make eventual detection of covert

diversion quite probable.

Future Developments.—The AGR presents essentially the same opportunity as the LWR.

Reprocessing is less important than for the

LWR, and could be eliminated. If there is

reprocessing but not recycle the overt diverter

would have a substantial stockpile at his disposal, just as there would be for the same

LWR cycle. The AGR’s lower enriched

uranium would be slightly easier to procure

than that for the LWR in case of embargos,

and there would be essentially no impact on

the power production since the recovered

plutonium is not being used. The HTGR with

its high-enriched fresh fuel and required

reprocessing presents more opportunities for

both overt and covert diverters. The fuel-cycle

facilities, however, are expensive and technologically demanding and might never be

available for export. This could eliminate

overt diversion.

The R & D reactors could again enhance or

limit opportunities. The overt diverter would

prefer the LMFBR and GCFR for the same

reasons as would the major nation, but may

not be able to afford them. The LWBR would

be quite inappropriate. The MSBR might produce sufficient strategic nuclear materials, but

its intricate technology would be difficult to

manage. The MSBR concept, however, may be

readily adaptable to small sizes, which would

make it more attractive. The covert diverter

would also prefer fast breeders, possibly by a

wide margin, Thermal breeders provide few

opportunities.

Nations Desiring the Option of Rapid

Development of Nuclear Weapons in the

Future Should That Appear Necessary

The important factors are:

. rapid access to strategic nuclear materials

. high production rate of fissile material

● cos t

The enrichment option is not particularly

interesting because the process is too slow, except possibly for centrifuge designed for fast

conversion to high enrichment.

The LWR reprocessing route is very

vulnerable, in that a significant stockpile of

plutonium can be legitimately maintained.

This provides immediate access, and considerably more can be supplied from the

batches of spent fuel waiting to be

reprocessed, Spent fuel with no commercial

reprocessing would require a small reprocessing plant to be built ahead of time and held in

readiness. Even then, there would be no

stockpile for immediate seizure,

The CANDU would be less appropriate for

this proliferate unless an appropriate

reprocessing plant already exists for other

reactors.

The HTGR could be useful because fresh

fuel could be quickly processed even if no

other fuel-cycle facilities were available. This

would mean loss of the reactor as it could not

be refueled, but national emergencies might be

seen to override this factor. The fast breeders

would provide substantial strategic nuclear

materials both in the fresh fuel and in

reprocessing plant stockpiles.

The LWBR would provide useful highenriched fresh fuel as in the HTGR and easily

processed spent fuel if needed, The entire core

inventory could be made available quickly

and would provide a great many weapons.

The MSBR contains 2300 kg U233 at all times

168
(enough for as many as 460 bombs). This

material could be processed immediately

because its low-fission product inventory

eliminates the need for long-term cooling. The

small normal excess of U233 could also be

stockpiled, and would provide immediate access to about eight weapons for

stockpiling.

Non-State Adversaries

The prime requirements are:

. many vulnerable points

. high rate of material flow

. ease of conversion

The only present generation

offers a significant opportunity

every year’s

system that

is the LWR

with reprocessing. Plutonium recycle allows

the reprocessing plant, plutonium shipments,

mixed-oxide plant, and possibly even the

fresh fuel to be targets for attack or diversion,

The AGR is as resistant as the LWR if no

reprocessing takes place. The HTGR fresh fuel

is a possibility, but considerable work must be

done to separate the high-enriched uranium

from the thorium. If the high-enriched

uranium can be attacked before it is mixed

with thorium, the weapon preparation would

be easier.

The LWBR can be attacked at the fuel

fabrication plant or at the reprocessing plant.

The U233 is more easily separated from the

thorium here than in the HTGR. The MSBR is

almost invisible to the non-state adversary.

All operations are performed at the plant site,

and only a small amount of U233 need be exposed. This could easily be denatured in U233

before shipping.

Figure VII-4 ranks these systems in order of

vulnerability to each of the diverters.

Research Reactors

There are many research reactors operating

throughout the world, Appendix V in volume

11 lists the research reactors outside the United

States with a power rating of 1 MW(t) or

more. Examination of that list shows that

there are 18 countries which possess either (a)

natural uranium or low-enriched uraniumfueled reactors that will have accumulated 10

kg or more of Pu239 by 1984, or (b) reactors

fueled with 80 percent to 100 percent U235

with a power rating of 5 MW(t) or more (i.e.,

an annual fueling requirement of 5 or more kg

of 80 percent to 100 percent U235), or (c) both

of the above.

Examination of a list prepared by ERDA

shows that, through December 31, 1976, the

United States exported a total of 1,115 kg of

plutonium to 38 countries. Eight countries

have received more than 5 kg of plutonium

from the United States (see list in volume II,

appendix V). From January 1, 1968, through

December 31, 1976, the United States exported

nearly 10,000 kg of uranium enriched to 20

percent or more in U235 to 21 countries. Eight

countries have received substantial amounts

of highly enriched uranium.

The exported plutonium is used largely in

critical assemblies, that is, experimental

facilities run at zero power. This plutonium is

essentially uncontaminated by fission products, and is of very high quality for use in

weapons.

Thus, substantial diversion or theft potential exists outside the commercial power industry. India’s nuclear explosive was made

with plutonium produced in one of the

research reactors mentioned above.

Alternate Fuel Cycles and

Nonproliferating Reactors

Present commercial and near-commercial

fuel cycles have been conceived and developed

with essentially no thought given to their implications for proliferation or to the

difficulties of safeguarding them. Other

possibilities exist, however, that are less

vulnerable to diversion.

Alternate Fuel Cycles

ERDA has recently set up a study in the

Office of Nuclear Energy Assessments, Division of Nuclear Research and Applications, to

169
investigate and evaluate alternative fuel cycles. The criteria for evaluation of the alternate

cycles are: (a) proliferation risk potential, (b)

safeguard potential, (c) technical feasibility,

(d) economics and resource utilization, (e)

commercial feasibility, and (f) introduction

date. In evaluating proliferation risk potential,

emphasis will be placed on diversion or theft

of nuclear material for the purpose of making

an explosive weapon. Both domestic and

foreign applications will be considered.

The schedule calls for a final report in October 1978, with a developed set of proliferation

criteria and an assessment of selected alternate

fuel cycles. ERDA is requesting supplemental

funds of $4 million from Congress for FY 77,

and has budgeted the program at $7 million

for FY 78.

The program is currently in the phase of

collecting proposals for alternate fuel cycles

and issuing some contracts for promising proposals already collected. Some work previously contracted by ERDA has been

assembled under the aegis of this project. A

screening for the most promising alternates is

set for July 1977.

For the results of this program to be most

useful, the alternates that are selected for

further study ought to be balanced between

relatively short-term payoff on technical

modifications of existing cycles and radically

new approaches. The differences between national capabilities and non-national

capabilities should be kept in mind. An alternate such as coprocessing, for example, might

put a substantial obstacle in the way of a nonnational group but provide much less of a

deterrent to national proliferation.

A good deal of emphasis is apparently

being given to an effort to develop a quantitative methodology for evaluating proliferation

potential, The first phase of this criteria effort

is due to be completed in June 1977. Such an

effort can be extremely useful in forcing the

people involved to think through the

problems in detail. However, a set of numerical criteria purporting to quantitatively evaluate proliferation risk should be regarded with

skepticism.

The areas that the program is currently

looking at can be grouped in the following

categories:

(1) Reexamination of the LWR and the

LWR fuel cycle

(2) Introduction of the CANDU into the

United States

(3) Thorium fuel cycles

(4) The fast-breeder fuel cycle

In the first category, reexamination of the

LWR fuel cycle, a variety of concepts are being

considered, most of which are aimed at increasing the energy obtainable from LWR fuel

without going to plutonium recycle.

Several possibilities exist for modifying the

design of the LWR so that spent fuel will have

a lower fissile content, approaching that of the

CANDU, thus reducing resource-utilization

pressures for plutonium recycle. Preliminary

estimates indicate that a modified LWR could

extract an additional 20 percent of power out

of a given amount of uranium, as compared to

an additional 30 percent with plutonium recycle and present LWR design. Possible changes

include opening up the lattice and decreasing

periods between refueling; increasing the initial uranium enrichment; decreasing neutron

absorption in the coolant, moderator, and

control rods by either geometry changes or

material changes, including use of heavy

water; or the use of uranium-metal fuel.

(Some of the above design changes are incompatible with others.) Many such design variations have been considered in the past, when

nonproliferation was not a consideration, and

rejected because of technical or economic

reasons.

An updated assessment of the use of metal

fuel has recently been completed at ORNL.

The study indicates that uranium enrichment

could be reduced by up to one half (i.e. 1.5

percent instead of 3 percent), and that the

fissile content of the spent fuel would indeed

be very low, Metallurgical problems have in

the past precluded this option; however, recent development work is reported to look extremely promising,

The adoption of a throwaway cycle (i.e., no

reprocessing) would make the LWR cycle a

170
less-attractive target for diversion by nations

and a much less-attractive target for theft by

non-state adversaries. The central international issues would revolve around the disposal of the spent fuel, including questions of

transportation safety, disposal sites, long-term

storage security, and disposal costs. Pressures

to recycle might recur if uranium prices rose

high enough.

Other LWR schemes under consideration

(but apparently not funded as yet) include

several reprocessing variants. In one concept,

only uranium would be recycled; plutonium

would be either (a) partially decontaminated

and stored as highly radioactive plutonium

nitrate solution, or (b) purified and stored.

Variant (a) would provide some deterrent for

the non-state adversary, but neither variant

addresses the question of national proliferation. Indeed, variant (b) involves stockpiling

plutonium. Plutonium stockpiles are the most

vulnerable target for the national diverter and

require massive security against the non-state

adversary. Coprocessing is also on the list of

alternates, and also apparently as yet unfunded. This concept would recycle LWR

spent fuel without separation of uranium and

plutonium. Instead of pure PuO2 at the end of

the reprocessing/conversion stream, there

would be approximately 1 percent PuO2 in 99

percent U02

. The economics are unclear. Fuel

fabrication costs would increase because more

fuel would contain toxic plutonium.

Reprocessing costs would decrease. Claims

have been made for increased fuel utilization.

Coprocessing would present a substantial

obstacle to the non-state diverter, Plutonium

would never appear in highly purified form in

the fuel cycle. One thousand kg of mixed-oxide material would have to be stolen to obtain

10 kg of plutonium. The separation of PuO2 in

such a dilute form would present a very timeconsuming task to the non-state adversary.

Coprocessing, however, presents a much

less-significant hurdle to the overt national

diverter, A nation could keep a small PuO2

-

UO2 separation plant “on ice” until it made

the decision to go for a nuclear explosive; it

would then appropriate the mixed-oxide

material, and separate it in a matter of days.

The implications of coprocessing for the

covert national diverter are less clear. In the case

discussed above, the equipment for separating

uranium and plutonium would be absent,

forcing the nation to divert 1000 kg of mixedoxide material for every contained 10 kg of Pu.

This presents serious logistical problems,

which, however, possibly could be surmountable, even in a safeguarded plant. In a variant

of the above process, where uranium and

plutonium are only partially separated (to

give about 5 percent PuO2 and 95 percent

UO2

, as the final product) covert national production of tens of kilograms of pure PU02

, undetected by the materials accountancy system,

is credible given a commercial-sized plant.

Whether or not this material could then be

removed from the plant without detection

would depend on the efficiency of containment and surveillance safeguards. (See

chapter VIII.)

ERDA is at present, actively looking at some

of the problems of collocating reprocessing

plants, fuel fabrication plants, and possibly

plutonium-burning reactors. Generic studies

of environmental effects and institutional

problems are underway, as are technical

studies of a possible nuclear energy center at

Hanford. Confining plutonium in fresh fuel to

a small number of fixed sites has the potential

for reducing the risk of non-state theft. The

results of these studies will also be applicable

to multinational fuel-cycle centers. (See “International Control of Proliferation”, chapter

VIII.)

Another LWR option being investigated by

ERDA is the tandem fuel cycle. In this scheme,

discharged LWR fuel is inserted into a heavy

water reactor (HWR) to achieve an additional

33 percent burnup. After discharge from the

HWR, the fuel would be stored indefinitely.

There are severe technical, economic, and

licensability questions to be resolved, as discussed in appendix V of volume 11.

Other concepts to extend the use of spent

fuel without recycle include bombarding

spent fuel with neutrons from:

. a target bombarded by

high-energy accelerator

breeder idea);

protons from a

(the accelerator

171
. controlled thermonuclear fusion (the

spent fuel would be inserted into a

blanket in the fusion reactor);

. laser or ion beams on fusion targets; and

. an LMFBR

Using fusion neutrons to produce fissile

material (either plutonium or U233) could be

economical before self-sustained fusion was

achieved, The accelerator-breeder and fusion/fission devices may well have an important role to play in extending resources of

fissile materials and possibly in cleaning up

nuclear waste. Both devices might have applicability in the international thorium cycle

discussed below.

However, such neutron irradiation schemes

can clearly be regarded as antioroliferation

measures only at an international center. A nation with a device designed to irradiate spent

fuel could as easily irradiate clean uranium or

thorium. A nation would ship highly radioactive spent fuel to an international irradiation

center, where the plutonium or U233 content

of the spent fuel would be increased by a factor of 2 or more. The spent fuel might then

have to be refabricated. Finally, the still

radioactive spent fuel, with enhanced

plutonium or U233 content, is shipped back to

the nation for reinsertion into the reactor.

After one or more such round trips, the spent

fuel is shipped back for disposal. Both this

concept and the accelerator breeder are discussed in appendix V of volume II. Many of

the metallurgical problems discussed for the

tandem fuel cycle would exist for these options, Neutron irradiation of spent fuel appears to be a somewhat contrived antiproliferation measure.

The ERDA studies on introducing the CANDU into the United States appear to be focusing on economics, licensability in the United

States and U.S. commercial feasibility. No current U.S. reactor vendors manufacture CANDUS

, and presently there is little U.S. utility

interest, The proliferation potential of CANDUS and LWRS was compared in the preceding section, where it was concluded that

safeguarding against the national diverter was

a harder problem for the CANDU than the

LWR without recycle. Thus, purely from a

172

nonproliferation point of view, LWR redesign

appears more attractive.

Through another program, ERDA is investigating the problems of commercializing

the HTGR. Because the HTGR contains exposed 93 percent U235 in its fuel cycle, it has

serious proliferation implications. However,

the alternates program is investigating the use

of less than 20 percent U235 in the HTGR cycle.

The detailed assessment is underway but not

yet completed. Earlier studies indicated that a

low-enriched uranium cycle, possibly as low

as 6 percent U235, would be technically feasible but at a distinct economic disadvantage to

the 93 percent U235 cycle. The low U235 HTGR

would have better fuel utilization than the

LWR. Major redesign of the HTGR might

yield more favorable results.

The program is apparently planning an extensive investigation into thorium fuel cycles,

including work on the recently proposed international thorium cycle. In this system, national reactors would operate on a fresh fuel

mix of something like 1 part U233, 6 parts U238

,

and 10 to 60 parts thorium. As discussed in

chapter IV, a U233/U238 ratio of 1:7 represents

a lower limit of concentration, below which

the mixture cannot be used in a practical fission explosive. Preliminary calculations suggest that spent fuel from such a reactor would

contain only one-fifth to one-tenth as much

plutonium as spent fuel from present reactors,

for the same amount of power output, Spent

fuel would be sent to international fuel support

centers which would reprocess the spent fuel,

extracting the plutonium for burning onsite,

possibly in fast breeders with thorium as the

fertile element. The U233 produced in the fast

breeders would be denatured with U238 at the

center, fabricated into fresh fuel, and shipped

to the national reactors. Thus either enrichment (for fresh fuel) or reprocessing (for

spent fuel) would be necessary to extract

weapons material from fuel in national hands.

Both routes are possible for the national

diverter, but both require the construction of a

dedicated facility.

The national diverter, if discovered, is very

vulnerable to fuel-supply cutoff in the international thorium cycle. The international

thorium cycle offers a very high degree of protection against the non-state diverter.
A partial list of questions to ask about the

denatured thorium cycle includes:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

What is the concept for starting up

thorium cycle reactors? Can startup fuel

material be generated without paying the

economic penalty that appears to be required for the LWBR?

How does the rate of growth of nuclear

power affect the attractiveness of the cycle?

The thorium concept requires reprocessing, whereas an optimized throw-away

LWR U-PU fuel cycle does not. What are

the relative safeguard, economic, and

uranium utilization differences for each

of these concepts?

How much redesign of LWRS (an d

H WRS

) is necessary to achieve an optimum thorium fuel-management

program?

What are problems and costs of production development of the thorium

reprocessing (Thorex) process?

What is the increased safety/radiation

risk of a thorium fuel cycle during

a) normal operation?

b) abnormal situation (e.g., sabotage attempt) ?

How much development and exploration

is required for a - large-scale supply of

reactor-grade thorium?

The project is also studying coprocessing of

fast-reactor fuel for either the U/Pu or the

Th/U

233 cycles. The emphasis would be on

metallic fuels for breeding in the core, rather

than in the blanket. As pointed out before,

coprocessing is a tactic of limited usefulness

against national proliferation.

Nonproliferating Reactors

One of the most intriguing concepts that

ERDA is studying is being funded at $250,000

for FY 77 by the Division of International

Security Affairs. This is the concept of nonproliferating reactors.

Through strict design requirements, this approach attempts to eliminate the diversion

paths present in current and projected powerreactor systems and their associated fuel cycles. Several key design criteria are: (a) the

system shall contain only a small amount of

fissile material at any given time; (b) there

shall be no access to the fuel during the

lifetime of the reactor; (c) any diversion of

fuel will cause the reactor to shut down; (d)

the reactor shall be refueled by the addition of

fertile (i.e., non-fissile) material only; (e) the

reactor shall not operate as a breeder, but as a

sustainer, producing just enough fissile

material to keep itself running (i.e., the breeding ratio should be essentially one); (f)

reprocessing shall be done onsite inside a

biological shield.

In addition, the reactor is required to produce economical power and be designed so

that accidents have minimum consequences

of fsite,

This last requirement suggests that it might

be possible to site the reactors fairly close to

load centers and use the waste heat locally,

thereby markedly increasing overall efficiency. Finally, although the optimum power level

for such reactors is not known, preliminary

studies suggest that the reactors may be

economical on a small scale, i.e., 50 to 250

MW(e).

Preliminary conceptual studies have been

done on three reactor systems.

. Gas core reactor ($100,000)

. Suspended particle bed reactor ($40,000)

. Modified molten salt reactor ($100,000

assigned; $20,000 spent)

Conceptual and design studies on a gas core

reactor have been carried out for a number of

years at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

(LASL) under NASA funding. Some experimental work has been done for NASA with a

zero power assembly. An experimental flowing gas system has started up at LASL recently, and has attained criticality.

The gas core reactor designed for the nonproliferating reactor study is a conservative

variant of the 6000oK plasma reactor being

designed for NASA use around the year 2000.

This particular nonproliferating gas-core

design has the following features: U233F6

gaseous fuel; beryllium moderator and

graphite neutron reflector; molten thoriumsalt breeding blanket; relatively low-operating

temperature of approximately 1200 ‘K; power

173
level of 200 MW(t); entire plant-fissile inventory of 100 kg of U233 (i.e., this includes the

material being reprocessed). Diversion of 4 kg

of U233 will shut the reactor down, as would

adding more thorium in an attempt to increase the breeding ratio.

Preliminary calculations indicate that if the

operating temperature of a nonproliferating

gas-core design is raised to the 4000oK range

(i.e., the magneto-hydrodynamic range), the

total inventory of U233 may decrease to a few

tens of kilograms. Moreover, the quantity of

U

233 that could be diverted without shutting

down the reactor would probably also

decrease markedly. This sensitivity of fissile

inventory to operating temperature should be

explored more thoroughly.

Another aspect of the gas core design that

merits further investigation is the possibility

of using denatured U233 fuel.

The suspended particle bed reactor features

extremely small coated-fuel particles and a

gas-cooled, heavy water moderated, fluidized -

bed design. Such high burnup is attained that

reprocessing is of no benefit. The reactor is

refueled online with fertile material only, but

has a high fissile inventory of 3000 kg of U233

for a 300 MW(e) system.

The molten salt reactor concepts are based

on the use of a circulating fluid fuel with

online continuous fuel reprocessing.

A detailed 300 MW(e) molten salt breeder

reactor design previously prepared for

another purpose was examined to determine

the feasibility of redesign for nonproliferation

requirements. Potential diversion paths were

identified and changes suggested which were

qualitative in nature (there was insufficient

time to actually redesign the reactor).

The modified molten salt reactor as a nonproliferation reactor has many features which

make it attractive. However, it appears that

the system would have difficulty meeting the

requirement for a breeding ratio of approximately one. It is not known how significant

the deviation from one would be. The system

inventory is high, on the order of 500 to 1000

kg of U233, which at this time would be judged

excessive. Finally, it is not clear that diversion

of a significant quantity of U233 would cause

the reactor to shut down.

For all the nonproliferating reactor designs,

enough U233 to start the reactor up would

have to be supplied from an external source,

probably a thorium cycle fast breeder. One

thorium cycle breeder could provide enough

start-up U233 for many nonproliferating reactors. Start-up U233 would have to be produced, reprocessed and shipped under guard,

In this sense, nonproliferating reactors would

not totally eliminate diversion possibilities, but

the concept does hold forth the promise of

enormously limiting diversion and proliferation paths.

Conclusion on Nonproliferating Reactors.—

This small program is the first attempt to

design reactors specifically with nonproliferation and nondiversion in mind. As such, it

deserves continued funding at an expanded

scale, a wide hearing, a thorough assessment,

and an open-minded comparison with other

alternatives.

DEDICATED FACILITIES

All nations now possessing nuclear

weapons obtained fissile material from

facilities specifically dedicated to its production

or separation. Therefore, a nation need not

undertake a nuclear power program in order

to have a nuclear weapons program. In fact, a

nation determined to

may be able to do so

in a shorter period

174

acquire nuclear weapons

with lower capital costs,

of time, and with less

scrutiny from other nations by building

facilities specifically dedicated to the production of fissile material by itself (or with gray

market aid).1

Isee “purchase and Theft” section, this chapter and

appendix VII of volume 11 for a discussion of black and

gray markets.
Such a nation would have two basic options:

(1)

(2)

Construct a plutonium-production

reactor plus a reprocessing plant to separate the plutonium from the spent fuel;

Construct an enrichment plant to produce highly-enriched uranium {rem

natural uranium.

Variants on the above two options are

possible. For example, a nation might feed a

dedicated reprocessing plant with spent fuel

obtained from an unsafeguarded power or

research reactor. This is the route India took,

removing fuel from the unsafeguarded Canadian-supplied Cirrus research reactor. Alternatively, a nation might divert low-enriched

uranium from a safeguarded facility or buy

low-enriched uranium in a black or gray

market and boost it to highly enriched

uranium in a dedicated enrichment plant. No

case of the diversion or purchase-plus-boosting route is known to have occurred.

A major motivation for nations to build

dedicated facilities is to have a reliable, possibly secret, and/or legal source of fissile

material. As safeguards are improved and extended over all imported nuclear facilities, and

as greater restraints are placed on the sale of

enrichment and reprocessing plants, more nations may be inclined to develop their own

facilities.

The construction of any facility dedicated to

the production of weapons material, which of

course is not safeguarded, would constitute a

violation of the NPT by parties to that treaty.

The NPT nation must accept IAEA safeguards

on all its peaceful nuclear materials, in all its

peaceful nuclear facilities, and must require

IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to all

non-nuclear weapons states. However,

nothing in the NPT prohibits the transfer of

nuclear material or technology to nonparties

to the NPT, even though such nations may

have some unsafeguarded facilities. At the

present time, the non-NPT nation, even while

receiving safeguarded imports from NPT parties, may still indigenously build or obtain

unsafeguarded nuclear facilities from another

nonparty to the NPT.

In spite of the above fact, even countries not

party to the NPT would usually have strong

incentives to attempt to keep construction and

operation of dedicated facilities secret, at least

until they had built up a stockpile of weapons

material. A nation that can suddenly

demonstrate the capability to explode a

nuclear device has a strengthened position. At

the same time, a clandestine weapons

program avoids the recriminations and international political pressures that the nation

might encounter if it pursued the program

openly.

Under some conditions, a nation might feel

it had little to lose and perhaps some political

prestige to gain by the open pursuit of a

nuclear weapons option. This section will thus

include consideration of dedicated facilities

that would be difficult to keep secret.

Weapons Program Levels

The magnitude of the weapons program a

nation decides to undertake is a crucial factor

in determining what kind of dedicated facility

it will choose to build.

A country interested in only a small

weapons program would look first at option

(a), the plutonium production reactor. As

shown in appendix VI of volume II, the rate of

plutonium production is proportional to the

reactor-power level. For example, a reactor

operating at 25 MW will produce between 9

and 10 kg of plutonium per year, enough for

one or two explosives. As outlined below,

such a reactor can be built and operated at

nominal cost, in a relatively short time, with a

small number of personnel, and there is at

least a fair chance that its existence could be

concealed for several years. This size will be

referred to as a Level I reactor.

A more ambitious program, one which

would yield between 10 and 20 explosives per

year, would require a reactor operating at

about 400 MW. This is referred to as a Level II

reactor. Its construction would require a large

investment in capital and involve a large

number of engineers and construction

workers, Because of the magnitude of the task,

175
there is little chance that the project could be

kept secret, either during construction or in

operation.

An alternative to a single Level II reactor

might be the construction of several Level I

reactors that together would yield the same

plutonium output as the larger reactor. A nation with a limited technological base might

find it easier to build several smaller reactors,

each based on the experience gained with the

first.

If a nation decided to build an enrichment

plant to feed its nuclear weapons program, it

would have to allow for 15 to 30 kg of highly

enriched uranium for one explosive. The most

likely choice of enrichment technique at present (as discussed below) is the gas centrifuge.

Because construction of an enrichment dedicated facility would be more expensive and

difficult than a Level I reactor it is unlikely to

be considered by a nation that wants only one

or two weapons per year. One exception

might be a nation that has either developed or

purchased a centrifuge enrichment plant for a

commercial power program. In that case, the

components for a dedicated enrichment plant

might cost no more than add-ens to the existing plant, The cost for a small dedicated

enrichment plant would then be low enough

for a Level I weapons program. (See also

chapter VII “Diversion From Commercial

Power Systems” for a discussion of this

route.) Another important exception in the

future might result if other enrichment techniques are found that are cheaper and technologically simpler.

Assessment of the likelihood of a nation

building any of these dedicated facilities, and

of the probability that its efforts can be

detected, requires an evaluation of the cost,

time, and personnel required,

The numbers vary widely with the types of

assumptions made. If one assumes that the

dedicated facility will be essentially a scaleddown commercial facility, the cost, time, and

personnel estimates are generally quite high.

One might more realistically assume that a

designer would make considerable simplifications if the facility were built specifically to

produce nuclear weapons material. In particular, such plants can be subject to less stringent

safety and radiation-protection restrictions.

The estimates of cost, time, and personnel

will also depend quite heavily on the particular nation building the facility. Important factors are the available natural resources, the

technological and industrial base, the number

of trained scientists and engineers, and the

cost of labor.

Level I Plutonium Production

Reactor2

The most likely choice for a Level I production reactor would be one fueled with natural

uranium, moderated with graphite, and

cooled by air. The uranium might either be

mined and milled indigenously, since many

nations have at least small uranium reserves

(see appendix VI of volume II), or it might be

purchased on a gray or black market if commercial purchases would raise suspicions.

Graphite and heavy water are the only practical moderators to use with natural uranium.

The heavy water is an improbable choice

because it is expensive, available from only a

few countries, and indicative of its purpose if

imported in large quantities. Air is selected as

a coolant rather than water because it

simplifies the design, construction, and maintenance of the reactor and the fabrication of

the fuel elements.

One graphite-moderated, air-cooled,

natural-uranium reactor that has operated

successfully is now fully described in open

literature. It might well serve as a model reactor to guide the construction of a dedicated

facility. This reactor is the Brookhaven

graphite research reactor (BGRR), described

in appendix VI of volume II. The BGRR is a 30

MW reactor which, when operated with

natural uranium (from 1948 to 1957) for

research purposes produced about 9 kg of

Wluch of this section originally appeared in: John R.

Lamarsh, “On the Construction of the Plutonium Producing Reactors by Smaller and/or Developing Nations,” Prepared by CRS, April 30, 1976. See also appendix VI of volume II.

176
nearly pure Pu239 annually (enough for one or

two weapons per year). The cost of the BGRR

and its related equipment was $16.7 million

when built in 1948. It is not necessary to

duplicate the BGRR in detail in order to attain

the same rate of plutonium production.

Simplifications in the BGRR design would

permit the building of a plutonium-production reactor that would be cheap and reliable,

and that would require the talents of only a

small group of conventionally trained

engineers.

The design of a simplified BGRR is discussed in detail in appendix VI of volume II

with cost estimates for the various components. Costs are based on current U.S. prices,

and as such they may have only the roughest

applicability to another nation. Moreover, the

costs in appendix VI refer to a bare-bones

program, with primitive conversion and fuelfabrication facilities and perhaps some

sacrifice of safety and environmental controls.

The overall reactor cost estimated with these

assumptions is $10 million. Other estimates

have been made for a Level I reactor of the

same basic type which are considerably higher.

A conservative estimate for the capital cost

of a Level I reactor of modified BGRR design

producing 9 kg of Pu239 per year, is, therefore,

in the range of $15 million to $30 million.

The personnel requirements for the design

and construction of the facility are modest, as

all of the essential design parameters are in

open literature. High-level research and

development personnel are not required. Only

a handful of experienced and competent

professional engineers—possibly no more

than 10—would suffice to design and oversee

the construction of the facility.

The reactor could be ready for production

approximately 3 years from the beginning of

the project.

Level I Reprocessing Plant3

To fabricate nuclear explosives as quickly as

possible, the fuel from a dedicated Level I production reactor would be removed after it had

been in the reactor for approximately 1 year.

The concentration of plutonium would then

be about 9 kg in 75 tons of fuel, or about 120

grams per ton. The nation would have to build

a reprocessing plant to separate the plutonium

from the spent fuel.

A plutonium recovery plant must be

designed and operated with care. The raw

fuel, when first discharged from the reactor, is

highly radioactive. Even if the fuel is allowed

to cool for 120 days, during which time the activity decays by a factor of 100 or more, the

total radioactivity is still about 45,000 curies

per ton or 0.05 curies per gram of fuel. This

means that the chemical processing of the fuel

must be carried out remotely, in a shielded

cell, at least up to the point where the fission

products are removed.

It should be noted, however, that the

radioactivity of the BGRR fuel is much lower

than that of a typical power reactor. The activity of power-reactor fuel after a cooling-off

period of 120 days runs between 2 and 3

million curies per ton, a factor of about 50

times higher than BGRR fuel. Considerably

more precautions must therefore be taken in

reprocessing power-reactor fuel than fuel

from a BGRR.

Although the chemical steps required in the

process are straight-forward and well-known,

design and operation of the plant is complicated by the radioactivity of the spent fuel, the

toxicity of plutonium, and the potential criticality of the plutonium fuel. These problems

Slvfuch of this section originally appeared in: John R.

Lamarsh, “On the Construction of the Plutonium Producing Reactors by Smaller and/or Developing Nations,” Prepared by CRS, April 30, 1976. See also appendix VI of volume II.

177
require remote control, concrete shielding,

and careful procedures, but do not constitute

major obstacles,

Virtually all reprocessing plants built since

the 1950’s use the Purex solvent-extraction

method. Both the chemical engineering techniques and the designs of actual reprocessing

plants are well documented in open literature.

For example, the plans for the Barnwell, S. C.,

reprocessing plant recently constructed by

Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS) have

been widely distributed to the public and are

available in the NRC Public Document Room.

Because AGNS is such a large plant, with a

through capacity of 5 tons of fuel per day

(1,500 tons of fuel per year), considerable scaling down of this plant would be necessary for

the purpose of reprocessing fuel from a Level I

reactor.

Plans and specifications for a smaller plant

are also available. In the late 1950’s, the

Phillips Petroleum Company undertook a

feasibility study of a small reprocessing plant

designed to handle spent fuel from Commonwealth Edison’s Dresden-1 plant, then

scheduled for operation in 1960. Phillips

issued a report on this study in 1961, containing detailed drawings of every component of

this plant. Although some chemical/nuclear

engineers have expressed skepticism about the

workability of the Phillips plant, because of its

compact design and high level of automation,

it nevertheless can be viewed as an excellent

starting point for the design of a clandestine

reprocessing facility in a small and/or

developing nation.

A number of simplifications, described in

appendix VI of volume II, are possible when

the plant is designed for the sole purpose of

recovering plutonium from BGRR fuel.

Several of these simplifications result because

the fuel has a lower burnup than fuel from a

power reactor as discussed above, and, less

shielding and fewer precautions are necessary

when reprocessing the production-reactor

fuel,

All of the equipment and supplies required

to build and operate a plutonium recovery

plant are generally available on the world

markets. There is no single item that is so exotic as to be obtainable from only a single

source,

Estimating the cost of a reprocessing plant

is difficult even for commercial operations.

The discussion in appendix VI of volume 11 arrives at a figure of less than $25 million, while

estimates from other sources range from a few

million, to $10 million, to $70 million. The

highest cost estimates do not appear to take

into account the simplifications possible with

relaxation of safety and radiation protection

standards and the use of lower burnup fuel.

The lowest cost estimates correspond to extremely crude and imperfectly shielded (but

technically feasible) solvent extraction or ionexchange facilities, not suitable for a sustained

program but which might be constructed to

obtain material for a total of only a few explosives.

In view of this range of assumptions and

costs, a reasonable estimate for the cost of a

frugally designed reprocessing plant for

BGRR fuel, based on the Purex solvent-extraction process, is less than $25

million. If the plant were built to handle higher burnup fuel (for example, spent fuel

diverted from a power reactor), the costs

would be somewhat higher.

Thus the total capital costs of a Level I reactor and associated reprocessing plant are in

the range of several tens of millions of dollars.

Many of the same technical personnel involved in the reactor project could be utilized

for the plutonium recovery plant. Such a plan

makes good sense because the recovery plant

would necessarily be located adjacent to the

reactor and would probably be built during

the same time frame. The total engineering

personnel for the two projects would be in the

range of 10 to 20. Top-ranking research and

development personnel are not required, as

the staff largely follow and/or modify

established designs. Nevertheless, the staff

must contain competent engineers with applicable practical experience. A reactor and

reprocessing plant cannot be built by reading

books alone.

Many developing countries with a modest

technical infrastructure would have the

capability to build and operate the Level I

178
reactor and reprocessing plant described

above, The construction of Level II reactors

(producing 100 kg of plutonium/year), discussed below, would not be feasible for countries without a fairly high level of industrialization and a considerable nuclear

base upon which to build.

Level II Plutonium Production

Reactor

It is reasonable to assume that any dedicated plutonium production reactor would be

fueled with natural uranium, because if

facilities for enriching uranium were available

it would be more logical to base a weapons

program entirely on enriched uranium rather

than reactor-produced plutonium.

In order to produce 100 kg of Pu239 per year

(enough for 10 to 20 nuclear explosives), a

reactor operating at about 400 MW is necessary (a reasonable allowance of 30 percent

downtime is made).

Several different choices of moderator and

coolant are possible. The moderator for a

natural uranium-fueled reactor can be only

heavy water or graphite. The coolant can be

either ordinary or heavy water, or any one of

a number of gases. As discussed in appendix

VI of volume II, the most practical choice

would probably be a graphite moderated,

light-water cooled reactor.

Such a reactor would be similar to the first

reactors built at Hanford, Wash., in the

Manhattan Project. While a nominal 400 MW

Level 11 reactor wouId operate at only about

one-fifth the power of an early Hanford reactor, the nuclear designs of the two systems

would be very similar. (The designs of the

Hanford reactors have recently been

declassified.)

One estimate of the total capital costs of a

Level 11 reactor with associate reprocessing

plant is in the range of $175 million to $350

million. Roughly 50 to 75 engineers would be

needed in the design and construction phase

of this Level II program, supported by roughly

150 to 200 skilled technicians. The length of

time required from the start of the design to

the first output of plutonium metal would be 5

to 7 years. As in the Level I reactor, the output

would be nearly pure Pu239

.

Level I and Level 11 Enrichment

Plants

Several methods might be considered for

enriching uranium. To date the most successful method is the gaseous diffusion process, which was developed by the Manhattan

Project in World War 11. This technique has remained essentially the only source of enriched

uranium for military and civilian nuclear

programs since that time, both in the United

States and abroad. However, gaseous diffusion plants are inherently large structures that

utilize a relatively sophisticated technology,

much of which remains classified; they require an enormous investment of capital; and

they consume large amounts of electric power.

Finally, they cannot be concealed. The

gaseous-diffusion route to nuclear explosives

is not feasible for any but a handful of the

largest and most developed countries, and will

not be considered further in this report,

Another method for enriching uranium is

the Becker nozzle process. Such an enrichment

facility is being sold to Brazil by Germany,

and a variation of it is being developed in the

Union of South Africa. However, this method

requires a large number of stages (see discussion of stages in appendix VI of volume 11)

and consumes 2–1/2 times as much electric

power as gaseous diffusion and about 30 times

as much as centrifuges (see below). Although

the Becker method has fewer classified critical

aspects, it does not appear to be a reasonable

choice for any but an advanced nation.

Separation by means of high-speed

centrifuges was explored during the Manhattan Project but later abandoned. This technique has reemerged in the last few years and

has reached an advanced stage of development, both in this country and abroad. It appears likely that the centrifuge method of

enrichment will prove to be cheaper than any

other presently developed method of enriching uranium,

An Anglo-German-Dutch

group, Urenco, has successfully

enrichment

demonstrated

179

92-592 0-77 . 13
the first cascades of two small centrifuge

plants, each with a planned capacity of about

200,000 kg separative work units (SWU) per

year at Capenhurst, England, and Almelo,

Holland. Urenco has plans to expand one or

both plants to a total enrichment capacity of 2

million kg SWU by 1982. A small test facility

is in operation at Oak Ridge, Term. One

American firm has proposed building a major

centrifuge uranium-enrichment plant to provide fuel for nuclear powerplants.

One advantage of the centrifuge method for

a dedicated facility is that a small number of

units or groups of centrifuges can be placed in

operation as soon as they are built and tested.

The separative operation need not wait upon

the completion of a large facility. Production

of weapons-grade uranium can begin at a

small level and gradually be increased as additional centrifuges are installed.

The capacity of an enrichment plant necessary to produce 30 kg of highly enriched

uranium (enough for one or two explosives) is

shown in appendix VI of volume II to be between 6000 and 7000 kg SWU/year, depending

on the tails assay. If each centrifuge has a

capacity of 5 kg SWU/year this size plant

would require 1200 centrifuges. An enrichment plant for a Level II weapons program

would have to be about 10 times this size,

with a capacity of 60,000 kg SWU/year.

The costs of a Level I or Level II centrifuge

plant can only be based on estimates made by

those now planning commercial plants. Those

figures are not only estimates themselves, but

most are for plants considerably larger than a

dedicated enrichment plant would be and

costs do not scale linearly with size. Urenco,

which plans a plant whose capacity is several

million kg SWU/year, (i.e., hundreds of thousands of machines), has estimated its capital

costs at $165/SWU. A U.S. estimate of capital

costs for a 3 million kg SWU/year plant is

$300/SWU. Another U.S. estimate for a

smaller (300,000 SW U/year) plant is

$700/SWU. Finally, Japan expects the cost of a

50,000 kg SWU/year plant to be $3,300 /SWU.

The only one of these estimates to correspond closely to the size of a Level II

centrifuge plant is the Japanese estimate. On

this basis, one might put the cost per SWU at

$2,000-$4,000 and the total plant capital cost

at $120-$240 million. Because, as discussed

earlier a Level I centrifuge-enrichment plant is

likely to be built only as an “add-on” to an existing plant, its costs may run the same per

SWU as those of a larger plant. Taking the

range of U.S. estimates of capital costs of

$300 -$700/SWU, this assumption leads to a

cost estimate for a Level I add-on plant of between $2 million and $5 million.

The costs discussed above do not include

those for research and development.

Centrifuge separation is a difficult technology

only recently developed by a few of the most

advanced nations. The AEC classified

centrifuge technology in 1960, and Urenco

also maintains tight security. Although

unclassified details of early centrifuge technology are available, considerable development work would be necessary before even a

small operable enrichment plant could be

built.

Comparison

The centrifuge enrichment route calls for

quite different resources and capabilities than

does plutonium production reactors. In the

latter case not only are complete facility plans

readily available, but nuclear reactor and

chemical engineers are being trained openly

around the world.

For these reasons it is improbable that

centrifuge enrichment would be the route

taken by a country with a limited industrial

and scientific base interested in a Level I

facility.

There do not appear to be major differences

in personnel requirements between the two

types of Level II facilities—plutonium production and centrifuge enrichment-although the

centrifuge program might require somewhat

more manpower, The centrifuge program

might also take longer from inception to

metallic-weapons material. The capital and

operating costs appear comparable.

Thus, an industrialized country desirous of

producing significantly more than one bomb

per year might carefully weigh the centrifuge

180
enrichment plant against a large plutonium

reactor.

Advanced Isotope Separation

Techniques

Several enrichment processes are under

development that may allow highly enriched

uranium to be produced from natural

uranium (or even depleted uranium) in a very

small number of stages. Two of the processes,

laser isotope separation (LIS) and the ioncyclotron resonance process (the Dawson

process), are under development on contract

to ERDA. There are two variants of the LIS

process. One, the atomic LIS process, is under

development at Lawrence Livermore

Laboratory (LLL). The other, the molecular

process, is under development at Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratory (LASL). The atomic

process is also being developed by a private

U.S. firm, Jersey Nuclear AVCO Isotopes

(JNAI), a subsidiary of Exxon Nuclear and

Avco Corporation. Research applicable to LIS

is also being conducted in a number of other

countries, notably the U. S. S. R., France, and

West Germany.

A third process, an advanced form of

electromagnetic separation, is under conceptual investigation by a private U.S. firm,

Phrasor Technology, Inc., and research may

be underway in at least one other country. It is

unclear how much actual laboratory research

and development has been done.

The three processes, LIS, advanced

electromagnetic, and Dawson, share several

key features. All promise to extend uranium

resources, because low-tails assay should be

easily achievable. The present gaseous diffusion facilities produce tails of 0.2 percent to 0.3

percent U235

, and operation at lower tails

assay would be very expensive.

The advanced processes project a tails assay

of 0.05 percent U235 or less, and an economical

extension of uranium resources of about 30

percent could therefore be achieved from

lower tails assay. In addition, tails accumulated over the years from the gaseous-diffusion process could be run through an advanced process to extract residual U235. ERDA

has estimated that by 1989, at an average of

0.25 percent UZSS in accumulated tails, enough

extractable UZSS will be contained in the tails

for the lifetime fueling of 40 to 50 reactors,

each of 1000 MW(e).

The three processes also hold forth a promise of lower cost enrichment. The goal of the

ERDA program is a 50 percent to 75 percent

reduction in enrichment costs, but much

greater cost reduction may also be possible. If

these approaches are economical on the large

scale, all would be also economical in smallscale plants, in marked contrast to centrifuge

processes and especially to gaseous diffusion

processes. The reason for this is that the advanced technologies will probably require

very few stages (possibly only one) to go from

natural uranium to low-enriched uranium for

reactors. The gaseous-diffusion process requires over a thousand stages; the centrifuge

process requires the order of ten stages, with

many centrifuges per stage.

The LIS processes and the Dawson process

are still in the research stage, with solutions to

several difficult problems still to be demonstrated. The proprietors of the advanced

electromagnetic process claim that they are

ready to begin pilot plant development, but

they have apparently done little laboratory

development. (It should be noted that a version of the electromagnetic process, the

calutron, was used during the Manhattan

Project to separate U235 for the first uranium

weapon. The calutron method is described in

appendix VI of volume II.)

The EXXON LIS process, although closer to

the pilot-plant stage than the corresponding

ERDA process (perhaps partially because of

its less ambitious cost-reduction goals) also

has technical problems to solve.

All three processes have built on a high

technology base. LIS development in the

United States depends heavily on the

electro-optical base developed by the Department of Defense. The electromagnetic process

has apparently built upon ion propulsion

research in the space program.

All three processes have the potential for

exacerbating the nuclear proliferation

181
problem. This is true in general of all enrichment processes which could produce highly

enriched uranium from natural uranium in a

few steps, because such processes are highly

economical on a small scale once research and

development have been completed.

This report has looked more closely at laser

isotope separation (LIS) than the other two

processes, and has had access to classified

material, including ERDA-prepared responses

to a series of questions and a classified discussion meeting with representatives from LASL

and LLL. In order to keep this document

unclassified, much of the detailed material

supplied by ERDA has been omitted. As a consequence, the detailed state-of-the-art and

description and evaluation of remaining technical problems are not presented.

It appears unlikely, based on knowledge of

U.S. technology, that LIS could contribute to

nuclear proliferation before the 1990’s. ERDA

plans to reach a decision in 1979 on which of

the approaches, atomic LIS, molecular LIS, or

Dawson, to fund to the pilot-plant stage. Pilotplant operation is scheduled for 1984. This

schedule depends on the successful solution of

a number of difficult technical problems.

Proliferation From Advanced Isotopic

Separation Techniques

Like any other enrichment technology, LIS

could theoretically contribute to proliferation

in the following ways:

1. The indigenous development of a dedicated facility;

2. Misuse of a commercial facility;

(a) Replication for the purpose of producing weapons material,

(b) Covert diversion, and

(c) Seizure.

These routes are considered in turn below.

Once LIS is known to work on the pilotplant scale, research and development can be

expected to intensify in several technically advanced countries. Some of these countries

would probably develop LIS 5 to 10 years after

a U.S. demonstration. Countries with only a

moderate technological base would take

longer.

The above discussion presupposed that LIS

technology remained tightly and effectively

classified. Leaks of essential data or technical

details would speed-up development of LIS by

other countries by eliminating the need for

some basic research. However, the design,

construction, and operation of a workable LIS

system (even one that was not commercially

competitive) from source preparation to

isotope extraction would still require a lengthy and expensive development and learning

program.

For these reasons, indigenous development

of an LIS dedicated facility to produce highly

enriched uranium is unlikely to be a feasible

route for nations with a low c r moderate technological base.

A greater danger is that LIS technology will

be marketed by one or several advanced countries. France and the U.S.S.R, in particular

could well succeed in LIS technology at about

the same time as the United States (again, it

should be noted that the eventual success of

LIS is not a certainty). As noted above, several

other countries would probably be only 5 or

10 years behind. Because LIS is economical on

a small scale, many countries with a small

nuclear power program could make a good

economic case for wanting an LIS enrichment

plant.

The spread, through sale, of commercial LIS

technology would teach many purchasing nations a technology that they probably could

not have developed for themselves. Replication of the technology in a small facility to

produce weapons material would not be easy,

but would be possible for more nations than

indigenous development, The sale of commercial LIS technology could also result in many

nations possessing a declared and safeguarded

facility that could be modified, covertly or

overtly, to produce weapons material.

It would be the aim of safeguards to detect

covert production of weapons material in a

commercial LIS facility. It is not possible to

assess a nonexistent safeguards system on a

nonexistent plant containing a nonexistent

process. However, several general statements

can be made. The most important obstacle to

effective safeguarding of a LIS plant against

covert diversion could turn out to be the

182
obstacle that presently might hamper

safeguarding of centrifuge enrichment

facilities: the fact that inspectors do not have

access to the area where the actual enrichment

process is going on, but must rely on monitoring inputs and outputs at the perimeter of the

facility, with some input and output routes exempt from monitoring (i. e., perimeter

monitoring with undeclared paths. See chapters VIII “Safeguards” and VII “Diversion

From Commercial Power Systems”.) On the

other hand, the intrinsic nature of the LIS

process, with relatively small pieces of equipment and a low-process inventory, could

make LIS plants easier to safeguard against

covert diversion than present enrichment

facilities. In addition, many LIS plants would

be small, and small plants are intrinsically

easier to safeguard than large plants because

the uncertainties in materials accountancy are

smaller in absolute terms of kg of enriched

uranium. Therefore, LIS plants may not present uniquely difficult safeguarding problems.

A greater danger than covert diversion is

overt divers ion, which international

safeguards, by their nature, cannot prevent.

Some form of sanctions would be the only

effective response to overt diversion. A nation

with an enrichment facility is in a strong position to withstand international embargos

aimed at LWR fuel, and LIS facilities could

provide this immunity to countries that could

not consider present enrichment technologies.

(See chapters 111 and VIII for a discussion of

sanctions. )

The difficulty of modifying a commercial

LIS plant designed for 3 percent U235 reactor

fuel to produce highly enriched U235 f o r

weapons would depend on the engineering

details of the process. (It should be noted that

one need not go to 90 percent enrichment to

have useful weapons material: anything

above about 50 percent U235 would be useful.)

There do not appear to be any basic physics

reasons to preclude obtaining weapons-grade

material in a few stages in either the atomic or

molecular LIS processes. Jersey Nuclear Avco

Isotopes (JNAI) has stated that their process

appears to be unsuitable for the production of

highly enriched uranium. Representatives of

the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) LIS

group have stated that they do not agree with

the JNAI statement, if it is meant to apply to

all possible atomic vapor processes, although,

LLL continues, it could be true for the particular JNAI design. The concept of a “tamperresistant” LIS process, atomic or molecular, is

an attractive idea, but a good deal of technological analysis would be necessary to

establish how tamper resistant any particular

design was. Moreover, too much reliance

should not be placed on tamper-resistant LIS

designs. Even a very tamper-resistant design

would not be an absolute fix; what it would

do is drive the nation towards the route of

replication with modifications (a research and

development program might be necessary to

accomplish this) rather than overt seizure.

Some observers have suggested a U.S.

moratorium on LIS development, coupled

with strenuous U.S. diplomatic effort to obtain agreement from other countries to suspend work on LIS. Others express great doubt

that the United States could achieve international agreement to stop the development of

LIS or other advanced enrichment technologies, in view of both the pressures in

many countries for independent and inexpensive enrichment and the worldwide market

for enrichment services expected to develop in

the 1990’s.

ERDA predicts the worldwide market for

enrichment to reach about 130 million SWU

per year in the year 2000, based on their projections of 1200 GW(e) for LWRS worldwide

by the year 2000. These projections may prove

to be too high, nevertheless present and

planned U.S. and foreign enrichment stands

now at about 60 million SWU per year, all of it

the expensive diffusion or centrifuge processes (see figure X-18). The advanced enrichment technologies, promising much less expensive enrichment, are thus extremely attractive to countries wanting both to assure themselves of self-sufficiency at a low cost in meeting their own enrichment needs and to profit

from the sale of enrichment services.

Some observers have argued that the

United States should develop an advanced

enrichment technology and guarantee to sell

enrichment services for a low fee or at cost. If

183
this were done, they maintain, the profit incentive for other countries to develop such

technologies would be removed, and the incentive for smaller countries to buy an advanced enrichment facility would be much

reduced. Thus, these observers argue, U.S.

development of these technologies would in

fact slow down their spread.

It would be unrealistic to expect, if this happened, that no other countries would develop

advanced enrichment technology. A few advanced countries, with large nuclear programs

and an avowed interest in LIS or another advanced enrichment technology (notably

France and the U.S.S.R.), would almost certainly prefer their own low-cost enrichment

facilities, even at the cost of indigenous

development, to reliance on U.S. guarantees.

The same argument of desire for independence could be used by countries seeking to

purchase an advanced enrichment facility,

even if guaranteed services were available

from the United States and perhaps a few

other suppliers. Whether the independence

argument will be plausible, or will be perceived as only a mask for an unstated

weapons objective, would depend strongly on

how supplier-importer relationships develop

over the next decade.

In summary, the sale of LIS and other advanced enrichment technologies presents a

greater proliferation danger than indigenous

development of the technologies. The present

course of formulating suppliers’ agreements

to end the sale of enrichment facilities is

therefore particularly crucial in the case of the

advanced technologies. (Chapters III and VIII

discuss methods to restrict the spread of

enrichment and reprocessing. )

All enrichment technologies capable of producing highly enriched uranium from natural

uranium in a few stages should be closely

watched by the United States. At the time of

the ERDA decision point in 1979, the competing ERDA technologies should be evaluated

for proliferation potential, in addition to

economical and technical promise. In particular, the ability to safeguard advanced enrichment facilities and the possibility of tamperresistant processes should receive attention.

In evaluating the proliferation potential of

advanced enrichment technologies, the effect

that their uranium-conserving properties

might have on the economics of the introduction of plutonium recycle and fast breeder

reactors should also be considered.

Detection of Dedicated Facilities

This report has not had access to any

classified intelligence information. Therefore,

only a few general comments on the detection

of dedicated facilities can be offered.

Once the political decision has been made, it

would take up to 5 years to build a facility

dedicated to the production of weapons

material and to obtain the material for the first

explosive. As discussed in chapter VIII “International Control of Proliferation, ” a nation

would probably be at an advantage if its

weapons program were not detected until after

it had assembled its first explosive. Therefore,

the question of the detection of dedicated

facilities focuses on the probability of detection within a time span of approximately 5

years—between the time a nation begins

serious internal discussion of the possibility to

a short but significant time before it has the

weapons material in hand.

The likelihood of detection of a dedicated

facility in a particular country depends on

several factors. For example, it will be

relatively easy to detect a clandestine nuclear

facility in a country which otherwise has a

very limited nuclear program. It will be

relatively easy to detect a clandestine nuclear

facility in a country which appears to have

cause to want a nuclear weapons capability,

because intelligence analysts will be more

alert for early indications of a move towards

clandestine nuclear activity. It will also be

relatively easy to detect a large Level 11 nuclear

facility.

One of the most important intelligence

techniques, especially for the first indications

of a dedicated facility, is political reporting.

The very first indications of a dedicated

facility are unlikely to come from technological techniques, such as satellite photography.

Visible photography from satellite or aircraft

184
would become an important tool only after an

active, coordinated surveillance program has

begun.

A sustained effort, probably over a period

of several years, coordinating many elements

of the intelligence system—political reporting,

visible photography, monitoring of the movement of materials and persons, sampling for

chemical or isotopic indicators (such as Kr85

for a reprocessing plant) would be necessary

to build up familiarity with the target of surveillance and thus confidence in conclusions.

It appears unlikely that a Level II facility

could long escape detection. Too many people

would be involved in its design, construction,

and operation. Level I facilities probably

would present a detection problem in many

countries, especially if the country were not

considered one of the five or six most likely

Nth countries. Intelligence agencies cannot

continually monitor the whole world for dedicated facilities, and must allocate their

resources according to priorities of problems

and priorities of targets.

PURCHASE AND THEFT

A third potential route to the acquisition of

nuclear weapons is the direct purchase or

theft of either the fissile material or the

weapons themselves. The commodities might

be purchased through an illegal nuclear black

market, bought or traded from a friendly nation in what is termed a gray market, or even

stolen directly from some national nuclearweapons arsenal. These paths bypass the need

for the expensive and demanding technologies

required by either the commercial power or

dedicated facilities route, Thus, if this type of

transaction emerges, the scope of proliferation

could be extended to technologically limited

nations and non-state adversaries (NSAS)

who would otherwise have found the task

difficult and risky. The pace of proliferation

could be further accelerated by the relative

ease of obtaining weapons, a general sense

that the nonproliferation regime was crumbling, and a specific concern that one’s

enemies could be covertly arming. This section describes and evaluates the three elements to this route: black market; gray

market; and theft. Appendix VII of volume II

provides further detail.

Black Market

The term black market, as used here, means

the illicit trade of goods where the commodity

does not in general belong legitimately to the

seller. The commodities traded in a nuclear

black market could be fissile material,

weapons designs, or actual weapons. The

most probable fissile material is plutonium

derived from commercial power cycles,

because it can be directly used for weapons

fabrication. Only a very small fraction of the

plutonium expected to be moving in a worldwide plutonium fuel cycle by the end of this

century would have to be diverted to produce

many bombs annually. Research-reactor and

breeder-experiment fuel are other potential

sources. A detailed design of an effective

bomb would be an attractive commodity,

especially for NSAS, because it would reduce

the time and risk necessary to develop an

effective weapon. The third black market com -

modity—weapons—might be stolen from

military stockpiles, particularly if proliferation continues and security is lax in the new

weapons states.

Participants in black markets can be

categorized as buyers, suppliers, and intermediaries. Several potential participants can

be identified in each category, and the type of

transaction and motivation varies with the

participants. Buyers might be nations or subnational groups (terrorists, political or military factions, and criminals). The types of nations most likely to pursue a black market

route are those technologically limited but internationally ambitious or those confronted

with a sudden dire emergency which

precludes the more conventional but timeconsuming routes. Demand for illicit weapons

or strategic nuclear materials could arise for

185
economic reasons. An approximate price for

plutonium if freely traded could be about

$9000/lb. ($20/gram).4 Ten kg for one or two

bombs would at that price be $200,000, and a

small arsenal of 20 bombs would cost less

than $4,000,000. The black market price

would probably be several times higher, but

even so the total cost could still be much less

than that of the construction and operation of

dedicated facilities. Subnational groups that

consider terror to be a legitimate weapon

could be drawn to nuclear weapons as

described in chapter V, but might find procurement of the material otherwise too

difficult. A military faction might want

nuclear arms to facilitate a coup, or to hold in

reserve for a national emergency if the civilian

government has forsworn their development.

Criminal groups, conceivably even individuals, might want to acquire arms for extortion.

Different commodities require different

suppliers, Fissile material (plutonium) might

be diverted by an employee at a nuclear

facility such as a reprocessing plant. Motivation could be money, coercion, or ideology.

Alternatively, strategic nuclear materials

could be acquired by terrorists or criminal

groups staging an armed attack, probably on

shipments. Military weapons might also be

procured by armed attack, but the tighter

security would require even higher motivation on the part of the attackers. Corrupt military elements in a nuclear weapons state

might steal their own bombs for profit,

especially if security is casual. If intermediaries are involved they would most likely be

criminal or international terrorist groups.

One constraint on a nuclear black market is

the difficulty of initiating transactions. Most

buyers and suppliers are unlikely partners.

Contact and trust may be difficult to establish,

except possibly between terrorist groups. Suppliers can generally find buyers more easily

qBased on previous expectations and discussions with

industry representatives. Utilities presently assign zero

value to their plutonium in the spent fuel, but if recycle

is allowed, the value would depend on the cost of the

enrichment which the plutonium replaces, the cost of

reprocessing, and the additional cost of mixed-oxide

fuel fabrication.

than vice versa, since potential buyers are

relatively obvious. By contrast, a supplier

might be the only employee out of 500 at a

reprocessing plant with the motivation and

the ability to divert plutonium. The supplier,

however, runs the greater risk since he enters

into the transaction with the illegally obtained

commodity.

These transactions are more likely to occur

if both the supply and demand are high. The

supply of weapons designs and weapons

themselves is likely to change only slowly

(although access to them may increase

faster). The potential supply of fissile material,

however, could increase dramatically if largescale reprocessing and plutonium recycle are

initiated. If all the spent fuel from 1,000 LWRS

(anticipated by 1995) is reprocessed, then

diversion of one-tenth of 1 percent of the annually produced plutonium would be sufficient for about 50 bombs. This supply might

be limited by effective safeguards and physical

security, which can sharply reduce opportunities for illegal diversion, just as they

reduce opportunities for national diversion.

Material accounting, containment, and surveillance will reduce employee theft, while

physical security should deter and repel

armed attack, Physical security is especially

important to protect weapons.

Given sufficient supply and demand, a sustained market could emerge from initial intermittent transactions. Thus, the market would

be transferred from an amateur to a professional operation. The latter would be more

dangerous because it would be continually

seeking new suppliers and customers, and

because the greater expertise of the operators

would inhibit interference. A full-blown

market could consist of many individual

diversion activities and continuing networks,

with criminal organizations providing necessary middleman services. A sustained black

market requires a high demand, which would

probably come only from less developed

countries: more advanced countries would

want more and better bombs than a black

market could be expected to provide, and

NSAS are unlikely to be able to afford more

than a few. The major source of supply might

be a number of reprocessing plant employees.

If each smuggled out just one gram of

186
plutonium per day (an amount probably too

small for either material accounting or portal

monitors to detect) he should realize at least

$5,000 per year and maybe several times that.

This source could be supplemented by attacks

on shipments of plutonium, which could net

several million dollars worth of material. A

market of several hundred pounds of fissile

material worth millions of dollars per year

seems credible. Although small by comparison to the drug market, this is large

enough to interest criminal groups and to

have a major impact on proliferation.

Gray Market

A gray market falls between a black market

and normal commercial transactions. The

commodity belongs legitimately to the seller

and the transaction is legal under the laws of

the nations concerned but must be covert

because it would be unacceptable if known

publicly. The main reasons for secrecy of

nuclear transactions would be to avoid alerting an enemy and to avert domestic or international reaction to furthering proliferation,

especially if in violation of the NPT. The

transaction could involve weapons, fissile

material, or technical assistance.

The buyer in a nuclear gray market could

only be a government, because purchase by

any non-national group would be illegal. The

supplier could be another government, a corporation, or an individual. Government-togovernment transfer of nuclear arms could occur if a close and valued ally was on the verge

of annihilation. Sale or barter of such weapons

under more normal conditions is less likely.

Fissile material is a more probable commodity, and technical assistance the most

likely. The latter could consist of design information for either weapons or plutonium production facilities, or the critical components

for either one, A supplier nation might enter

into gray market transactions either at the demand of a nation that provides a vital resource

(e.g., oil) or by the desire to gain political support (e.g., Pakistan and India both trying to

gain favor with Arab nations), Alternatively,

some nations may engage in a joint development program to reduce costs and shorten

schedules.

Corporations with a large investment or

substantial business expectations in another

country could be subjected to considerable

pressure to assist in a weapons program, particularly the plutonium production aspects.

Revelations of corporate bribing of foreign

officials gives a certain credence to this

speculation, but the difference between a bribe

and a contribution to proliferation will not be

lost on corporation executives. The impact of

exposure could also be much larger, Furthermore, the nations with the most leverage

would the ones needing the least assistance.

Hence, this type of transaction seems less

likely than governmental assistance. If it does

emerge, however, the most likely suppliers

would be reactor manufacturers, architectengineers, and consulting companies. These

are discussed in appendix IV of volume 11.

Companies might be more susceptible to

foreign overtures if their domestic nuclear activities are curtailed.

Individuals could contribute to a weapons

development program by becoming scientific

mercenaries. A sizable pool of scientific manpower conversant with plutonium reprocessing, materials handling, and related fuel-cycle

technology already exists. Lack of demand for

their skills at home might force a few to seek

employment elsewhere, and bitterness over

their loss of careers could overcome their

‘scruples about contributing to proliferation. A

constraint on this movement would be the

desire of most nations to keep their weapons

program secret. The nation may not wish to

rely on the loyalty of foreigners in this situation, and may be unable to sequester them

voluntarily for the long duration of the

development program.

It is possible that some examples of gray

marketing have already occurred. It was

reported in 1975 that West Germany had been

covertly involved in South Africa’s uranium

enrichment development programs This

cooperation was denied but some evidence indicates it may have existed. Nuclear mercenaries have a precedence in the migration of

scientific manpower to the developed countries in the brain drain of the 1950’s and

1960’s.

5 T/le obserz)er (London), Oct. 5, 1975.

187
Countermeasures to Black and

Gray Market

An important step in combatting these

transactions is to detect them. Intelligencegathering operations can serve to identify participants, but the difficulty experienced with

cracking the illegal drug market illustrates the

problems that will be encountered in

penetrating a nuclear black market. Isolated

transactions would be even harder to detect

unless the participants revealed themselves. If

the buyer in either a gray market or black

market is a government, then some aspects of

its weapons fabrication may emit unique intelligence signals (as for other weapons

development programs). This is discussed in

the previous section, “Dedicated Facilities. ”

Intelligence activities could also track migrating manpower, but the difficulty of separating

the critical cases from the legitimate movements will be great and conflicts with civil

liberties may arise. International safeguards

should be capable of at least detecting when

significant diversion has occurred. With that

as a start, then intelligence can more easily

track the material and determine the participants.

International safeguards have been directed

at national diverters, but the same methods

would be effective against black market diverters. Both intelligence and safeguards can be

enhanced and reoriented towards this threat.

Increased effectiveness in detection would be a

potent deterrent to potential participants. The

factor that would probably have the greatest

impact in controlling a black market in fissile

material would be to limit plutonium recycle.

The supply that does exist can be made less accessible by enhanced physical security,

The willingness of participants to engage in

these transactions depends not only on perceived rewards and risks of detection, but also

on the consequences of detection. Possible

responses might include sanctions against

countries engaged in nuclear gray marketing,

police work to capture black marketeers, and

control of the activities of potential nuclear

mercenaries and corporations abroad.

Theft of Nuclear Weapons

The most direct route to a nuclear weapon

is the theft of someone else’s. This report does

not analyze weapons security in detail.

Nevertheless, certain observations can be

made. Fewer groups are capable of attacking a

nuclear weapons stockpile or transport than

could participate in a black market. Only

highly motivated, well-organized, and wellarmed attackers would have much chance of

overcoming effective military security surrounding weapons.

U.S. nuclear weapons consist of bombs,

missiles, artillery shells, depth charges, torpedoes, and demolition charges.6 All are protected against unauthorized use by internal

mechanisms. None of these can prevent the

weapons from being used simply as a source

of high quality fissile material, but the delay

would enhance the chances of recovery. Even

without rebuilding the weapons, however, the

thief would achieve full psychological value of

possession.

U.S. weapons are kept in Europe, the Pacific

Ocean area on naval vessels, and at home.

Storage sites are usually on military installations. The protection provided is more

stringent than that required for commercial

fissile material, but the need for upgrading is

recognized and being addressed by the

Department of Defense. Weapons stored

abroad might become less secure if the host

government suddenly changed hands.

Transport for logistical purposes is probably

the most vulnerable link, but it is also infrequent.

It is difficult to defend against a determined,

effective, comando type of attack. Groups of

about 8 to 20 attackers using an imaginative

plan and aided by one or more insiders would

be especially difficult to resist without rapid

reinforcement. On the other hand, it would

also be difficult to mount this type of attack

bJoint Committee on Atomic Energy, Development,

Use and Control of Nuclear Energy for the Common

Defense and Security and for Peaceful Purposes, 1976.

188
without giving some warning to appropriately oriented intelligence activities.

Massive attacks such as the Israeli raid on the

Entebbe Airport are least likely to be successfully resisted, but neither can they be accomplished anonymously. Consequently,

political and military responses, if activated,

can be expected to ensure return or destruction of stolen weapons.

Other present nuclear weapons states appear to present about the same barriers to

theft as the United States. New nuclear states,

however, may be more vulnerable. Some potential Nth countries have experienced turbulent domestic politics, and factions could

seize weapons for their own use or for sale on

a black market. This threat could be exacerbated if some Nth countries are unconcerned

about physical security, or feel it is secondary

to the need for immediate operational readiness. Furthermore, such nations will probably

not have the sophisticated protective mechanisms built into their weapons.

Conclusions

The emergence of a black market is presently constrained by the lack of supply of

fissile material. Widespread plutonium recycle

would remove this constraint. Some demand

appears to exist, as already evidenced by

Libya’s attempts to buy a bomb.7 This demand

7steven J. Rosen, Nuclear Proliferatiotz and the NearNuclear Countries, p. 178, Bullinger Publishing Co.,

Cambridge, Mass., 1975.

could increase if more nations feel intense

security concerns or if they sense a continuing

pattern of proliferation and feel they, too,

should have a few nuclear weapons in reserve.

The inherent lack of prestige of weapons attained by this route may deter some, but

others might feel no compunctions. Thus, if

supply is not limited, the outcome is likely to

be at least intermittent black market transactions.

Gray market transactions appear at least as

likely as those on the black market. The supply of some commodities already exists, the

participants are more natural partners, and

less risk would be involved. Gray market

transactions would be individually negotiated, and so present less danger of spreading.

The existence of either black or gray markets

would be a serious blow to nonproliferation.

They would themselves lower the barriers to

weapons, and the feeling that nonproliferation efforts had failed would spur other nations to procure their own weapons.

Theft of weapons is the hardest to evaluate.

Largely unpredictable conjunctions of motivation, ability, and opportunity would have to

occur. Unless the attack is overwhelming, success will depend to some extent on luck. The

military and psychological effectiveness of a

stolen weapon would probably be substantially greater than that of a homemade one,

particularly for non-state adversaries. Hence,

physical security of weapons must be such

that the risk of losing them is very low.

189
Chapter Vlll

Control of Proliferation

.

–——.———- — 

Preceding page blank

’

I
Chapter VIII

Control of Proliferation

The first seven sections of this report described the nations or groups that

might want to make weapons and how they might go about it. The materials required for such an enterprise are common, and will become more so as nuclear

technology spreads. Many means of control have been developed or proposed to

prevent this material from being used for military purposes. There are four

general levels on which these efforts can be based. The first is to detect if a diversion has in fact taken place, through the use of safeguards measures. In the

United States, the term safeguards generally encompasses physical security, since

the threat (non-state adversaries) is the same for both types of protection. On the

international level, safeguards and physical security are quite distinct. International safeguards are measures designed to detect and deter diversion and misuse

of fissile material by governments authorized to hold such material, while physical security is designed to foil theft, sabotage, and external attacks by

unauthorized groups and individuals. From a political and institutional standpoint the two problems are quite different. Supplier and recipient governments

have a common interest in physical security, but by definition, national diversion does not involve such a community of interest. Safeguards assume a potentially adverse relationship between inspectors and users of nuclear material.

Consequently, safeguards involve the imposition of external controls on the user

state by a supplier state or regional or international agency. Primary responsibility for the application of international safeguards has been assumed by the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Euratom, an agency of the European Community, has regional safeguards responsibilities which are being coordinated with the IAEA. Neither of these agencies has the power to provide or require physical protection, or to pursue and recover stolen material. Nor do they

have the authority to detect clandestine weapons facilities or purchase/theft activities. The functions they do perform are described below. Other functions can

be performed by intelligence agencies (such as the CIA) as alluded to in the sections on these routes.

In our own government from 1946 to 1974, the important branches were the

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Department of State, and the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Two years ago the AEC was split into

the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC is responsible for safety rules, security

safeguards, and accounting safeguards throughout this country.

Preceding page blank 193
The second level is to respond to a detected diversion in such a manner as to

force its reversal and deter others from like actions. Neither the IAEA or Euratom

have any significant authority in this area, nor has any other international institution. If sanctions are to be applied it must be done by arrangements among

nations, as discussed below.

Third, nuclear systems and facilities can be limited to those that minimize

opportunities for diversion. This requires cooperation among all suppliers of

nuclear equipment. It consists of restricting the export of sensitive facilities

(enrichment and reprocessing plants), except possibly for those operated under

multinational control. The development of reactors and facilities that are inherently less vulnerable can be emphasized. Suppliers’ conferences have been

useful in attaining some of these ends. Multinational fuel-cycle facilities may be a

promising approach for others. There appears to be very little emphasis yet on

low vulnerability systems in any country and no international move to implement them.

The final level is to set a climate in which nations will not want to proliferate. This means decreasing incentives and enhancing disincentives as discussed

in chapter IV. It also means weaving a network of treaties, promises, and commitments that is hard to break becuase of the moral, financial, and public appearance factors that act on modern nations. The Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) has been a cornerstone in this effort, binding its parties to accept IAEA

safeguards on all their nuclear material and on all exports (even to nonparties).

International cooperation is the thread that binds all these objectives. None

is perfect or even very effective by itself. Together the total may be greater than

the sum of the parts, but only if there is a continual effort to strengthen each element. If successfully and flagrantly breached, the entire system could rapidly collapse.

The first part of this chapter describes the controls the United States places

on its domestic nuclear program to protect against theft or diversion of nuclear

material. The IAEA procedures for the detection of diversion of nuclear material

are also discussed. The second part of this chapter analyzes the institutions and

other arrangements designed to control proliferation. Appendices VIII and 1X of

volume II provide further detail on safeguards and on the international institutions respectively.

SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY

U.S. Domestic Safeguards possession or use of significant quantities of

nuclear materials through theft or diversion;

In the United States, safeguards have been

and sabotage of nuclear-facilities. ”l

defined as “all measures designed to detect, 1WASH-1.l 327, P. V-61 (August 1974) Draft

deter, prevent, or respond to the unauthorized (GESMO).

194
The three subsystems of the U.S. safeguards

system are physical protection, material control, and material accounting. These subsystems are discussed in detail in appendix

VIII of volume II.

The primary safeguard measures the United

States uses to prevent or detect diversion are

the physical protection and material control

systems. The goal of the physical protection

subsystem is to prevent access by force,

stealth, or the use of false identity to nuclear

material in a facility or shipment. This subsystem should prevent unauthorized removal

of nuclear material and prevent sabotage. The

physical protection subsystem overlaps the

material control subsystem, which is designed

to detect any unauthorized or suspicious activity involving nuclear material.

Examples of elements of a physical security

system include armed guards, barriers,

alarms, locks, portal monitors for detection of

smuggled nuclear material, a central command and communication station, search procedures, and liaison with local and State

police. Material control encompasses a set of

procedures for access to and transfer of

nuclear materials. The aim of these procedures

is to prevent any two insiders, acting in collusion, from diverting nuclear material from the

facility. The effectiveness of these procedures

depends on the interpretation of regulations

by NRC and the facility operator, and on continued surveillance and testing to ensure that

the procedures are in fact being followed.

Material accounting for nuclear material is

similar to accounting systems for other valuable materials, involving complete records of

movement of the material and the taking of

physical inventories. At present, the primary

job of the material accounting subsystem is to

determine, after some period of time, that the

other two subsystems have been effective, or

to provide information as to where. and how

they may have failed. Highly automated,

semicontinuous measurement systems

designed to provide prompt information that

nuclear material may be missing are under

development. (See “Advanced Material Accounting Systems “ in this chapter. )

A history of U.S. safeguards from 1946 to

the present is given in appendix VIII of

volume II. Until recently, safeguards have not

been a matter of high priority to government

or the public. Several years ago, safeguards

began to attract widespread interest and increased funds were provided. However, a sudden injection of interest and money cannot

quickly make up for years of complacency.

In the United States there are three major

nuclear programs and three agencies having

safeguard responsibilities. The three programs

are: military, nuclear power, and nuclear

research. The Department of Defense provides

safeguards for the nuclear weapons in its

possession. The Energy Research and

Development Administration (ERDA) operates production facilities for the nuclear military programs and conducts research on

nuclear power and other nuclear applications.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

is responsible for applying safeguards to both

privately owned nuclear facilities and a few

ERDA-owned facilities.

NRC Safeguards

This discussion focuses on NRC safeguards.

The NRC safeguards can be considered in four

classes. The first three are of present concern;

the fourth allows time for further study. These

problems are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Protection of power reactors against

sabotage;

Protection of shipments of privately

owned weapons-grade material;

Protection of existing production

facilities that possess and process

weapons-grade material against theft or

sabotage; and

Protection of future fuel facilities that

would process large quantities of

plutonium-containing fuel or other concentrated weapons-grade material.

The key facilities to be guarded in a

domestic nuclear power program are (1) those

which a non-state adversary might sabotage,

or (2) those from which it might steal or embezzle nuclear material that can be used in a

nuclear weapon with little or no processing.

195

92-592 0- 77 - 14
Protection of Power Reactors Against

Sabotage. —The reactor itself must be

safeguarded against sabotage, but not, at present, against theft of weapons-grade material.

U.S. reactors (with the one exception of the

Fort St. Vrain HTGR) do not presently contain

onsite material useable in nuclear explosive

weapons, except for the plutonium contained

in spent-fuel elements. (See discussion in

chapter VII of the usefulness of spent fuel to

the non-state adversary.)

The subject of reactor sabotage was judged

peripheral to the topic of this study—nuclear

weapons proliferation. Thus, this report has

not assessed safeguards at U.S. reactors.

Shipments of Privately Owned WeaponsGrade Material.—Presently, NRC and ERDA

require physical protection for shipments of

strategically significant amounts of special

nuclear material, i.e., more than 5 kilograms

(kg) of highly enriched uranium, or 2 kg of

plutonium or U233. Until recently, both ERDA

and privately owned materials were

transported by private transport companies

which met the then-existing security requirements. In 1976, ERDA decided to provide its

own transportation system for its nuclear

materials, including highly enriched uranium

fuels for naval reactors and research reactors

and plutonium fuels for the test breeder

program. In consequence, all ERDA shipments

of significant amounts of nuclear materials between its facilities, private contractors licensed

by NRC, and ERDA and private facilities, are

now protected by the ERDA system, while the

relatively few shipments of privately owned

materials are subject to NRC regulations.

ERDA and NRC transportation safeguards

are described in appendix VIII of volume II.

The important differences between the two

systems are: (a) ERDA transport convoys

maintain continuous communication with the

ERDA control center in Albuquerque over a

nationwide dedicated communications network (SECOM). SECOM cannot be used by

NRC shipments; (b) ERDA shipments are

made in specially designed tractor trailers

providing protection to the drivers, resistance

to penetration, and wheel locks. The transport

vehicle is accompanied by escort vehicles,

with which it is in constant communication.

NRC requirements are less stringent.

196

There appear to be no serious legal,

economic, or institutional reasons for NRC

shippers not to employ the ERDA communications and control system. This,

coupled with the use of tractor trailers (similar in performance to ERDA’s) and the requirement of an accompanying escort vehicle

would significantly upgrade NRC transportation security.

Protection of Existing Facilities That

Possess Weapons-Grade Material.—The NRC

has licensed 15 privately owned facilities

(listed in volume II, appendix VIII) to process

strategic quantities of highly enriched

uranium or plutonium.

There is at present a controversy over

whether or not safeguards at these facilities

are adequate. The controversy centers on what

level of threat the safeguards should meet: i.e.,

the debate is about the phzysicul security

systems.

In the spring of 1976, a joint NRC-ERDA

task force investigated the safeguards systems

at these facilities. The threat-levels defined for

the review consisted of:

. an internal threat of one employee occupying any position, or

. an external threat comprised of three

well -armed (legally obtainabl e

weapons), well-trained individuals, including the possibilities of inside

knowledge or assistance of one insider.2

Nearly half of the licensees were found unable to meet this total threat level and were ordered by NRC to upgrade their physical

security. A number of critics, notably the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC),

have claimed that the above threat level is far

too low. NRDC quotes a memorandum from

Carl Builder, then Director of NRC’s Division

of Safeguards, expressing concern that some

current licensees could not meet the lowest

threat being considered for the safeguards

supplement of the Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed-Oxide Fuels (GESMO), which

was, like the threat level postulated above,

three outsiders and one insider, NRDC further

zNUREG-0095/ERDA 77-34: Joint ERDA-NRC Task

Force on Safeguards (U) Final Report, July 1976,

[Unclassified Version].
refers to several studies done for NRC which

spoke of maximum credible threats or credible

threats in the range of 12 to 15 or 6 to 8 persons, with 2 or 3 insiders.

The National Resources Defense Council

petitioned NRC to dispatch Federal marshals

as an emergency procedure to ensure security

at the facilities. This petition was denied by

the NRC commissioners. On January 21, 1977,

the commissioners stated their intention to

conduct a public rulemaking “to consider

upgraded interimsafeguards requirements

and proposed longer term upgrading actions. ”

In late February 1977, NRC decided that

security at these facilities should be upgraded

to meet a threat of two or more insiders acting

in collusion with an outside group of several

adversaries armed with automatic rifles,

recoilless rifles, and high explosives. Guard

forces were ordered increased and required to

be armed with semiautomatic rifles. Full-field

background investigations were required for

licensed employees who might effectively conspire to steal or divert weapons material.

This report has not assessed NR C

safeguards at the facilities in question, but

several general observations can be made. Of

all of the attributes of the potential adversary,

numbers has received the most attention. This

may be because the number of possible

assailants is the easiest attribute to deal with

in designing a security system. The estimated

number of attackers is also often considered to

directly determine the required number of

guards. Guards are an expensive component

of security systems, Guards at Government

facilities must be paid for by Government; at

licensed facilities by private industry. A requirement to maintain a large guard force

could shut down some facilities not able to

pay the costs and remain profitable.

Appendix III of volume II summarizes a

number of studies of threat size and describes

the data bases of the studies.

Current research at the RAND Corporation

is investigating a number of (non-nuclear) adversary actions which have been selected as

analagous to potential nuclear theft or

sabotage, This work shows that groups of 3 to

6 are common, that larger groups do appear,

and that a group size of 12 does appear to be

somewhat of an upper boundary, although

there are a few cases in modern industrialized

societies in which larger groups have been involved. More importantly, the RAND

researchers argue that one must be extremely

cautious in interpreting historical data regarding the number of attackers. The number of attackers taking part in a mission are, for the

most part, what the perpetrators perceived to

be necessary to accomplish the mission, and in

most cases what turned out to be sufficient. In

other words, the adversaries came with as

many as they needed to do the job, and no

more. The fact that most came with a handful

of persons, 3 to 6, does not represent an upper

limit on their capacity to mobilize people. The

upper limit would appear to be higher.

Although the historical data are useful as a

guide, an estimate of the number of attackers

is inescapably a matter of judgment. Without

speaking in terms of a maximum threat, the

RAND studies suggest a range of anywhere

from 7 or 8 to about 15 as a prudent estimate,

Again, although it is judgmental, military

men and law enforcement officials argue that

more than this number might be counterproductive. It is no coincidence that after 5,000

years of military history, the smallest operational unit of almost all armies is a squad composed of 9 to 13 men, Although an attacking

force could be composed of several squads, it

should be recognized that to assemble even 10

or 12 attackers would stretch to the limit the

capacity of most known violent political extremist groups in this country. Moreover,

although no one has attempted to determine

precisely how many persons must be in conspiracy to commit a serious crime before it is

no longer a secret, the probability of discovery

must increase rapidly in the higher ranges.

The fear of leaks appears to be a principal consideration and constraint in assembling the

personnel for a task-force crime.

The number of attackers is not the only

parameter to consider in determining the adequacy of physical security. Another factor to

consider is armament. Here the potential adversaries seem to have the edge. Civilian

guard forces are armed with pistols, shotguns,

and in some cases, semiautomatic rifles. (The

recent NRC upgrading calls for guards armed

197
with semiautomatic rifles. Guards at ERDA

facilities may be armed with automatic

weapons and at some facilities may also have

armored cars.) NRC officials concede that attackers may be armed with automatic

weapons, hand grenades, and possibly even

antitank weapons.

Another, and a most important parameter,

is tactics. Armed robbers seldom assault their

target. They employ stealth, deception, diversion, and other techniques to gain access.

Often they are inside or close upon the guards

before displaying arms and revealing their intentions. Deception often proves to be successful where assault would probably fail.

A fourth set of parameters involves the size

and location of the facilities themselves, and

the amount, form, and location of the nuclear

material they possess. The number of guards,

indeed the adequacy of the physical security

system as a whole, is a judgment that can only

be made by an examination of each specific

site. The approach to be taken should be to

design an entire physical security system to

protect a specific facility against all conceivable actions—burglary, armed robbery, embezzlement, sabotage, armed assault, standoff

attacks—rather than to pick a number of attackers and let an equation determine the

number of guards. Once this is done, a team

composed of physical security experts and

nuclear technology experts should jointly

assess the system probing for weaknesses and

trying to design successful attacks on the

system (i.e., black-hatting evaluation should

take place).

This is the approach being taken by ERDA

and NRC in their safeguards research

programs, discussed in more detail in the section on “Domestic Safeguards Research and

Development” later in this chapter. The

safeguards system concepts now being

developed aim to integrate safeguards and

physical security into the design of new

facilities, and hold the promise of making

them more easily defensible against both outside attack and inside embezzlement. The

point to emphasize here is that physical

security can and should eventually be

upgraded in more basic, varied, and imaginative ways than by simply increasing the numbers of guards and the power of their armament.

For example, it should be recognized that

there could be an alternative to relying on onsite guard forces to overcome armed adversary attack. A crucial question, which deserves

serious review, is the extent to which

safeguard systems can be designed to delay attacking adversaries sufficiently so that the

burden of engagement and arrest falls on

offsite response forces instead of on onsite

guards.

The preceding discussion on numbers of attackers and guards leads to another issue involving guards at nuclear facilities. At present,

unless they are deputized by a Government

agency, guards at nuclear facilities have only

limited civilian-arrest powers. Moreover, the

powers of such guards, particularly with

respect to the use of deadly force and permissible behavior in hot pursuit, vary from

State to State (some licensees have facilities in

more than one State). Guards who overstep

State laws, even to protect special nuclear

material, can face lawsuits, Although

unauthorized possession of special nuclear

material is a Federal crime (Sec. 42 U.S.C.

2271 (b) and 2272), it is not clear if this crime,

by itself, is a dangerous felony. The use of

deadly force is justified only to prevent a

dangerous felony.

The entire subject of the powers and status

of guard forces at privately owned nuclear

facilities should be reexamined. The subject of

a Federal security force to protect weapons

material should be reopened, particularly in

view of the increased threat levels licensees

are being required to meet.

In addition, there are indications that

safeguard threats to private nuclear facilities

are coming to be regarded as threats to national security, without being explicitly

defined as such. Should sabotage of a nuclear

power reactor or detonation of a nuclear explosive by terrorists be regarded as having national security significance? Would sabotage

of a large dam or of a liquid-natural-gas

tanker, which would cause comparable

damage, be a threat to national security? So

far, these questions have not been explicitly

considered.

198
One measure that apparently hinges on the

question of national security significance is

the requirement of clearances for employees of

nuclear facilities. NRC and ERDA have maintained in the past that only a few key

employees of private nuclear facilities would

(or should) be cleared. The purpose of this

clearance would be to provide added

assurance that managers and guards would

not engage in conspiracies to steal nuclear

material or sabotage nuclear facilities. The

legal basis for such a clearance requirement is

an amendment to an appropriation bill

(Public Law 93-377), which authorized the

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to require

clearance for licensee personnel if deemed

necessary for national security. In light of this

wording, NRC seems to have implicitly

decided that safeguarding nuclear facilities is

essential to national security: that is, it seems

possible that the enabling statute which

authorizes security clearance for national

security reasons might not provide the

authorization necessary to clear nuclear

employees who may not be involved in national security.

By the year 2000, according to the Draft

Societal Impact Chapter of GESMO, the number of people employed in mixed-oxide fuel

cycle facilities and requiring security

clearances would be in the range of 13,000 to

20,000. In addition, NRC has recently announced a proposed rule to require that 6,000

employees of 63 nuclear reactors be cleared.

This program is aimed at protecting against

reactor sabotage. This represents a substantially larger number of employees than those

“few hundred” thought to be affected when

the appropriation bill mentioned above

authorized the AEC to implement a clearance

program for private licensees.

The question of national security significance needs to be clarified. Moreover, if protection of nuclear facilities against domestic

threats is defined as necessary for national

security, the policy of using private guard

forces becomes extremely questionable.

Protection of Future Fuel-Cycl e

Facilities. —The preceding discussion of

physical security at nuclear facilities has highlighted certain tasks that must precede effective evaluation and implementation of

safeguards. These tasks include the determination of a reasonable estimate of the size of a

potential attacking force, the inclusion of

other attacker attributes in the design of

physical security systems for a specific facility,

the clarification and standardization of guard

powers, and the decision on whether theft

from, or sabotage of, a nuclear facility constitutes a threat to national security.

These tasks are important for both existing

and future facilities if plutonium reprocessing

goes forward.

It is not clear at this time if or when NRC

will license plutonium processing facilities.

The only such plant which could start operations within the next few years is the AlliedGeneral spent-fuel reprocessing plant, which

has been built at Barnwell, S.C. Other facilities

to produce plutonium oxide or to fabricate

plutonium for breeder reactors exist only on

paper and are 5 to 10 years from completion.

In the meantime, the ERDA safeguards R&D

program is working to develop substantially

improved safeguard techniques to meet the

problems posed by large-scale plutonium

processing and fabrication facilities. Several

techniques are discussed below under the

heading “Domestic Safeguards Research and

Development.”

Domestic Safeguards Research and

Development

Both NRC and ERDA have safeguards R&D

programs. ERDA has the responsibility for

developing safeguards for the new energy

systems it develops, and also to ensure that

the safeguards for its military and research

programs will meet future safeguard goals.

On the other hand, the Energy Reorganization

Act of 1974 assigned NRC the responsibility

for confirmatory research. This has been interpreted so far to mean that ERDA would

support the bulk of hardware research, technology development, and demonstration and

testing of safeguards systems in actual

facilities, while NRC has put emphasis on

systems studies, on the development of

analytical techniques, and on programs to

help it to (1) define safeguard requirements

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for the facilities that it regulates, and (2) assess

not only compliance of these licensees but also

the effectiveness of its role in protecting and

advancing the interests of the U.S. public.

The most important subjects for study,

which both NRC and ERDA are emphasizing,

are the methods of assessing and evaluating

safeguard systems and subsystems, and of

how to make cost-benefit analyses. Both tasks,

especially the latter, are very difficult when

the threats are hypothetical, the systems remain untested because there have been no significant incidents so far, and the consequences

range from zero to catastrophic.

Appendix VIII of volume II describes the

principal elements of U.S. domestic safeguards

research. The following section discusses and,

to the extent possible at this time, evaluates

several specific technical safeguards concepts

of particular prominence.

Massive Spiking

Massive spiking is the addition of lethal

amounts of radioactive material to fresh reactor fuel. The purpose of massive spiking is to

protect fresh fuel containing highly enriched

uranium or plutonium against theft by nonstate adversaries. The idea has a long history

and several studies have recently been done,

the most complete of which was a part of the

1975 NRC Special Safeguards Study. It considered several possible methods to achieve

massive spiking, and also the possible attachments of intensely radioactive cobalt-60 rods

to fresh-fuel assemblies.

The NRC study concluded that massive

spiking of fresh fuel would not constitute an

insuperable obstacle to an adversary who was

competent (1) to separate plutonium from

uranium in mixed-oxide form, and (2) to

design and fabricate an effective terrorist

nuclear explosive.

On the other hand, such spiking would increase the cost of fuel fabrication and

transportation by a large factor, expose

nuclear facility employees to increased radiation, and substantially increase the risk to the

public due to accidents or acts of sabotage.

Attaching cobalt-60 sources to fresh fuel in

shipment would place one more obstacle in

the way of the diverter, but not an insurmountable one. It would increase transportation costs but more importantly create

problems both in loading and unloading and

in the risk of accidental exposure.

Massive spiking is not cost-effective when

compared to massive containment and

stringent physical security for domestic

safeguards use. It would not be useful at all in

restraint of national proliferation.

Light Spiking

Light spiking is the addition of low levels of

radioactive material to fissile material to

afford easy detection. This concept was also

investigated in the NRC Special Safeguards

Study. All three fissile isotopes—U235, U233

,

and plutonium-are naturally radioactive.

The important question is how difficult it

would be for an adversary to shield significant

amounts of any of these isotopes and pass

radiation monitors without being detected.

The NRC study concluded that: (1) gram

amounts of highly enriched uranium in easily

carried shielded containers can probably be

removed without detection; (2) portal monitors equipped with both gamma-ray and

neutron detectors should detect attempts to

remove as little as one to several grams of

plutonium in portable shielded containers; (3)

existing portal monitors should effectively

detect small quantities of U233 because of the

highly penetrating (2.6 MeV) gamma-rays

associated with unavoidable trace impurities

of U232.

The study recommended that the subject of

low-level spiking for highly enriched uranium

be investigated further, and that an experimental program be undertaken to design and

test gamma-ray and neutron portal monitors

for plutonium of various isotopic compositions.

Evidently, no further studies or experiments were conducted by NRC or ERDA. It

would therefore be useful if: (1) ERDA institutes a design, test, and evaluation program

for portal monitors in actual production

facility environments (radiation backgrounds

200
directly affect monitor sensitivity), and (2)

NRC or ERDA initiate a study to assess costs

and benefits which might derive from lowlevel spiking of highly enriched uranium. It

should be noted that the large amounts of

highly enriched uranium in military and

naval programs are presently the most attractive targets for an adversary who wants

material to use in a nuclear explosive.

Spiking is unlikely to be used except for

domestic safeguards, but the subject of radiation monitors for surveillance of nuclear

facilities is of considerable interest to the

IAEA.

Denaturing of Plutonium

The concept of denaturing Pu239 with Pu240

or some other isotope of plutonium also has a

long history. It has long been believed that a

high content of Pu240, because of its high

spontaneous fission rate, renders plutonium

unsuitable for use in a nuclear weapon. This is

not true. A high content of Pu240 is a complication. Given a free choice, a designer

would prefer low Pu240 material, but all

plutonium isotopes can be used directly in

nuclear explosives. (See chapter VI.)

Storage and Transport of Plutonium in

Dilute Mixed-Oxide Form

Plutonium oxide stored and transported in

a mixture containing large amounts of

uranium oxide (i.e., dilute mixed-oxide form)

would present a significant (but not

insurmountable) obstacle to the non-state adversary. This technique would be a much lesseffective deterrent against national proliferation than against the non-state adversary. The

dilute mixed-oxide material might be produced in the following ways:

(a) Plutonium would not be separated at all

from uranium at the reprocessing plant

(coprecipitation)

(b) Plutonium would be incompletely separated from uranium at the reprocessing

plant (partial coprecipitation)

In alternate (a), the concentration of

plutonium in uranium would be approximately 1 percent. The machinery for separating plutonium and uranium would not exist,

so plutonium could never appear in concentrated form in the fuel cycle. However, the increased costs of both a larger nitrate-to-oxide

conversion facility, and a larger plutoniumuranium mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility,

plus the necessity for over-enriching additional uranium, could more than outweigh

savings in the solvent extraction process and

in eliminating conversion of recovered

uranium to UF6

. If so, this option would not

be economically attractive compared to (b)

with more stringent safeguards. ERDA plans

to consider option (a), at least in the preliminary stages of its Alternate Fuel Cycle Study.

(See chapter VII “Diversion From Commercial

Power Systems.”)

Alternate (b) appears to provide significant

improvement in safeguards without undue

economic penalties. In effect, it moves one

processing step from the fuel-fabrication plant

to the reprocessing plant.

The major contribution of scheme (b) is

elimination of transport of concentrated

plutonium. A potential non-state embezzler

or national diverter could still tinker with the

separation system at the reprocessing plant to

produce pure plutonium. Materials accounting in a large plant could not provide timely

detection of the removal of 10 kg of pure

plutonium, thus the physical security and

material control subsystems (or the containment and surveillance systems in the case of

IAEA safeguards) would be crucial.

As far as this report has determined, the

only study of the deterrent effect of diluting

plutonium with uranium was done as part of

the NRC Special Safeguards Study. The study

investigated the effort required by a non-state

adversary group to separate plutonium from

uranium. It concluded that an ion-exchange

operation, operated in a 10 kg batch mode

with 5-percent-plutonium content, would require $5,000 in chemical costs alone. The time

per batch was not explicitly stated, but

analysis of what is presented suggests 40 to 80

hours processing time per batch, or 30 to 60

days of round-the-clock operation to obtain

10 kg of plutonium. The process as described

is clearly not a laboratory operation; it is a

201
small pilot-plant operation, and as such requires the supervision of someone with practical experience in chemical engineering or

larger-than-laboratory scale chemistry. The

time required for the operation, during which

the adversaries are immobile, significantly

enhances their chances of being discovered.

It is not clear whether any additional work

on this subject has been done. It would be

valuable to have a clearer idea of the actual

time-delay granted by this technique.

Although a month or two may be too long, at

least several weeks sounds extremely plausible. It would also be useful to examine what

new search and recovery techniques could

take advantage of the fact that the adversaries

would be carrying on a pilot-plant scale

chemical operation.

The following proposal for collocating

reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities is

closely related (in its potential effect on

safeguards) to the above proposal for diluting

plutonium oxide with large amounts of

uranium oxide,

Collocation of Reprocessing Plant and Fuel

Fabrication Plant

If reprocessing plants were sited adjacent to

fuel fabrication plants, the transportation of

plutonium in concentrated form would be

eliminated. However, although the NRC

Nuclear Energy Site Survey-197 5

(NUREG-001) concluded that “. . . . collocation might have a beneficial effect on

safeguards effectiveness; however transportation safeguards considerations do not

preclude dispersed siting,” all the advantages

and disadvantages of collocation have not yet

been assessed in any systematic way. This

question cannot be separated from the previous question—that of complete or partial

coprecipitation of plutonium oxide and

uranium oxide at the reprocessing plant. If

some form of coprecipitation is used, then the

added advantage of collocation would seem to

be small.

Advanced Material Accounting Systems

There are unavoidable limitations on

material accountancy because of statistical

measurement errors. These errors will translate into an inability to detect diversion of significant quantities of weapons material in

future large commercial facilities unless the

sensitivity of material accountancy can be significantly improved.

No substantial and economical improvement in the sensitivity of materials accountancy can be expected unless real-time material

control can be achieved. Two such systems are

being developed: DYMAC at Los Alamos

Scientific Laboratories (LASL) and RETIMAC

by NRC. (See appendix VIII of volume II for a

description of these systems.) These two R&D

programs have the same goal: to provide continuous or nearly continuous measurements

of all materials being stored, transferred, or

processed.

The LASL safeguards group is developing

instrumentation and online computer systems

for DYMAC. This system is being implemented at LASL in three phases. In phase 1,

the present LASL plutonium processing

facility is being used as a test bed for component development and operator training,

Phase II is the design and installation of a

DYMAC system for the new plutonium processing facility (TA-55) presently under construction at LASL. This is a small facility with

a typical throughput of tens of kilograms per

month of plutonium. It does not handle spent

fuel. Installation of DYMAC/TA-55 is

scheduled for June 1978. Phase III is a

program to evaluate the performance of

DYMAC at the TA-55 facility.

Operation of DYMAC/TA-55 in the new

LASL plutonium processing facility is intended to investigate:

●

●

●

the reliability and operational feasibility

of online nondestructive analysis instrumentation in a production environment,

the timeliness and sensitivity to missing

nuclear material that can be achieved,

the accuracy and efficiency of data collection that can be achieved,

202
● the operation of common data base

management, and

. the capability for production control,

quality assurance, and financial management.

Another task is to design on paper and

evaluate the cost effectiveness of such systems

for future commercial facilities. The most

useful of these studies has been done by LASL

and Sandia as part of a project to develop an

integrated safeguards system for a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility. The report gave

estimates of costs and sensitivities for the realtime measurement and analysis system.

LASL and Sandia based their designs on a

mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel fabrication plant planned by Westinghouse for construction at Anderson, S.C. (Throughput 8000

kg/year of plutonium. ) They contacted

Westinghouse for assistance in defining plant

parameters and providing cost estimates.

Although this is a paper study, plant data are

realistic and the online measurement and

computer systems are conventional or stateof-the-art.

The report states that capital safeguards

costs for this system are less than 5 percent of

the total plant cost and the total safeguards

staff (excluding guards) is about 8 percent of

the total staff of 300. At a false-alarm rate of

0.1 percent, a single theft of the order of 0.1 to

().2 kg of plutonium could be detected with a

50 percent probability. With a 16 percent

false-alarm rate, a dribble theft of approximately 1 kg over 1 month could be detected

with an 85 percent probability of detection.

These results should be compared with present NRC requirements for a fuel fabrication

facility which are: a 50 percent probability of

detection of removal of 0.5 percent of

throughput with a material balance every 2

months and a false-alarm rate of 2.5 percent.

For the case above, this corresponds to a 50-50

chance of diverting 7 kg of plutonium in 2

months, without being detected by the

materials accounting system. (Note that this

does not mean a 50-50 chance of diverting 42

kg of plutonium per year.)

Although considerable development work

and in-plant demonstration is required before

the effectiveness and costs of real-time

material control can be reliably assessed, the

studies indicate that improvements made

using DYMAC will be greater for fuel fabrication facilities than for spent-fuel reprocessing

plants. DYMAC is batch-oriented, as is the

operation of a fuel fabrication plant, whereas a

reprocessing plant is a continuous operation.

The R&D Office of the NRC has been supporting work at Lawrence Livermr e

Laboratory (LLL) on systems studies of

material control and accounting techniques,

which include automated online measurements systems for nuclear production

facilities (RETIMAC). These are purely software studies, and are not advanced enough to

give sensitivities or costs.

One thing that is clear is that even realtime, online materials accountancy systems

cannot do the entire safeguards job. Physical

security, containment, and surveillance will

still have crucial roles to play in any effective

safeguards system.

Research on Physical Security Systems

Work on physical security systems for new

facilities is being performed by Sandia

Laboratories under contract to ERDA, The approach is to design for specific nuclear

facilities, either existing ones such as the

Allied General reprocessing facility, or specific

engineered designs such as the Westinghouse

fuel fabrication plant proposed for construction at Anderson, S.C.

On the assumption that credible threat

characteristics may change in the future, the

researchers postulate a spectrum of internal

and external threats, and various combinations of the two. Combinations of barriers,

alarms, and guards are chosen to provide

multiple impediments to an intruder, or to

authorized insiders attempting to perform

unauthorized acts. A spectrum of divisionary

scenarios, including emergency situations, are

considered. The physical protection design is

coordinated with the Los Alamos design of

fully automated online nuclear material

measurement and control of all nuclear

materials in the facility. Capital and operating

costs for a given system configuration are

203
determined with assistance from the designers

of the particular facility. (Compare with the

preceding section on “Materials Accountancy,”)

Sandia and Brookhaven have developed

computer-based models to assess the comparative effectiveness of alternative combinations of safeguards elements to protect nuclear

materials against postulated overt attacks on

the facility with or without the aid of one or

two insiders. Sandia is also in the process of

developing models for assessing the

safeguards systems against covert diversion

attempts by a trusted employee or by several

employees in collusion. This is based on the

National Bureau of Standards analytical

method called “Diversion Path Analysis. ” The

overt-attack model is presently in use. The

covert-diversion model is still in the early

developmental stage. The assessment experts

emphasize that their analytical tools give

qualitative rather than quantitative assessments of effectiveness.

ERDA safeguards system designers believe

that the strategy and performance of both adversary and defender personnel are very

difficult to predict in any satisfactory manner.

Hence, special attention is paid to physical

barriers and devices which will delay the adversary, whatever his skill and dedication,

without requiring heroic behavior by the onsite guard force. Another aim is to design a

safeguards system that will be adaptable to

changing design threats with economically acceptable modifications in plant equipment or

changes in the size of the guard force.

The most effective safeguards system will

be one in which the various safeguard elements are balanced against each other and are

integrated into the design of the facility. At

this time, it appears to be at least as important

to develop a methodology for evaluating the

effectiveness of a safeguards system as it does

to work on the development of equipment and

computerized controls. In order for

safeguards assessments to give useful results,

reliable input data on the individual elements

of the safeguards system is necessary. It is also

important, therefore, to continue the experimental program to provide better information

on the penetration resistance of barriers,

reliability of alarms, and efficacy and safety of

techniques, such as foams and reactive sensors

that delay and confuse the adversary.

The object of designing a safeguards system

to delay attacking adversaries has been

described by de Montmollin and Walton:

“The effect on the design against forcible theft

is heavy reliance on passive barriers, the restriction of material accessibility, and protected

defensive positions for guards. It is not necessary

for the safeguards system to capture or kill adversaries; it is only necessary that control of the

material be maintained. The system should be

designed to withstand a protracted siege, and the

sequence of actions necessary for an adversary to

gain ultimate control of the materials should be

attacked at many points. Delay should be exploited, and the uncertainty of success as perceived by the adversary should be enhanced

wherever possible. Increased delay of the adversaries will correspondingly increase their probability of failure. Given sufficient delay, police

support will be ultimately decisive; first, by sealing off the general area to maintain contact as

adversaries attempt to break out, and eventually

to overcome them. The mission of the safeguards

systems must be to provide decisive delay rather

than to overcome adversaries in a direct, armed

confrontation.”3

Interaction of U.S. Research and IAEA Requirements and Research

The ERDA safeguards systems development, and complementary NRC work on

developing methodologies for safeguards

systems assessments, hold forth a good deal of

promise for both U.S. and international

safeguards. ERDA is aiming for a 1980–82

demonstration of a integrated safeguards

system for IAEA safeguards. A discussion of

IAEA research programs, and US. and foreign

research related to IAEA needs is given in appendix VIII of volume II.

Long-Term Safeguards Effectiveness

A subject which is of concern to some in

NRC and ERDA, and which is receiving some

preliminary attention, is the question of how

sJ,M, de Montmollin and R.B. Walton, The Design Of

Integrated Safeguards System /or Nuclear Facilities, Nuclear

Materials Management Vol V, No. III, p 317 (Fall 1976).

204
safeguards effectiveness can be maintained

during long periods of quiet. The safeguards

system, as described early in this chapter, is

designed to deter, detect, prevent, and respond. A safeguards system will effectively

deter only if it is perceived as being able to

very effectively detect, prevent, and respond.

Functions must be exercised to remain effective, and if the object is to never give the

safeguards system, and the people who run it,

real exercise, then sufficiently challenging

substitutes must be designed to maintain the

quality of the safeguards system and attract

good people to run it.

Physical Security Outside

the United States

Primary responsibility for the application

of international safeguards has been assumed

by the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA). Euratom, an agency of the European

community, has regional safeguards responsibilities which are being coordinated with

IAEA. Neither of these agencies has the power

to provide or require physical protection, or to

pursue and recover stolen material; nor do

they have the authority to detect clandestine

weapons facilities or purchase/theft activities.

As stressed in the introduction, international

safeguards are aimed at detection of diversion

by a nation from its own facilities. Physical

security of the facilities is the responsibility of

the nation.

IAEA does advise on physical security, and

has published a discussion of physical security

procedures in an IAEA manual, INFCIRC/225.

In a brief discussion in the IAEA Bulletin of

possible future IAEA actions on physical

security, IAEA envisages its role as advising,

organizing training courses and conferences,

and acting as a clearinghouse for information.

The United States has also tried to encourage greater physical security on nuclear

facilities worldwide, as it recognizes that

nuclear material obtained in one nation may

well be used in another nation, In a Presidential message dated May 1975, it is stated that

the United States has adopted a policy of no

longer issuing licenses for the export or

retransfer of more than 5 kg of highly

enriched uranium, or 2 kg of plutonium or

U233*, unless the government of the recipient

country “has an established system of physical security measures acceptable to the United

States.” This report is unaware of any detailed

standards of acceptability beyond a statement

that they should be “comparable to those imposed domestically. ”

To implement this policy, physical-security

review teams were dispatched by ERDA to 18

countries in 1975–76. Visits to an additional

21 nations were planned for 1976, ERDA

stated that by the end of 1976, “the United

States will have made reviews of the physicalsecurity measures of all major recipients of

strategic quantities of U.S. nuclear materials

and intends to cover all nations with whom it

has Agreements for Cooperation, as well as

other nations that might receive trigger quantities through the U.S.–IAEA Agreement. ”

This report has not assessed physical security

in other countries, nor has it been able to

assess the ERDA review of foreign physical

security, because ERDA has classified its

review citing the following reasons: “. . states

continue to keep their specific physicalsecurity measures classified and/or under

proprietary restrictions. The results of the

US. visits are therefore classified, at the request of the nations involved, and the United

States cannot divulge results of the review.

Furthermore, the laws and regulations of the

various recipient nations as well as the factors

peculiar to each recipient nation make it

difficult to present even general observations.” (Some additional material is presented

in volume 11, appendix VIII.)

IAEA Safeguards

The Statute of IAEA states that the objective

of Agency safeguards is to assure, so far as it is

able, that the nuclear assistance provided by

it, or at its request, or under its supervision or

control, is not used in such a way as to further

any military purpose. As a result, IAEA

safeguards differ in one vital respect from

those of U.S. domestic safeguards. Domestic

*These respective amounts of highly enriched

uranium, plutonium, and UZSS are sometimes called

“trigger quantities” because they are the amounts that

will set safeguards into effect.

205
safeguards are concerned with the non-state

adversary. International safeguards (i.e., IAEA

and Euratom safeguards) focus on the detection of national diversion.

The word safeguards is generally understood to be a collective term comprising those

measures designed to guard against the diversion of nuclear material from uses permitted

by law or treaty, and to give timely indication

of possible diversion or credible assurance

that no diversion has occurred. The difference

in objectives between U.S. domesti c

safeguards and international safeguards is

reflected in the different measures encompassed in the word “safeguards.” As discussed

in the preceding section, U.S. domestic

safeguards include physical security, material

control, and material accounting. For IAEA,

the use of materials accountancy is considered

to be the safeguards measure of fundamental

importance, with containment and surveillance at present considered only as complementary measures. The following definitions for these three measures have been

derived from the IAEA Safeguards Technical

Manual.

Material Accountancy .—Those safeguard

measures which provide the essential

knowledge on the identity, composition,

quantity, and location of nuclear material. The

basic source of data for the Agency’s accountancy system is the facility operator’s measurement system, records, and reports, and the

State’s system of accountancy for, and control

of, all nuclear material subject to safeguards.

For each material-balance area within a State,

the facility operator must record, and the State

report, the initial inventories of nuclear

material and subsequent inventory changes to

IAEA. Periodically, the operator’s book inventory is compared with a physical inventory

taken by the operator and independently

verified by an Agency inspector.

Containment. —A safeguards measure

which uses physical barriers to restrict or control access to, or movement of, nuclear

material. Examples include process tanks and

piping, transport casks, building walls, and

fences.

Plant operators use containment primarily

to provide physical protection of nuclear

material, for reasons of health, safety, and/or

operational necessity. If safeguards requirements are included in the earliest planning

phases, containment can significantly enhance

the effectiveness of safeguards. Failure to do

so may result in an inherently unsafeguardable nuclear facility.

Surveillance. —A safeguards measure

which uses instrument or human observation

to detect access to, or confirm movement of,

nuclear material.

Surveillance devices and instruments are

used 1) during the absence of an inspector to

indicate that access to or movement of nuclear

material has not compromised the integrity of

prior measurements made by the IAEA, and

2) to provide the inspector with a continuity

of knowledge of specific inventories and

material flows at key points in the fuel cycle.

Surveillance devices include cameras, television, seals, and radiation monitors.

The Evolving Role of Containment and Surveillance in IAEA Safeguards

Nuclear material accountancy has continued to be the safeguards measure of fundamental importance in the implementation of

IAEA safeguards procedures. The role of containment and surveillance, however, has

evolved at a relatively rapid pace within the

last few years and is now assuming greater

significance. It is now generally accepted that

there are unavoidable limitations on material

accountancy because of measurement errors.

For nuclear facilities with very large

throughputs, cumulative measurement errors

on nuclear material will introduce uncertainties in the material balance which exceed by

several times the IAEA’s own limits on significant quantities of diverted plutonium or

uranium which it must detect. The dictum

“what one cannot measure one must watch”

underscores the urgent necessity for fully

operational, reliable, tamper-resistant surveillance equipment.

In addition, renewed emphasis is being

placed on the NPT objective of timely detection. Material accountancy, with its dependence on independent verification of

physical inventories and material flows, is

206
confronted, as above, with an exceedingly

difficult problem. For manpower as well as

economic reasons connected with facility

downtime, physical inventories may be

limited to one per year in some facilities, and

possibly not more frequently than four per

year in the largest facilities. Under the IAEA’s

own requirements for timely detection, the

deterent value of a material balance may be

seriously degraded. New surveillance equipment which is just now being designed may

be able to meet many of the Agency’s requirements for timeliness and holds forth the

promise of eventually being able to provide

IAEA headquarters in Vienna with real-time

surveillance.

Initially, self-monitoring surveillance

devices will require frequent communication

between the facility operator and/or the host

government and IAEA headquarters in Vienna. Within a period of 3 to 5 years,

however, certain of the Agency’s surveillance

devices may be able to provide encrypted realtime status reports, first to IAEA regional

safeguards offices and finally to the Vienna

headquarters. This capability will place exceptionally stringent requirements on the longterm reliability of equipment and on the

necessity for a very low false-alarm rate. The

consequences of even a small number of false

alarms would be so counterproductive that it

seems probable that, like the space program,

IAEA’s equipment will be designed to meet a

zero defects requirement and will be correspondingly expensive.

There have been substantial increases in

money and manpower, both in the United

States and within the IAEA, to develop surveillance equipment. In order to implement

the increases in funding which Congress

authorized under the Gifts-in-Kind Program

to strengthen IAEA safeguards, ERDA has

established an International Safeguards Project Office at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

The draft program plan for Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, Task E, Assistance

for Containment and Surveillance, includes 22

separate projects. For FY 77, approximately

$990,000 has been allocated to fund these

projects. Funding by the United States, which

is scheduled to continue over a period of 5

years, the increased support within the IAEA

for surveillance equipment, and the greater

willingness on the part of the nuclear suppliers to support improved measures for

physical security and safeguards research in

general, all should provide the Agency with

reliable and effective surveillance equipment

within the next few years.

Effectiveness of IAEA Safeguards for Power

Reactors

On December 21, 1975, the IAEA had 43

nuclear power stations under safeguards, 10

of which were onload* refueled reactors of the

CANDU or Magnox type. Most of the remainder were light water reactors (LWRS).

(See annex L to appendix IX of volume II.) The

Agency has fully developed model Facility Attachments and Safeguards Implementation

Procedures (SIPS) for both classes of power

reactors, including an analysis of potential

diversion paths and possible means of countering diversion strategies. Evaluating the

effectiveness of the Agency’s safeguards on

power reactors is rendered difficult because

information about critical IAEA procedures

and policies are either not available outside

the Agency or are classified by the Agency as

Safeguards Confidential. For example, no information is available on the Agency’s sitespecific diversion analyses, the allocation of its

inspection effort, the reliability and performance of its surveillance and nondestructive

analysis (NDA) equipment (much of which is

in the early stages of development), the effectiveness of the different State Systems of Accounting and Control and, in a few instances,

the inclusion of special conditions in the

Safeguards Agreements with those states that

restrict the nationality of acceptable inspectors

or the normal use of safeguards equipment

and procedures. It is hoped that in at least

some of these areas the Director General’s

proposed Special Safeguards Implementation

Report to the Board of Governors will remedy

these shortcomings. This report is believed

due in September 1977, after several delays

totalling over a year in extent.

*I.e., reactors that are refueled without being shut

down. See chapter VII “Diversion from Commercial

Power Systems, ” and appendix V of volume II.

207
Of all the types of nuclear facilities on

which the IAEA must apply safeguards, the

light-water power reactor (LWR) presents the

fewest problems. Safeguards on these facilities

are based on an item accountability of fuel elements, a procedure which in principle is free

of measurement error. Light-water reactor

fuel is relatively large in size and involves a

relatively small number of fuel elements in

either the core or storage pond. The reactor is

usually refueled only once a year; the remainder of the time the reactor vessel is closed

and may be sealed by the Agency. The fresh

fuel, containing low-enriched uranium, is expensive to fabricate, and tight fuel specifications at the fabrication plant mean that the

amount and enrichment of the uranium in the

fuel is known within the narrowest limit of

any point in the fuel cycle. The intense

radioactivity of the spent fuel severely limits

the diversion possibilities. Even under INFCIRC/153 (the document issued in 1971 to

govern NPT safeguards arrangements), the

Agency is permitted adequate inspection

effort for effective safeguards for this type of

facility. Finally, secure surveillance equipment

(such as cameras) is available, although a fair

amount of development and testing remains

to be done in order to assemble a fully reliable

system. Nondestructive analysis techniques

required to minimize the threats of fuel

substitution have been demonstrated, but

have not been routinely applied.

The Agency has the knowledge both in

principle and in practice to provide effective

safeguards on LWRS and implementation is

proceeding.

The safeguarding of ordoad refueled reactors, such as the CANDU, is substantially

more difficult. Nuclear fuel for such reactors is

small in size, while the number of fuel elements in the core and in either the fresh or

spent-fuel storage is very large. The onload

refueling feature and the possible use of unsafeguarded natural uranium in the fuel

greatly expand both possible diversion

scenarios and the IAEA’s task of devising and

implementing effective countermeasures.

Since 1968, the IAEA, Canada, and the United

States have been engaged in joint R&D

programs specifically directed at surveillance

and containment problems of CANDU reac208

tors. More recently, the Canadians significantly increased the level of effort of their

R&D programs.

Sufficient information is not available at

this point to evaluate the effectiveness of the

new surveillance instrumentation in combination with the traditional review of the power

stations records and reports. If the IAEA concludes at the end of its testing that credible

and effective safeguards procedures for

onload reactors cannot be achieved, it may request, and the States probably will grant it, the

right to station inspectors at such facilities on

a continuous basis. Such a move would

greatly increase IAEA costs and workload.

IAEA Safeguards for Enrichment Plants

(Comparison of Domestic and International

Safeguarding Problems)

To date, the IAEA has not safeguarded any

type of enrichment facility, including pilot

plants. However, it may have to undertake

such a task in the near future as a result of its

recent agreements with both Euratom and

Japan. The proposed safeguards procedures

for enrichment plants, contained in the IAEA

Safeguards Technical Manual, are currently

being revised and have not yet been officially

released or published. Enrichment plants are

not specifically covered in either of the two

IAEA books of regulations (IN -

FCIRC/66/Rev.2 or INFCIRC/153), except for

one provision in the latter which states that a

small plant producing uranium enriched to

less than 5 percent in U235 need not be subject

to continuous inspection.

In view of this lack of experience, and the

preliminary nature of plans for safeguarding

enrichment plants, only a very limited assessment of IAEA safeguard procedures can be

made at this time. However, a few general

statements about the difficulties in safeguarding enrichment plants and a few crucial points

can be made.

An enrichment plant is the only nuclear

facility besides a reprocessing plant that is

capable of generating separated weapons

material. However, a significant difference exists in that a reprocessing plant is designed to

routinely handle material suitable for use in
weapons (i.e., separated plutonium) either

directly or after a simple chemical step. A

commercial enrichment plant normally produces only 3 percent to 4 percent enriched

uranium, which is impossible to use in

nuclear-fission weapons without further

enrichment. Therefore, the output of an

enrichment plant is of use to the non-state adversary only if a criminal black market in lowenriched uranium develops. Portions of an

enrichment plant can be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium. This is a credible scheme for a national diverter, but a

scenario in which management and workers

of a US. enrichment plant conspire to produce

highly enriched uranium is not credible.

Moreover, such a proceeding could not be

kept secret from NRC inspectors who have the

right of unlimited and unannounced access.

The case is different for IAEA inspection of

enrichment plants. At present, IAEA inspectors are not permitted access to the cascade

area of an enrichment plant (i.e., the portion

of the enrichment plant where the actual

enrichment takes place). Inspection techniques that are presently proposed for enrichment plants treat the cascade area as a black

box with a number of inputs (e.g., people,

uranium feed, and new equipment) and a

number of outputs (e.g., people, low-enriched

uranium, and old equipment). If a reconfiguration of a portion of the plant to produce

a small highly enriched uranium loop occurred, IAEA would have to deduce its existence from input and output measurements.

In the first place, materials accountancy in a

large plant is not accurate enough to provide

assurance that a significant diversion has not

taken place. More important, new equipment

is an undeclared path; IAEA is not permitted

to monitor new equipment going into the

plant. This path could be a route for clandestine feed for a small highly enriched

uranium production loop.

For input-output monitoring to be effective,

all streams need to be monitored. Physical inventory and surveillance methods need to

complement continuous input-output

monitoring. Other complementary inspection

techniques would include enrichment

monitoring (particularly checking tails

enrichment) and the use of the isotope ratio

technique to check the ratio of U235 and U234

in the product and tails.

These inspection techniques are still in the

developmental stage and have not been applied in an integrated way to an enrichment

plant.

Allowing inspectors access to the cascade

area upon demand would greatly enhance the

effectiveness and credibility of the inspection.

Inspection accessibility to the cascade area

would certainly not ensure that the plumbing

changes required for a highly enriched

uranium loop would be detected in the maze

of cascade area piping. However, it would

most likely act as a significant deterrent to any

country wishing to conduct a covert operation. In addition, undeclared feed, product, or

tails takeoff would also have a higher probability of detection.

There are two reasons given for restricting

inspector access. The first, and probably the

reason preceived as the most important, is

that of protecting commercial secrets. The second is to prevent the dissemination of enrichment plant technology via the inspectors, i.e.,

to make nuclear proliferation less likely. This

reason creates an interesting situation where,

in the name of nonproliferation, inspectors

are denied access to an area to which, in the

cause of nonproliferation, they should have

access.

IAEA Safeguards for Reprocessing Plants—

Comparison With Domestic Safeguards

The eventual effective safeguarding of a

large reprocessing plant presents the greatest

technological uncertainty of all safeguarding

problems facing the IAEA, because of the complexity of the operation, the inaccessibility of

large sections of the plant due to high radiation levels and difficult analytical problems.

Although the IAEA has somewhat more experience safeguarding reprocessing plants

than enrichment plants, it has not undertaken

the routine application of safeguards to any

commercial reprocessing plant on a long-term

basis. It has conducted safeguard experiments

and exercises at the Nuclear Fuel Services

Plant, West Valley, N.Y. (plutonium

throughput of 300 kg/year), and at the

209
Eurochemic plant in Mel, Belgium (plutonium

throughput 500 kg/year). Operation of both

these facilities has been suspended indefinitely. Currently, IAEA has experimental

safeguard projects at the two Italian pilot

plants at Sallugia and Itrex (plutonium

throughput 64 kg/year). The proposed

Safeguards Technical Manual procedures for

spent-fuel reprocessing have been drafted but

have not yet been published. The safeguarding

of reprocessing plants is treated in a very

general way in INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2. INFCIRC/153, paragraph 80(b) states that for

any facility involving more than 5 kg of

plutonium, the Agency may expend at least

1.5 man years of inspection effort. This insures

almost continuous inspection, even for very

small reprocessing plants.

Table 6 in appendix V of volume II lists existing and planned reprocessing facilities

worldwide. It can be seen that there is only

one commercial facility in operation, and that

most of the facilities to be subject to IAEA

safeguards in the next 5 years or so have

design capacities of no more than 2,500 kg of

plutonium throughput per year. However, the

Allied General (AGNS) plant at Barnwell,

S. C., has a design capacity of 15,000 kg of

plutonium throughput per year, and cost

studies indicate that plants of this size or

larger are the most economical. Therefore, this

discussion will be referenced to a plant with

plutonium throughput of 15,000 kg per year.

NRC requirements call for a 50 percent

chance of detection by the materials accountancy system of a diversion of 1 percent of the

throughput, with a materials balance taken

every 6 months. This means that a diverter

would run a 50 percent chance of being caught

by the materials accountancy system if he

diverted 75 kg of plutonium in 6 months from

the reference plant. One might argue that 50

percent is too high a risk for the diverter; in

that case he could content himself with 10 kg

in 6 months with only a 5 percent chance of

detection by the materials accountancy

system. (The numbers are slightly different for

the IAEA.)

For the IAEA, the expected accuracy of

material balance is lower; the allowable falsealarm rate, although not yet set, may be lower;

210

and the frequency of inventory is higher.

These differences will not qualitatively change

the conclusion of this analysis. Looking at the

situation from the operator’s point of view, he

can be 95 percent confident of detecting a

diversion of over 120 kg from the reference

plant within a 6 month period. That is, if the

materials accountancy system does not call a

theft, all the operator can say is that he is 95

percent certain that a theft, if it did occur, was

less than 120 kg.

Moreover, as one industry reviewer noted:

“The conclusions regarding the probability of

‘calling’ a discrepancy fail to take cognizance

of efforts to resolve the discrepancy prior to

‘calling.’ Since the ‘calling’ would undoubtedly entail added cost and inconvenience to

the operator, there would be significant effort

to resolve the discrepancy with the possibility

of introducing an unsuspected bias. ”

The above discussion reveals that the detection of diversion from a large reprocessing

plant by the present materials accounting

systems is not very sensitive to quantities of

the order of tens of kilograms, nor, more important, is the detection timely. That is, detection would occur weeks or months after the

diversion.

Both NRC and IAEA therefore require a

variety of surveillance and containment

systems. These, coupled with physical security

systems and personnel (for domestic

safeguards) and resident IAEA inspectors (for

IAEA safeguards), would make diversion (a)

more difficult, and (b) enhance the probability

of timely detection. The development, installation, and prosecution of such systems is one of

the most important safeguarding tasks to be

accomplished.

An important distinction should be made

between the non-state diverter and the national diverter.

Although a better understanding of the

likely behavior of the white-collar embezzleradversary and advances in the state-of-the-art

in evaluating safeguards systems against

covert insider actions are necessary, a national

safeguards and physical security system can

probably be designed which, if competently

implemented, would make it very difficult for
a non-national diverter to covertly remove

kilogram quantities of plutonium from a

reprocessing plant. For example, portal monitors are presently capable of detecting gram

quantities of plutonium through a moderate

amount of shielding.

The safeguarding problem is more difficult

in the case of the national diverter. Although

resident inspectors may be able to independently verify materials balances to the accuracies discussed above through promising

techniques such as isotopic correlation, diversion from the process stream undetected by

the materials accounting system of the order

of tens of kilograms per year would still be

possible. It would be very difficult for IAEA

inspectors, who have no physical security

function, to detect covert removal of this

material by a nation from its own reprocessing plant. In effect, the inspectors would have

to rely on a prompt-reporting, tamper-indicating leak-proof perimeter containment

and surveillance system. Such systems have

yet to be demonstrated, but are in the early

conceptual design stage.

Future of Safeguards on Enrichment and

Reprocessing Plants

In contrast to IAEA’s limited experience in

safeguarding enrichment and reprocessing

plants, Euratom has had some experience in

safeguarding small enrichment facilities. After

many delays, the IAEA-Euratom Safeguards

Agreement is now expected to come into force

within the next few months. The staffs of the

two organizations have worked together for

many years in anticipation of this event, but

differences in safeguards approaches and the

IAEA requirement to independently verify that

diversion has not taken place will present

many problems. For example, it seems certain

that IAEA inspectors will be denied access to

the Almelo centrifuge cascade during their inspections.

The potential diversion scenarios directly

related to measurement errors in the

throughput of large plants will place a heavy

burden on the use of surveillance and containment as supplementary safeguard measures.

In general, the United States has taken the major role in the development of unattended,

tamper-resistant surveillance devices for both

enrichment and reprocessing plants. Unfortunately, integrated systems tests have not

been undertaken in either case.

A major U.S.-IAEA effort to test installed

safeguards surveillance equipment at a

reprocessing plant (General Electric Company’s Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant in Morris, 111. ) was frustrated by a G.E. decision

not to place the facility into operation. In the

absence of a suitable U.S. enrichment facility,

strong but unsuccessful efforts were made to

persuade Urenco management to test U.S.

enrichment plant surveillance equipment at

Almelo. The United States is now considering

a comprehensive perimeter safeguards system

test at the Centrifuge Test Facility at Oak

Ridge, Term.

IAEA and Euratom will not be immediately

confronted with the safeguarding of very large

enrichment or reprocessing plants. Given adequate manpower and technical and financial

support, the safeguards systems should be

able to evolve and improve as the size of

facilities under safeguards increases. It is not

possible to conclude at this time that this

effort will be successful. There are a number of

unresolved technical and political problems,

any one of which might preclude credible

safeguards against covert national diversion

for these types of plants.

211

92-592 0- 77 - 15
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF PROLIFERATION

International

Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA was formed under the auspices of

the United Nations in 1957 to promote atomic

energy for the benefit of mankind without

contributing to any military purposes. Its

safeguards functions arose from the latter

constraint, The agency is authorized to

establish and administer safeguards on fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information, but only

with the consent of the safeguarded nation.

The statute establishing the agency granted

explicitly limited powers. No authority to

recover diverted material or to conduct intelligence activities was included, and the

agency’s role in combatting non-state adversaries by physical security is advisory only,

Thus police powers were not conferred upon

the IAEA, and none have been granted since.

Initially, safeguarding activities concerned

only research and test reactors of less than 100

MW thermal. Procedures were outlined in Information Circular 26 (INFCIRC/26), approved in 1961. This document is reproduced

in annex D to appendix IX of volume II. It is

interesting chiefly because of its role in setting

the pattern for subsequent activities. In particular, the Agency’s interest was to develop a

facility-specific safeguards system that would

evolve with experience and technological

developments. Two items later caused

difficulty: only first generation fissile material

was safeguarded (i.e., plutonium produced in

a safeguarded reactor was not covered), and

the safeguards agreements had an explicitly

limited duration. Both these weaknesses

offered a legal route for the acquisition of

safeguarded fissile material.

The next major step occurred in 1964, as the

emergence of large power reactors became imminent. IN FCIRC/66 was approved to

describe the necessary safeguards system. It

was later revised to include enrichment and

reprocessing plants. INFCIRC/66 is still in

effect for nations which have not ratified the

NPT. The concepts embodied in INFCIRC/26

212

are apparent in its successor. The general intent is still to safeguard specific facilities. The

desirability of safeguarding derived special

nuclear material is recognized, but not to the

degree of the original statute which allowed, "

. access at all times to all places and

data. . .“ The concern of some states over the

intrusions safeguards might inflict on normal

operations was addressed by a number of

clauses restricting activities. Protection of

commercial secrets is explicitly handled, but

in a manner that has since been a source of

concern in evaluating the effectiveness of the

Agency. The inclusion of features which

would enhance safeguards as a facility design

parameter was not required, an omission

which has substantially increased the

difficulty of effectively applying safeguards.

Most U.S. bilateral safeguards agreements

have been transferred to the IAEA under these

procedures. The IAEA had agreements with 20

states as of December 31, 1975, for this type of

safeguarding arrangement. These are shown

in annex F to appendix IX of volume II.

The NPT caused a major shift in the Agency’s operation when it came into force in 1970.

The salient feature is the shift from facilityspecific arrangements to a full-fuel cycle

system based on the flow of material at certain

strategic points. Article III of the NPT (the

safeguards article) is reproduced in appendix

IX of volume II. In essence, it requires the nonnuclear weapons states to accept IAEA

safeguards in verifying that no diversion had

taken place. These safeguards were to be applied to all special fissionable material under

control of the member state or transferred to

another nonweapons state. Article III further

stipulated that these safeguards were to be applied in a manner that would not interfere

with the economic operation of the subject

facilities. The NPT considerably strengthened

the role of the IAEA by assigning it the

responsibility for implementing NPT

safeguards, and mandating acceptance of

these safeguards on all nuclear activities by

the non-nuclear weapons states. Another significant feature was the ban on the development of any nuclear explosive, thus removing

the PNE loophole described in chapter VI
“Peaceful Nuclear Explosive s,” Thi s

strengthening, however, came at the cost of

losing unlimited access for inspection.

INFCIRC/153 was issued in 1971 to govern

the NPT safeguards arrangements. The key

sections of this document are reproduced in

annex I of appendix IX of volume II. The

emphasis is on the timely detection of material

diversion, and the chief reliance is placed on

material accountability with containment and

surveillance as supplements. The material accountability is to be provided by the state with

verification by IAEA inspectors. This verification is to be done by independent measurements and observations. The section on design

information was considerably expanded over

that in INFCIRC/66. In order for the Agency

to determine the system needed for monitoring the material flow, it is required that sufficient information be presented. This involves

the establishment of material balance areas,

and timing and procedures for taking physical

inventories. This section leads to the important observation that IAEA can refuse to

safeguard a facility if it feels it cannot do so

effectively. Since an NPT member cannot

legally have an unsafeguarded activity, this

gives the Agency considerable leverage. There

is still a strong emphasis on minimizing the

safeguards intrusion, which led to the

material balance area concept. The inspectors’

limited access however, is compensated for in

part by the new requirements of accounting

and the redundancy that is inherent in the

safeguards of the full fuel cycle.

The present membership of 110 nations is

shown in figure VIII-1. The Department of

Safeguards and Inspections (DSI) is one of five

major departments reporting to the Director

General as shown in figure VIII-2. DSI has

been the fastest growing department for 10

years, and its total manpower is scheduled to

increase from 138 in 1976 to 161 in 1977.

Budget information is presented in figure

VIII-3. At present, DSI accounts for 18.6 percent of the total IAEA budget. The 34 industrialized states bear 95 percent of the

safeguards cost.

A key factor in the effectiveness of the

IAEA’s safeguards is the quality of the inspectors. Political pressure can be brought to bear

on the hiring and retention of inspectors, and

long-term contracts are not available to encourage career decisions. Even the best inspectors must grapple with morale problems

when away from home for long periods, and

face difficult and sometimes dangerous working conditions. Every effort must be made to

ensure a high level of professional competence

by providing equitable salaries, promotion

opportunities, training programs, and a

general understanding that the inspector role

is a critical element and a matter of vital importance to the peace and security of the

world.

A Safeguards Technical Manual (STM) is

now being prepared to form the basis of the

procedures and techniques of the safeguards

system. Two parts have now been released (as

described in appendix IX of volume II) and

offer insight into the expectations and intentions of the Agency. Potential diverters and

the means to diversion are candidly defined.

The function of safeguards to these threats is

then developed. The technical requirements of

the system are described in the safeguards section above.

Each safeguarded facility will be the subject

of a Safeguards Implementation Practices

(SIP) document. These will be classified confidential because they are facility specific and

contain the Agency analysis of the diversion

possibilities and the means to detect them.

One of the more important functions of SIPS is

formalizing the Agency’s analysis of the

limitations currently experienced in its

safeguarding activities, and identifying improvements which should be made. Both these

documents reveal an understanding of the

necessary adversary nature of international

safeguards.

Noncompliance can take many forms, ranging from simple inadequacies of accounting to

outright diversion, encompassing large unexplained losses, and denial of access to critical

strategic points. The response would begin

with an inspectors’ report within DSI. This

would be followed by a report from the Chief

of the Regional Section to the Inspector

General and Director General stating that the

inspectors had been unable to verify that a

diversion had not taken place. The Inspector

213
Figure VIII-1.

Organizational Chart

I

I DIRECTOR GENERAL I

I

Nuclear Power

and Reactors I

Nuclear Safety

and Environmental

Protection

SOURCE=lAEA

i

I Languages Research and

Laboratories

General and Director General would be faced

with a necessity to evaluate both the quantitative and qualitative information. Many technical as well as subjective factors would have to

be weighed. These would include the effectiveness of the state system of accounting, previous history, the magnitude of the suspected

diversion, throughput of the facility, the precision and accuracy of the measurements by

both the facility operator and the IAEA, the

availability and reliability of the containment

and surveillance devices, the magnitude of the

inspection effort, the performance of inspectors themselves, and, perhaps, questions of a

political nature.

If still unresolved, the matter would be

brought to the attention of the Board of

Governors. Both the Agency and the Board are

required to afford the state every reasonable

opportunity to provide whatever necessary

214
Figure Vlll -2

IAEA Member Nations

June 22, 1976

— —.-——.—.

Afghanistan

Albania*

Algeria*

Argentina*

Australia

Austria

Bangladesh*

Belgium

Bolivia

Brazil*

Bulgaria

Burma*

Belorussian Soviet

Socialist Republic*

Cambodia (Khmer Republic)

Cameroon

Canada

Chile*

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba*

Cyprus

Czechoslovak Socialist

Republic

Denmark

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Egypt, Arab Republic of

El Savador

Ethiopia

Finland

France*

Gabon

German Democratic

Republic

Germany, Federal

Republic of

Ghana

Greece

Guatemala

“Member nat!ons that are not party to NPT

In addltlon, Taiwan IS parly to NPT but IS not an IAEA member

Haiti

Holy See (Vatican City)

Hungary

Iceland

India’

Indonesia

Iran

[rag

Ireland

Israel*

Italy

Ivory Coast

Jamaica

Japan

Jordan

Kenya

Korea, Democratic

People’s Republic of*

Korea, Republic of

Kuwait

Lebanon

Liberia

Libyan Arab Republic

Liechtenstein*

Luxembourg

Madagascar

Malaysia

Mali

Mauritius

Mexico

Monaco*

Mongolia

Morocco

Netherlands

New Zealand

Niger*

Nigeria

Norway

Pakistan’

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal*

Qatar*

Romania

Saudi Arabia*

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Singapore

South Africa*

Spain’

Sri Lanka

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Thailand

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda*

Ukranian Soviet

Socialist Republic”

Union of Soviet

Sociatist Republics

United Arab Emirates*

United Kingdom of

Great Britian and

Northern Ireland

United Republic of

Tanzania*

United States of America

Uruguary

Venezuela

Vietnam

Y@slavia

Zaire, Republic of

Zambia*

SOURCE: IAEA

215
Figure Vlll -3.

Safeguards Costs in Relation to Total Agency

Expenditure Under the Agency’s Budget 1971-76

Safeguards Total Safeguards Costs

Year Budget in percent of

(us $ 000) (us $ 000) Regular Budget — . —.

1971 1636 14010 11 .lO

/o

1972 2035 16532 12.3°/0

1973 2564 19881 12.9 %

1974 3441 25064 13.7 %

1975 4802 29675 16.2%

1976 6443 34702 18.60/0

See Working Papers Appendix IX.

reassurance is required. If the Board of Governors is unable to resolve a question of nondiversion brought to its attention by the

Director General, it is instructed by statute to

report the noncompliance to all members, to

the Security Council, and to the General

Assembly of the United Nations. Under

statute, the Board may also “direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a member and call

for the return of materials and equipment

made available to the recipient member or

group of members.” As a final act, the Agency

may suspend the membership of the state or

states from the exercise of the privileges and

rights of the membership. There has not yet

been occasion to exercise or test the interpretation of these powers, none of which

are likely, in themselves, to give pause to Nth

countries. If, however, the phrase “or by a

member” is interpreted to include the supplier

states, the return of this material and equipment at the “demand” of the supplier states

should considerably strengthen the Agency’s

position. The immensely more difficult

problem of the actual application of sanctions

would have to be the responsibility of the individual member states and more particularly

of the supplier states acting individually or in

concert. As has already been noted, the Agency cannot prevent diversion nor does it have

the power to recover diverted material. It has

no police powers.

In general, the Board of Governors operates

by consensus. Votes are taken only when a

state feels that its vital interests are at stake.

Decisions of the Board as well as the action of

the General Conference have been unique in

their absence of the political discord which

has characterized the deliberations of many

other international organizations. In spite of

this record, it is difficult to predict what the

actions of the Board of Governors would be if

it were confronted with a report from the

Director General stating that he could not

verify that there had been no diversion of

nuclear material in a specific state. Although it

should not be the case, the response of the

Board to such an announcement might be conditioned by the identity of the state and

whether or not it was a member of the Board.

Under some conditions of political

pressures, the Board might find a majority

vote on noncompliance very difficult to obtain, Nevertheless, the response to a proven

case of diversion is so crucial to both the

future effectiveness of safeguards and the

willingness of would-be proliferators to test

them that a majority of members of the agency

are likely to insist that the Board take the actions authorized by statute. The truly difficult

decisions will come when the evidence of

diversion is somewhat ambiguous.

There are several political and institutional

factors which may be expected to have a

marked impact on the IAEA’s ability to effectively carry out its safeguards responsibilities

over the next few years. In the safeguards area

the question of the attitude of member states is

probably the most crucial factor. In spite of increased recognition of the need for effective

and credible safeguards, there remains an

urgent need to enlarge the perceptions of industrial and developing states to the dangers

which proliferation presents to all. A cooperative attitude by most member states will

establish a pattern of behavior difficult for

other nations to flout. This in turn will

strengthen the effectiveness of the technical

safeguards and provide reasonable assurance

that the diversion of nuclear materials for

weapons purposes can be detected. Failing

this, and confronted with inadequate funding

and overriding concerns for either national

sovereignty or the protection of industrial

secrets, the success of the Agency’s safeguards

activities will be placed in serious doubt.

216
The most pressing near-term

Institutional nature, directly

operations of the Agency as a

problem of an

affecting the

whole and its

safeguards efforts in particular, is the matter

of the retirement or imminent contract expiration of many key management people at the

highest Agency levels. The Director General is

66 years old. If he is to be succeeded in an orderly manner, the nomination must be submitted to the Board of Governors in June 1977.

Many of the members of the Director

General’s immediate staff are his contemporaries and are also approaching mandatory

retirement. Of immediate concern is the fact

that the contract covering the services of Dr.

Rometsch, the Inspector General, must be

renegotiated or a replacement recruited by

September 1977. The Agency has recently circulated a request for nominations for the position of Director, Division of Operations,

Department of Safeguards and Inspections. As

a result of the proposed reorganization of DSI,

Directors will have to be nominated for the

new Division of Operations and the Division

of Information. Finally, the Head of the Section for Methods and Techniques, Division of

Development, is also approaching mandatory

retirement and a replacement for this position

will be required. The staffing of these positions will have a marked and long-range effect

on the Agency, as well as on the performance

and morale of DSI.

The reorganization of DSI (noted above)

was planned to meet the major increase in

safeguards activities resulting from the implementation of the IAEA-Euratom and Japanese

Safeguards Agreements, and application of

Agency Safeguards under the United States

and United Kingdom offers. This substantial

increase in the operational activities of DSI

will place new and exacting demands on the

Department and on the management of the

two operations divisions. At the level of Inspector General there will be an even greater

need for strong leadership and effective, imaginative management to meet this challenge.

It is too early to evaluate the impact of the

very large increases the U.S. Congress has

authorized to strengthen and support IAEA

safeguards. In FY 1975, approximately

$200,000 was made available in gifts-in-kind

through the Foreign Assistance Act, In FY

1977 a total of approximately $1.6 million will

be available through the Foreign Assistance

Act of 1977 for similar gifts-in-kind. It was the

recommendation of President Ford that approximately $5 million should be made

available to the IAEA over the next 5 years.

The effective use of this money will require a

careful and realistic assessment of the Agency’s needs.

If the United States does not actively strive

to broaden this type of support among all of

the nuclear supplier states and the Soviet

Union, there is danger that the United States

will find itself carrying a disproportionately

large part of the burden. The report of a German decision to contribute approximately

$300,000 in similar support for IAEA is heartening and should be encouraged.

The IAEA can also be assisted in political

and technical ways as well as economic. Political support can be indicated by full backing in

arguments, such as the present dispute with

Euratom over the IAEA’s oversight role, or by

manifestations of faith in the Agency’s ability

to competently fulfill its functions. Technical

assistance has been provided for many years

by the United States and other nations. This

has consisted of instrumentation and security

hardware development, safeguards application, training of inspectors, and assistance in

data management systems development.

Euratom

The European Atomic Energy Community,

created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 along

with the European Economic Community,

was the first multinational safeguards system.

The original members, Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The

Netherlands were later joined by the United

Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. All Euratom

nations except France have since then ratified

the NPT.

Euratom inspection rights are broader than

those of the IAEA, and are in fact exercised by

the inspectors. This includes “. . access to all

places and data and all persons who by reason

of their occupation deal with material, equipment, or installations subject to the

safeguards. . .“ The Commission may also require that all fissile material not immediately

217
needed be stored by the Commission. Commercial sensitivity does not restrict the

Euratom inspectors. The safeguards approach

is similar to that of IAEA in that verification of

material accountancy is the key element. In

general, reports are required monthly to indicate both inventory changes and the final inventory.

Euratom at present has about 60 inspectors

for 400 safeguarded facilities. It is Euratorn

practice that the inspectors specialize in certain types of installations and are responsible

for these installations wherever they may be

found within the European community. The

inspector proposes the inspection methods to

be used for specific facilities, examines the

records and reports of the facility, reviews the

differences between the operator’s declarations and his findings, and makes the first

recommendation on the admissibility of losses

and wastes reported by the facility operator.

The final decision on this latter matter is made

at the level of the Directorate. Responses

available are stronger than the IAEA’s, including temporary administration of the facility

and sanctions by member states.

The non-nuclear weapons states are fulfilling their NPT responsibilities by an agreement

between Euratom and IAEA which incorporates the essentials of INFCIRC/153. Euratom

will continue its own inspections which will

be verified by IAEA. Several significant

differences remain to be resolved and the

agreement is not yet in force, although considerable cooperation does already exist. One

complication introduced by Euratom is the

perception of it by other nations as essentially

a self-inspection operation, since it is small

and cohesive.

The Role of Sanctions in

Nonproliferation Strategy

Sanctions already play a role in the nonproliferation regime. Article XII of the IAEA

Statute provides that, in the event of a violation of safeguards, the Board of Governors is

empowered to suspend nuclear assistance

provided the offending country by the Agency

or a member state. The Board may also require

the return of materials or equipment previously provided and suspend any noncomplying member from continued participation in the Agency. Similarly, under bilateral

American Agreements for Cooperation, noncompliance gives Washington the right “. . .to

suspend or terminate this Agreement and to

require the return of any materials, equipment, and devices. ” The Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act provides

for a cutoff of American economic or military

assistance to any state exporting or importing

unsafeguarded reprocessing or enrichment

capabilities.

The purpose of sanctions is three-fold: to

dissuade potential proliferators, to prevent the

erosion of safeguards effectiveness which

would follow a successful violation, and to

reinforce international political norms against

proliferation.

Sanctions might be triggered by a variety of

events, including violations of safeguards

agreements; violations of bilateral Agreements for Cooperation; sudden withdrawal

from the NPT; nuclear gray marketing; and

movement, though not in violation of any

legal obligation, towards a nuclear weapon

capability. However, the specific context within which these events occur could influence

the feasibility and/or desirability of invoking

sanctions. Under some conditions (e.g., where

other foreign policy interests are involved)

there may be compelling reasons not to

threaten or apply sanctions. Consequently,

any sanctions strategy should permit some

degree of flexibility.

This can be accomplished by a strategy of

combining two postures: one threatening

automatic imposition of sanctions where a

clear violation of a legal obligation is involved; a second designed to create a strong

presumption that sanctions might be imposed

even following more ambiguous violations.

Failure to respond strongly following violation of a legal obligation would have serious

adverse effects upon nonproliferation efforts.

In this case, the risks of inaction are likely to

outweigh those of action. On the other hand,

the presumptive sanctions postur e

acknowledges that in some cases the costs and

risks of taking action may be too high and that

flexibility may be desirable.

218
The historical record concerning the threat

or imposition of sanctions is not one to insure

confidence. Major targets of international

economic sanctions have included Mussolini’s

Italy, China, Cuba, and Rhodesia. In none of

these instances did sanctions achieve the

desired results. Canada’s recent termination of

nuclear assistance to India did not greatly

slow India’s nuclear program. But to extrapolate from past ineffectiveness into the future

may be inappropriate. Instead, detailed assessment of the degree of existing leverage over

specific Nth countries is needed. Within the

framework of automatic and presumptive

sanctions, a broad set of levers might be

utilized. These include manipulation of

nuclear assistance, economic and military

assistance, U.S. influence over the lending

policies of international financial institutions,

trade, investment, and security guarantees.

Ultimately it may include the threat and/or

use of military force.

Different Nth countries are more vulnerable to some sanctions than to others; deterrent

impact varies from case to case. At the same

time, nearly all prospective near-term

proliferators would be vulnerable to one or

more of these levers. Recent American

pressure upon South Korea to forgo acquisition of a reprocessing plant illustrates that

sanctions can be effective, at least in a situation where the target state is highly vulnerable. Whether the threat of sanctions will be as

effective under less optimal conditions (e.g.,

Pakistan and Brazil) remains to be seen.

Multinational Fuel Cycle Facilities

Multinational control of enrichment and

reprocessing facilities has been proposed in

order to reduce the opportunities for diversion by proliferators. In addition to the obviously greater difficulty one member would

have in diverting strategic nuclear materials

from a multinational facility as compared to

diverting from a plant under his sole control,

multinational fuel cycle facilities (MFCF)

would have other advantages. They would

generally be bigger than plants serving a

single nation and therefore offer economies of

scale. Fewer large plants are also cheaper to

safeguard and protect. The expertise of an advanced member nation could benefit the

operability of the plant, while participation by

the less advanced nations will serve to mollify

their sense of discrimination under the NPT.

Opposing these are several notable disadvantages. The primary one is that MFCFS

threaten to spread the very disease they are

designed to control, both by weakening the

arguments against all reprocessing and by disseminating the technology so that nations

could later build their own facilities. In addition, multinational reprocessing plants would

still make plutonium accessible. This would

necessitate possibly discriminatory burdens of

heavy safeguarding of mixed-oxide fuels sent

to potential Nth countries, or fuel-cycle

schemes which send only enriched uranium

to them and reserve the mixed oxide for existing weapons states.

Several important issues will have to be

resolved before the concept will become practical. The details of the control of each facility

will have to be spelled out in some detail

before nations will feel secure in forgoing

their option to build domestic plants. Too

much control by individual members,

however, will interfere with commercial

operation when it conflicts with national objectives. Accessing the technology will have to

be controlled, possibly by members renouncing the right to build their own facilities. The

IAEA role in technical assistance and

safeguarding will also have to be resolved.

Multinational fuel cycle facilities have precedents for both enrichment and reprocessing

plants. Two enrichment plants and one

reprocessing plant have been built in Europe

by different groups of governments and private companies. The primary motivation was

economic, and the partners were mostly advanced countries which are not generally considered prime proliferation threats. Nevertheless, the examples demonstrate that the concept is feasible at least under some conditions.

Alternatives to MFCFS are national facilities

and abstinence, at least on the part of the

target nations. A concensus appears to be

developing among supplier nations that national control is undesirable. Abstinence can

only be secured by guaranteeing substitutes

219
for the services these facilities would have

provided. This appears relatively straightforward for enrichment. A clear commitment by

the United States to construct the necessary

enrichment capacity could eliminate the need

for other national facilities. Reprocessing is

more difficult, as present or planned capacity

cannot handle the spent fuel being produced.

The spent fuel is simply being stored, and

therefore demand for some sort of disposal is

growing. In addition, as the technology of

reprocessing is simpler than that of enrichment many nations could bypass export bans

by building their own facilities. Some means

of relieving potential proliferators of their

spent fuel is therefore both necessary and

desirable. This could be done by storing the

spent fuel in nuclear weapons countries or in

MFCFS designed only for fuel storage. The latter approach would have the advantage of

beginning the MFCF concept for reprocessing

without a full commitment to it, and the relative simplicity of the approach would ensure a

greater chance of success.

The IAEA is presently conducting a major

study of MFCFS. The first report on institutional and legal aspects has been issued, and

others are expected in 1977. Preliminary indications are that the concept will be found

beneficial in most respects.

The main impetus behind the concept is

concern over proliferation. Even if the

economics and fuel-cycle convenience prove

useful, however, MFCFS will be contributors,

not barriers, to proliferation unless access to

the technology, and therefore to the

plutonium, is controlled. Hence, implementation must be approached with caution. Spentfuel storage facilities are one way to jointly

test the concept and relieve the pressure for

reprocessing.

The Suppliers’ Conference

The First Suppliers’ Agreement

On August 22, 1974, Australia, Denmark,

Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,

Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, the Soviet

Union, the United Kingdom, and the United

States filed identical memoranda with the

Director General of the International Atomic

Energy Agency concerning “procedures in

relation to exports of (a) source or special fissionable material, and (b) equipment and

material designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable

material. ” As stated by all these states, except

the Federal Republic of Germany and The

Netherlands which had at the time not yet

ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, these

memoranda were intended to coordinate the

fulfillment of “commitments under Article III

paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons not to provide such items to any non-nuclear-weapon

state for peaceful purposes, unless the source

or special fissionable material is subject to

safeguards under an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The documents relating to this agreement were distributed by the IAEA in INFCIRC/209, a copy

of which is provided as annex S to appendix

IX of volume II.

The agreed procedures and so-called Trigger List was the result of several years of

negotiation, and represented the first major

agreement on uniform regulation of nuclear

exports by actual and potential nuclear suppliers. It had great significance for several

reasons. It was an attempt to strictly and

uniformly enforce the obligations of Article

III, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. It was intended to reduce the likelihood that states would be tempted to cut corners on safeguard requirements, because of

competition in the sale of nuclear equipment

and fuel-cycle services. In addition, and very

important in the light of subsequent events, it

established the principle that nuclear supplier

nations should consult and agree among

themselves on procedures to regulate the international market for nuclear materials and

equipment in the interest of nonproliferation.

Notably absent from the list of actual participants or potential suppliers, as from the list of

parties to the NPT, were France, India, and the

People’s Republic of China. By 1974, however,

French policy had changed to one of respect

for the agreed-upon Trigger List, and in all

other matters related to nuclear exports began

to act as if she were a party to the NPT.

220
The 1976 Agreement

Within a year of the delivery of these

memoranda a second series of supplier

negotiations were underway, This round, convened largely at the initiative of the United

States, was a response to 1) the Indian nuclear

test of May 1974, 2) mounting evidence that

the pricing actions of the Organization of Oil

Exporting Countries were stimulating Third

World and other non-nuclear states to initiate

or accelerate their nuclear power programs,

and 3) recent contracts or continuing negotiations on the part of France and West Germany

for the supply of enrichment or reprocessing

facilities to Third World states. The initial participants in these discussions, conducted in

London under the veil of official secrecy, were

Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany,

France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United

Kingdom, and the United States.

Two major issues were discussed in the

series of meetings which led to a new agreement in late 1975. The first was if, and under

what conditions, technology and equipment

for enrichment and reprocessing, the most

sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle from a

weapons proliferation perspective, should be

transferred to non-nuclear states. The United

States, with support from several other participants, was reported to argue in favor of

both a prohibition on such transfer and a

commitment to reprocessing in multinational

facilities. France had already signed contracts

to sell small reprocessing plants to Pakistan

and South Korea, and West Germany had

agreed to sell technology and facilities for the

full fuel cycle to Brazil. They successfully

resisted the prohibition proposed by others.

The second issue was whether transfers

should be made to states unwilling to submit

all nonmilitary nuclear facilities to IAEA

safeguards, or whether total industry

safeguards should become a condition of sales.

On January 27, 1976, the seven participants

in the negotiations exchanged letters endorsing a uniform code for conducting international nuclear sales. The major provisions of

the agreement require that before nuclear

materials, equipment, or technology are

transferred the recipient state must:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

pledge not to use the transferred

materials, equipment, or technology in

the manufacture of nuclear explosives;

accept, with no provision for termination, international safeguards on all

transferred materials and facilities

employing transferred equipment or

technology, including any facility that

replicates or otherwise employs transferred technology;

provide adequate physical security for

transferred nuclear facilities and

materials to prevent theft and sabotage;

agree not to retransfer the materials,

equipment, or technology to third countries unless they too accept the constraints on use, replication, security, and

transfer, and unless the original supplier

nation concurs in the transactions;

employ “restraint” regarding the possible export of “sensitive” items (relating

to fuel enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, and heavy water production); and

encourage the concept of multilateral

regional - facilities for reprocessing and

enrichment.

There is of course a problem in trying to impose such constraints on the diffusion of technology. Technical advances made by the recipient country may alter the initial technology

to the point where it can reasonably be

claimed to be different technology. Such ambiguities are handled by specifying an arbitrary time period—reported to be 20 years—

within which all related technology will be

unambiguously considered as transferred

technology and after which differing interpretations may be possible. The basic

obligation, however, is not limited in time. A

copy of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency news release of February 23,

1976, a discussion of these provisions is found

in appendix volume II.

Evaluation of the 1976 Agreement

It is important to recognize what this suppliers’ agreement does and does not do. It does

not ban transfers to nonparties of the NPT or

221
to states that refuse to place all nuclear

facilities under IAEA safeguards.4 It also does

not ban the export of reprocessing and enrichment facilities and equipment, but it attempts

to render such exports benign through the imposition of safeguards and government

pledges.

It requires IAEA safeguards be applied, and

a no-explosives-use pledge be associated both

to facilities that are actually exported and to

facilities the recipient may build based on the

same technology. This is a significant

strengthening of the provisions previously applied to Trigger-List equipment. The

retransfer provision not only precludes states

acquiring technology with fewer constraints

by retransfer, but also gives the exporter a

veto over what countries may receive

retransfers. In this way any countries thought

to be particularly high risk, can be prevented

from obtaining help via an intermediary. The

provisions also explicitly recognize the importance of physical security protection of

nuclear materials and facilities, and will

strengthen the IAEA role as advisor on physical security matters to interested states.

Beyond the agreement’s provisions themselves, its very existence and the process of

negotiation that produced it have some significant implications. The most important

benefit is perhaps the strengthening of the international norm prescribing the acquisition

of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states. The

importance that nuclear supplier states attach

to the prevention of proliferation is indicated

and symbolized by their agreement on

uniform standards. Agreement is made

despite the rather considerable opportunities

and incentives for each state to compete for

sales in a rather tight and lucrative export

market by demanding less stringent antiproliferation requirements than other vendors. In addition, the process of negotiation

and the publicity associated with it were instrumental in causing the issues of nuclear

proliferation and nuclear exports to be raised

to the highest political levels within the

~Ratification of the NIT or acceptance of international

safeguards on all nuclear facilities has now been adopted

unilaterally by Canada as a condition for the supply of reactors

or uranium. Canada has also called on other suppliers to adopt

comparable conditions of export.

governments of all participants. Considerable

pressure could therefore be brought to bear on

France and West Germany to adopt a policy

more closely in line with other major exporters.

While producing only partial (although still

quite significant) changes before major agreement was achieved in January 1976, subsequent statements by both governments indicate continued movement closer to the

American position and away from insistence

of their right to export sensitive facilities.

Progress is evidenced by a French decision to

avoid any future export agreements involving

reprocessing technology and facilities. President Giscard has also announced the formation of a cabinet-level committee to coordinate

and supervise French nuclear exports. President Ford announced a toughening of U.S. export criteria in line with the London agreements, calling for a 3-year moratorium on the

export of reprocessing and enrichment technologies. In the meantime, Canada has gone

further than other suppliers by declaring that

its nuclear exports would be confined to countries that have ratified the NPT or that accept

full fuel-cycle safeguards. Finally, the existence of the supply negotiations aided the application of American pressure on South

Korea and Pakistan to abandon their plans to

build reprocessing plants, and increased the

political cost for other states that might be

contemplating acquiring reprocessing

facilities. As of this writing (May 1977),

the French-Pakistan deal may be canceled and

implementation of the West German-Brazilian

agreement is in some doubt.

On the negative side is the fact that the

negotiations have involved only actual and

potential nuclear suppliers. Having conducted

the negotiations in official secrecy and totally

outside the IAEA context, the parties have left

themselves open to several criticisms by potential purchasing states. The first is that the

suppliers are in violation of their obligations

under Article IV, paragraph 2 of the NPT “to

facilitate. . . the fullest possible exchange of

equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of

nuclear energy,” and to “cooperate in contributing. . . .to the further development of the

application of nuclear energy for peaceful

222
purposes, especially in the territories of nonnuclear-weapons states party to the Treaty,

with due consideration for the needs of the

developing areas of the World.” The second

possible criticism is that through the suppliers’ agreement a group of industrialized

states have formed a nuclear cartel and are

conspiring to promote the continued dependency of developing countries prevented

from acquiring industrial capability, the importance of which for building modern industrial economies is demonstrated by the

suppliers’ own pursuit of such capability.

If such interpretations gain favor among

potential recipients states, the suppliers’

agreement could contribute to a weakening of

the sense of bargain on which the acceptability

of the NPT to many non-nuclear states rests. It

could also weaken the American argument in

international forums that cartelization is an

inappropriate mechanism for organizing commodity markets. In addition, it could become a

symbolic issue of contention in the context of

North-South negotiations over the distribution of the world’s resources, wealth, technological capabilities, and power.

Current and Future Issues

As of November 1976, Belgium ,

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, The

Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland were reported to have adopted the suppliers’ guidelines and joined the suppliers’

discussions. This raises the number of participants to 15 and omits only Argentina, India,

and South Africa of those states potentially

able to enter the nuclear equipment or services

export market in the foreseeable future. By

adding three members of the Soviet bloc in addition to Russia, the suppliers’ conference has

become a joint East-West enterprise-a fact of

considerable political significance. There is

still no indication that the IAEA will become

involved, even to the extent of serving as a

communications medium to other states as it

did in the case of the 1974 Trigger List agreement, Possible items for future agendas of the

suppliers’ group include reopening the question of reprocessing and enrichment exports,

establishing uniform nonproliferation provisions in Agreements for Cooperation and contracts leading to the supply of enrichment or

reprocessing services, and multinational fuel

reprocessing or spent-fuel storage facilities.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT)

The NPT evolved from the concern over the

increasing access to nuclear material from

commercial powerplants that emerged in the

late 1960’s. The intent was to restrict this access by safeguards and gain a formal commitment by the non-weapons states to remain

weaponless. These considerable intrusions

into national sovereignty were obtained by

guaranteeing access to peaceful nuclear technology and obligating the weapons states to

pursue disarmament. The treaty, which went

into effect in 1970, is reproduced in appendix

IX of volume II.

The status of nations relative to the NPT is

noted in figure VIII-2. The great number of

signers is encouraging, but included in the

almost 50 nonsignatories are Argentina,

Brazil, Chile, Peoples Republic of China,

France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan,

Portugal, Saudia Arabia, South Africa, Spain,

and North Vietnam. That lack of participation

is a serious weakness of the NPT. The membership could be expanded if participation

were made more attractive, possibly by offering members preferential treatment in the export of nuclear technology or security

assurances.

The asymmetry between the nuclear and

non-nuclear states has caused some discomfort. The non-nuclear states surrendered considerably more sovereignty than did the

weapons states, in that the major obligation of

the latter was only to pursue negotiations

towards arms control. Most states are apparently willing to accept the separate status

accorded the present nuclear weapons states,

provided that their access to imports is not

impaired and that the arms control negotiations are conducted in good faith. Of particular interest are the views of the non-nucIear,

nonaligned states of Africa, Asia, and Latin

America. These nations have been opposed to

the imposition of stricter new controls and

limitations on their nuclear imports in light of

223
the nuclear powers’ refusal to accept such constraints and controls for themselves as regarding nonweapon aspects of nuclear energy.5 In

their viewpoint, controls regarding the

peaceful utilization of nuclear energy should

be applied equitably to both nuclear and nonnuclear energy.

The major concern of these nations,

however, was focused upon the large political

issues rather than upon technical matters. Led

by Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, and Yugoslavia,

a number of specific demands for action by

the superpowers were presented:

an end to underground nuclear tests;

a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals;

a pledge not to use or threaten to use

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear

parties to the Treaty;

concrete measures of substantial aid to

the developing countries in the peaceful

uses of nuclear energy;

creation of a special international regime

for conducting peaceful nuclear explosions; and

an undertaking to respect all nuclear-free

zones.6

Some movement towards meeting these demands will have to be visible for these nations

to feel that the NPT is a partnership and not

just a constraint on them. The bitter reaction

of the nonweapons states during the 1975

NPT Review Conference and the threat of

Yugoslavia to withdraw from the Treaty

because, in its view, the United States and the

Soviet Union in particular had not fulfilled

their solemn obligations under Article 6, are

clear evidence that the non-nuclear weapons

states do not take lightly their understanding

of the balance of obligations undertaken by all

parties to the NPT.

The NPT by itself clearly does not solve the

proliferation problem. As noted above, some

of the key countries have not signed the treaty,

.

sWilliam Epstein, “Retrospective on the NPT Review Conference: Proposals for the Future,” Congressional Record, p. S.

19558 (Nov. 10, 1975).

61bid4

224

D

and hence, are not legally bound from

developing their own weapons. Further, any

member can, upon justification of extraordinary circumstances, withdraw with only 3

months notice. Members can also legally make

all preparations except final assembly of

weapons. Hence, a fully armed nuclear state

can spring forth, leaving a rather surprised

world little time to formulate a response.

Despite these weaknesses, the NPT was a

momentous achievement and remains a significant deterrent. There are strong reasons

why a nation could find it very difficult to

abrogate the NPT, even though it is technically easy to do so. Few nations can afford to

flaunt international public opinion so

flagrantly, especially if their justification is not

convincing. This would be construed as reneging on a commitment to nonproliferation, as

well as a violation of an international consensus, and could provoke a strong international

response. Nor would most nations take lightly

the possible unraveling of the fabric of nonproliferation,

The NPT is useful, at least in the short-term,

in slowing down or deterring proliferation,

but it should not be viewed as an end in itself.

It has been observed that even if the NPT were

suitably strengthened and extended by the accession of states not now party to it, it would

not be a perpetual assurance that nuclear wars

would be prevented.7 That lack of assurance is

attributable to the dynamic nature of competing interests, goals, and objectives. The fate

and effectiveness of the NPT will depend upon

the actions undertaken by the nuclear

weapons parties to fulfill their obligations to

the non-nuclear parties, as well as upon the

preference or benefits the non-nuclear parties

to the treaty accrue as compared to the treatment received by non-nuclear states not party

to the treaty. In the long term it is important to

recognize that the NPT is merely a part,

although a central part, of a more extensive

strategy aimed at inhibiting proliferation.8

7John Maddox, “prospects f or

Ade/phi Papers, No. 113, p. 1 (London:

Studies, 1975).

MIbid., p. 2.

Nuclear Proliferation, ”

The Institute for Strategic
Conclusion and Prognosis

The basic purpose of the control mechanisms discussed above is to supplement eroding technological barriers to proliferation

with institutional and political constraints.

These include the Non-Proliferation Treaty,

IAEA safeguards, Euratom safeguards, the

Suppliers’ Conference, various bilateral and

other export controls, and unilateral or

multilateral sanctions. The achievements to

date have been considerable. Thev include:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

an improved but still inadequate comprehension of the nature of the problem

and the requirements for a solution;

the creation of a broadly endorsed international norm against further proliferation;

the bridging of the East-West gap in international politics with regard to this

issue;

the voluntary relinquishment by nonnuclear weapons states of certain

sovereign prerogatives in the interest of

nonproliferation (e.g., forswearing the

right to obtain nuclear weapons, permission for international civil servants

to inspect national nuclear facilities, acceptance of controls and restrictions on

nuclear imports);

the creation of at least rudimentary institutions for a coordinated international approach to the problem;

the establishment of national governmental machinery to implement

bilateral agreements;

identification and utilization of a

variety of policy instruments designed

to contain proliferation (e.g., security

guarantees, international safeguards,

nuclear-free zones, etc.);

the elevation of proliferation to near the

top of supplier/state agendas and to the

attention of the highest level of governmental authority; and

the agreement on a broad quid pro quo

between nuclear weapons states and

non weapons states involving the

reciprocal obligations delineated in the

NPT.

Although still inadequate, these achievements can provide the basis for the development of a truly effective nonproliferation

regime. Whether that promise will be actualized depends largely on two master variables: technological change and political will,

Assuming that the pace and configuration

of technological advance (e.g., new enrichment techniques or fast breeder reactors) can

be managed or accommodated and that the

political will is present, what does the future

agenda regarding nonproliferation look like?

In broad terms the task will be to:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

achieve a clearer understanding of the

issue in all its complexity, particularly

the linkage between its technological

and nontechnological dimensions;

identify priorities for action in terms of

importance, urgency, feasibility, and

time required for implementation;

reinforce the international norm against

proliferation;

strengthen the IAEA by improving its

capabilities (e.g., budget) and expanding its responsibilities (e.g., regarding

international fuel repositories);

improve international safeguards and

export controls by expanding their

scope, standardizing their requirements,

etc.;

develop institutional innovations (e.g.,

multinational fuel-cycle facilities);

redefine or clarify the bargain between

nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear

weapons states underlying the NPT to

place the nonproliferation regime on a

firmer international political foundation (i.e., bridge the gap between industrialized and less developed countries on this issue);

develop comprehensive sanctions along

with an enforcement capability in support of the nonproliferation regime; and

improve coordination between bilateral

and multilateral nonproliferation controls.

225
Chapter IX

Comparison of Routes

to Nuclear Material

.

4
Chapter IX

Comparison of Routes

to Nuclear Material

The previous two chapters described three routes for obtaining the fissionable nuclear material suitable for weapons, and the restraints on those routes.

The route that would be selected by a particular nation or non-state adversary

will depend on many individual factors:

1) Technological Capability: If its ability is high, a nation can consider any

route. A low capability limits the proliferator to purchase or theft.

2) Availability of Nuclear Facilities: The ability of a proliferator to divert

nuclear material depends on the type of facility it owns or can readily acquire.

3) Urgency of Need: If the proliferator must have the weapons on a short

time-scale, it may have to openly abrogate safeguards on its own nuclear

facilities or obtain weapons by purchase or theft.

4) Critical Resources: If a nation has large quantities of uranium, it would be

5)

6)

less vulnerable to sanctions if caught- diverting and less liable to be

detected if it constructs a dedicated facility.

Political Relationships: Acceptance of safeguards or vulnerability to sanctions will force a nation to travel a route with the least chance of detection. On the other hand, alliance with a more advanced nation may provide an Nth country with the technology or resources for a dedicated

facility.

Perceptions of Controls: If a nation perceives safeguards to be effective, it

will be less likely to attempt diversion.

The interaction of all these factors with the Nth country’s objectives will

determine the optimal path.

One categorization of objectives, as identified in chapter VII, under “Diversion From Commercial Power Systems, ” is as follows:

a) Nations desiring a major weapons force.

b) Nations satisfied with a smaller, perhaps less-sophisticated force.

Preceding page blank 229
c) Nations wishing the option of rapid development of nuclear weapons

in the future.

d) Non-state adversaries limited to a few crude devices.

A major weapons program might be defined as one that produces at least 10

high quality weapons per year. Only a nation with a relatively sophisticated

technological base can realistically consider such a program. That nation would

not select a route as unreliable or intermittent as an illegal nuclear market. It

could pursue either of the other two routes, but would probably be unable to

keep its intentions secret for long. The diversion of sufficient quantities of

nuclear material from a commercial nuclear power program would necessitate

open abrogation of safeguards, unless the nation already had an unsafeguarded

facility. Sanctions such as nuclear embargoes might effectively hamper a nation

from continuing along this route unless it had its own uranium reserves and a

natural uranium or fast breeder reactor. Construction of a plutonium production

reactor dedicated to production of weapons material might have more appeal, in

that it would be legal for a nation that is not a party to the NPT, and its production capabilities can be kept secret even if the existence of the facility could not.

The nation that wants a small number of unsophisticated weapons might

procure the material from any of the three routes. If it needed the weapons

quickly it could purchase the required goods on a black or gray market, if available, or might consider overt diversion from a reprocessing or enrichment plant. If

its needs are not urgent, a country might be able to obtain the nuclear materials

secretly. If it owned a reprocessing plant it could attempt to covertly divert sufficient material. The country might be unwilling to risk detection if it perceived

safeguards to be effective. In that case it might construct a plutonium production

reactor, especially if uranium were available. The reactor would be on such a

small scale that it might easily escape detection. A final alternative, for a country

that possessed a centrifuge enrichment plant would be to rework a portion of it

into a high enrichment loop or to build a small “add on” to the existing plant.

The nation wishing only an option for future nuclear weapons development

might build or acquire commercial nuclear power reactors. A reprocessing plant

would be essential for it to extract the weapons material from spent reactor fuel.

If it could not obtain such a facility, it might build one of its own to hold in

reserve. A small reprocessing plant for weapons is far easier to design and build

than a commercial plant.

The non-state adversary can obtain nuclear material either by black market

transactions or by armed attack on shipments or stockpiles of plutonium from

commercial power program. The non-state adversary would probably not be

able to use material from other points in the fuel cycle because construction of

the facilities required to convert the material to weapons grade would be most

likely beyond the group’s capabilities.

230
This brief analysis indicates that all three routes are plausible under some

conditions. The least predictable is purchase/theft. If such a route comes into

existence, it could satisfy three of the four categories of proliferators. It might

also serve the major force nation wanting a few bombs in hand to forestall the

preemptive attack that might occur if its intentions became known before its

program was complete. Hence, a high priority must be given to controlling this

type of transaction. Diversion from commercial power systems can be largely

controlled if Nth countries do not have their own reprocessing or enrichment

plants. A reprocessing plant in particular provides instant access to any nation

willing to abrogate its safeguards agreement and many opportunities for covert

diversion by those that are not. The dedicated facility route is the least subject to

control. Many nations are capable of this route because of ready access to sufficiently detailed plans and the availability of the modest resource requirements.

One of its few disadvantages is that its cost which, while lower than that of a

commercial power system, does not produce an economic return. More attention

should be directed to possible means of detecting the efforts of nations who have

embarked upon a dedicated facility route, and international responses prepared

to deter them.

Control—including the manipulation of incentives and disincentives to

proliferation —have been discussed in previous sections of this study (see chapter

IV). Figure IX-1 summarizes the relationship between the routes available to the

would-be proliferator and the major controls most appropriate to each route.

Figure IX-2 describes three hypothetical Nth countries. Those national characteristics that would govern the choice of a preferred route and the controls most

likely to be effective in each case are identified.

231
Figure IX-1 Control

Route Detection Deterrence Limit Opportunities

Political Climate Conducive

to Nonproliferation

(Covert Diversion

Overt Diversion

Dedicated Facilities

Purchase/Th 

SOURCE: OTA

Safeguards Sandions Export control

Political pressure Spent fuel return

curses, spells & Technological measures

incantations (e.g., nonproliferation

readers)

Multinational Fuel Cycle

Facilities

Guaranteed fuel suppIy

International management

of the fuel cycle

Not needed Sanctions (except G.F.S.)

Poitical pressure

curses, spells &

incantations

Intelligence sanctions Secrecy for new developments

Political pressure Exports controls

Curses, spells&

incantations

Safeguards & International Physical security

Intelligence coordination protection (e.g., PAL)

of police Tecnological measures

(e.g., coprecipitation)

Weaken incentives

Strengthen security of Nth countries

(e.g., Securuty guarantees, military

assistance, etc.)

Reduce prestige of nuclear weapons

(e.g., arms control)

Resolve intenational disputes

strengthen potitical disincentives

Icrease the political posts

strengthen domesic anti-proliferation

forces

Global and regional arrangements

(e.g., MNFCFS)

Moderate grievances
Figure IX-2

Country Case Study I

Salient Characteristics

1) Technological capability: Large, economically strong country with moderate to high technology.

2) Nuclear facilities: LWRs on stream providing high fraction of

total power supply. No reprocessing or enrichment

facilities.

3) Urgency of need for weapons: No specific, critical need, so

an orderly sustained program is feasible.

4) Critical resources: Significant deposits of uranium and other

materials used in nuclear fuel cycle.

5) Political relationships: Relatively independent—no patron,

but also no immediately threatening rival. Not a party to

the NPT, but safeguards agreements on imported reactors.

6) Perception of control: Safeguards believed to be effective

and international response to illegal diversion expected

to be strong.

Objective

This nation would probably not be satisfied with less than a

major weapons force: perhaps 50-100 deliverable weapons.

Route

The dedicated facility route — a large plutonium production

reactor and reprocessing plant — would probably be the most

probable. Covert diversion is very unlikely, and overt diversion

would necessitate the construction of the full commercial fuel

cycle, which would be more expensive than the dedicated

facilities. The international response to the Iegal construction of

dedicated facilities is likely to be less severe than to covert or

overt diversion, even if the tatter is technically legal.

Controls

Control over the acquisition of nuclear weapons by such a

country will be difficult. There are no obvious, effective levers

should it decide to build dedicated facilities. Influencing incentives and disincentives and gaining a nonproliferation commitment by the nation maybe the best hope. Export controls and

sanctions may have some utility particularly if the country is still

dependent on some nuclear imports (e.g., reactor fuel), but it

would be difficult to maintain supplies units in the face of legal

proliferation,

Country Case Study II

Salient Characteristics

1) Technological capability: Small country with low to moderate technology.

2) Nuclear facilities: Two LWRS on stream and several more

expected. High economic dependence on availability of

nuclear power. No reprocessing or enrichment facilities.

3) Urgency of need for weapons: Looming security threat implies urgent, but not frantic, program.

4) Critical resources: Small, noncommercial deposits of uranium. High dependency on imports for many resources,

5) Political relationships: Party to the NPT: patron of uncertain

reliability.

6) Perception of control: Safeguards effective, and international response could be overwhelming.

(cue study II contlnued)

Objective

A small force of about 10 weapons and an unsophisticated

delivery system would suffice.

Route

Secrecy and cost would be overriding considerations. The

purchase/theft route would be most desirable. If this is not

available, a small dedicated facility would be the next choice.

Covert diversion of spent fuel would be possible, but quite

difficult and would still require the construction of a reprocessing facility.

Controls

incentives and disincentives provide the most effective means

of control. Improved physical security for materials and

weapons can limit puchase/theft opportunities. Enhanced

safeguards and intelligence work can improve the chances of

detection. The threat of sanctions can at least limit the nation to

routes most Iikely to be kept secret. Tecnological measures,

international management of the fuel cycle, or multinational

fuel cycle facilities can limit opportunities for diversion.

Country Case Study Ill

Salient Characteristics

1) Technological capability: Medium size country with moderate technology.

2) Nuclear facilities: Several LWRs on stream and more under

construction which will constitute a high fraction of total

power supply. Centrifuge enrichment plant and small reprocessing facility.

3) Urgency of need for weapons: Sudden crisis introduces

very urgent need.

4) Critical resources: Small commercial deposits of uranium.

High dependency on imports.

5) Political relationships: Party to the NPT patron of uncertain

reliability.

6) Perception of control: Safeguards effective. Subject to considerable non-nuclear international influence.

Objective

The primary goal would be to obtain several weapons quickly

and more later. Sophistication of weapons and delivery systems is not a major consideration.

Route

Since speed is the prime requirement, overt diversion would be

most attractive. Purchase/theft also offers a quick route but is

unlikely to provide weapons in the required quantity. Plutonium

stockpiles from the reprocessing plant would be rapidly assembled into crude weapons. The enrichment plant would

allow independence from international nuclear embargoes in

the long term.

Controls

Little can be done to deter a country in such a situation. Any

plausible sanctions would appear less dangerous and further

removed than the immediate threat, and the means are aleady

at hand to procure the fissile material. The most effective

controls would have been to previously defuse the political

situation, provide credible security guarantees, and prevent the

acquisition of sensitive facilities. SOURCE: OTA

233
Chapter X

The International

Nuclear Industry

.
Chapter X

The International

Nuclear Industry

The concern over proliferation has emerged largely as a consequence of the

growth of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Measures to control proliferation

will therefore interact with several aspects of the nuclear industry: the real or

perceived need for nuclear power to fill future energy demand, the means by

which this need will be fulfilled, and the economic interests of nuclear corporations and their parent countries. This chapter begins by discussing the need for

nuclear energy and its appropriateness for advanced and developing nations. It

then presents a plausible projection of the growth of nuclear power worldwide

by the year 2000. This projection leads to an estimate of the spread of facilities

and movement of materials created by the nuclear industry. Finally, the value to

the United States of nuclear exports is estimated. All these subjects are treated in

greater detail in appendix IV, volume II.

THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR POWER

The extent to which various nations may

rely on nuclear power will depend on their

total energy demand and the alternatives

available to meet that demand. One difficulty

in assessing the energy demand of a nation is

that the relationship between a nation’s

economy and its energy use is still not well

understood. Obviously, energy consumption

is in someway connected to a nation’s standard of living as measured by the accessibility

of goods and services: Highly industrialized

countries use much more energy per capita

than the less developed countries (LDCS).

Nevertheless, different nations accomplish

similar functions with very different requirements for energy. The per capita energy consumption for a variety of nations is related to

the per capita gross national product in figure

X-1. This comparison between nations is only

a rough one, because both energy and

economics are measured differently by

different nations. For instance, the numbers

do not include noncommercial energy such as

firewood, which can amount to half an LDC’S

total energy consumption. Nevertheless, it

does indicate that the United States might

maintain economic growth with substantially

less than historic- energy

possibility is less apparent

dustrialized nations and quite

the LDCS.

The explanation for these

growth. This

for other inimprobable for

differences lies

partially with the patterns of historical

development of natural resources. The United

States was endowed with vast supplies of

energy resources and showed an increasing

casualness towards them as its primary

energy dependence shifted

coal to oil and gas. This

figure X-2, was engendered

Preceding page blank

from fire-wood to

shift, depicted in

chiefly by the low

237
Figure X-l.

Relation of GNP and Energy Consumption

GNP Per Capita

7,000

6,500

6,000

5,500

5,000

I

4,500

4,000

3.500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

14

0-1970

● -1974

15. West Germany

16. Japan

17. Algeria

18. Libya

19. Egypt

20. Thailand

21. India

22. Turkey

23. Argentina

24. Australia

25. Iran

28. Israel

13. United Kingdom 27. Saudi Arabia

14. United States 28. Venezuela

1,000 2,000 3,000 4,()()() 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,130(1 10,OOO 11,000 12,000 13,000

SOURCE World Almanac and Book of Facts, Waahmgton Star, 1973 and 1976,

and ‘World Energy Supphes 19501974,” United NatIons, 1976.

cost and convenience of resource extraction

and use. Other nations, constrained by limited

resources and high costs, have developed

more frugal patterns of use. Most other nations have also been shifting towards increasing use of oil and gas as energy sources, Even

though few industrialized nations outside of

the United States have substantial reserves of

cheap oil and gas, most have been relying increasingly on imports of these fuels rather

than on coal. Most LDCS do not have significant reserves of either oil or coal (part of the

reason for their lack of industrialization) and

are still in the early stages of a shift from noncommercial fuels to imported oil, at least for

use in industries and cities where the traditional sources are impractical. In most cases,

foreign exchange considerations have led

governments to impose high fuel taxes to

minimize consumption. A graph of the world238

Energy Consumption Per Capita (Kilograms of coal equivalent)

wide use of commercial energy resources,

shown in figure X-3, illustrates the rapid rise

in oil consumption since 1945. Figure X-4

details this trend for several groups of nations.

Even if the energy consumption growth rate

can be reduced, these patterns of energy use

will have to change. In particular, the use of

oil is not a long-term solution. The United

States has been increasing its purchases of this

fuel on the world market because of increasing consumption and declining domestic production. It now appears likely that U.S. production will continue to decline, and by the

year 2000 it will certainly be much lower than

it is now. Some OPEC members could produce

at a substantially higher rate than at present,

but they generally will not find it to their advantage to do so. Even at present rates of production, oil-rich lands such as Saudi Arabia
Figure X-2.

U.S. Energy Consumption Patterns

Percent of Total

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Fuel Wood Petroleum &

“ \ /

Natural Gas

\

\

\

Coal

\

/ ’

\

\

\

\

\

\

— \

\

\

\

1860 ’80 1900 ’20 ’40 ’60 ‘80

Calendar Year

SOURCE ERDA 76-1, “A National Plan for Energy Research, Development and

Demonstration Creating Energy Choices for the Future.”

could find their production declining in about

20 years. Thus oil prices are very likely to

become much higher than they are now.

Figure X-5 shows estimates of the proved

world reserves and estimated ultimate

recoverable oil resources. The latter figure is

especially subject to error, but the important

points are that there is a limit which could

easily be much lower and that most of the

very cheap oil has already been discovered.

The U.S. Geological Survey, for instance, has

recently sharply lowered its estimates of U.S.

resources. At present consumption rates, the

estimate of ultimate recoverable oil in figure

X-5 will last 83 years. If consumption increases at 3 percent per year, it will last only

40 years.

A partial return to coal is therefore inevitable despite a considerable aversion to its use.

Major problems center on the inconvenience

and expense of extracting and using it in an

environmentally acceptable way. World coal

reserves are shown if figure X-6. The known

recoverable reserves provide an energy

resource not much greater than that of the estimated total recoverable oil. The addition of

the estimated recoverable reserves of coal

raises the energy value to over five times that

of oil, and improved mining techniques could

recover much more. Production in Europe is

not expected to change significantly over the

next 10 years and the cost of extraction there is

highl

. Large amounts could be exported by

the United States, Australia, South Africa,

Canada, and the U. S. S. R., but in the United

States at least there would be considerable opposition to the domestic environmental

damage incurred for exports. Among the

LDCS only India and South Korea have substantial coal production.

Nuclear energy has been widely considered

to be the only viable alternative. Unlike coal, it

is not readily suitable for, uses other than producing electricity. This is not felt to be a disadvantage by its promoters. Electricity is the

most convenient form of energy, and is expected by many to become the dominant

mode of consumption. It can be generated

from a variety of sources simultaneously and

used efficiently. Most countries have seen

their electricity consumption grow faster than

their overall energy use, and they expect this

trend to continue. The biggest drawback to

electricity is its expense. The equipment to

generate it is costly and the fuel to produce it

is used inefficiently: because of the thermodynamic processes involved in a steamelectric plant, about two units of fuel are lost

as low-grade heat for every one that is converted to power.

The major uses of electricity are to produce

heat and light, perform work (operate

machines), operate electronic equipment, and

perform certain tasks (such as electrolysis)

which depend on the unique nature of

electricity y. When tasks such as low-temperature space heating can be performed as

well by the combustion of fossil fuels,

electricity can seem very expensive and inefficient. As oil and gas are depleted in the future,

the only choice may be between electricity and

the direct use of coal with all the difficulties it

entails. Even though technology may produce

more attractive direct-use options such a s

I World l+cr<~l~ OIItlook, Organization for Economic

Cooperation and De~elopment, Paris, 1977.

239
Figure X-3.

Changing Use of Energy Resources

in the Twentieth Century

Annual Energy Production and Consumption (Quadrillion Btu ‘s)

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

—

—

—

—

I

I

Nuclear I

I

Hydroelectric

Natural Gas

1900 ‘lo ’20 ’30 ’40 ’50 ’60 ’70 ’80

Year Projected

SOURCE Survey of Energy Resources World Energy Conference 1974

solar energy or synthetic fuels, significant

growth in electricity consumption is probable.

Electricity can be generated from water

power (hydroelectricity), steam-turbine

plants (fossil fuel, nuclear, solar, or geothermal), photovoltaics or open-cycle engines (gas

turbines or diesels). The trend has been to increase the size of plants and to centralize

generation in a relatively few sites thereby

allowing the use of equipment that can

achieve higher efficiency and economies of

scale, and easing management by the utility. It

also necessitates the transmission of power

over long distances and makes each plant a

substantial fraction of the entire grid capacity,

Nuclear power marks the culmination of this

process (except possibly for hydroelectric

plants which are even larger, generally require

remote siting and are not well suited for other

purposes).

Although eventual fossil-fuel resource

depletion is one of the major elements behind

the desire for nuclear power, the present

generation of reactors use uranium so inefficiently that this nuclear-resource base is comparable to that of oil. Nevertheless, the advent

Figure X-4.

Oil Consumption

for Selected Groups of Nations

18

16

14

- — — Industrialized Countries

(Except U. S.)

U.S .

Communist

Communist-Bloc Countries

Emerging Countries

● ● ● ● ● . Less Developed Countries

1940 1960 1960 1970

Year

SOURCE: “Survey of Energy Resources,” World Energy Conference, 1974.

240
Energy Value

Quads (1015 Btu)

2529

777

470

Figure X -5

World Estimated Ultimate Crude Oil Recovery, January 1, 1975*

(Billions of barrels of oil)

Undiscovered

Discovered Potentialultimate Resources Total

recovery Expected Range Remaining”

-.— .

Russia & China et al. 136

United States 49

Canada 11

300

85

70

70-700

50-150

40-110

436

134

81

Total N. America 59 155 100-250 213 1235

Middle East 549 150 75-280 699 4054

Other foreign:

Greater N. Sea

Other W. Europe

North Africa

Gulf of Guinea

Other Africa

Northwestern S. America

Other Latin America

Southeast Asia

Other Far East

Antarctica

23

2

42

32

—

29

45

12

33

30

8

32

50

32

58

20

20-80

7-17

15-60

15-50

3-15

20-50

23-95

18-50

20-120

5-50

68

14

75

62

8

61

69

58

67

20

394

81

435

360

46

354

400

336

389

116

2912

10127

19

9

—

Total other Foreign 182 320 300-500 502

Total worldwide 821 925 600-1,400 1,746

.

‘Joint Committee on Atomic Energy “Project Interdependence” 1976

“’As of January 1, 1973

of breeders would transform this uranium

into an effectively inexhaustible energy

source. Another major factor in the desire for

nuclear power is the promise of relatively

cheap energy. This claim is considerably

harder to substantiate. Capital costs have risen

dramatically over the past several years and

the price of uranium has risen faster than that

of petroleum. Even with these higher costs,

however, most countries will still find

electricity generated from nuclear power

cheaper than that from imported oil.

fueled with imported coal could be

cheaper than nuclear plants in some

cases, and much cheaper than those fired

by imported oil in many others. New

sources could be emphasized as they

become available, including wind power,

solar electric, and combustion of trash.

Cogeneration could be implemented (a

steam turbine is coupled with industrialprocess steam boilers or district-heating

plants in such a way that additional heat

energy is nearly 100 percent converted to

electricity y). Assumptions that high electric growth rates

must be maintained and that nuclear power is

the only way to fulfill that demand are not

universally accepted. Alternatives proposed to

reduce the need for nuclear power are:

. Non-Electric Replacements: Fossil fuels

and new energy sources used directly as

heat sources would in some cases be

more efficient than electricity produced

from either nuclear energy or these fuels

themselves.

. Electricity from other sources: The use of

coal could be greatly expanded. Plants

241
USSR

China, RR. of

Rest of Asia

United states

Canada

Latin America

Europe

Africa

Oceania

World Total

136,600

60,000

17,549

181,781

5,537

2,803

126,775

15,628

24,518

591,191

2,456

2,090

655

5,095

131

68

2,495

382

485

13,857

273,200

300,000

49,479

383,562

9,034

9,201

319,807

30,291

74,689

1,402,273

5,713,600

1,000,000

106,053

2,924,503

106,777

32,828

607,521

58,844

199,654

10,753,680

“Survey of Energy Resource, ” World Energy Conference, 1974

. Conservation of Electricity: Strict

measures (such as increased insulation

and use of heat pumps) could free

enough existing generation capacity so

that new plants would not be needed for

a period. Alternatively, a nation could reject the energy-intensive, high-consumption society now generally accepted as a

goal.

The desirability and feasibility of these

alternatives have to be weighed against those

factors both favoring and opposing nuclear

power. Factors that suggest nuclear energy be

considered are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

242

Lack of cheap alternatives. Even oil-rich

nations may opt for nuclear energy if it

appears to be cheaper than the world

price of their own oil;

Expectation of continued fuel price

escalation. A nuclear powerplant that is

only marginally economical now may

become very attractive in a decade,

because nuclear power economics are

much less sensitive to fuel prices than are

fossil plants;

A large and growing electricity demand;

A desire to diversify the energy supply;

The need to guarantee a fuel supply by

storage or rapid procurement, both of

which are impractical for fossil plants

6.

7.

8.

because of the cost and quantity of the

fuel;

A desire for the prestige which comes

from demonstrating the ability to handle

high technology;

The hope that nuclear power will help

provide a shortcut to technological advancement;

The feeling that there will be no alternatives to nuclear power in a few decades

and that massive deployment will then

be impossible without a long learning

period.

The absence of one or more of these factors

will reduce the desirability of nuclear power.

In addition, there are several arguments

against a nation choosing nuclear power:

1. The high initial cost for nations with a

capital shortage (especially LDCS). Even

when the purchase is financed by an exporting nation, only a limited amount of

credit is available and the ability to borrow for other purposes will be reduced.

This problem has evidently not yet been

overwhelming for the LDCS, who seem

to prefer the more expensive heavy water

reactors;

2. An increased dependence on nuclear

supplies for critical parts and material.

The range of suppliers is narrower than
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

that for most other transactions, and this

may strike some as neo-colonialism;

Absence of technological depth and experience to handle nuclear plants. imported reactors have generally lower

capacity factors, which may indicate that

the risk of accidents could be higher;

Increased vulnerability to non-state adversaries or to enemies in case of war.

Sabotage of a nuclear powerplant could

cripple a nation’s power supply and

cause substantial damage;

The problem of nuclear waste disposal. If

a nation reprocesses its own spent fuel,

other nations may be unwilling to accept

the wastes. A small waste-disposal

program could be relatively expensive

and seems unjustified except for nuclear

weapons states, who in any case have to

dispose of large quantities from weapons

programs. Note that a program for the

return of spent fuel to supplier countries

automatically solves the problem.

A power system so small that the nuclear

plant would be too large a fraction (more

than 10-15 percent) of the overall

capacity. A single plant larger than this

diminishes total system reliability

because a sudden outage would have too

great an impact. Development of a

nuclear plant that is economical on a

smaller scale would greatly enhance its

appropriateness for an LDC;

Industrial demand insufficient to permit

operation of the plant at full capacity

around the clock:

8. Lack of a suitably sophisticated work

force, such that operation of facilities

would place undue demands on the supply of skilled manpower. Note that the

work force dedicated to reactor operation

need not be very large.

Whether the above factors tip the scale in

favor of nuclear power is a judgment that each

individual nation must make for itself. The

decision by a nation to take its first step

toward a nuclear power program may be a

momentous one. A miscalculation in the deci -

sionmaking process can be a very expensive

mistake. The LDCS in particular must be

careful since they will be relatively more

damaged should nuclear power turn out to be

inappropriate. Since most of the potential Nth

countries identified in chapter IV are in this

group, proliferation concerns might best be

served if supplier nations make a special effort

to find appropriate alternative energy sources

for them. At present, little energy research is

directed at the needs of LDCS. Energy-producing devices could be developed at relatively

low R&D expenditures to especially suit the

problems of LDCS, which are: difficulty in financing high capital cost projects; shortages

of highly skilled manpower; and an abundance of unskilled labor. Examples might be

waste digesters to produce methane gas and

efficient ovens for producing charcoal (the

present method loses 80 percent of the energy,

and firewood is becoming critically scarce in

many parts of the world). This approach

might be reminiscent of colonialism for some

LDCS unless such devices are also implemented in the advanced nations, but the latter

may also find them useful.

PROJECTIONS

Many estimates of worldwide energy and

nuclear growth have been made. These have

generally been based on exponential extrapolations of historical growth curves. Until

1973, this method proved reasonably accurate.

The real price of energy had been declining,

and consumption was increasing faster than

the general economy. The sudden quadrupling of oil prices starting in 1973, followed by

the rapid escalation of other fuel costs, produced a surge of interest in nuclear energy.

Since then, much of this new interest has

waned. The latest nuclear projection by the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) is in fact lower than

that of 1973. The primary reason for this

decline is economic. Nuclear capital and fuel

costs have soared along with oil, and

243

92-592 0 - 77 - 1 ‘7
Figure X-7

World Nuclear Capacity*

(1000 Megawatts)

1975 1960 1$85 1990 2000

U.S. Rerference Case 39 67 145 250 510

Other Nations 29 100 230 425 1030

Total 68 167 375 675 1540

IAEA/OECD (lower bound) 69 179 479 875 2005

“Edward J. Hanrahan, etal., “Worfd Requirements and Sup@yofUranium,” r

the Atomic Industrial Forum Confararm,

~ eaentedat

Geneva, Switzartand, Sept. 14, 976.

economic growth projections are substantially

lower, partly because of the higher cost of

energy. Thus, the first reaction to the oil price

rise was to continue the previous patterns of

consumption by turning to new sources,

while the later trend was to adjust to new high

energy costs by consuming less.

The previous section considered the various

factors influencing an individual nation to

choose or reject nuclear power. An accurate

projection of the nuclear growth in each country would require an exhaustive and complex

analysis of both the total electrical power demand and the various alternatives to meet this

demand, No projection has yet been based on

such an analysis. Several less complete projections are described in appendix IV of volume

II.

Even if such a projection had been done, it

probably could not adequately treat unpredictable developments such as the cohesiveness of the OPEC cartel. The best projections

remain largely guesses based on estimates of

the major parameters. Nevertheless, planners

need a framework for their discussions, and

proliferation control must be based on an understanding of the expected material flow and

availability of facilities. They must rely on the

less complete studies that have been done.

Projections of nuclear energy growth have

been made in recent years by the IAEA and

the OECD. The most recent official forecast is

a 1976 ERDA modification of an IAEA study.

The results are shown in figure X-7 and compared with the 1975 IAEA/OECD study from

which it was derived.

Figure X-8 shows the distribution of the

1975 IAEA/OECD projection. Significant

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,7

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5

Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3

Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,2

Greece. . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . —

Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6

Luxembourg ... ... . . . —

Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . 0.5

New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . —

Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2

Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Turkey ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

United Kingdom . . . . . ., 4.8

United States . . . . . . . . . . 40.1

OECD,

High Estimate . . . . . . . . 68

Low Estimate . . . . . . . . 68

African regionl . . . . . . . . —

American region2 . . . . . . . 0.3

Asian region3 . . . . . . . . . . 0.7

0.7

3.5

7,2

—

1.5

20.4

19.1

—

—

1,4

17

—

0.5

—

—

—

8.7

7.4

3.8

—

11.1

82.2

185

171

—

3.6

5

3

9.5

18.4

1.8

3.9

56

44.6

0.6

0.7

26.4

49

1.2

3.5

—

—

1.4

23.7

11.3

8

0.6

15.4

205

484

437

3.1

14,4

28.2

. 

1

6

16.5

41

4.9

4.9

90

77

1.2

2

62

84

1.2

7.5

1.2

1.8

3.3

42

16.3

8

2.2

31

386

890

774

6.9

35

72

6

14

30

115

11.4

13

170

134

4

6

140

157

1.2

16

3

4

8

80

24

12

16

115

1,000

2,080

1,685

29

147

224

45.7 113.9 400

points to be drawn from figures X-7 and X-8

are that the United States is reducing estimates

of its own nuclear growth more than most

other countries and now anticipates a growth

rate lower than others. These are largely

because of forecasts of a reduced economic

growth rate and substantial opportunities for

conservation in the United States.

244
The most recent projections of total electrical power demand for individual LDCS was a

1974 Market Survey by the IAEA. The results

of this IAEA study for those LDCS and emerging nations also listed in the OECD report are

shown in figure X-9. This figure has been

overtaken by recent events as shown by the

comparison with more recent OECD figures,

but it does give an idea of which nations will

be considering nuclear power and what their

alternatives are.

The developing nations heavily committed

to nuclear (i.e., planning to install more than

10,000 MW by the year 2000) are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Egypt, India, Iran, Taiwan,

South Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, and

Singapore. These are either emerging nations

with expectations of becoming major industrial powers by 2000 or industrializing

LDCS with especially poor resources. Exceptions may be South Korea with its large coal

deposits and Egypt with potential oil reserves.

All have nuclear projects underway. A major

effort with far-reaching ramifications would

be required to convince these nations to eliminate their planned use of nuclear energy

altogether. Only those nations with a lower

anticipated dependence on nuclear power, as

listed in figure X-9, might accept a total

substitution of alternatives should that prove

desirable. Many already have a start in

nuclear technology however, as detailed in

appendix IV of volume II, and some are planning on a very high eventual nuclear fraction

of their total power capacity.

Even allowing for a reduction in projections, nuclear energy is expected to be a major

energy source for the world. The 1,540,000

MW of nuclear capacity in the year 2000

(figure X-7) would produce a total of about

100-Quads (101s Btu) per-year of thermal

energy, nearly twice the present rate of coal

consumption shown in figure X-3. Producing

this much nuclear capacity will be difficult

and may well not be achieved. If the world

economy continues to grow however, finding

alternatives may be even harder.

THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT

The previous section summarized projections of the growth of nuclear power expected

in the future. The impact this growth might

have on proliferation depends largely on the

characteristics of the international nuclear industry. The capabilities of reactor-supplier nations are particularly important in estimating

the success of any unilateral or multilateral

proliferation-control measures. The spread of

those facilities that are most sensitive to

proliferation+nrichment and reprocessing

plants—is also critical. Such plants not only

give their operators the means to produce

weapons material but also reduce their

vulnerability to international sanctions.

(These and other facilities less critical to

proliferation control are discussed in appendix IV of volume II). Finally, the location and

adequacy of the supply of uranium fuel itself

affects fuel supply strategies, such as guaranteed fuel, and determines when measures that

might increase proliferation problems—such

as recycling plutonium or relying on the

breeder reactor—are really needed. The

worldwide distribution of reactors and their

supporting facilities is depicted in figure X-10.

Reactors

The nations and enterprises that presently

manufacture reactors are listed in figure X-11.

The export market has been restricted to the

United States, Germany, France, and the

U. S. S. R., for light water reactors (LWRS) and

to Canada for heavy water reactors (HWRS).

Italy and Great Britain also have the spare

capacity to export if they can find a market.

Japan and Sweden will continue to import, as

their manufacturing capability is less than

domestic demand.

The general pattern of growth has been for

a nation to import its first few reactors and

then develop its own manufacturi ng

capability, possibly under a licensing agreement. India is now in the middle of this process, building a capability for producing heavy

●

245
Figure X-9.

Projected Distribution of Installed Electric Capacities in Developing Nations by Plant Type*

(1000 Megawatts)

American Region

Brazil

Mexico

Argentina

Venezuela

Colombia

Peru

Chile

Cuba -

Jamaica

Uruguay

Region Total

——. . .

African Region

Egypt

Israel

Kuwait

Iraq

Morocco

Algeria

Nigeria

Tunisia

Saudi Arabia — —

Region Total

Asian Region

India

Iran

Taiwan

Korea

Thailand

Pakistan

Philippines (Luzon)

Hong Kong

Singapore

Malaysia (Peninsular

Indonesia (Java)

Bangladesh

Rsgion Total

Sub-Total

Percentage

—

(a) Not available

1980

Conv. Nuclear Hydro Total — —

3.1 0.6

8.6 0.7

5.4 1.5

6.4 -

3.4 -

1.6 -

1.1 -

2.5 -

1.0 -

1.0— .-

34.1 2.8

2.8 -

3.8 -

1.3 -

1.1 -

0.3 -

0.4 -

0.8 -

0.4 -

0.4 -

22.0

6.9

4.0

1.2

2.6

1.8

1.6

0.3

40.4

2.4

0.6

0.4

0.1

0.1

25.7

16.2

10.9

7.6

6.0

3.4

2.7

2.5

1.0

1.3

77.3

5.2

3.8

1.3

1.1

0.9

0.8

0.9

0.5

0.4

11.3 0

25.5 4.2

6.3 -

6.1 2.9

4.7 1.2

3.0 -

3.5 0.1

2.7 -

3.5 -

1.8 -

1.0 -

0.8 -

1.1 -

3.6 14.9

22.3 52.0

3.0 9.3

(a) 9.0

0.7 6.6

1.3 4.3

2.9 6.5

1.0 3.7

3.5

1.8

0.6 1.6

0.7 1.5

0.1 1.2

60.0 8.4 32.6 101.0

105.4 11,2 76.6 193.2

54.6 5.8 39.6 100

1990

Conv. Nuclear Hydro Total —

3.1 11.4 49.2 63.7

9.1 21,6 8.6 39.3

4.9 8.1 8.5 21.5

6.4 4.4 3.4 14.2

3.4 1.7 6.5 11.6

1.6 1.3 3.6 6.5

1.1 1.7 2.4 5.2

2.6 2.1 - 4.7

1.0 1.8 - 2.8

1.1 1.1 0.5 2.7

.- —

34.3 55.2 82.7 172.2

2.6 5.0 2.4 10.0

3.8 3.9 - 7.7

1.3 1.3 - 2.6

1.1 1.1 - 2.2

0.3 0.4 1.0 1.7

0.4 0.5 0.8 1.7

1.1 0.5 0.3 1.9

0.8 0.2 0.2 1.2

0.8 0.2 - 1.0 —

12.2 13.1 4.7 30.0

26.0 31.4 43.0 100.4

6.4 10.0 8.0 24.4

10.0 10.3 (a) 20.3

4.7 9.8 2.3 16.8

3.1 3.7 2.2 9.0

3.2 4.9 4.8 12.9

2.8 4.8 2.0 9.6

3.6 3.2 - 6.8

1.8 4.3 - 6.1

1.3 1.3 1.4 4.5

0.8 1.7 1.8 4.3

1.1 4.0 0.5 5.6

—

64.8 89.9 66.0 220.7

111.3 158.2 153.4 422.9

26.3 37.4 36.3 100

Conv. Nuclear Hydro Total

3.1 46.9 52.3 102.3

9.4 68.0 10.6 88.0

3.9 18.1 15.8 37.8

6.4 8.4 9.8 24.6

3.4 5.3 12.5 21.2

1.6 3.0 7.0 11.6

1.1 3.7 4.9 9.7

2.6 5.5 - 8.1

1.2 5.8 - 7.0

1.1 3.1 0.6 4.8

33.8 167.8 113.5 315.1

2.5 12.6 2.4 17.5

5.0 7.4 - 12.4

2.2 3.2 - 5.4

1.8 2.6 - 4.4

0.3 1.6 1.3 3.2

0.4 1.8 1.3 3.5

0.8 2.6 1.0 4.4

0.8 1.6 0.2 2.6

0.8 1.4 - 2.2

14.6 34.8

27.0 130.0

6.5 28.0

14.9 22.4

4.7 24.5

3.1 9.6

3.3 15.9

3.9 12.0

4.9 7.3

1.8 14.9

1.3 5.0

1.1 5.7

1.1 9.7

6.2 55.6

—

60.0 217.0

10.0 44.5

(a) 37.3

2.3 31.5

4.3 17.0

7.3 26.5

2.8 18.7

12.2

16.7

2.3 8.6

3.0 9.8

0.8 11.6

73.6 285 92.8 451.4

122 487.6 212.5 822.1

14.8 59.3 25.8 100

“Derived from IAEA Market Survey for Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, 1974.

246
❑

●

4

4

0

●

o

0

●

● o*04 Q

o

247
Figure X–11.

Principal Suppliers of Reactors

HWR

Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Canada

Kraftwerk Union Federal Republic

of Germany

Canadian General Electric Canada

LWR

Kraftwerk Union AG

Framatronne

Atomenergoexport

ASEA-Atom

General Co.

Westinhouse Co .

Toshiba

Hitachi

Combustion Engineering

Babcock and Wilcox

Ansaldo Meccanico“co Nuclear SpA

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

FRG

France

USSR

Sweden

USA

USA

Japan

Japan

USA

USA

Italy

Japan

Gas Colled

General Atomic USA

Nuclear Power Co. United Kingdom .

SOURCE: OTA

water reactors derived from its Canadian imports despite total withdrawal of Canada’s

assistance. Few other nuclear importers,

however, will be tempted into the business of

reactor manufacturing. The necessary infrastructure is too expensive and demanding

to be worthwhile even to provide domestic

needs. Entering the reactor export business

would be even harder because of the stiff competition and difficulty in demonstrating a

reliable product to a new customer.

The growth of various types of reactors

most likely to be installed worldwide through

the year 2000 are shown in figure X-12. This

figure indicates the continued predominance

of LWRS, the increasing popularity of HWRS

and the entrance of breeders near the year

2000.

Uranium

Those nations with economically recoverable resources of uranium are listed in figure

X-13. Interestingly, few of the Western reactor

Figure x-12.

World Nuclear Capacity Projection

Installed Capacity 1000 Megawatts

1,600

1,400

1,200

1 ,000

800

600

400

200

/

Other Enrichad

o

suppliers will be major exporters of

uranium. Despite their large reserves,

and Australia may have restrictive

limiting their uranium exports. The

.

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

SOURCE : OTA Year

natural

Canada

policies

United

States has substantial reserves, but even these

may not be enough for domestic needs. The

other nations on the list can be expected to export uranium.

Although economically recoverable

resources seem to be concentrated in a few

countries, most other countries do have some

deposits and more may be discovered as exploration is accelerated. Some may find it

politically advantageous, even if not economical, to mine and mill uranium to ensure a fuel

supply for domestic plants.

The figures presented in figure X-13 do not

represent an estimate of ultimately recoverable resources. They have been collected largely

248
Figure X -13.

Uranium Reserves and Resources ●

Data Available November 1.1976

Reasonably Estimated

Assured Resources Additional Resources Total

Cost Range (1000 Metric Tins) (1000 Metric Tins) (1000 Metric Tons)

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Denmark (Greenland) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Gabon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

20.6

243

10.4

172

8

6

1.9

55

20

1

29.2

1.2

7.7

2.4

6

50

6.9

462

103.5

300

31

1.8

493

6.5

1.8

39

80

8.8

605

8

10

—

40

10

4

23.3

1 —

30

—

74

106.8

—

0.4

4

812

15.2

1.7

-

Total (rounded) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2041.0 1873.2

.

‘Nuclear Engineering international, November 1976

for purposes of short-and mid-term planning.

Two factors could result in a considerable expansion of the figures. The first is confirmation of more speculative deposits not included

here. In the United States, 1,430,000 metric

tons have been estimated by ERDA as possible

or speculative, and as vast areas of the world

have yet to be prospected no estimate at all has

been made for them. It is conceivable,

although far from definite, that several times

the total in figure X-13 eventually will be

identified as recoverable. The second factor

would be the use of higher cost ores. Nuclear

power is relatively insensitive to the price of

the fuel, so this possibility cannot be

precluded as cheaper deposits are consumed.

It is well known that enormous quantities of

28

59.6

323

19.2

777

16

16

‘ 1.9

95

30

5

52.5

2.2

7.7

2.4

6

80

6.9

536

210.3

300

3.5

5.8

1305

21.7

3.5

3914.2

—

uranium, far exceeding any projected demand, exist in very low-grade forms such as

shales, granite, and sea water, but tapping

these resources is not feasible under present

techniques. Much less is known about middlegrade ores since the abundance of high-grade

ores has limited the interest in them. Middlegrade ores may in fact be virtually nonexistent, as is exhibited by some materials, or they

may present a resource base mid-range between the high- and low-grade resources.

Much exploratory work remains to further

define both these factors,

The adequacy of worldwide reserves of

uranium for the projected growth of nuclear

249
34

17000

2.03

0.88

4.8

.494

.581

239

185

33 39 30 30

2.28

0.74

5.8

93.15

l8500

93.15

—

0.711

0.31

1.7

.199

.199

.367

.458

42.5

222

174

388

311

519

441

3.21

0.90

7.0

83.15 0.711

0.15

2.3

0.154

0.191

0.125

0.125 —

85

73

.167

9.5

0.128

0.158

93

75

4810

4310

1350

1870

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

MWm is thermal megawatts; MWe is net electrical megawatts; MW~ is thermal m awattdays; MTU is metnctonnes (thousand of kilograms) of uranium;

~erS&~E is short tons of UG yellowcake from an ore processing mill. One S U is equivalent to one kg of separative work. %

For red acement o ioadinas, the reauired feed and separative work are net, in that thev allow for the use of uranium recovered from soent fuel. Allowance is

made lor fabrication arid reproce&i

3

losses. “

Includes natural uranium to be spik with plutonium; 0.0067 ST U30dMWe for BWR and 0.0067 for PWR.

Plutonium available for recycle ratchets I+ each

Y

s because not all of the piutonium charged is burned. Therefore, more plutonium is recovered from

mixed-oxide fuel than from standard uranium fue, and this increment increases with each cycle (5-6 years par cycle) requiring several passes to reach

steady state. The data shown represent conditions for the 1960’s when most reactors will be dischargi

v

fuel which has only seen one racyde pass.

Average for all fuel dischar

F

with full racyde of self-generated plutonium. For mixed-oxide fud (natural spiked with setf-generated plutonium) the spent

fuel from BWRS contains 1 .1 kg Pu per MTU and from PWRS, 18.7.

Lifetime commitments assume operations at 4070 C

TV 1

d Factor (CF for the first year, 65?4. CF for the next two years, followed by 12 years at 75% CF.

Thereafter, CF drops 2 points per ear, reaching 35°. in t e last (30th year.

● ERDA-1, “The Report of the Liquid etal Fast Breeder Reactor Program Review L Group,” January 1975.

250
Figure X-15.

Cumulative Lifetime Uranium Commitments

Uranium Millions of Metric Tons

Figure X-1 6.

Cumulative Consumption of Uranium

Uranium” Millions of Metric Tons

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

No Pu Recycle

0.3% Tails /

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2,000

SOURCE OTA Year

plants depends upon a variety of complex factors. One is the efficiency with which various

reactor types use this resource. The abundant

LWRS use more than HWRS, and breeders

could operate for decades on the uranium that

has already been mined. The utilization of

uranium also depends upon the operation of

the enrichment plants required for LWRS (See

chapter VII and appendix V of volume II for

technical details of all aspects of the nuclear

fuel cycle). If the demand for enrichment services is high, a plant can be operated in a mode

that provides a more enriched product but

also requires more uranium feed. If more efficient enrichment techniques (such as the laser

isotope separation) are developed, they might

be able to recover some of the useful fuel now

left in the tails.

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

/

0.3% Tails

\

\

.

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

SOURCE OTA

2000

Year

Another factor influencing the adequacy of

uranium reserves is the fuel burnup of a reactor: The fuel would be more completely

burned if the LWRS operated at full power for

the expected 80 percent of the year rather than

at the current average of 60 percent of the

year. (A realistic goal might be 70 percent.) At

the lower percentage of full-power operation

the fuel could be left in the reactor several

months longer. However, reactors continue to

be refueled at regularly scheduled yearly intervals because it is most economical to time

the refueling with the required annual shutdown for maintenance. This leaves a substantial amount of unburned enriched uranium in

the spent fuel which could be recovered, along

with the generated plutonium, by reprocessing. This step would undoubtedly be advan -

251
Figure X-1 7.

World Annual Separative Work Requirement

Annual Separative Work Requirements: Millions kg SWU/Yr

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

No Pu

/

0.2% Tails

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

SOURCE OTA Year

tageous from an energy resource conservation

viewpoint but it is far from certain that recycling will become widespread.

The amount of uranium that will be needed

by each of the presently available reactors

over their lifetimes are shown in figure X-14.

These figures can be translated into the demand that will be placed upon uranium

resources by the growth of nuclea r

powerplants. The projected installed capacity

as a function of time is plotted on figure X-12.

The required cumulative lifetime commitments (allotting to a reactor at the start of

operation the entire supply of fuel it will use

in its lifetime) for this projection are shown in

figure X-15 for enrichment tails of 0.2 percent

and 0.3 percent, with and without plutonium

recycle. The actual day-by-day

consumption is shown in figure

cumulative

X-16. Both

figures show the reserves of-figure X-13, the

1,430,000 metric tons of U.S. possible or

speculative reserves, and an estimate of the

equivalent world reserves based on the same

ratio of speculative to reserves figures as in the

United States. This latter figure is purely empirical and is included only to give an idea of

the possible magnitude of world reserves. The

lifetime commitments reach the estimated

total resource base of figure X-13 in 1999 with

Pu recycle and in 1995 without it, assuming

ample enrichment capacity. If the more

speculative reserves are confirmed, uranium

may not be a constraint on reactor construction until well into the next century, even

without recycling. If, however, even the present estimates turn out to be optimistic, a

serious shortage could develop in the 1990’s.

Actual consumption would not be limited until well after the year 2000, with or without

recycle. Thus, nuclear growth could continue

past the 1,000 reactors that will commit the

estimated base, but this expansion could only

be pursued if there were considerable confidence that a fuel supply would emerge to

allow the reactors to complete their normal

expected lifetimes, This supply might come

from new ore discoveries, breeders, laser

enrichment of tails, or new recovery techniques for tapping the vast reserves of lowgrade, presently uneconomical, ore such as the

Chattanooga shales or sea water.

Enrichment

Enrichment plants are essential for LWRS,

which must use fuel with a higher concentration of the uranium isotope U235 than occurs

naturally, The adequacy of enrichment

facilities in meeting present and future demands of LWRS will affect the motivations of

various nations, either to build their own

enrichment plants or to purchase a reactor

type such as the HWR that does not require

enriched uranium. Global enrichment

capacity is plotted against requirements in

figure X-17. The U.S.S.R. has been credited

with 7 million separative work units (SWUS),

but it is not known if that much actually will

be available. It is apparent that new capacity

252
Figure X -18.

Enrichment Plants*

Nation Type Location

Capacity Operation

Million SWU Date

U.S. ... ... ... .., ... ... ... .. Diffusion

Diffusion

Diffusion

Diffusion

Diffusion

Centrifuge (Proposed)

USSR .. .. .. ., .. .. .. .., ... . Diffusion

United Kingdom .. .. .. .. .. DiffusionCentrifuge

Centrifuge (Proposed)**

Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . Centrifuge

France .. .. .. .. .., .. .. .. ... . Diffusion

Diffusion

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .., .. .Centrifuge (Proposed)

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Jet (Proposed)

South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Jet (Proposed)

“Nuclear Engmeenng lnternahonal, November 1976

‘“Expansion could beat Almeloorm Germany Instead

will be needed by the 1990’s, especially if

reprocessing is delayed (plutonium ‘can

substitute for enriched uranium). Because the

construction time for new plants is about 8

years, plants should start in the early 1980’s if

growth projections are to be met, The enrichment facilities in operation are listed in figure

X-18.

The United States has been the major supplier of enrichment services, even to other

reactor suppliers, although its dominance is

now declining. All large-scale operating

plants are the gaseous diffusion type, and

most of these are in the United States, The next

series of large plants will probably be the

centrifuge type, which promises to be more

economical, Both are very high-technology

processes based on proprietary or classified

Oak Ridge, Term.

Paducah, Ky.

Portsmouth, Ohio

Improvements and

Uprating

Portsmouth, Ohio

(add on)

Siberia

Capenhurst

Capenhurst

Capenhurst

Almelo

Tricastin

Tricastin

4.73

7.31

5.19

17.23

10.5

8.75

1.6 to 9.0

7-1o

0.4-0.6

0.2

1.6

0.2

10-8

9-1o

2

2

5

1975-85

1985

1982-1989

—

—

1977

1982

1977

1978-1981

1985

1988

1989

—

information. Thus, although centrifuge plants

can be built on a small scale and more

economically than diffusion plants, not many

countries beyond these listed in figure X-18

are likely to undertake commercial enrichment. The nations most likely to enter the

enrichment market are Australia and West

Germany. If new techniques under development (such as jet-nozzle or laser isotope

separation) prove practical, this picture may

change drastically. Both Brazil and South

Africa are currently developing enrichment

plants based on the jet-nozzle technique—

Brazil to supply its domestic needs and South

Africa to enter the export market. Another

new feature that may contribute to the spread

of enrichment technology is the participation

by some nations (such as Iran) in an enrichment consortium such as Coredif.

253
Figure X -19.

World Reprocessing PIants*

operator Type of Plant Capacity Date

te/y operational status

Us.

U.K.

Windscale BNFL 1 Nat. U metal 1500-2500 1964

Oxide head end 1972 to

1973

Refurbished oxide 1977-78

head end

2 New commercial 1000 1984

oxide plant

3 New commercial oxide 1000 1987

plant “overseas”

France

La Hague CEA 1 Nat. U metal 800 1968

Note Several other pdot and laboratory scale plants have been and are being operated fordeveloprrrent of reprocessing tec+mology. Commeraal reprocessing of research reactorfuel

has also been undertaken m several plants around the world, Fast reactor oxldefuel WIII be reprocessed m pdot scale plants m France and the U.K. and a plant for mixed thorium urarvum

oxides was bult m Italy but has not been operated.

“Nuclear Englruwmg International, February 1976.

254
Reprocessing

Reprocessing is considerably less mature

than other stages of the fuel cycle. Interest in

reprocessing has been limited, both because it

is not essential to any reactor now marketed

and because its costs have escalated very

rapidly as the difficulties of handling

plutonium and highly irradiated fuel have

become more apparent. If breeder reactors

enter the market they will require reprocessing plants. A major argument for building

reprocessing capabilities now is to gain experience and to produce plutonium stockpiles

for the initial breeder cores. Additional advantages of reprocessing are its contribution

to resource conservation and the role it is expected to eventually play in permanent waste

disposal.

Despite these advantages, reprocessing has

become the focus of much of the opposition to

nuclear power. The reason is that reprocessing

potentially exposes plutonium with all the

resulting implications for health, safety, and

proliferation.

At present the only operating reprocessing

plant for LWR fuel is a small commercial

facility in France that has been running since

May 1976. The weapons countries all operate

large noncommercial reprocessing plants, and

several countries reprocess spent fuel from

other types of reactors. The older magnox

reactor in Great Britian requires reprocessing

for its magnesium-clad fuel. The facilities for

LWR fuel that are expected to begin operating

in the next few years are listed in figure X-19.

Several others have been shut down because

of obsolescence. If all spent fuel were to be

reprocessed, considerably more capacity than

is currently planned would be required. The

planned and required capacity is shown in

figure X-20. The alternative is simply to increase the temporary pool storage for spent

fuel (at some expense), or to devise quasi-permanent storage for it, if processing is to be

deferred indefinitely.

Commercial reprocessing plants are expensive and technologically demanding facilities,

A minimum size plant might be designed to

handle 500 tons of spent fuel per year,

equivalent to the discharge of about 25000

MW of installed capacity. Very few nations

will have such a large capacity in this century.

Hence international reprocessing centers may

become economically advantageous.

Even though reprocessing facilities make

sense only if serving a large number of reactors and are not essential to LWRS or HWRS,

Brazil and Pakistan have signed contracts to

import them.

U.S. NUCLEAR EXPORTS

The United States has been the leader in the

development of nuclear energy for both

domestic use and export. The LWR was

developed in the United States, and is now the

major reactor of all supplier nations except

Canada and the United Kingdom. Most imported reactors have been purchased from the

United States and American enrichment

plants will be fueling most of the world’s

LWRS for at least the next decade. The benefits

of these exports were not seriously questioned

for many years. Not only was nuclear energy

seen as a benefit to mankind in general, but

nuclear exports were expected to generate

sizable profits while maintaining America’s

technological advantages. There is considerably more controversy now over nuclear

power in general and exports in particular,

but American companies have simultaneously

found them increasingly important to fill

spare capacity.

The chief U.S. exports have been reactors

and their associated equipment. Engineering

and construction services have also been important. The only fuel-cycle service of note so

far has been enrichment. The United States

has refused to transfer the sensitive technologies of enrichment and reprocessing.

The U.S. share of the reactor export market

has been dropping markedly, as indicated by

figure X-21. In the future the United States

will be selling less to the other industrialized

nations, as so many have gone into business

255
Figure X-20.

World Annual LWR Fuel

Reprocessing Potential Requirements

LWR Fuel Reprocessing Requirements:

103

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

I I I I

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

SOURCE OTA

2000

Year

for themselves, and more to the developing

countries. The U.S. share of the latter market

is likely to be 35 to 40 percent in the early

1980’s, but drop to 25 to 30 percent by the late

1980’s. This market share amounts to 13,000

to 17,000 MW capacity and an export value of

$5 to $7 billion by 1990. The U.S. share of the

European market will decline to 5 percent by

1990. Combined with sales to Japan, these exports could total 30,000-35,000 MW, but this

would amount to only $5 to $7 billion since

the advanced nations supply more of the plant

themselves. Total revenue from reactor sales

should be $10 to $14 billion.

The reactor export market is a very competitive one, especially because most suppliers

are capable of producing more reactors than

they can use domestically. The success of any

single exporter will depend upon a variety of

factors:

1) Governmental export policies: Some

other suppliers have added enrichment

or reprocessing technology as inducements for their reactor sales, but all recently seem to be agreeing to withhold

these technologies as the United States

has done. Canada has taken the lead in

restricting its exports to signatories of the

NPT or its equivalent (full fuel cycle

safeguards).

2) Adequacy of enrichment services: In

1974, the United States stopped accepting

further orders for enrichment services

because its capacity was fully booked. As

a result, the U.S. reputation as a reliable

supplier of enrichment was damaged. If

the United States fails to expand its

enrichment capacity or imposes high

charges for the services, nations may be

more reluctant to purchase American

reactors.

3) Financial assistance: Most reactors are

sold under advantageous credit terms.

Changes in one nation’s policy will affect

all exporters.

4) Industrial capacity: Although most suppliers now have excess capacity, Canada

may soon be booked up because of the

strong interest expressed by LDCS in the

CANDU reactor.

5) Quality of reactor exports: The United

States is still respected as a reliable supplier of proven products that are subject

to strict standards of design, construction, and safety, It may, however, have to

adapt its reactors to the developing-nation market by such innovations as

smaller reactors.

6) International political influence: A given

supplier will be helped if its government

has a special relationship with an importing nation, and is willing to use that influence.

As these various factors change they may

alter the above projections. Barring major

policy changes, however, U.S. reactor exports

are expected to be about $1 billion per year.

256
111111 1 This sum is a small but significant part of total

exports ($100 billion in 1975 with a trade

surplus of $11.5 billion) and could have a

large impact on the balance of trade.

As noted earlier in this chapter, the sale of

enrichment services is another large contributor to the revenues obtained from nuclear-related exports. American capacity is currently

committed through 1985, and no orders have

as yet been taken beyond that date. Roughly

one-third of this capacity (about 70-million

separative work units (SWU)) has been ordered by foreign customers for delivery in the

1977 to 1985 period. Assuming an average

charge of $80 per SWU, the revenue expected

from this source will be about $6 billion.

Because of the many uncertainties surrounding the development of new enrichment

facilities in the United States and elsewhere, it

is difficult to estimate the potential export

value of this service above that which is

already committed.

The export of fuel fabrication services presents a smaller revenue source to the United

States than does the sale of powerplants or

enrichment services. This process does not require a large capital investment and is not

highly technical; in the future, many countries

can be expected to market fuel-fabrication

services, producing strong competition in this

area, In addition, U.S. industry may be hampered by the uncertainty over long-term permission to export fuel services and by the

existence of government-supported activities

in other countries. The cumulative value of

the export of fuel-fabrication services can be

expected to be on the order of $1.5 billion

through 1985.

$1 111111 1

The future of spent-fuel reprocessing in the

United States is still very uncertain. Even if the

decision is soon made to go ahead with

reprocessing and plutonium recycle, it would

be many years before a commercial industry

developed sufficient capacity to provide

reprocessing services to foreign customers.

:11111 1

257
Glossary

Preceding page blank
Glossary

Breeder—A nuclear reactor that produces

more fissile nuclei than it consumes. The

fissile nuclei are produced by the capture of

neutrons in fertile material. (See definitions

below.) The resource constraint for breeder

reactors is thus fertile material, which is far

more abundant in nature than fissile

material. These reactors have not yet

reached commercialization. Fast breeders

do not contain a moderator (see definition

below) to slow neutrons down; i.e., fast

neutrons are used. Thermal breeders do

contain a moderator; i.e., slow neutrons are

used.

Centrifuge—A rotating vessel that can be

used for enrichment of uranium. The

heavier isotopes of the UF6 gas tend to concentrate at the walls of the rotating

centrifuge.

Chain Reaction—A series of nuclear fissions,

each one stimulated by a neutron emitted in

. .

a Previous fission. A chain reaction occurs

when at least one of the two or more

neutrons released in a fission initiates

another fission.

Critical Mass—The minimum amount of

fissile material required to sustain a chain

reaction. The exact mass varies with many

factors such as the particular fissile isotope

present, its concentration and chemical

form and the geometrical arrangement of

the material.

Dedicated Facility—A facility built indigenously (possibly clandestinely) in

order to produce fissile material for nuclear

weapons. It might be a plutonium production reactor, a uranium enrichment plant or

a reprocessing plant.

Denaturing—A technique to render fissile

nuclear material unsuitable for explosive

weapons by mixing in other isotopes of the

same element.

Diffusion—A technique for enrichment of

uranium based on the fact that the lighter

isotopes of a gas will diffuse through a

porous barrier more rapidly than the

heavier isotopes.

Diversion—The removal of material from

some point in the commercial nuclear fuel

cycle to use in nuclear weapons.

Enrichment—The process of increasing the

concentration of one isotope of a given element.

Fast Neutron—A fast-moving, neutral

subatomic particle. Neutrons are emitted

when a nucleus, such as uranium-235, fissions.

Fertile Isotope—An isotope not itself fissile

but that is converted into a fissile isotope,

either directly or after a short decay process

following absorption of a neutron. Example: U238 can capture a neutron to give U239

.

U

239 then decays to N p

239 which in tur n

decays to fissile Pu239.

Fissile Isotope—An isotope that will split, or

fission, into two (or more) lighter elements

plus extra neutrons when it is struck by a

neutron,

Fission—The splitting of a nucleus usually

into two or more lighter elements. The total

mass of the resulting particles is less than

that of the original atom, the difference

being converted into energy.

Fresh Fuel—Nuclear fuel ready for insertion

into a power reactor.

Fuel Cycle—The set of chemical and physical

operations needed to prepare nuclear

material for use in reactors and to dispose

of or recycle the material after its removal

from the reactor. Existing fuel cycles begin

with uranium as the natural resource and

create plutonium as a byproduct, Some

future fuel cycles may rely on thorium and

produce the fissile isotope uranium-233.

Fuel Fabrication Plant—A facility where the

nuclear material (e.g., enriched or natural

uranium) is fabricated into fuel elements to

be inserted into a reactor.

Gun-Type Nuclear Weapon—A device in

which gun propellants are used to move

Preceding page blank 261
two or more subcritical masses of fissile

material together to produce an explosion.

Implosion-Type Nuclear Weapon—A device

in which high explosives surrounding a

subcritical configuration of fissile material

compress it into a condition o f

supercriticality to produce an explosion.

Isotopes-Atoms of the same chemical element whose nuclei contain different numbers of neutrons and hence have different

masses, even though chemically identical.

Isotopes are specified by their atomic mass

number, that is, the total number of protons

plus neutrons, and a symbol denoting the

chemical element, e.g., U

235 f o r

uranium-235.

Mixed-Oxide Fuel—Nuclear reactor fuel

composed of plutonium and uranium in oxide form. The plutonium replaces some of

the fissile uranium, thus reducing the need

for uranium ore and enrichment. This is the

form of the fuel that would be used in

plutonium recycle.

Moderator—A component (usually water,

heavy water, or graphite) of some nuclear

reactors that slows neutrons, thereby increasing their chances of being absorbed by

a fissile nucleus.

Multinational Fuel-Cycle Facilities (MFCF)-

A concept for joint national ownership and

management of certain steps of the nuclear

fuel cycle-especially those steps that are

particularly vulnerable to national diversion. Multinational reprocessing plants and

spent-fuel storage facilities are currently

under study.

Nth Country—A nation judged to have high

potential of becoming a nuclear-weapons

state—because of its technical and economic

ability and its political motivations.

Neutron—Neutral particles which, together

with protons, comprise the nucleus of an

atom.

Non-State Adversary—Any individual or

group that wishes to use destructive force to

further its own goals.

Nuclear Fission Weapons—Devices that

derive their explosive force from the energy

released when a large number of nuclei fission in a very short period of time.

Plutonium-239 (Pu

239)-A fissile isotope created as a result of capture of a neutron by

U

238. It is excellent material for nuclear

weapons.

Plutonium-240 (Pu

240)—A fissile isotope

whose presence complicates the construction of nuclear explosives because of its

high rate of spontaneous fission. It is produced in reactors when a Pu239 atom absorbs a neutron instead of fissioning.

Protons—Positively charged particles which,

together with neutrons, comprise the

nucleus of an atom.

Reactor—A facility that contains a controlled

nuclear fission chain reaction. It may be

used to generate electrical power, to conduct research, or exclusively to produce

plutonium for nuclear explosives.

Reactor-Grade Plutonium—Plutonium that

contains more than 7 percent of the isotope

plutonium-240. It is created in most power

reactors under normal operating conditions, although the liquid metal fast breeder

reactor does produce weapons-grade

plutonium in one portion of the reactor.

Recycle—The reuse of unburned uranium

and plutonium in fresh fuel after separation

from fission products in spent fuel at a

reprocessing plant.

Reprocessing-Chemical treatment of spent

reactor fuel to separate the plutonium and

uranium from the fission products and

(under present plans) from each other.

Safeguards-Sets of regulations, procedures,

and equipment designed to prevent and

detect the diversion of nuclear materials

from authorized channels.

Special Nuclear Material (SNM)-Plutonium,

or uranium enriched in U235 or U233

.

Spent Fuel—Fuel elements that have been

removed from the reactor because they contain too little fissile material and too high a

262
concentration of radioactive fission products. They are both physically and radioactively hot.

Strategic Special Nuclear Material (SSNM)-

Plutonium, U233, or uranium enriched to 20

percent or more in U235

.

Spiking—A technique to deter theft of nuclear

fuel by the addition of radioactive substances.

Thermal neutrons—Low energy, or slow

moving neutrons.

Thorium-232 (Th232)-A fetile, naturally occurring isotope from which the fissile

isotope uranium-233 can be bred.

Uranium-233 (U233)-A fissile isotope bred by

fertile thorium-232. It is similar in weapons

quality to plutonium-239.

Uranium-235 (U

235)-The only naturally O Ccurring fissile isotope. Natural uranium has

0.7 percent of U235; light water reactors use

about 3 percent and weapons materials normally consist of 90 percent of this isotope.

Uranium-238 (U238)—A fertile isotope from

which Pu239 can be bred. It comprises 99.3

percent of natural uranium.

Weapons-Grade Plutonium—Plutonium that

contains less than 7 percent o f

plutonium-240, an isotope that complicates

the design of nuclear weapons.

263
Index

\

.

9

4

 Preceding page blank

.
Index

advanced gas cooled reactor (AGR), 31, 152, 164, 166, 168

Afghanistan, 106

Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS), 178, 210

alternate fuel cycles, 33, 90, 167-171

Alternate Fuel Cycle Program, 35

evaluation of, 170

tandem cycle, 71, 171

throwaway cycle, 71, 170, 173

alternate reactor types, 49

American Nuclear Energy Council, 57

Antarctic, 104

Argentina, 19, 46, 49, 79, 103-105, 223, 245

as a potential weapon state, 93

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 144

Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 4

Atomic Energy Commission, 105, 116, 146, 180, 193, 199

Atomic Industrial Forum, 57

“Atoms for Peace” program, 5

Australia, 239, 253, 220

Bangladesh, 106

Baruch Plan, 4

Belgium, 217, 223 J

beryllium, 143, 173

Bilateral Agreement for Nuclear Sharing, 100

black market, 15, 27, 36, 37, 45, 115, 155, 175, 185-187, 188, 189,

230

defined, 185

boiling water reactor (BWR), 152

Bolivia, 104

bomb threats, 115, 117

boron, 141

Brazil, 12, 21, 43, 46, 47, 74, 75, 78, 79, 104, 105, 179, 223, 245,

253, 255

as a potential weapon state, 93

Brookhaven graphite research reactor (BGRR), 176, 178

cost of, 177

Builder, Carl, 196

buy-back arrangements, 75

Canada, 4, 43, 47, 96, 106, 219, 220, 239, 245,-

255, 256

Canadian Deuterium Reactor. (See CANDU.)

CA~DU, 14, 16, 23, 31, 32, 152, 158-159, 168, 172, 207, 208, 256

diversion from fuel cycle of, 32, 158

reprocessed fuel, 164

safeguard systems for, 159

technical description of, 158

carbon, 141

cartels, 76

Carter Administration, 70, 89

cascade, 152, 155, 180

area, 41

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 118, 193

cesium-137, 146

Chile, 65, 104, 223

China, 64, 67, 80,96,97,98, 103, 106, 107, 108, 219, 220, 223

as a weapon state, 93

ddcision to acquire nuclear weapons, 101-102

civil liberties, 8, 17-18, 28-29, 84, 128, 129, 131-134, 136

freedom of press, 28

impact of nuclear power on, 127

coal, 15, 60, 61, 237, 238

as non-nuclear energy source, 77

cost of use of, 46

environmental considerations of, 60, 239

,world resources of, 45

cobalt-60, 146

commercial nuclear power systems

diversion from, 30-31

Comprehensive Test Ban, 79, 144145

Congress, 3, 35, 134, 136

conservation, 60, 61

critical mass, 25, 261

Cuba, 219

Czechoslovakia, 223

dedicated facilities, 35-36, 66, 174-175, 232, 261

detection of, 184

De Gaulle, Charles, 100, 101

de Montmollin, J. M., 204

denaturing. (See plutonium and uranium.)

DeNike, L. Douglas, 123

Denmark, 217, 220

Department of Commerce, 76

Department of Defense, 37, 181, 188

safeguards, 38

Department of State, 87, 193

Division of International Security Affairs (ISA), 35

East Germany, 223

Egypt, 75, 79, 82, 144, 245

electricity, 45, 109, 239

conservation of, 242

decentralized systems of, 60

major uses of, 239-240

methods of electrical generation, 107

Energy Priority Perspective, 59, 89

Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 199

Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), 17,

33, 35, 46, 78, 116, 125, 169, 170, 171, 172, 181, 182, 183,

193, 196, 199, 200, 203, 244

safeguards, 38, 39, 204

England. (See Great Britain.)

enrichment, 23, 71-72, 152, 164, 251, 261

enrichment facilities, 14, 30, 42, 211, 233, 252

gas centrifuge process, 23, 31, 45, 155, 230, 261

gas diffusion process, 23, 155, 261

IAEA safeguarding of, 40-41, 208-209

nozzle method, 14

Euratom, 42, 205, 211, 217-218

creation of, 217

inspectors, 218

safeguards, 154, 193, 218, 225

European Atomic Energy Community. (See Euratom.)

Export-Import Bank, 75

fast breeder reactors (FBR), 160, 184

FBI. (See Federal Bureau of Investigation.)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 125, 134

Preceding page blank 267
Federal Republic of Germany. (See West Germany.)

Finland, 220

firewood

as an energy source, 237

fissile material, 139, 140, 142, 143-144, 185, 186, 188

fission, 22, 261

Ford Administration, 76, 89

Foreign Assistance Act, 217, 218

France, 14, 25, 43, 47, 64, 74, 75, 80, 101, 181, 182, 184, 217, 220,

223, 245

as a weapon state, 93

decision to acquire nuclear weapons, 100-101

French Atomic Energy Commission, 100

fuel cycle, 13, 23, 88, 105, 151-152, 261

multinational facilities. (See multinational fuel cycle

facilities.)

related technology of, 187

safeguards of, 213

fuel fabrication plant, 23, 261

fuel leasing, 13, 75

Gallois, Pierre, 100

gas, 15, 59, 237

as an energy source, 238

gas cooled fast reactor (GCFR), 32, 166, 168

Generic Environmental Statement on the use of Mixed Oxide

Fuel (GESMO), 129, 196, 199

German Democratic Republic, (See East Germany.)

Germany. (See West Germany.)

Giscard d’Estaing, V., 222

global stability, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12

bipolar alliance systems, 11

graphite

as a moderator, 176, 179

gray market, 36, 37, 45, 174, 175, 187-188, 189, 230

defined, 187

Great Britain, 4, 5, 47, 70, 75, 80, 102, 180, 217, 220, 245, 255

as a weapon state, 93

decision to acquire nuclear weapons, 99-100

guerrilla wars, 117

Gulf Universities Research Consortium, 144

gun-type nuclear weapon, 25, 29, 30, 142, 143, 261

heavy water, 104, 105, 164, 176

heavy water reactors (HWR), 160, 251, 255

high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR), 31, 33, 78, 152,

160, 161, 164, 168, 172

Hiroshima, 127

IAEA. (See International Atomic Energy Agency.)

illicit sale. (See black market or gray market.)

implosion-type nuclear weapon, 25, 29, 30, 142, 143, 262

India, 3, 25, 26, 35, 46, 67, 78, 79, 96, 97, 98, 103, 105, 106, 107,

187, 220, 223, 239, 245

as a weapon state, 93, 163

decision to acquire nuclear weapons, 102-103

nuclear explosion, 76, 169

intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), 101

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 17, 20, 21, 22, 31,

43, 46, 49, 50, 67, 70, 72, 78, 88, 145, 193, 194, 204, 205,

212-217, 220, 244, 245

creation of, 5, 212

expand functions of, 81

inspectors, 41, 209, 210, 213

safeguards, 20,32, 38, 40-42, 71, 73, 74, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 154,

205-211, 225

effectiveness of, 83

Safeguards Technical Manual, 208, 210, 213

international fuel cycle. (See fuel cycle.)

International Monetary Fund, 64

Iran, 46, 75, 106, 108, 245, 253

as a potential weapon state, 93

Ireland, 217

iron, 143

isotopes, 22-23, 147, 262

Israel, 5, 11, 25, 56, 58, 75, 79, 223

as a potential weapon state, 93

Italy, 47, 217, 219, 223, 245

Japan, 12, 15, 26, 46, 47, 50, 64, 67, 96, 103, 108, 110, 111, 163,

180, 208, 245, 256

Jenkins, Brian, 123

Jersey Nuclear Avco Isotopes (JNAI), 181, 183

Johns Hopkins University, 58

Kashmir, 106

Kissinger, Henry

as Secretary of State, 76

Korean War, 101

Kuwait, 56

laser isotope separation (LIS), 14, 36, 181-184, 251

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL), 40, 181, 182, 183, 203

less developed countries (LDC), 46, 237, 242, 245, 256

reserves of oil and coal, 238

Libya, 189

light water breeder reactor (LWBR), 33, 152, 160, 161, 162-163,

168, 173

diversion from fuel cycle of, 162

technical description of, 162

light water reactors (LWR), 14, 16, 23, 31-32, 46, 78, 158, 159,

160, 168, 171, 172, 207, 208, 233, 251, 255

diversion from, 154-156

fuel cycle of, 46, 155

future demands of, 252

reprocessed fuel of 164

technical description of, 152-154

Limited Test Ban Treaty, 145

liquid metal fast breeder reactors (LMFBRs), 13, 22, 23, 31, 32,

71, 78, 152, 163, 166, 168, 172

diversion from cycle of, 159

diversion prone points of, 32

technical description of, 159-160

London Suppliers Conference. (See Suppliers’ Conference.)

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASF), 40, 173, 181, 182

safeguards group, 202

Luxembourg, 217

Manhattan Project, 179, 181

mass communications, 118

mass media, 118

268
material accountancy, 40, 41, 81, 195, 206

and accounting systems, 202-203

Maud Committee, 99

Mexico, 46, 105, 224, 245

Middle East, 49, 75

potential for conflict in, 12

terrorism in, 76

Mitre Corporation, 123

mixed oxide fuel, 23, 40, 261

moderator, 22, 176, 179, 261

molten salt breeder reactor (MSBR), 33, 160, 168, 174

multinational fuel cycle facilities (MFCF), 20, 43, 83-84,

219-220, 232, 262

McMahon, Brien, 4

NASA, 173

Nassau Agreement, 100

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (Ser NASA,)

National Bureau of Standards, 204

National Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 196, 197

NATO, 63, 64, 68, 99, 100

neptuni urn

NP237, 139, 144

Netherlands, the, 47, 180, 217, 220, 223

neutrons, 22, 262

source of, 141

Nigeria, 224

Nonproliferation Perspective, 59, 89

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 5, 7, 19, 21, 35, 42, 43-44, 49,

60, 64, 74, 75, 78-79, 89, 105, 106, 109, 144, 145, 164, 194,

206, 212, 218, 219, 220, 223-225, 232, 233

Chinese rejection of, 101

conditions for nuclear exports, 79-80

definition of proliferation, 6

important weaknesses of, 22

penalizing violators of, 82

preferential treatment to signatories, 50, 63, 79

safeguards arrangements of, 213

nonproliferating reactors, 35, 1,73-174

gas core reactor, 173

plasma reactor, 173

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (See NATO.)

North Korea, 223

North Vietnam, 223

Norway, 220

nuclear blackmail, 123, 124, 133

nuclear extortion, 115, 124

nuclear free zones, 63, 80, 81-82, 232

in Latin America, 105

nuclear hoaxes, 115, 117, 124-125, 126, 146

defined, 124

nuclear industry, 72

international, 8, 43-45

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 17, 76, 78, 116, 129,

133, 134, 178, 193, 200, 202, 203, 210, 256

inspectors, 209

safeguards, 38-40, 78, 139, 195-199

Special Safeguards Study, 200, 201

nuclear sabotage, 4, 115-116, 117, 196

nuclear theft. (See theft. )

oil, 59, 237

as an energy source, 238

embargo, 117

global reserves of, 15

prices, 3

U.S. production of, 238

OPEC, 76, 238, 244

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD), 243, 244, 245

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. (See OPEC.)

organized crime, 27, 123-124, 125, 126

Pakistan, 12, 43, 56, 75, 79, 102, 103, 106, 107, 187, 223, 245, 255

as a potential weapon state, 93

Paraguay, 104

peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), 8, 63, 82, 96, 139, 144, 145,

212

creation of international facility for, 83

environmental hazards of, 96

evaluation of, 79

People’s Republic of China, (See China. )

petroleum. (See oil.)

Philippines, 245

Phillips Petroleum Company, 178

Phrasor Technology, Inc., 181

Plowshare Program, 144, 145

plutonium, 13, 14, 15, 29, 31, 116, 141, 146, 147, 154, 159, 160,

169, 171, 172, 186, 200, 229, 251, 255

denaturing of, 33, 40, 201, 261

Pu238, 139, 144

Pu239, 23, 36, 139, 143, 144, 151, 154, 160, 161, 169, 177, 262

Pu240, 31, 139, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 20I, 262

Pu242, 155

reactor grade, 16, 30, 32, 176, 262

weapons grade, 16, 31, 142, 179, 263

plutonium recycle, 12, 16, 26, 28, 29, 31, 50, 62, 69, 70-71, 117,

128, 134, 155, 158, 159, 168, 169, 170, 184, 188, 189, 257, 262

export technology of, 132

impact on civil liberties, 127, 129

risks of, 136

safeguard measures for, 129, 130-131

size of industry, 128-129

Poland, 223

Portugal, 223

pressurized water reactor (PWR), 152, 159, 162

protons, 22, 262

Quemoy and Matsu Crisis, 101

Radiological weapons, 146-147

defined, 146

RAND Corporation, 39, 197

recycling

of resources, 60

reprocessing plants, 23, 35, 36, 38, 42, 43, 211

IAEA safeguarding of, 41-42, 209-211

Republic of China, (See Taiwan. )

research reactor, 35, 175

Rhodesia, 219

Romania, 224

269
SALT negotiations, 79, 82

sanctions, 12, 20-21, 42-43, 66-67, 76, 89, 218-219, 229

nuclear embargoes, 44, 87

Saudi Arabia, 64, 65, 79, 223

“secrecy-denial”, 4

Shared Priority Perspective, 61, 62, 89

Singapore, 245

solar energy, 60, 240

economics of, 15

solar electric, 241

South Africa, 5, 11, 14, 47, 58, 65, 82, 109, 187, 223, 239, 253

as a potential weapons state, 93

South Korea, 19, 46, 56, 58, 65, 68, 75, 239, 245

as a potential weapon state, 93

South Vietnam, 77, 108

Soviet Union. (See U. S. S. R.)

Spain, 70, 223

special nuclear material (SNM), 72, 78, 102, 262

diversion of, 81

spent fuel, 23, 31, 146, 232, 262

reprocessing of, 73, 75

storage of, 31, 74, 152

spiking, 40, 200-201, 263

strontium-90, 146

Suez Crisis, 99, 101

Suppliers’ Agreement, 72, 73, 76

Suppliers’ Conference, 19, 21, 43, 49, 73, 74, 220-223, 225

“Trigger List,” 43, 220, 222

Sweden, 26, 47, 67, 96, 98, 103, 223, 245

Switzerland, 26, 96, 98, 223

synthetic fuels, 240

Taiwan, 21, 46, 56, 58, 65, 75, 82, 103, 108, 110, 245

as a potential weapon state, 93

Taiwan Straits Crisis, 101

terrorism, 77, 84

international, 118

growth of, 118-121

literature on, 126

nuclear, 121-123

political, 130

terrorists, 12, 16, 26-27, 28, 89, 115, 125, 126, 132

ties among groups, 126

Thailand, 144

thallium-208, 160

theft, 4, 15, 30, 31, 36, 37, 45, 59, 81, 89, 116, 117, 124, 185,

188-189, 229, 231, 232, 233

Third World, 59, 60, 65, 69, 84, 94, 95, 98, 101, 102, 103, 117

thorium, 23, 152, 162, 173, 174

cycle reactors, 173

reprocessing, 173

thorium dioxide, 163

Th232, 23, 151, 160, 263

Th233, 2 3

thorium fuel cycle, 33, 160-161, 170, 172

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), 145

Treaty of Rome, 217

Treaty of Tlatelolco, 80, 82, 105

Treaty on Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes

(PNET), 145

Turkey, 106

United Kingdom. (See Great Britain.)

United Nations, 42, 84

General Assembly, 5, 66, 76, 94, 216

Group of Ten, 64

Secretary General, 79

Security Council, 3, 64, 76, 94, 216

Resolution 225, 64

suspension from, 82

United States

allies of, 4

and its communist adversaries, 4

as a reliable supplier, 46-47, 49, 69, 70, 87, 88, 253, 256

foreign policy, 4

Geological Survey, 239

nuclear exports, 255-257

uranium, 29, 31, 69, 104, 107, 117, 143, 152, 160, 171, 248, 249

reserves of, 46

U232, 33, 141, 16(3, 161, 200

U233, 16, 23, 30, 33, 38, 139, 141, 142, 143, 146, 151, 160, 161,

162, 163, 166, 168, 169, 172, 174, 200, 205, 263

denatured, 78, 261

U234, 209

U235, 16, 23, 30, 31, 38, 39, 141, 142, 143, 151, 152, 154, 155,

161, 162, 163, 172, 181, 183, 200, 208, 209, 263

U238, 23, 33, 143, 151, 152, 154, 158, 159, 161, 166, 169, 172,

263

weapons grade, 35, 179

Urenco, 179, 180, 211

Uruguay, 104

U. S.S.R., 14, 47, 64, 67, 68, 75, 76, 80, 97, 107, 111, 144, 145, 181,

182, 184, 220, 239, 245, 252

as a weapon state, 93

counter to Baruch Plan, 5

decision to acquire nuclear weapons, 98-99

yellowcake, 152, 154

Yugoslavia, 56, 224

Venezuela, 104

Walton, R. B., 204

West Germany, 12, 14, 19, 43, 47, 64, 74, 75, 103, 163, 179, 181,

187, 217, 220, 245, 253

wind power, 60, 241

Wohlstetter, Roberta, 122

World Bank, 64

World War 11, 97, 101

270

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977 0-92-592