alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2024 ND 59

Jaime Urrabazo, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20230317

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, 

the Honorable Reid A. Brady, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Per Curiam.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant.

Derek K. Steiner, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for respondent and 

appellee.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

APRIL 4, 2024 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Urrabazo v. State 

No. 20230317

Per Curiam.

[¶1] Jaime Urrabazo appeals from a district court order denying his 

application for postconviction relief. Urrabazo argues counsel was ineffective 

and in turn, his plea was not voluntary or intelligently made because counsel 

failed to explain the offense he was pleading guilty to could be used to enhance 

future criminal penalties. Following a hearing, the court found that Urrabazo

failed to establish his attorney’s conduct fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and, in addition, he did not show the results of the case would 

have been different absent the alleged error. We conclude the court’s findings 

are not clearly erroneous. We affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2).

[¶2] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

Douglas A. Bahr
From: "Achanta, Chandana L." <Chandana_L._Achanta@omb.eop.gov>

To: William Charmley/AA/USEPA/US@EPA, "Neil.Eisner@dot.gov" <Neil.Eisner@dot.gov>, "Steve.Wood@dot.gov" <Steve.Wood@dot.gov

"james.tamm@dot.gov" <james.tamm@dot.gov>, "rebecca.yoon@dot.gov" <rebecca.yoon@dot.gov>, "Joanne.Petrie@dot.gov" <Joann

Date: 11/29/2010 03:17 PM

Subject: Summary of interagency working comments on draft NOI under EO 12866 review

Please find attached a summary of interagency working comments received on the draft supplemental 

NOI currently under EO 12866 review. They are for your consideration and subject to further policy 

review.

Thanks. 
Summary of Interagency Working Comments on Draft Supplemental Notice of Intent under EO 12866

Review

Below is a summary of interagency working comments received during interagency review of the draft

Supplemental Notice of Intent under EO 12866. They are for your consideration and subject to further

policy review.  

1) The draft raises the issue of California’s ZEV mandate but provides no plans for addressing any

potential conflict with the “one national program” approach.  Interagency commenters suggest

adding language to explain that the agencies will engage with California on their standards,

including exploring the issues related to the ZEV mandate, with the goal of developing a

consistent national program.   

2) Interagency commenter suggests adding a brief discussion about coordination with California

generally, including the importance of input from California during the rulemaking process.

3) Interagency commenter recommends that the agencies include a brief discussion of

jobs/employment impacts and how the agencies will evaluate and/or consider them during the

rulemaking process.

4) There is no discussion of criteria pollutant standards in the notice.   Interagency commenters

suggest using similar language to the October NOI about coordinating any criteria pollutant

tailpipe rules with the GHG standards.

5) Pg. 14 second full paragraph – first sentence (“Environmental groups commented...”) says that

environmental groups do not want the agencies to constrain stringency levels in the 2017‐2025

proposal.  Interagency commenters recommend that this sentence be modified to say that the

groups do not want the agencies to constrain the stringency levels “at this time. “ Please include

this change.     

6) Pg. 5 mentions that not all costs were considered in the TAR.  Interagency commenter suggests

including a sentence that the TAR also did not quantify social cost of carbon benefits and other

social benefits.   

7) In “Section III,” interagency commenter requests that the agencies include language that they

will conduct additional analyses to evaluate key design element and flexibility mechanisms,

including the treatment of lifecycle emissions.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-20937 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus GASPAR VASQUEZ-AREGUIN, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-00-CR-145-1

-------------------- June 15, 2001 Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Gaspar Vasquez-Areguin (“Vasquez”) appeals the 75-month sentence imposed following his plea of guilty to a charge of being found in the United States after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He contends that the felony conviction that resulted in his increased sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) was an element of the offense that should have been charged in the indictment. Vasquez acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States ,No. 00-20937 2– 523 U.S. 224 (1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court review in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres

. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 1214 (2001). Vasquez’s argument is foreclosed. Vasquez contends also that his indictment should have been dismissed because it failed to allege any general intent to enter the United States. Vasquez did not challenge the indictment in the district court; therefore, it is construed in favor of validity unless it was so defective that, by any reasonable construction, it failed to charge the offense of conviction. United States v. Threadgill , 172 F.3d 357, 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 528 U.S. 871 (1999). Vasquez’s indictment “fairly imported that his reentry was a voluntary act” and satisfied the constitutional requirements of a valid indictment. United States v. Guzman-Ocampo , 236 F.3d 233, 236, 239 & n.13 (5th Cir. 2000). Vasquez’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8486 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8486

  To direct the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the 
  Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, to establish a thriving 
                       communities grant program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 21, 2024

  Mrs. Torres of California introduced the following bill; which was 
     referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To direct the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the 
  Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, to establish a thriving 
                       communities grant program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Thriving Communities Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. THRIVING COMMUNITIES PROGRAM.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Transportation, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, shall 
establish a thriving communities grant program to provide technical 
assistance and capacity building to help underserved communities 
advance transformative, equitable and environmentally friendly 
infrastructure projects.
    (b) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report on--
            (1) the methods the Secretary uses in carrying out the 
        program established under subsection (a) to promote transit-
        oriented development;
            (2) the level of coordination between the Secretary of 
        Transportation and the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
        Development in carrying out such program, including the 
        respective roles of each Secretary; and
            (3) what equity metrics are used to distribute funding 
        under such program.
    (c) Authorizations of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for each fiscal year--
            (1) $100,000,000 to the Secretary of Transportation to 
        carry out this section; and
            (2) $5,500,000 million to the Secretary of Housing and 
        Urban Development to facilitate coordination with the Secretary 
        of Transportation to carry out this section.
                                 <all>
```
#### RICHARD L. PLATT, Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Army, Petitioner v UNITED STATES, Respondent

21 USCMA 496, 45 CMR 270

Miscellaneous Docket No. 72-25

July 5, 1972

*Alan Dranitzke, Esquire,*counsel for Petitioner.

Memorandum Opinion of the Court

By opinion dated July 23, 1971,1 this Court affirmed the action of the United States Army Court of Military Review in petitioner’s case. Thereafter, on November 24, 1971, petitioner filed a petition for new trial with the Judge Advocate General of the Army pursuant to Article 73, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 873. The petition was denied.

Petitioner has now filed a “Petition for a Writ of Error of Coram Nobis” contending that the newly discovered evidence upon which his petition for new trial was based demonstrates that the verdict of guilty should not have been entered and that the decision of the Judge Advocate General was arbitrary and capricious.

Article 73 of the Code, supra, provides :

> “At any time within two years after approval by the convening authority of a court-martial sentence, the accused may petition the Judge Advocate General for a new trial *497on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court. If the accused’s case is pending before a Court of Military Review or before the Court of Military Appeals, the Judge Advocate General shall refer the petition to the appropriate court for action. Otherwise the Judge Advocate General shall act upon the petition.”

Since petitioner’s case was not pending before this Court or the Court of Military Review on November 24, 1971, the date on which he filed the petition for new trial, the Judge Advocate General took action thereon. This Court’s decision of July 23,1971, ended the appellate review of the case, and the conviction became final pursuant to Article 76 of the Code, supra, 10 USC § 876. In the circumstances of this case, the Judge Advocate General had the sole responsibility for acting upon the petition for new trial, and his decision is not reviewable by this Court.

The petition is dismissed.

1

 United States v Platt, 21 USCMA 16, 44 CMR 70 (1971).
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8667 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

<DOC>
118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8667

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

            December 17 (legislative day, December 16), 2024

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To rename the community-based outpatient clinic of the Department of 
  Veterans Affairs in Cadillac, Michigan, as the ``Duane E. Dewey VA 
                               Clinic''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF DUANE E. DEWEY VA CLINIC.

    (a) Designation.--The outpatient clinic of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs located at 1905 North Mitchell Street in Cadillac, 
Michigan, shall, after the date of the enactment of this Act, be known 
and designated as the ``Duane E. Dewey Department of Veterans Affairs 
Clinic'' or the ``Duane E. Dewey VA Clinic''.
    (b) Reference.--Any reference in any law, regulation, map, 
document, paper, or other record of the United States to the community-
based outpatient clinic referred to in subsection (a) shall be 
considered to be a reference to the Duane E. Dewey VA Clinic.

            Passed the House of Representatives December 16, 2024.

            Attest:

                                             KEVIN F. MCCUMBER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
```

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Great Wall Acquisition
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2004
(the "Report"), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof, I Kin Shing Li, Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and
Secretary of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

     2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

By: /s/ Kin Shing Li                                      Dated: August 11, 2004
    ----------------------------------------
        Kin Shing Li
        Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer and Secretary
        (Principal Executive and Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
```
**Exhibit 32.2**
**Certification of Chief Financial Officer**
**Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)**
          In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year endedDecember 31, 2003 (the “Report”) of UTEK Corporation (the “Registrant”), asfiled with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, CaroleR. Wright, the Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, tothe best of my knowledge, that:
          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
          (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theRegistrant.      /s/ Carole R. Wright       Name: Carole R. Wright   Date: March 17, 2004
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-6159

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ALEJANDRO REYES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief

District Judge. (CR-03-195-3; CA-04-914-3)

Submitted: May 19, 2005 Decided: May 25, 2005

Before LUTTIG, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alejandro Reyes, Appellant Pro Se. N. George Metcalf, Assistant

United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Alejandro Reyes appeals from the district court’s order

dismissing one of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) claims but retaining

jurisdiction over his remaining claims. This court has

jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and

certain interlocutory and collateral orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1292

(2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). A final decision is one that “ends the

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but

execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233

(1945). When a district court dismisses fewer than all claims as

to the order, it is neither a final order nor an appealable

interlocutory or collateral order. See Baird v. Palmer, 114 F.3d

39, 42 (4th Cir. 1997).

We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
May 13, 1958

No. 61953.

#### Helena Rubinstein, Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

protests 247097-K, etc.

Protests abandoned April 14, 1958. (Not published.) (Initial No. 130146-K.) Plaintiff’s application for rehearing granted.
NO. 07-01-0472-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL D

	DECEMBER 13, 2001

	______________________________

	LEONE PLUMMER,

			Appellant

	v.

	CHARLENE J. REEVES,

			Appellee

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;

	NO. 37,940-C; HON. PATRICK PIRTLE, PRESIDING

	_______________________________

	ORDER OF ABATEMENT

	_______________________________

Before BOYD, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.

	Leone Plummer  (appellant) appeals the September 4, 2001  judgment of the 251st District Court of Randall County in favor of appellee. Subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal, this court received notice from counsel for appellee that appellant has filed a voluntary petition as debtor under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.  Said notice included a file-marked copy of said petition.  Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, any further action in this appeal is automatically stayed.  

	Under these circumstances, and for administrative purposes, this appeal is removed from the docket of this Court and abated.  The appeal will be reinstated upon proper motion showing that the stay has been lifted and specifying the action required by this Court.

	Accordingly, the appeal is abated.

							Per Curiam

Do not publish.
ACCEPTED 12-14-0030-cv TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS 2/27/2015 12:49:56 PM

CATHY LUSK CLERK
#### JOHN HANDWERK ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. TOWN OF GUTTENBERG, APPELLANT.

Submitted July 8 1918

Decided November 18, 1918.

An appeal from a judgment of tlie Supreme Court dismissing a *certiorari*does not continue the stay; the appeal is like a writ of error under the old practice.

On appeal from tlie Supreme Court.

For the respondent. *J. Emil Walscheid.*

For the appellant, *Warren Dixon.*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Swayze, J.

This is an action by the same men who sned to recover their compensation as “ordinance officers” of Guttenberg, and by one other who was not an ordinance officer. All were appointed members of the police force under the ordinance of December, 1913. The present suit is for the salaries of the policemen from the time judgment was entered in the Supreme Court, on April 24th, 1914, to the time when the police department was abolished in January, 1915. The only new question to be considered is whether the appeal to this court continued the stay of the *certiorari,*notwithstanding the judgment of the Supreme Court. No such contention would have been made under the former practice, *182when the judgment of the Supreme Court could only be reviewed by writ of error, which in legal effect was a new suit. *Lantz*v. *Hightstown,*46 *N. J. L.*102. It seems to be thought that the provision of the new Practice act that “an appeal is a step in the cause” operates to continue the stay. This is a mistake. The judgment of the Supreme Court remains a final judgment until it is reversed. In this present case it was without question a final judgment from April 24th, when it was entered, until May 6th. when the appeal was taken. During that time the stay that was inherent in the *certiorari*was not in force; the writ itself had been dismissed by solemn judgment. The stay might, indeed, be restored, but only by order of court. The very nature of the case prevents the appeal by its own force, bridging the time between the judgment and the appeal.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

*For affirmance*— The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Swayze, Trenchard, Parker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisch, Black, White, Heppenheimer, Williams, Taylor, Gardner, JJ. 14.

*For reversal*— None.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 877 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 877

  To change the treatment of certain Federal programs with respect to 
    susceptibility to significant improper payments, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 8, 2023

   Mr. Moore of Utah (for himself and Ms. Spanberger) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 
                             Accountability

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To change the treatment of certain Federal programs with respect to 
    susceptibility to significant improper payments, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Preventing Improper Payments Act''.

SEC. 2. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN NEW PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.

    Section 3352(a) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
            ``(4) Rule of construction.--Any program or activity 
        established by a Federal agency on or after the date of the 
        enactment of this paragraph making more than $100,000,000 in 
        payments in a fiscal year shall be construed to be a program or 
        activity with outlays exceeding the statutory threshold dollar 
        amount described in paragraph (3)(A)(i) that may be susceptible 
        to significant improper payment.''.

SEC. 3. REPORT REQUIREMENT.

    Section 3357(d) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by 
striking ``For each of fiscal years 2019 and 2020, each'' and inserting 
the following: ``Each''.
                                 <all>
```