July 2002

R E P O R T O F T H E SUBCOMMITTEE 

O N C R I M I N A L JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

H U M A N RESOURCES 

Committee on Government Reform

U.S. House of Representatives

FE D E R A L LAW EN F O R C E M E N T

AT T H E BO R D E R S A N D PO R T S

O F EN T RY

Challenges and Solutions
Union Calendar No. 495

107th Congress HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Report

2d Session 107–794

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT THE 

BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY —

CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

EIGHTH REPORT

by the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

January 2, 2003.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2003

82-970 PDF

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

Kevin Binger, Staff Director

Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director

James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel

Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk

Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

EX OFFICIO

Christopher A. Donesa, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

Nicholas Coleman, Professional Staff Member

Nicole Garrett, Clerk

Julian A. Haywood, Minority Counsel

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. McHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. “BUTCH” OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington, DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

___ ___

___

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent)

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

DAVE WELDON, Florida

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWKY, Illinois

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, January 2, 2003.

Hon. Dennis Hastert,

Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on Government Reform, I submit 

herewith the committee's eighth report to the 107th Congress. The committee's report

is based on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy

and Human Resources.

Dan Burton,

Chairman.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

I. THE BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

A. The Northern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

1. Geographic Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

2. Economic Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

3. Traffic Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

B. The Southern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

1. Geographic Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

2. Economic Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

3. Traffic Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

C. The Growth in Cross-Border Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

D. The Coasts and Non-Land Ports of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

II. THREATS AT OUR BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

A. Smuggling of Contraband . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

1. Illegal Narcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

a. Northern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

b. Southern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

c. Other Ports of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

B. Illegal Immigration and the Entry of Criminals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

1. Northern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

2. Southern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

3. Other Ports of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

4. Entry of Criminal Aliens and Aliens Posing a National Security Risk . . .32

III. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDERS 

AND PORTS OF ENTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

A. The U.S. Customs Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

1. Commercial Cargo Inspections – Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

a. Land Border Ports of Entry – Truck Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

b. Land Border Ports of Entry – Rail Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

c. Sea Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

d. Airports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

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2. Passenger Inspections – Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

a. Land Border Ports of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

b. Airports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

c. Sea Ports and Ferries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

3. Customs Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

4. U.S. Customs Air and Marine Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

5. Outbound Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

6. Upgrading and Improving Port of Entry Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

B. The Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

1. INS Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

a. The Visa Grant Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

b. Land Border Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

c. Airport and Sea Port Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

d. Entry/Exit Monitoring System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

2. The U.S. Border Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

a. Checkpoints Away From the Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

b. The Southern Border Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

c. IDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

d. The Northern Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

3. INS Interior Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

C. The U.S. Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

D. Cross-Border Cooperation on Law Enforcement Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

IV. NEW PROPOSALS FOR BORDER AND PORT OF ENTRY 

LAW ENFORCEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

A. Combining Border Law Enforcement Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

1. Issues Relating to the Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

a. The New Department’s Diverse Missions Must Not Be Neglected . . . .74

b. The New Department Must Make Sure the Benefits of

Reorganization Are Achieved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

c. Controlling the Costs of Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77

B. Increasing the Number and Intensity of Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77

C. Increasing the Number of Customs Inspectors, INS Inspectors,

Border Patrol Agents and Coast Guard Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

1. Finding Enough Recruits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

2. Providing Training, Equipment and Infrastructure for New Recruits . . . . .83

3. Dealing with Inexperience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

4. Draining Personnel from Other Agencies – 

Interagency “Musical Chairs” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83
D. Upgrading and Integrating Border Law Enforcement

Databases and Automated Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84

1. Upgrading Information Systems – Customs’ ACE Program . . . . . . . . . . . .84

2. Ensuring Compatibility – the INS and IDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

3. Information Sharing Between the Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

E. Shifting Cargo Inspections Away From the Ports of Entry

to the Point of Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88

F. Expanding “Fastpass” Systems for Those Who Frequently 

Cross the Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95

ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

APPENDIX B

HEARINGS AND VISITS TO PORTS OF ENTRY CONDUCTED BY THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN

RESOURCES RELATED TO BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY

APPENDIX C

TABLES: TRADE AND TRAFFIC AT THE PORTS OF ENTRY

APPENDIX D

TABLES: DRUG AND MIGRANT INTERDICTION BY U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. 

BORDER PATROL, AND U.S. COAST GUARD; INSPECTIONS BY IMMIGRATION

AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

APPENDIX E

MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 

DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

APPENDIX F

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Union Calendar No. 495

107th Congress HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Report

2d Session 107-794

FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDERS AND 

PORTS OF ENTRY—CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

January 2, 2003.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform

submitted the following

EIGHTH REPORT

On October 9, 2002, the Committee on Government Reform approved and adopted 

a report entitled “Federal Law Enforcement at the Borders and Ports of Entry—

Challenges and Solutions.” The chairman was directed to transmit a copy 

to the Speaker of the House.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

B

order security – the protection of the American homeland at its land 

boundaries, coasts, and ports of entry – presents two overriding challenges.

The first and most important of them lies in striking the right balance between

effective law enforcement at the border and preserving valuable trade and travel.

This country has benefited tremendously from our openness to international 

commerce and tourism – indeed our prosperity, our freedom, and our very way of

life depend on it. That openness, however, has left the U.S. vulnerable to increasingly global criminal organizations, who take advantage of porous borders and

ports of entry. Crafting a policy that can intercept these enemies without 

undermining America’s preeminent role in the world economy is the key 

dilemma facing the U.S. today.

The second challenge lies in setting the priorities of border law enforcement

itself. The threats facing our nation are often interrelated, but they are not the

same, and each of them requires a somewhat different strategy. The agencies

entrusted with protecting our borders and ports of entry – chiefly the U.S. 

Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (including the U.S.

Border Patrol), and the U.S. Coast Guard – must often make difficult choices when

deciding how to use limited resources to meet these varied threats. How much

emphasis should be placed on preventing terrorist attacks? How much on stopping the smuggling of narcotics and preventing illegal aliens from entering the

country? Law enforcement at the border requires a strategy that can meet all of

these threats.

The terrorist attacks of September 11 have given new urgency to these already

pressing challenges, and forced the nation to reexamine every aspect of border

security. President Bush’s plan to consolidate our border law enforcement agencies into a single Department of Homeland Security will help the nation to meet

these challenges by promoting interagency coordination – something that has

often been lacking in recent years. Congress must do its part, however, to ensure

that the new Department has the tools it needs to create a focused yet balanced

border security strategy. First, steps must be taken to make sure that the new

Department does not neglect some vital missions while focusing solely on the

threat of terrorism. Second, mechanisms giving the new Secretary of Homeland

Security the ability to ensure cross-agency cooperation and coordination of effort

must be added to the enacting legislation. And, most importantly, Congress must

give the new Department the resources it needs to fight the increasing power and

sophistication of global criminal networks.

1
First Challenge of Border

Law Enforcement:

Increasing Border Security

Can Restrict Commerce;

Facilitating Commerce Can

Hinder Border Security

Second Challenge of 

Border Law Enforcement:

Allocating Resources

Between Different 

Missions – How Much 

To Prevent Catastrophic 

Terrorism? How Much To

Stop Illegal Drugs and 

Illegal Immigration?

2

The First Challenge – Balancing Security and Open Borders

Border policy inevitably poses a fundamental dilemma of balancing national

security and law enforcement against international trade, commerce and travel. 

It is difficult, if not virtually impossible, to improve one side of the equation without detriment to the other. No single place in America illustrates this fundamental

tension better than the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit, Michigan. An overwhelming amount of commerce crosses the bridge, much of it tied to the auto industry.

In response to the heightened border alerts after September 11, General Motors

and other auto manufacturers contacted Customs officials in Detroit to express

their concern about slowdowns on the bridge. Because the auto industry, like 

others, operates primarily on a "just-in-time" inventory system, delays in arrival of

auto parts from Canada threatened to force layoffs of workers at several Detroit

area plants. Improving the flow of commerce therefore became a priority for the

Customs Service. 

But expediting inspections and enforcement on the bridge cannot come without a price. Canada is one of the primary sources for pseudoephedrine, one of the

main ingredients in methamphetamine. A Subcommittee staff interview with a

Drug Enforcement Administration agent in Las Vegas revealed that groups of Middle

Eastern nationals, under federal investigation for possible ties to terrorist financing,

were using the city as a transshipment point for pseudoephedrine sales to West

Coast drug producers. Their illegal trade had been directly traced to smuggling

over the Ambassador Bridge. Thus, even a minor policy step at a single port of

entry can have significant and unforeseen national ramifications – a fact that must

be considered with the greatest care.

The Second Challenge – Balancing the Competing Missions

of Border Law Enforcement

Border policy poses another dilemma, that of allocating limited law enforc e m e n t

r e s o u rces to meet widely varied threats and fulfill highly diverse missions. An agency

must determine how much of its personnel, equipment, infrastructure, and intelligence resources should be devoted to each function. That is not an easy task.

The experience of the Coast Guard since September 11 is perhaps the clearest

illustration of this difficult problem. Prior to September 11, the Coast Guard’s law

enforcement activities were concentrated on narcotics interdiction, the enforcement of fisheries regulations, and intercepting illegal immigrants on the waters.

Only 1 to 2 percent of its activities was directed at actual port security matters.

After the terrorist attacks, this percentage grew to 58 percent as the Coast Guard

shifted its resources to meet the threat to our vulnerable sea ports. Though certainly necessary to meet a new, immediate danger, this change in strategy came at

a price. During the first few months after September 11, the Coast Guard was

forced to stop nearly all fisheries enforcement and illegal immigrant operations,
Field Hearings Held by the

Subcommittee, 2001-02

Highgate Springs, Vermont

Champlain, New York

Blaine, Washington

San Diego, California

Ports of Los Angeles and

Long Beach, California

Sierra Vista, Arizona

and about 75 percent of its counter-narcotics operations. As one Coast Guard 

officer informed the media in the late fall of 2001, with respect to counternarcotics, "We’re basically guarding the goal line. We’re not covering the field."

Such changes in strategy may indeed be appropriate when, as after September

11, a clear vulnerability has been exposed that threatens the very functioning of

the national economy. Over the long term, however,

any border security strategy must be able to deal

effectively with all of the dangers – whether catastrophic terrorism, as at the World Trade Center and

the Pentagon, or the more insidious but equally devastating forms of terrorism in American communities,

like drugs – that menace our shores.

The Work of the Subcommittee

Since the summer of 2001, the Subcommittee on

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources has

been investigating the status of law enforcement at the borders and ports of entry.

The Subcommittee has held a comprehensive series of hearings in Wa s h i n g t o n ,

D.C. and at some of the key border areas in the U.S., focused on the issues of border

security and trade, as reflected in the specific and unique circumstances of each

port. Members and staff have visited many other ports of entry, met with local officials of the key agencies responsible for border and port security, and visited some

major foreign ports. At each location, the Subcommittee and staff have explored

which policies are working, which need improvement, and which new proposals

should be implemented to enhance the quality of border law enforc e m e n t .

Though the Subcommittee has not yet completed its work, and will be holding additional hearings in the near future, this initial Report is intended to provide

detailed background on how the border works, review the current state of law

enforcement’s efforts to manage it, describe our most significant findings to date,

and discuss the benefits of and obstacles to several potential solutions which are

currently under consideration, including President Bush’s proposal to consolidate

most federal border law enforcement agencies into a single Department of Homeland Security. The Subcommittee’s final report will offer further recommendations

for legislative action.

The Borders and Ports of Entry: Geography and Commerce

The "border" is an incredible challenge. It is far broader than commonly

understood, including both the Northern and Southern land borders, our shorelines and coastal waterways, and every other port of entry (land, sea or airport)

within the United States. Travel across any border is legally prohibited except at a

port of entry. Crossing our borders illegally is not especially difficult, however, as

3

Chairman Souder and Rep. John

McHugh hold a field hearing at the

U.S. Customs facility in 

Champlain, NY.

(Subcommittee photo)
4

they run for miles and miles through open wilderness or even across wide lakes

(especially on the huge and largely unpopulated Northern border). There are

hundreds of potential illicit crossings, many examples of which Subcommittee

Members and staff viewed with Customs and Border Patrol officials.

Legitimate traffic takes place through the legal

ports of entry at which most federal border security

resources are concentrated. Cross-border commerce

is enormous and of vital importance to the U.S. economy. There is now over $1.2 billion in trade per day

between the U.S. and Canada; annual trade grew

from $243 billion in 1994 to $406 billion in 2000.

Border communities are particularly dependent on

this trade, but virtually every state in the U.S. now has

strong economic ties to Canada; some 37 states have

Canada as their primary trading partner. Trade with

Mexico is somewhat smaller, but has been growing 

at an even faster rate. Total annual trade between Mexico and the U.S. grew from

$100 billion in 1994 to $248 billion in 2000, and Mexico has now passed Japan 

as the United States’ second largest trading partner. Though Mexico is more

dependent on this trade than the U.S., American businesses, particularly those on

the Southern border, are increasingly reliant on it. Note that although the 1990’s

was a period of unprecedented growth in cross-border trade, September 11 created the first annual drop in that trade in seven years in 2001.

Most commercial traffic along the Northern border is carried by truck, followed by rail. More than 13 million trucks cross the Canadian border each year,

up from 7 million in 1990. The traffic is heavily concentrated, with over half of 

it taking place across four bridges alone. These patterns are mirrored on the

Southern border.

Non-commercial traffic is considerably larger than commercial traffic on the

land borders, but again most of it is concentrated at a few major crossings. On

the Southern border, the data suggest that most border crossers are local residents,

most are frequent crossers, and many are daily business commuters. Trade and

travel by air and sea has also increased dramatically in recent years. Commercial

traffic at sea ports of entry is particularly important; approximately 6 million containers with $700 billion in cargo, 2 billion tons of oil, and 6.5 million cruise ship

passengers arrived at U.S. sea ports in 2000.

Threats at our Borders and Ports of Entr y

Potentially hidden – like a needle in a haystack – in the midst of the tremendous

volume of border traffic are numerous potential threats to America and its security.

Illegal narcotics remain one of the most difficult problems faced by federal law

The narrow ditch that forms the

border between the U.S. and

Canada east of Blaine, WA. 

(Subcommittee photo)

U.S. BORDER AND 

PORT FACTS:

5,657 miles U.S.-Canada 

border (incl.

Alaska)

2,062 miles U.S.-Mexico 

border

12,353 miles U.S. coastline

(total)

130+ Ports of entry on

Northern border

30+ Ports of entry on

Southern border

300+ Sea ports of entry

in the U.S.

100+ International airports in the U.S.

6 million Containers

arrived at sea

ports in 2000

$1.2 billion Daily trade

between U.S. 

and Canada

$680 million Daily trade

between U.S. 

and Mexico

Each border crossing 

and port of entry

is unique.
e n f o rcement. Most of the drugs consumed by Americans are made or have their

component chemical source in foreign countries – principally cocaine, heroin, 

marijuana, methamphetamine, and ecstasy (or MDMA).

On the Northern border, the chief trend has been the growth in high-potency

marijuana smuggling. "B.C. Bud," a variety of marijuana grown in British Columbia,

and "Quebec Gold" (grown in Quebec), have a THC content upwards of 30 perc e n t

(as compared to only about 4 percent for Mexican marijuana). This Canadian marijuana is so sought after that it is said that it can be traded pound-for-pound for

cocaine. The drug is sometimes smuggled in private or commercial vehicles, but is

more frequently carried in duffel bags and backpacks across rural and mountainous

stretches of the Washington border. The Northern border has also seen an explosion

in the smuggling of pseudoephedrine, the chief precursor chemical for the dangerous

drug methamphetamine.

The Southern border is the nation’s primary source of cocaine and marijuana.

Cocaine is typically smuggled by vehicle through the ports of entry, while marijuana is smuggled both in vehicles and by illegal immigrants acting as "mules"

along the border. Heroin has also started being smuggled across the land border,

although sea ports and airports remain the most common venue for smuggling.

Ecstasy is coming in increasing amounts from Europe, both through U.S. airports

and via Canada.

THREATS AT THE BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTR Y

Northern Border

• High potency marijuana from Canada ("B.C. Bud", "Quebec Gold") – 

8 times as potent as Mexican marijuana; said to be as valuable as cocaine

• Methamphetamine precursors (chiefly pseudoephedrine) – illegally 

smuggled in huge quantities into the U.S. from Canada, due to lax 

Canadian regulation

Southern Border

• 70% of America’s cocaine comes over the U.S.-Mexican border

• Mexico still leading producer of marijuana

• Mexico increasing source of U.S.-used heroin

• Mexican drug trafficking organizations now control 70% of U.S. 

methamphetamine trade

Air and Sea Ports of Entr y

• Ecstasy shipments increasing from Europe via airline passenger couriers

• 25% of America’s cocaine smuggled over the Caribbean

Illegal Narcotics

• 313 metric tons of cocaine / 13.7 metric tons of heroin smuggled to U.S. 

in 2000

Illegal Immigration

• 1.2-1.6 million illegal immigrants apprehended by Border Patrol each year

• 275,000 illegal immigrants (est.) make it into the U.S. each year

• 5 to 9 million illegal immigrants (est.) living in U.S. now

• 41% of illegal immigrants entered legally but stayed illegally 

("nonimmigrant overstays")

5

TOP 5 LAND BORDER 

CROSSINGS, 2001

(All Transportation Modes)

Detroit, MI

Laredo, TX

Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY

Port Huron, MI

El Paso, TX

TOP 5 SEAPORTS, 2000 

(By Port Calls)

Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA

Houston, TX

New Orleans, LA

New York, NY

San Francisco, CA

TOP 5 INTERNATIONAL 

AIRPORTS IN U.S. 

(April 2000-March 2001)

New York, NY (JFK)

Los Angeles, CA

Miami, FL

Chicago, IL (O’Hare)

Newark, NJ

Source: Bureau of Transportation

Statistics, U.S. Department of 

Transportation

Due in large part to the 

t e rrorist attacks of September

11, cross-border trade with

Canada and Mexico fell in

2001 for the first time in

seven years.

Threats at the border are like

a needle in a haystack.
6

Weapons of mass destruction are now a primary concern for federal law

enforcement. Given the high volume of international cargo shipments, it is a

daunting challenge to prevent a single such weapon from making it past cargo

inspections. A nuclear weapon would, of course, be the most devastating form of

attack, but it is equally possible for chemical and biological weapons to be smuggled into the country in a cargo container. Also of concern is the possibility that a

commercial ship could be hijacked by terrorists and

used as an instrument of destruction in a U.S. port 

or waterway.

Illegal immigration remains a significant cause for

concern. Each year, the U.S. Border Patrol apprehends

about one and a half million illegal aliens; unknown

numbers manage to evade apprehension. The vast

majority of these illegal crossings take place on the

Southern border, but such activity may be increasing

on the Northern border, and over the waters – in fiscal

year 2001, for example, the Coast Guard apprehended

over 3,900 migrants headed for U.S. shores.

Federal Law Enforcement at the Borders and Ports of Entr y

Three federal agencies take the lead on border enforcement; their efforts

appear to be largely complementary (but they do overlap to some degree). The

U.S. Customs Service has primary responsibility for preventing the smuggling of

narcotics and weapons of mass destruction through the ports of entry, in addition

to responsibility for collecting duties and enforcing numerous other laws. Customs

inspectors are responsible for examining both commercial cargo and the personal

items of travelers. Given the high volume of cargo shipments, Customs can only

inspect about 2 percent of all incoming imports. This necessitates "risk assessment," or the ability to separate out high risk shipments for inspection, while letting cargo believed to be low risk pass through.

At the land border ports, the process of cargo inspection is still heavily paperdriven; truck drivers generally must present full entry documentation, which they

pick up from their customs broker. The only aspect of the system that is automated is the Automated Broker Interface (ABI), which allows the importer (but not

the carrier) to file entry papers electronically. Customs bases many of its decisions

to do secondary inspections of cargo on the data submitted in ABI. The process 

of inspections on railroads and at sea ports and airports is more fully automated;

carriers can file their cargo information electronically through the Automated 

Manifest System (AMS).

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is primarily responsible for

preventing illegal immigration and the entry of dangerous foreign criminals, as

Multiple agencies 

have border security 

responsibility.

Customs inspectors examine cargo

at Miami International Airport.

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

U.S. Customs can only

inspect about 2% of all

incoming imports. At land

borders, Customs inspects

6.6% of cargo on the 

Northern border, and 26.8%

on the Southern border.

However, Customs claims 

to inspect all cargo that it

identifies and targets as 

high risk.
well as facilitating the entry and status of legal immigrants and visitors. Two main

branches of the INS are entrusted with these tasks: INS Inspections, which is

responsible for screening incoming travelers at land border ports, sea ports and

airports; and the U.S. Border Patrol, which is responsible for guarding the border

between the ports of entry.

Since 1994, the Border Patrol has greatly increased its numbers and activities

on the Southern border, which has had the effect of driving most illegal immigration away from urban centers and into more remote areas. Unfortunately, until

very recently the overall level of illegal immigration did not appear to be falling,

despite the stepped-up efforts.

7

CUSTOMS AUTOMATED

COMMERCIAL SYSTEM

(ACS)

Customs’ computerized 

tracking system for cargo is

the Automated Commercial

System (ACS). First deployed

in 1984, it consists of the

Automated Broker Interface

(ABI), which allows importers

and customs brokers to file

information on cargo, and the

Automated Manifest System

(AMS), which allows sea and

air carriers to file manifests, 

or descriptions of their shipments. Currently, only ABI 

is in operation on the land

border – truckers must still file

manifest information in paper

form at the border. ACS is

badly outdated, and must be

replaced. Customs hopes to

deploy the new, web-based

Automated Commercial 

Environment (ACE) in 

4 years.

In 1994, the INS announced a new Southern border strategy to 

combat illegal immigration, hiring thousands of new Border Patrol agents

and aggressively targeting key migration routes, beginning in major population centers. Illegal immigration fell sharply in the targeted areas, but

rose equally drastically in non-targeted areas as migrants shifted away

from large cities to smaller towns and rural areas. The number of apprehensions finally fell in 2001, a sign the new strategy was having an effect;

the slowdown in the U.S. economy, however, may have accounted for

some of the drop.

U.S. BORDER P ATROL APPREHENSIONS, SOUTHWEST BORDER

1997 1,369,000

1998 1,517,000

1999 1,537,000

2000 1,644,000

2001 1,236,000

2002 526,000 (through April 2002)

Source: Congressional Research Service compilation of INS data

The border near San Diego, CA prior

to 1994. (Courtesy Immigration and

Naturalization Service)

The Border Patrol’s Southern Border Strategy
8

Responsibility for tracking down and deporting illegal immigrants once they

have entered the country also lies with the INS. Its investigations, detention and

deportation, and intelligence branches are charged with this mission. Unfortunately, while some progress has been made, the vast majority of illegal immigrants

– including criminals and terrorists – are essentially "home-free" once they penetrate

the border. This makes it all the more important for the Border Patrol and INS

Inspections to intercept these persons before they are able to enter the country. 

The Coast Guard is a multi-mission service that takes the lead role in ensuring

the safety and security of America’s ports, waterways and maritime borders. It is

the nation’s primary law enforcement agency on the water, with broad responsibility

for preventing the smuggling of drugs, contraband and illegal aliens onto our

shores. Since September 11, the Coast Guard has also been entrusted with the

protection of sea ports and waterways from terrorist threats. The long-term 

challenge for the Coast Guard is to increase port and maritime security, but 

without losing ground with respect to its other key missions (including fisheries

enforcement and search and rescue).

Customs, Border Patrol

and Coast Guard Are Vital

to Drug Interdiction

Customs seizures (FY 2001)

190,856 pounds of cocaine

3,622 pounds of heroin

1,503,941 pounds of 

marijuana

Border Patrol seizures 

(FY 2001)

18,500 pounds of cocaine

1.1 million pounds of 

marijuana

Coast Guard seizures 

(FY 2001)

138,393 pounds of cocaine

34,520 pounds of 

marijuana

Together, these 3 agencies seize

more drugs bound for the U.S.

than any other agency.

Source: U.S. Customs Service, U.S.

Border Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard,

and Drug Enforcement Agency data

The experience of the

Coast Guard after 

September 11 shows

the strains that the

shift to a counterterrorist mode can

have on border law

enforcement. After

9/11, the Coast Guard

drew back its forces

into a coastal and port

defense posture – 

helping protect our

waterways and ports

of entry from terrorist

attack, but conceding

much of the high 

seas to illegal drug

traffickers.

THE SHIFT IN FOCUS: COAST GUARD REDEPLOYMENTS AFTER 9/11

MA J O R DE P L O Y E DCO A S TGU A R D FO R C E SPR I O R T O SE P T. 11

C o u rtesy U.S. Coast Guard
New Proposals for Border and Port of Entry Law Enforcement

Although there are a large number of proposals to improve border and port

management, some of which are specific to certain locations, this Report examines

the pros and cons of six of the most important:

COMBINING BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Various proposals to combine or restructure the border management agencies

have been discussed in Congress and the Administration since September 11.

President Bush asked Congress to create a Department of Homeland Security from

Customs, the INS, the Coast Guard, and other key national security agencies. 

The President’s proposal should promote a cohesive security strategy at the border

and the efficient use of scarce law enforcement resources. Care must be taken,

however, to ensure that the new Department does not become so focused on one

threat – namely, the threat of terrorism – that it neglects the numerous other 

dangers at our borders and ports of entry. In crafting the legislation creating this

Department, which will be the nation’s largest and probably most important law

enforcement agency, Congress must make certain that all aspects of border law

enforcement are included in the Department’s strategy.

9

Proposals for Reform

• Combine Agencies – 

But Ensure Effective 

Coordination

• Increase Inspections

• More Personnel

• Upgrade Databases

• Move Inspections Away 

From U.S. Ports

• Expand “Fastpass” 

Systems

MA J O R DE P L O Y E DCO A S TGU A R D FO R C E S SE P T. 19
1 0

Several steps, including mandating the cross-agency coordination of drug

interdiction and other law enforcement activities within the Department, should

be considered. Specifically, in light of the vital importance of Customs, the Border

Patrol and the Coast Guard for narcotics interdiction, one of the Department’s

Assistant Secretaries should be given the responsibility and authority to coordinate

interagency counterdrug efforts.

INCREASING THE NUMBER AND INTENSITY OF INSPECTIONS

The stepped-up inspections and heightened border alert after September 11

have clearly had an effect; seizures of drugs by our border law enforcement agencies have gone up dramatically, and this may already be affecting the supply and

price of narcotics. Increased inspections are perhaps the most important tool we

have for dealing with the new threats. Nevertheless, care must be taken to avoid

unduly hindering trade and travel; moreover, the increased inspections will not be

sustainable unless accompanied by increases in staff.

INCREASING THE NUMBER OF QUALIFIED CUSTOMS AND INS INSPECTORS , BORDER

PATROL AGENTS AND COAST GUARD PERSONNEL

There is an obvious need for more personnel at the borders and ports of entry,

particularly on the Northern border, which still has far fewer officers despite having

twice as much territory to cover. A similar increase in Coast Guard personnel will

also be required to provide an added presence at our sea ports, but without taking

away from the Coast Guard’s presence on the high seas and along the coast.

Recent legislation and Administration proposals to increase staffing are welcome

first steps. There are, however, difficulties involved with rapid expansion. The Border Patrol’s experience in the late 1990’s suggests that finding a sufficient number

of new recruits is more difficult than might be expected, and even when sufficient

recruits can be brought on board, an agency may have to scramble to properly

train, house and equip them. Moreover, if financial incentives are given to

increase the recruiting pool, this may draw individuals away from other vital law

enforcement agencies. The government must take care to ensure that expanding

border law enforcement does not become a game of personnel "musical chairs."

UPGRADING AND INTEGRATING BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT DATABASES AND

AUTOMATED SYSTEMS

All of the border law enforcement agencies need to upgrade and integrate their

databases to ensure that criminals do not fall through the cracks between agencies.

This must be the first priority of the new Department of Homeland Security. Customs in particular needs to replace its outmoded commercial tracking system, the

Automated Commercial System (ACS), with the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), a web-based, real-time system. It must also continue its move towards

paperless automated systems. All federal law enforcement agencies (including the

The new Department of

Homeland Security should

appoint an Assistant Secretary

for Narcotics Interdiction,

with responsibility and 

authority to coordinate the

counter-drug efforts of 

Customs, the Border Patrol

and the Coast Guard.
Coast Guard) must work to improve the sharing of vital information in what are currently independent systems. And all of those agencies must work together to

streamline those systems, and prevent unnecessary and costly duplication.

SHIFTING CARGO INSPECTIONS AWAY FROM PORTS OF ENTRY,

TO THE POINT OF ORIGIN

In response to the growing tide of commercial traffic,

Customs is considering a new strategy of pre-clearing

cargo before it reaches the border by inspecting it at the

"point of origin." While this shift in strategy must be

given all due consideration, several issues need to be

addressed. First, it is not clear how Customs will go about

inspecting the cargo, or how it will ensure the security of

the cargo between the point of origin and the U.S. border. Second, moving to such a system may involve substantial costs for industry

and/or the federal government, which could mean both higher taxes and higher

consumer prices. Customs (in cooperation with the Coast Guard) should continue

to develop pilot programs to determine whether this new strategy is workable.

EXPANDING "FASTPASS " SYSTEMS

FOR THOSE WHO FREQUENTL Y

CROSS THE BORDERS

The INS and Customs have

developed "fastpass" systems

(NEXUS and SENTRI) allowing 

frequent crossers to be enrolled in

a special program that allows them

to use a dedicated lane, thus

reducing their wait times at the

border. Participants are required to

submit to background checks,

although these are more easily

done for Canadian citizens than for

Mexican citizens. These programs

are strongly endorsed by local 

business leaders and our NAFTA

partners, but it is not yet clear 

that they are cost-effective. More

information should be gathered in

order to expand these systems.

1 1

Photo courtesy Architect of the

Capitol

Action Points for Homeland Security

• The new Department of Homeland Security must be stru c t u red to maximize

the benefits of interagency cooperation, coordination, and integration of

i n f o rmation systems.

• An Assistant Secre t a ry at the new Department should be given re s p o n s i b i l i t y

and authority for coordinating the drug interdiction eff o rts of Customs, the

B o rder Patrol and the Coast Guard – which are the nation’s top narc o t i c s

i n t e rdiction agencies.

• The new Department should take an active lead not only in modernizing and

integrating the computer and information systems of its own component

agencies, but in ensuring that they are compatible with those of other federal

law enforcement agencies – like the FBI – as well as state and local law

e n f o rc e m e n t .

• Our border law enforcement agencies – Customs, the INS, and the Coast

G u a rd – will have to continue their stepped-up eff o rts, but to do so without

damaging our economy, they will need more re s o u rces and more personnel.

• Personnel growth is necessary to improve homeland security, but it must be

p roperly managed – excessive growth can create difficulties for an agency,

and can draw personnel away from other vital agencies.

• New strategies, such as inspecting goods at the point of origin instead of at

the ports of entry, and expanding "fastpass" systems for frequent travelers,

should be pursued, but we must recognize that wholesale conversions are

u n realistic. Incremental steps should continue to be taken, while aggre s s i v e l y

s t rengthening more traditional methods of border security.

1 3

IN T R O D U C T I O N

F

or at least a decade, it has been fashionable to speak of the coming 

"borderless" world, in which the ease and speed of international commerce

and travel have rendered national boundaries virtually obsolete. Proponents of

this vision have cited the tremendous benefits of free trade, and some have even

called for the completely free movement of peoples as well. As recently as last summ e r, a major newspaper editorialized in favor of abolishing border controls between

the U.S., Mexico and Canada.1

Although threats had continued all along, the September 11 terrorist attacks

reminded the nation of the dangers of fully open borders and the importance of

maintaining control over our boundaries and ports. While free trade has indeed

improved the lives of all Americans, it has also brought with it a deadly wave of

dangerous narcotics, and the specter of weapons of mass destruction. While the

free movement of peoples has increased tourist revenues and helped spread 

American values abroad, it has also brought terrorists and other dangerous

criminals onto our shores. These risks must be dealt with, and they must be 

dealt with at the borders and ports of entry, or not at all.

The challenge for Congress and the Administration is to strike the right 

balance – to improve law enforcement at the borders and ports without unduly

hindering the commerce and travel that have helped make the United States the

freest and most prosperous nation on earth. The federal government must also

determine how to allocate its limited law enforcement resources to meet many 

different threats. Since last summer, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 

Drug Policy and Human Resources has been conducting a wide-ranging and 

comprehensive study of border control issues.2 Although the study is still continuing,

this initial Report provides background on the border and its management and

presents some of the most significant initial findings of the Subcommittee.

This Report is divided into four sections. Section I describes the borders and

ports of entry, and the importance they hold for American economic and social

life. Section II describes the chief threats entering the country through our 

borders and ports, while Section III describes the efforts of our primary border 

and port law enforcement agencies, the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (INS), and the U.S. Coast Guard, to deal with those

threats. Finally, Section IV explores some of the most significant proposals to

improve law enforcement at the borders and ports of entry, including President

Bush’s proposal to consolidate the primary border agencies into a single 

Department of Homeland Security.
1 4

Chairman Souder and Rep. Juanita 

Millender-McDonald (not pictured)

hold field hearing at the Port of

Long Beach, CA. 

(Subcommittee photo)

Field Hearings Held 

by Subcommittee

Highgate Springs, VT

Champlain, NY

Blaine, WA

San Diego, CA

Ports of Los Angeles/

Long Beach, CA

Sierra Vista, AZ

Information on all of the

Subcommittee’s hearings

can be found on our

website, at

http://www.house.gov/reform/cj/

Hearings and Meetings Held by the Subcommittee and Staff

on the Southern and Northern Borders, at Ports of Entry and

in Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee has held field hearings at a number of key ports of entry

and border communities: Highgate Springs, Vermont; Champlain, New York;

Blaine, Washington; San Diego, California; the Ports of Los Angeles and Long

Beach, California; and Sierra Vista, Arizona. Visits were also made to a number of

subsidiary ports of entry, including San Ysidro and

Otay Mesa, California; Port Angeles, Lynden and

Sumas, Washington; and Nogales and Douglas, Arizona. At each such location, the Members and

staff have met with local officials of Customs, the

INS, the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard and the

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 

In addition to these hearings, Chairman Souder

and the Subcommittee staff have traveled to a 

number of other locations with significance for border security. Chairman Souder recently visited the

border crossings at Fortuna and Portal, North Dakota,

and Sweetgrass, Montana. Members and staff have also met with officials at the ports

of Seattle, Wa s h i n g t o n , and Port Huron, Marine City and Detroit, Michigan, while

Subcommittee staff have met with officials at the ports of El Paso, Texas; Buffalo and

Niagara Falls, New York; Washington-Dulles International Airport; and with the U.S.

Coast Guard in New York City.3 The Subcommittee staff recently visited the foreign

port of Hong Kong, where they met with local customs and other law enforc e m e n t

officials there. In addition, Chairman Souder conducted two Congressional delegations to Canada: the first to Ottawa, where he and staff met with several Canadian 

ministers, Members of Parliament, U.S. Ambassador Paul Cellucci, and the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)4; and the second to Va n c o u v e r, where he and

staff met with Canadian customs officials and the RCMP, and met with U.S. Customs

inspectors taking part in pre-screening of U.S.-bound cargo.

The Subcommittee has also held hearings in Washington, D.C. on nationwide

border security and law enforcement issues. In October 2001, the Subcommittee

held a hearing on the staffing levels required for key federal law enforcement

agencies in the wake of September 11, and related personnel issues. Also in October,

the Subcommittee held a hearing on the connection between drug smuggling 

and international terrorism. In December, the Subcommittee heard testimony

concerning the impact of September 11, and the necessity of responding to the

new terrorist threat, on the other missions of key border enforcement agencies. 

In April 2002, the Subcommittee held a hearing on new strategies and proposals

for border law enforcement. And in June 2002, the Subcommittee heard 

testimony from the former heads of the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, 
1 5

Additional Ports 

of Entry Visited by 

Subcommittee 

Members and Staff

Douglas, AZ

Nogales, AZ

Otay Mesa, CA

San Ysidro, CA

Detroit, MI

Marine City, MI

Port Huron, MI

Sweetgrass, MT

Buffalo, NY

Niagara Falls, NY

Rouses Point, NY

Fortuna, ND

Portal, ND

El Paso, TX

Alburg, VT

St. Albans, VT

Port Angeles, WA

Seattle, WA

Sumas, WA

Washington-Dulles 

International 

Airport, VA

Customs, the Treasury Department’s law enforcement branch and the DEA, and Stephen Flynn, a

border security expert, on the potential impact of

President Bush’s homeland security reorganization

plan on drug interdiction and other non-terrorism

related law enforcement activities. Further hearings

and field hearings will be held in the near future as

the Subcommittee continues its investigation of

these vital issues.

The Subcommittee staff has also researched 

the extensive number of reports and studies already

prepared on these issues by federal agencies and non-governmental organizations

over the last few years. We hope that this Report will provide members of Congress

and concerned citizens with an overview of law enforcement and security at our 

borders, and an appreciation of the difficult choices facing the American people 

in this area.

The border crossing at Fortuna,

ND. The Customs inspector’s

home is next to the inspection facility, allowing him to hear 

any nighttime traffic even when the

station is closed. 

(Subcommittee photo)

I. THE BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY

A. The Northern Border

1. GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES

The “Northern border” typically refers to the land

border between the mainland United States and

Canada, which is 4,121 miles long. (The CanadaAlaska border is an additional 1,536 miles long.)5

Much of this border is aquatic, running in the east

from the St. Lawrence River between New York and

Quebec through the Great Lakes (Lakes Ontario, Erie,

Huron and Superior), and in the west through the

Straits of Georgia and San Juan de Fuca between

Washington and British Columbia. (There are several

lakes on the boundary between Minnesota and 

Manitoba as well.)

There are approximately 130 official ports of entry on the Northern border at

which it is legal to cross (whether by vehicle or on foot). There are in addition over

300 unofficial crossing areas along the Northern border, roads which are unmonitored and allow for individuals or groups to cross undetected.6

For example, in the

area east of Blaine, Washington, the only “barrier” between the U.S. and Canada is

a narrow ditch between two roads. The terrain along the Northern border is

extremely varied – ranging from rivers, lakes and forests in the east to open prairie

and rugged mountains in the west. The vast, unpopulated areas along the Northern

b o r d e r, especially in the west, allow individuals to cross undetected virtually at will.

In the Great Plains states, for example, people can cross the Northern border by

bicycle, snowmobile or horseback. Securing the border in these remote areas

involves closing open prairie, numerous mountain passes, and enormous lakes.

2. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

The Northern border is the world’s busiest in economic terms. There is now

over $1.2 billion per day in trade between the U.S. and Canada.7 Trade with

Canada increased from a total of $243 billion in 1994 to $406 billion in 2000 –

growing an average of 10 percent each year in the 1990’s.8 The U.S. and Canada

are now each other’s number one trading partners.

The importance of U.S.-Canadian trade for both the U.S. and Canadian

economies cannot be overestimated. This is nowhere more obvious than in areas

close to the border; for example, the Plattsburgh-North County Chamber of Commerce estimates that in Plattsburgh, New York alone, the U.S.-Canadian economic

1 7

The Northern Border

The Northern border is

extremely vast, passing 

through huge wilderness 

areas. The photo above 

shows the prairie that 

makes up the border from

Glacier National Park in 

Montana to the Red River 

in eastern North Dakota. 

(Subcommittee photo)

Mainland U.S.-Canada border

4,121 miles

Alaska-Canada border

1,536 miles

World’s busiest border

$1.2 billion in trade per day

Growth in trade

Averaged 10% per year in

1990’s

Daily traffic

36,500 trucks; 665,000 travelers

37 U.S. states have Canada as

primary trading partner
1 8

relationship generates $1.4 billion per year, with almost 14 percent of the workforce employed by Canadian employers.9

In Michigan, U.S. automakers have

grown increasingly dependent on parts makers in Ontario, which are shipped on a

“just-in-time” basis to American factories in less than 6 hours.10 The benefits of

Canadian trade are not limited to border states, however. There are now 37 U.S.

states that have Canada as their primary trading partner, and half of all U.S. exports

bound for Canada are produced in 14 states that are not on the Northern border –

including California and Te x a s .1 1 Canada is even more heavily dependent on Northe r n border trade; 86 percent of its exports are destined for the U.S., and those

exports now account for more than one-third of Canada’s total economic activity.1 2

The cross-border trade in energy is especially important for the U.S. economy;

Canada is the single largest energy supplier to the U.S., providing about 15 percent of America’s natural gas and 9 percent of its oil.13 Canada supplied over 3.5

trillion cubic feet of natural gas to the U.S. in 2000 through pipelines across the

Northern border (major crossing points include Eastport, Idaho, Port of Morgan,

Montana, Niagara Falls, New York, Sumas, Washington and Noyes, Minnesota).14

It also supplied over 494 million barrels of crude oil, and over 100 million barrels

of refined petroleum products. Nearly 100 percent of U.S. electricity imports

(such as hydroelectric power) come from Canada, worth about $3 billion.16

3. TRAFFIC PATTERNS

Most commercial traffic in both directions across the Northern border is carried by truck or rail; trucks carry the majority of goods by value, while railroads

carry the most goods by weight. More than 13 million trucks – about 36,500 per

day – currently cross the border each year (in both directions – about 7 million of

those crossings are into the U.S. from Canada), up from 7 million in 1990. Truck

traffic is expected to increase by 10 percent each year for the next decade.17

Truck traffic along the Northern border can take place at over 75 land ports,

but almost 90 percent of all truck crossings take place at 20 locations. In fact, 4

bridges alone – the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit, Michigan and Windsor,

Ontario; the Blue Water Bridge between Port Huron, Michigan and Sarnia,

Ontario; the Peace Bridge between Buffalo, New York and Fort Erie, Ontario; and

the Lewiston Bridge near Niagara Falls, New York – handle over 50 percent of the

total truck traffic.18

Cross-border movement along the Northern border is by no means confined

to commercial traffic, however. In fact, travelers (whether business commuters or

tourists) account for about 200 million crossings, or 85 percent of the total.19

Finally, not all traffic between the two countries is by land; the number of air travelers between the U.S. and Canada increased from 12 million in 1988 to nearly 18

million in 1998, while the number of commercial flights between the two countries has increased by one-third over the last five years.20 The Washington State

Canada Is America’ s

Largest Energy 

Supplier

3.5 trillion cubic feet 

of natural gas (15% of

total U.S. consumption)

494 million barrels of

crude oil (9% of total

U.S. consumption)

$3 billion of electricity

imports (nearly 100% 

of total U.S. imports)

Top 10 Land Border

Freight Crossings, All

Transportation Modes,

Northern Border, 2001

Detroit, MI

Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY

Port Huron, MI

Champlain-Rouses Point, NY

Blaine, WA

Alexandria Bay, NY

Pembina, ND

Sweetgrass, MT

Portal, ND

Eastport, ID

Source: Bureau of Transportation

Statistics, U.S. Department of 

Transportation
Ferry system also carries over 25 million passengers and 11 million vehicles on

about 150,000 trips per year, many of which cross the U.S.-Canada border.

21

B. The Southern Border

1. GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES

At 2,062 miles, the Southern border is only about

half as long as the mainland Northern border (excluding the Alaska-Canada border). 22 About half of the

Southern border is strictly land border, ranging from

San Diego, through the deserts of eastern California

and Arizona, to the New Mexico-Texas border. The

Texas-Mexico border is defined by the Rio Grande

River – a river that is unnavigable except at its mouth

(at Brownsville, Texas), often dries up to a bare trickle, and can be crossed on foot

in many places.23 Nevertheless, the river can support small boats in some places,

and the U.S. Border Patrol even maintains a light boat patrol in certain spots.24

There are approximately 30 ports of entry (many with multiple crossing stations)

along the Southern border. As is the case on the Northern border, however, there

are innumerable “unofficial” crossings along the Southern border – and a much

larger number of illegal crossings into the United States are made from Mexico

than from Canada.

2. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE

Economic activity along the Southern border is growing rapidly. Mexico is

now the United States’ number two trading partner, passing Japan in 1999. Total

trade with Mexico grew from $100 billion in 1994 to $248 billion in 2000.25 The

cross-border trade is of vital economic importance to Mexico’s economy; exports

to the U.S. account for 88 percent of total Mexican exports, and 25 percent of the

Mexican economy.

26

Trade with Mexico is a significant contributor to U.S. economic health as well,

however. Like Canada, Mexico is a major supplier of energy; in 2000, Mexico 

provided over 508 million barrels of crude oil to the U.S., and over 3.5 trillion

cubic feet of natural gas (through pipelines running to Texas).27 Mexico is the

largest importer of many kinds of U.S.-built transportation equipment, including

single engine airplanes, railway parts, various kinds of vehicle engines, and wheel

rims and spokes; Mexico is also the biggest purchaser of many types of textiles a n d

clothing, including woven cotton fabric and synthetic yarns, various household

appliances and electrical goods, and many agricultural products.28

1 9

A U.S. Border Patrol van keeps

watch along the California-Mexico

border. (Subcommittee photo)

The Southern Border

Though only half the size of

the mainland U.S.-Canada

border, the Southern border is

almost equally rugged and

extremely difficult to patrol.

U.S.-Mexico border

2,062 miles

Daily trade

$680 million

Growth in trade

More than doubled in 1990’s

Daily traffic

Over 800,000 people and

nearly 12,000 trucks cross 

into U.S. each day

Mexico is our second biggest

trading partner 

Mexico Is a Major 

Supplier of U.S. 

Energy

508 million barrels of 

crude oil

3.5 trillion cubic feet 

of natural gas.
2 0

3. TRAFFIC PATTERNS

Most cargo on the Southern border is carried by truck; there were about 4.3

million truck crossings into the U.S. from Mexico in 2001 (down slightly from 4.5

million in 2000).2 9 As is the case on the Northern 

b o r d e r, truck traffic on the Mexican border is highly

concentrated at a few crossings. Approximately 91

p e rcent of the more than 4 million truck crossings

from Mexico into the U.S. that took place in 1998

occurred at 7 of the 25 ports of entry that handle

c o m m e rcial traffic – in order, they are Laredo, Te x a s ;

Otay Mesa, California; El Paso, Brownsville and

Hidalgo, Texas; Nogales, Arizona; and Calexico East,

C a l i f o r n i a .3 0 L a r e d o ’s share of the total U.S. land trade

(both north and south) increased from 8 percent to 15

p e rcent from 1995 to 2000; 4,100 trucks and $140

million in merchandise pass through it each day.3 1

Although truck traffic continues to grow, most border crossings are made by

non-commercial travelers. Approximately 300 million people legally enter the 

U.S. from Mexico each year, 83 percent of them using personal vehicles, and 16

percent on foot via pedestrian crossings. The crossings in El Paso and San Ysidro

account for one-third of all northbound traffic; San Ysidro alone clears 40,000 cars

per day, the single busiest international checkpoint in the world.32

One important aspect of non-commercial traffic across the Southern border is

that it is primarily local and composed of frequent crossers. Perhaps the most

thorough study of people crossing the border was conducted in 1992-94 in San

Diego; it found that 96 percent of the crossings at the two area ports (Otay Mesa

and San Ysidro) were made by residents of the San Diego/Tijuana region. Sixty

percent of those crossing the border were either “frequent” crossers (crossing 

4-19 times per month), or “very frequent” crossers (crossing at least 20 times 

per month). These frequent and very frequent crossers accounted for 96 percent

of the crossings.33

The importance of this non-commercial traffic for the U.S. economy is significant. In San Diego, Mexican nationals cross more often than American citizens,

and the majority of them cross either to shop (42 percent) or to work (24 percent). (Most Americans crossing the border do so either to make social visits – 40

percent – or for tourism and shopping – 32 percent.)34 Retailers in Texas record

an estimated $15 billion in sales to Mexican shoppers each year, and local Texas

chambers of commerce estimate that the percentage of sales made by retailers to

Mexican residents ranges from 10 percent to almost 40 percent. A survey of San

Diego businesses recently made by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce showed that

Otay Mesa, CA border crossing.

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

Top 10 Land Border

Freight Crossings, 

All Transportation Modes,

Southern Border, 2001

Laredo, TX

El Paso, TX

Otay Mesa, CA

Nogales, AZ

Hidalgo, TX

Brownsville-Cameron, TX

Calexico East, CA

Eagle Pass, TX

Del Rio, TX

San Luis, AZ

Source: Bureau of Transportation

Statistics, U.S. Department of 

Transportation
30 percent or more of their sales are to Tijuana shoppers, while the Arizona Chamber

of Commerce estimated that 50 percent of retail sales in the state’s border region

are to Mexican nationals.3 5 Testimony at the Subcommittee’s field hearings anecdotally indicated a significant drop in business in Southern border towns as the alert

level increased along U.S. borders after September 11.3 6

C. The Growth in Cross-Border Trade

As indicated above, U.S. trade with its NAFTA partners has grown dramatically

over the past decade; Canada and Mexico together account for one-third of the

value of all U.S. international trade. Though trade with Canada remains greater,

Mexico has been rapidly catching up. Manufactured goods have accounted for

most of the growth in NAFTA trade, particularly the trade in motor vehicles, parts

and accessories, which account for 22 percent of the U.S. land trade. The top ten

leading commodity groups in 2000 (consisting of manufactured goods and industrial raw materials) accounted for 73 percent of the land trade. Notably absent

from these lists are agricultural products; farm goods, while important, have not

been primary sources of the growth in U.S. cross-border trade.37

2 1

Top 10 Land Border

Crossings for 

Passengers/Pedestrians,

FY 2001

El Paso, TX

San Ysidro, CA

Hidalgo, TX

Brownsville, TX

Laredo, TX

Detroit, MI

Buffalo, NY

Calexico, CA

Nogales, AZ

Otay Mesa, CA

Source: U.S. Customs Service data

Most Southern bord e r

t r a ffic is conducted 

by local, fre q u e n t

c ro s s e r s .

Top 10 Commodities for 

North American Trade, 2001

Vehicles, parts and accessories

Electrical machinery and 

equipment

Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery

Mineral fuels, mineral oils 

and waxes

Special classification provisions

Plastics and articles thereof

Paper and paperboard, articles of 

paper pulp

Optical, photographic, surgical instruments

Furniture, bedding, mattress supports, lamps

Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal

Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation
In 2001, however, total trade with Canada and Mexico actually declined for

the first time since NAFTA was implemented seven years ago – due in large part

to the impact of September 11, though the U.S. economic slowdown also had

an effect. Land trade declined 4.9 percent, with most of the drop taking place

after the terrorist attacks; the value of trade dropped only 1.5 percent in the 

J a n u a ry-August period, but 11.6 percent in September-December. The biggest

decline was in imports from Canada, which dropped 14.4 percent following 

September 11.3 8

D. The Coasts and Non-Land Ports of Entry

The U.S. has a total of 12,353 miles of marine shoreline – almost twice as long

as the borders with Canada and Mexico combined.39 The coasts are incredibly

varied, ranging from virtually unapproachable rocks on the northwest Pacific

Ocean, to the much gentler shores of the Gulf Coast and Caribbean Sea, to the

numerous seaports on the Atlantic Ocean. 

Along those coasts, there are more than 300 sea ports at which cargo may be

legally loaded or unloaded in the United States.4 0 In 2000, about 60,000 commerc i a l

vessels (including tankers, dry bulk ships and container ships) entered U.S. sea ports.4 1

The U.S. is particularly dependent on the energy trade over the waters; of the more

than 300 billion barrels of crude oil imported from foreign countries by the U.S. in

2001, more than two-thirds came from outside North America. In addition, over 226

billion cubic feet of liquid natural gas was shipped to the U.S. at Everett, Massachusetts (near the port of Boston) and Lake Charles, Louisiana.42 

2 2

NAFTA trade

declined in 2001 

for the first time in 

7 years, due mostly

to the aftermath of

the September 11

attacks.

U.S. Monthly Surface Trade with NAFTA Partners: 2000 and 2001

(Graphic courtesy of Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Dept. of Transportation)
Beyond the energy trade, maritime cargo is the lifeblood of international commerce; about 90 percent of the world’s cargo moves by sea container.

43 Approximately 7.8 million containers arrived in the U.S. by sea in 2001, loaded by more

than 500,000 non-vessel operators and freight forwarders around the world.

More than half of the containerized cargo arriving in the U.S. is shipped from just

10 foreign ports (Hong Kong historically being the largest, shipping about 1.6 million containers (measured in “twenty-foot equivalent units”, or TEUs) per year to

the U.S.). Many (more than a half-million per year) containers are actually

unloaded at seaports in Canada and then shipped by

rail to the U.S. 44 In fact, of the total traffic handled

by the Port of Montreal, approximately 70 percent of

both inbound and outbound traffic originated in or is

destined for the U.S.45

Passengers also move through the sea ports

(though not in the same numbers as at land border

crossings and airports), generally on the cruise line

i n d u s t ry. Over 95 cruise line vessels now operate in

U.S. ports, serving over 7 million passengers each year.4 6

2 3

The San Juan islands, between the

state of Washington and Canada.

(Subcommittee photo)

The Coasts

The shores and coastlines represent another "border" of the

U.S., one even longer – over

12,000 miles – and equally

difficult to patrol.

The port of Seattle, WA, one of the

country’s busiest sea ports. 

(Subcommittee photo)

Sea Ports – Lifeline of

International Trade

60,000 cargo vessels arrive

at U.S. ports each year

7.8 million containers

arrived in U.S. ports in 2001

90% of the world’s cargo

travels by sea container

Volume has nearly doubled

in the last 6 years

The ports of Los Angeles/Long

Beach, CA. (Subcommittee

photo)

Top 10 Sea Ports 

by Port Calls, 2000

Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA

Houston, TX

New Orleans, LA

New York, NY

San Francisco, CA

Philadelphia, PA

Hampton Roads Area, Norfolk, VA

Charleston, SC

Columbia River, WA/OR

Savannah, GA

Source: U.S. Maritime Administration data
2 4

The U.S. also maintains ports of entry for airborne cargo and travelers.

Though the amount of airborne cargo is small as compared with sea and land

transport, air carriers hauled 8.4 million tons of freight to and from U.S. airports 

in the year ended March 2001. Far more significant is the volume of passenger

traffic at the airports; in the year ended March 2001, U.S. airports handled a total

of 144 million passengers traveling between the U.S. and the rest of the world.47

SUMMARY

• The borders are huge, and present a 

significant challenge to effective law 

enforcement.

• Trade at our ports of entry is enormous 

and growing at a rapid pace; Canada and

Mexico are now America’s No. 1 and No. 2

trading partners, respectively.

• The U.S. cannot lose sight of the vital 

importance of cross-border and 

international trade to our economic 

health as new solutions to border 

security are pursued.

Top 10 Airports 

for International 

Passenger Traffic

New York, NY (JFK)

Los Angeles, CA

Miami, FL

Chicago, IL (O’Hare)

Newark, NJ

San Francisco, CA

Atlanta, GA

Houston, TX

Honolulu, HI

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX

Source: U.S. Department 

of Transportation 

and U.S. Customs 

Service data
II. THREATS AT OUR BORDERS AND

PORTS OF ENTRY

A. Smuggling of Contraband

The sheer volume of commercial and passenger traffic described above presents virtually limitless opportunities to smuggle contraband of every kind into the

U.S. Some of the smuggled materials – essentially commercial goods brought into

the country without declaring them and paying the applicable tariff – are seemingly innocuous, though they represent a threat to our economic security through

job loss to American workers if not controlled. Two kinds of contraband represent

serious threats to our national security and the health and safety of our citizens:

illegal narcotics and weapons of mass destruction.

1. I LLEGAL NARCOTICS

Most of the illegal drugs consumed in the U.S.

are produced or have their chemical source in foreign

countries, meaning they must come through ports of

entry or be smuggled across the border. The key foreign-produced or foreign-sourced drugs are cocaine,

heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine (produced in

both the U.S. and Mexico from smuggled chemicals

such as pseudoephedrine), and ecstasy or MDMA.

Estimates of the amount of these drugs that come

into the U.S. are necessarily tentative, because there is

no truly accurate data available. The Office of National

Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimates that 429 metric tons of cocaine were

exported to the U.S. in 2000 from source countries (primarily in Central and South

America), of which 313 metric tons (or 73 percent) were successfully brought in

past law enforcement interdiction efforts. An estimated 13.7 metric tons of heroin

were brought to the U.S. border, of which 13.05 metric tons were successfully

smuggled in past the border.

48 Federal authorities seized a total of 235,377

pounds of cocaine, 2,673,535 pounds of marijuana and 4,379 pounds of heroin in

fiscal year 2001.49

a. Northern Border

The most significant trend in Northern border drug smuggling has been the

rise in high-potency marijuana. Usually called “B.C. Bud” (for British Columbia),

the drug is typically grown hydroponically in basements and garages in the Vancouver region (it is also grown in Quebec, where it is called “Quebec Gold”). The

THC (the active component of marijuana) content of B.C. Bud is about 30 percent,

compared to about 4 percent for Mexican marijuana. A pound of B.C. Bud sells

2 5

Some smuggled goods

are not critically 

dangerous, but drugs

and weapons of mass

destruction are.

Opium poppy and cocaine (Courtesy Drug Enforcement Administration)

Five major drugs used in the

U.S. have their primary origin

or chemical source in foreign

countries: cocaine, heroin, 

marijuana, ecstasy, and

methamphetamine (which 

is produced in both the U.S. 

and Mexico, but is created 

from illegally smuggled 

chemicals – most notably 

the decongestant 

pseudoephedrine).
2 6

for about $6,000 – comparable to the price of a pound of cocaine in some areas

(although the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) disputes this figure); by 

comparison, Mexican marijuana typically sells for only $700 a pound. Because of its

p o t e n c y, a B.C. Bud plant has a very high yield; even a low-end grower (with about

25 plants) can make up to $150,000 a year.5 0 The economic incentive to smuggle is

tremendous even where there is vigorous border enforc e m e n t .

B.C. Bud is now Canada’s number two cash crop, producing at

least 800 metric tons of the drug annually. The RCMP reports that

seizures of marijuana plants in Canada jumped from 156,139 in

1992 to 1,102,198 in 2000.5 1 The drug is often smuggled in secret

compartments in passenger vehicles (Chairman Souder witnessed

one large seizure of B.C. Bud from the side doors of a minivan at

D e t r o i t ’s Ambassador Bridge, and members of the staff were told by

U.S. Customs officers at Buffalo’s Peace Bridge of another smuggler

who stuffed the roof of his car with the drug). But B.C. Bud is more

frequently carried on foot by backpackers, or by all-terrain vehicle or

snowmobile across the northwestern border. Customs officials,

Chairman Souder and staff of the Subcommittee traveled deep into

the muddy woods and personally viewed some of the trails in Washington used by

the backpackers to transport B.C. Bud; once in the U.S., it is typically loaded onto

small trucks waiting at the border. Marijuana is also smuggled over the water, in the 

vicinity of the San Juan Islands in Wa s h i n g t o n .5 2

The second major drug threat emanating from Canada is the illicit trade in

pseudoephedrine and other precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of

methamphetamine. Pseudoephedrine, the main active component of cold medicines, has been subject to strict controls in the U.S. since Congress took action in

1996 to stop the illegal diversion of the chemical from pharmaceutical companies

to meth labs. Canada, however, has not yet enacted such measures, and thus has

become an attractive supply route for pseudoephedrine.53 Canadian imports of

precursor chemicals have increased 14 times since 1995, and organized crime

groups from Latin America to the Middle East (including countries like Iraq and

Jordan) have begun using Canada as a conduit to the U.S. (The DEA is currently

investigating the potential connection between the Middle Eastern groups

engaged in this activity and terrorist organizations.)54

Massive amounts of the chemicals have been concealed on commercial trucks

and smuggled into the U.S., where they are diverted to meth “superlabs” in California

and Mexico. In the 11 months up to March 2002, U.S. Customs seized more than

110 million smuggled tablets of decongestants, including 2 seizures of 48 million

tablets in Detroit alone. Not all of the smuggling is taking place at commercial 

border crossings, however; there is evidence that a trafficking organization is using

the territory of the Akwesasne Mohawk Indian Reservation, in upstate New York, to

smuggle the precursors out of Canada.5 5

B.C. Bud

B.C. Bud, so named because it

is primarily grown in British

Columbia, is an extremely

potent variety of marijuana.

The THC (the active component of marijuana) content of

B.C. Bud can be as much as

30% or higher, whereas the

more common form of marijuana from Mexico has a THC

content of only 4%. B.C. Bud

is typically smuggled across

the border on foot in hockey

bags or backpacks. Once in

the U.S., it is said to be so

valuable that it can be traded,

pound-for-pound, for cocaine. 

(Photo courtesy Drug Enforcement

Administration)
The Canadian government is currently moving

ahead with new controls on precursor chemicals, 

to be implemented (if approved by Parliament) in

2003.56 At a minimum, it appears that the proposed

regulations would help prevent illegal precursor 

chemical smugglers from obtaining these materials 

on the open market. 

Several other drugs are being shipped over the

Northern border, though in somewhat lesser quantities.

U.S. Customs believes that Canada is being used as a

transshipment point for European ecstasy, as there was a

70 percent increase in ecstasy seizures from 2000-01 (this trend has been confirmed by a recent intelligence report of the RCMP). 

Federal authorities are also seeing increasing amounts of cocaine; at least 70 

percent of the estimated 16-26 tons of cocaine smuggled into Canada each

year is destined for the U.S. (Despite this, large amounts of cocaine are also

being smuggled from the U.S. into Canada.) Intelligence sources for the U.S. 

Border Patrol report that some heroin is also being shipped into the U.S. through

Vancouver (a city which itself has a very serious heroin abuse problem).57

b. Southern Border

Despite increases in the amount of drugs crossing the Northern border in

recent years, the Southern border remains by far the most significant source of illegal narcotics. Currently, over 70 percent of the cocaine entering the U.S. does so

over the border with Mexico (up somewhat from 2000).58 Mexican drug trafficking organizations control the smuggling of cocaine through a lucrative arrangement with the Colombian organizations that produce it.59

Mexico has also emerged as a significant and increasing source of heroin over the

past 20 years, with most of the heroin arriving in large loads on passenger vehicles

through the Southern border. Federal authorities have also discovered smaller (1-3

kilogram) loads on illegal immigrants crossing between the ports of entry.6 0

Mexico is the largest source country for marijuana consumed in the U.S.,

although as noted above Mexican marijuana is far less potent than the marijuana

smuggled from Canada. Most of it is transported into the U.S. in secret compartments in passenger vehicles, or concealed in commercial shipments of agricultural

products or industrial goods. Marijuana is also smuggled in by pedestrians at border crossings, or by illegal immigrant “mules” carrying backpacks of 20 kilograms

in remote areas.61

As noted above, while the bulk of the precursor components of methamphetamine are smuggled from Canada into the U.S., the drug itself is actually produced

2 7

"Crystal" methamphetamine

(Courtesy Drug Enforcement

Administration)

The Rising Trade in

Methamphetamine 

Precursors

Methamphetamine is manufact u red from several ingre d i e n t s ,

including the active ingre d i e n t s

of nasal decongestants,

ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.

In 1996, Congress passed strict

laws against the illegal diversion

of these medicines to meth labs.

These regulations, aggre s s i v e l y

e n f o rced by the DEA, virt u a l l y

shut down the U.S. supply of

p recursors to drug rings. 

Canada has not yet passed 

regulations controlling the sale

or diversion of pre c u r s o r s .

Canadian imports have

i n c reased 14 times since 1995,

and much of that increase 

has been smuggled into the 

U.S. The DEA is curr e n t l y

investigating the possible 

connection of these pre c u r s o r

smuggling rings to Middle 

E a s t e rn terrorist gro u p s .
2 8

either domestically or in “superlabs” in California or Mexico. The DEA estimates

that 70 to 90 percent of the methamphetamine sold in the U.S. is now produced

and distributed by Mexican drug trafficking cartels, which used the routes and

connections they created for other drugs to take control of the methamphetamine

trade.62 Methamphetamine produced in Mexico is typically smuggled in concealed compartments in passenger vehicles, historically at border crossings in

southern California, but increasingly at checkpoints in Texas as well.63

Though most of the ecstasy coming into the U.S. comes either across the

Northern border or directly from Europe via airports, the DEA has become increasingly worried about the possibility that Mexico is being used as a transit country

for MDMA. There were several significant seizures of ecstasy both within Mexico

and bound for Mexico in 2000.64

c. Other Ports of Entry

Large amounts of drugs also come into the U.S. through airports and sea

ports. The most common form of smuggling of South American heroin, for example, has historically been by individual couriers on international passenger flights

from locations in Central and South America, although recently smuggling organizations have used commercial shipping routes (often mixing heroin with cocaine

shipments) as well as cruise ships. Southeast Asian heroin, which dominated the

U.S. market in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, typically arrives via commercial ships.65

Although most of the cocaine arriving in the U.S. does so via the Southern

border, Colombian drug producers have also turned to commercial shipping

routes on the eastern Pacific Ocean. The drug is taken by commercial fishing

boats to Mexico, where it is loaded onto high-speed boats (often called ‘go-fast”

boats) and either taken directly to California or dropped off in northern Mexico for

shipment across the land border. In the Caribbean region, cocaine is frequently

loaded onto go-fast boats for shipment to Florida.66 Currently, about 25 percent

of all cocaine is smuggled into the U.S. through the Caribbean Sea (down from

2000), with less than 5 percent being smuggled directly to U.S. sea ports in 

commercial cargo vessels.67

Ecstasy is frequently transported by individual couriers on international flights

from Europe, and is also concealed on commercial cargo shipments (particularly

from the Netherlands, the primary source country).

2. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

With respect to weapons of mass destruction, useful data is even scarcer. To

date, there have been no known incidents of terrorists attempting to smuggle

nuclear, biological or chemical weapons into the United States.68 The terrorist

Ahmed Ressam was caught at Port Angeles, Washington in 1999 attempting to

U.S. Border Patrol agents, with

seized narcotics. (Courtesy Immigration and Naturalization Service)

The Southern border is still the

p r i m a ry source of illegal dru g s

in the U.S. Most of the marijuana and 70% of the cocaine

entering the U.S. comes over the

Mexican bord e r. Mexico is also

e m e rging as a significant sourc e

of heroin, and Mexican dru g

t r a fficking organizations now

c o n t rol nearly 3⁄4 of the m e t h a mphetamine trade in the U.S.

Ecstasy pills, large amounts of

which can be easily concealed

by an individual courier, are

frequently smuggled on commercial flights (particularly

from the Netherlands, the 

primary source country for

ecstasy). These ecstasy pills

were discovered hidden 

in a suitcase by Customs

inspectors. (Courtesy U.S.

Customs Serv i c e )
smuggle a home-made bomb as part of a plot to destroy the Los Angeles airport,

but even that weapon was made of conventional explosives. The danger of an

unconventional weapon being brought into the country, however, is very real. A

nuclear device could be secreted in a single cargo container anywhere in the world

and brought into any American (or Canadian) seaport. Detonating even a single

such device would have a devastating impact in terms

of lives lost, property destroyed, and damage to the

national economy. The situation is almost as grim

with respect to chemical or biological agents. As one

commentator has pointed out, every year an estimated 5 to 10 million pounds of illegal chlorofluorocarbons are smuggled into the U.S. to be sold on the

black market.69 It would certainly be no more difficult to smuggle deadly chemicals or germs through

the international cargo system.

B. Illegal Immigration and the Entry of

Criminals

The real number of foreign nationals who attempt to enter the United States

illegally each year is unknown. The Border Patrol apprehended over 1.2 million

illegal immigrants in fiscal year 2001 (down from over 1.6 million in 2000), but

there are few good estimates of how many individuals managed to elude capture.70 Still, one writer has estimated that illegal crossings represent only about

0.5 percent of total crossings over the Southern border.

71 Although accurate data

have not yet been collected, it is estimated that most people who cross the border

illegally do so repeatedly; thus, the approximately 1.5 million crossings each year

may be made by far fewer individuals.

2 9

A Customs inspector and a National

Guardsman supervise the unloading

of a sea container. (Courtesy U.S.

Customs Service)

The danger of weapons

of mass destru c t i o n

entering through a 

p o rt is very real. 

A single nuclear, 

chemical or biological

weapon, hidden inside

one of the many 

thousands of containers,

t rucks and vehicles that

enter the U.S. each 

d a y, could have a 

c a t a s t rophic eff e c t .

Border Patrol agents on bike patrol.

(Courtesy Immigration and Naturalization Service)

Illegal Immigration

• 1.2-1.6 million people apprehended

crossing the border each year

• 5 to 9 million illegal immigrants (est.)

living in the U.S.; growing by at least

275,000 per year

• 41% of illegal immigrants entered

legally but overstayed their visas

("nonimmigrant overstays")
3 0

It is also important to note that the term “illegal immigrant” does not just

include those who cross the border illegally. The total number of illegal immigrants residing in the U.S. was estimated by the INS in 1999 at roughly 5 million,

although recent 2000 census data suggest a figure closer to 7.5 to 9 million.72

The INS has also estimated that the number of illegal aliens grows by about

275,000 persons each year, although some independent analysts have put the estimate at 400,000 or even 600,000 per year.

73 It is believed, however, that only 59

percent of these persons actually sneaked into the country. The remainder are

believed to be “nonimmigrant overstays,” meaning that they entered legally on a

temporary basis but then failed to depart. The vast majority (84 percent) of illegal

immigrants from Mexico did enter illegally, as is the case for most (74 percent) of

those from Central America; but 91 percent of the illegal immigrants from other

countries are nonimmigrant overstays.74

1. NORTHERN BORDER

The Border Patrol apprehended 81,285 deportable individuals on the

Northern border from 1993-98, including 5,074 smuggled aliens (i.e., persons being brought into the country by professional smugglers). The Border

Patrol also apprehended 4,384 non-deportable individuals, namely U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents caught engaging in criminal activity,

principally alien smuggling. Although these numbers are dwarfed by illegal

activity on the Southern border, INS intelligence suggests that smuggling

activity is increasing on the U.S.-Canadian border. Moreover, Border Patrol

agents in the north are more likely to encounter organized criminal activity

than their counterparts in the south. From 1993-98, northern Border Patrol

agents were 14 times more likely to encounter aliens smuggling weapons,

and 9 times more likely to encounter aliens smuggling drugs.7 5

As is the case with narcotics, smugglers of aliens often take advantage of the

sovereign status of Indian reservations on the Northern border. Although the U.S.-

Canada border still has legal force in the reservation, its enforcement is entrusted

largely to the reservations’ police forces, creating an attractive avenue for smugglers of all kinds. Federal officers do engage in cooperative efforts with Indian

authorities to stop illegal activity. In December 1998, for example, the INS led an

operation that broke a smuggling ring that used the Akwesasne Mohawk Territory

in New York to smuggle about 3,600 Chinese nationals into the U.S.76

2. SOUTHERN BORDER

Most illegal crossings take place on the Southern border, and primarily involve

citizens from Mexico and Central America. Anecdotal evidence of an increasing

number of illegal immigrants from Middle Eastern countries crossing on the Southern border has been cited, but no hard figures are available (and in any case, most

illegal immigrants of Middle Eastern origin cross on the Northern border).77 In the

A Border Patrol agent watches the

Northern border on a snowmobile.

(Courtesy Immigration and Naturalization Service)

Illegal Immigration on the

Northern Border

• 81,285 deportable individuals apprehended from

1993-98

• 14 times more likely to be

smuggling weapons than

on Southern border

• 9 times more likely to be

smuggling drugs than on

Southern border

Smuggling activity 

is increasing on 

the U.S.-Canadian

border.
past year, illegal border crossings on the Southern border appear to have dropped

significantly; the INS reports that such crossings have hit a 17-year low, and that

arrests by the Border Patrol dropped 44 percent during the period October 2001

to February 2002, as compared with the same period from 2000-01.78 This drop

follows an overall increase in the number of illegal crossings throughout the

1990’s, however, despite a stepped-up presence and

more aggressive strategy by the Border Patrol (see Section III below). The recent drop may reflect the U.S.

economic slowdown as much as the INS’ stepped-up

enforcement efforts.79 The recent terrorist attacks (and

the federal government’s response) also seem to have

had an impact; illegal crossings have plunged even further since September 11. 80

As is described in more detail in Section III below, the

Border Patrol’s strategy of stepped-up enforcement in

some areas has led to unprecedented surges in illegal

immigration in others. While illegal crossings in the San

Diego and El Paso regions dropped, they skyrocketed in areas like southern Arizona

and New Mexico, and particularly in border towns such as Nogales and Douglas.

Recent Border Patrol enforcement actions have driven much of the illegal traffic away

from these population centers as well, but now it is taking place in the more rural

ranching areas outside the towns.8 1 The heavy illegal traffic has taken a severe toll

on these communities. Illegal immigrants often dump large amounts of litter and

cause significant property damage to ranches and homes, and some engage in petty

thefts or even violent crimes. One rancher in Arizona’s Cochise County reported

spending $50,000 to repair damage done to her property by illegal aliens since

1999, while another reported being tied up and robbed in his home.8 2

Illegal immigrants often pay professional border smugglers, called “coyotes,”

to help them across the border. Sometimes migrants are used as “mules” by drug

smugglers, bringing backpacks of marijuana or other narcotics across the border

with them. In general, however, it appears that alien smugglers keep migrants

away from the routes used by drug trafficking organizations.83

3. OTHER PORTS OF ENTRY

Illegal immigration at ports of entry can take one of several forms: the smuggling of aliens (most often in cargo containers), the use by aliens of false identification papers, or the abuse of legal short-term visits (i.e., non-immigrant overstays).

In recent years migrants from Asia (especially China) have made up a high percentage of stowaways on ships. There is also a steady flow of migrants at sea

attempting to make landfall in the U.S. – particularly in the Caribbean region, presenting a significant challenge for the Coast Guard. In fiscal year 2001, the Coast

Guard apprehended 3,948 migrants at sea.84

3 1

The number of people

attempting to cross the 

Southern border is staggering.

Here, the footprints in the

sand show the illegal traffic

across one small section of

the border during one night

only. Each morning, the sand

was swept clean with a tire

by the Border Patrol. 

(Subcommittee photo)

The Border Patrol’s

strategy of stepped-up

enforcement in some

areas has led to

unprecedented surges

in illegal immigration

in others.
3 2

4. ENTRY OF CRIMINAL ALIENS AND ALIENS POSING A NATIONAL SECURITY RISK

Since the attacks of September 11, Congress and the Administration have

focused on efforts to bar criminals, in particular terrorists, from entering the country.

E v e ry year, many individuals are refused entry into the U.S. because of their criminal

h i s t o ry or because they are deemed to be potential threats to national security. Other

individuals are apprehended and detained by the Border Patrol due to their criminal

background. Some of these individuals have had terrorist connections. For example,

Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested at the Port Angeles, Washington ferry crossing, had

connections to the Al Qaeda terrorist network; he was carrying home-made bomb

equipment in the trunk of his car, and intended to blow up the Los Angeles airport.

Lucia Garofalo was arrested in Vermont in 1999 attempting to smuggle a suspected

terrorist into the U.S. Abu Mezer, who was arrested attempting to cross into Wa s hington illegally, jumped bond in 1997 and was later shot in New York City attempting

to blow up that city’s subway system. Ressam and Garofalo attempted to cross at

legal crossing points; Mezer entered over the open frontier. 

More recently, concern has focused on the ability of dangerous criminals to

enter the country through sea ports of entry. In October 2001 an official in southern Italy discovered an Egyptian-born Canadian citizen living in a container that

had been loaded on a cargo ship in Egypt, bound for Canada. The container was

equipped with a bed, toilet facilities, a laptop computer, satellite phone, airport

maps and security passes. In May of this year, a report surfaced that 25 Islamic

extremists hid in cargo containers and sneaked into ports in Florida, Georgia and

California, some apparently disguised as stevedores.85 These cases illustrate the

challenge facing our border management agencies today.

There has been a

small but growing

trend of terrorists

attempting to sneak

into the country: 

1997 – Abu Mezer apprehended 3 times crossing the

Washington-British Columbia

b o rder; he jumped bail after his

t h i rd arrest; later discovere d

attempting to build a bomb in

New York City. 

1999 – Lucia Garofalo arre s t e d

attempting to smuggle a suspected terrorist into Ve rmont. 

1999 – Ahmed Ressam caught

at Port Angeles, Washington

trying to bring a bomb into

the U.S. to blow up the Los

Angeles airport. 

2002 – Report surfaced claiming that 25 Islamic extremists

entered the U.S. at sea ports

by hiding on cargo ships. SUMMAR Y

• Illegal narcotics are entering the country

through every possible channel: land borders,

coastlines, and air, sea and land ports of entry.

• Illegal immigration continues to be a serious

problem, with more than 5 million illegal 

immigrants living in the country. 

• Weapons of mass destruction are an 

increasing threat, given the growing volume 

of international trade and travel.
III. FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT

THE BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY

Law enforcement at the nation’s borders and ports of entry can be broadly

divided into three categories: the control and inspection of goods entering the

country, the control and inspection of people entering the country, and the protection and patrol of sea ports, waterways and shorelines. The first task falls generally to the U.S. Customs Service, the second to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the third is the responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard. There is

significant overlap; at all land ports of entry, for example, line inspectors from Customs and the INS are trained to perform both tasks, while between the ports of

entry, the INS’ Border Patrol division and the Coast Guard bear primary responsibility for preventing the illegal crossing of both people and contraband. It is nevertheless useful to organize an analysis of federal law enforcement around these

three agencies. Each will therefore be discussed in turn.

A. The U.S. Customs Service

The U.S. Customs Service is a branch of the U.S. Department of the Treasury,

and is one of the oldest sections of the federal government, dating back to 1789.

Customs enforces over 400 laws and regulations on behalf of more than 40 federal

agencies on the borders, along the coasts, and at the ports of entry, but its primary responsibilities are to collect tariffs and fees from importers, and to prevent

the smuggling of contraband into the U.S. This makes Customs perhaps the most

important law enforcement agency in the country.

The “front line” of the Customs Service is its inspector force; Customs inspectors at all ports of entry (whether at border crossings, sea ports, or airports) are

responsible for the initial inspection of all goods entering the U.S., whether

brought by commercial carriers or by individual travelers on their persons or in

passenger vehicles. According to estimates recently provided to the Subcommittee by Customs, there are currently about 7,654 Customs inspectors, with approximately 1,059 of them stationed on the Northern border, 2,232 stationed on the

Southern border, 899 assigned to sea ports, and 3,464 assigned to airports.

3 3

There is significant

overlap between 

agencies at borders 

and ports of entry.
3 4

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
3 5
3 6

All Customs inspectors essentially perform the same basic function – the inspection of cargo and personal goods – but there are differences between commerc i a l

cargo and personal goods inspections, and between the various locations. Every

d a y, the Customs Service examines an average of 50,889 trucks and containers,

355,004 vehicles, 588 vessels, 2,642 aircraft, and 1.3 million passengers; it also

makes 107 narcotics seizures and 232 seizures of 

c u r r e n c y, weapons, child pornography, counterf e i t

goods and other items of contraband. The task is

obviously a daunting one, and can be quite complex.8 6

The various kinds of inspections are detailed below.

1. COMMERCIAL CARGO INSPECTIONS - PROCEDURES

In principle, all commercial cargo imported into

the U.S. follows this simple process: upon arrival at a

port of entry, the importer files entry documents for

the goods with the Customs port director. Customs

then examines the entry documents, and decides

whether to physically examine the cargo. Assuming there are no problems, Customs

then authorizes the cargo to be released (after any applicable duties have been

assessed). Under regulations that are still valid, entry documents may be filed up to

5 days after the shipment arrives at the port of entry; the shipment is not to leave

the port of entry, however, until the entry papers have been filed and examined and

the cargo released by Customs.

As one might expect, this theoretical system – developed in an era of much

slower transportation and much less international trade – bears little resemblance

to the real processes used today. Most cargo must move through the ports of

entry very quickly, and certainly in less time than 5 days. Moreover, Customs cannot possibly inspect every shipment, or even spend much time examining every

entry paper to determine whether to inspect the cargo. For example, it is estimated that with over 1 million containers arriving at the Ports of Los Angeles and

Long Beach, California each year, and 6,000-7,000 trucks crossing the Ambassador

Bridge in Detroit each day, Customs inspectors must release one container every

20 seconds and one truck every 12 seconds.87 In fact, Customs physically inspects

only about 2 percent of the imports coming into the U.S.

As the Customs Service points out, however, it is somewhat misleading to say

that “only” 2 percent of imports are being inspected – because Customs claims to

inspect 100 percent of “high risk” cargo.88 Given the massive quantities of goods

coming in, Customs subjects them to “risk assessment,” seeking to determine

which shipments are more suspicious and thus more in need of close inspection.89

The ability of Customs inspectors to perform adequate risk assessment (using intelligence information, statistical modeling, and inspectors’ personal observations and

experience) is therefore just as important, if not more important, than Customs’

A Customs inspector and a canine

enforcement officer walk the lines of

vehicles at San Ysidro, CA. 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

U.S. Customs Service

Inspections

7,654 Customs Inspectors

1,059 on Northern Border

2,232 on Southern Border

899 at Sea Ports

3,464 at Airports

Every day, they inspect:

50,000 trucks and 

containers

355,000 vehicles

590 vessels

2,600 aircraft

1.3 million passengers

Every day, Customs makes:

107 narcotics seizures

232 seizures of currency,

weapons, child pornography, counterfeit goods,

and other contraband
capacity to conduct more inspections. That ability varies depending on where and

how imported goods enter, as is described below.

a. Land Border Ports of Entry – Truck Traffic

At the land borders, the inspection process begins when cargo trucks

approach primary inspection booths at the port of entry facility. Upon arrival, the

truck driver must present the inspector with the initial entry documents: an entry

manifest (usually prepared using Customs Form 7533) and the bill of lading, and

Customs Forms 3461/3461-ALT, which allow for entry and immediate delivery; evidence of right to make entry (essentially proof that the person bringing the goods

in is an agent of the ultimate owner of the goods); and a commercial invoice that

describes the type and amount of the goods. Other

documents, such as packing lists, may be required for

certain goods. The Customs inspector reviews the

documentation, and may ask questions of the truck

driver. If the inspector is satisfied with the documentation and does not believe that the goods pose a

threat, he will collect any duties owing (or accept

proof that a bond for the value of any duties has been

posted) and then release the goods into the U.S. If

the inspector is not satisfied with the documentation,

or some other aspect of the shipment concerns him,

he will direct the truck to secondary inspection for

further review. Ten days after goods are released into the U.S., an entry summary

containing further information on the shipment is submitted to Customs on Customs

Form 7501.

Some of the process described above has been automated as part of Customs’

Automated Commercial System (ACS), which was first deployed in 1984. At the

land border, the branch of ACS in general operation is the Automated Broker Interface (ABI). Using ABI, licensed customs brokers (private individuals or firms that

prepare documentation and arrange for the payment of duties on behalf of

importers) can now file most of the entry information electronically before the truck

arrives at the border. According to Customs, 96 percent of all licensed brokers now

participate in the ABI system. The pre-filing of this information allows Customs 

better to perform its screening of the cargo for potential high-risk shipments.

At most border crossings, however, the truck driver must still present the entry

information in paper form to the Customs inspector – even if the materials have

been filed electronically. This generally means that before the driver reaches the

checkpoint, he must stop his truck at a customs broker’s office just before reaching

the U.S. border and pick up the printed entry information. Under certain circumstances, truck drivers can skip this process by participating in the Border Release

Advanced Selectivity System (BRASS). BRASS allows a driver to present simply the

3 7

Trucks line up for inspection at the

Blue Water Bridge, Port Huron,

Michigan. (Subcommittee photo)

Customs inspectors must move

huge amounts of cargo

through the ports of entry in

very little time. For example,

it is estimated that inspectors

must release one container

every 20 seconds at the Ports

of Los Angeles/Long Beach,

California, and one truck

every 12 seconds at Detroit’s

Ambassador Bridge.

Top 10 Land Border Ports,

Truck Traffic, 2001

Detroit, MI

Laredo, TX

Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY

Port Huron, MI

Otay Mesa, CA

El Paso, TX

Blaine, WA

Champlain-Rouses Point, NY

Hidalgo, TX

Alexandria Bay, NY

Source: U.S. Customs Service data
3 8

invoice, the manifest, and a pre-assigned bar code (called a C4 card), all of which he

can pick up at the place where the truck is loaded. The Customs inspector then

“wands” the barcode with a scanner, pulling up the relevant information on a computer screen. This partially automated system is only available to a limited number

of shippers, and only when they have a good record with Customs, are transporting

a bulk commodity, and are taking a single shipment to one consignee.

At each port of entry, Customs inspectors face a unique set of challenges

based on the type of commodities being shipped through. For example, in

Sweetgrass, Montana, the large volume of agricultural products (live and

dried) present certain challenges to detecting smuggling; in Vermont, significant cheese shipments are another problem; while in North Dakota, electrical appliances are a prime commodity.

The process of clearing truck traffic is essentially the same on the Northern

and Southern borders, although there are significantly more BRASS entries on the

Northern border; about 50 percent of the trucks on the Northern border use

BRASS, whereas only 10 percent of those on the Southern border do.90 Individual

ports of entry on both the Northern and Southern borders have implemented pilot

programs which seek more fully to automate much of the entry process. Those

pilot programs are described in more detail in Section IV below.

TARGETING

As noted above, the decision to send a truck to secondary inspection can be

based on the Customs inspector’s observations of the driver or the truck, or can be

based on something in the documentation – such as the type of shipment, or a

lack of specificity in the manifest about the goods being transported. Customs has

attempted to develop various targeting techniques, particularly since 1995, when

it initiated “Operation Hard Line,” an anti-narcotics program focusing on the

Southern border. Customs’ primary targeting mechanism is ACS Cargo Selectivity,

a computer program which attempts to filter out low-risk shipments and highlight

high-risk shipments by analyzing data submitted on ABI. ACS Cargo Selectivity

attempts to compare entry data from each shipment against a set of high risk

characteristics. These characteristics are identified and developed by Customs’

Operational Analysis Staff, using intelligence and the results of previous inspections. If the computer identifies a shipment as a high-risk shipment, the Customs

inspector is supposed to refer the truck to secondary inspection.

Questions have been raised about the effectiveness of ACS Cargo Selectivity.

The Treasury Department’s inspector general reported in March 2000 that the

ports of El Paso, Laredo, Otay Mesa and Nogales attributed only 2 narcotics

seizures to ACS targeting between October 1995 and March 1998. The inspector

U.S. Customs inspector at primar y

inspection station, Champlain, NY.

(Subcommittee photo)

Customs’ Automated 

Systems

Customs inspectors receive

electronic data on cargo via the

Automated Broker Interface

(ABI) system, a computer system first deployed in 1984. At

the land borders, however,

truckers cannot send summary

data on their shipments (called

manifests) electronically, as the

manifest counterpart of ABI,

called the Automated Manifest

System (AMS), has not been

deployed to land crossings – it

is used only at sea ports and

airports. This creates significant delays, as Customs inspectors and truckers must still rely

on paper manifests to clear

inspection. The entire system is

hopelessly outmoded, and must

soon be replaced.
general found that better targeting criteria needed to be developed through

improved training of personnel and better use of intelligence. The inspector 

general also found that examination overrides (where a shipment is targeted by

the system for inspection but is overridden by inspector error or clerical mistake)

were used “excessively,” raising the possibility that the system was being abused.

Customs has been testing a different targeting system, the Automated Targeting System (ATS) at several southwestern ports, starting with the port of Laredo.

The ATS uses a scoring system based on standardized ACS information. It is not

clear whether this system has proven more effective than ACS Cargo Selectivity,

but it appears that Customs has decided to replace ACS Cargo Selectivity with

ATS. A third targeting system, the Three Tier Targeting System (3T), was suspended in 2000 on the recommendation of the General Accounting Office (GAO).

3T attempted to divide shipments into three categories depending on an analytic

assessment of the risk for each shipment.91

INSPECTIONS

The percentage of trucks subjected to cargo inspection varies between the

Southern and Northern borders, but on either border it is significantly higher than

the inspection rate at sea ports. On the Southern border, a relatively high percentage of trucks are subjected to detailed narcotics inspections. The GAO reports that

in fiscal year 1998, for example, Customs inspected 12 percent of the loaded truck

containers entering at the Mexican border; that same year, 14 to 47 percent of

trucks were inspected at the seven busiest ports of entry.92 Statistics provided by

Customs’ Detroit port authority to the Subcommittee in January 2002 put the percentage of trucks and containers inspected in fiscal year 2000 on the Northern

border at 6.6 percent, while on the Southern border the rate was 26.8 percent.

Materials provided to the Subcommittee at the Buffalo port of entry in June 2001

indicated that the rate of inspection there was about 8 percent.

3 9

The Importance of 

Intelligence in Targeting

Cargo

Although Customs uses 

computerized targeting 

systems to identify high risk

imports for inspection, the

effective use of intelligence is

critical. At the port of entry

in Sweetgrass, Montana, 

Customs inspectors told

Chairman Souder that the

largest marijuana bust ever

made at that port was 

made on the basis of timely

intelligence. In May 2002,

Customs officers in Blaine,

Washington sent out a 

bulletin to inspectors on the

Northern border to be on the

lookout for a truck from a

certain company. On May

10, an inspector at Sweetgrass saw a truck from that

company approaching the

booth; he entered the license

plate number into Customs’

lookout database, and it

came back positive. 

A subsequent canine search

revealed over 1,200 pounds

of "B.C. Bud" marijuana

hidden in a secret compartment in the trailer.

Trucks park at Customs inspection 

station at Detro i t ’s Ambassador Bridge

to bring in paperwork. 

(Subcommittee photo)

Truck Inspections

• 6.6 percent of trucks inspected on

Northern border

• 26.8 percent of trucks inspected on

Southern border

Source: U.S. Customs Service data
4 0

A detailed Customs narcotics inspection is referred to as a “six point” inspection,

consisting of an examination by canine units, a search of the tractor engine and

compartment, an examination of the trailer walls, ceiling and floor, an inspection of

the fuel and air tanks, the tires, and the fifth wheel.9 3 A full examination of this kind

can take 5 inspectors up to 3 hours for a single 40-foot trailer container,9 4 so Customs

has been forced to perform somewhat less thorough

examinations or come up with better technology.9 5

To accomplish this, Customs has been expanding

its use of several scanning technologies, most notably

the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS).

VACIS is a gamma ray machine for use on commercial

trucks (or other vehicles and containers). The stationary version of VACIS involves two tracks, one the

source of the gamma rays, the other the detector.

The vehicle is positioned between the two tracks, and

the gamma ray scan runs through it, sending a visual

image to a computer screen. The Customs inspector

reviews these images to determine if narcotics or other contraband are hidden

inside. As of April 2001, Customs had deployed stationary VACIS units to 12

Southern border crossings and 4 sea ports, and planned to deliver more units to 3

locations on the Northern border, 4 more Southern border ports, and the Los

Angeles sea port.

One significant variant of the VACIS system is the Mobile VACIS. The Mobile

VACIS is a truck that extends a boom over the vehicle or container to be scanned;

the VACIS truck is then slowly driven past the vehicle and the gamma ray scan is

taken. As of April 2001, Customs had deployed Mobile VACIS units to 3 Southern

border locations and 6 sea ports, with further units to be deployed to Southern

and Northern border locations.

Two major x-ray scan systems are currently in use at the borders: the Truck X-Ray

(TXR) and the Mobile Truck X-Ray (MTXR) systems. The Truck X-Ray system is a

large, stationary building through which trucks pass and are x-rayed for contraband.

As of April 2001, it was installed in 9 Southern border ports. The Mobile Truck X-Ray

system is similar, but mounted on a truck. As of April 2001, Mobil Truck X-Ray units

were at 5 Southern border locations, with further units scheduled to be deployed at

the Southern border and 2 sea ports. The Subcommittee was informed in late 2001

that a Mobile Truck X-Ray had been deployed at Blaine, Washington as well.

A prototype VACIS system for scanning pallets and small containers has been

deployed at Otay Mesa. The Subcommittee staff observed a demonstration of the

system, which involves placing pallets inside a cabinet containing the gamma-ray

scanners. The scanner is intended to allow Customs inspectors to examine individual

pallets that might be able to conceal contraband from the larger VACIS or x-ray units.

On left: truck undergoes complete

x-ray exam at Otay Mesa, California; on right: container being

scanned by Mobile VACIS unit.

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

Scanning Technology

To meet the growing flows of

commercial traffic, Customs

has acquired new technology

allowing it to conduct more

inspections in less time.

These new devices include the

Vehicle and Cargo Inspection

System (VACIS), which uses

gamma ray scans, in both stationary and mobile units;

Truck X-Ray (TXR) and

Mobile Truck X-Ray

(MTXR) machines; and Personal Radiation Detectors

(PRDs), pager-like devices

that can detect hidden

radioactive materials.
These “non-intrusive inspection” systems have been quite successful. Customs

attributed 265 seizures of over 311,000 pounds of narcotics to these systems in fiscal year 2001 – up from only 166 seizures of 119,221 pounds in fiscal year 2000.96

In addition to technological scanners, Customs continues to rely on canine

inspections. Customs trains dogs at its facility at Front

Royal, West Virginia to be able to smell concealed narcotics, weapons, or other contraband. The dogs are

then used at ports of entry to sniff out these prohibited

materials. As of fiscal year 1999, Customs employed

660 Canine Enforcement Officers at land ports, sea

ports and airports. Officials at Customs and other law

enforcement agencies have been almost unanimous in

praising the effectiveness of canine inspections.97

In recent years Customs has also increasingly

relied on the assistance of members of the National

Guard in conducting inspections at the land border.

According to information provided to the Subcommittee by the National Guard

last fall, 626 of its personnel were assisting Customs at the borders, with 248 on

the Northern border and 378 on the Southern border. (Those numbers have 

been in flux as more members of the Guard were detailed to various ports of 

entry after September 11.)

b. Land Border Ports of Entry – Rail Traffic

Depending on the location, rail traffic may not be inspected at the border

itself, but instead may be subject to inspection at the rail yard in the U.S. This is

because the process of filing entry papers for rail shipments has been more fully

automated; entry documentation is not only entered through ABI, but is also

entered through the Automated Manifest System (AMS) component of ACS. AMS

allows the shipper to file the manifest and supporting documents electronically,

while the importer files (usually through a customs broker) entry papers on ABI.

The computer then matches the two sets of documents, and a Customs inspector

reviews the information. If the Customs inspector believes that a shipment

requires further inspection, he can withhold release until inspectors have had an

opportunity to travel to the freight yard and examine the cargo.

It is unclear how often Customs inspectors are actually able to perform examinations of rail shipments deemed high-risk. Customs provided the Subcommittee

with information showing that 14.7 percent of rail cars are “inspected” daily on

the Northern border, but it is not clear that all such cars are actually being given a

thorough examination; the same set of statistics showed that while 20.7 percent of

truck traffic on the Northern border was subject to “inspection,” only 6.6 percent

was subject to “search”. For example, John Wilda, a Customs inspector at the

4 1

Customs inspectors examine box

car at the Long Beach, California

rail yard. 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

Top 7 Rail Freight Ports,

2001

Laredo, TX

Port Huron, MI

Detroit, MI

Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY

Eagle Pass, TX

Nogales, AZ

Portal, ND

Source: Bureau of Transportation

Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation
4 2

Highgate Springs, Vermont port of entry, testified before the Subcommittee that an

80-car freight train arrives daily at St. Alban’s from Canada without any inspection at

a l l .9 8 Customs inspector Barry Clement testified to a similar lack of resources to

inspect the 5 freight trains arriving daily in the Blaine, Washington area.9 9

At some locations, however, some inspection

does take place at the border itself. For example, at

Calexico, California, one 30- to 40-car train arrives

each day. Immediately upon arrival at the border the

train is stopped, so that inspectors can check crew

documentation; Customs inspectors and Border Patrol

agents then inspect the cars for hidden persons or

packages on the outside of the cars. Again, however,

inspection of the actual cargo is generally delayed

until the train reaches the rail yard, about one-half

mile away.

100

One solution being promoted by Customs is the Rail VACIS system. The Rail

VACIS is similar to the stationary VACIS, but is set up on a rail line to scan railroad

cars. As of April 2001, it had been deployed in Laredo; another Rail VACIS unit has

recently been installed in Nogales. If it receives sufficient funding, Customs plans

to install further units on the Northern and Southern borders.

c. Sea Ports

As is the case with rail shipments, sea carriers generally file manifests electronically on the AMS system before cargo arrives in the U.S. Most customs brokers

now also file entry papers electronically, which Customs inspectors will review (and

which are processed by Customs’ automated targeting systems) and decide

whether to examine the cargo further. The Subcommittee staff was informed that

some entry papers cannot be filed electronically due to trade agreement requirements. If that is the case, then the cargo is held at the port until entry papers are

filed. In most cases brokers will file such papers within 24 hours (since holding

cargo at the port is quite expensive for the importer), but occasionally there can

be longer delays, usually because shippers in certain foreign countries use antiquated documentation procedures. The compliance and timeliness rates for all

manifests and bills filed by sea carriers and importers appear to be quite good,

exceeding the “target” rate set by Customs in fiscal year 2001.101

Most major sea ports now have the VACIS and/or x-ray units (whether mobile

or stationary) described in the section on land border inspections above. Another

device, now used not simply at sea ports but at most land crossings as well, is the

Personal Radiation Detector (PRD). The PRD is the size of a pager, and worn on a

Customs inspector’s belt. It contains a gamma ray radiation detector for use in the

detection of radioactive materials. Customs has now issued about 4,000 of these

Containers are unloaded at the Port

of Long Beach, California. 

(Subcommittee photo)

Top 10 Sea Ports by 

Container Volume 

(FY 2001)

Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA

New York, NY/Newark, NJ

Charleston, SC

Houston, TX

Seattle, WA

Oakland, CA

Savannah, GA

Miami, FL

Port Everglades, FL

Tacoma, WA

Source: U.S. Customs Service data

Note: This chart is based on the

number of containers; however,

some analysts prefer to measure

container volume using the TEU, or

"twenty foot equivalent unit," system, which is based on the length of

container volume instead of the

number of distinct units.
devices; recently Commissioner Bonner announced that the agency would purchase an additional 3,400 of them.102

It should be noted that cargo unloaded at sea ports of entry need not be

inspected at the water’s edge. Cargo can be unloaded at the sea port, and then sent

to an inland port of entry for processing and inspection by Customs; such cargo is

referred to as “in bond” while it is being transported to the final destination port.

Thus, a container can be unloaded in Seattle and sent by rail or truck to Cincinnati

before it is ever inspected. In fact, half the cargo unloaded in U.S. ports is transferred

in this manner.1 0 3 While this procedure helps Customs spread its workload among

many different facilities (thus lessening the bottleneck in commercial traffic that might

be created if all inspections took place at the shoreline), it does raise security concerns. Narcotics could be unloaded from containers while travelling to the final port.

S i m i l a r l y, a weapon of mass destruction could be concealed in such a container and

then detonated in a major city before Customs is able to examine it.1 0 4

d. Airports

Though the amount of cargo imported into the

U.S. by air is dwarfed by the amount carried by sea

and land conveyances, certain kinds of freight must be

shipped by this method due to its speed. Air freight is

part of the AMS system, and thus most carriers now

file manifests electronically before the cargo arrives in

the U.S. If the importer files entry documentation

electronically on ABI, the ACS system will match it up

with the manifest filed on AMS, and the Customs

inspector will look at these documents and decide

whether to inspect or release the cargo. Compliance

rates for air carriers are apparently not as good as for

sea carriers; Customs’ target rate was met in only one of four categories in fiscal

year 2001.1 0 5

As was reported in 2000 by the Treasury Department’s inspector general, a

problem can arise with Air AMS if the importer does not have entry papers filed

electronically. Because cargo at an airport must be unloaded and taken off the tarmac expeditiously, it will quickly be taken to a Container Freight Station (CFS), a

private facility where cargo is sorted and distributed into commerce. To allow this

to happen, ACS must be “tricked” into believing that matching entry papers were

filed on ABI, and that Customs examined and cleared the cargo. This is required

because ACS, which was designed in the early 1980’s, will not allow cargo to leave

Customs until an official release is entered. In essence, the Customs inspector

must create a “fake” entry filing in ABI, as well as a “fake” release. The importer

then has 5 days (as per Customs regulations) to file a “hard copy” of the real entry

papers, which the Customs inspector will then enter into the system manually, over4 3

Customs inspections supervise the

unloading of a cargo plane. 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

Cargo can be unloaded at a

sea port and then shipped "in

bond" to an inland Customs

facility, where inspection takes

place. Although this procedure helps Customs manage its

workload at sea ports and

break up bottlenecks, it also

runs the risk of allowing drugs

or even a weapon of mass

destruction to enter U.S. soil

without inspection.

Top 10 Airports, 

Volume of International

Cargo Freight, 2001

Anchorage, AK

Miami, FL

New York, NY (JFK)

Los Angeles, CA

Chicago, IL (O’Hare)

San Francisco, CA

Atlanta, GA

Newark, NJ

Memphis, TN

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX

Source: Airports Council Interna -

tional – North America data
4 4

riding the previous “fake” entry. The inspector then can make the determination

whether to examine the cargo or release it into commerce. There is, however, no

way to keep track in ACS of which entries are true entries and which are the “tricks”.

The CFS is supposed to hold the cargo until the real entry papers are filed and

Customs issues a release. The inspector general estimated, however, that some

3,000 shipments had been released into commerce without ever having entry

papers filed, thus completely avoiding Customs inspection. Customs’ only remedy

was to pursue fines against importers who did this, but the inspector general

found that few fines had actually been pursued, as the procedure for imposing the

fines was time-consuming and rarely resulted in substantial penalties.

The inspector general identified a second problem with the Air AMS system

that raised a risk that shipments had entered the U.S. without inspection. As is the

case at sea ports, cargo unloaded at airports can be transported “in bond” to

another port, or remain on the aircraft for a later (domestic) flight to another port

of entry. The Air AMS system attempts to keep track of which of the 3 options for

air freight has been selected: inspection and release at the initial airport (called a

“permit to transfer”), movement by ground transport to another port of entry

(referred to on the system as “in bond”), or transportation on the same flight to

another port of entry (called a “permit to proceed”). The trade itself, and not 

Customs, is entrusted with the task of entering one of these 3 codes into the Air

AMS system, thus allowing Customs to keep track of where and when the shipments are to be inspected. The inspector general discovered, however, that the

trade community was frequently using the “permit to transfer” code to cover 

shipments that were, in fact, moved in bond or remained on the airplane. This

made it very difficult for Customs to track the merchandise and ensure that it was

inspected before entering commerce. Moreover, many carriers and importers were

supplying very scanty information into the ACS system (for example, one entry

described the merchandise shipped simply as 426 pounds of “documentos [sic]”),

making it that much harder for Customs to sort high-risk from low-risk shipments.1 0 6

The Subcommittee staff contacted Customs recently to determine what action

had been taken to remedy these problems. In response, Customs informed us that

the most direct solution, namely the reprogramming of Air AMS, had been considered but was rejected as too costly and time-consuming, particularly since Customs

plans to replace the entire ACS system with a new system, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). Instead, Customs increased its enforcement actions against

violators of the system, improved its audit procedures, and increased the training of

its own personnel. While it understandable that Customs might reject the more

expensive reprogramming of ACS, the Subcommittee recommends that Customs

report to Congress on the effectiveness of its increased enforcement and training.107

The Treasury Department’s

inspector general revealed in

2000 that a flaw in Customs’

Automated Manifest System

(AMS) computer program for

air carriers may have allowed

3,000 shipments to enter the

U.S. without any inspection at

all. Additional problems with

the way importers classify 

their shipments on Customs’

computer system may have 

also allowed some cargo to 

slip through the cracks without

inspection. These problems

highlight the need for Customs

to replace its outdated 

computer system with the

Automated Commercial 

Environment (ACE).
2. PASSENGER INSPECTIONS – PROCEDURES

As indicated earlier, the vast majority of border crossings are made by nonc o m m e rcial travelers, whether tourists entering or returning to the U.S., or daily

commuters living in border communities. They arrive by passenger vehicle 

(sometimes on international ferry boats), on foot, by

airplane, or by cruise ship. Travelers usually bring 

luggage, gifts and other personal items with them –

and many bring contraband, necessitating inspections

by Customs. As is the case with commercial traffic,

inspection of individual travelers varies considerably

depending on what kind of port of entry is involved.

a. Land Border Ports of Entr y

Most non-commercial travelers cross the borders

in personal vehicles, meaning that Customs must

determine not simply if the driver and passengers are

carrying contraband on their persons, but also if any prohibited items are hidden

inside the car. The inspection process normally begins, as with commercial cargo,

at the primary inspection booth, where a driver must stop and answer the 

Customs inspector’s questions.

Since Customs inspectors do not have a computerized targeting system with

pre-filed information on a passenger vehicle, they must rely both on standard Customs procedures and methods for identifying high-risk individuals, and on their

own experience and judgment in determining whether a vehicle should be

referred to secondary inspection. Customs estimated that it apprehended 15.3

percent of serious violations at land border ports in fiscal year 2000; its targeting

methods were 12.6 times more effective than purely random inspections in fiscal

year 2000, and 18.3 times more effective in fiscal year 2001.108

On the Southern border, the amount of drugs being smuggled through

checkpoints is so large that Customs inspectors at a number of high-volume ports

of entry have begun the initial screening process even before vehicles reach the

primary inspection booth. At San Ysidro and El Paso, for example, canine enforcement officers lead dogs through the waiting lines of passenger vehicles to sniff for

narcotics. In Nogales, Customs inspectors walk among the waiting vehicles and

attempt to determine which ones will need closer examination.

Once a vehicle is referred to secondary inspection, it can be scanned with a

VACIS or X-Ray unit (as are commercial trucks), or it can be immediately searched

4 5

Customs inspection facility at

Nogales, AZ; showing the passenger

vehicle and truck inspection lanes.

Customs estimates that it apprehended 15.3% of violations at land

border ports in FY 2000; its 

targeting methods were 18.3 times

as effective as random searches in

FY 2001. (Subcommittee photo)]

Top 10 Land Border

Ports for Passenger

Vehicles, FY 2001

El Paso, TX

San Ysidro, CA

Detroit, MI

Brownsville, TX

Hidalgo, TX

Laredo, TX

Buffalo, NY

Calexico, CA

Nogales, AZ

Otay Mesa, CA

Source: U.S. Customs

Service data
by hand. Drug traffickers have grown increasingly sophisticated in hiding 

narcotics in secret compartments; in New York City, DEA officials demonstrated to 

Subcommittee staff some of the examples of mechanized, even motorized secret

compartments now found in smuggler’s vehicles.

Narcotics inspections are far more frequent on the Southern border, reflecting

the much larger amounts of illegal drugs there. At the San Ysidro crossing, Customs inspectors and assisting National Guardsmen searched a small passenger car

as the Subcommittee staff watched, revealing numerous packages of cocaine.

Within minutes after they finished, another such vehicle was being searched. Customs officials there must contend with lookouts employed by Mexican drug smuggling cartels, who watch inspectors and attempt to determine their habits and

potential weaknesses.

The Crucial Role of the Individual Inspector

The capture of Ahmed Ressam, the would-be 

"millennium bomber," illustrates how important the 

perception and experience of an inspector is. Diana

Dean, a Customs inspector at the passenger ferry

crossing of Port Angeles, Washington, caught Ressam

after she noticed how nervous he was while answering

her questions. When she referred him to secondary

inspection, he got out of his vehicle and attempted to

flee; Dean’s fellow inspectors Mark Johnson, Dan Clem

and Mike Chapman chased him through the streets of

Port Angeles until they finally apprehended him.

Searching his vehicle, they discovered what later turned

out to be a bomb in the trunk. This incident illustrates

the tremendous debt we owe to our Customs inspectors

and others like them, as they put their lives on the line

to protect the country.

4 6

Customs canine officers inspect a

van at San Ysidro, California.

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

C h a i rman Souder 

(center), at the Port

Angeles, WA ferry 

c rossing, with (from left)

Customs Inspector Mike

Chapman, Inspector

Diana Dean, Inspector

Mark Johnson, and U.S.

Coast Guard Captain

Bill Peterson. 

(Subcommittee photo)

Canine Inspectors

Customs uses dogs to detect

hidden narcotics, weapons,

currency, and other contraband. Nearly 700 canine

inspectors (who train the dogs

at Customs’ Front Royal, West

Virginia facility) are deployed

at land crossings, sea ports

and airports. The dogs are

generally considered very

effective.
Pedestrian traffic is small on the Northern border, but about 16 percent of

travelers on the Southern border do cross on foot. Customs inspectors must

determine which ones are suspicious, and may then subject them to a “pat down”

to determine if concealed packages or weapons are being carried. Customs has

also deployed Body Scanners, similar to those used at airports (see below), at 3

Southern border ports (as of April 2001), with 4 more still to be delivered.

Rail passengers represent a very small fraction of

total passengers at the land borders; on the Northern

b o r d e r, only about 270,000 passengers used rail transp o r t in 2000, less than half a percent of the total.1 0 9

(There are only four rail passenger crossings on the

Northern border: Rouses Point, New York (from Montreal); Port Huron, Michigan (from Toronto); Niagara

Falls, New York (from Toronto); and Blaine, Wa s h i n g t o n

(from Vancouver).) Northern border rail passengers

were, until September 11, subject to a procedure known

as “rolling inspection,” under an agreement with Amtrak

in 1993. Under “rolling inspection,” Customs inspectors

boarded the train when it arrived at the border and cleared passengers as the train

proceeded to its U.S. destination. Under the 1993 agreement, Amtrak committed to

providing advanced passenger information (using APIS, described below), but

according to Customs, Amtrak has thus far failed to do so.1 1 0

On the Southern border, passenger rail traffic is even smaller – only 18,000

passengers used rail transport to cross the border, less than 0.1 percent of the

total.111 In California, for example, the only cross-border rail crossing is a once-per

week train between Tecate, Mexico and Campo, California, carrying about 200

passengers. There is no passenger processing facility; all clearance is done on the

train, although Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) checks are

performed at the port of Tecate using information provided by the railroad.112

b. Airports

Unlike at land border checkpoints, Customs inspectors at international airports

generally have prior information on passengers that allows them to target the

highest risk individuals. The Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) allows

Customs inspectors to review the passenger lists of each incoming flight, and to

check their names against various databases and “watch lists” of known or suspected criminals or national security risks. Prior to September 11, 2001, a number

of carriers did not participate in this process, citing a lack of sufficient technology,

and/or passenger privacy concerns. After the terrorist attacks, Customs required

all carriers to provide APIS information or face the prospect of intensive inspections

of each and every passenger on the flight. Customs is phasing in that requirement, with all carriers expected to comply by July 2002.113

4 7

Examples of the increasingly sophisti -

cated ways that smugglers conceal

drugs, currency and other contraband.

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)]
4 8

At airports, international passengers pass through Customs inspection immediately after picking up their luggage. Even as they pick up their luggage, passengers are being screened by roving Customs inspectors, who look for clues as to

which individuals may merit closer examination. Customs inspectors at Washington-Dulles International Airport informed the Subcommittee staff that the effectiveness of this screening process had been hampered by the fact that all Customs

inspectors, including the roving inspectors, are now required to be in uniform.

This policy has made it impossible for the inspectors to blend in with the crowds

of passengers, meaning that they cannot do their

work unobserved. Moreover, they are now constantly

being approached by passengers seeking information,

distracting them from the screening process. Congress and Customs should work together to determine if a solution to this problem can be found.

While passengers collect their luggage, canine

enforcement officers also rove the baggage claim

area. If the dog “hits” on a particular bag, the officer

will direct the owner to secondary inspection.

Once passengers have their luggage, they

approach the primary inspector, who reads their Customs declaration forms,

observes the passengers, asks questions, and then directs potentially suspicious

individuals to secondary inspection. (For certain flights, such as those out of

Colombia and Peru – significant source countries for illegal narcotics – Customs

will sometimes refer every passenger to secondary inspection.) A version of ATS,

called ATS-P (Automated Targeting System – Passenger), a web-based computer

program operational since October 2001, is also used to screen passengers for

high-risk individuals. (Customs is working to fully integrate ATS-P with APIS.) At

secondary, luggage may be searched by hand, or sent through an x-ray machine.

If the inspectors believe an individual may be concealing narcotics or weapons on

his or her person, he or she may be subjected to a “pat down” hand search. At 8

major airports, including Dulles Airport, Customs has installed Body Scanners that

run a low-level x-ray scan, allowing the inspector to see concealed items. In some

cases, the inspector may have reason to believe a passenger has ingested packages

of narcotics (for example, rubber balloons filled with heroin). If so, the passenger

may be held in a detention room until he or she has a bowel movement. At some

airports, Customs has deployed mobile internal x-ray machines, which allow

inspectors to see if an individual has ingested contraband.114 

For fiscal year 2000, Customs estimated that it apprehended 20.4 percent of

serious violations at airports, a rate 15.6 times more effective than random inspections; in fiscal year 2001, Customs estimated its rate of apprehension was 15.7

times more effective than random targeting.115

Customs canine inspector examines

passenger baggage at the airport.

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

Top 10 U.S. Airports, 

International Passenger

Traffic, FY 2001

New York, NY (JFK)

Los Angeles, CA

Miami, FL

Chicago, IL (O’Hare)

Newark, NJ

San Francisco, CA

Atlanta, GA

Houston, TX

Honolulu, HI

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX

Source: U.S. Customs Service data

Customs estimates it 

apprehended 20.4% of violations at airports in FY 2000, a

rate 15.6 times more effective

than random inspections.
c. Sea Ports and Ferries

Sea port inspections are similar to those conducted at airports. Most passengers at sea ports arrive on cruise ships. As the number of cruise ship voyages

increases, Customs will have to deploy more inspectors and more equipment to

handle the increased volume.

Note that large numbers of passengers also arrive on ferries from Canada, 

particularly in the Washington state and Great Lakes regions. Inspections at these

sites are similar to those conducted at land border ports of entry.

3. CUSTOMS INVESTIGATIONS

In its effort to prevent illegal contraband of all kinds from

entering the country, Customs does not simply intercept 

prohibited items at the border and arrest the carrier. Customs

also carries out its own investigations of smuggling organizations, relying in large part on the intelligence generated by

border and port seizures. Customs’ special agents conduct

these investigations (which may include undercover operations

and “controlled deliveries” of seized narcotics to identify and

arrest more members of a smuggling ring). In fiscal year

2001, Customs special agents conducted 22,741 narc o t i c s

smuggling investigations.1 1 6 Special agents’ work is not 

limited to narcotics, however, but also focuses on cases of

money laundering, trade fraud, computer crime, and child pornography.

4. U.S. CUSTOMS AIR AND MARINE INTERDICTION

Customs is also heavily involved in preventing smuggling over the waters and

by air – a task it shares with the U.S. Coast Guard. Customs’ Air and Marine Interdiction Division conducts both surveillance and actual interdiction in the air and

on the waters. Customs’ airborne assets include Cessna Citation airplanes, P-3

AEW or Orion radar airplanes, and Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters. Its marine

assets include speed boats designed to intercept the “go-fast” boats now used by

smugglers to run drugs to American shores.117

Customs also maintains the Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center

(AMICC), located near Riverside, California. AMICC connects over 98 separate

radar sites around the country, including both ground-based military and civilian

radars, Aerostat balloon radars (designed to detect low-flying aircraft), and reconnaissance aircraft, allowing the AMICC staff to monitor flights into and within the

U.S. Chairman Souder and the Subcommittee staff visited AMICC, and observed

the huge computer screens that track the thousands of aircraft crossing the 

country. When AMICC staff detect a flight that is suspicious, it can alert 

4 9

Customs special agents prepare to

make a raid. Customs does not

simply intercept drugs and other

contraband at the ports of entry; it

also conducts investigations of

smuggling organizations. 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

The ferry crossing at Marine City,

MI, between Port Huron and

Detroit. Some ports of entry are

very small, but they still present

potential avenues for smugglers and

terrorists. (Subcommittee photo)

Customs air interdiction officers

apprehend drug smuggling suspects.

Customs’ Air and Marine Interdiction Division tracks incoming 

aircraft and boats used by drug

smugglers, and seeks to arrest them

upon landfall. 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)
5 0

Customs interdiction personnel, or other federal, state or local law enforcement

throughout the country to intercept the aircraft in the air or on the ground.

AMICC is thus a tremendous resource for all levels of law enforcement.

5. OUTBOUND INSPECTIONS

Customs is also responsible for inspecting vehicles

and cargo leaving the U.S., although for obvious reasons it does not devote the same level of resources to

this task as to inbound inspections. Many Northern

border crossings have no dedicated facilities for outbound inspections at all. 118 As one Customs official at

Sweetgrass, Montana informed Chairman Souder,

however, outbound inspections are very important,

since they are necessary to prevent the smuggling of

cocaine (often obtained in exchange for Canadian

B.C. Bud marijuana), and to prevent the smuggling of

illegal drug profits out of the U.S. In fiscal year 2001,

Customs made 1,199 seizures of outbound currency, totaling $46.9 million (unfortunately down 24 percent from fiscal year 2000 seizures). 

Customs’ outbound seizures are also necessary to prevent the smuggling of

stolen cars and military-grade weapons. In fiscal year 2001, Customs intercepted

463 outbound stolen vehicles, and seized 827 shipments of munitions, technology

and sanctioned goods, worth over $85 million.119

Customs has an automated computer system to track exports, the Automated

Export System (AES), which collects trade data from exporters and forwarding

agents. In fiscal year 2001, there were 5,302 filers submitting 18 million export

transactions on AES. The data collected on AES accounts for 77.3 percent of all

non-Canadian exports.120 AES will eventually be superceded by the new Automated Commercial Environment (ACE).

6. UPGRADING AND IMPROVING PORT OF ENTRY INFRASTRUCTURE

In addition to increased staffing and better information systems, Customs will

need significant improvements to the infrastructure at the ports of entry. Often,

the physical limitations of border crossing facilities account for the long delays

experienced by travelers. At Buffalo’s Peace Bridge, for example, the road

approaching the U.S. inspection lanes narrows and makes a sharp turn – which

causes trucks turning at the bend to block off passenger vehicles immediately

behind them. Thus, a single truck waiting at the bend can cause long back-ups

for cars trying to enter the U.S., because the cars are unable to approach the passenger inspection lane. At Detroit’s Ambassador Bridge facility, Customs officials

have space to inspect only a few trucks at a time – at the busiest truck crossing in

Customs P-3 surveillance aircraft

patrol the skies, looking for airborne

smugglers. Customs maintains a

substantial Air and Marine Interdiction Division, responsible for detecting and intercepting smugglers on

the water and in the air.

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)]

Outbound inspections are

particularly important in 

preventing illegal drug profits

and weapons technology from

leaving the U.S. In FY 2001,

Customs seized $46.9 million

in outbound currency, and $85

million worth of prohibited

munitions, technology and

sanctioned goods.
the world. And at the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, Customs needs new

inspection facilities at the docks, as currently its inspectors must drive suspect

cargo several miles through crowded city streets to its main facility to do detailed

inspections. In total, Customs has identified 822 port of entry infrastructure 

projects needed throughout the country, costing an estimated $784 million.

B. The Immigration and Naturalization Service

The INS is the primary agency entrusted with controlling the movement of

people across the U.S. border and through the ports of entry. A branch of the

U.S. Department of Justice, it is organized into 3 regional offices, 4 regional service

centers, 3 administrative centers, 36 district offices, 21 Border Patrol sectors, and is

present at each of the country’s ports of entry. The INS’ activities at the borders

are carried out by two branches of the Service: INS Inspections and the Border

Patrol. INS Inspections is responsible for examining all entrants at the ports of

entry; the Border Patrol is responsible for preventing illegal entries between 

the ports. A third “branch” of the INS’ law enforcement activities, interior 

enforcement, seeks to find and remove illegal aliens who manage to get past 

INS Inspections and/or the Border Patrol.

1. INS I NSPECTIONS

The INS currently employs 5,343 Inspectors, of whom 524 are stationed on

the Northern border, 1,545 are stationed on the Southern border, 82 are stationed

at sea ports, and 3,242 are stationed at airports.121 It is the job of INS inspectors to

5 1

The Customs office at Rouses

Point, New York. Customs will

need significant improvements to

port of entry infrastructure. Many

Customs facilities were built as

long ago as the 1930’s, and are in

need of repair or replacement.

Customs has identified 822 port of

entry infrastructure projects needed

in the U.S., costing an estimated

$784 million. 

(Subcommittee photo)

SUMMAR Y

• Customs can only inspect about 2% of imports,

but the most important measure of its effective -

ness is whether it can identify all high-risk cargo

shipments and travelers.

• Customs will need more personnel, better port of

entry infrastructure, and – most importantly – a

replacement for its current computer system, the

Automated Commercial System (ACS).

• Customs must complete its transition from a

paper-based, 20th century trade system to a computer-based, real-time system in the form of the

Automated Commercial Environment (ACE).
5 2

verify the identity of each individual requesting entry into the U.S., and to ensure

that all such individuals have the right to enter. Each year, there are over one-half

billion entries into the U.S. at ports of entry – 510 million in fiscal year 2001. The

vast majority are made at the land borders – in fiscal year 2001, for example, 413

million of the 510 million (79 million entries were made at airports, and 11.8 million at seaports).122 Over 70 percent of land crossings are made on the Southern

border and the remainder on the Northern border. Only one-third of these entries

were made by U.S. citizens.123 INS Inspections refused entry to approximately

700,000 persons in fiscal year 2001, a rejection rate of about 0.2 percent.124

In connection with the visa grant process (described below), INS Inspections is

probably the most important line of defense against potential terrorists and criminals who seek to slip into the U.S. from foreign soil. If INS Inspections fails to work

properly, these dangerous individuals may never be apprehended.

a. The Visa Grant Process

In general, all foreign visitors must have a visa granting them the right to

enter the U.S. and to remain for a given period of time and under certain conditions. (Immigrants must also receive a visa.) There are 24 major non-immigrant

visa categories, and 70 specific types of non-immigrant visas. The U.S. issued 7.1

million nonimmigrant visas in fiscal year 2000, of which 58.7 percent were for visitors for tourism or business, 21.3 percent were for Mexican border crossers (receiving the Border Crossing Card (BCC), or “laser visa” described in the section on

land inspections below), 8.4 percent were for students, and 4.9 percent for workers. (The remainder were for executives and investors, crew and transits, and

diplomats.)125 The State Department rejected about 2.1 million nonimmigrant

visa applications in fiscal year 2000, a rejection rate of about 23 percent.126 The

U.S. also issued about 413,000 immigrant visas in fiscal year 2000, and rejected

about 102,000 – a rejection rate of about 20 percent.127

Visas are required to be machine-readable, allowing INS inspectors at ports of

entry to swipe them through scanning machines. They also contain a photo of

the traveler.

128

Requests for visas are now processed overseas by the U.S. Department of State

through its Bureau of Consular Affairs. The Bureau’s consular officers are required

to check the names of all visa applicants on the State Department’s lookout database, the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which contains approximately 4 million records on suspected terrorists, drug smugglers, and international

criminals. CLASS includes data provided by TIPOFF, a classified database containing the State Department’s intelligence on suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations.129 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 now also authorizes the Attorney General

to provide criminal history data (most notably that gathered by the FBI) to the

State Department to assist it in its visa screening process.

INS Inspections desk, Rouses Point,

NY (Subcommittee photo)

INS Inspections

5,343 Inspectors

524 on Northern border

1,545 on Southern

border

3,242 at airports

82 at sea ports

510 million persons inspected

entering the U.S. in FY 2001

413 million at land 

crossings

79 million at airports

11.8 million at sea ports

0.2% of all international

travelers (whether foreigners

or U.S. citizens) are refused

entry by INS Inspections 

per year – about 700,000 in

FY 2001
The Bureau employs approximately 884 consular officers worldwide, of whom

about 75 percent (660+) have some involvement with the visa granting process; at

any given time, however, apparently only about 200-300 of them are working on

the visa clearance process. 130 In the late 1990’s, large backlogs in the Bureau’s

processing of visas raised concerns about staffing shortages; while the number of

visas applications had increased significantly, the total number of consular officers

providing visa services had actually fallen to less than 400. Beginning in 1998,

however, the State Department began hiring more officers.131

ENTRY WITHOUT VISAS

A large number of foreign visitors are no longer required to obtain visas, however. Under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP – formerly the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, or VWPP), citizens from 28 countries are allowed to visit the U.S. for up to

90 days without obtaining a visa (mirroring similar concessions made by these

countries to U.S. citizens). Thus, the State Department is unable to screen any of

these visitors before they reach U.S. ports of entry.132 In 2001, 17.1 million persons entered the U.S. under the VWP.

133

Another program, the Transit Without Visa program, allows foreign travelers to

change flights at U.S. airports (boarding planes bound for non-U.S. destinations)

without obtaining visas. Upon arrival, the passengers may remain in U.S. airports

for several hours, ostensibly in specially guarded secure lounges – although some

200,000 per year are allowed to mingle with the general airport population or

even leave the airport, escorted by private guards. More than 5 million passengers

have participated in the Transit Without Visa program in the last 3 fiscal years. The

INS, which administers the program, briefly suspended it after September 11, but

revived it with the additional safeguard of requiring such passengers to submit to

immigration inspection (described below) upon arrival.134 The program is

extremely important to the U.S. airline industry, which has aggressively promoted

it in recent years.

PROBLEMS WITH THE VISA PROCESS

There have been significant problems with the visa grant process and the visa

waiver programs. At every stage, of course, there is a risk of corruption, which will

bypass the security procedures designed to exclude dangerous individuals. For

example, a former employee of the U.S. consulate in Saudi Arabia (where, coincidentally, many of the September 11 hijackers obtained their visas) recently admitted that he took bribes in exchange for fraudulent visas.135 FBI and INS investigators also suspect that the airlines’ private security guards may have helped

passengers using the Transit Without Visa program to remain illegally in the country; apparently, the INS has cited the airlines nearly 6,000 times in the last three

years for failing to provide documentary proof that passengers actually left the

U.S.136 And in 1999, the Department of Justice’s inspector general reported that

5 3

Visas and Visa Waivers

• Every foreign visitor must

have a visa or be eligible

for a visa waiver

• 7.1 million non-immigrant

visas issued in 2000

• 2.1 million non-immigrant

visa applications re j e c t e d

(23% rejection rate)

• Visas are issued by State

Department’s Bureau of

Consular Affairs, which is

responsible for screening

out criminals and terrorists

• 17.1 million persons

entered under the Visa

Waiver Program in 2001,

which allows citizens of 

28 countries to visit the

U.S. without a visa for up

to 90 days

• 5 million persons entered

under the Transit Without

Visa program over past 3

years, which allows intransit foreign travelers to

remain in the U.S. for a

short time while connecting to another international flight
5 4

terrorists, immigrant smugglers and other criminals have used the VWP to try to

get into the U.S.137

Even when a visa has been granted under correct procedures, however, there

is no guarantee that the holder of a visa may safely be permitted to enter. At least

thirteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers

entered the U.S. with legally valid visas. This illustrates

the necessity of the second, and most important stage

of entering the U.S.: INS immigration inspection.

b. Land Border Inspections

At land border ports of entry, primary immigration inspection begins at the same time as primary

Customs inspection – each takes place at the same

primary inspection booth. In fact, Customs and INS

inspectors are cross-designated to do both tasks. For

immigration purposes, however, the inspector is

checking the status of the individual driver (or pedestrian). First, if (as is usually

the case) the traveler is approaching in a vehicle, the inspector is supposed to

enter the vehicle’s license plate number into a computer linked to the Interagency

Border Inspection System (IBIS) to determine if there are any “lookouts” for the

vehicle in various law enforcement databases – most notably the National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS II), the Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System (TECS), the State Department’s CLASS, and (on a limited

basis) the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC).138 (INS inspectors can

also access the IDENT system – described in the section on the Border Patrol

below – and, in some locations, the Enforcement Case Tracking System, or

ENFORCE.) Once the traveler reaches the inspection booth, the inspector is supposed to ask for identification, which should establish the citizenship of the individual seeking entry. If the traveler is a U.S. citizen, or a citizen of a country for

which the U.S. does not require a visa (under the VWP), then, assuming the

inspector is satisfied with the identification presented, the traveler may proceed.

Foreign visitors from countries for which visas are required must present them.

If at any point the inspector is not satisfied with the information presented, or

has some other reason to be suspicious, the traveler will be referred to secondary

inspection. At secondary inspection, INS inspectors will question the traveler 

further, do a more detailed check of the traveler’s identification and/or visa, and

run the traveler’s name through the IBIS database, which contains the names of

persons with histories of immigration violations, criminal histories, or who are 

considered national security risks. The INS estimated that it prevented 20.3 

percent of inadmissible aliens from entering the country at the 11 land ports of

entry it sampled in fiscal year 2000.139

The San Ysidro port of entry is the

single busiest border checkpoint in

the world (the Port of El Paso,

which processes more total travelers,

is divided into several different border crossings). 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

Top 10 Land Border 

Crossings for

Passengers/Pedestrians, 

FY 2001

El Paso, TX

San Ysidro, CA

Hidalgo, TX

Brownsville, TX

Laredo, TX

Detroit, MI

Buffalo, NY

Calexico, CA

Nogales, AZ

Otay Mesa, CA

Source: U.S. Customs Service data
Travelers determined to be inadmissible at the port of entry are given the

opportunity to withdraw their application and return voluntarily to Canada or

Mexico, or are referred to an Immigration Judge at the Executive Office for Immigration Review for an independent determination of admissibility, where applicants

may have legal representation at their own expense. Applicants referred to the

Immigration Judge may be detained by the INS depending on the facts of the

case. If there is a warrant for the traveler’s arrest, of course, the INS is supposed to

take that person into custody.

On the Northern border, the majority of persons entering the U.S. are either

American or Canadian citizens, meaning that visas are not required. On the

Southern border, however, Mexican citizens must have a visa. Section 104 of the

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996

required that visas for Mexican citizens be issued as part of an automated biometric system. The INS, together with the State Department, developed the Border

Crossing Card (BCC) in response. The BCC, also called a “laser visa,” is a laminated, credit card-style document with security features and 10-year validity. All

cards issued after April 1, 1998 are required to have a biometric component, such

as a fingerprint, and be machine-readable. The INS has installed laser visa card

readers at most border crossings, but there are some Southern border checkpoints

(including the McAllen, Texas port of entry) that have not yet done so. 

There have been some problems with the conversion to laser visas. The original deadline for all pre-April 1, 1998 BCCs to be replaced was October 1, 1999;

this deadline was extended by legislation to September 30, 2001 and subsequently to September 30, 2002. The final extension was only passed by Congress

in spring of this year; the delay left some 2 million Mexican citizens (including

some truck drivers and cross-border workers) temporarily without a legal means of

entering the country. This has meant a sharp reduction in the number of people

crossing the border.

140

c. Airport and Sea Port Inspections

At airport and sea ports, INS inspection is separate from Customs inspection.

Passengers are required to verify their identities and present their visas before proceeding to claim their luggage and go through Customs. INS inspectors are supposed to check foreign visitors’ names in the IBIS computer database to determine

if there are reasons to deny them entry or take them into custody.

141 The INS also

has access to the same APIS information used by Customs. In fiscal year 2000, the

INS estimated that it prevented 42.4 percent of inadmissible aliens from entering

the country at airports. 142

Questions have been raised about the effectiveness of INS Inspections at airports. These concerns can be divided into four general categories: thoroughness,

document fraud, computer system problems, and errors on the part of inspectors.

5 5

The INS estimates

that it prevented

20.3% of inadmissible

aliens from entering

the U.S. at land 

border ports of entry

in FY 2000.

The INS estimates 

that it prevented

42.4% of inadmissible

aliens from entering

the U.S. at airports 

in FY 2000.
5 6

First, the thoroughness of inspections has been criticized, as INS inspectors have

attempted to process large numbers of travelers in a relatively short period of time.

Until very recently, the INS was required by law to process all international flights

through primary inspection within 45 minutes – a policy that was certainly travelerf r i e n d l y, but may have forced INS inspectors to rush the screening process. Congress

redefined the 45 minute rule as a “goal” rather than a requirement in the Enhanced

Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. While this change should help,

INS inspectors still face the difficult problem of balancing the nation’s security needs

with the need to move large numbers of international travelers out of the airport.

Second, the problem of document fraud is still a major concern – if INS

inspectors are unable to detect forged or stolen documents, criminals and terrorists will continue to use them to gain entry. Currently, virtually all countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program issue machine-readable passports, allowing INS

inspectors to inspect their documents with the benefit of automated systems – a

situation which should make the process more efficient and decrease the chances

of document fraud. The Justice Department inspector general reported in December 2001, however, that INS inspectors were still not consistently checking passport numbers in the automated lookout system – only travelers’ names were being

checked.143 And even when passports are machine-readable, the problem of identity theft raises the possibility that a visitor may not be who he claims. The inspector general also found that the INS had done a poor job of maintaining records of

stolen passports in its automated lookout system – meaning that these passports

may have been used to enter the country without INS inspectors having been

aware that they were stolen.144

Third, the IBIS computer system used by INS inspectors has serious technical

problems. An INS inspector in the Miami airport recently told CBS News that

when the database containing the names of suspected terrorists and known criminals crashes (which supposedly happens once or twice a week), INS supervisors

order the inspectors to continue processing aliens.145 The INS has denied that the

computer system crashes so frequently (though one official acknowledged that

crashes are “not rare”). The INS has also denied that passengers are simply waved

through when that happens; instead, the INS says that CD-ROMs containing the

names of individuals on the watch lists are used as a backup (though officials

acknowledge that the CD-ROMs are not in every inspection booth).146 Without

taking sides in the dispute, it is clear that (a) the INS needs a computer system

that crashes less frequently, and (b) the INS needs to make sure that an adequate

backup system is in place and is always used when crashes occur. Other computer

problems have recently surfaced; an error during an upgrade of the NAILS database caused nearly 3,500 people identified as suspected criminals or even terrorists

to be dropped from the system for nearly two months, from March to May 2002.

As a result, at least one individual in that group entered the country without being

apprehended, and the INS is unsure how many others may have entered.147

Questions have been raised

about how thorough and

effective INS inspections are.

Computer system crashes, 

failures to keep track of 

stolen passport numbers, 

and inspector errors may 

have allowed criminals to 

slip by the INS.

The IBIS database

used by INS

inspectors has

serious technical

problems.
Fourth, the huge volume of international travelers makes the risk of errors on the

part of inspectors almost inevitable. For example, recently an INS inspector improperly allowed 4 Pakistani crewmen on a Russian vessel to come ashore; they then disappeared. The ship’s 27 crewmen, 19 of whom were Pakistani, were granted a special waiver at Norfolk, Virginia to go ashore. The INS inspector failed to follow

protocol before issuing the waivers, including getting a senior-level administrator to

sign off on them. An inspector also entered an improper birth date for one of the 4

men, which would have revealed that the man had committed an immigration violation in Chicago several years ago.1 4 8 The INS must take steps to ensure that inspectors follow proper procedures; failure to do so can mean allowing a terrorist cell to

be established on U.S. soil. Corruption can, unfortunately, also be a potential problem – as it is for every law enforcement agency. In Los Angeles, for example, an INS

s u p e rvisor was recently arrested for allegedly smuggling illegal immigrants into the

c o u n t ry, using the Transit Without Visa program.1 4 9

d. Entry/Exit Monitoring System

One major difficulty for the INS lies in determining whether, and when, a legal

foreign visitor has actually left the country. As noted above, most visas allow visitors to remain in the U.S. for a limited time only, and even visitors not required to

have visas under the Visa Waiver Program may stay for no more than 90 days. Visitors who fail to leave after their visas expire, or after the 90-day period granted

under the VWP, are referred to as “nonimmigrant overstays.” Finding and deporting nonimmigrant overstays is both challenging and vital, since (as noted above) a

large percentage of the illegal immigrants in this country got into the country by

overstaying their visas. In fact, abusing the legal visa process (or the VWP) is a

very popular method for criminals to enter the country. (Three of the September

11 hijackers had overstayed their visas.)

An entry/exit monitoring system is required if the INS is going to be able to

keep track of nonimmigrant overstays. Unfortunately, a true entry/exit system does

not yet exist. The INS maintains a Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) database in an effort to identify nonimmigrant overstays, but the system lacks sufficient

information to be effective. For an entry/exit system to work, the INS must be able

to collect entry information on every foreign visitor, and exit information when the

visitor leaves the country. The INS could then match the entry and exit information

for each visitor to determine whether that person had indeed left on time.

Under current law, however, the INS cannot collect documentary entry or exit

information from Canadian and Mexican citizens at land border crossings. Thus,

for all practical purposes, virtually all of the nearly 195 million foreigners who enter

at land ports of entry do not have to provide any entry information at all. Section

110 of the original 1996 IIRIRA mandated that the INS set up a complete

entry/exit system at the border, but under pressure from the Canadian and Mexican governments, and Congressional delegates from border areas (who legiti5 7

Lack of an Entry/Exit 

System

• 41% of the 5 million or

more illegal immigrants

residing in the U.S.

entered legally, but 

failed to leave at the

required time.

• The INS does not currently have a system that

effectively tracks the

entry and exit of foreign

visitors to the U.S. – thus

it cannot be certain when

an individual has entered,

or whether he or she 

has left.

• At the land borders, the

INS collects virtually no

e n t ry or exit inform a t i o n

at all.

• At airports and sea ports,

the INS collects the I-94

entry and exit form, but

it has been unable to 

collect complete and

accurate I-94 cards when

foreigners leave.

• Congress and the Administration are working to

create a fully automated

entry/exit system that

would rely on machinereadable passports 

and visas.
5 8

mately feared creating even longer lines at land border crossings), Congress subsequently amended that provision. The new “entry/exit system” mandated by the

Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management and Improvement Act

of 2000 cannot involve any new documentary requirements – which essentially

renders the system non-functional at the present time.

At airport and sea ports, the INS does collect entry/exit information in the

form of the I-94 card, which all foreign visitors must fill out before arrival, submit

to an INS inspector, and then return to the INS upon departure. It is primarily

these entries and exits – about 15 percent of all nonimmigrant entries into the U.S.

– that the NIIS tracks.150 As the Department of Justice’s inspector general has

reported, however, even this data is incomplete and poorly managed. The inspector general found that the INS does not actively monitor airline compliance with

the requirement that passengers provide accurate I-94 departure records. Essentially, the airlines have failed to collect I-94 departure forms from all of their passengers, and the INS has been slow to enforce the requirement because it has

been waiting for full deployment of its Automated I-94 System – a system which

the INS has now decided to abandon in favor of the system called for by the USA

Patriot Act of 2001 (see below).151

Congress and the Administration have sought to implement a complete, automated entry/exit system at all of our ports of entry. President Bush has requested

$380 million for fiscal year 2003 for the development of such a system; the USA

Patriot Act of 2001, enacted in the wake of the September 11 attacks, expressed the

sense of Congress that the integrated entry/exit system required by Section 110 of

the IIRIRA be implemented as quickly as possible. The Enhanced Border Security and

Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 also mandates an automated entry/exit system, relying

on machine-readable passports and other entry documents. In principle, the system

could rely on automatic passport and visa reading machines at each port of entry,

which would record the date and location of a visitor’s entry into the U.S., and the

date and location of his departure (feeding all of this information into a central database). It will likely be some time before such a system is in place, however.

SUMMAR Y

• The entire process of legal entry into the U.S. – from the

visa application system (currently administered by the State

Department), to INS Inspections at the ports of entry, to 

the development of an automated, complete entry/exit

monitoring system – must be harmonized and upgraded

with the latest technology. This will be a primary task for

the new Department of Homeland Security .

• Preventing the illegal entry of foreigners is critical, since

tracking down those who make it in is extremely difficult.
2. THE U.S. B ORDER PATROL

The Border Patrol is tasked with the defense of the open border between the

ports of entry. As might be imagined, this is a massive undertaking. As of February 2002, the Border Patrol had 9,812 agents, of whom approximately 9,126 were

stationed on the Southern border, and only 348 on the Northern border.

152 There

are 8 Northern border sectors, and 9 Southern border sectors.

To carry out its mission, the Border Patrol relies on both manpower and technology. Its agents use a number of different kinds of vehicles, from patrol cars and

all terrain vehicles to helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft and even patrol boats. In Arizona, agents even use mobile towers to observe the remote stretches of the Southern border. Finally, the Border Patrol makes extensive use of sensors and remote

video surveillance systems as “force multipliers” that allow more territory to be

watched by fewer agents.153

a. Checkpoints Away From the Border

One somewhat controversial strategy implemented by the Border Patrol has

been the use of checkpoints on major roads, designed to catch alien and drug

smugglers away from the border itself. The Border Patrol has established 26 

permanent checkpoints along freeways and highways in Texas, New Mexico and

California, including the large checkpoint on the I-5 freeway between San Diego

and Los Angeles. Vehicles are required to stop and are observed by agents, who

5 9

A Border Patrol agent watches the

line. (Courtesy Immigration and

Naturalization Service)

U.S. Border Patrol - Sectors

(Courtesy Immigration and Naturalization Service)

U.S. Border Patrol

9,812 agents

9,126 on Southern

border

348 on Northern border

21 sectors

8 Northern border 

sectors

9 Southern border 

sectors

1.5 million apprehensions of

illegal aliens each year
6 0

may also ask questions. If the agent is suspicious, a vehicle may be directed to

secondary inspection.

Concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of these checkpoints, particularly since they are

fixed – in other words, everyone, including smugglers, knows where they are and can attempt to circumvent them. Moreover, they arguably divert

agents and resources away from the actual border,

thus implicitly conceding part of the immediate border zone to illegal immigrants and smugglers. These

concerns have prompted Congress to prohibit the

Border Patrol from building permanent checkpoints in

its Tucson sector (which covers much of the ArizonaMexico border).

Though these concerns are valid, it is clear that some form of checkpoints

should be used. If INS Inspections can only intercept about 20 percent of illegal

immigrants at the land border crossings, and even more migrants are getting

through between the ports of entry, then the Border Patrol must have a mechanism to catch them away from the border. In conversations with Subcommittee

Members and staff, the Border Patrol has insisted that the checkpoints are effective, and pointed to the numbers of arrests made at them, including statistics

showing that seizures of marijuana are much higher in sectors with permanent

checkpoints (the Border Patrol apparently apprehended 4 times as many illegal

aliens and seized 13 times as much marijuana along Highway 281 in south Texas

as along Interstate 19 between Nogales and Tucson, Arizona). 

The real issue is whether the checkpoints should be permanent or roving. The

Border Patrol’s preference for permanent checkpoints is based on two factors: legal

and technological. First, the Border Patrol believes that U.S. Supreme Court decisions have made it illegal for law enforcement to use roving checkpoints to stop

and inspect motorists away from the border. This argument may be valid, though

it is far from obvious that there is no constitutional way for the Border Patrol to

move a checkpoint. Because of this perceived legal limitation, the “roving” checkpoint outside Tucson, Arizona does not move at all – thus removing any advantage

from mobility. Second, the Border Patrol claims that it has been unable to establish effective wireless links to roving checkpoints to allow agents to access computer databases (like IDENT, described below). Fixed checkpoints can obviously

have ground wire links. This simply highlights the need for the INS to improve its

computer systems technology, a problem discussed in more detail in Section IV.

The roving checkpoint outside Tucson, Arizona. (Courtesy U.S. Border Patrol – Tucson Sector)

The Checkpoints 

Controversy

The Border Patrol uses 

permanent checkpoints on

major roads past the Southern

Border, except in most of 

Arizona due to Congressional

mandate; in that area, it uses

non-permanent, "roving"

checkpoints. The Border Patro l

believes the permanent checkpoints are a successful mechanism for apprehending alien

and drug smugglers; its data

show that it apprehended 4

times as many illegal aliens 

and seized 13 times as much

marijuana along Highway 281

in south Texas as along I-19

between Nogales and Tucson,

Arizona. Though checkpoints

appear to be a useful strategy, it

is questionable whether fixed

checkpoints are really more

effective than truly roving

checkpoints. The "roving"

checkpoint outside Tucson does

not really move; it stays in the

same place, night after night.

The key problems with roving

checkpoints are legal and 

technological: the Border 

P a t rol must find a way to have

constitutional road checkpoints,

and must also improve its 

wireless technology to allow

agents to link up to key INS

databases while on the road.
b. The Southern Border Strategy

The Border Patrol has grown significantly in recent years, in response to Congressional mandates. In fact, the INS has added over 5,000 Border Patrol agents

since 1993 (a 150 percent increase) to sectors on the Southern border. In 1996

Congress required the Border Patrol to add 1,000 agents per year on the Southern

border from fiscal years 1997-2001, but it was only able to achieve this in 1997

and 1998.

Apprehensions In Southwest Border Patrol Sectors in Fiscal Years 1995, 

1998 and 2000

(Graphic courtesy of General Accounting Office)

The Southern Border Strategy

The Southern Border Strategy was introduced by the INS in 1994. In 4 phases (the

first three focusing on diff e rent parts of the U.S.-Mexico border), the INS planned to

stem the tide of illegal immigration by increasing Border Patrol personnel and techn o l o g y, and implementing aggressive new tactics – most notably putting more agents

d i rectly on the border to deter crossings instead of responding to crossings after they

o c c u r. The INS added 5,000 agents to Southern border sectors after 1993.

The strategy resulted in significant drops in illegal crossings in the targeted areas, but also 

created significant spikes in areas that did not receive as many new resources. Unfortunately,

overall illegal immigration did not drop until last year. The INS claims that it will need 3,200

to 5,500 more Border Patrol agents and $450-500 million to complete the securing of the

Southern border.

6 1

View of the CaliforniaMexico border. (Subcommittee photo)
6 2

The growth in agents accompanied a shift in border enforcement strategy,

announced in 1994. The INS set forth a four-phase strategy, designed to tighten

the border by sectors. Phase One focused on the San Diego and El Paso sectors

(which at that time were the most active in terms of illegal immigration); Phase

Two would focus on the Tucson, Arizona and Del Rio, Laredo and McAllen, Texas

sectors; Phase Three would focus on the remaining three sectors on the Southern

border; and Phase Four would tighten the Northern border, Gulf Coast, and other

coastal waterways. The strategy was intended to close off the routes (usually

through urban areas) most frequently used by smugglers and illegal aliens, and

shift traffic to ports of entry or to areas that are more remote and difficult to cross.

The strategy had already been implemented in El Paso in September 1993

with Operation Hold-the-Line, focusing on the busiest 20-mile section of the border. In 1994, Operation Gatekeeper began in San Diego, focusing initially on the

5-mile section that at the time accounted for nearly 25 percent of all illegal crossings. The operation has since been expanded to the entire 66 miles of the San

Diego Border Patrol sector. That same year, Operation Safeguard began in the

Tucson sector, focusing initially on Nogales, and later expanding to Douglas and

Naco, Arizona. In August 1997, the Border Patrol launched Operation Rio Grande

in south Texas, focusing on the McAllen and Laredo sectors. In 1998, Operation

Gatekeeper expanded to include the El Centro, California sector.

To implement the plan, the Border Patrol concentrated personnel in the targeted

areas, increased its use of sensors and other technology, and increased the physical

barriers (i.e. fencing) to crossing the border. Agents began to spend more time waiting at the border for smugglers and aliens to cross, rather than responding to incursions after they happened. The amount of time spent by agents on border enforc ement activities in the targeted sectors increased by 27 perc e n t .1 5 4

The strategy was certainly effective in the areas targeted, in that apprehensions of illegal aliens at first spiked, and then dropped dramatically. The San

Diego, El Paso and McAllen Border Patrol sectors showed significant drop-offs in

apprehensions from fiscal year 1998 through 2000.155 The San Diego sector in

particular saw a drop of 76 percent from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 2001.156

As the Border Patrol predicted, illegal alien traffic shifted from the targeted

areas to the less heavily patrolled areas. From fiscal years 1994-98, for example,

apprehensions increased in Calexico, California ten-fold, and more than doubled in

Nogales. Unfortunately, at least until very recently, the total number of apprehensions along the Southern border continued to increase, thus defying the INS’ hope

that by pushing illegal aliens to more remote, inhospitable areas (like the southern

Arizona desert), more aliens would be deterred. In the first 4 months of 2001,

Border Patrol apprehensions finally declined (by 26 percent) as compared with the

same period in 2000. The reasons for the decline are unclear, and may be attributable more to the slowing U.S. economy than to the Border Patrol’s efforts. The
GAO reported in August 2001 that the Border Patrol still has not developed adequate data to show the overall effect of its stepped-up activities on illegal traffic.157

The new strategy has improved the quality of life in the targeted communities;

at the Subcommittee’s hearing in San Diego, for example, witnesses confirmed

that crime and property damage associated with illegal traffic had gone down.

The surge in traffic in other areas, however, created havoc in those communities.

In Calexico, for example, the increase in illegal traffic was accompanied by an

increase in prowler calls and vehicle thefts.158 Witnesses told the Subcommittee

that in Nogales, crime increased dramatically until the Border Patrol erected new

fencing and drove the illegal traffic outside the town.159

Although it is clear the Southern border strategy has begun to have results (at

least in targeted areas), it is equally clear that more needs to be done. INS’ preliminary estimates show that it may need 3,200 to 5,500 more agents, additional

support personnel, and hundreds of millions of dollars in new technology to fully

implement the southwest border strategy. The total number of agents would thus

be between 11,700 and 14,000; it would take 5-9 years and Congressional

approval to achieve this level of staffing on the Border Patrol. Southwest border

sectors have requested new technology estimated to cost between $450 million

and $500 million, nearly all of it for about 1,100 remote video surveillance systems. INS budget officials told the GAO it would take 7-10 years to deploy the

additional staff and technology required to complete the strategy.

160 

c. IDENT

The Automated Biometric Identification System, called IDENT, was created in

1989 as an automated fingerprint identification system allowing the INS to identify

and track aliens who repeatedly crossed the border. The system was first deployed

in the field in October 1994 by the San Diego Border Patrol sector. The 1996

IIRIRA directed the INS to expand the use of IDENT to illegal or criminal aliens

nationwide. The system is now used in all Southern border sectors and most

Northern sectors, as well as in some INS District offices and ports of entry. In

1996 the INS began integrating IDENT with its Enforcement Case Tracking System

(ENFORCE), which collects enforcement data from across the INS. Ports of entry

and 2 of the Border Patrol’s Northern sectors (Houlton, Maine and Swanton, 

Vermont), however, only have access to IDENT and not to ENFORCE.

The IDENT system stores flat press (as opposed to rolled) fingerprints of an alien’s

right and left index fingers. It also stores a photograph and certain other biographical

information. IDENT then electronically compares an apprehended alien’s fingerprints

to fingerprints in 3 databases: (1) a lookout database that contains fingerprints and

photographs of about 240,000 aliens who are convicted or suspected of serious

crimes or narcotics smuggling, or are deemed national security risks; (2) a database

that tracks 300,000 aliens who have an administrative final order of removal or who

are deemed an officer safety risk; and (3) an apprehension database that contains 

6 3

The Alphabet Soup of 

INS Databases

At the ports of entry, INS uses the

Interagency Border Inspections 

System (IBIS) to check the identity

of persons entering the U.S. IBIS

has access to the following 

databases:

• National Automated Immigration

Lookout System II (NAILS II)

• Treasury Enforcement 

Communications System 

(TECS, also used by Customs)

• Consular Lookout and Support

System (CLASS, maintained by

State Department)

• National Crime Information 

Center (NCIC, maintained by 

the FBI – available to INS on a

limited basis only)

The Border Patrol and INS 

Inspections also have access to:

• Automated Biometric 

Identification System (IDENT)

• Enforcement Case Tracking 

System (ENFORCE)

Agencywide, the INS also 

maintains:

• Central Index System (CIS)

• Deportable Alien Control 

System (DACS)

A number of issues have arisen

with respect to these databases:

• IDENT is a fingerprint-based

database used to identify illegal

aliens apprehended at the border.

Currently, however, it cannot

search the other major fingerprint-based crime databases, the

Integrated Automated Fingerprint

Identification System (IAFIS) and

the National Crime Information

Center 2000 (NCIC 2000), both

maintained by the FBI. This

means Border Patrol agents and

INS personnel cannot use IDENT

to determine if an apprehended

alien is wanted for serious crimes.

• IBIS frequently crashes, and

NAILS has also experienced 

serious computer problems

• Congress has mandated that

IDENT and IAFIS be integrated,

and that the INS integrate all of

its information databases into 

a single system (the "Chimera"

system) 
6 4

fingerprints and photographs of 4 million illegal aliens who have been apprehended

by the INS, enrolled in IDENT and then allowed to leave the U.S. voluntarily. The

electronic comparison normally takes about 2 minutes. The system was designed to

handle a high volume of fingerprint checks in a relatively short time, in response to

the high volume of apprehensions which the Border Patrol must rapidly process.

One major issue which has arisen is the lack of integration between IDENT and

other law enforcement databases, most notably the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and the NCIC 2000 system, created by the

National Crime Information Center. IAFIS, which was finally deployed in July 1999, 5

years after IDENT, uses 10 rolled fingerprints. It contains more than 40 million such

ten-print records, with the response time for a search about 2 hours for criminal fingerprints and 24 hours for civil fingerprints. NCIC 2000 allows law enforc e m e n t

agents to quickly search 22 NCIC databases containing 60 million records. It also

allows agents in the field to transmit a single pressed fingerprint that is searched in

minutes against a subset of NCIC databases. NCIC was built to handle a limited volume of fingerprints against a much smaller set of databases than IAFIS.

The FBI and the INS met in 1990 to discuss their plans for automated fingerprint systems, but the INS determined that its system requirements were significantly different, and that it could not wait for the FBI to develop IAFIS. Thus, it is

not possible for the Border Patrol to check the FBI’s criminal database when it

checks illegal aliens’ fingerprints on IDENT.

Concern about the lack of integration surfaced in 1999 with the Resendez

case, in which a Mexican national known as the “railroad killer,” who was wanted

for several murders in the U.S., was repeatedly apprehended crossing the border

by the Border Patrol but was released each time. Local, state and federal law

enforcement officers had obtained warrants for Resendez’s arrest, beginning in

1998, but IDENT did not contain that information. The Border Patrol was therefore unaware of the warrants when it apprehended Resendez as late as June 1999,

found no criminal history information about him in IDENT, and simply released

him back to Mexico (as is common with illegal aliens). Resendez returned to 

commit 4 more murders that month.

While the lack of database integration was certainly a contributing factor in the

Resendez case, a Justice Department inspector general report indicates that the

action, or rather lack of action, of three INS investigators was a major culprit. Even

though the databases are not integrated, it is still possible to put “lookouts” into the

IDENT system if the INS obtains information that they are being sought. Three INS

investigators were contacted by local law enforcement authorities seeking Resendez,

but they failed to put a lookout into the system; two of the investigators did nothing

at all, and the third referred the local authorities to Customs to have a lookout put in

its Tr e a s u ry Enforcement Communications System (TECS) database – which would

only have been useful if Resendez had tried to enter through a port of entry.1 6 1 H a d
the INS taken care to update its lookout list on IDENT, Resendez might have been

apprehended earlier even without database integration.

As a result of the Resendez case, Congress imposed a moratorium on further

deployment of IDENT until the Justice Department completed several tests on the

feasibility of IDENT/IAFIS integration. The Justice Department announced a 5-year plan to integrate the two databases in March 2000; the plan would cost $200 million,

and would supplement IAFIS with IDENT’s fingerprint

files, while allowing the INS to check fingerprints of

apprehended aliens against IAFIS. The Justice Departm e n t ’s tests, however, estimated that upgrading IDENT’s

2-print system to a 10-print system would cost $450-570

million between fiscal years 2002-07. An additional $600

million to $1.4 billion would be required in additional

detention and processing costs as more criminal aliens

would be identified under the new system.1 6 2

d. The Northern Border

The Northern border has received considerably less attention and resources

from the Border Patrol. In 1999, only 311 of the nation’s 8,364 agents were

assigned to the eight northern Border Patrol sectors. From fiscal years 1995-98, all

of the additional new agents were assigned to the Southern border.

163 At the

direction of Congress, 44 new agents were assigned to the Northern border from

fiscal years 1999-2001, along with 41 new vehicles, additional sensor systems were

deployed to 5 of the 8 northern sectors, and all of the sectors received new night

vision devices. In January 2002, the Attorney General announced the temporary

assignment of 100 agents to the northern sectors, for approximately 60 days. Further deployments to the northern sectors are planned for this fiscal year.

164

The Northern border still does not have adequate Border Patrol staffing and

resources, however. Four of the eight sectors do not have any stations operating

on a 24-hour basis. 165 One sector informed the Justice Department’s inspector

general that it had identified 65 smuggling corridors along its 300 miles of border,

but the sector had only 36 sensors with which to monitor the activity. The Border

Patrol still uses antiquated radio equipment that criminals can monitor; the INS

does not plan to replace it until 2005. The northern sectors reported to the

inspector general that they needed more remote cameras, boats, office space and

support staff as well.166 These statements were confirmed to the Subcommittee

and its staff during our visits to several Northern border sectors.

It must be recognized, however, that 100 percent enforcement at the Northern border is unrealistic. Even with cameras and sensors, the Border Patrol cannot

be expected to monitor every mile of the 4,100-mile mainland boundary with

6 5

Border Patrol headquarters, Blaine,

WA (Subcommittee photo)

Only about 350 Border

Patrol agents are currently

stationed (on a permanent

basis) on the vast Northern

border. Four of the eight

Northern border sectors 

do not have any stations

operating on a 24-hour

basis.165 The Border Patrol 

is also in need of new equipment on the Northern border;

one sector reported that it

had identified 65 smuggling

corridors, but only had 36

sensors to monitor them with.
6 6

Canada.167 As on the Southern border, the INS will have to devise a strategy,

focusing its efforts on the corridors most accessible to smugglers. Individuals will

still be able to cross the border, but their ability to set up smuggling networks will

be significantly hampered if the Border Patrol deploys its (expanded) forces wisely.

3. INS I NTERIOR ENFORCEMENT

The INS is also responsible for tracking down and deporting illegal aliens

who are able to get past INS Inspections and/or the Border Patrol, and for removing immigrants who overstay their visas. There are three components of the INS’

interior enforcement: Investigations, Detention and Deportation, and Intelligence.168 INS Investigations’ special agents, who are essentially the plain-clothes

law enforcement branch of the INS, carry out a wide variety of operations. Their

activities range from investigating and breaking up alien smuggling rings, to cracking down on U.S. employers of illegal aliens, to preventing document and benefits

fraud. They are also responsible for identifying immigrants who violate the law

and become deportable. It is these special agents who must find and remove illegal immigrants who get past our borders and ports of entry. INS’ Intelligence

branch supports the Investigations agents by developing and analyzing intelligence on illegal smuggling rings and other operations, while Detention and

Deportation officers are charged with holding apprehended aliens in INS detention

facilities and transporting them out of the country.

The INS has had some success in removing illegal aliens from the U.S.; in fiscal

year 1999, for example, the INS removed 176,990 aliens (including 62,359 criminal aliens). An additional 72,000 illegal aliens were allowed to leave voluntarily

that year, waiving their right to a removal proceeding before an administrative law

judge.169 Removals increased slightly in fiscal year 2000, to over 181,000.170 It has

SUMMAR Y

• The Border Patrol’s Southern Border Strategy of the 1990’ s

shows both how effective vigorous enforcement can be in

targeted areas, and how illegal traffic can quickly shift to

less guarded areas.

• The problems of integrating the Border Patrol’s and the

FBI’s automated fingerprint identification systems illustrate

one of the key challenges facing the new Department of

Homeland Security: coordinating information systems

development.

• The vast Northern border presents significant challenges: 

it must be watched, but it is perhaps too large to watch 

at all times.
also broken a number of large and sophisticated alien smuggling rings, including

one organization that smuggled over 7,200 migrants from India over three years,

earning nearly $220 million in the process.171

Nevertheless, the challenge of finding and deporting all of the people who enter

the U.S. illegally, or who overstay their visas, is daunting. As noted above, there are

an estimated 5 million illegal aliens in the U.S., with many more arriving each year –

thus, the deportation of 200,000-300,000 per year may not do much to reduce the

total illegal population. Even when the INS is able to obtain deportation orders

against known illegal aliens, it cannot always find and remove them. At a hearing

before the Subcommittee in December 2001, INS Commissioner Ziglar testified that

about 314,000 individuals have jumped bail and disappeared in the face of deportation orders; the INS was at that point only just beginning to enter their names into

the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database to ensure that they

could be identified as illegal aliens if subsequently arrested on unrelated charges.1 7 2

These numbers illustrate how important it is to apprehend illegal aliens, particularly

criminals, before they enter the country – since if they are not apprehended then, the

chances of apprehending them later are small indeed.

C. The U.S. Coast Guard

The U.S. Coast Guard, the federal government’s

principal maritime law-enforcement agency, is a military service and a branch of the armed forces, operating within the Department of Transportation.173 The

Coast Guard is small in size, with about 36,000 active

duty personnel, 8,000 reservists, 6,000 civilian

employees, and the 32,000 all-volunteer auxiliary

force, possessing a unique blend of law enforcement,

regulatory, diplomatic, humanitarian, and military

capabilities. A multi-mission service, the Coast Guard

performs five fundamental roles: maritime security, maritime safety, protection of

natural resources, maritime mobility (ensuring the flow of waterborne traffic), and

national defense.174

Prior to September 11, the Coast Guard’s typical yearly distribution of operating

effort in various mission areas was as follows: drug interdiction, 18 percent; fisheries

and marine resources enforcement, 16 percent; aids to navigation, 15 percent;

marine safety, 14 percent; search and rescue, 12 percent; marine environmental

protection, 11 percent; migrant interdiction, 5 percent; ice operations, 4 percent;

defense readiness, 2 percent; port security, 1 percent; and other activities, 1 percent. Some of the significant Coast Guard accomplishments during 2001 included

saving the lives of 4,200 mariners in distress, interdicting 3,900 undocumented

migrants attempting to illegally enter the country by sea, boarding over 9,100

fishing vessels to enforce fishery and safety regulations, and ensuring more than 1

6 7

U.S. Coast Guard patrol boats at

Port Angeles, Washington. 

(Subcommittee photo)

INS Interior Enforcement

INS interior enforcement 

officers are tasked with finding

and deporting illegal immigrants who make it past the

border. In FY 1999, the INS

removed 176,990 aliens

(including 62,359 criminal

aliens). The task of deporting

all of the nation’s estimated 5

to 9 million illegal immigrants

is daunting, however. The

INS reports that 314,000 

individuals have already had

deportation orders entered

against them, but they have

jumped bail and cannot 

be found.
6 8

million safe passages of commercial vessels through congested harbors. 

The Coast Guard also plays a major role in drug interdiction, providing (along

with Customs) our nation’s marine line of defense against narcotics smugglers. In

2001, the Coast Guard prevented 138,000 pounds of cocaine and 34,000 pounds

of marijuana from reaching the U.S. The importance of the Coast Guard in our

nation’s counter-narcotics efforts is highlighted by the fact that the Coast Guard’s

Commandant (its highest-ranking officer) has traditionally served as the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC), responsible for coordinating all of the drug interdiction

efforts of the U.S. government.

The Coast Guard operates in a complex and dangerous maritime environment

characterized by rapidly changing security threats at home and abroad. It must

therefore be flexible, versatile, and maintain sufficient resources to be capable of

short-term “surge” operations in response to major crises. This was never truer

than after September 11, as the nation was forced to address the vulnerability of

our seaports and maritime borders to terrorist attack. Prior to September 11, the

Coast Guard’s work in the maritime security arena concentrated on counter-drug

operations, fisheries enforcement, and illegal migration operations. The Coast

Guard’s activities in the nation’s seaports were predominantly focused on

marine/port safety, with less than 2 percent of the total effort directed toward port

The U.S. Coast Guard

36,000 active duty personnel

8,000 reservists

6,000 civilian employees

32,000 auxiliary volunteers

In FY 2001, the Coast GuardInterdicted 138,000

pounds of cocaine

Interdicted 34,000 pounds

of marijuana

Apprehended over 3,900

illegal migrants

Saved the lives of 4,200

mariners

U.S. Coast Guard Organizational Map

(Courtesy U.S. Coast Guard)
security matters. After September 11, this percentage grew to 58 percent as the

Coast Guard significantly changed its mission focus to improve maritime security.

The following are some of the more significant actions taken by the Coast

Guard to strengthen seaport and waterway security after September 11:

• Cutters and aircraft were diverted from more distant high seas operations

to patrol U.S. ports and coastal waters. 

• 124 security zones were established and enforced throughout the nation’s

ports and waterways.

• Over one-third of the Coast Guard’s reserves (about 2,700 personnel)

were activated; in addition, the Coast Guard utilized over 110,000 

volunteer hours of the Coast Guard Auxiliary to assist with the largest 

port security operation since World War II. 

• The Coast Guard activated four of its six Port Security Units (PSUs, 

contingents of Coast Guard reservists normally used to protect U.S. Navy

vessels overseas) to protect the ports of New York, Boston, Seattle, and

6 9

These pie charts

show the Coast

Guard’s budget allocations for FY 2002

(enacted prior to

September 11), and

the President’s

request for FY 2003.

The Post-9/11 “New Normalcy” for the Coast Guard
7 0

Los Angeles/Long Beach. Currently, a PSU is also deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to protect the U.S. Naval Base where Al Qaeda and Taliban soldiers are being held.

• New regulations were imposed requiring all inbound commercial ships to

provide detailed information on the vessel, cargo, and crew 96

hours prior to arrival at a U.S. port. This pre-arrival information

is processed at the newly commissioned National Vessel Movement Center in Martinsburg, West Virginia. The information is

run through numerous classified and unclassified national databases to identify potentially high risk ships, cargo, or people.

• The “Sea Marshals” program was created to provide ship escorts

and Coast Guard boarding personnel for inbound high risk 

vessels. This includes most cruise ships and vessels with bulk

hazardous materials.1 7 5

The Coast Guard’s customary multi-mission culture and

resilience enabled it to make this rapid transition. While this operational “surge”

to boost port and waterway security was effective, however, it came at the

expense of other operations. During the months following September 11, the

Coast Guard stopped nearly all fisheries enforcement, migrant operations, and

about three-quarters of its counter-drug operations. The Commandant of the

Coast Guard, Admiral James Loy, reported at a Subcommittee hearing in December 2001 that “port safety and security mission now stands as Mission 1, right

alongside Search and Rescue.”176

Although short-term reductions in some Coast Guard mission areas are acceptable during a national crisis, the “new normalcy” for the Coast Guard must allow

sufficient resources to handle all maritime security concerns. Along with port

safety and security, this also must include other national priorities such as counternarcotics, illegal migration, and fisheries enforcement. The Coast Guard’s extra

burdens over the past 6 months were recognized by Congress in a fiscal year 2002

supplemental appropriation of $209 million, and another 6 month supplemental

appropriation would cover the remainder of the year. Long-term solutions to the

Coast Guard’s budgetary demands will have to be found, however. The President’s

fiscal year 2003 budget request includes $7.2 billion for the Coast Guard, a 19

percent increase in operating funds. Although this is a major budget increase (the

biggest since World War II), there are some experts who believe that the Coast

Guard budget (together with that of Customs) should be doubled.177

U.S. Coast Guard “Sea Marshals”

escort a cruise ship into San Diego

harbor. The Sea Marshalls program

is one of several new port safety initiatives instituted by the Coast

Guard since 9/11. 

(Courtesy U.S. Coast Guard)

During the months following

September 11, the Coast

Guard stopped nearly all

fisheries enforcement,

migrant operations, and

about three-quarters of its

counter-drug operations.
D. Cross-Border Cooperation on Law Enforcement Issues

The U.S. has engaged in cooperative efforts with Canadian and Mexican law

enforcement agencies for some time, but significant advances were made beginning in the 1990’s. On the Northern border, in 1995 the U.S. and Canada

entered into the Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Border, which generated a number of law enforcement and law enforcement-related cooperative

efforts, including the NEXUS program (see Section IV, below), and the Cross-Border Crime Forum. The Cross-Border Crime Forum, created in 1997, involves over

100 senior law enforcement officials from Canada and the U.S. (including the

Canadian Solicitor General, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian customs and immigration authorities, the FBI, DEA, Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and local and provincial police) on cross-border crime problems such as

smuggling, money laundering, and abducted children. Cooperation has not historically been as close between the U.S. and Mexican law enforcement authorities,

although local cross-border working groups have been formed (particularly by U.S.

Customs). Recently, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge entered into “smart

border” agreements with both Canada and Mexico, seeking to improve on border

security by pursuing joint technology programs.

U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies in the Pacific Northwest have led

the way in cross-border cooperation through the creation of the Integrated Border

Enforcement Team (IBET), which brings together Customs, the Border Patrol, INS

Inspections, the RCMP and other Canadian counterparts, and local and provincial

law enforcement. The IBET is not simply a forum for discussion; it has actually

formed an intelligence-sharing mechanism and has generated joint operations that

have broken up major drug smuggling rings.178 The Coast Guard has led the way

in forming a marine version of IBET, called the Integrated Marine Enforcement

7 1

SUMMAR Y

• The Coast Guard is entrusted with a wide variety

of vital missions, including law enforcement and

marine safety; its importance to the nation’s drug

interdiction efforts cannot be overstated.

• The multiple demands placed on the Coast Guard

after September 11 illustrate the trade-offs of bor -

der security: an excessive focus on one mission or

one threat can leave other missions and threats

underserved.
7 2

Team (IMET).179 The U.S. and Canada are now in the process of creating IBET

teams at other areas along the Northern border.

There are some significant issues that remain, of course, particularly on the

Northern border. First, Canada still does not officially allow U.S. law enforcement

agents to carry firearms onto its side of the border – making both pursuit of criminals and the possibility of Canadian-side inspections by U.S. Customs officers problematic. Second, despite the trend towards development of joint border inspection stations at smaller border crossings (such as at Sweetgrass, Montana), the U.S.

has frequently been forced to pick up most of the bill for the facilities (as much as

two-thirds of it at Sweetgrass). Third, Canada’s generous immigration rights have

attracted international migrants from all over the world – including terrorists and

criminals; similarly, its liberal marijuana and precursor chemical laws have made it

a haven for drug growers and smugglers. These and other issues need to be

resolved through further negotiation.
IV. NEW PROPOSALS FOR BORDER AND

PORT OF ENTRY LAW ENFORCEMENT

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, new attention has been focused

on the effectiveness of federal law enforcement at the borders and ports of entry.

Americans are understandably anxious about whether the agencies are doing

enough to protect the country from terrorists and smugglers; at the same time,

they are concerned that any new measures avoid needlessly impeding trade and

travel. Congress has already taken action on many of these issues in the USA

Patriot Act of 2001 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of

2002, but further steps will be necessary. This report will focus on six of the most

significant proposals.

A. Combining Border Law Enforcement Agencies

Various proposals to combine or consolidate Customs, the INS, the Coast

Guard, and other border and port management agencies (such as the Department

of Tr a n s p o r t a t i o n ’s Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), the Department of

A g r i c u l t u r e ’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and other agencies) have been made in Congress since September 11. On June 6, 2002, President

Bush asked Congress to create a new Department of Homeland Security, whose

border security branch would include Customs, the INS and the Coast Guard. 

The changes embodied in the President’s plan are long overdue, and should

bring significant improvements to our national border security strategy. The

benefits include increasing cooperation and coordination between our border

security agencies on common missions (such as preventing terrorism, drug 

trafficking and illegal immigration); reducing wasteful competition for resourc e s

devoted to those common missions; and ensuring the compatibility and efficiency of information systems. The new Department will be in a much better

position to achieve these goals than the several agencies currently scattered

throughout the executive branch.

1. I SSUES RELATING TO THE REORGANIZATION

While the President’s proposal deserves the support of Congress, several factors must be taken into further consideration in its implementation. First, the reorganization must not have the effect of diminishing the efforts of Customs, the INS

and the Coast Guard in non-terrorism related mission areas. Second, care must be

taken to ensure that the benefits of reorganization – such as improved coordination

and greater efficiency – are actually achieved. Finally, the costs of reorganization 

cannot be ignored.

7 3

Subcommittee 

Recommendations:

• Combine border law

enforcement agencies into

a new Department of

Homeland Security, but

not at the expense of

other vital missions like

drug interdiction

• Increase the number and

intensity of inspections

while preserving 

commerce

• Increase the number of

qualified and trained 

Customs inspectors, INS

inspectors and Border

Patrol agents

• Upgrade and integrate

border law enforcement

databases and automated

systems

• Shift cargo inspections

away from the ports 

of entry, to the point 

of origin

• Expand “fastpass” 

systems for those who 

frequently cross 

the borders
7 4

a. The New Department’s Diverse Missions Must Not Be Neglected

The concept of “Homeland Security” must be broadened to include the

diverse range of potential threats to America – we cannot afford to neglect some

critical dangers even as we focus attention on others. The Administration has

defined the mission of the new Department as follows:

• To prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;

• To reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and

• To minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

The Department of Homeland Security

Proposed by President Bush on June 6, 2002

The Border and Transportation Security branch of the new Department

would include the government’s key border and transportation law enforcement agencies:

• U.S. Customs Service

• Immigration and Naturalization Service

• U.S. Coast Guard

• Transportation Security Administration

• Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

• General Services Administration’s Federal Protective Service

The reorganization, the largest since 1947, will:

• Help ensure coordination and cooperation between border 

security agencies

• Help streamline the allocation of resources

• Help ensure integrated, compatible information systems

Care must be taken, however, to ensure that:

• The new Department does not lose sight of key missions other than 

preventing catastrophic terrorism – such as drug interdiction, illegal

immigration, and marine safety

• The Department has mechanisms to ensure interagency coordination

and cooperation

• The costs of the reorganization are minimized
Thus, the stated mission of the Department does not include most of the diverse

missions of the critical federal law enforcement agencies that will be included in it.

In fact, the primary goal of the Department appears to be simply to protect the

nation from the kind of catastrophic terrorism we saw on September 11.1 8 0

It is certainly the case that the U.S. will have to devote far more resources than

it did before September 11 to preventing catastrophic attacks. But the other 

missions of Customs, the INS and the Coast Guard are simply too vital to be 

neglected – if they are, the nation will pay dearly for it. Combining the Customs

Service, the INS, the Coast Guard and other agencies will instantly create the

largest and probably the most important law enforcement agency in the country,

the entire range of functions for which must be fully considered. In addition to

such major national priorities as drug interdiction and border control, these agencies also perform such significant tasks unrelated to terrorism as tariff collection,

immigration status adjudication for foreign citizens visiting and residing in the

United States, fisheries enforcement, marine search-and-rescue, investigation of

counterfeiting, and public health functions. 

The Subcommittee’s previous work on narcotics and border issues strongly

suggests that, though terrorism is vitally important in its own right, the new

Department of Homeland Security must avoid focusing on that single threat so

intently that it loses sight of the many other dangers lurking on our borders.

These activities cannot be given a “back seat” to an overriding preoccupation with

catastrophic terrorism. The nation will not be better off if, in the rush to meet the

terrorist threat, other criminal organizations are allowed to penetrate America. As

Subcommittee Ranking Member Elijah Cummings has pointed out, the illegal

drugs pouring into the country represent a form of “biochemical weapons attack

on the United States . . . [that] has been effective in destroying untold lives and

communities throughout this Nation.”181

Although the White House has pledged that these functions will continue as at

present, it appears clear that Congress should carefully consider how best to

ensure that both the concept of “Homeland Security” and any new Department

properly take such critical functions into account in addition to terrorism. Two

major approaches to this problem of focus have been suggested: first, removing all

non-terrorism related functions from the Department; and second, ensuring that

the Department devote a significant amount of its resources to those functions.

We believe the latter approach is the best option.

While splitting off all of the “non-terrorism” related functions (such as tariff

collection by Customs, or search and rescue by the Coast Guard) would create at

least the appearance of “focus” at the new Department, there would be significant

costs. Creating further divisions between the agencies at the borders and ports of

entry will not necessarily result in greater security. It is not clear, for example, that

Canada is any better off for having attempted to divide tariff collection (by Canadian

7 5

It is certainly the case that 

the U.S. will have to devote 

far more resources than it 

did before September 11 to

preventing catastrophic

attacks. But the other 

missions of Customs, the 

INS and the Coast Guard

are simply too vital to be 

neglected – if they are, 

the nation will pay 

dearly for it.

The new Department of

Homeland Security must

avoid focusing on a single

threat so intently that it 

loses sight of the many 

other dangers lurking on 

our borders.
7 6

customs) from border law enforcement (by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) –

it has simply resulted in duplicative inspections at the ports. And artificial limits 

on a border agency’s authority can be highly counterproductive. For example,

Congress’ attempt to transfer all narcotics investigations from Customs to the

newly-created DEA in 1973 hamstrung Customs’ ability to rapidly follow up on the

leads generated by drug busts at the border (Congress restored this authority to

Customs a decade later). 182 There is nothing inherently wrong with multi-mission

agencies, when those multiple missions are rationally related to one another – 

and the various functions of Customs, the INS and the Coast Guard are certainly

rationally related to each other.

Instead, we believe that the best approach is to require the new Department

to include these various missions in its concept of border security. “Homeland

security” should be defined in the reorganizing legislation to include not simply

the prevention of catastrophic terrorism, but also the protection of America from

drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and other cross-border threats to its wellbeing. The new Department should be required to report annually on its efforts to

meet all of the international threats its component agencies are designed to meet.

And Congress should consider requiring the Department to devote a minimum

amount of its resources to meet each of its mission areas. Though this issue will

need further study, it cannot be ignored as Congress moves ahead with the creation of the new Department.

b. The New Department Must Make Sure the Benefits of Reorganization

Are Achieved

Care must be taken to ensure that the potential benefits of agency consolidation are actually achieved. Foremost among these are the streamlining of

r e s o u rce allocation decisions and the improvement of agency coordination. To

some extent, Customs, INS and the Coast Guard (and other border agencies)

compete for the same pool of funds, and may end up duplicating each other’s

e f f o r t s .1 8 3 Agency consolidation could help improve this situation by ensuring

that all of the agencies are on the same page. Moreover, agency consolidation

could improve coordination, particularly as the agencies move to modernize their

information systems.1 8 4 And the consolidation could help reduce the interagency

competition for “headlines” that often impedes joint operations; for example, one

senior Coast Guard officer told the Subcommittee that Customs marine personnel

often wait until the last minute to request help from the Coast Guard in catching

drug smugglers on the water – simply because they don’t want to share credit for

making the arrests.

Reorganization alone, however, will not necessarily achieve these results. It

must be remembered that even within the same agency there is competition for

resources, and the potential for a lack of coordination. The FBI and the INS, for

example, are both part of the Justice Department and answer to the Attorney 

Importance of Customs,

Border Patrol and 

Coast Guard to Drug 

Interdiction

Customs seizures (FY 2001)

190,856 pounds of

cocaine

3,622 pounds of heroin

1,503,941 pounds of 

marijuana

Border Patrol seizures 

(FY 2001)

18,500 pounds of cocaine

1.1 million pounds of

marijuana

Coast Guard seizures 

(FY 2001)

138,393 pounds of

cocaine

34,520 pounds of

marijuana

Together, these 3 agencies

interdict more drugs being

smuggled into the U.S. than

any other agency.

Source: U.S. Customs Service, U.S.

Border Patrol, U.S. Coast Guard,

and Drug Enforcement Agency data
General; they do not have a perfect record of coordinating their efforts, however,

as illustrated by the IDENT/IAFIS problems.185 Likewise, although the Army, Navy,

Marine Corps and Air Force are all part of the same Department of Defense, competition between them during the annual budget process can be intense. And as

the National Journal recently explained, for decades after the 1947 merger of the

armed forces the four services still submitted separate budget requests to Congress, and both “unified commanders” and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no real

authority. This resulted in frequent breakdowns in coordination and communication – remedied only when Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.186

The lesson here is that reorganization must be accompanied by strong authority at the top, accountability on the part of each agency to the Secretary, and institutional mechanisms for coordinating inter-agency action. The President’s proposal gives strong authority to the new Secretary, a feature that should be kept,

but Congress should consider additional ways to ensure cooperation. 

For example, given the vital importance of Customs, the Border Patrol and the

Coast Guard to drug interdiction, an Assistant Secretary should be assigned the

task of ensuring cross-agency coordination and cooperation on counter-narcotics

efforts. That Assistant Secretary should have full authority (subject to the approval

of the Secretary) to force the various agencies to cooperate, share information,

and engage in joint operations where appropriate.

c. Controlling the Costs of Reorganization

F i n a l l y, the costs of agency consolidation could be significant, as personnel are

reassigned to new offices and departments are merged - a point made to the Subcommittee by both of the unions representing INS and Customs employees.1 8 7 N e w

lines of command will have to be established, personnel will have to be reassigned

and moved, and new offices will have to be created. The process will not be trivial.

To some extent, these costs are inevitable, and they certainly should not deter

Congress from moving ahead with the reorganization. Nevertheless, Congress

and the Administration must provide vigorous oversight to ensure that the consolidation proceeds as quickly, efficiently and inexpensively as possible.

7 7

The new Department of 

Homeland Security should

appoint an Assistant Secretary

for Narcotics I n t e rdiction, with

re s p o n s i b i l i t y and authority to

coordinate the counter-drug

efforts of Customs, the Border

Patrol and the Coast Guard.

• President Bush’s proposal for a Department of Homeland Security,

combining all of our key border law enforcement agencies, will help the 

government craft a balanced, focused strategy for border security.

• To achieve this, the new Department must be structured to ensure the

maximum coordination and cooperation between each agency.

• An Assistant Secretary should be designated with responsibility and authority to coordinate the narcotics interdiction efforts of all of the Department’s

agencies – including Customs, the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard.

Action Points
7 8

B. I NCREASING THE NUMBER AND INTENSITY OF INSPECTIONS

Given the increasing threats coming across the borders and through the ports

of entry, one obvious response is to conduct more inspections. This is precisely

what Customs and the INS have done in the months since September 11, when

they went to a “Level One” alert; Customs and the INS began insisting on photo

identification from all border crossers, and began checking the trunk of every

vehicle. The Border Patrol and the Coast Guard also stepped up their efforts.

The increased inspections have certainly had results. From October-December

2001, Customs seized more than twice as much cocaine and twenty times as

much heroin on the Southern border as it did during the same period in 2000.188

Customs and the Border Patrol reported seizing 20 percent and 15 percent more

marijuana, respectively, in the last 4 months of 2001 as in the last 4 months of

2000 (although the Border Patrol also reported seizing somewhat less heroin and

cocaine in the same period). The agencies believe that drug smugglers held back

in the first few weeks after September 11, but then began to flood the borders

with drugs – leading to increased seizures. While there is as yet no firm evidence

as to street prices, anecdotal evidence suggests that marijuana has become scarcer

and more expensive in New York and Boston.189

Although it is clear that more inspections will make it more difficult to smuggle

drugs and other contraband into the U.S., there are four potential problems that

must be addressed. 

First, and most important, increased inspections can slow legitimate traffic at

the ports of entry, which will hurt trade and travel. Wait times increased signifiA Customs inspector interviews a

traveler at San Ysidro, CA. 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)

• To improve border security, more inspections and more

guards at the border will be needed.

• Since 9/11, Customs and INS inspectors have been conducting

m o re intensive inspections at ports of entry; the Border Patro l

and the Coast Guard have also stepped up their eff o rt s .

• The increased inspections have had results: Customs seized

twice as much cocaine and 20 times as much heroin in the fall

of 2001; the Border Patrol seized 15% more marijuana.

There are 4 issues that need to be addressed, however:

• More inspections can lead to longer wait times, decreased

trade and travel, and slower economic growth.

• All ports and border regions must be secured, or smugglers and

illegal aliens will simply shift to the less secure are a s .

• Increased inspections and border or coastal patrols can divert

resources from other vital missions.

• The agencies will need more personnel to carry out the

heightened activity over the long run.

Increasing Inspections and Border Patrols
cantly in the first few weeks after September 11; in Blaine, for example, the wait

times jumped to 2-3 hours.1 9 0 The delays deterred many travelers; chambers of

c o m m e rce across the Southern border have reported steep drops in the number of

people crossing the border after September 11 (as much as 25 percent in Del Rio,

30 percent in San Diego, and 60 percent in Arizona).1 9 1 The number of auto crossings in Blaine dropped 46 percent in October 2001 (as compared with October

2000). The U.S. Chamber claims that these drops “devastated” the Southern border region’s retail sector; local business representatives at each of the locations visited by the Subcommittee confirmed the negative impact of the increased security

on their sales. For example, the Whatcom Council of Governments estimates that

the October 2001 drop in traffic cost the Blaine region $2.5 million in receipts

from Canadian visitors that month.192

Second, the Border Patrol’s experience with the Southern border strategy suggests that if only portions of the border or certain key ports of entry are “hardened,” smugglers will turn to alternate routes. Once a route has been closed off,

law enforcement must anticipate new routes, while still holding the old one. For

example, it already appears that smugglers have returned to the Pacific Ocean and

Caribbean boat routes they favored in the 1980’s, taking advantage of the Coast

Guard’s reduced patrols since September 11.193 

Third, as already discussed in several other contexts, heightened activity with

respect to one mission will, unless accompanied by more resources, divert attention from other missions. The Coast Guard, for example, diverted significant

resources to its “Sea Marshals” port escort system, which Chairman Souder and

the Subcommittee staff were allowed to watch in action at the Port of Los Angeles

in February 2002. In an effort to control the movement of vessels deemed “high

interest,” a team of Sea Marshals led by the Coast Guard (but accompanied by

other federal and local law enforcement personnel) boards the vessels – accompanied by Coast Guard patrol boats and, in some cases, helicopters or other aircraft.

The Sea Marshals inspect the ship and guard and monitor activities on its bridge,

in an effort to prevent or deter terrorists from taking it over and using it as an

instrument of destruction in the port. Although the motivation for this program is

obvious, it is an open question whether the resources devoted to it would be better spent on other missions. If the Coast Guard were suddenly faced with another,

simultaneous emergency in the port, they might not have sufficient time to divert

Sea Marshals to the actual point of danger.

194 A terrorist could even create a small

diversion to draw resources away from an actual point of attack.

Finally, to conduct more inspections, Customs, the INS and the Coast Guard

will need more equipment, more infrastructure, and – perhaps most important of

all – more personnel to conduct the inspections. At hearing after hearing, representatives of the Customs and INS inspectors who have taken up the extra work

after September 11 told the Subcommittee of the hardships imposed on these officers. In Vermont, for example, Customs inspector John Wilda reported working 50

7 9

The heightened security after

9/11 took its toll on trade

and travel at the borders. 

In Blaine, Washington, wait

times jumped to 2-3 hours,

and the number of auto

crossings dropped 46% in

October 2001 – costing the

region $2.5 million in receipts

from Canadian visitors that

month. Equivalent drops in

travel and business activity

were reported along the

Southern border.

Customs inspectors have

reported grueling hours

put in since 9/11: 50

hours of overtime in 2

weeks, working 21 days

without a day off, and

working multiple shifts.
8 0

hours of overtime over a 2-week period in October 2001, and working 21 days

straight without a day off. On the job injuries have increased due to fatigue, all

leaves and vacations have been cancelled, and the inspectors are forced to work

multiple shifts.195 Although these men and women have fulfilled their duty to the

country admirably, we cannot expect them to be able to maintain such grueling

work schedules over the long term. More inspections will require more inspectors.

C. INCREASING THE NUMBER OF CUSTOMS INSPECTORS , INS I NSPECTORS ,

BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND COAST GUARD PERSONNEL

Improving border and port of entry security will therefore involve increases in

personnel. This is nowhere more obvious than on the Northern border, where

currently fewer than 500 Border Patrol agents are stationed on over 4,000 miles of

wilderness. But the Southern border will also require more agents if the flood of

illegal immigration is to be halted; as stated earlier, the INS estimates that it will

need 3,200 to 5,500 more agents to fully implement its Southern border strategy.

Customs in particular is in need of significant staffing boosts; in February

2001, its Resource Allocation Model (RAM) estimated that the agency would need

more than 14,000 new employees to fully meet its missions, including over 6,000

new inspectors.196 Among other things, the RAM indicated that Customs had

only 50 percent of the optimal staffing on the Northern border.

197 The need,

however, is not confined to the border ports; given the massive amounts of cargo

that come through sea ports, higher staffing will be needed there, too. At the Port

of New York and New Jersey, for example, there are only 350 Customs inspectors

to staff 6 shipping terminals, a cruise ship terminal, a rail terminus, 5 airports, and

an international mail facility. Only 64 Customs inspectors actually inspect cargo –

of which the port processed almost 19 million tons in 2000.198 

The Coast Guard is also in dire need of additional personnel. Even before 

September 11, the Coast Guard was strained to keep up with mission demands.

With the nation’s new focus on terrorism, the need to maintain and restore overall

The Need for More 

Personnel at the Borders

and Ports

• Customs estimates that 

it needs 14,000 more

employees, including

6,000 new inspectors,

to fulfill its missions

nationwide.

• Border Patrol estimates it

needs 3,200-5,500 new

agents to secure the

Southern border.

• Coast Guard estimates it

needs 5,000-6,000 more

active-duty personnel and

1,000 more reservists over

the next 3 years.

• The new Department of Homeland Security will need to conduct more

inspections and stepped-up patrols at the borders and ports of entry to

defend against international threats.

• To accomplish this without unduly hindering vital trade and travel, and

without straining its existing personnel, the Department will need more

inspectors and agents.

Action Points
capability reduced by escalating mission demands is magnified and more urgent.

Growth of the service must also be commensurate with the significant new duties

the Coast Guard has taken on in recent years. As one Coastguardsman put it, “We

have gone from a firehouse mentality, where we respond to calls, to being more

like a cop on the beat, patrolling 24 hours a day, seven days a week.” The Coast

Guard estimates that, over the next three years, it will need staff growth of 5,000

to 6,000 active-duty personnel and 1,000 reservists, as well as a significant

increase in port security response boats to meet the new national priorities.

Growth in staffing is certain to come; already Customs will be adding 919 new

inspectors and canine enforcement officers in fiscal year 2002. Moreover, the Presid e n t ’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposal requests funds to hire 1,160 new INS inspectors, 570 additional Border Patrol agents, and about 576 new Customs inspectors

and canine enforcement officers.1 9 9 As might be expected, adding new inspectors,

agents and personnel is expensive; each new position carries with it an annual cost

of $100,000 or more (including salary, benefits, equipment and training). 

Increasing staff, however, is a more complicated problem than simply allocating money for salaries. An agency must first be able to attract enough qualified

candidates, while keeping attrition of its experienced officers at an acceptably low

level. It must have adequate training facilities, and enough excess infrastructure

and equipment to allow the new recruits to function. And it must be prepared to

handle an increasingly inexperienced workforce, while being on its guard against

potential corruption. All of these difficulties are illustrated by the INS’ crash program of expanding the Border Patrol in the late 1990’s.

8 1

A Border Patrol agent keeps watch

on the Southern border.

(Courtesy Immigration and 

Naturalization Service)

The Border Patrol’s experience in the 1990’s (when over 5,000 new agents

were added to the Southern border) illustrates some of the key problems with

rapid expansion of agency personnel:

• Difficulties in attracting enough recruits and preventing attrition among

experienced officers (Border Patrol was unable to recruit the target 1,000

agents per year after 1999, while attrition rates rose from 5% in 1994 to

as high as 14% this year)

• Difficulties in providing enough training, equipment and infrastructure

(Border Patrol was forced to open a temporary training facility, and had

problems giving enough equipment, office space and housing to new

recruits)

• D i fficulties in dealing with inexperienced officers and a greater potential for

c o rruption (Border Patrol saw its ratio of inexperienced to experienced off icers rise dramatically, while re p o rts of corruption of individual officers gre w )

• Rapid growth at one agency may also draw personnel away from other

vital agencies (the new Sky Marshals program has raised attrition at the

Border Patrol)
8 2

1. Finding Enough Recruits

First, the Border Patrol’s experience demonstrates that even an agency with a

large recruitment budget may not find enough qualified candidates willing to take

the job. As noted above, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) required the INS to add 1,000 new Border Patrol agents

each fiscal year from 1997-2001. The GAO reported in 1999 that the INS met this

target in 1997 and 1998, but by 1999 only 369 net new agents were added. The

Border Patrol was simply unable to attract enough qualified applicants and retain

them through the hiring and training process. The Border Patrol’s attrition rate

rose from 5 percent in 1994 to 13 percent in 1998 before dropping somewhat (to

9 percent) in 1999; most of the attrition occurred during the initial 19-week training course at the Border Patrol Academy. The attrition made it impossible to add

the required number of new recruits.200 It now appears that heavy recruitment of

agents by the sky marshals program has pushed attrition back up to 14 percent

this year, and maybe even as high as 20 percent – meaning the Border Patrol’s

task in hiring has become that much more difficult.201

Although the Border Patrol has taken steps to improve the recruiting and hiring process (by shortening it and changing testing requirements), its experience is

hardly unusual or unique, suggesting that there simply may be limits on how many

people an agency can add. The Border Patrol historically hired about 4 percent of

eligible applicants, but only 2 percent in 1999. By comparison, the Los Angeles

Police Department hires about 5 percent of applicants, the state of Texas hires about

3 percent of its applicants for State Trooper positions, and the U.S. Coast Guard only 

1 percent, while Customs hired only 1 percent for fiscal year 1999.2 0 2

In short, unless an agency is prepared to lower its standards, the only other

option may be to dramatically improve pay and benefits. The Border Patrol has

considered instituting signing bonuses for new recruits, and increasing the top pay

scale (the “full performance” or “journeyman” level) from GS-9 to GS-11 – a proposal now included in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of

2002. Similar proposals have been made for INS and Customs inspectors; the

American Federation of Government Employees, which represents INS workers, has

called for upgrading the top pay scale for inspectors to GS-11, and giving them

“law enforcement retirement pay,” normally reserved for officers in physically

demanding law enforcement professions (like the Border Patrol).203 The National

Treasury Employees Union has made similar proposals for Customs inspectors. In

short, providing the financial incentive for workers to come to the INS and Customs, and stay there, will be a very expensive investment.204
2. Providing Training, Equipment and Infrastructure for New Recruits

Second, even when enough new recruits can be found, an agency faces a difficult challenge in providing them with adequate training, equipment, and infrastructure (such as housing and office space). The Justice Department’s inspector

general found that the massive hiring wave left most Southern border sectors

scrambling to equip and house new agents, a problem exacerbated by the fact

that the INS (due to Congressional pressure and budget delays) has been unable

to give the sectors advance notice of how many new recruits will be arriving.205

Similarly, the Border Patrol was forced to build a temporary training center in

Charleston, South Carolina, because its facilities at the Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia were too small to handle all of the new

recruits.206 Since this facility also contains the training centers for Customs and

INS Inspections (as well as other law enforcement agencies), it is certain that a hiring wave in those 2 agencies will put strains on FLETC as well.

3. Dealing with Inexperience

Rapid hiring will also test an agency’s ability to supervise and police its new

recruits. The percentage of Border Patrol agents with two years’ experience or less

along the Southern border tripled between fiscal years 1994 and 1998; seven of

the nine sectors saw the number of nonsupervisory agents assigned to each supervisory agent increase. Hiring new recruits increases the chances that some will

have legal or disciplinary problems; in the Tucson sector, there have even been

cases of agents engaging in violent crimes. If Customs and the INS double the

number of inspectors, they will almost certainly face these problems as well.207

4. Draining Personnel from Other Agencies – Interagency 

“Musical Chairs”

It should also be noted that pushing for rapid hiring at one or two agencies

may deplete the manpower of other vital agencies. This will certainly be a problem if Congress increases the pay and benefits of INS and Customs inspectors, Border Patrol agents and Coast Guard personnel, without making corresponding

changes in the pay and benefits of other law enforcement agencies. Already Customs, the INS, the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard have been victims of the

popularity of the newly expanded “sky marshals” program; the Border Patrol in

particular has lost about 150 agents to the sky marshals, and even Customs has

“loaned” 115 special agents to that program. Local and state law enforcement

agencies might also find themselves losing personnel if Congress makes federal

jobs much more attractive. As Chairman Souder has pointed out, we must not

end up simply playing a game of “musical chairs,” with the same pool of law

enforcement officers merely shifting from one agency to another; the entire pool

of potential officers must be expanded.

8 3
8 4

D. UPGRADING AND INTEGRATING BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT DATABASES AND

AUTOMATED SYSTEMS

There is broad agreement in Congress and the Administration that border law

enforcement agencies must improve and update their informational databases and

automated systems. Two major tasks will face the new Secretary of Homeland

Security: upgrading each agency’s computer systems, and ensuring that all information systems are compatible and communicate with each other. Neither job

will be easy.

1. Upgrading Information Systems – Customs’ ACE Program

The need for systems upgrade is nowhere more obvious than at Customs,

where (as described earlier in this report) the agency is using a cargo clearance

program that is nearly two decades old. The current Automated Commercial System (ACS) simply cannot be expected to handle the rapid growth in international

trade, particularly in a post-9/11 world where more information will be needed

about incoming shipments. 

Customs has recognized this problem for quite some time; planning for a

replacement, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), which would provide web-based, real-time data, has been going on since 1990. Recently, Customs

expanded ACE to include the International Trade Data System (ITDS) project,

which is supposed to provide a “single window” through which all government filings relating to import and export shipments can be delivered electronically. If

completed, this would allow shippers, carriers, customs brokers and importers to

file information required by 104 separate agencies – not just Customs.208

Action Points

• The new Department of Homeland Security will need significant infusions of new Customs and INS inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and

Coast Guard personnel.

• Rapid expansion carries risks, however, as illustrated by the experience of

the Border Patrol in the 1990’s – difficulty in attracting enough recruits,

strains on existing equipment and infrastructure, and coping with an

inexperienced workforce and the increased risk of corruption.

• Care must be taken to ensure that growth in one agency does not 

come at the expense of other agencies – a game of personnel 

“musical chairs.”
U n f o r t u n a t e l y, progress has not been as rapid as might have been hoped.

While Customs has tested many systems in the field (the most important of which

are described below), full deployment of ACE seems almost as far off now as it

did a decade ago. Part of the problem has been inadequate leadership of the

modernization effort at the agency; the Tr e a s u ry Department inspector general

reported in March of this year that the Customs Modernization Office was inadequately staffed, jeopardizing the success of the project; a recent GAO study of the

ACE program came to a similar conclusion. In April 2001, Customs did award a

5 - y e a r, $1.3 billion contract to e-Customs Partnership, a coalition of contractors

led by IBM Global Services, to begin designing and planning ACE. After September 11, Customs reportedly decided to move up the project’s completion from

five to four years.2 0 9

Although the full deployment of ACE is still years away, Customs has tested

several aspects of it in the field. One of the most significant is the Pre-Arrival

Processing System (PAPS), which is currently in place at the Peace Bridge crossing in Buffalo, New York. PAPS is designed to reduce the number of trucks

referred to secondary inspection solely because all the paperwork is not yet in

o r d e r. In 1994, 34 percent of all trucks were referred to secondary inspection at

the Peace Bridge, but actual cargo inspections were conducted on only onequarter of them - meaning that each year, about 220,000 trucks were sent to

s e c o n d a ry for paperwork processing alone. The goal of PAPS was to reduce the

p e rcentage of trucks being sent to secondary to 8 percent by eliminating the

p a p e rwork delays.

8 5

Upgrading to ACE

Customs’ current import and export information 

processing system, the Automated Commercial System

(ACS), consists of the Automated Broker Interface

(ABI, which can be used by importers and customs 

brokers) and the Automated Manifest System (AMS,

which allows sea, rail and air carriers – but not truckers

– to file cargo manifests). It was first deployed in

1984, and is in need of replacement. A new system, the

Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), will 

create a “single window” through which importers and

carriers can file all information on a web-based, real

time system. Though planning for it has been going on

since 1990, it will not be deployed for at least another

4 years, at a projected cost of $1 billion. 

A Customs inspector reviews cargo

manifests on the Sea Automated

Manifest System (AMS). 

(Courtesy U.S. Customs Service)
8 6

PAPS seeks to do this by cutting out most of the paperwork that a trucker

needs at the standard border crossing. When the truck is loaded, the shipper or

carrier generates an invoice for the shipment; a unique bar code is affixed to the

invoice, which is then faxed to the customs broker. The broker enters the invoice

into Customs’ computer system; when the trucker arrives at the border, the local

Customs inspector already has the invoice on his computer. The inspector then

wands the bar code on the trucker’s paper invoice, and decides if the truck can be

released or should be referred to secondary for a cargo inspection. Truckers thus

avoid having to present any of the other forms normally required at the border,

saving them the stop at the customs broker’s office.

PAPS appears to have made substantial progress; as of 2001, only 16 percent

of arriving trucks were being referred to secondary inspection. As of January 2000,

524 carrier trading chains were using PAPS, saving each of them an average of

$2.5 million per year due to increased efficiency.

210

Other ACE prototypes include the North American Trade Automation Prototype (NATAP), conducted by the U.S., Canada and Mexico to assess the potential

of harmonizing trade processes, sharing data and creating a paperless customs

process. The NATAP also used “intelligent transportation systems,” such as

transponder/radio frequency identification devices in trucks, to provide advance

information to Customs inspectors at the border. It was tested in 1997-98, and

lessons learned were incorporated into the National Customs Automation Program

(NCAP), used at 3 ports of entry to process automobile and auto parts imports for

four companies.211

The cost of modernizing and integrating any of these systems, of course, will

not be negligible. For example, Customs has estimated the final bill for its modernization efforts at $5 billion over 15 years, with $1 billion being for ACE development and deployment. Currently, Congress has appropriated $300 million for ACE

for fiscal year 2002; President Bush’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposal requests

another $312 million.212 The cost, though high, is worth it over the long run,

since eventually ACS will simply be overwhelmed. Steps must be taken, however,

to ensure that costs are kept to a reasonable minimum.

2. Ensuring Compatibility – the INS and IDENT

Similar upgrades will have to be made to the INS’ systems to handle the

growing amount of individual travel and the need for more information on

potential security risks. One key concern, given the problems with IDENT and

IAFIS described earlier, is that these new systems be capable of communicating

with each other. Customs and the INS should work with each other, and other

related agencies, to ensure that the old “stovepipe” model, where each agency

independently generates similar but incompatible systems, is not repeated in this
next generation of databases. (This is, in fact, a problem which President Bush’s

reorganization proposal could help solve.)

Further efforts to integrate other law enforcement databases should also continue. These projects will not be easy, but there is simply too much information that

is spread among too many different agencies. The goal

should be to create databases that can communicate with

each other, and with state and local databases as well.

Information sharing can help prevent not simply future

Resendez cases, but future terrorist attacks as well. Nor is

this task impossible; as one commentator has pointed out,

the situation faced by the government is similar to that

faced by private business in the early 1990’s, when most

businesses’ computer systems were incompatible with

each other. The business world solved that problem by

moving to open data exchange standards; similar measures could be taken (while still preserving data security) by

the various agencies which must work together.2 1 3

3. Information Sharing Between the Agencies

Meanwhile, as Customs, the INS and the Coast Guard await new systems,

they must take care to ensure that maximum use is derived from what they currently have. Sharing information, and using the information shared, are the keys

to success. As the Resendez case demonstrated, even a system with limitations like

IDENT can be useful in apprehending criminals if its managers are careful to

update it with “lookout” information provided by other agencies.

In the maritime security area, the Coast Guard has taken the lead on agency

intelligence sharing with the MDA, or Maritime Domain Awareness initiative. The

Coast Guard’s goal is to improve federal law enforcement’s knowledge of activity

on the waters by sorting information on incoming vessels and distributing it to the

proper agencies. As noted in the section on the Coast Guard’s activities above,

the newly created National Vessel Movement Center in Martinsburg, West Virginia

compares the advance information it receives on incoming vessels against the

intelligence databases of numerous other agencies. The Center then disseminates

intelligence on high risk vessels to the proper agencies – including Customs, the

INS, and the FBI. Although the concept behind the MDA is a sound one, the program remains in its infancy, and major gaps in the system still exist. Lack of coordination and compatibility among the various agencies, and the Center’s ability to

process the massive amount of incoming information, remain pressing challenges.

The Coast Guard is trying to strengthen the MDA through the National Maritime

Security Coordinating Committee, a high-level working group consisting of the

INS, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, Customs, and other

federal agencies involved in maritime activities.214

8 7

Intelligence Sharing in

Practice

The Coast Guard’s Operations

System Center, home of the

National Vessel Movement

Center (NVMC), in Martinsburg, WV. The NVMC collects

information on incoming vessels and then shares it with

Customs, the INS, the FBI and

other law enforcement agencies

under an intelligence sharing

initiative called Maritime

Domain Awareness (MDA). 

(Courtesy U.S. Coast Guard)
8 8

E. SHIFTING CARGO INSPECTIONS AWAY FROM THE PORTS OF ENTRY TO THE

POINT OF ORIGIN

As the volume of cargo passing through ports of entry has grown, taxing 

Customs’ ability to inspect it properly (and causing major delays), there have been

proposals to begin pre-clearing cargo before it even reaches the port. To pre-clear

cargo, the shipment must be inspected and secured at the place where it is initially

shipped; hence, such a system is often called “point of origin” inspection. As long

as the cargo is not tampered with, it can pass through the border or port without

any additional inspection, thus allowing inspectors to focus their attention on

higher-risk shipments. The idea is an intriguing one, and deserves careful study.

Inspections should 

be moved away from

the United States, to

the extent possible.

Action Points

• The Department of Homeland Security will have to both upgrade and

integrate each agency’s information systems.

• Customs’ outdated Automated Commercial System (ACS) must be

replaced with the new Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) as

soon as practicable.

• Law enforcement databases (such as those of the INS and the FBI) must

be able to communicate with each other.

• Intelligence sharing between the agencies must be a primary goal of the

new Department.

Point of Origin Inspections

• In an effort to improve security and reduce the backlog at our ports of

entry, some commentators have suggested a shift to point of origin inspections. This new strategy would target inspections at the place where

goods are made and shipped, instead of waiting until they arrive in the

U.S. In theor y, the goods would be inspected and their cargo container

sealed; assuming there are no signs of tampering, the cargo would be

allowed to pass through a U.S. port without further inspection.

• The concentration of trade in relatively few companies suggests that this

strategy has potential:

100 importers account for 40% of all Northern border trade

80,000 trucks made the 4.2 million crossings on the Southern border in 1999

7,400 out of the total 400,000 importers in the U.S. control about 82% of

all imported merchandise by value

• Issues of cost, monitoring, and the ability of U.S. personnel to enforce

U.S. law overseas make a wholesale shift to point of origin inspections

problematic for the foreseeable future, however.
Proponents of point of origin inspections argue that since so much of international commerce is dominated by a few carriers, it would not actually be that difficult to implement an effective pre-clearance system. For example, only 100

importers account for 40 percent of all cross-border trade on the Northern border.2 1 5

S i m i l a r l y, while there were 4.2 million truck crossings on the Southern border in

1999, only about 80,000 trucks actually made those crossings.2 1 6 In fact, out of

400,000 importers in the U.S., about 7,400 control 82 percent of all imported 

m e rchandise by value.2 1 7 Thus, the number of players who would have to be

brought into the system might be smaller than expected.

There are, however, several problems with point of origin inspections that

have to be worked out. First, shifting inspections to the point of origin means

shifting them to foreign jurisdictions – where the U.S. has less legal control over

the circumstances of the inspection, and no power to enforce its own laws without

foreign cooperation. The U.S. has already encountered this problem in Canada,

where efforts to station U.S. Customs inspectors north of the border have run into

Canadian resistance to allowing those inspectors to be armed or to enforce U.S.

drug laws. This problem will only be greater in countries which do not share

American legal and political values.

In fact, unless the U.S. government gives up a great deal of direct control over

the process of inspection, it is hard to see how point of origin inspections will result

in much net benefit. Merely shifting inspections to foreign countries might have the

benefit of breaking up bottlenecks at the U.S. ports of entry, but the same number

of inspections, and the same number of inspectors, will be required unless the U.S. is

planning to scale back enforcement efforts. Point of origin inspections rely on selfpolicing by the trade community itself; in short, foreign exporters would be

entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that their cargo is contraband-free, with

only spot checks by Customs officials to ensure compliance. While this may be

workable with respect to exporters in some countries, companies in many jurisdictions simply may not be trustworthy enough to allow self-policing.

Second, point of origin inspections will not be effective unless we can be certain that no tampering occurs between the point of origin and the U.S. port of

entry. Ensuring the integrity of the supply route is not as simple as it may seem.

For example, the U.N.-chartered International Maritime Organization catalogued

382 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in 2001, and

over 2,500 since July 1995.218 Nor is most tampering that blatant; as Stephen

Flynn, a leading scholar on point of origin inspections notes, American companies

lose an estimated $12 to $15 billion each year in stolen cargo.219

This fact alone gives companies some incentive to monitor their shipments,

and thus it would not be impossible to co-opt this monitoring process for national

security purposes. Manufacturers could be encouraged to adopt stringent internal

security measures against tampering, and could use near-real time tracking systems,

8 9
9 0

such as are used by many companies operating on a “just-in-time” basis, to follow

the movement of their cargo. They could even be required to put global positioning system (GPS) transponders on ships or individual containers, and the containers could be outfitted with sensors that detect tampering (for example, by measuring temperature changes).220

The costs of such a system could be very high,

however, and it is not clear who should pay for it. If

the cost is borne by Customs, U.S. taxpayers will have

to pick up a very substantial bill. If the cost is

imposed on industry, by contrast, the result will be

higher prices for consumers, and another barrier to

entry for smaller companies that cannot afford such

expensive security measures.221

Moreover, even if such a system could be

designed (and the basic infrastructure paid for), Customs would still have to be able to process and analyze the massive amounts of information that would be sent by the industry.222

Customs would have to have a computer system capable of receiving near-real

time information on thousands, eventually perhaps millions, of shipments each

day, and would have to have sufficient technical personnel available to analyze the

data and look for anomalies. The complexity of Customs’ Air & Marine Interdiction Coordination Center (AMICC), near Riverside, California, which tracks flights

originating in or entering into the U.S., illustrates what a challenge such a system

might present.

It is therefore unlikely that a wholesale conversion to point of origin inspections

is realistic in the near future. It will be difficult enough to modernize the systems

Customs already has in place; a fundamental shift in strategy would require

r e s o u rces that the agency simply does not have at the present time. Nevertheless,

the pilot programs recently initiated by Customs, which will allow Customs to

measure the feasibility of point of origin inspections in various environments,

appear well warranted. Some of these programs include the stationing of Customs

inspectors at the three Canadian sea ports of Va n c o u v e r, Montreal and Halifax, to

help in the inspection of cargo bound for the U.S.2 2 3 ; and the program developed

in cooperation with the state of New Hampshire, a U.S. importer, and a Slovakian

plant, involving point of origin inspections and specially sealed containers.2 2 4 M o s t

r e c e n t l y, Customs reached agreement with the government of Singapore to allow

U.S. Customs inspectors to assist in pre-screening of U.S.-bound cargo, and discussions are underway with authorities at the port of Hong Kong as well.2 2 5

Similarly, Customs’ programs to encourage better internal security on the part

of major carriers and exporters appear to be making meaningful progress. Customs’ first such effort, the Carrier Initiative Program (CIP), was responsible for the

Containers are unloaded at the port

of Hong Kong, one of the world’s

largest sea ports. 

(Subcommittee photo)

Top 10 Foreign Ports 

Sending Cargo to 

the U.S.

Hong Kong, China

Shanghai, China

Singapore

Kaohsiung, Taiwan

Rotterdam, Netherlands

Pusan, South Korea

Bremerhaven, Germany

Tokyo, Japan

Genoa, Italy

Yantian, China

Source: U.S. Customs Service data
seizure at ports of entry of over 18,400 pounds of narcotics in 1996-97, and

another 59,180 pounds of narcotics destined for the U.S.2 2 6 Customs has followed

the CIP with programs such as the Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI),

the Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP) (which all carriers wishing to participate in BRASS line release must be a part of), and the Business Anti-Smuggling

Coalition (BASC). Customs’ most recent such venture, announced by Commissioner Bonner in January 2002, is the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which seeks

to build on the success of the CIP by establishing security criteria to identify highrisk containers, using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers before they

arrive at U.S. ports, and developing and using “smart and secure” containers. The

CSI is initially targeting the top 10 ports world-wide.2 2 7 The success of these various initiatives has depended in the past on the degree to which Customs clearly

defines the benefits to the participating businesses, and takes a clearly defined role

in it.2 2 8 We recommend that Customs take a similar approach to the CSI.

Moreover, although a tracking system for individual cargo containers is probably not practical in the immediate future, the Coast Guard is already working on a

vessel tracking system to help improve port security. The Automatic Identification

System (AIS) would transmit a ship’s identity, position, course and speed, using a

transponder. A proposal for this system is pending before the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency that coordinates international shipping safety and security policies. The proposal would require all vessels

to install this system by July 1, 2004.229

F. EXPANDING “FASTPASS ” SYSTEMS FOR THOSE WHO FREQUENTL Y CROSS THE

BORDERS

Just as cargo may be pre-cleared to allow it to pass through the border without additional inspection, so too can individual travelers. These “fastpass” systems

allow frequent travelers to pre-register with the INS and Customs, submitting to

background checks and providing the agencies with information about themselves. In return, the INS and Customs set aside a special lane at the border for

9 1

Action Points

• The Department of Homeland Security will have to tackle the issue of

shifting cargo inspections to the point of origin, away from the ports of

entry.

• Although a wholesale shift to this strategy is probably not feasible in the

immediate future, Customs should continue its efforts to promote it.

• Issues that will have to be dealt with in the future include technology

problems, enforcing U.S. law overseas, and the extent to which private

foreign businesses can be trusted.
9 2

approved individuals, who may drive through it without additional inspection

(although they are periodically required to submit to random compliance checks).

The fastpass system is designed to take advantage of the fact that a high percentage of border crossings are made by frequent crossers (as described in Section I,

above). If most of these people are enrolled in the system, traffic at the border

crossings could be improved as Customs and the INS could focus their efforts on

high-risk travelers.

The first fastpass system was the Dedicated Commuter Lane (DCL) system

established in 1982 at the Peace Bridge in Buffalo. Blaine and Point Roberts,

Washington established DCLs in 1991 as the Peace Arch Crossing Entry (PACE).

The DCLs, which are now being phased out, were non-automated systems that

relied on decals placed on a vehicle’s window. (Canada’s DCL program, CANPASS,

has been in place since 1991). 

In 1995, the INS piloted an automated DCL, the Secure Electronic Network for

Travelers’ Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), at Otay Mesa. It has since been expanded to

El Paso, Calexico, Brownsville and Hidalgo, Texas; virtually identical systems have

been installed at the Peace Bridge and the Ambassador Bridge (although the INS

technically does not refer to them as SENTRI systems). The SENTRI system uses a

special lane, open only to enrolled users, and only to non-commercial vehicles.

Registered users’ vehicles are equipped with a radio frequency transponder that

sends a unique signal to the SENTRI system as it approaches the inspection booth.

The system displays information about the vehicle and enrolled passengers on the

computer screen in the booth. Once the vehicle reaches the inspection booth, the

driver swipes an electromagnetic card through a card reader. The inspector (either

an INS or a Customs inspector, trained to use SENTRI) verifies that all occupants of

the vehicle, not just the driver, are enrolled in the SENTRI system. The system also

randomly designates certain vehicles for secondary inspection as a compliance check.

To enroll in SENTRI, applicants complete an application form, pay an application fee, have their fingerprints taken and checked against the FBI’s IAFIS criminal

database system, and undergo a preliminary interview. Biographical information is

Frequent and trusted

travelers should be

expedited.

Fastpass Systems on the Border

SENTRI – Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection; allows

people who frequently cross the border to register with the INS and Customs,

undergo a background check, and then use a special traffic lane allowing rapid

crossing (with only spot checks to ensure compliance). Now in place at several Northern and Southern border locations.

NEXUS – Harmonized Highway Pilot; integrates SENTRI with Canada’s simi -

lar CANPASS system, allowing two-way rapid crossing. Currently in place at

Port Huron, Michigan, and soon to be deployed in Blaine, Washington.
then entered into a SENTRI Global Enrollment System (GES) database. (Currently,

each GES database contains enrollment data only for an individual port of entry,

although the INS eventually plans to create a national database.) An electronic

criminal background check is then run on the IBIS computer database, and the

applicant submits to a personal interview by an INS or Customs inspector and a

full Customs vehicle inspection. The entire enrollment process takes 4-6 weeks.

Enrollment status must be renewed annually, meaning the background checks

must be repeated.230

A variant on the SENTRI system is the Harmonized Highway Pilot, or NEXUS,

which combines SENTRI with Canada’s CANPASS system; the program is jointly

administered by the two countries, and background checks are performed in both

jurisdictions. NEXUS was pilot tested at Port Huron, Michigan, and is scheduled to

replace the PACE system at Blaine, Washington this year. The INS also operates a

fastpass system at international airports, called INSPASS, allowing pre-registered

frequent travelers to bypass long lines at immigration inspection.231

The SENTRI and NEXUS systems are promising, and individuals and businesses

in border communities have voiced their strong support for expanding the programs at each of the Subcommittee’s field hearings. There are, however, several

issues that should be resolved before fastpass systems are enlarged. First, it is not

yet clear that SENTRI has improved the overall traffic situation at any of the locations where it has been implemented. On the Southern border, wait times for

those enrolled in SENTRI have certainly improved, but neither the INS nor Customs has yet conducted a thorough study showing that wait times in the general

traffic lanes have improved. On the Northern border, there is a similar lack of data

with respect to general traffic wait times; and there, the data even suggest that

those enrolled in SENTRI have not seen their wait times substantially reduced.232

Since the creation of a SENTRI lane can cost over $2.5 million (depending on the

location), and removes a lane from general traffic use, it is important for the INS

and Customs to determine whether the benefits of the program have been sufficient to justify expanding it.

Second, the INS and Customs still have not decided how best to pay for the

SENTRI program. An Office of Management and Budget regulation, Circular A-25,

states that if SENTRI is established as a permanent program, the full cost must be

recovered by users’ fees. At present, the INS collects a $129 user’s fee on the

Southern border, but no fee at the Peace or Ambassador Bridges (it has in the past

collected a $25 fee for PACE users). Even the users’ fees collected on the Southern

border do not completely cover the program costs. It appears that there would be

significant resistance to paying users’ fees on the Northern border, perhaps

because the benefit in terms of reduced wait times is not substantial enough.233

If this is the case, it may suggest that in practice the SENTRI program is simply not

worth the additional costs. Although we appreciate the importance of exploring

traffic management programs, we believe that partially recovering the costs of

9 3
9 4

SENTRI and NEXUS through users’ fees is necessary to ensure that costs and benefits are properly balanced.

Finally, expansion of the SENTRI and NEXUS systems raises security concerns,

particularly on the Southern border. Thus far, there have been no reported criminal violations of the programs; infractions have been confined to relatively minor

offenses, such as carrying non-enrolled travelers, or engaging in commercial

traffic.234 The more people are enrolled in the system, however, the greater the

likelihood that some of them may attempt to take advantage of it by smuggling

drugs or other contraband. There is a particular danger of this on the Southern

border, because, unlike in Canada, there is no central criminal database in Mexico

and thus no way to run a criminal background check. The INS and Customs have

been forced to rely on letters written by local Mexican police chiefs, which merely

certify that an individual does not have a criminal history in a particular local jurisdiction.235 To guard against the potential abuse of the system, Chairman Souder

has recommended that at the very least penalties for violations be doubled if they

take place through a SENTRI or NEXUS lane.

Action Points

• The Department of Homeland Security should continue expansion of

“fastpass” systems at the borders, but it must work out several issues first.

• Before SENTRI and NEXUS can be implemented wholesale, the 

Department must be certain that they are cost-effective.
CONCLUSION

In proposing the new Department of Homeland Security, President Bush 

compared this reorganization to the creation of the Department of Defense in

1947. The comparison is an apt one, and not simply because of the similar size

and complexity of the two reorganizations. Like the Department of Defense, the

new Homeland Security Department is a response to a new international situation,

and a new set of threats to the nation.

In 1945, when President Truman first proposed creating the

Department of Defense, the U.S. faced a world transformed. Tw o

world wars had left the major European and Asian powers in ruins; in

place of the fascist threat, the Soviet empire emerged as the leading

danger to freedom and democracy. As the last bulwark of freedom in

the world, the U.S. was forced to abandon its historic preference for isolationism and its often haphazard approach to intelligence and military

readiness. The merger of the armed forces and the creation of centralized intelligence agencies in 1947 was a vital response to the Cold Wa r.

To d a y, we too face a new reality, one that has been quietly emerging for many years but has become impossible to ignore after September 11. Globalized trade and travel has created globalized crime: international terrorist networks, drug trafficking organizations, and sophisticated financial criminal

enterprises. Like viruses in the bloodstream, these criminals move about unseen, until

they strike – either in catastrophic ways (as at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon), or in ways less spectacular but no less destructive, poisoning our communities

and young people, robbing them of hope for a better future. 

Like the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security will help

the federal government to develop and sustain a focused, coordinated border security

strategy – one that can protect the U.S. from terrorism, drug trafficking, and other

international crime without blockading trade and economic growth. By bringing

together the disparate agencies that protect our borders and ports of entry, the new

Department can help reduce unnecessary competition for resources, wasteful duplication of effort, and lack of coordinated responses. That will be an important first step

in getting the job done.

As was the case in 1947, however, reorganization is only a first step. The Department of Defense would never have been able to protect the free world against the

Soviet threat without adequate resources. Similarly, once the new Department of

Homeland Security is in place, Congress and the Administration will have to work

together to give the new agency the resources – personnel, equipment and technology – it needs to protect the nation. The price will be high; there is simply no way of

avoiding that unpleasant fact. But it will be a price worth paying if we are able to

control and defeat our enemies, and secure America’s borders and economic health

for the new century.

9 5

A Historic Parallel

President Harry S. Truman,

shown here in 1946, proposed the reorganization of

the nation’s disparate military

and intelligence agencies at

the end of World War II. His

vision was enacted into law

by the National Security Act

of 1947, creating the Department of Defense, the

National Security Council

and the Central Intelligence

Agency. Like the National

Security Act, President Bush’s

proposal for a Department of

Homeland Security is an

important step in meeting a

new set of international 

security challenges. 

(Photo courtesy Truman 

Presidential Museum and Library)

9 7

EN D N O T E S

Introduction

1 “Open NAFTA Borders? Why Not?”, Robert L. Bartley, Wall Street Journal - OpinionJournal, July 2, 2001, 

http://www.opinion/journal.com/columnists/rbartley/?id=95000738

2 The Subcommittee began its work as a result of discussions at the 2001 meeting of the U.S.-Canada Interparliamentary Group. 

Chairman Souder, along with Canadian M.P. Susan Whelan, chaired the trans-border issues group.

3 See Appendix B for a complete list of relevant hearings held and visits made to ports of entry by the Subcommittee.

4 Chairman Souder and the Subcommittee gratefully recognize the assistance of Denis Paradis, M.P., in arranging the delegation 

meetings in Ottawa.

Section I - The Borders and Ports of Entr y

5 CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html#Geo

6 “Northern Border Threats and Trends,” U.S. Customs Service informational publication

7 Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum Report: Building a Border for the 21st Century, December 2000, http://www. s t a t e . g o v / w w w / r e g i o n s / w h a /

8 North American Trade and Travel Trends, U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2001,

http://www.bts.gov/publications/nattt/entire.pdf; Rethinking our Borders: A Plan for Action, Coalition for Secure & Trade-Efficient 

Borders, December 3, 2001, http://www.canambta.org/Plan_For_Action.pdf

9 Written testimony of Garry F. Douglas, President and CEO, Plattsburgh-North County Chamber of Commerce, before the Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Champlain, New York, October 29, 2001

10 “Beyond Border Control,” Stephen E. Flynn, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2000,

http://www.cfr.org/public/pubs/Flynn_Border_Article.html. One General Motors plant in Fort Wayne, Indiana relies on parts carried

by trucks that make 100 border crossings per day.

11 Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum Report

12 “Common Borders, Shared Destinies: Canada, the United States and Deepening Integration,” Michael Hart and William Dymond, 

Centre for Trade Policy and Law, November 20, 2001, http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/borders/hartdymondweb.htm; Rethinking our 

Borders: A Plan for Action

13 “ Trust the Market (and Canada),” Michael Kergin, Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2002, http://www. c a n a d i a n e m b a s s y. o r g / a m b a s s a d or/

020515-e.asp

14 Source: “Summary of U.S. Natural Gas Imports by Point of Entry, 1996-2000,” Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department

of Energy website, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/data_publications/natural_gas_annual/current/pdf/table_010.pdf

15 S o u rce: “Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products into the United States by Country of Origin,” Energy Information Administration,

U.S. Department of Energy website,http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/petroleum_supply_annual/psa_ 

volume1/ current/txt/table_21.txt

16 “United States-Canada: The World’s Largest Trading Relationship,” Canadian Embassy website,

http://www.canadianembassy.org/trade/wltr-e.asp

17 Rethinking our Borders: A Plan for Action; “North American Trade & Transportation News Truck Crossings Annual Release: 2001 Truck

Crossing Traffic Entering the U.S. Declined in 2001 in First Drop Since NAFTA Began,” Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S.

Department of Transportation, June 14, 2002, http://www/bts/gov/PressReleases/2002/bts013_02/index.html

18 Rethinking our Borders: A Plan for Action. The next busiest crossings are the Pacific Highway Crossing at Blaine, Washington, and the

crossing at Champlain, New York.

19 Id.

20 North American Trade and Travel Trends

21 Written testimony of Rear Admiral Erroll Brown, Commander, 13th U.S. Coast Guard District, before the Subcommittee on Criminal

Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Blaine, Washington, December 10, 2001

22 CIA World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mx.html#Geo

23 Encyclopedia Britannica Intermediate (online edition), http://search.ebi.eb.com/ebi/article/0,6101,36875,00.html

24 “U.S. Border Patrol Del Rio Sector expanding boat patrol to reduce flow of illegal immigrants,” U.S. Border Patrol press bulletin, April

25, 2001, http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/fieldoffices/sectors/delrio/newsrel/r042501.htm

25 North American Trade and Travel Trends
9 8

26 America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11, Jason A. Aquino, Theresa Cardinal Brown, and John Murphy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce

report, February 2002, http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/70EBE993-01A4-4530-B91F-5BB72A0B3C24/usswborder.pdf

27 “Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products into the United States by Country of Origin,” Energy Information Administration;

“Summary of U.S. Natural Gas Imports by Point of Entry, 1996-2000,” Energy Information Administration 

28 Mexico: a global partner for trade, investment, and growth, SECOFI-NAFTA Office, Embassy of Mexico, 2000,

http://www.naftaworks.org/Mexico-US_Trade/mexico-us_trade.html

29 “North American Trade & Transportation News Truck Crossings Annual Release: 2001 Truck Crossing Traffic Entering the U.S.

Declined in 2001 in First Drop Since NAFTA Began,” Bureau of Transportation Statistics

30 U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed to Handle Growing Commercial Traffic, General Accounting Office, Report No.

GAO/NSIAD-00-25, March 2000 

31 North American Trade and Travel Trends; America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11

32 North American Trade and Travel Trends; America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11. Note that while El Paso is the busiest land port of

entry, it has several actual border crossings, unlike San Ysidro which has only one.

33 Who Crosses the Border: A View of the San Diego/Tijuana Metropolitan Region, San Diego Dialogue report, April 1994, available at

http://www.sandiegodialogue.org/cb_research.htm. This study, though nearly a decade old, remains probably the most scientific

and complete survey of its kind. Local chambers of commerce recently reported unscientific estimates of the percentage of frequent

and very frequent crossers that bear out the 1994 study’s numbers. See America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11

34 Who Crosses the Border

35 America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11

36 See, e.g., Testimony of Harlan Capin, President of Nogales Alliance and Port of the Future, before the Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Sierra Vista, Arizona, February 22, 2002

37 North American Trade and Travel Trends

38 “North American Trade & Transportation News Transborder Annual Release: 2001 U.S. Surface Trade with Canada and Mexico Fell in

2001 for the First Time Since NAFTA Inception,” Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation, June 20,

2002, http://www.bts.gov/PressReleases/2002/bts14_02/index.html

39 CIA World Factbook

40 “Seeking Safe Harbor,” Katherine McIntire Peters, GovExec.com, March 1, 2002, http://www.governmentexecutive.com/

features/0302/0302s3.htm

41 U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration website, http://www.marad.dot.gov/Marad_Statistics/Porcalls_us.htm

42 “Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products into the United States by Country of Origin,” Energy Information Administration; 

“Summary of U.S. Natural Gas Imports by Point of Entry, 1996-2000,” Energy Information Administration

43 “Factsheet: U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative to Safeguard U.S., Global Economy,” U.S. Customs Service website, February

22, 2002, http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2002/0222-00.htm

44 Written testimony of Christopher Koch, President and CEO, World Shipping Council, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,

Drug Policy and Human Resources, April 10, 2002; “Preserving Open Borders in the Post-September 11 World,” Statement of

Stephen E. Flynn, USCG Commander and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, Ottawa, Canada, November 27, 2001,

http://www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?pub!4238

45 Rethinking our Borders: A Plan for Action

46 Written Testimony of Captain Bill Wright, Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy

and Human Resources, Long Beach, California, February 1, 2002

47 U.S. International Air Passenger and Freight Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, March 2001, http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/aviation/international-series/

Section II - Threats at Our Borders and Ports of Entr y

48 National Drug Control Strategy: Performance Measures of Effectiveness, 2001 Annual Report, Office of National Drug Control Policy

49 Federal-wide Drug Seizure System (FDSS) statistics, Sourcebook of criminal justice statistics Online, http://www. a l b a n y. e d u / s o u rc ebook/1995/pdf/t437.pdf. Note that these numbers, which combine the seizures of Customs, the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, the

DEA and the FBI, do not exactly correspond with the seizures reported by the individual agencies. Each agency, in its annual reports,

will report all seizures in which it was involved – including joint seizures with other agencies. Thus, when Customs and the Coast

Guard make a joint drug bust on the water, for example, both agencies will report the total amount seized in their annual statistics.

The FDSS system, maintained by the DEA, eliminates such “duplications” by counting only one report per seizure. However, by agreement with each agency, FDSS does not attempt to credit any one agency with any amount of drug seizures, in order to minimize

competition between the agencies. Thus, it is not possible to determine exactly what percentage of total drugs seized was seized by

any one federal agency. See Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit Zone Interdiction Efforts, General Accounting

Office, Report No. GAO-02-13, January 2002. Nevertheless, it is clear from the totals reported by Customs, the Border Patrol and the
Coast Guard that these three agencies seize most of the total amount of drugs interdicted by the federal government.

50 “New strain of marijuana is no laughing matter,” U.S. Customs Today, January 2000,

http://www.customs.gov/custoday/jan2000/bcbud.htm; Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border, U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General, Report No. I-2000-04, February 18, 2000

51 Drug Situation in Canada – 2000, Criminal Intelligence Program, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, June 2001, http://www.rcmpgrc.gc.ca/crim_int/drugs_2000_e.htm

52 Written testimony of Admiral Erroll Brown

53 Drug Situation in Canada – 2001, Drug Analysis Section, Criminal Analysis Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian

Mounted Police, April 2002, http://www.rcmp-grc.ca/crim_int/drugs_2001_e.htm

54 See Chemical Diversion and Synthetic Drug Manufacture, joint report of the Office of International Intelligence, Drug Enforcement

Administration and the Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police,

http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/intel010621.html

55 “U.S. Moves to Close Canadian Drug Route for Illegal Stimulant,” Clifford Krauss, New York Times, March 5, 2002,

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/05/international/americas/05CANA.html; “Northern Border Threats and Trends,” U.S. Customs

56 “Minister McLellan announces proposed Precursor Control Regulations,” News Release, HealthCanada Online, April 26, 2002,

http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/media/releases/2002/2002_30.htm

57 “Northern Border Threats and Trends,” U.S. Customs Service; Drug Situation in Canada – 2001; Border Patrol Efforts Along the 

Northern Border. Ironically, even in the Pacific Northwest, much of the heroin entering the U.S. originates in Mexico, even though

Asian heroin is the drug of choice in western Canada. Chairman Souder and the Subcommittee staff accompanied RCMP officers on

a late-night survey of the high drug-use areas of Vancouver. During daylight hours, Subcommittee staff witnessed three separate

injection drug addicts openly shooting up in the streets in a one-hour period. 

58 Source: Subcommittee staff conversations with federal law enforcement officials

59 Drug Trafficking in the United States, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration web site, http://www. d e a . g o v / p u b s / i n t e l / 0 1 0 2 0 / i n d e x . h t m l

60 Id.

61 Id.

62 Written testimony of Joseph D. Keefe, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, before the Subcommittee on Criminal

Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, July 12, 2001

63 Drug Trafficking in the United States

64 Id.

65 Id.

66 Id.

67 Source: Subcommittee staff conversations with federal law enforcement officials

68 Conventional weapons smuggling is already a serious problem; in fiscal year 2000, Customs seized 6.4 million rounds of ammunition

and 39,643 firearms. “About U.S. Customs,” U.S. Customs Service website, http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/about/about.htm

69 “Transportation Security: Agenda for the 21st Century,” Stephen E. Flynn, TR News, Nov.-Dec. 2000, http://www.nas.edu/trb/

publications/security/sflynn.pdf

70 Source: INS data, as compiled by Congressional Research Service

71 “Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the Southwest Border,” Pia M. Orrenius, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas report, June

2001, http://www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/border/tbe_orrenius.pdf

72 Immigration Legalization and Status Adjustment Legislation, Ruth Ellen Wassem, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL30780,

April 15, 2002

73 See Holding the Line? The Effect of the Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration, Belinda I. Reyes, Hans P. Johnson, and

Richard Van Swearingen, Public Policy Institute of California, 2002, http://www.ppic.org/publications/PPIC162/ppic162fulltext.pdf

74 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/IMM99.pdf; “State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud,” Statement of 

Benjamin F. Nelson, General Accounting Office, Statement No. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May 20, 1997

75 Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border

76 Id.

77 Written testimony of Roger Hedgecock, former Mayor of San Diego, California, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug

Policy and Human Resources, San Diego, California, January 31, 2002. The San Diego Border Patrol sector informed Chairman

Souder and the Subcommittee staff in January 2002 that 13 Lebanese individuals were apprehended crossing the border in El Cajon.

78 “Frontiersmen: A Visit with the Border Patrol,” Brendan Miniter, OpinionJournal, February 27, 2002,

9 9
1 0 0

http://opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=105001696. There have been steep declines in certain sectors; in San Diego, for example,

apprehensions dropped from 450,152 in 1994 to 110,074 in 2001. Source: Presentation by the U.S. Border Patrol, San Diego Sector,

to Chairman Souder, Rep. Bob Filner and the Subcommittee staff, on January 31, 2002

79 Miniter, “Frontiersmen: A Visit with the Border Patrol”; INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven

Years, General Accounting Office, Report No. GAO-01-842, August 2001

80 Miniter, “Frontiersmen: A Visit with the Border Patrol” 

81 INS’ Southwest Border Strategy; Written testimony of David Aguilar, Sector Chief, Border Patrol Tucson Sector, before the Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources hearing, Sierra Vista, Arizona, February 22, 2002

82 “Border Blues,” John J. Miller, National Review, March 11, 2002

83 Source: Staff conversations with Border Patrol and DEA agents in the southern Arizona region, February 2002

84 Source: U.S. Coast Guard website, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/amiostats01.htm

85 “Warnings on Terror Mounting; Graham: Extremists Use Ports for Entry,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, May 21, 2002

Section III - Federal Law Enforcement at the Borders and Ports of Entry

86 Source: “A Day in the Life of the U.S. Customs Service,” U.S. Customs Service website,

http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/about/weare.htm; additional U.S. Customs Service data

87 Flynn, “Beyond Border Control” 

88 Moreover, this rate of inspection compares favorably to the inspection rates in many foreign jurisdictions. For example, information

provided to the Subcommittee staff in Hong Kong suggests that the inspection rate there is less than 1 percent; likewise, in Vancouver, the Canadian customs service apparently inspects less than 1 percent of all containerized cargo.

89 “The Customs Patrol,” Robert C. Bonner, Washington Post, February 16, 2002; “Customs official disputes container inspection

claims,” Marsha Salisbury, The Journal of Commerce online, March 19, 2002,

http://www.joc.com/20020319/sections/trade/w34604.shtml

90 U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed to Handle Growing Commercial Traffic

91 Audit Report on the United States Customs Service Automated Commercial System Cargo Selectivity, Department of the Treasury Office of

the Inspector General report, OIG-00-066, March 6, 2000

92 U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed to Handle Growing Commercial Traffic

93 Id.

94 “Rethinking the Line: Transforming Border Management Along the U.S.-Mexico Border,” Stephen E. Flynn, Council on Foreign 

Relations website, August 24, 2001, http://www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?pub!4097

95 The Treasury Department inspector general reported in 2000 that 6 of the 12 intensive inspections it observed had failed to follow

Customs protocols, for example by examining too few packages or relying exclusively on canine detection. Audit Report on the

United States Customs Service Automated Commercial System Cargo Selectivity. It is important to remember, however, that Customs

inspectors simply do not have the time or the manpower to carry out detailed searches of every truck referred to secondary inspection.

It may well be better to conduct medium-intensity searches of several trucks than one high-intensity search of a single truck. 

96 U.S. Customs Service: America’s Frontline, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2001, U.S. Customs Service publication, 2002, http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/download/reports2001/uscs_report2001.pdf

97 One official at a Northern border port of entry disagreed and stated that the dogs were not as effective as might have been hoped.

During our visits, it became clear that canine units are much more active on the Southern border than on the Northern. They are

generally considered very effective.

98 Written testimony of John Wilda, U.S. Customs Inspector, and President, Chapter 142, National Treasury Employees Union, before the

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Highgate Springs, Vermont, October 28, 2001

99 Written testimony of Barry Clement, U.S. Customs Inspector and President, NTEU Local Chapter 164, before the Subcommittee on

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Blaine, Washington, December 10, 2001

100 Written responses of Rex Applegate, Assistant Director, Mission Support, Field Operations, Southern California Customs Management

Center, U.S. Customs Service, to questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources

101 Customs reports that 97 percent of sea carriers filed timely manifests, timely bills were filed for the imports 97 percent of the time,

the matching rate of the bills was 96 percent, and the compliance rate of the manifest was 94 percent. Customs’ target rate for all

four categories is 92 percent. U.S. Customs Service: America’s Frontline

102 “Customs steps up radiation screens,” Robert Schlesinger, Boston Globe, May 1, 2002,

http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/121/nation/Customs_steps_up_radiation_screens+.shtml

103 Peters, “Seeking Safe Harbor” 

104 Cargo can also be shipped “in bond” from ports of entry on the land borders. According to a Customs official knowledgeable about

the procedure, however, cargo shipped in bond at a land border crossing is still subject to screening for narcotics and other danger-
ous materials at the border. Only “commercial” inspections (to determine if the proper amounts of dutiable cargo have been

declared, for example) are postponed until the final port of entry.

105 The timeliness rate of manifests for air carriers was 92 percent (meeting the target rate), but the timeliness rate of filing bills was 91

p e rcent, the matching rate of bills 86 percent, and the compliance rate for manifests only 88 percent. U.S. Customs Service: America’s

Frontline

106 Audit of U.S. Customs Service’s Air Automated Manifest System

107 The Subcommittee staff spoke with Customs officials knowledgeable about the Sea AMS system to determine if similar problems had

arisen at the sea ports of entry. We were told that the first problem, the necessity to “trick” the system, does not arise with Sea AMS

because there is no need immediately to remove cargo from the facility; the cargo simply waits at the port until all proper documentation

is filed. The officials also informed us that they were unaware of any incidents of the trade community miscoding the disposition of cargo.

108 U.S. Customs Service: America’s Frontline; Customs and INS: Random Inspection Programs Can Be Strengthened, General Accounting

Office, Report No. GAO-02-215R, December 3, 2001. Customs uses a random inspection program called the Compliance Measurement Examination (COMPEX) to test the effectiveness of its targeting procedures at major ports of entry. Essentially, Customs

searches a random sample of non-targeted individuals and compares the data to the results of its targeted inspections. The GAO has

raised some concerns about how accurate and complete the data produced by COMPEX are, however.

109 North American Trade and Travel Trends

110 See Written responses of Thomas W. Hardy, Director, Field Operations, Northwest Great Plains Customs Management Center, U.S.

Customs Service, to questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. Note that

since September 11, Customs has apparently suspended rolling inspection. Currently, passenger trains are stopped at the Northern

border and inspections are conducted there (taking on average less than 15 minutes). Id.

111 North American Trade and Travel Trends. Amtrak does not operate any trains between Mexico and the U.S.

112 Written responses of Rex Applegate

113 As mentioned above, Customs is exploring the possibility of requiring APIS data at the land borders from operators of buses and passenger trains, but has informed the Subcommittee that it currently does not have the legislative authority to do this. Written

responses of Philip W. Spayd, District Field Officer, U.S. Customs Service, to questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Criminal

Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources 

114 Relatively few passengers are actually subjected to any sort of personal search. For example, the GAO reported that out of the

approximately 140 million passengers who arrived in U.S. airports in 1997 and 1998, only about 102,000 were forced to undergo a

personal search. U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results, General

Accounting Office, Report No. GAO/GGD-00-38, March 2000

115 Customs and INS: Random Inspection Programs Can Be Strengthened; U.S. Customs Service: America’s Frontline

116 U.S. Customs Service: America’s Frontline, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2001

117 The Subcommittee staff observed demonstrations of both Customs’ speedboats and Black Hawk helicopters in San Diego, California.

118 See Written responses of Thomas W. Hardy

119 U.S. Customs Service: America’s Frontline

120 Id.

121 These figures were provided to the Subcommittee by the INS Office of Legislative Affairs in April 2002.

122 Source: INS data, http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/msrapr02/INSP.HTM

123 Source: Testimony of Michael J. Hrinyak, Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Inspections, INS, before the House Judiciary Committee,

Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, July 23, 1998

124 Source: INS data, compiled by Congressional Research Service

125 U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL31381, May 8,

2002

126 S o u rce: Department of State data, compiled by Congressional Research Service. Note that the 2.1 million rejections does not include

about 310,000 visa applications that were initially rejected but were eventually granted (because the grounds for ineligibility were cured).

127 Id.

128 Nelson, “State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud”

129 Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, William J. Krouse and Raphael F. Perl, Congressional

Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, June 18, 2001, Order Code RL31019

130 Source: Information provided to staff of the Government Reform Committee and the Subcommittee by the U.S. Department of State

and the American Foreign Service Association

131 State Department: Tourist Visa Backlogs Persist at U.S. Consulates, General Accounting Office, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-98-69, March

1998

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132 The VWP was created in 1986 as the VWPP, and was made permanent by legislation in 2000.

133 Immigration: Visa Waiver Program, Alison Siskin, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21205, April 22, 2002

134 “Smuggling by Airline Guards Feared,” Patrick J. McDonnell, Rich Connell and Greg Krikorian, Los Angeles Times, May 6, 2002

135 “Official Took Bribes for U.S. Visas,” Jeffrey Gold, Associated Press Wire Report, May 21, 2002

136 McDonnell, et al., “Smuggling by Airline Guards Feared”

137 The Potential for Fraud and INS’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector

General, Report No. I-99-10, March 1999; see also Follow-up Report on the Visa Waiver Program, Department of Justice, Office of the

Inspector General, Report No. I-2002-002, December 2001

138 Technically, Customs’ TECS is the centralized database for IBIS; IBIS accesses the other law enforcement databases through TECS. 

Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues

139 The INS uses a random sample testing method called the Inspections Traveler Examination (INTEX), similar to that used by Customs,

to test the efficacy of its screening procedures. As with Customs’ COMPEX, however, the GAO has called into question the completeness and accuracy of the INTEX system. Customs and INS: Random Inspection Programs Can Be Strengthened

140 America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11

141 In June 2002, the Department of Justice proposed new regulations requiring visa holders from certain Middle Eastern countries to

register with the INS upon arrival and be fingerprinted. “U.S. Will Seek to Fingerprint Visas’ Holders,” Eric Schmitt, New York Times,

June 4, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/05/national/05IMMI.html

142 Customs and INS: Random Inspection Programs Can Be Strengthened

143 Follow-up Report on the Visa Waiver Program

144 “ Technological Help for Border Security,” Statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, before the Senate

Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, October 12, 2001

1 4 5 “INS Vigilance Under Fire,” CBS News website, March 10, 2002, http://www. c b s n e w s . c o m / s t o r i e s / 2 0 0 2 / 0 3 / 0 7 / 6 0 m i n u t e s /

m a i n 5 0 3 2 1 0 . s h t m l

146 “INS Backup System Described,” Alfonso Chardy, Miami Herald, March 13, 2002; “INS in Database Dispute; Union Questions Airport

Checks,” Alfonso Chardy, Miami Herald, March 9, 2002

147 “INS Mix-Up Drops 3,500 From Travel ‘Watch List’,” Patrick J. McDonnell, Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2002,

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-052302glitch.story

148 “Justice Dept. to Probe New INS Visa Error,” Cheryl W. Thompson, Washington Post, March 25, 2002, p. A11

149 “Immigration supervisor at Los Angeles airport arrested in smuggling ring,” Kate Berry, Associated Press, June 12, 2002

150 Follow-up Report on INS Efforts to Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant Overstays, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of

Justice, Report No. I-2002-006, April 23, 2002

151 Id.

152 Figures provided by INS Office of Legislative Affairs.

153 Like Customs, the INS has enlisted the support of National Guard personnel at the borders, assisting both the Border Patrol and INS

Inspections. Figures provided to the Subcommittee last fall by the National Guard indicated that 710 members of the Guard were

assisting the INS, with 517 on the Southern border and 193 on the Northern border. Again, these numbers have fluctuated significantly since September 11.

154 INS’ Southwest Border Strategy

155 Id.

156 Written testimony of William T. Veal, Chief Patrol Agent, San Diego Border Patrol Sector, before the Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, San Diego, California, January 31, 2002

157 INS’ Southwest Border Strategy

158 Id.

159 The Border Patrol’s strategy has been criticized in Arizona not simply for increasing the illegal traffic in that state, but also for creating

massive costs for the state’s health care providers. The push to drive illegal aliens out of town and into more remote areas has

sharply increased the number of illegal aliens suffering from exposure, accidents, and even criminal assaults by bandits. When the

Border Patrol apprehends injured aliens, it will hand them over to the local hospitals for treatment (which they are required by law to

provide), but without officially arresting them – thus avoiding the obligation to pay for the aliens’ medical costs. As a result, local

hospitals are forced to pick up the tab, straining their already limited resources. At present, the federal government’s compensation

program is inadequate to cover these costs, and should be reviewed by Congress. See Written testimony of James J. Dickson, CEO of

Copper Queen Community Hospital, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Sierra Vista,

Arizona, February 22, 2002
160 INS’ Southwest Border Strategy

161 The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS’ Actions and the Operation of Its IDENT Automated Fingerprint Identification 

System, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Special Report, March 2000

162 Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. I-2002-003, December 7,

2001

163 Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border

164 Follow-Up Report on the Border Patrol’s Efforts to Improve Northern Border Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector

General, Report No. I-2002-004, February 2002

165 Id.

166 Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border

167 See “Plugging a Very Porous Northern Border,” Bill Miller, Washington Post, April 8, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/articles/A10757-2002Apr7.html

168 See Immigration and Naturalization Service website, http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawenfor/interiorenf/index.htm

169 “INS Sets New Removals Record; Fiscal Year 1999 Removals Reach 176,990,” Immigration and Naturalization Service News Release,

November 12, 1999

170 INS Detention and Removals home page, http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawenfor/interiorenf/custody.htm

171 “U.S. Dismantles Largest Global Alien Smuggling Cartel Encountered to Date,” Immigration and Naturalization Service News Release,

November 20, 1998

172 Testimony of James Ziglar, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,

Drug Policy and Human Resources, December 5, 2001

173 In time of war, or at the order of the President, the Coast Guard may be temporarily transferred under the control of the Department

of Defense.

174 “U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian,” Coast Guard Publication 1, January 1, 2002,

http://www.uscg.mil/overview/Pub%201/contents.html

175 Source: U.S. Coast Guard website, http://www.uscg.mil/overview/Homeland%20Security2.htm

176 Written testimony of Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug

Policy, and Human Resources, December 5, 2001

177 Testimony of Stephen E. Flynn, Council on Foreign Relations, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, April 11, 2002

178 See Written testimony of Ronald H. Henley, Chief Patrol Agent, Blaine Border Patrol Sector, before the Subcommittee on Criminal 

Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Blaine, Washington, December 10, 2001

179 See Written testimony of Admiral Erroll Brown

Section IV - New proposals For Border and Port of Entry Law Enforcement

180 See Testimony of Stephen E. Flynn, Council on Foreign Relations, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and

Human Resources, June 17, 2002

181 Statement of Ranking Member Elijah Cummings, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, at hearing

on October 3, 2001

182 See Testimony of Peter K. Nunez, former Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Department of the Treasury, before the Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, June 17, 2002

183 For example, the maritime security legislation that recently passed in the House, H.R. 3983, originally gave authority to TSA to

require electronic cargo manifest information from every carrier – authority already held by Customs. This raised the specter of a

duplicate cargo manifest reporting system, which would further splinter information flow into the federal government and place

unnecessary burdens on commercial carriers. Eventually a compromise was reached conferring the new authority on Customs, but

requiring it to share the information with other agencies. One benefit of agency consolidation could be to prevent such “turf battles” between agencies from ever starting in the first place.

184 See Written Testimony of Larry C. Johnson, BERG Associates LLC, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and

Human Resources, April 10, 2002

185 Some have suggested that another problem that could be fixed by consolidation is the elimination of multiple inspections at the 

borders and ports of entry. It should be noted, however, that at least at the land borders, Customs and INS inspectors are already

cross-designated to perform primary inspection for both agencies. Thus, there is no duplication of primary inspection between these

agencies. Moreover, though Customs and INS inspectors can each perform primary inspection, secondary inspections (for immigration, customs and agricultural products) require expertise and hence specialization – so separate inspector corps for these three 

functions may have to be maintained even if the separate agencies are “merged.” See Written testimony of Colleen M. Kelley,

National President, National Treasury Employees Union, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human

Resources, April 10, 2002

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186 “Repeating the Past?”, Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., Corine Hegland, and Margaret Kriz, National Journal, June 14, 2002, http://nationaljournal.com/members/news/2002/06/0614nj2.htm

187 Written Testimony of Colleen M. Kelley; Written Testimony of T.J. Bonner, National President, National Border Patrol Council, American Federation of Government Employees, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, April

10, 2002

188 “Drug Seizures Up at State Borders,” William Overend, Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2002, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la000007806jan31.story

189 “White House says counterterrorism tactics aiding drug war,” Wayne Washington and Anne E. Kornblut, Boston Globe, March 6,

2002. Note, however, that the news is not all good; drug prices apparently have not fallen in Miami, Chicago or Los Angeles.

“Smugglers Refine Tricks to Pass Stricter Scrutiny,” Donna Leinwand, USA Today, April 11, 2002

190 Written Testimony of Jim Miller, Executive Director, Whatcom Council of Governments, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,

Drug Policy and Human Resources, Blaine, Washington, December 10, 2001

191 America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11

192 Responses of Jim Miller, Executive Director, Whatcom Council of Governments, to written questions submitted by the Subcommittee

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources

193 Leinwand, “Smugglers Refine Tricks to Pass Stricter Scrutiny”

194 Yet another demand on the Coast Guard’s resources has been created by the six new Marine Safety and Security Teams (MSSTs),

which enforce moving and fixed security zones to protect commercial vessels, Navy ships, and waterside critical infrastructure.

195 Written testimony of John Wilda

196 Customs summary data on Resource Allocation Model, http://www.customs.gov/about/pdf/ram4a.pdf

197 “Northern Border Threats and Trends,” U.S. Customs Service

198 Peters, “Seeking Safe Harbor” 

199 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 authorized the tripling of Customs and INS inspectors, and Border Patrol agents, on the Northern 

border. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 authorized an additional 200 INS inspectors and support

staff. The Customs Reauthorization Act, H.R. 3129, recently passed by the House, would authorize funds for approximately 285 new

Customs inspectors for the Northern border. It would also authorize over $90 million for new detection equipment, including 

additional VACIS machines for both the Northern and Southern borders.

200 Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring Goal Was Not Met, General Accounting Office, Report No.

GAO/GGD-00-39, December 1999

201 Written testimony of T.J. Bonner 

202 Border Patrol Hiring

203 Written testimony of Stephen Duchaine, INS Inspector, and President, Highgate Springs Chapter, American Federation of Government

Employees, Immigration and Naturalization Service Council, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human

Resources, Highgate Springs, Vermont, October 28, 2001

204 Although it is understandable that the NTEU and AFGE would like to improve retirement benefits for Customs and INS employees,

extending the “law enforcement” retirement system may not be the most effective way. The “law enforcement” retirement system is

based in part on assumptions about the career length of certain government law enforcement jobs, which may not necessarily apply

to Customs and INS inspectors. A better way to improve the retirement benefits of these positions may simply be to directly increase

benefits payments, although this is a subject beyond the scope of this Report.

205 Inspection of the Influx of New Personnel, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 1-2000-018, June 1,

2000

206 Border Patrol Hiring

207 See, e.g., Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption, Statement of Richard M. Stana,

Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, General Accounting Office, GAO/T-GGD-99-86,

April 21, 1999

208 Written Testimony of Bonni Tischler, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs Service, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, April 10, 2002; Customs’ Automated Commercial Environment (ACE):

Briefing for the Congressional Northern Border Caucus, General Accounting Office, April 11, 2002 (this information is now publicly

available in Customs Service Modernization: Management Improvements Needed on High-Risk Automated Commercial Environment

Project, General Accounting Office, Report No. GAO-02-545, May 2002)

209 “One step at a time,” Judi Hasson, Federal Computer Week, March 4, 2002, http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2002/0304/mgtcustom-03-04-02.asp; Interim Report on Customs ACE Program Management: Customs Needs to Adequately Staff the Modernization

Office, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Inspector General, Report OIG-02-058, March 4, 2002; Customs’ Automated 

Commercial Environment (ACE): Briefing for the Congressional Northern Border Caucus. A key test of ITDS at the Peace Bridge in

Buffalo, intended to test the viability of incorporating private companies’ data with Customs’ inspection systems, was unfortunately

suspended shortly after it began due to the September 11 attacks. “One step forward, one step back at the border,” Preeti Vasishtha,

Government Computer News, February 18, 2002, http://www.itds.treas.gov/gcn021802.html. Hopefully it will be brought back on

line in the near future.
210 “PAPS: Pre-Arrival Processing System,” informational brochure provided by U.S. Customs at Buffalo port of entry

211 U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed

212 Congress has conditioned the release of some of these funds on the submission of detailed spending plans from Customs. Congress

should continue its oversight of ACE development, given the complexity, cost and importance of this system. See Customs’ Automated

Commercial Environment (ACE): Briefing for the Congressional Northern Border Caucus

213 “Time to Get On the ‘GovBus’,” Om Malik, Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2002, page A22

214 “Border Security: Coast Guard Encounters Big Hurdles in New Effort to Screen Arriving Ships,” New York Times, March 16, 2002

215 Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum Report

216 Flynn, “Rethinking the Line: Transforming Border Management Along the U.S.-Mexico Border” 

217 Peters, “Seeking Safe Harbor” 

218 Id.

219 Flynn, “Rethinking the Line: Transforming Border Management Along the U.S.-Mexico Border” 

220 Id.; Flynn, “Preserving Open Borders in the Post-September 11 World”

221 Not only would expensive new sealing and tracking technology be required, but apparently a large number of containers themselves

would have to be replaced due to aging and wear and tear. In May 2002, Customs reported that a surprise inspection at the port of

Jacksonville, Florida revealed that 30 percent of cargo containers there had problems serious enough to prevent them from moving

into or out of the port under Customs safety regulations. “Cargo holds problems: Inspection finds faulty containers,” Dana Treen,

Florida Times-Union, May 2, 2002, http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/050202/met_9298798.html

222 Flynn, “Preserving Open Borders in the Post-September 11 World” 

223 “U.S. Customs Will Screen at 3 Ports in Canada,” Bill Miller, Washington Post, March 9, 2002. Chairman Souder and the staff

recently had the opportunity to meet with the U.S. Customs inspectors currently assisting in pre-screening at the port of Vancouver.

The Canadian customs service, after it has finished performing its own screening of all inbound cargo, provides information on U.S.-

bound cargo to U.S. Customs inspectors stationed near Vancouver (at the Canadian customs cargo inspection facility located at

Burnaby). The U.S. inspectors then use their standard screening mechanisms to identify high-risk cargo, which they ask Canadian

customs officials to inspect. As of yet, U.S. Customs does not itself perform any inspections at these foreign facilities.

224 “Pilot program on border security coming to New Hampshire,” Holly Ramer, Associated Press, February 26, 2002; “In Transit,” Jason

Peckenpaugh, GovExec.com, July 15, 2002, http://www.govexec.com/news/index.cfm?mode=report&articleid=23399

225 “Plan Would Prevent Terrorist Use of Shipping Containers,” Patrick Goodenough, CNSNews.com, June 7, 2002,

http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=\ForeignBureau...\FOR20020607c.htm

226 “Industry Partnerships,” U.S. Customs website, http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/impoexpo/tools/archives/vol1n01/indmay.htm

227 “Factsheet: U.S. Customs Container Security Initiative to Safeguard U.S., Global Economy,” February 22, 2002, U.S. Customs website,

http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2002/0222-00.htm

228 See United States Customs Service Support for the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Inspector

General, Report No. OIG-00-109, July 17, 2000 

229 “Track Ships to Protect Ports, U.S. Maritime Authorities Urge,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 1, 2002. There is a similar push to have

the AIS installed on all commercial ships travelling on domestic waterways, particularly barges carrying hazardous materials.

230 Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,

Report No. I-2000-019, June 2000

231 A “fastpass” system has also been created for small boats travelling between the U.S. and Canada, the I-68 Canadian Border Boat

Landing Program. The boater receives a permit after filling out the INS’ I-68 form and paying a fee; the boater then can travel freely

between the U.S. and Canada for recreational purposes without paying a fee. The program was suspended after September 11, and

although it has since been reinstated, boaters must now appear in person for inspection, interview and a name check on the IBIS

database. Photographs and fingerprints are also required. INS News Release, April 9, 2002, http://www/ins/gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrel/boatlanding.htm 

232 Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection

233 Id.

234 Id.

235 Id.

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APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ABI Automated Broker Interface, part of Customs’ ACS system. It allows customs brokers and importers to

file entry documentation for cargo electronically.

ACE Automated Commercial Environment, the planned replacement for ACS. It will allow all import data

to be filed on a web-based computer system.

ACS Automated Commercial System, Customs’ electronic cargo database. First deployed in 1984, it 

consists of AMS and ABI.

ACSI Americas Counter-Smuggling Initiative, Customs-led cooperative effort designed to improve internal

security of Latin American carriers and importers.

AES Automated Export System, Customs’ electronic system for tracking export transactions.

AIS Automatic Identification System, a proposal by the Coast Guard to create a vessel tracking system

using transponder technology.

AMICC Air and Marine Interdiction Coordination Center, located near Riverside, California; Customs-led 

program to track flights into and within the U.S. to prevent illegal smuggling by air.

AMS Automated Manifest System, part of Customs’ ACS system. Sea, rail and air carriers can file their 

manifests (descriptions of their cargo) electronically on AMS.

APIS Advanced Passenger Information System, which provides advance electronic information on incoming

international passengers to Customs and INS inspectors at airports.

ATS Automated Targeting System, new system used by Customs to screen incoming cargo.

ATS-P Automated Targeting System – Passenger, computer system used by Customs to screen information

on incoming passengers.

BASC Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, Customs private-public partnership intended to improve monitoring of cargo by private industry.

BCC Border Crossing Card, a laminated, credit card-style visa document, containing biometric information,

issued to Mexican citizens. Commonly referred to as a “laser visa.”

BRASS Border Release Advanced Selectivity System, which helps simplify the paperwork required by Customs

of truck drivers at land border crossings.
1 0 8

CANPASS The Canadian version of the DCL system.

CIP Carrier Initiative Program, early cooperative effort between Customs and private carriers and

importers to improve internal security.

CIS Central Index System, an agencywide database used by the INS.

CFS Container Freight Station, a private facility where cargo is sorted and distributed.

CLASS Consular Lookout and Support System, database used by the Department of State to screen 

applications for visas overseas.

COMPEX Compliance Measurement Examination, a random inspection program used by Customs to test the

effectiveness of its targeting procedures.

CSI Container Security Initiative, new public-private cooperative effort, spearheaded by Customs, to

improve the security of containerized cargo.

DACS Deportable Alien Control System, an agencywide database used by the INS to track deportable aliens.

DCL Dedicated Commuter Lane, a system reserving a traffic lane at a land border crossing for participants

in a special pre-clearance program.

E N F O R C E Enforcement Case Tracking System, INS database that collects enforcement data from across the INS.

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, located in Glynco, Georgia. Provides training to, among 

others, INS and Customs inspectors, and Border Patrol agents.

IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FBI database containing criminal history

records. It relies on 10 rolled fingerprints to identify criminal suspects.

IBET Integrated Border Enforcement Team, a team formed by U.S. and Canadian law enforcement officials

to share intelligence and conduct joint investigations and operations. The first IBET was created in

the Pacific Northwest.

IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System, computer database used primarily by INS inspectors at ports of

entry, to screen incoming travelers.

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System, used by the INS to track aliens who repeatedly cross the

Southern border. It relies on two flat press (as opposed to rolled) fingerprints of an apprehended 

individual’s right and left index fingers.

IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.

IMET Integrated Marine Enforcement Team, a marine version of IMET.
1 0 9

INTEX Inspections Traveler Examination, random sample testing method used by the INS to test the efficacy

of its screening procedures.

ITDS International Trade Database, a project intended to create a “single window” through which all data

on imports required by government agencies can be submitted electronically. Currently entrusted to

Customs, the ITDS project will be combined with ACE.

LBCIP Land Border Carrier Initiative Program, Customs initiative designed to improve internal security of 

land-based carriers. All carriers wishing to participate in BRASS must be a part of LBCIP.

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness, an intelligence sharing initiative created by the Coast Guard to improve

information flow between maritime law enforcement agencies.

MTXR Mobile Truck X-Ray system, a system mounted on a truck and used by Customs to scan cargo.

NATAP ACE prototype pilot, conducted by the U.S., Canada and Mexico to assess the potential of harmonizing trade processes, sharing data and creating a paperless customs process. The NATAP also used 

“intelligent transportation systems,” such as transponder/radio frequency identification devices in

trucks, to provide advance information to Customs inspectors at the border.

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NAILS National Automated Immigration Lookout System, database used by INS inspectors to identify 

potentially dangerous immigrants. Current version is called NAILS II.

NCAP National Customs Automation Program, Customs pilot program used at 3 ports of entry to process

automobile and auto parts imports for four companies.

NCIC National Crime Information Center, computerized criminal information clearinghouse maintained by

the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The main database available to law enforcement personnel is

NCIC 2000.

NEXUS Harmonized Highway Pilot, a DCL system on the Northern border that combines SENTRI with the 

Canadian CANPASS system.

NIIS Nonimmigrant Information System, database used by the INS to identify foreign visitors who have

remained illegally in the country.

PACE Peace Arch Crossing Entry, DCL system established in 1991 at the Blaine and Point Roberts, Washington border crossings.

PAPS Pre-Arrival Processing System, a pilot project used by Customs at the Peace Bridge crossing in 

Buffalo, New York to reduce the number of trucks referred to secondary inspection due to defects 

in paperwork alone.
1 1 0

PRD Personal Radiation Detector, a gamma ray detection device that can be used to identify hidden 

r a d i o a c t i v e materials. It looks like a pager, and is worn by Customs inspectors on their belts.

PSU Port Security Unit, a contingent of Coast Guard reservists normally deployed to protect U.S. Navy 

vessels overseas.

RAM Resource Allocation Model, used by Customs to estimate its need for new personnel.

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the primary federal law enforcement agency of Canada.

SENTRI Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection, an automated DCL system now in place at

a number of locations on the Southern and Northern borders.

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System, database used by Customs (among others) in 

screening entrants at the borders.

TIPOFF Classified database used by the State Department, containing intelligence on terrorists and terrorist

organizations.

TXR Truck X-Ray system, a stationary system used by Customs to scan cargo.

USIC United States Interdiction Coordinator, position at the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The USIC (who has traditionally been the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard) is responsible for

coordinating the federal government’s drug interdiction efforts.

VACIS Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System, a gamma-ray scanner used by Customs. It takes several forms,

including mobile, fixed and rail versions.

VWP Visa Waiver Program (formerly the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, or VWPP). Allows citizens from certain

nations (currently 29 of them) to visit the U.S. for up to 90 days without a visa.

3T Three Tier Targeting System, prototype cargo screening system, recently terminated by Customs.
1 1 1

APPENDIX B

HEARINGS AND VISITS TO PORTS OF ENTRY CONDUCTED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE

ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES RELATED TO 

BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY

1. Hearings

“Drug Trade and the Terror Network,” October 3, 2001

“Keeping a Strong Federal Law Enforcement Work Force,” October 17, 2001

“Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at the Northern Border: Field Hearing at Highgate Springs, 

Vermont,” October 28, 2001

“Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at the Northern Border: Field Hearing at Champlain, New York,”

October 29, 2001

“Federal Law Enforcement: Long Term Implications of Homeland Security Needs,” December 5, 2001

“Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at the Northern Border: Field Hearing at Blaine, Washington,”

December 10, 2001

“Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at the Southern Border: Field Hearing at San Diego, California,” 

January 31, 2002

“Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at the Nation’s Ports of Entry: Field Hearing on the Seaports of

Los Angeles and Long Beach, California,” February 1, 2002

“Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at the Southern Border: Field Hearing at Sierra Vista, Arizona,” 

February 22, 2002

“Enhancing Border Security and Law Enforcement,” April 10, 2002

“Homeland Security Reorganization: What Impact on Federal Law Enforcement and Drug 

Interdiction?”, June 17, 2002
1 1 2

2. Visits to Ports of Entry

Washington – Dulles International Airport, June 2001 (Staff)

Buffalo and Niagara Falls, New York, June 2001

San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, California, August 2001 (Staff)

El Paso, Texas, August 2001 (Staff)

Highgate Springs, Alburg and St. Albans, Vermont, October 2001 (Chairman Souder and staff)

Champlain and Rouses Point, New York, October 2001 (Chairman Souder and staff)

Blaine, Port of Seattle, Sumas and Port Angeles, Washington, December 2001 

(Chairman Souder and staff)

Port Huron, Marine City and Detroit, Michigan, January 2002 (Chairman Souder and staff)

Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, February 2002 (Chairman Souder and staff)

Fortuna and Portal, North Dakota, February 2002 (Chairman Souder)

Nogales and Douglas, Arizona, February 2002 (Chairman Souder and staff)

Sweetgrass, Montana, May 2002 (Chairman Souder)
1 1 3

APPENDIX C

TABLES: TRADE AND TRAFFIC AT THE PORTS OF ENTRY

I. TRADE DATA

U.S. Merchandise Trade with Canada and Mexico by Mode: 2000

Value Weight

Mode (percent) (percent)

NAFTA trade, total 100.0 100.0

Truck 65.6 35.1

Rail 14.4 17.4

Pipeline 3.6 14.8

Air 6.9 0.2

Water 5.0 32.4

Other and unknown 4.5 0.1

U.S.-NAFTA imports, total 100.0 100.0

Truck 59.3 25.7

Rail 19.4 19.8

Pipeline 6.3 20.5

Air 4.9 0.1

Water 6.4 33.9

Other and unknown 3.7 0.1

U.S.-NAFTA exports, total 100.0 100.0

Truck 73.6 55.7

Rail 8.1 12.3

Pipeline 0.2 2.3

Air 9.3 0.4

Water 3.2 29.2

Other and unknown 5.5 0.2

Source: North American Trade and Travel Trends, http://www.bts.gov/publications/nattt/entire.pdf

Top 10 Commodities by Value in U.S. Merchandise Trade with 

NAFTA Partners for All Land Modes, 2000

Value

Rank Commodity ($ billions) Percent

1 Motor vehicles, parts, and accessories 125 21.7

2 Electrical machinery, equipment and parts 89 15.5

3 Nuclear reactors, machinery, and 

mechanical appliances 75 13.0

4 Mineral fuels, mineral oils, and products 31 5.3

5 Plastics and related products 22 3.8

6 Special classification provisions 21 3.6

7 Paper, paperboard, and paper products 16 2.8

8 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal 13 2.3

9 Furniture, furnishings, and lighting products 13 2.3

10 Optical, photographic, and precision 13 2.3

Total, top 10 commodities 418 72.6

Total, all commodities 576 100.0

Source: North American Trade and Travel Trends
II. TRAFFIC DATA

A. TRUCK TRAFFIC

Top 20 NAFTA Border Truck Crossings into the United States: 1997 and 2000

Average

Number

of Truck

Rank Crossings Percentage

In 1997 2000 Per Day 1997 2000 Change

2000 Port name (thousands) (thousands) (2000) (%) (%) 1997-2000

1 Detroit, MI 1,420 1,769 4,848 15.4 15.3 24.6

2 Laredo, TX 1,251 1,493 4,091 13.6 12.9 19.3

3 Buffalo-Niagara, NY 1,054 1,198 3,282 11.4 10.4 13.7

4 Port Huron, MI 679 839 2,299 7.4 7.3 23.5

5 El Paso, TX 583 720 1,974 6.3 6.2 23.6

6 Otay Mesa/San Ysidro, CA 568 688 1,886 6.2 5.9 21.2

7 Blaine, WA 463 517 1,416 5.0 4.5 11.6

8 Champlain-Rouses Pt., NY 299 391 1,071 3.2 3.4 30.7

9 Hidalgo, TX 235 374 1,025 2.5 3.2 59.3

10 Brownsville, TX 248 299 820 2.7 2.6 20.9

11 Calexico East/Calexico, CA U 279 764 U 2.4 U

12 Alexandria Bay, NY 220 278 763 2.4 2.4 26.5

13 Nogales, AZ 243 255 698 2.6 2.2 4.9

14 Pembina, ND 152 214 587 1.7 1.9 40.9

15 Calais, ME 126 154 422 1.4 1.3 22.5

16 Sweetgrass, MT 112 146 400 1.2 1.3 30.5

17 Derby Line, VT 101 139 380 1.1 1.2 37.6

18 Houlton, ME 103 133 364 1.1 1.1 28.8

19 Highgate Springs, VT 99 133 364 1.1 1.1 33.9

20 Jackman, ME 87 128 350 0.9 1.1 47.1

Total, top 20 ports 8,041 10,148 27,802 87.3 87.7 26.2

Total, all ports 9,215 11,574 31,709 100.0 100.0 25.6

KEY: U = data are unavailable.

NOTE: Data represent the number of truck crossings, not the number of unique vehicles, and include both loaded and

unloaded trucks. Data for the port of Calexico is typically reported as a combined total with Calexico East.

Source: North American Trade and Travel Trends

1 1 4
Top 10 Ports for Trucks, FY 2001

Total

Ports Trucks 

1 Port of Detroit, MI 1,668,837

2 Port of Laredo, TX 1,419,165

3 Port of Buffalo, NY 1,142,592

4 Port of Port Huron, MI 827,141

5 Port of Otay Mesa, CA 700,453

6 Port of El Paso, TX 656,257

7 Port of Blaine, WA 492,532

8 Port of Champlain-Rouses Point, NY 384,885

9 Port of Hidalgo, TX 367,991

10 Port of Alexandria Bay, NY 279,350

Total 7,939,203

Source: U.S. Customs Service data

1 1 5
B. LAND PASSENGER TRAFFIC

Incoming Passengers by Mode: 1997–2000

1997 1998 1999 2000

Number Number Number Number

(1000’s) % (1000’s) % (1000’s) % (1000’s) %

From Mexico

Passengers on trains U U 13 – 17 – 18 –

Passengers on buses U U 3,639 1.3 3,495 1.2 3,466 1.2

Pedestrians 45,000 17.9 44,477 16.2 48,186 16.4 47,090 16.2

Passengers in 

personal vehicles 206,113 82.1 226,104 82.4 242,613 82.4 239,795 82.6

Total 251,112 100.0 274,232 100.0 294,311 100.0 290,368 100.0

From Canada

Passengers on trains U U 241 0.3 187 0.2 270 0.3

Passengers on buses U U 3,951 4.3 4,366 4.5 4,873 5.1

Pedestrians 520 U 585 0.6 587 0.6 585 0.6

Passengers in 

personal vehicles 90,731 U 88,127 94.9 92,470 94.7 90,047 94.0

Total U U 92,904 100.0 97,610 100.0 95,775 100.0

KEY: – = value too small to report; U = data are unavailable.

NOTE: Data for passengers in personal vehicles include the driver.

Personal vehicles are automobiles, minivans, sport utility vehicles, and pickups.

Source: North American Trade and Travel Trends

Top 10 U.S.-Mexico Border Crossings for Incoming Passengers 

and Personal Vehicles: 2000

Daily port share of

Passengers personal vehicles

in personal Personal crossing U.S.-

U.S. Customs vehicles vehicles Mexico border

Rank port/crossing per day per day (percent) )))))))))))))

1 El Paso, TX 132,658 45,746 18.3

2 San Ysidro, CA 85,001 38,649 15.5

3 Hidalgo, TX 60,131 24,054 9.6

4 Brownsville, TX 53,954 21,582 8.6

5 Laredo, TX 48,980 19,592 7.8

6 Calexico, CA 55,053 18,479 7.4

7 Otay Mesa, CA 29,204 13,275 5.3

8 Nogales, AZ 31,511 12,826 5.1

9 Eagle Pass, TX 23,546 9,199 3.7

10 San Luis, AZ 19,365 7,117 2.8

Total, top10 ports 539,403 210,519 84.3

Total, all U.S.-Mexico

border crossings 656,971 249,745 100.0

NOTE: Rank is based on the number of personal vehicle crossings per day.

Source: North American Trade and Travel Trends

1 1 6
Top 10 U.S.-Canada Border Crossings for Incoming Passengers 

and Personal Vehicles: 2000

Daily port share of

Passengers personal vehicles

in personal Personal crossing U.S.-

U.S. Customs vehicles vehicles Mexico border

Rank port/crossing per day per day (percent) )))))))))))))

1 Detroit, MI 59,518 22,905 22.6

2 Buffalo-Niagara, NY 45,269 20,980 20.7

3 Blaine, WA 22,560 9,129 9.0

4 Port Huron, MI 18,810 6,390 6.3

5 Calais, ME 8,525 3,875 3.8

6 Sault Ste.Marie, MI 10,634 3,498 3.5

7 Massena, NY 8,340 2,987 3.0

8 Champlain-Rouses Pt., NY 7,526 2,685 2.7

9 Sumas, WA 5,583 2,243 2.2

10 Derby Line, VT 4,144 2,190 2.2

Total, top

10 ports 190,909 76,883 76.0

Total, all U.S.-Canada

border crossings 246,704 101,137 100.0

NOTE: Rank is based on the number of personal vehicle crossings per day.

Source: North American Trade and Travel Trends

Top 10 Ports for Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs), FY 2001

Total

Ports POVs))

1 Port of El Paso, TX 17,285,331

2 Port of San Ysidro, CA 15,675,483

3 Port of Detroit, MI 8,148,948

4 Port of Brownsville, TX 7,879,955

5 Port of Hidalgo, TX 7,760,868

6 Port of Laredo, TX 7,684,459

7 Port of Buffalo, NY 7,663,934

8 Port of Calexico, CA 6,652,232

9 Port of Nogales, AZ 4,834,871

10 Port of Otay Mesa, CA 4,198,508

Total 87,784,589

Source: U.S. Customs Service data

1 1 7
C. SEA PORT TRAFFIC

Top 25 U.S. Port Calls by Vessel Type 2000*

Other 

Tanker 1/ Dry Bulk Containership General Cargo 2/ Total 

Port Calls Capacity Calls Capacity Calls Capacity Calls Capacity Calls Capacity

Los Angeles/Long Beach 911 66,045 783 37,568 2,955 124,281 677 15,057 5,326 242,951 

Houston 2,988 134,809 748 28,342 614 19,799 779 24,881 5,129 207,831 

New Orleans 1,371 81,956 2,676 119,270 388 10,853 655 21,957 5,090 234,036 

New York 1,271 65,965 301 10,099 2,172 87,463 861 23,104 4,605 186,631 

San Francisco 787 50,653 626 22,619 1,936 82,958 226 6,841 3,575 163,071 

Philadelphia 954 82,170 492 17,662 468 11,315 825 18,057 2,739 129,204 

Hampton Roads Area 155 7,602 436 26,602 1,557 61,943 348 14,271 2,496 110,417 

Charleston 149 6,052 139 4,872 1,547 62,463 332 8,313 2,167 81,699 

Columbia River 277 13,894 1,279 46,457 262 10,025 345 7,061 2,163 77,436 

Savannah 253 8,561 330 10,407 739 31,506 447 12,154 1,769 62,629 

Baltimore 151 4,938 426 20,517 409 14,669 650 15,352 1,636 55,476 

Corpus Christi 974 64,596 230 9,574 2 83 142 10,036 1,348 84,289 

San Juan (PRI) 80 3,784 101 3,098 610 11,490 553 9,077 1,344 27,449 

Jacksonville 204 8,848 190 6,946 305 7,989 592 11,749 1,291 35,532 

Beaumont 1,053 76,914 99 4,483 - - 67 4,704 1,219 86,101 

Miami 11 472 65 2,519 766 25,522 370 6,041 1,212 34,553 

Texas City 1,105 64,471 64 3,223 2 63 26 2,578 1,197 70,335 

Tacoma 68 3,190 218 10,163 568 27,950 342 5,866 1,196 47,169 

Seattle 49 2,786 229 10,253 794 31,182 78 1,348 1,150 45,569 

Port Everglades 345 15,119 123 4,734 211 5,890 135 2,091 814 27,834 

Tampa 228 6,379 367 13,750 6 127 178 3,372 779 23,628 

Mobile 140 8,702 408 22,706 5 88 204 8,364 757 39,860 

Lake Charles 518 37,749 115 5,203 3 62 79 1,921 715 44,935 

Honolulu 141 10,677 84 4,802 339 8,987 112 2,434 676 26,900 

Freeport (Texas) 516 30,660 18 646 46 766 61 3,664 641 35,737 

Top 25 U.S. Ports 14,699 856,992 10,547 446,515 16,704 637,472 9,084 240,293 5 1 , 0 3 4 2 , 1 8 1 , 2 7 3

Total U.S. Ports 19,183 1,271,983 12,649 519,297 17,401 657,619 10,722 280,942 59,955 2,729,841 

Top 25% of U.S. T o t a l 76.6% 67.4% 83.4% 86.0% 96.0% 96.9% 84.7% 85.5% 85.1% 79.9% 

* Excludes calls by vessels under 10,000 dryweight (dwt) tons. 

1/ Includes petroleum, chemical, and gas carriers. 

2/ Includes roll-on/roll-off, roll-on/roll-off container, vehicle carriers, general cargo, partial containership, 

refrigerated, barge carrier, livestock carrier, and combination carriers. 

Note: Capacity = Dwt * Calls 

Source: Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration website, http://www.marad.dot.gov/Marad_Statistics/Porcalls_us.htm

1 1 8
Top 10 Seaports by Container Volume – Individual Containers, FY 2001

Total Vessel

Ports Containers

1 Port of Los Angeles, CA 1,811,610

2 Port of New York – Newark, Elizabeth, NJ 945,196

3 Port of Charleston, SC 388,028

4 Port of Houston, TX 285,667

5 Port of Seattle, WA 282,777

6 Port of Oakland, CA 259,140

7 Port of Savannah, GA 254,541

8 Port of Miami, FL 241,879

9 Port of Port Everglades, FL 175,495

10 Port of Tacoma, WA 160,024

Total 4,804,357

Source: U.S. Customs Service data

Top 20 Sea Ports by Container Volume – Twenty-Foot Equivalent 

Units (TEUs), 2001

Ports TEUs

1 Los Angeles, CA 2,621,034

2 Long Beach, CA 2,374,581

3 New York, NY 1,598,788

4 Charleston, SC 611,529

5 Seattle, WA 498,389

6 Norfolk, VA 454,117

7 Savannah, GA 429,874

8 Oakland, CA 418,185

9 Houston, TX 390,126

10 Tacoma, WA 356,323

11 Miami, FL 346,652

12 Baltimore, MD 177,435

13 Port Everglades, FL 172,451

14 Jacksonville, FL 123,608

15 Wilmington, DE 103,355

16 Philadelphia, PA 86,636

17 New Orleans, LA 85,425

18 Gulfport, MS 66,914

19 Boston, MA 48,503

20 Portland, OR 46,648

Source: National Journal, June 29, 2002

1 1 9
D. AIRPORT TRAFFIC

Top 10 Airports for International Passengers, FY 2001

Total

Ports Passengers

1 New York, NY (JFK) 9,569,498

2 Los Angeles, CA 8,365,462

3 Miami, FL 8,066,609

4 Chicago, IL (O’Hare) 4,563,302

5 Newark, NJ 4,179,980

6 San Francisco, CA 3,807,972

7 Atlanta, GA 2,942,244

8 Houston, TX 2,772,453

9 Honolulu, HI 2,602,407

10 Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX 2,256,671

Total 49,126,598

Source: U.S. Customs Service data

Top 15 Airports for International Freight

Freight tons Freight tons

Airport 2001 2000

1 Anchorage, AK 1,608,816 1,493,611

2 Miami, FL 1,219,597 1,297,576

3 New York, NY (JFK) 1,017,448 1,276,043

4 Los Angeles, CA 844,501 911,078

5 Chicago, IL (O’Hare) 704,739 728,036

6 San Francisco, CA 325,224 431,083

7 Atlanta, GA 254,513 270,598

8 Newark, NJ 173,809 222,924

9 Memphis, TN 149,837 156,647

10 Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX 146,799 145,937

11 Houston, TX 119,785 120,346

12 Philadelphia, PA 119,480 105,192

13 Washington, DC (IAD) 118,025 132,679

14 Boston, MA 89,401 106,646

15 Dayton, OH 85,882 123,386

Source: Airports Council International – North America data

1 2 0
APPENDIX D

TABLES: DRUG AND MIGRANT INTERDICTION BY U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, U.S. 

BORDER PATROL, AND U.S. COAST GUARD; INSPECTIONS BY IMMIGRATION AND 

NATURALIZATION SERVICE

1 2 1
U.S. BORDER PATROL MIGRANT APPREHENSIONS

Apprehensions by Southwest Border Patrol Sector, Fiscal Years 1993-2000

Fiscal Year

Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

San Diego, CA 531,689 450,152 524,231 483,815 283,889 248,092 182,267 151,681

El Centro, CA 30,058 27,654 37,317 66,873 146,210 226,695 225,279 238,126

Yuma AZ 23,548 21,211 20,894 28,310 30,177 76,195 93,388 108,747

Tucson, AZ 92,639 139,473 227,529 305,348 272,397 387,406 470,449 616,346

El Paso, TX 285,781 79,688 110,971 145,929 124,376 125,035 110,857 115,696

Marfa, TX 15,486 13,494 11,552 13,214 12,692 14,509 14,952 13,689

Del Rio, TX 42,289 50,036 76,490 121,137 113,280 131,058 156,653 157,178

Laredo, TX 82,348 73,142 93,305 131,841 141,893 103,433 114,004 108,973

McAllen, TX 109,048 124,251 169,101 210,553 243,793 204,257 169,151 133,243

Total 1,212,886 979,101 1,271,390 1,507,020 1,368,707 1,516,680 1,537,000 1,643,679

Source: INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, General 

Accounting Office, Report No. GAO-01-842

1 2 2
Coast Guard Drug Interdictions At Sea 

Fiscal Year 1996 – 2002

As of 06/05/2002

FISCAL YEAR

FY-96 FY-97 FY-98 FY-99 FY-00 FY-01 FY-02

Cocaine 28,585 103,617 82,623 111,689 132,480 138,393 106,971

Marijuana Products 31,000 102,538 31,390 61,506 50,463 34,520 28,049

Cases 36 122 129 118 92 65 40

Vessels Seized 41 64 75 74 56 30 27

Arrests 23 233 297 302 201 114 178

Value Seized $1.1 Billion $4.0 Billion $3.0 Billion $3.7 Billion $4.4 Billion $4.5 Billion $3.5 Billion

Coast Guard Migrant Interdictions At Sea 

Fiscal Year 1992 – 2002

As of 06/05/2002

FISCAL YEAR 

FY-92 FY-93 FY-94 FY-95 FY-96 FY-97 FY-98 FY-99 FY-00 FY-01 FY-02 

Haiti 37,618 4,270 25,302 909 2,295 288 1,369 1,039 1,113 1,391 1,354 

Dominican 

Republic 588 873 232 3,388 6,273 1,200 1,097 583 499 659 37

Cuba 2,066 2,882 38,560 525 411 421 903 1,619 1,000 777 287

People’s Republic 

of China 181 2,511 291 509 61 240 212 1,092 261 53 72

Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 171 49 17 32 

Ecuador 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 298 1,244 1,020 1,186 

Other 174 48 58 36 38 45 37 24 44 31 40 

Total 40,627 10,584 64,443 5,367 9,080 2,194 3,648 4,826 4,210 3,948 3,008

Source: U.S. Coast Guard website, http://www.uscg.mil/news/cgnews.shtm

1 2 3
INS Inspections Data

Month Fiscal Year Total

Apr-2002 Apr-2001 % Change FY-02 to Date FY-01 to Date % Change FY-01 

Total Inspections 37,137,781 43,471,332 -15 245,090,306 299,201,090 -18 510,582,959

Air Admitted 5,848,248 6,811,420 -14 36,632,730 44,775,562 -18 79,391,456

Land Admitted 29,877,954 35,185,854 -15 198,976,332 244,589,864 -19 413,947,396 

Sea Admitted 971,865 976,875 -1 6,665,948 6,655,175 0 11,869,375

Inadmissible 59,699 55,036 8 414,246 392,169 6 700,803

Source: INS data, http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/exec/prnfriendly.asp

Seasonally Adjusted Total Inspections - Land, Air & Sea Admissions

1 2 4
APPENDIX E

MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY

AND HUMAN RESOURCES 

Mark E. Souder (IN), Chairman

REPUBLICAN MEMBERS

Benjamin A. Gilman (NY), Vice Chairman

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL)

John L. Mica (FL)

Bob Barr (GA)

Dan Miller (FL)

Doug Ose (CA)

Jo Ann Davis (VA)

Dave Weldon (FL)

DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS

Elijah E. Cummings (MD), Ranking Member

Rod R. Blagojevich (IL)

Bernard Sanders (VT)

Danny K. Davis (IL)

Jim Turner (TX)

Thomas H. Allen (ME)

Janice D. Schakowsky (IL)

STAFF

Christopher A. Donesa, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

Nicholas P. Coleman (principal staff member for border issues)

Sharon Pinkerton

Roland Foster

Elizabeth Meyer

Conn Carroll, Clerk

CDR James Rendon, Congressional Fellow (U.S. Coast Guard)

Julian A. Haywood, Minority Counsel

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APPENDIX F

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. General Border Issues 

America’s Southwestern Border After 9/11, Jason A. Aquino, Theresa Cardinal Brown, and John Murphy, U.S. Chamber

of Commerce report, February 2002, http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/70EBE993-01A4-4530-B91F5BB72A0B3C24/usswborder.pdf

“Beyond Border Control,” Stephen E. Flynn, Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2000,

http://www.cfr.org/public/pubs/Flynn_Border_Article.html

“Common Borders, Shared Destinies: Canada, the United States and Deepening Integration,” Michael Hart and

William Dymond, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, November 20, 2001, http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/borders/hartdymondweb.htm

Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum Report: Building a Border for the 21st Century, December 2000,

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/

Rethinking our Borders: A Plan for Action, Coalition for Secure & Trade-Efficient Borders, December 3, 2001,

http://www.canambta.org/Plan_For_Action.pdf

“Rethinking the Line: Transforming Border Management Along the U.S.-Mexico Border,” Stephen E. Flynn, Council

on Foreign Relations website, August 24, 2001, http://www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?pub!4097

“Transportation Security: Agenda for the 21st Century,” Stephen E. Flynn, TR News, Nov.-Dec. 2000,

http://www.nas.edu/trb/publications/security/sflynn.pdf

U.S.-Mexico Border: Better Planning, Coordination Needed to Handle Growing Commercial Traffic, General Accounting

Office, Report No. GAO/NSIAD-00-25, March 2000

2. Trade and Travel Data

Mexico: a global partner for trade, investment, and growth, SECOFI-NAFTA Office, Embassy of Mexico, 2000,

http://www.naftaworks.org/Mexico-US_Trade/mexico-us_trade.html

“North American Trade & Transportation News Transborder Annual Release: 2001 U.S. Surface Trade with Canada

and Mexico Fell in 2001 for the First Time Since NAFTA Inception,” Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of Transportation, June 20, 2002, http://www.bts.gov/PressReleases/2002/bts14_02/index.html

“North American Trade & Transportation News Truck Crossings Annual Release: 2001 Truck Crossing Traffic Entering

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the U.S. Declined in 2001 in First Drop Since NAFTA Began,” Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Department of

Transportation, June 14, 2002, http://www/bts/gov/PressReleases/2002/bts013_02/index.html

North American Trade and Travel Trends, U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2001,

http://www.bts.gov/publications/nattt/entire.pdf

U.S. International Air Passenger and Freight Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International

Affairs, U.S. Department of Transportation, March 2001, http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/aviation/international-series/

Who Crosses the Border: A View of the San Diego/Tijuana Metropolitan Region, San Diego Dialogue report, April 1994,

available at http://www.sandiegodialogue.org/cb_research.htm

3. Drug Interdiction Information and Issues

Chemical Diversion and Synthetic Drug Manufacture, joint report of the Office of International Intelligence, Drug

Enforcement Administration and the Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police,

http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/intel010621.html

Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit Zone Interdiction Efforts, General Accounting Office,

Report No. GAO-02-13, January 2002

Drug Situation in Canada – 2001, Drug Analysis Section, Criminal Analysis Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate,

Royal Canadian Mounted Police, April 2002, http://www.rcmp-grc.ca/crim_int/drugs_2001_e.htm

Drug Trafficking in the United States, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration web site,

http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/01020/index.html

National Drug Control Strategy: Performance Measures of Effectiveness, 2001 Annual Report, Office of National Drug

Control Policy

4. Immigration Information and Issues

Holding the Line? The Effect of the Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration, Belinda I. Reyes, Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen, Public Policy Institute of California, 2002,

http://www.ppic.org/publications/PPIC162/ppic162fulltext.pdf

“Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the Southwest Border,” Pia M. Orrenius, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

report, June 2001, http://www.dallasfed.org/htm/pubs/border/tbe_orrenius.pdf

Immigration Legalization and Status Adjustment Legislation, Ruth Ellen Wassem, Congressional Research Service, Order

Code RL30780, April 15, 2002

Immigration: Visa Waiver Program, Alison Siskin, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RS21205, April 22, 2002

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Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, William J. Krouse and Raphael F. Perl,

Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, June 18, 2001, Order Code RL31019

U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, Ruth Ellen Wasem, Congressional Research Service, Order Code

RL31381, May 8, 2002

5. U.S. Customs Service Information and Issues

Audit Report on the United States Customs Service Automated Commercial System Cargo Selectivity, Department of the

Treasury Office of the Inspector General report, OIG-00-066, March 6, 2000

Customs and INS: Random Inspection Programs Can Be Strengthened, General Accounting Office, Report No. GAO-02-

215R, December 3, 2001

Customs Service Modernization: Management Improvements Needed on High-Risk Automated Commercial Environment

Project, General Accounting Office, Report No. GAO-02-545, May 2002

Interim Report on Customs ACE Program Management: Customs Needs to Adequately Staff the Modernization Office,

Department of the Treasury, Office of the Inspector General, Report OIG-02-058, March 4, 2002

United States Customs Service Support for the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition, Department of the Treasury, Office of

the Inspector General, Report No. OIG-00-109, July 17, 2000

U.S. Customs Service: America’s Frontline, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2001, U.S. Customs Service publication, 2002,

http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/download/reports2001/uscs_report2001.pdf

U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results, General

Accounting Office, Report No. GAO/GGD-00-38, March 2000

6. Immigration and Naturalization Service/U.S. Border Patrol Information and Issues

1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/

aboutins/statistics/IMM99.pdf 

Border Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Report No.

I-2000-04, February 18, 2000

Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring Goal Was Not Met, General Accounting Office,

Report No. GAO/GGD-00-39, December 1999

Follow-up Report on INS Efforts to Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant Overstays, Office of the Inspector General, U.S.

Department of Justice, Report No. I-2002-006, April 23, 2002

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Follow-Up Report on the Border Patrol’s Efforts to Improve Northern Border Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

the Inspector General, Report No. I-2002-004, February 2002

INS’ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, General Accounting Office,

Report No. GAO-01-842, August 2001

Inspection of the Influx of New Personnel, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 1-

2000-018, June 1, 2000

Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the

Inspector General, Report No. I-2000-019, June 2000

The Potential for Fraud and INS’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks of the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, Department of Justice,

Office of the Inspector General, Report No. I-99-10, March 1999; Follow-up Report on the Visa Waiver Program,

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. I-2002-002, December 2001

The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS’ Actions and the Operation of Its IDENT Automated Fingerprint

Identification System, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Special Report, March 2000

“State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud,” Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, General Accounting Office,

Statement No. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May 20, 1997

State Department: Tourist Visa Backlogs Persist at U.S. Consulates, General Accounting Office, Report No. GAO/NSIAD98-69, March 1998

Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report No. I-2002-003,

December 7, 2001

“Technological Help for Border Security,” Statement of Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice,

before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information,

October 12, 2001

7. U.S. Coast Guard Information and Issues

“U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian,” Coast Guard Publication 1, January 1, 2002,

http://www.uscg.mil/overview/Pub%201/contents.html

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FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDERS AND PORTS OF ENTRY

CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS

R E P O R T O F T H E SUBCOMMITTEE ON C R I M I N A L JUSTICE, 

D R U G POLICY AND H U M A N RESOURCES 

Committee on Government Reform

U.S. House of Representatives