13-2155 Dong v. Lynch BIA Hom, IJ A088 021 371 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**  **At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United** 2 **States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,** 3 **on the 24 th** **day of November, two thousand fifteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JON O. NEWMAN,** 7 **RALPH K. WINTER,** 8 **PETER W. HALL,** 9 Circuit Judges**.** 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **BIN DONG,** 13 Petitioner**,** 14 15 **v. 13-2155** 16 **NAC** 17 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER: Oleh R. Tustaniwsky, Brooklyn, NY.** 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney** 25 **General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr.,** 26 **Assistant Director; Drew C.** 27 **Brinkman, Trial Attorney, Office of** 28 **Immigration Litigation, United** 29 **States Department of Justice,** 30 **Washington, D.C.** 31UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is 2 hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for 3 review is DENIED. 4 Bin Dong, a native and citizen of China, seeks review 5 of a May 6, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming an 6 Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) September 2, 2011, denial of 7 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 8 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Bin Dong, No. 9 A088 021 371 (B.I.A. May 6, 2013), aff’gNo. A088 021 371 10 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept. 2, 2011). We assume the 11 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 12 procedural history of this case. 13 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 14 both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 15 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The applicable 16 standards of review are well established. 8 U.S.C. 17 § 1252(b)(4)(B);Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 18 (2d Cir. 2009). 19 The only issue for our review is whether Dong has met 20 his burden with respect to future persecution. To establish 21 eligibility, Dong must show that he has a well-founded fear 22 of future persecution on account of his religion. 8 U.S.C. 23

2§ 1101(a)(42). To establish this fear, Dong must show that 1 he subjectively fears persecution and that his fear is 2 objectively reasonable. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft , 357 F.3d 3 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). There must be “solid support” in 4 the record; absent such support, a fear is “speculative at 5 best.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d 6 Cir. 2005). To sustain his burden, Dong must either show 7 that he will be “singled out individually for persecution” 8 or establish “a pattern or practice” of persecution of 9 “similarly situated” people. 8 C.F.R. 10 § 1208.13(b)(2)(C)(iii)(A). 11 Dong alleges that he attended an underground Christian 12 gathering in China that was raided by police, he escaped, 13 went into hiding, and learned from his parents that the 14 police were looking for him. Dong states that he fears 15 future persecution if he returns to China because of his 16 practice of Christianity. However, Dong’s testimony, alone, 17 is insufficient to satisfy his burden because he did not 18 suffer past harm and the agency found no solid evidence of 19 future harm. Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129. Although 20 letters from Dong’s parents and friends from China are in 21 the record, the agency was not required to credit them 22

3because they were unsworn, and the authors were not 1 available for cross-examination. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. DOJ, 2 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (the weight accorded to 3 documentary evidence lies largely within agency’s 4 discretion); In re of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z- , 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 5 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished weight to letters from 6 relatives because they were from interested witnesses not 7 subject to cross-examination), rev’d on other grounds by Hui 8 Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012). 9 Additionally, the letters do not provide sufficient detail. 10 The letter from his parents says police continue to look for 11 Dong, but without any description of how often or reference 12 to any specific actions or visits. And, the letter from his 13 fellow practitioner says names were given to police, but 14 does not specify that Dong’s name was; it also includes no 15 detail about how often this individual is required to report 16 to police or what reporting entails. The letter from the 17 friend who hid Dong does not contain any information 18 pertaining to future harm; it only states that the friend 19 hid Dong in his apartment until Dong fled China. 20 The agency also reasonably determined that the country 21 reports did not establish a pattern or practice of 22 persecution of Christians who practice at underground 23

4churches. According to the 2010 International Religious 1 Freedom Report, in some parts of China, officials tacitly 2 allowed underground church activities without incident, 3 while in others, church leaders and adherents could be 4 arrested and detained. As conditions differ throughout 5 China, Dong would have to show how officials in his village, 6 Fuzhou, or province, Fujian, react to underground church 7 activities, and whether officials take action against 8 churchgoers. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142, 9 149, 169-72 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in the BIA’s 10 evidentiary framework requiring an applicant to demonstrate 11 that similarly situated individuals face persecution in his 12 or her local area when enforcement varies by region). As 13 the record lacks evidence showing how officials in Fuzhou or 14 Fujian Province treat underground churches and their 15 members, Dong has not shown that he will be targeted for 16 persecution or that there exists pattern or practice of 17 persecution of similarly situated people. 8 C.F.R. 18 § 1208.13(b)(2)(C)(iii)(A). Thus, he has not met his burden 19 of showing that his alleged fear is objectively reasonable. 20 Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129. 21 As Dong has failed to establish his eligibility for 22 asylum it follows that he cannot satisfy the higher standard 23 5for withholding of removal or CAT relief. Paul v. Gonzales , 1 444 F.3d 148, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2006). 2 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 3 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 4 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 5 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 6 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for 7 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 8 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 9 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 10

FOR THE COURT: 11 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 12 13 14

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