alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 64 (Wednesday, April 4, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 16396]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-6266]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary


Aviation Proceedings, Agreements Filed the Week Ending March 23, 
2007

    The following Agreements were filed with the Department of 
Transportation under the Sections 412 and 414 of the Federal Aviation 
Act, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1383 and 1384) and procedures governing 
proceedings to enforce these provisions. Answers may be filed within 21 
days after the filing of the application.

    Docket Number: OST-2007-27664.
    Date Filed: March 20, 2007.
    Parties: Members of the International Air Transport Association.
    Subject:

TC12 North Atlantic-Africa except between USA and Reunion Resolutions 
and Specified Fares Tables (Memo 0252).
Intended effective date: 1 May 2007.

    Docket Number: OST-2007-27666.
    Date Filed: March 20, 2007.
    Parties: Members of the International Air Transport Association.
    Subject:

TC12 Mid Atlantic-Africa Resolutions and Specified Fares Tables (Memo 
0253).
Intended effective date: 1 May 2007.

    Docket Number: OST-2007-27667.
    Date Filed: March 20, 2007.
    Parties: Members of the International Air Transport Association.
    Subject:

TC12 South Atlantic-Africa Resolutions and Specified Fares Tables (Memo 
0254).
Intended effective date: 1 May 2007.

    Docket Number: OST-2007-27671.
    Date Filed: March 20, 2007.
    Parties: Members of the International Air Transport Association.
    Subject:

TC2 Europe-Africa Resolutions and Specified Fares Tables (Memo 0246).
Intended effective date: 1 May 2007.

    Docket Number: OST-2007-27673.
    Date Filed: March 20, 2007.
    Parties: Members of the International Air Transport Association.
    Subject:

TC2 Middle East-Africa Resolutions and Specified Fares Tables (Memo 
0153).
Intended effective date: 1 May 2007.

    Docket Number: OST-2007-27674.
    Date Filed: March 20, 2007.
    Parties: Members of the International Air Transport Association.
    Subject:

TC2 Within Africa Resolutions and Specified Fares Tables (Memo 0174).
Intended effective date: 1 May 2007.

Renee V. Wright,
Program Manager, Docket Operations, Federal Register Liaison.
 [FR Doc. E7-6266 Filed 4-3-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-2349

TORINA A. COLLIS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:06-cv-02451-PJM)

Submitted: March 23, 2011 Decided: March 31, 2011

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Torina A. Collis, Appellant Pro Se. Elena D. Marcuss, 

MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Torina A. Collis appeals from the district court’s 

final judgment following her unsuccessful trial in which she 

alleged employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. She raises numerous 

issues on appeal. For the reasons that follow we affirm.

First, we find no error in the district court’s 

dismissal of Collis’ trial attorney Morris Fischer. We note 

that Fischer was the fourth attorney hired by Collis and that 

Collis had ample time prior to trial to hire another attorney. 

Second, we find that Collis has failed to show 

entitlement to a new trial based on her allegation of juror 

misconduct, and we find no abuse of discretion by the district 

court regarding the matter. See United States v. Basham, 561 

F.3d 302, 319 (4th Cir. 2009) (providing review standard for new 

trial), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3353 (2010); United States v. 

Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that decision of 

whether improper contact or communication compromised the 

impartiality of the jury is reviewed for a “somewhat narrowed” 

abuse of discretion). 

Third, the jury instruction to which Collis objects is 

irrelevant, as the jury did not consider the instruction. 

Fourth, we do not find that the district court abused its 
3

discretion in limiting Collis to thirteen trial witnesses. 

United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993). 

Finally, we decline to reverse the district court, as 

sought by Collis in her fifth issue, and we find no error in the 

district court’s ruling regarding Collis’ attempt to utilize the 

judicial notice provision of Fed. R. Evid. 201. See generally

Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239-40 (4th Cir. 

1989) (discussing Rule 201(b)(2) regarding judicially noticed 

facts). 

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
1The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-2582

___________

Charles Armstrong, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

Barbara DeBois, * District of Missouri.

*

Appellee. * (UNPUBLISHED)

___________

 Submitted: December 22, 2000

 Filed: January 5, 2001

___________

Before McMILLIAN, BOWMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

Judges. 

___________

PER CURIAM.

Charles Armstrong appeals the district court’s1 order dismissing his pro se civil

rights complaint against private-party defendant Barbara Debois. After careful review

of the record, we conclude that Mr. Armstrong’s complaint was frivolous and failed to

state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s
-2-

Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47A(a).

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

July 12, 2024 SC-2024-0378 Ex parte Henry Beaty. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Ex parte Henry Beaty (In re: State of Alabama v. Henry Beaty)) (Chambers Circuit Court: CC-11- 252; Criminal Appeals: CR-2024-0191).

CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT WHEREAS, the petition for writ of certiorari in the above referenced cause has been duly submitted and considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the judgment indicated below was entered in this cause on July 12, 2024: Writ Denied. No Opinion. Shaw, J. -- Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's judgment in this cause is certified on this date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.

I, Megan B. Rhodebeck, certify that this is the record of the judgment of the Court, witness my hand and seal.

Clerk, Supreme Court of Alabama
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v RICHARD LEE COOK, Quartermaster Third Class, U. S. Navy, Appellant

15 USCMA 436, 35 CMR 408

No. 18,306

June 25, 1965

*437
      *Lieutenant Craig F. Swoboda,*USNR, argued the cause for Appellant, Accused. With him on the brief was *Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Sevier,*USMC.

*Commander M. S. Ochstein,*USNR, argued the cause for Appellee, United States. With him on the brief was *Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Holben,*USMC.

Opinion of the Court

Kilday, Judge:

Despite a plea of not guilty, the appellant was convicted by a Navy special court-martial of one specification of sodomy, in violation of Article 125, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 925. He was sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, restriction to the limits of his barracks for sixty days and reduction to the pay grade of E-1. Intermediate appellate authorities approved and we granted appellant’s petition to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to corroborate his confession.

It is a sound principle of law that no person shall be convicted of crime upon his uncorroborated confession, and that a court may not consider the confession or admission as evidence against him unless there is in the record other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the offense charged had probably been committed by someone. Paragraph 140a, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951; United States v Smith, 13 USCMA 105, 32 CMR 105, and the authorities therein collated; United States v Anderson, 14 USCMA 627, 34 CMR 407. In United States v Young, 12 USCMA 211, 213, 30 CMR 211, we stated:

> “It is settled military law that, in order to sustain findings of guilty, an accused’s confession must be corroborated by substantial, independent evidence tending to establish the existence of each element of the offense charged.”

That is the determining standard we must apply in this case.

Upon careful review of the record of trial, we find that the evidence, *aliunde*the confession, does not reflect that the offense charged or even any lesser included offense had probably been committed by someone. The corroborating evidence in this case consisted of mere suspicion and conjecture; hardly sufficient to meet the standard set forth above. It is not enough to suspect from a particular set of facts that something nefarious is going on or that a guilty mind is indicated. Something more is needed, and while it need not spell out in detail, and with particularity, the manner in which the offense was committed (Cf. United States v Fioco, 10 USCMA 198, 27 CMR 272), yet, it must indicate the type of offense that was probably committed.

In light of the above, reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the charges are required. United States v Smith, supra.

Accordingly, the decision of the board of review is reversed, and the record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General of the Navy. The charges are ordered dismissed.

Judge FERGUSON concurs.

Quinn, Chief Judge

(dissenting):

I would affirm the decision of the board of review. See my opinion in United States v Smith, 13 USCMA 105, 120, 32 CMR 105.
Filed March 11, 1890.

#### Edgar C. Davis, Resp’t, *v.*The Rome, W. & O. R. R. Co., App’lt. Byron H. Garland *v.*The Same. Elisha Garrison *v.*The Same.

*Stone, Gannon & Petit,*for resp’l; *Chas. J. Babbitt,*for app’lt.

Appeals dismissed, with costs.

All concur.

See 25 N. Y. State Rep., 1137.
Exhibit
32.1
  
 **DDS
Technologies USA, Inc.**
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350
 AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the Annual Report of DDS Technologies USA, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned, Spencer L. Sterling, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and
Joseph Fasciglione, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
  (1)
    The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)
    The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
 
 By:/s/
      Spencer L. SterlingPresident and Chief Executive OfficerBy:/s/
      Joseph FasciglioneChief Financial OfficerDated:April
      [],
      2005
 
 30
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,978-01

EX PARTE CHARLES ANDREW CAPPS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 13-02-01707-CR(1) IN THE 9TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM MONTGOMERY COUNTY

YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Ex parte Fournier, 473

S.W.3d 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

FILED: FEBRUARY 10, 2016

DO NOT PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO.: 2:11-CR-019

JUDGE SMITH

MAGISTRATE JUDGE DEAVERS

RONALD E. PARAMORE, 

Defendant.

ORDER

On February 17, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), recommending that the Court accept Defendant Paramore’s guilty plea to

Count One of the Information charging him with engaging in a business of dealing in firearms without

a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(1)(A). Defendant, represented by counsel, waived his

right to appear on the matter before a District Judge. The Magistrate Judge conducted the colloquy

required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant’s plea was knowing,

voluntary, free from coercion, and had a basis in fact. 

Defendant was specifically informed of his right to contest the Report and Recommendation

by filing any objections within 14 days of the issuance of the Report and Recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant did

not file any objections. 

Case: 2:11-cr-00019-GCS-EPD Doc #: 13 Filed: 03/15/11 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
-2-

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and ACCEPTS

Defendant’s plea of guilty to Count One of the Information. Defendant is hereby adjudged guilty of

engaging in a business of dealing in firearms without a license. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case: 2:11-cr-00019-GCS-EPD Doc #: 13 Filed: 03/15/11 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
U.S. Department 

of Transportation 

Federal Aviation 

Administration 

April 27, 2015 

Mr. Brian Richardet 

Manager, Product Certification 

Cessna Aircraft Company 

P.O. Box 7704 

Wichita, Kansas 67277-7704 

Dear Mr. Richardet: 

Exemption No. 7625B 

Transport Airplane Directorate 

1601 Lind Avenue, S.W. 

Renton, Washington 98057-3356 

Regulatory Docket No. F AA-200 1-9982 

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for an amendment to Exemption 

No. 7625A. It explains the basis for our decision and describes its effect. 

The Basis for Our Decision 

By letter no. L390-15-0342 dated January 26, 2015, you petitioned the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), on behalf of Cessna Aircraft Company, to add Cessna Model 680A 

airplanes to Exemption No. 7625. That exemption provides relief from§ 25.785(b) of Title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations for persons on Cessna Model 680 airplanes occupying multipleplace, side-facing seats during takeoff and landing. 

FAA policy statement ANM-03-115-30, "Policy Statement on Side-Facing Seats on Transport 

Category Airplanes," dated May 6, 2005, describes dynamic test procedures and pass/fail criteria 

that are considered for transport-category airplanes to provide an appropriate level of safety for 

occupants of both multiple-place side-facing seats, certified by exemptions, and single-place 

side-facing seats, certified by special conditions. 

FAA policy statement PS-ANM-25-03-Rl , "Technical Criteria for Approving Side-Facing 

Seats," dated November 5, 2012, updated our policy on dynamic-test procedures and pass/fail 

criteria for single- and multiple-place side-facing seats. 

Because the proposed Cessna 680A side-facing divan installation was an in-work program at the 

time of issuance of policy statement PS-ANM-25-03-R1 , the applicable guidance to this project 

is ANM-03-115-30. 

Your letter includes no change in the conditions and reasons relative to public interest and safety 

that were the basis for granting the original exemption. 
2 

Federal Register Publication 

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for waiving the requirement for Federal Register 

publication for public comment because the request is identical in all material respects to 

previously granted exemptions, and the amended exemption, if granted, would not set a 

precedent. 

Our Decision 

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 7625B remains 

valid with respect to this amendment and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the authority 

provided by 49 U .S.C. 40113 and 44 701 , which the FAA Administrator has delegated to me, I 

grant your petition for exemption. 

The Effect of Our Decision 

Our decision amends Exemption No. 7625A to include the Cessna Model 680A airplane among 

the exemption 's affected models. 

All conditions and limitations of Exemption No. 7625A remain the same. This letter must be 

attached to, and is a part of, Exemption No. 7625A. 

Sincerely, 

L~~ Michael Kaszycki 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate 

Aircraft Certification Service
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed February 15, 2017.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D16-2899

Lower Tribunal No. 12-46272

________________

Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority,

Petitioner,

vs.

Electronic Transaction Consultants Corporation,

Respondent.

A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.

Holland & Knight LLP, and Rodolfo Sorondo, Jr. and Christopher N.

Bellows, for petitioner.

Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A., and Michael Piscitelli and Bradley S.

Copenhaver (Ft. Lauderdale), for respondent.

Before SUAREZ, C.J., and ROTHENBERG and SALTER, JJ.

ROTHENBERG, J.
Miami-Dade County Expressway Authority (“MDX”) seeks a writ of

prohibition disqualifying the trial judge and an order remanding the case to the

circuit court for the reassignment of the case to another judge. Because we

conclude that the motion to disqualify the trial judge filed below was both timely

and legally sufficient, disqualification is required. See Wolfson v. Wolfson, 159

So. 3d 394, 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding that disqualification is required

where the trial judge’s comments suggested that she had prejudged the case);

Wade v. Wade, 123 So. 3d 697, 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding that

disqualification is required where the trial court announced its ruling before

hearing all of the evidence); Cummings v. Montalvo, 135 So. 3d 389, 389 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2014) (finding that disqualification was required because the judge’s

statements reflected that she had prejudged a party’s credibility); Amato v. Winn

Dixie Stores/Sedgwick James, 810 So. 2d 979, 980-83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)

(finding that disqualification was required where the trial court had issued an order

on the merits before all of the evidence had been submitted, even though the trial

court subsequently vacated the order). We, therefore, grant the petition and

remand for reassignment of the case to another judge. 

Petition granted.

2
No. 46246.

#### Protests 805716-G, etc., of Montgomery Ward & Co. et al. (St. Paul, etc.).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
(V.D. 114)

#### E. Leitz, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry Nos. 37799; 43856.

(Decided November 9, 1960)

*Eugene R. Pichrett*for the plaintiff.

*George Ooohram, Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

OliveR, Chief Judge:

This matter is before me on remand from classification proceedings decided by the first division of this court in *E.*Leitz, *Inc.*v. *United*States, 43 Cust. Ct. 388, Abstract 63480. The conclusion therein, and the judgment issued pursuant thereto, were to the effect that the protest had been prematurely filed and the matter was remanded to a single judge in reappraisement to determine the proper dutiable value in the manner provided by law. (28 U.S.C. § 2636(d).)

' The case has been submitted on a written stipulation reading as follows:

> *401IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between tbe attorneys for tbe parties hereto that tbe merchandise covered by tbe above remand of protest consists of Microscopes and Oases, containers for said microscopes, which were the subject of a judgment and decision by the First Division of this Court in the case of *E. Leitz, Inc.*v. *United States,*Abstract 63480, on November '4, 1959, wherein it is stated “* * * remand the matter, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. § 2636(d), for further proceedings before a single judge for determination of the value of the imported merchandise in the manner provided for by law.”

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, the price at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for exportation to the United States was as follows:

> United States United States

> Merchandise dollars per each Merchandise dollars per each

> Entry No. WH 43856 5 Microscope Laborlux_$156. 80

> 12 Ortholux II Microscope_$553.15 5 Wooden Cabinets for same_ 17.92

> 12 Wooden Cabinets for same- 18.20

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that there was no higher foreign value for such or similar merchandise.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the above remand of protest may be deemed to be submitted for decision upon this stipulation.

On tbe agreed facts, I find that the proper basis for appraisement of the articles in question is export value, as defined in section 402(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, and hold that such statutory value for each class of merchandise is as set forth in the stipulation of submission embodied herein.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
**Lakeland Section 8** 

**- 6(16).**  **Permits and Fees**

**- Reporting Requirements.** 

(a) Except as provided below, each permitted stationary air pollution source must submit to the Department an annual report that establishes the amount of actual emissions of each regula ted pollutant, including carbon monoxide, for that source. This report will be for the emissions of that source that occurred during the calendar year starting in 1991 and continuing for succeeding years thereafter. The Department may request, and the ai r pollution source shall provide, additional information on the emissions data submitted when the Department determines, the data previously provided is inadequate to establish the actual type or amount of emissions from the source subject to fees.

(b) No t including air toxics as they are defined in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the amendments thereto, if the source emits fewer than twenty five (25) tons of actual emissions of pollutant during a year, it may at its option, use as the actual emis sions figure, its permitted pollutant levels where available and known. If the source is a "major source" under the air toxics provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 it too must calculate its actual emission of regulated pollutants.
Failure t o provide, on a timely basis, any additional information requested shall be considered failure to pay the fees.

8

- 6(16), p. 1