UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-5023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

HENRY LEWIS GARLAND, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:08-cr-00015-WO-6)

Submitted: May 23, 2013 Decided: May 28, 2013

Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John D. Bryson, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High Point, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States 

Attorney, Graham T. Green, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Bethany Corbin, Clinical Program 

Law Student, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Henry Lewis Garland, Jr., appeals the sixteen-month 

sentence imposed upon revocation of his term of supervised 

release. He contends that the upward variance sentence was 

unreasonable because the district court did not find that 

Garland’s criminal history category understated his criminal 

record. We affirm.

We will not disturb a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release that is within the prescribed 

statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In 

making this determination, we first consider whether the 

sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry 

takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of 

fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review 

for [G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

Although a district court “ultimately has broad 

discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of 

imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

439 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court must consider 

the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal Sentencing 

Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory requirements and 
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factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006). 

In determining Garland’s revocation sentence, the 

district court considered the Chapter Seven policy statements, 

the statutory requirements, and the relevant factors in 

§ 3553(a). The court noted that the six-month revocation 

sentence Garland previously received was insufficient to protect 

the public and deter him from future criminal activity. The 

court also considered Garland’s continued illegal conduct while 

on supervision—including numerous traffic violations and his 

pattern of drug use—and concluded that an upward variance to 

sixteen months’ imprisonment was appropriate. See United States 

v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2011) (providing 

that court may vary from Guidelines range based on 

considerations other than Guidelines-sanctioned departures).

This sixteen-month sentence is not plainly 

unreasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-39. The district 

court complied with the requirements of sentencing and did not 

abuse its discretion in imposing Garland’s sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED