J-S61042-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: A.O., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

:

 :

:

:

APPEAL OF: J.R.O., Natural Mother : Nos. 424, 425 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order February 19, 2016 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County, 

Orphans' Court Division, No(s): CP-05-DP-0000021-2014 

5 for 2015 

BEFORE: PANELLA, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2016 

J.R.O. (“Mother”), the natural mother of A.O., a son born in March 

2014, appeals from the Order granting the Petition filed by Bedford County 

Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate her parental 

rights to A.O. pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption 

Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b). We affirm. 

On March 9, 2014, CYS received a report that Mother did not possess 

the knowledge or skills necessary to adequately care for A.O. On April 11, 

2014, Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh admitted A.O., after he was referred 

by his primary care provider for being underweight. CYS received 

Emergency Protective Custody on April 16, 2014. A.O. entered foster care 

following his release from the hospital. On April 29, 2014, A.O. was 

adjudicated a dependent child and placed in the legal and physical custody 

of CYS. 
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CYS established plans to begin the reunification process between 

Mother and A.O., including services with the Alternative Community 

Resource Program (“ACRP”), which assists in family preservation, mental 

health services through Mental Health Mental Retardation Services 

(“MHMR”), and alcohol and drug services. Mother was also afforded visiting 

opportunities with A.O. Between April 2014 and June 2014, Mother visited 

A.O. 22 times. However, Mother discontinued her visits until December 

2014, during which she visited A.O. twice. Mother then visited A.O. twice in 

January 2015, and once each month in March and April 2015.1 On April 17, 

2015, CYS filed the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 

seeking termination of Mother’s rights and a change in the goal of 

dependency proceedings to adoption. 

During the two termination hearings, the trial court heard testimony 

from a bonding expert, two agency workers, Mother’s current paramour, and 

Mother. Dennis Kashurba (“Kashurba”), a psychologist and expert on 

bonding, testified to the lack of a meaningful bond between Mother and A.O. 

See N.T., 11/10/15, at 11-12, 20-23. Further, Kashurba testified that he 

did see a meaningful bond between A.O. and foster mother. Id. at 12-13, 

22-23. 

Amanda Kendall (“Kendall”), an ACRP family preservation worker, 

testified that Mother initially did not have any parental instinct, but that 

 

1

 After maternal grandmother passed away on April 13, 2015, Mother did not 

visit A.O.
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Mother was responsive to the program. Id. at 31-32, 38-40. However, 

Kendall also testified to Mother’s lack of contact with the agency at times, 

and the gaps in visitation with A.O. Id. at 26-29. Kendall testified that 

Mother did not appear to be interested in reunification, and that she seemed 

more concerned with other things in life, despite the potential consequence 

of losing her parental rights. Id. at 33-36. Moreover, Kendall testified to 

Mother’s lack of progress toward her Permanency Plan goals, a regression in 

skills, and that Mother could not gain those skills in a reasonable period of 

time. Id. at 37-38. Additionally, Kendall testified about her concerns with 

Mother’s living situation, such as an overwhelming smell of cigarettes in one 

of her temporary residences. Id. at 41. Finally, Kendall stated that from 

her observations, there was a lack of a meaningful bond between Mother 

and A.O. See id. at 42-43 (noting that Mother would not initiate contact 

with A.O., A.O. did not recognize Mother, and A.O. was not distressed when 

separated from Mother). 

Tessa Miller (“Miller”), a CYS worker, testified about Mother’s lack of 

visitation with A.O. See N.T., 2/19/16, at 6-10, 12-13. Miller noted 

Mother’s housing instability, citing eighteen different residences in the time 

span of this case. Id. at 11, 19-20. Miller testified to the content of 

Mother’s Permanency Plan goals, her initial cooperation, and to the overall 

lack of progress toward meeting those goals. Id. at 15-17, 20-22. 

Additionally, Miller stated that the elements of Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) 
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had been met in this case. Id. at 17-18. Miller then testified that she was 

aware Mother had a new baby during this process, but that the baby was not 

living with her and had also been the subject of a different county’s child 

services investigation. Id. at 23-24. 

Jeremy Dodson (“Dodson”), Mother’s current paramour, testified that 

Mother lived with him and his family for a period of time. See id. at 27-28, 

30-31. Dodson also testified that Mother cares well for the new baby and 

would be able to take care of A.O. Id. at 28-29. Dodson then testified that 

the new baby has always lived in his parents’ home, and that they have tried 

to take custody of the new baby. Id. at 31. 

Finally, Mother testified about the stability level of her living situation. 

See id. at 32-34, 36-40, 63-65. Mother acknowledged that while she is 

formally unemployed, she makes money babysitting. Id. at 35, 65. Mother 

noted the gaps in her visitation, but stated that one gap was the result of 

her “trying to better [herself].” Id. at 41; see also id. at 52-53, 59, 61-63 

(wherein Mother testified that some of the lack in visitation was attributable 

to difficulties dealing with the agencies). However, Mother also testified that 

at one time, she filed a Petition for Increased Visitation, but she failed to 

appear in court, and has not refiled since that occasion. Id. at 60-61. 

Mother testified that a major problem was her mother’s death in April 2015, 

causing her to feel depressed and unable to handle working with the 

agencies. Id. at 37-38. 
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In regards to the visits that did take place, Mother testified that the 

visits were normal, she gave A.O. attention, and that there was a connection 

between her and A.O. Id. at 42-44. Thereafter, Mother testified that she 

had been taking part in different services at various times that would help 

her progress toward her Permanency Plan goals, such as parenting classes 

during the new pregnancy, attending MHMR, attending psychological 

rehabilitation, and participating in ACRP and Independent Living for portions 

of the case. Id. at 44-51. Mother testified about her concerns with A.O.’s 

foster care. Id. at 53. Subsequently, Mother testified that she and A.O. had 

a bond at one time, and that she desires custody. Id. at 56. 

Following the hearings, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5), (8), and (b), and granted 

CYS’s request for goal change to adoption for A.O. Mother then filed the 

instant timely appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement. 

On appeal, Mother raises three questions for our review: 

A. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion in 

determining [that CYS] had established a legal basis through 

clear and convincing evidence for changing the goal to 

adoption/terminating [Mother’s] parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)(8), as such a finding is not 

supported by the record? 

B. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion by 

determining that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of [A.O.] under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), as 

such a finding is not supported by the record? 
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C. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion by failing 

to consider the impact of the death of [maternal 

grandmother] on [Mother’s] efforts to remedy the conditions 

leading to the placement of [A.O.]? 

Brief for Appellant at 3 (issues renumbered). 

Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is 

as follows: 

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental 

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the 

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse 

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support 

for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a 

trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate 

parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s 

decision the same deference that we would give to a jury 

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence. 

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. In termination cases, the burden is 

upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that its 

asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. 

See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. “[C]lear and convincing evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations 
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and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (citation omitted). If competent evidence supports the trial 

court’s findings, “we will affirm even if the record could also support the 

opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citation omitted). 

Satisfaction of any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with 

consideration of Section 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary termination 

of parental rights. In re B.C.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). In this case, we will review the trial court’s decision to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights based upon Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which state 

the following: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 

(a) General rule.– The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

* * * 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.– The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 
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child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)...(8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice 

of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. 

“Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to 

remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In 

re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period 

has been established, courts must determine whether the conditions that led 

to the child’s removal continue to exist. Id. “[T]ermination under Section 

2511(a)(8), does not require an evaluation of [a parent’s] willingness or 

ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her [child].” In re 

Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted); see also In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 789 (Pa. Super. 2012). The 

“relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to removal 

have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is 

imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 

2009). With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis, this Court 

observed the following: 

[T]he focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under 

Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the 

child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an 

evaluation of the “needs and welfare of the child” prior to 

proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for 

the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent. 

Moreover, only if a court determines that the parent’s conduct 

warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to 

Section 2511(a), does a court engage in the second part of the 

analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child. Accordingly, while both Section 

2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the “needs 

and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve the analysis 

relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs 

and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by Section 2511(b); as 

such, they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) 

before reaching Section 2511(b). 

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en 

banc) (citations and some quotation marks omitted). 

In her first issue, Mother asserts that CYS did not present clear and 

convincing evidence supporting termination of her parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(8). See Brief for Appellant at 6, 9-10. Mother also 

claims that the progress she made toward her Permanency Plan goals and 

her improvements in parenting skills weighed against a change in goal from 

reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption. Id. at 8-9. 

Our review of the record discloses that CYS was granted Emergency 

Protective Custody on April 16, 2014, and filed the Petition for Involuntary 

Termination on April 17, 2015. See N.T., 2/19/16, at 17-18; In re A.R., 

837 A.2d at 564. Further, the conditions which led to A.O.’s removal 

continue to exist. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 33-38, 41; N.T., 2/19/16, at 11, 

16-17, 19-20, 65. Indeed, despite initial participation in reunification 
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programs, there was no progress toward Mother’s Permanency Plan goals. 

See In re D.A.T., 91 A.3d 197, 206 (Pa. Super. 2014) (finding termination 

proper where not all goals were completed, despite the mother completing 

some of the goals). Additionally, Mother’s parenting skills regressed, Mother 

inconsistently participated in the treatment programs, and there was no 

improvement in Mother’s residential or economic stability. See In re 

Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 680 (Pa. Super. 2013) (using instability 

of housing as support for termination). 

Moreover, the trial court considered the needs and welfare of A.O. 

See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008-09. The trial court found 

no meaningful bond between Mother and A.O., evidenced by A.O.’s lack of 

distress when separated from Mother. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 11-12, 20-23, 

42-43. Alternatively, the evidence showed a strong, beneficial bond 

between A.O. and his foster family. Id. at 12-13, 22-23. 

Analyzing Section 2511(a)(8), we conclude that the trial court’s 

determinations are supported by competent evidence. Thus, termination 

under Section 2511(a)(8) is appropriate. 

In her second issue, Mother avers that the trial court did not complete 

a full examination regarding the best interests of A.O., as required by 

Section 2511(b), and that it specifically omitted a discussion as to the 

natural bond between a biological parent and child. See Brief for Appellant 

at 11-14. 
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Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). “While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re Adoption of 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). 

[I]n assessing the parental bond, the [trial] court is 

permitted to rely upon the observations and evaluations of social 

workers. Moreover, the mere existence of an emotional bond 

does not preclude the termination of parental rights.... 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, ... the trial 

court should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child

bond can be severed without detrimental effects on 

the child. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791 (citations omitted). 

Here, A.O. has spent all but one month of his life in foster care. See 

In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010) (considering placement with 

a foster family for nearly the child’s whole life and concluding that there is 

no meaningful bond between child and natural parent, but rather a bond 

with the foster family that would be detrimental to sever). Kashurba, an 

expert on bonding, determined there was not a meaningful bond between 
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Mother and A.O. See N.T., 11/10/15, at 11-12, 20-23; see also In the 

Interest of B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 611 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that “in cases 

where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is 

reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”). Indeed, Kendall testified that 

Mother would often times not acknowledge A.O. on her own during 

visitation, A.O. did not react to Mother because he did not know her, and 

A.O. showed no distress when being separated from Mother. See N.T., 

11/10/15, at 42-43. Kashurba also noted a bond between the foster family 

and A.O. See id. at 13 (stating that “[a]ll in all, there’s little question in this 

examiner’s mind that one would be quite hard pressed to find a better family 

arrangement for [A.O. than] that which is provided by his current foster 

parents.”); see also In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791 (stating that “whether a 

child’s primary emotional attachment is with a foster parent rather than a 

birth parent is a significant factor in evaluating the child’s developmental and 

emotional needs and welfare.”). The trial court was free to rely on the 

observations of Kashurba and Kendall, see In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791, and 

we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law, as competent evidence 

supports the conclusions of the trial court. 

In her final issue, Mother alleges that the trial court did not give 

enough weight to the effects of maternal grandmother’s death on Mother’s 

efforts at reunification, stating that the emotional trauma rendered her 
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incapable of fully participating in the reunification process. Brief for 

Appellant at 10-11. 

“Our law is well established that once a child is removed from the care 

of the parent, the burden is on the parent to take action to regain parental 

rights.” In the Interest of B.C., 36 A.3d at 609; see also In re Z.P., 994 

A.2d 1108, 1118-19 (Pa. Super. 2010) (holding that parental obligation is a 

positive duty which requires affirmative performance). Although Mother 

went through a tragedy, “[a] child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the 

hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 

2003). 

Here, maternal grandmother passed away a couple of days prior to the 

filing of the termination Petition. Miller testified that although Mother was 

not cooperative with the bulk of services provided after maternal 

grandmother passed away, “[i]t was before that[,] too[.]” N.T., 2/19/16, at 

22. Thus, Mother’s final claim does not entitle her to relief. 

Based upon the foregoing, the Order to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to A.O. was proper under Section 2511(a)(8) and 

(b). 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/16/2016