alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of G2 Ventures, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 11, 2010 (the Report), I, Gust Kepler, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                           
|---------------------------
|/s/ Gust Kepler            
|Gust Kepler                
|Principal Financial Officer
|May 11, 2010               

A signed original of this certification
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Chester Smith v. State.

176 So. 781.

Division A.

Opinion Filed October 28, 1937.

*756
      *Knight & Laird,*for Plaintiff in Error;

*Cary D. Landis,*Attorney General, and *Tyrus A. Nor-wood,*Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Buford, J.

We review on writ of error judgment of conviction of the crime of manslaughter had under information charging murder in the second degree.

Plaintiff in error presents four questions for our consideration, as follows:

“1. Did the trial court err in his charge to the jury as to the law of self-defense ?

“2. Did the trial court err in his charge to the jury as to whether the defendant is guilty of manslaughter?

‘‘3. Did the evidence in this case justify a verdict of. manslaughter ?

“4. Should the defendant in this case have been given a new trial *?”*

The statement of questions as above quoted in nowise complies with amended Rule 20 and, therefore, we shall not discuss them in detail. See Croft v. State of Fla., 107 Fla. 724, 144 Sou. 663; Callaway v. State, 112 Fla. 599, 152 Sou. 429; Reese, *et al.,*v. Levin, 124 Fla. 96, 168 Sou. 851; St. *757Andrews Bay Lbr. Co. v. Bernard, 102 Fla. 389, 135 Sou. 831.

The charges complained of and referred to in the first and second questions were not as full and complete as they might have been, but, taken in connection with other charges given and considered with them as the whole charge of the court, they were neither misleading or confusing and, as far as they went, they presented correct enunciations of the law. It is well settled that this Court will not reverse a judgment of conviction on the ground that instructions to the jury were incomplete unless the instructions were misleading or confusing, or it be shown that the accused requested further correct instructions' which were refused. See McKenna v. State, 119 Fla. 575, 161 Sou. 561, and cases there" cited.

In the instant case no further or additional instructions were requested.

Questions three and four in effect challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment.

The evidence was sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of a higher degree of homicide than that of which plaintiff in error was convicted.

Plaintiff in error relied on the doctrine of the right of self-defense to justify the homicide and if the jury had believed his story it should have acquitted him. That he was not acquitted evidences that the jury believed the other witnesses, whose testimony failed to show the basis for the application of the doctrine of self-defense, and did not believe the accused. That question was' one for the jury and was resolved adversely to the accused.

No reversible error is made to appear.

The judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

*758Ellis, C. J., and Terrell, J., concur.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown and Ci-iapman, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
IIB 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8662 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

DECEMBER 20 (legislative day, DECEMBER 16), 2024 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, 

and Transportation 

AN ACT 

To reduce commuting burdens on Transportation Security 

Administration employees, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

HR 8662 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘TSA Commuting Fair3 ness Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON TSA COMMUTING BENE5 FITS. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of 

8 the Transportation Security Administration shall submit 

9 to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 

10 Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, 

11 Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Home12 land Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a 

13 study on the feasibility of treating as on-duty hours the 

14 time Transportation Security Administration employees 

15 working at airport locations spend traveling between reg16 ular duty locations and airport parking lots and bus and 

17 transit stops. 

18 (b) CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the feasibility 

19 study required under subsection (a), the Administrator of 

20 the Transportation Security Administration shall consider 

21 the following with respect to Transportation Security Ad22 ministration employees: 

23 (1) The amount of time needed by such employ24 ees to travel between regular duty locations and air25 port parking lots and bus and transit stops at small 

26 hub airports, medium hub airports, and large hub 


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3 

HR 8662 RFS

1 airports (as such terms are defined in section 40102 

2 of title 49, United States Code). 

3 (2) The amount of time such employees spend 

4 commuting, on average, exclusive of the time de5 scribed in paragraph (1). 

6 (3) The potential benefits to such employees 

7 and the Administration of treating as on-duty hours 

8 the time described in such paragraph. 

9 (4) The feasibility of using mobile phones, loca10 tion data, and any other means to allow such em11 ployees to report their arrival to and departure from 

12 the airport parking lots and bus and transit stops 

13 concerned. 

14 (5) The estimated costs of treating as on-duty 

15 hours the time described in such paragraph, includ16 ing by considering such hours creditable as basic pay 

17 for retirement purposes. 

18 (6) Other considerations determined appro19 priate by the Administrator. 

Passed the House of Representatives December 20, 

2024. 

Attest: KEVIN F. MCCUMBER, 

Clerk. 


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---

EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this Amendment No.1 to the
Annual Report of World Moto, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the year
ended December 31, 2012 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, Lisa Ziomkowski-Boten, Treasurer and
Secretary (Principal Accounting and Financial Officer) of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that;

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of this Annual
Report or as a separate disclosure document.

A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.

/s/ Lisa Ziomkowski-Boten
Name:           Lisa
Ziomkowski-Boten
Title:            
Treasurer and Secretary (Principal Accounting Officer and Principal Financial
Officer)
Date:            
June 3, 2014

---
June 12,2000

                            ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT
                                     Between
                                Site HQ, Inc. and
                      Internet Properties Development, Inc.




In conjunction with the agreement, "DOMAIN NAME PURCHASE AGREEMENT Between Site
HQ, Inc. and Internet Properties Development, Corp."

Internet Properties Development, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of KwikWeb.com,
Inc., (the Buyer) and Site HQ, Inc. (the "Seller") also agree that the "Buyer"
is purchasing the infrastructure and development assets of the "Seller"
including all work to date in the Domain Names and Internet assets described in
Exhibit "A" of the "DOMAIN NAME PURCHASE AGREEMENT Between Internet Properties
Development, LLC and Internet Properties Development, Corp."

The "Buyer" is also purchasing from the "Seller" all of the office assets for
all the properties above referenced and described in the attached Schedule "A"
of assets and Schedule "B" of liabilities.

In consideration for the transfer of all of the above described assets, the
"`Buyer" agrees to pay the "Seller"

$7000 Seven thousand and no/100 within (thirty) days of today's date, following
a reasonable period of due diligence.


Buyer:


/s/ Matthew Hayes
--------------------------------
Internet Properties Development, Inc.
MATTHEW HAYES



Seller:

/s/ H. Page Howe
---------------------------------
Site HQ, Inc.
H.PAGE HOWE
#### Ida I. Ross, Appellant, *v.*Joseph Ross, Jr., *Respondent.*

— Reargument ordered.

Pratt, J., not sitting.
(Reap. Dec. 9186)

#### Leading Forwarders, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 947319.

(Decided July 11, 1958)

*Robert Rubinger*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

This appeal for reappraisement relates to certain items of glassware exported from Germany and entered at the port of New York. In a stipulation of submission, the appeal has been limited to the merchandise described on the invoice as “Bell Shaped Graduate Blanks, 250 ml cap.,” appraised at DM 2.95 each, plus *12%*per centum, less 25 per centum, plus packing.

Stipulated facts, upon which the case is before me, establish that the proper basis for appraisement of the articles in question, as here-inabove identified, is foreign value, as defined in section 402 (c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and that such statutory value for the merchandise is DM 1.25 each, plus 12K per centum, less 25 per centum, plus packing, and I so hold. Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

Th e H o n o r ab l e Ll o y dD . G e o r g e , Se n i o rD i s tr i c tJ u d g e f o rth e U . S. ** D i s tr i c tC ourtf

orN e va da , s i tt i ng byde s i gna t i on.

NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T S E R GI O A L F ON S O A R R E OL AAR R E OL A, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 09- 71830 A ge nc yN o. A 011- 434- 117 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o a r d o f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls A r gue d a nd S ubm i tt e d D e c e m be r8, 2011 S a n F r a n c is c o , C a lif

o rn ia B ef ore: T R O T T and B E A , C i rc ui tJudg es , and G E O R G E , S eni or D i stri ctJudg e. ** S e r gi o A l f

ons o A rr e ol a - A rr e ol a( “ A rr e ol a ” ) pe t i t i ons f orr e vi e w of

the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ order a ff i rm i ng the re i nst at em entof a pri or order o f r em o v al fr o m th e U n it ed S tates. W e h av e ju risd icti o n to re v iew A rr eo la’s 

# FI LED DE C 23 2011 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS2

chal l enge t o the re i nst at em entorder und er8 U . S . C . §1 25 2(a) . In exer ci si ng that j ur i s di c t i on, w e a r e notpr e c l ude d by8 U . S . C . §1231( a ) ( 5) f r om r e vi e w i ng a c ol l a t e r a l c ons t i tut i ona l a tt a c k on the pr i oror de rof r e m ova l unde r l y i ng the re i nst at em entorder. 8 U . S . C . §1 25 2(a) (2)( D ). A rr eol a’ s a l l eged depri vat i on of du e proces s i n h i s und er l yi ng re m ov al p r o c e e d in g s c a n n o t s u p p o rt h is c la im b e f o r e th is c o u rt: th a t h is d u e p r o c e s s r ig h ts w er e vi ol at ed by the re i nst at em entof thatpri or order. T he “ [r ] ei nst at em entof a pr i orr e m ova l or de r–r e ga r dl e s s of the pr oc e s s a f

f or de d i n the unde r l y i ng or de r–doe s notof

f e nd due pr oc e s s be c aus e r e i ns t a t e m e ntof apr i oror de rdoe s not change the al i en’ s r i gh t s or r em edi es . ” Moral es -I zqui erdo v. G on zales , 486 F . 3d 48 4, 49 7 (9 C i r. 20 07 ) ( e n banc ).

th AF F I RME D.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned hereby certifies that (i) the Form 10-Q filed by New Century Bancorp, Inc. (the Issuer) for the quarter ended
September 30, 2010, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in that report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer on the dates and for the periods presented therein.



|                        |  |     |  |                                      
|----------------------- |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------
|Date: November 15, 2010 |  | By: |  | /s/ William L. Hedgepeth II          
|                        |  |     |  | William L. Hedgepeth II              
|                        |  |     |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
No. 50166.

#### Protest 116022-K of Seaboard Liquor Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

An examination of the record failed to disclose anything that would warrant the court in disturbing the finding of the collector. The protest was therefore overruled.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21

- 7095

MICHAEL L. MARTIN , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. HAROLD CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Roanoke

. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. ( 7:19

- cv - 00854

- JPJ

- PMS )

Submitted : December 21 , 2021 Decided: December 27, 2021

Before KING and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Michael L. Martin , Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Michael L. Martin see ks to appeal the district court’s order s dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition and denying his motion for reconsideration. See Gonzalez v.
Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 148 & n.9 (2012) (explaining that § 2254 petitions are subject to

one - year statute of limitations, running from latest of four commencement dates enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). The order s are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A
certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive pr ocedural ruling is debatable and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 140

- 41 (citing Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Martin has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 32.01

               CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER &
                        CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Michael Pacult, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
White Oak Financial Services, Inc. as general partner of Providence Select
Fund, L.P., certify that (i) the Form 10Q for the period ended September 30,
2006 of Providence Select Fund, L.P. fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the
information contained in the Form 10Q for the period ended September 30, 2006
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of Providence Select Fund, L.P.


PROVIDENCE SELECT FUND, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
By:	White Oak Financial Services, Inc., General Partner


By:  /s/ Michael Pacult
Michael Pacult
Chief Executive Officer &
Chief Financial Officer

Date: November 20, 2006
#### John W. Jones and another, *as Administrators, etc., Respondents, v.*Celine W. Power and others, *Appellants.*

— Judgment affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Dykman, J.;

Barnard, P. J., not sitting.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6679

KIM ANTONIO GRIFFIN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WILLARD R. HALL,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Loretta Copeland Biggs, 

District Judge. (1:14-cv-00007-LCB-JEP)

Submitted: July 23, 2015 Decided: July 28, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Kim Antonio Griffin, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, 

III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Kim Antonio Griffin seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and 

dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment 

of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on 

procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the 

dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition 

states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. 

Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Griffin has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 
3

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Frederick R. Jorgensen, *Respondent v.*Horace K. Thurber, *Appellant.*

— Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event. Opinion by Dykman, J.;

Cullen, J., not sitting.
----

|   | By:    | /s/ Gary R. Vaughan    |   |
|--------|--------|------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Name: Gary R. Vaughan  |   |
|   |   | Its: Managing Director |   |
|   |   |                   |   |
|   | By:    | /s/ David Co           |   |
|   |   | Name: David Co         |   |
|   |   | Its: Director          |   |
|   |   |                   |   |
|   | By:    | /s/ Matt Bowen         |   |
|   |   | Name: Matt Bowen       |   |
|   |   | Its: Director          |   |
|   |   |                   |   |
|   | By:    | /s/ Kevin Fischer      |   |
|   |   | Name: Kevin Fischer    |   |
|   |   | Its: Director          |   |
|   |   |                   |   |
|   | By:    | /s/ Robert Frier       |   |
|   |   | Name: Robert Frier     |   |
|   |   | Its: Director          |   |

|   | By:    | /s/ Kevin C Weeks      |   |
|--------|--------|------------------------|--------|
|   |   | Name: Kevin C Weeks    |   |
|   |   | Its: Managing Director |   |
|   |   |                   |   |
|   | By:    | /s/ Jenna Kaufman      |   |
|   |   | Name: Jenna Kaufman    |   |
|   |   | Its: Director          |   |

----
I

March 7, 1961

HonorableRobert S. Calvert Opinion No, ~~-1.006 Comptrollerof Public Accounts Capitol Station Re: Whether transfersof Austin, Texas permanent reserve fund stock certificates

of building and loan associationschartered by State of Texas are exempt from the Texas Stock Transfer Dear Mr. Calvert: Act. You ask whether transfersof permanent reserve fund stock certificates

of building and loan associationscharteredby the State of Texas are exempt from the Texas Stock Transfer Act. We answer, "Yes, they are exempt." The law making this exemption Is Article 16.09 of Title 122A, Taxation-General, V.A.T.S.,which reads as follows: "The tax imposed by this Chapter shall not be construedas being applicableto shares, share accounts, certificates or passbooks issued by any building and loan associationcharteredunder the laws of this State, nor to credit unions defined in Article 2461, Revised Civil Statutes, 1925." The principal statutesgoverningbuilding and loan associations

are coveredby Title 24, V.A.T.S. Article 881a-36 therein specifically authorizes issuanceof several different classes of shares, stock, share accounts and investmentcertificates. Reserve fund or permanent stock is one of the classes authorized. We believe the exemption stated in Article 16.09, supra, is clear and unambiguousand that it must be applied in accordancewith Its plain terms. Gilmore v. Waples, 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W.2d 1037 (1916), and authoritiescited in 39 Tex. Jur. 160-162, Statutes, Sec. 88. SUMMARY Transfers of permanent reserve fund stock certificates of building and loanHonorableRobert S. Calvert, Page 2 Opinion No. WWassociationscharteredby the State of Texas are exempt from the Texas Stock TransferAct. Yours very truly, WILL WILSON Attorpey General of Texas

Assistant WEA:cm APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE: W. V. Geppert, Chairman W. Ray Scruggs Robert T. Lewis Dudley McCalla Sam Wilson REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GE8ERAL By: Morgan Nesbitt