Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-68 | May 16, 2019 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John Kindley

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Samantha M. Sumcad

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chad E. Smith,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 16, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-68

Appeal from the Parke Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Samuel A. Swaim, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

61C01-1806-F5-191

61C01-1807-CM-260

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-68 | May 16, 2019 Page 2 of 9

[1] Chad Smith appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he pleaded 

guilty to Level 5 Felony Criminal Confinement, Level 6 Felony Strangulation, 

and Class A Misdemeanor Invasion of Privacy, arguing that the trial court erred 

when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Finding no 

error and that the sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm. 

Facts

[2] On or about June 19, 2018, Sondra Knight came home after work to find 

Smith, her ex-boyfriend, waiting for her. Knight and Smith did not live 

together. Smith had been contacting Knight repeatedly to try to convince her 

that they should get back together. Knight invited Smith inside, and after taking 

shots of alcohol, the two began to argue. Smith became aggressive, grabbing 

Knight by the hair and forcing her onto her bed. Smith proceeded to smother 

Knight by pressing his chest and stomach onto her body while placing his hands 

on her mouth and nose. After Smith released her, Knight ran into the 

bathroom. Smith followed her and pushed her into the toilet, breaking the lid. 

Smith then used a nearby pair of sweatpants to strangle Knight. 

[3] Next, Smith forced Knight outside and into his truck. As they drove to Smith’s 

house, he warned her that if she screamed, he would kill her. Once at Smith’s 

house, Smith tied Knight up and stated that he was going to kill her and then 

commit suicide. Smith ordered Knight to write a note to her children in which 

she told them that she was going to die. Over the course of the evening, Smith 
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unplugged all the lights in his home, repeatedly tied up and untied Knight, 

boarded up the front and back doors of his house, and placed a solid object up 

against Knight’s head so that she believed it was a gun. Knight pleaded for her 

life multiple times, asking Smith to let her go. Later that night, after Smith fell 

asleep, Knight tried to escape. She discovered that the doors were boarded, but 

she was able to pull back enough wood to squeeze through. She then ran down 

the street to a nearby house and called the police. Soon after, officers arrived at 

Smith’s house and arrested him. 

[4] On June 20, 2018, the State charged Smith with Level 5 felony criminal 

confinement, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Level 6 felony domestic battery 

resulting in moderate bodily injury. On June 21, 2018, the trial court issued a 

no contact order, barring Smith from making any sort of contact with Knight 

until trial. Yet, leading up to Smith’s jury trial, he called Knight more than 

twenty times. On June 25, 2018, the State also charged Smith with Level 5 

felony kidnapping, Level 6 felony strangulation, and one additional count of 

Level 5 felony criminal confinement. Smith has a long criminal history and had

previously been convicted of kidnapping, criminal confinement, battery 

resulting in bodily injury, and invasion of privacy “involving women and 

domestic stuff[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 95-96. On July 9, 2018, under a separate cause 

number, the State charged Smith with one count of Class A misdemeanor 

invasion of privacy based on his violations of the no contact order. 

[5] On the morning of Smith’s October 9, 2018, jury trial, pursuant to an open plea 

agreement, Smith pleaded guilty to one count of Level 5 felony criminal 
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confinement, one count of Level 6 felony strangulation, and one count of Class 

A misdemeanor invasion of privacy in exchange for dismissal of the other 

charges. Before accepting Smith’s plea, the trial court advised Smith of the 

rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The trial court also informed Smith of 

the crimes to which he would be pleading guilty and of the potential sentences 

that would be imposed. Smith stated that he understood and accepted the terms 

of the plea agreement, the potential sentences to be imposed, and the rights he 

was waiving. Id. at 37-41.

[6] At the December 7, 2018, sentencing hearing, Smith filed a motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea. During a separate hearing on that motion, Smith argued that he 

was not aware of the potential sentences he would face by pleading guilty and 

that he did not know he was pleading guilty to Class A misdemeanor invasion 

of privacy. The trial court denied his motion. 

[7] The trial court sentenced Smith to an aggregate term of eight and one-half years 

to be served in the Department of Correction. Of that sentence, the trial court 

imposed the maximum sentence (six years) for the criminal confinement count

and the maximum sentence (two and one-half years) for the strangulation 

count. The trial court gave Smith credit for the 170 days served in the Parke 

County jail, appellant’s app. vol. II p. 44, thereby leaving him with no time left 

to serve for the invasion of privacy count. Smith now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision

I. Guilty Plea

[8] First, Smith argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. 

[9] There is a presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea. Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995). In 

determining whether the trial court erred in its ruling, we examine statements 

made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was 

offered freely and knowingly. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001).

[10] Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b) establishes when a defendant can move to 

withdraw a guilty plea: 

(b) After entry of a plea of guilty, or guilty but mentally ill at the 

time of the crime, but before imposition of sentence, the court may 

allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, or 

guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, for any fair and just 

reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by 

reliance upon the defendant’s plea. . . . [T]he court shall allow the 

defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty[] . . . whenever the 

defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to 

correct a manifest injustice.

Therefore, the trial court must grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea if the defendant can prove that withdrawal will correct a manifest 

injustice. 
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[11] Here, though Smith claims that he did not know he was pleading guilty to Class 

A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and that he was unaware of the potential 

sentencing ranges for his offenses, the record shows otherwise. Smith explicitly 

stated that he understood that he was waiving certain constitutional rights by 

pleading guilty and that he accepted the terms of his plea agreement. 

Furthermore, the trial court asked Smith numerous times if he understood that 

he was pleading guilty to specific charges, including invasion of privacy. Once 

again, Smith stated that he understood the nature of his guilty plea, the offenses 

listed therein, and the potential sentences to be imposed. Tr. Vol. II p. 37-41. As 

such, Smith’s direct testimony undermines any argument that he lacked 

knowledge of the sentence he would receive or that he was unaware of the 

crimes to which he was pleading guilty. There is no indication that Smith did 

not offer his plea freely and knowingly and at no point would Smith’s 

withdrawal have corrected a manifest injustice. Thus, the trial court did not err 

in denying Smith’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

II. Appropriateness

[12] Next, Smith argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate 

in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. 

[13] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) states that a “Court may revise a sentence . . . if, 

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense[s] and the 

character of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden of persuading us 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-68 | May 16, 2019 Page 7 of 9

that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 

2006). In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we will consider 

numerous factors such as culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and a “myriad [of] other factors that come to light 

in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[14] The maximum sentence for a Level 5 felony criminal confinement conviction is 

six years and the minimum sentence is one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The 

advisory sentence is three years. Id. The maximum sentence for a Level 6 felony 

strangulation conviction is two and one-half years and the minimum sentence is 

six months. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The advisory sentence is one year. Id. For a 

Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy conviction, the defendant “shall be 

imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-

3-2. Here, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of eight and one-half 

years, of which the trial court ordered the maximum six years for the criminal 

confinement count, the maximum two and one-half years for the strangulation 

count, and credit given for time served for the invasion of privacy count. 

[15] First, as to the nature of the offenses, Smith committed particularly heinous and 

brutal criminal acts against Knight. After Knight allowed him into her home, 

Smith smothered her face and pressed hard on her body after grabbing her and 

forcing her onto a bed. Then, after chasing Knight into the bathroom, slamming 

her into the toilet, and strangling her with a pair of sweatpants, Smith forced 

Knight into his car so they could drive to his home. There, Smith continued to 

tie up, untie, berate, threaten, and essentially torture Knight for the rest of the 
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evening, even going so far as to order Knight to write a note telling her children

that she was going to die. Moreover, Smith unplugged all the lights in his home 

and boarded up the doors to prevent Knight from escaping. This experience has 

caused Knight severe psychological trauma, and the record evidences Smith’s 

deliberate attempt to harm Knight without any justification. Therefore, we find 

that the nature of the offenses does not render Smith’s sentence inappropriate. 

[16] Second, as to Smith’s character, Smith’s actions following his arrest are telling. 

After the trial court issued a no contact order against him, Smith nevertheless 

called and harassed Knight more than twenty times before the time of trial.

Additionally, the record shows that this is not his first criminal conviction. 

Smith had previously been convicted of the very crimes (criminal confinement 

and invasion of privacy) to which he pleaded guilty in this case, demonstrating 

poor and reprehensible character. See Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ind. 

2002) (holding that a history of criminal activity, even if those criminal actions 

did not lead to convictions, reflects poorly on a defendant’s character at 

sentencing). Moreover, while Smith contends that the trial court 

inappropriately imposed the maximum sentences for two counts, the trial 

court’s reasoning is explicit: 

Ms. Knight was subject to a night of torture and terror for several 

hours[.] . . . The Court also finds that [Smith] does have a history 

of criminal behavior as outlined in the presentence report. The 

Court would also note the evidence presented today that [Smith] 

attempted to contact . . . the victim in excess of twenty times after 

a No Contact Order was issued. Now, the Court has considered 

the fact that [Smith] has not been in trouble, as argued by Defense 

counsel, for sixteen years and, I guess, the Court would’ve been 
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willing to give you, Mr. Smith, some credit for that time, until 

today’s hearing, when you continued to try to shame the victim 

after you’ve already pled guilty. So, really, none of --- nothing you 

said today makes much sense. There was no reason presented for 

the victim to lie about any of this. There’s no motive for her to do 

any of this. In fact, there would be every reason for a lot of women 

not to have the courage to come forward with any of this. So 

you’re not taking any responsibility for the crimes that you 

committed and pled guilty to. Convictions have already been 

entered. I know you’re not low intelligence. You graduated high 

school. I see no reason why you wouldn’t understand what’s going 

on. Your conduct in the Courtroom, continually shaking your 

head, looking at the victim, also I find that to be threatening[.] . . . 

I don’t think you have any remorse whatsoever for the acts you’ve 

committed.

Tr. Vol. II p. 99-100. Even though Smith pleaded guilty, the trial court had 

ample reasons to impose the maximum sentences for those two counts. 

Therefore, we find that Smith’s character does not render the sentence 

inappropriate. In sum, we will not revise Smith’s sentence pursuant to Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B).

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.