Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Reese CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLARENCE REESE,

Defendant and Appellant.

B323148

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA230274)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Conditionally 

reversed and remanded.

Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Yun K. Lee, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

In 2005, a jury convicted Clarence Reese of various crimes 

committed when he was 16 years old. He now appeals from an 

order denying his motion to transfer this matter to juvenile court. 

The People concede, and we agree, that the trial court erred in 

denying the transfer motion.

BACKGROUND

In 2002, then 16-year old Reese and Juan Saucedo tried to 

carjack Vuthipong Sanguansukdikosol. Reese or Saucedo shot 

Sanguansukdikosol, killing him. Reese later told a detective that 

Saucedo was the shooter.1 

Reese was prosecuted for Sanguansukdikosol’s murder in 

adult criminal court under a felony murder theory. A jury found 

him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a)), 

attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)), and first degree 

burglary (§ 459). (People v. Reese, supra, B186147.) The jury also 

found true special circumstance allegations that the murder was 

committed while Reese was engaged in the commission of 

attempted carjacking and burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(L), 

(G).) The trial court sentenced Reese on the murder count to 25 

years to life in prison. This Division affirmed Reese’s judgment of 

conviction. (People v. Reese, supra, B186147.)

In 2019, Reese petitioned for resentencing under then 

recently enacted Senate Bill No. 1437, which limited accomplice 

liability for murder and added section 1172.6.

3

 The trial court 

1 We derive the background from People v. Reese (Mar. 2, 

2007, B186147) [nonpub. opn.].

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.

3 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to 

section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
3

denied that petition, and this Division affirmed that order on 

appeal. (People v. Reese (Apr. 30, 2021, B301473 [nonpub. opn.].) 

In 2021, Reese petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. We 

granted the requested relief, vacated the special circumstances 

finding, remanded to the trial court for consideration of a new 

resentencing petition, and directed the trial court, upon the filing 

of a new petition, to vacate Reese’s murder conviction and to 

resentence him on the attempted carjacking and burglary counts. 

(In re Reese (Apr. 28, 2022, B312440) [nonpub. opn.].) 

On remand, Reese filed a new petition for resentencing

under section 1172.6, and the trial court scheduled a hearing on 

the petition. Reese also filed a motion to transfer the case to 

juvenile court under Proposition 57. The trial court denied the 

transfer motion, saying that even if it had authority or discretion 

to send the case to juvenile court, it would not exercise it. The 

trial court then resentenced Reese to a total term of 3 years 10 

months, time served.

DISCUSSION

Reese contends that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to transfer the matter to the juvenile court. The People 

concede the error, and, as we now explain, we agree.

In 2016, California voters enacted Proposition 57, a 

measure requiring criminal charges against minors to be filed in 

juvenile court. (See generally People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 

152, 158–159 (Padilla); People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 

Cal.5th 299, 303.) Under Proposition 57, certain categories of 

minors can still be tried in adult criminal court but only after a 

juvenile court holds a transfer hearing to consider factors such as 

the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior 

delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated. 
4

(Lara, at p. 305.) The law applies retroactively to cases in which 

the judgment was not final when the proposition went into effect. 

(Id. at p. 309.)

Cases not final when Proposition 57 went into effect include 

ones where the defendant was sentenced in adult criminal court 

before the initiative’s passage, that sentence was vacated, and 

the defendant is being resentenced after the initiative’s passage. 

(Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 158.) The 16-year old defendant 

in Padilla had been convicted of murder in adult criminal court 

and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. (Id. at 

p. 159.) After that judgment was final, he sought resentencing 

via a habeas petition based on new United States Supreme Court 

authority holding unconstitutional mandatory life without the 

possibility of parole sentences for juveniles. The trial court 

vacated Padilla’s sentence but reimposed the same sentence. 

Padilla appealed, and the Court of Appeal vacated the second 

sentence and remanded for resentencing. (Ibid.) Weeks later, 

Proposition 57 was enacted. On remand, the trial court did not 

hold a transfer hearing and reimposed the same sentence. 

Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page 168, held that the 

defendant was entitled to a transfer hearing because, for the 

purposes of retroactivity, his conviction was not final. The court 

found no meaningful distinction between a conviction that has 

been vacated after becoming final and one that has never become 

final at all (i.e., review on direct appeal has not concluded). 

(Ibid.; see also People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 996–

1000.) Thus, nonfinal judgments include ones where 

“resentencing that occurs after a defendant’s original sentence is 

vacated in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Padilla, at p. 163.)
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That is the scenario here. Reese was sentenced in 2005, 

before Proposition 57’s enactment in 2016. In 2021, we granted 

his petition for writ of habeas corpus, vacated the special 

circumstances finding, and remanded to the trial court for 

consideration of a new resentencing petition with the direction to 

vacate Reese’s murder conviction and to resentence him on the 

attempted carjacking and burglary counts. (In re Reese, supra, 

B312440.) As Reese’s judgment was therefore not final, the trial 

court should have conducted a transfer hearing.

And although the People do not argue that remand is 

unnecessary based on statements the trial court made suggesting 

it would not have, in any event, sent the matter to juvenile court, 

we would reject any such argument. First, the trial court clearly 

did not think it had authority to hold a transfer hearing. Second, 

it did not consider the factors necessary to determine Reese’s 

unsuitability for rehabilitation under the juvenile court system. 

(See generally Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).)
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DISPOSITION

The order is conditionally reversed and remanded with the 

direction to the trial court to conduct a juvenile transfer hearing. 

If, after the hearing, the trial court determines it would have 

transferred Reese to adult criminal court, then his sentence shall 

be reinstated. If the trial court determines it would not have 

transferred Reese to adult court, then the trial court must treat 

the conviction as a juvenile adjudication. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.