alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AO 450 (Rev. 5/85) Judgment in a Civil Case

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Eastern Division 

DAVID BARCLAY, JR.,

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

vs.

 CASE NO. C2-10-897

COMMISSIONER OF JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

SOCIAL SECURITY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE TERENCE P. KEMP

Defendants.

Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have

been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

Decision by Court. A decision has been rendered by the Court without a hearing or

trial.

Pursuant to the Order filed August 17, 2011, JUDGMENT is hereby entered

DISMISSING this case.

Date: August 17, 2011 JAMES BONINI, CLERK

/S/ Andy F. Quisumbing 

(By) Andy F. Quisumbing

 Courtroom Deputy Clerk

Case: 2:10-cv-00897-EAS-TPK Doc #: 22 Filed: 08/17/11 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: <pageID>
# SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY

HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

# Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11

# A Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader

# July 2002

# 

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Case No. 9,139.

#### MARSTELLER et al. v. McCLEAN.

[1 Cranch, C. C. 579.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

Nov. Term, 1809.2

Limitation op Actions — Disability op Plaintips —Joint Action.

The disability of one joint plaintiff does not take the case out of the statute of limitations.

Trespass quare clausum fregit for mesne profits. The defendant pleaded the statute of limitations. Replication, infancy of some, and coverture of others of the plaintiffs; but Marsteller and some of the plaintiffs were under no disability.

As to them, Mr. Taylor, for defendant, contended that the replication is no answer to the plea. All the plaintiffs sue in their own rights, and as joint tenants, or tenants in common. There is no difference between the case of joint tenants of goods and joint tenants of land. If the plaintiffs were joint merchants, and some of them out of the country and others in, the action must have been brought within five years. Perry v. Jackson, 4 Term R. 516. The promise of one joint defendant takes the case out of the statute as to all. It is not necessary that *856the infants and femes covert should join in the action. They might be summoned and severed.

C. Simms, on the same side.

This is trespass for mesne profits. Those plaintiffs who were competent to sue cannot avail themselves of the disabilities of the others. Nor can those who by themselves would be under the disability, claim an exemption from the statute, if they join with those who were able to sue. It is not necessary that the wives should be made parties, the husbands were competent to sue alone for a trespass.

E. J. Lee, contra.

It appears by the whole declaration that the husbands sue in right of their wives. The tracing of the title up to Richard Arrell shows it. It is no1 averred that they sue in their own right. The husbands are parties only pro forma.. The replication goes to all the parties really interested. The wives would be entitled to the action if their husbands should die. Where-ever the husband sues in right of his wife she must be joined.

Mr. Simms, in reply.

The right of action is in the husband alone, it is for a trespass upon his possession. In the case of a bond given to a feme while sole, the right of action is in the wife.

Judgment affirmed in the supreme court of the United States, 7 Cranch [11 U. S.] 156.

2

 [Affirmed in 7 Cranch (11 U. S.) 156.]

THE COURT

were of opinion that the replication of coverture as to some of the plaintiffs, and of infancy as to others, is not a good replication to a plea of the statute of limitations.

Where adults and infants have a joint right of action for trespass, the incapacity of the infants shall not avail the adults so as to avoid the statute of limitations.
#### William P. Clyde *v.*Amos Rogers.

— Order of Special Term refusing to amend order of General Term affirmed, without costs.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-30812

Summary Calendar

 

LARRY A. BROYARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BURL CAIN, Acting Warden,

Louisiana State Penitentiary;

DORA RABALAIS; JANETTA ANTOINE,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CV-1654-B

- - - - - - - - - -

November 21, 1996

Before REAVLEY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Larry A. Broyard, Louisiana inmate #96610, appeals the

district court’s dismissal as frivolous of his pro se and in

forma pauperis civil rights complaint. Broyard argues that the

penitentiary’s no-smoking policy violates his due process and

equal protection rights and his right to be free from ex post

facto punishment. We have reviewed the record and Broyard’s
brief and AFFIRM for the reasons adopted by the district court. 

Broyard v. Cain, No. 95-1654-B-M2 (M.D. La. July 24, 1996).
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
**PURSUANT TO AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE**
**QUARTERLY REPORTS ON FORM 10-Q**
**TO BE FILED UNDER SECTIONS 13 AND 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF**
**1934, AS AMENDED**
I, Sherri W. Schugart, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Hines Real Estate Investment Trust,Inc.;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
     (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
     (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
     (c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
     (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
     (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.   Date: May 13, 2005 /s/ SHERRI W. SCHUGART   Sherri W. Schugart Chief Financial Officer
26
Anthony J. Pucciarella

ALARIS

PO Box 1835
Lusby, MD 20657

240.538.8444
Tony@TeamAlaris.com

13 February 2016

United States Department of Transportation

Docket Management System

1200 New Jersey Ave., SE

West Building Ground Floor Room W12

- 140
Washington, DC 20590

Re: Additional information requested by FAA for Docket No. FAA

- 2015

- 4549

Dear Sir or Madam:

Please accept this letter in response to the e

- mail from Ms. Leah Werner on 11 February 2016

in reference to Docket FAA

- 2015

- 4549

. In the e

- mail, Ms. Werner stated:

“ Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) which is
required by Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. If you wish for us to proceed with out

this manual and remove closed

- set filming from your proposed operation please inform of us of
your intention by the requested response date listed below

. ”

The original exemption petition in the referenced docket states that Senord is not requesting

permission for closed

- set filming

. Specifically, i tem #2 on page 5 of petition letter dated 22

August 2015 states:

“2. Operations for the purpose of closed

- set motion picture and television filming are not permitted. “

To reiterate, Senord is not requesting permissi on for closed

- set filming

. Please contact me at
your earliest convenience if there are any questions.

Sincerely,

Anthony J. Pucciarella

ALARIS
**Exhibit 10.6**

DDS HOLDINGS, INC.150 East Palmetto Park Road, Suite 510Boca Raton, Florida 33432

December 5, 2002

DDS Technologies Ltd.c/o Studio Vinti & AssociatesGiorgio M. MazzoliVia Emilia, 8800187 Rome, Italy

Gentlemen:

        This letter is intended to confirm in writing the understandings andagreements of DDS Technologies Ltd. ("DDS Technologies") and DDS Holdings, Inc.("DDS Holdings") with respect to the modification of the License Agreemententered into on August 29, 2002 by and among DDS Technologies and DDS Holdings(the "License Agreement").

        It is understood by DDS Technologies and DDS Holdings that neither party isrequired to obtain product liability insurance, in the amount and mannerrequired by Section 15 of the License Agreement, until the first sale of thelicensed technology by DDS Holdings, Inc. is completed. 

        If the foregoing correctly sets forth our understandings and agreements,please so confirm by signing below and returning a copy to Hodgson Russ, LLP.

 

Very truly yours,

DDS Holdings, Inc.

 

|    | By:______________________ |
|--------------|---------------------------|
|    | Name: Ben Marcovitch      |
|    | Title: President          |

ACCEPTED, AGREED, CONFIRMED

DDS Technologies, Ltd.

_________________________________Name: Umberto ManolaTitle: President, DDS Technologies, Ltd.
Exhibit 99.1




Annual Servicer’s Certificate


Provided by Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation


to Holders of Notes and Certificates







NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION






OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE






The undersigned, Jeffrey L. Edwards, Vice-President, Operations of NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, a California corporation (the “Company”), does hereby certify, in his capacity as an Authorized Officer of the Company:






(1)           The undersigned has caused a review, under his supervision, to be made of:  i) the activities; and ii) the performance under the Agreement, of the Company during the 12-month period ended March 31, 2012 (the “Reporting Period”); and






(2)           To the best of the undersigned’s knowledge, based upon such review, i) the Company has fulfilled all its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects during the Reporting Period; and ii) no Servicer Default has occurred.






This Officer’s Certificate is being furnished pursuant to (i) Section 3.01(c) of the Servicing Agreement, as amended, dated as of March 1, 1999, by and among Nissan-Infiniti LT, NILT Trust, as UTI Beneficiary, and the Company, as Servicer; and (ii) Section 8.11(b) of the 2010-A SUBI Servicing Supplement, dated as of May 25, 2010, by and among Nissan-Infiniti LT, as Titling Trust, NILT Trust, as Grantor and UTI Beneficiary, and the Company, as Servicer (the “Agreement”).






Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein have the meaning assigned to them in the Agreement.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand effective as of the 15th day of June, 2012.




/s/ Jeffrey L. Edwards


Jeffrey L. Edwards


Vice President, Operations
Exhibit 32

          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
           PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of
Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code), each of the undersigned
officers of The Washtenaw Group, Inc., does hereby certify with respect to the
Quarterly Report of The Washtenaw Group, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarterly
period ended September 30, 2005 (the "Report') that

         (1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.



Date: November 14, 2005                  /s/ Charles C. Huffman
                                         ----------------------
                                           Charles C. Huffman
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer



Date: November 14, 2005                 /s/ Howard M. Nathan
                                       --------------------
                                        Howard M. Nathan
                                       Principal Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the
United States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a
separate disclosure document.
EXHIBIT 32.2
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In connection with the Annual Report of Oraco Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Donna S. Moore, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 Date: July 20, 2011
 
 
 /S/ Donna S. Moore
 Donna S. Moore
 Chief Financial Officer
No. 47989.

#### Protests 492570-G, etc., of John Zimmermann Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that certain of the hats in question are similar to those involved in *Caradine*v. *United States*(9 Cust. Ct. 69, C. D. 664) the protests were sustained.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 19

- 1033

_____________________________
M ICHAEL C HARLES M C G ILL , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County

. Mark W. Moseley , Judge

. June 21, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
D ISMISSED

. R OWE , M AKAR , and K ELSEY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Michael Charles McGill, pro se
, Appellant.2 Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
**Exhibit32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION OFCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

I, Paul W.B.Stephenson, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of myknowledge, the Annual Report of Fargo Electronics, Inc. on Form 10-K for theyear ended December 31, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that informationcontained in such Form 10-K fairly presents in all material respects thefinancial condition and results of operations of Fargo Electronics, Inc.

 

 
| March 15, 2006 |   |                       |
|----------------|--------|----------------------------|
|           |   |                       |
|           |   |                       |
|           | By:    | /s/ PAUL W. B.  STEPHENSON |
|           | Name:  | Paul W. B.  Stephenson     |
|           | Title: | Chief Financial  Officer   |

 

A signed originalof this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to FargoElectronics, Inc. and will be retained by Fargo Electronics, Inc. and furnishedto the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 18, 2009 

p0915 

Order 

 

September 18, 2009 

137990 

SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA 

INDIANS, 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ 

Appellee, 

v SC: 137990 

 COA: 276712 

Chippewa CC: 04-007606-CC 

BERNARD BOUSCHOR, 

Defendant/Appellant, 

and 

DANIEL T. GREEN, DAVID E. SCOTT, JAMES 

M. JANNETTA, and DANIEL J. WEAVER, 

 Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/ 

 Appellees, 

and 

PAUL W. SHAGEN, JOSEPH M. PACZKOWSKI, 

and JOLENE M. NERTOLI, 

 Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs, 

and 

MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK & STONE, 

P.L.C., 

 Defendant/Appellee. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 18, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We DIRECT the parties to submit 

supplemental briefs, within 35 days of the date of this order, addressing the issue whether 

Michigan’s governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., applies to defendant 

Bernard Bouschor, the former tribal chairperson of plaintiff Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of 

Chippewa Indians, in light of the Tribe’s status as a sovereign and the definitions 

contained in MCL 691.1401. The application for leave to appeal remains pending.
#### Hinman *v.*Craft.

In Banc.

Dec. 13, 1948.

(37 So. (2d) 770)

Collins & Collins, for appellant.

*572L. B. Melvin, for appellee.

*574Alexander, J.

A writ of habeas corpus was sought by appellant in a petition before the chancellor of Jones County, and, upon hearing, custody of his two children was awarded to appellee. Appellant assigns for error that in view of the prior award of such custody to her by the Chancery Court of George County, the Chancellor was without jurisdiction to alter such decree.

The parties are the parents of these children. They were delivered in 1939 by a decree of the chancery court of George County, which awarded custody to the wife. She took the children to Alabama, in which state the father made two unsuccessful attempts to procure their possession by court order. In 1947, the mother agreed to allow the father to take the children to be placed in school in Alabama. The father, exceeding this permission, brought them to Jones County, Mississippi. The’ mother, appellant here, sued on a writ of habeas corpus in the county court. The proceedings were transferred to the chancery court of that county.

Upon the hearing evidence touching the welfare of the children was introduced over objection by the mother, who stood upon the decree of the chancery court of George County. The trial judge found that the mother was a fit person to retain custody, but refused to give controlling effect to the decree of the George County Chancery Court. We find this to be error.

*575Begardless of the right of the mother to invoke the former decree as a basis for her application for writ of habeas corpus,  the latter remedy was not available to appellee as a device to amend the existing decree. Herndon v. Bonner, 97 Miss. 328, 52 So. 513. See also Cole v. Cole, 194 Miss. 292, 12 So. (2d) 425. It is true that in Leggett v. Leggett, Miss., 32 So. (2d) 189, 191, we held that an original proceeding in the form of habeas corpus would be adjudicated in the light of the objects sought and the jurisdiction of the court, and treated as an action cognizable by the chancery court as such and that it retained exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of custody. We stated “It would provoke endless confusion to permit one, or several, other courts to undertake to adjudicate the rights of the parties and best interest of Ms minor, at the instance of the father, in this state of affairs. . .

The proceeding here differs from that in such cases as Yarbrough v. Dunnam, 130 Miss. 669, 94 So. 892, where the proceeding was before the judge and was in form and substance strictly a habeas corpus hearing. Our conclusion is not out of accord with Haynie v. Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 85 So. 99. See 27 C. J. S., Divorce, Sec. 303, page 1162; 17 Am. Jur., Divorce & Separation, Sec. 687, p. 523.

 The decree of the George County Chancery Court was a sufficient basis for awarding custody in the habeas corpus suit, and due recognition of the former decree would require that its provisions be protected against modification save by the court which made the initial award.

Beversed, and decree here for appellant.
Before the Third Division,

December 30, 1938

No. 40267.

#### Protests 929075-G, etc., of Ignaz Strauss & Co. Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel and on the authority of *Kwong*v. *United States*(T. D. 49409) the wooden stands in question were held dutiable at 33)4 percent under paragraph 412 as claimed.
May 3, 1946

No. 51096.

Abstract 50988.

#### Protests 80214-K, etc., of Finland Ceramics *&*Glass Corp.

Plaintiff’s application for rehearing granted.
May 24, 1960

No. 64248.

protests 59/12257(B), etc.

#### Hensel, Bruckmann & Lorbacher, Inc., and B. Altman & Co. *v.*United States,

Plaintiffs’ application for rehearing granted.