In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17‐1322

MARSHA WETZEL,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

GLEN ST. ANDREW LIVING COMMUNITY, LLC, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 16 C 7598 — Samuel Der‐Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 27, 2018

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. Within months of her arrival at Glen

St. Andrew Living Community (“St. Andrew”), Marsha Wet‐

zel faced a torrent of physical and verbal abuse from other

residents because she is openly lesbian. Time and again, she

implored St. Andrew’s staff to help her. The staff’s response

was to limit her use of facilities and build a case for her evic‐

tion.
2 No. 17‐1322

Wetzel sued St. Andrew, alleging that it failed to provide

her with non‐discriminatory housing and that it retaliated

against her because of her complaints, each in violation of the

Fair Housing Act (FHA or Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.

St. Andrew insists that the Act affords Wetzel no recourse, be‐

cause it imposes liability only on those who act with discrim‐

inatory animus, an allegation Wetzel had not expressly made

of any defendant. The district court agreed and dismissed

Wetzel’s suit. We read the FHA more broadly. Not only does

it create liability when a landlord intentionally discriminates

against a tenant based on a protected characteristic; it also cre‐

ates liability against a landlord that has actual notice of ten‐

ant‐on‐tenant harassment based on a protected status, yet

chooses not to take any reasonable steps within its control to

stop that harassment. We therefore reverse the district court’s

grant of St. Andrew’s motion to dismiss and remand for fur‐

ther proceedings.

I

After her partner of 30 years died, Wetzel moved into

St. Andrew, a residential community for older adults; she

continues to live there today. Her tenancy, presumably like

that of St. Andrew’s other residents, is governed by a form

Tenant’s Agreement (“Agreement”). Beyond a private apart‐

ment, the Agreement guarantees three meals daily served in

a central location, access to a community room, and use of

laundry facilities. It conditions tenancy at St. Andrew on re‐

fraining from “activity that [St. Andrew] determines unrea‐

sonably interferes with the peaceful use and enjoyment of the

community by other tenants” or that is “a direct threat to the

health and safety of other individuals.” It also requires com‐

pliance with the “Tenant Handbook,” which may “be
No. 17‐1322 3

amended from time to time.” The Agreement authorizes St.

Andrew to institute eviction proceedings against a tenant in

breach, and if St. Andrew prevails, the breaching tenant must

also reimburse St. Andrew for its attorney’s fees. (Indeed, the

Agreement requires reimbursement of St. Andrew’s fees re‐

lated to an alleged violation or breach even if suit has not been

instituted.)

After arriving at St. Andrew, Wetzel spoke openly to staff 

and other residents about her sexual orientation. She was met

with intolerance from many of them. The following is just a

sample of what Wetzel has alleged that she endured. At this

early stage of the litigation, we accept her account as true, rec‐

ognizing that St. Andrew will have the right to contest these

assertions at a trial.

Beginning a few months after Wetzel moved to St. Andrew

and continuing at least until she filed this suit (a 15‐month pe‐

riod), residents repeatedly berated her for being a “fucking

dyke,” “fucking faggot,” and “homosexual bitch.” One resi‐

dent, Robert Herr, told Wetzel that he reveled in the memory

of the Orlando massacre at the Pulse nightclub, derided Wet‐

zel’s son for being a “homosexual‐raised faggot,” and threat‐

ened to “rip [Wetzel’s] tits off.” Herr was the primary, but not

sole, culprit. Elizabeth Rivera told Wetzel that “homosexuals

will burn in hell.”

There was physical abuse too. Wetzel depends on a

motorized scooter. Herr at one time rammed his walker into

Wetzel’s scooter forcefully enough to knock her off a ramp.

Rivera bashed her wheelchair into a dining table that Wetzel

occupied, flipping the table on top of Wetzel. In yet another

incident, Wetzel was struck in the back of the head while alone

in the mailroom; the blow was hard enough to push her from
4 No. 17‐1322

her scooter, and she suffered a bump on her head and a black

eye. She did not see the assailant, but the person said “homo”

when attacking her. Following this mugging, Herr taunted

Wetzel, rubbing his head and saying “ouch.” Wetzel also had

two abusive trips in the elevator. During the first, Rivera spat

on her and hurled slurs. During the second, Wetzel, Herr, and

another resident, Audrey Chase, were together in the elevator

when Herr again hit Wetzel’s scooter with his walker.  

Wetzel routinely reported the verbal and physical abuse to

St. Andrew’s staff, including Carolyn Driscoll, Sandra Cubas,

and Alyssa Flavin (the “management defendants”). Wetzel’s

initial complaints won her a brief respite, prompting her to

draft a thank‐you note. But the management defendants,

among whom we need not distinguish for purposes of this

appeal, otherwise were apathetic. They told Wetzel not to

worry about the harassment, dismissed the conduct as acci‐

dental, denied Wetzel’s accounts, and branded her a liar. Wet‐

zel’s social worker accompanied her to one meeting about the

harassment; despite that, the managers denounced Wetzel as

dishonest.

Had the management defendants done nothing but listen,

we might have a more limited case. But they took affirmative

steps to retaliate against Wetzel for her complaints. For exam‐

ple, they relegated Wetzel to a less desirable dining room lo‐

cation after she notified them about being trampled by Rivera.

Following other complaints, they barred her from the lobby

except to get coffee and they halted her cleaning services, thus

depriving her of access to areas specifically protected in the

Agreement. They falsely accused Wetzel of smoking in her

room in violation of St. Andrew’s policy. Early one morning,

two staff members woke Wetzel up and again accused her of
No. 17‐1322 5

smoking in her room. When she said that she had been sleep‐

ing, one of them slapped her across the face. One month, Wet‐

zel did not receive the customary rent‐due notice, though

other tenants did. She remembered to pay on time, but she

had to pry a receipt from management.

In response, Wetzel changed her daily routine. She ate

meals in her room, forgoing those included as part of the

Agreement. She stopped visiting the third floor of St. Andrew,

where Herr lived. She did not use the laundry room at hours

when she might be alone. And she stayed away from the com‐

mon spaces from which she had been barred by management.  

Eventually Wetzel brought this action against the manage‐

ment defendants and the entities that own and operate St. An‐

drew (the “corporate defendants”). Unless the distinction

matters, we refer to the group collectively as defendants or

St. Andrew. She alleged that St. Andrew failed to ensure a

non‐discriminatory living environment and retaliated against

her for complaining about sex‐based harassment, each in vio‐

lation of the FHA. The complaint included related state

claims.  

All of the defendants moved for dismissal, contending

that the FHA does not make a landlord accountable for failing

to stop tenant‐on‐tenant harassment unless the landlord’s in‐

action was animated by discriminatory animus. In the alter‐

native, the defendants argued that Wetzel’s harassment claim

must be dismissed insofar as it relied on 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)

because that section does not cover post‐acquisition harass‐

ment claims—in other words, harassment claims brought by

a tenant already occupying her home. The defendants also as‐

serted that Wetzel’s retaliation claim failed because it too

lacked an allegation that the defendants were motivated by
6 No. 17‐1322

discriminatory animus. The district court agreed with each of

the defendants’ arguments and dismissed the harassment

claim. It dismissed the retaliation claim without further dis‐

cussion. With the federal claims gone, the court chose to relin‐

quish supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Wetzel

appeals the dismissal of her suit.

II

A

As we recognized in Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771

(7th Cir. 2009) (en banc), the protections afforded by the Fair

Housing Act do not evaporate once a person takes possession

of her house, condominium, or apartment. The question be‐

fore us, while an important one, is thus narrow: does the Act

cover the particular kinds of post‐acquisition discrimination

that Wetzel suffered?  

Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate

against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of

sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or

facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, reli‐

gion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” In addition, the

Act makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or in‐

terfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of ... any

right granted or protected by section ... 3604 ... of this title.”

42 U.S.C. § 3617. Among other things, these sections prohibit

discriminatory harassment that unreasonably interferes with

the use and enjoyment of a home—by another name, a hostile

housing environment. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491

(7th Cir. 1997); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.

1996); see also Bloch, 587 F.3d at 781 (recognizing that the pro‐

tections under sections 3604(b) and 3617 may be coextensive).  
No. 17‐1322 7

A hostile‐housing‐environment claim requires a plaintiff 

to show that: (1) she endured unwelcome harassment based

on a protected characteristic; (2) the harassment was severe or

pervasive enough to interfere with the terms, conditions,

or privileges of her residency, or in the provision of services

or facilities; and (3) that there is a basis for imputing liability

to the defendant. See DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008; see also

Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2017) (listing

elements of a Title VII hostile‐workplace claim); Honce v. Vigil,

1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993) (adopting elements of a

Title VII hostile‐workplace claim for the FHA).

B

St. Andrew agrees that our ruling in Hively v. Ivy Tech

Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017)

(en banc), holding that discrimination based on sexual

orientation qualifies as discrimination based on sex under

Title VII, applies with equal force under the FHA. We

therefore move directly to the second element of the case:

whether the harassment from which Wetzel suffered was

severe or pervasive enough to interfere with her enjoyment of

her dwelling. Harassment is severe or pervasive if it

objectively interferes with the enjoyment of the premises or

inhibits the privileges of rental. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008. That

standard requires us to consider the totality of the

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct, its severity, and whether it is physically threatening

or humiliating rather than merely offensive. Alamo, 864 F.3d

at 549–50. There is no “magic number of instances” that must

be endured before an environment becomes so hostile that the

occupant’s right to enjoyment of her home has been violated.

Id. at 550. While isolated minor affronts are not enough,
8 No. 17‐1322

DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008, either a small number of “severe

episode[s]” or a “relentless pattern of lesser harassment” may

suffice, Alamo, 864 F.3d at 550 (quoting Cerros v. Steel Techs.,

Inc., 398 F.3d 994, 951 (7th Cir. 2005)).

Though it need be only one or the other, the harassment

Wetzel describes plausibly can be viewed as both severe and

pervasive. For 15 months, she was bombarded with threats,

slurs, derisive comments about her family, taunts about a

deadly massacre, physical violence, and spit. The defendants

dismiss this litany of abuse as no more than ordinary “squab‐

bles” and “bickering” between “irascible,” “crotchety senior

resident[s].” A jury would be entitled to see the story other‐

wise. (We confess to having trouble seeing the act of throwing

an elderly person out of a motorized scooter as one of the or‐

dinary problems of life in a senior facility.) Wetzel has pre‐

sented far more than “a simple quarrel between two neigh‐

bors or [an] isolated act of harassment.” See Halprin v. Prairie

Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330

(7th Cir. 2004).

C

That takes us to the main event: Is there a basis to impute

liability to St. Andrew for the hostile housing environment?

This question is new to our circuit. Our response begins, as it

must, with the text of the statute. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.

167, 172 (2001). Again, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) makes it unlawful

“[t]o discriminate ... because of ... sex,” and 42 U.S.C. § 3617

forbids a housing provider to “interfere with any person in

the exercise or enjoyment of ... any right granted or protected

by section ... 3604 ... of this title.” The focus on the actor ra‐

ther than the benefitted class, St. Andrew deduces, confines

the world of possible defendants under these sections to those
No. 17‐1322 9

accused of carrying discriminatory animus. But St. Andrew

relies on language defining the substantive contours of an

FHA action to ascertain a landlord’s potential liability for ac‐

tionable abuse—in other words, it is looking at what is prohib‐

ited, not who is subject to those prohibitions. As the Supreme

Court’s cases in analogous areas demonstrate, the questions

are different. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.

629, 639 (1999) (distinguishing the scope of behavior pro‐

scribed under Title IX from availability of private suit); Fara‐

gher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788–89 (1998) (separat‐

ing the analysis of the substantive contours of a forbidden

hostile environment claim under Title VII from the rules for

determining employer liability); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.

Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (telling lower courts to look to

common‐law principles for guidance on employer liability

under Title VII). True, a sex‐harassment claim under the FHA

demands sex‐based discrimination, but Wetzel has alleged

such discrimination. On its face, the Act does not address who

may be liable when sex‐based discrimination occurs or under

what circumstances. Cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742, 754–55 (1998) (considering proper vicarious lia‐

bility standard for an employer for purposes of Title VII).  

Because the text of the FHA does not spell out a test for

landlord liability, we look to analogous anti‐discrimination

statutes for guidance. One natural point of reference is

Title VII, which governs discrimination in employment. It

and the FHA have been described as “functional

equivalent[s]” to be “given like construction and application.”

Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir.

2000); see also Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive

Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2015)

(comparing section 3604(a) of the FHA to Title VII); Bloch,
10 No. 17‐1322

587 F.3d at 779 (noting that section 3604(b) mirrors Title VII).

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII’s parallel

section is illuminating. That section makes it unlawful “to

discriminate against any individual ... because of ... sex.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1). Under operative language in

Title VII identical to that of the 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), an

employer may be liable under some circumstances when its

own negligence is a cause of prohibited harassment.

Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 758–59. Indeed, “when Congress

uses the same language in two statutes having similar

purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the

other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended

that text to have the same meaning in both statutes.” Smith v.

City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). The FHA followed

Title VII by four years. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703;

Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 804. St. Andrew provides no reason

why the FHA requires in all instances that the defendant

acted with discriminatory animus when an identically

worded statute has not been read in such a manner. As a

textual matter, we see none.

We recognize, however, that there are some potentially

important differences between the relationship that exists be‐

tween an employer and an employee, in which one is the

agent of the other, and that between a landlord and a tenant,

in which the tenant is largely independent of the landlord. We

thus refrain from reflexively adopting the Title VII standard

and continue our search for comparable situations.

That takes us to Title IX of the Education Amendments of

1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688. Like the FHA and Title VII,

Title IX aims to eradicate sex‐based discrimination from a

sector of society—education. The Supreme Court has held
No. 17‐1322 11

that Title IX supports a private right of action on the part of a

person who experiences sex discrimination in an education

program or activity receiving federal financial aid. Cannon v.

Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688–89 (1979). In Davis v. Monroe

County Board of Education, the Court confronted the question

whether a school district’s “failure to respond to student‐on‐

student harassment in its schools can support a private suit

for money damages.” 526 U.S. at 639. Because Title IX was

enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, private damages

were available against a funding recipient only if it had

adequate notice of its potential liability. Id. at 640. Applying

that limiting principle, the Court held that the district could

be held accountable only for its own misconduct. Id. But that

is just what the Davis plaintiff was trying to do. As the Court

put it, “petitioner attempts to hold the Board liable for

its own decision to remain idle in the face of known student‐

on‐student harassment in its schools.” Id. at 641. Indeed, the

district itself subjected the plaintiff  to discrimination by

remaining “deliberately indifferent to known acts of student‐

on‐student sexual harassment [when] the harasser is under

the school’s disciplinary authority.” Id. at 646–47. It

emphasized that the recipient of funds exercised substantial

control over both the harasser and the premises on which the

misconduct took place. Id. at 645.

Much of what the Court said in Davis can be applied read‐

ily to the housing situation. In Davis, the fund recipient’s own

misconduct subjected the student to actionable sex‐based har‐

assment. Here, we need look only to the management defend‐

ants themselves, asking whether they had actual knowledge

of the severe harassment Wetzel was enduring and whether

they were deliberately indifferent to it. If so, they subjected

Wetzel to conduct that the FHA forbids. (We say nothing
12 No. 17‐1322

about the situation in a setting that more closely resembles

custodial care, such as a skilled nursing facility, or an assisted

living environment, or a hospital. Any of those are different

enough that they should be saved for another day.) Wetzel

may be in unchartered territory, but the Supreme Court’s in‐

terpretation of analogous anti‐discrimination statutes satisfies

us that her claim against St. Andrew is covered by the Act.

D

St. Andrew offers several reasons why, in its view, we

should not adopt the analysis we have just laid out. We re‐

spond to the most important points. It argues that there is no

agency or custodial relationship between a landlord and ten‐

ant, and from that it reasons that a landlord has no duty to

protect its tenants from discriminatory harassment. But we

have not gone that far: we have said only that the duty not to

discriminate in housing conditions encompasses the duty not

to permit known harassment on protected grounds. The land‐

lord does have responsibility over the common areas of the

building, which is where the majority of Wetzel’s harassment

took place. And the incidents within her apartment occurred

precisely because the landlord was exercising a right to enter.

More broadly, St. Andrew has a statutory duty not to discrim‐

inate. As the Supreme Court said, the FHA “defines a new le‐

gal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff 

for the injury caused by the defendant’s wrongful breach.”

Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974). The same is true of

an action under Title VII or Title IX. See Dunn v. Washington,

429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005); Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.

We need not address St. Andrew’s arguments about vicar‐

ious liability, because it is irrelevant here to the management

defendants’ possible liability. (The Supreme Court has held
No. 17‐1322 13

already that the Act imposes vicarious liability on a corpora‐

tion, but not upon its officers or owners. See Meyer v. Holley,

537 U.S. 280, 285–86 (2003).) The management defendants’ li‐

ability, if any after a full trial, would be direct—the result of

standing pat as Wetzel reported the barrage of harassment.

Because liability is direct, “it makes no difference whether the

person whose acts are complained of is an employee, an inde‐

pendent contractor, or for that matter a customer ... . The gen‐

esis of inequality matters not; what does matter is how the em‐

ployer handles the problem.” Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691. A school

district’s liability under Title IX is the same. Davis, 526 U.S. at

640–43.

St. Andrew complains that it would be unfair to hold it li‐

able for actions that it was incapable of addressing, but we are

doing no such thing. We have no quarrel with the idea that

direct liability for inaction makes sense only if defendants

had, but failed to deploy, available remedial tools. Id. at 644;

Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691. St. Andrew protests that it can only

minimally affect the conduct of its tenants because tenants ex‐

pect to live free from a landlord’s interference.

Control in the absolute sense, however, is not required for

liability. Liability attaches because a party has “an arsenal of

incentives and sanctions ... that can be applied to affect con‐

duct” but fails to use them. Id. St. Andrew brushes aside the

many tools for remedying harassment that it has pursuant to

the Agreement. For example, the Agreement allows St. An‐

drew to evict any tenant who “engages in acts or omissions

that constitute a direct threat to the health and safety of other

individuals” or who “engage[s] in any activity that [St. An‐

drew] determines unreasonably interferes with the peaceful

use and enjoyment of the community by other tenants.” The
14 No. 17‐1322

mere reminderthat eviction (along with liability for attorneys’

fees) was a possibility might have deterred some of the bad

behavior. St. Andrew also could have updated the Tenant

Handbook to clarify the anti‐harassment and anti‐abuse pro‐

visions. With respect to the common areas, St. Andrew could

have suspended privileges for tenants who failed to abide by

the anti‐harassment policies, instead of taking a blame‐the‐

victim approach.  

If liability is possible here, St. Andrew warns, then land‐

lords may just renounce control of the premises altogether.

But unless the rental unit is a detached, single‐family dwell‐

ing, such total abandonment is not a practical possibility.

St. Andrew itself had a common living area, a common dining

area, common laundry facilities, and hallways. It is hard to

believe that a total disclaimer of liability would be in its own

best interest. In addition, contract law is not the exclusive

source of a landlord’s duties or powers. Property law governs

landlord‐tenant relations as well. A landlord typically must

provide its tenants a residence that is free from “interfer[ence]

with a permissible use of the leased property by the tenant.”

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LAND. & TEN. § 6.1. The obli‐

gation is breached even if a third party causes the interfer‐

ence, so long as the disturbance was “performed on property

in which the landlord has an interest” and the “conduct could

be legally controlled by [the landlord].” Id. § 6.1 cmt. d. Inher‐

ent powers spring from that obligation. Cf. id. § 6.1 cmt. d, il‐

lus. 10–11 (illustrating that a landlord breaches its obligation

to a tenant if the landlord fails to act after learning that con‐

duct performed on the owned property interferes with the

tenant’s permissible use of the leased property). And if need

be, there is always the right of exclusion, which is “[o]ne of

the main rights attaching to property.” Byrd v. United States,
No. 17‐1322 15

138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018) (citing 2 W. Blackstone, Commen‐

taries on the Laws of England, ch. 1). The same kinds of steps

we already mentioned could have been justified as a matter of

property law.  

Seeking a broader ruling, Wetzel points to a rule interpret‐

ing the FHA that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Affairs (HUD) published in 2016. The HUD rule interprets the

FHA to make a landlord directly liable for failing to “take

prompt action to correct and end a discriminatory housing

practice by a third party” if the landlord “knew or should

have known of the discriminatory conduct and had the power

to correct it.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.7(a)(1)(iii). HUD’s rule mirrors

the scope of employee liability under Title VII for employee‐

on‐employee harassment. We have no need, however, to rely

on this rule. As we noted earlier, there are salient differences

between Title VII and the FHA. In the end, it is possible that

they could be overcome, but more analysis than HUD was

able to offer is necessary before we can take that step. It is

enough for present purposes to say that nothing in the HUD

rule stands in the way of recognizing Wetzel’s theory.

It is important, too, to recognize that the facts Wetzel has

presented (which we must accept at this stage) go far beyond

mere rudeness, all the way to direct physical violence. This

case is thus not, as St. Andrew would have it, one about good

manners. Courts around the country have policed that line for

years in the context of Title VII, for which they have ensured

that the standard is “sufficiently demanding to ensure that

Title VII does not become a general civility code,” and

“filter[s] out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of

the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language,

gender‐related jokes, and occasional teasing.” Faragher,
16 No. 17‐1322

524 U.S. at 788 (citations omitted). We have no reason not to

expect the same discipline here.  

III

In the alternative, St. Andrew urges that Wetzel’s section

3604(b) claim falls outside the scope of post‐acquisition ac‐

tions available under that section of the FHA. Our treatment

of this argument might have little effect on the outcome of this

case, because Wetzel’s harassment claim invokes the protec‐

tions of both section 3604(b) and section 3617. And a claim al‐

leging a post‐acquisition pattern of harassment can proceed

under section 3617 even if there is no route for relief under

section 3604. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330. St. Andrew nonetheless

maintains that Wetzel’s section 3604(b) claim is unavailable

post‐acquisition.

In Bloch, the en banc court took a careful look at the availa‐

bility of post‐acquisition claims under section 3604(b).

587 F.3d at 779–81. We identified two situations in which such

a claim could proceed: (1) when discriminatory conduct con‐

structively evicts a resident, and (2) when occupancy is gov‐

erned by discriminatory terms (in that case, a condo associa‐

tion rule that prohibited hanging mezuzot and thus discrimi‐

nated against Jews). Id. at 779–80. As to the first situation, we

reasoned that habitation is a “privilege of sale.” Id. As to the

second, the Bloch family’s adherence to the discriminatory

rule was a “condition of sale.” Id. St. Andrew reads Bloch as

identifying the exclusive set of post‐acquisition claims that

would be possible under section 3604(b). But we said no such

thing. Instead, as courts do, we were addressing the case be‐

fore us, and so we simply noted that those were “two possi‐

bilities for relief in [the present] case.” Id. at 779. St. Andrew’s

argument also ignores that section 3604(b) protects not only
No. 17‐1322 17

against discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges

of sale or rental,” but also discrimination “in the provision of

services or facilities in connection therewith.” As the Ninth

Circuit has recognized, the latter language most naturally en‐

compasses conduct that follows acquisition. Comm. Concern‐

ing Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713

(9th Cir. 2009). Few “services or facilities” are provided prior

to the point of sale or rental; far more attach to a resident’s

occupancy. Id.

In this case, Wetzel has alleged that while the management

defendants sat on their hands, residents’ harassment confined

her to her room for prolonged stretches. Regular harassment

also impeded her from eating the meals she had paid for at

the dining hall, visiting the lobby and other common spaces,

and obtaining access to the laundry room. These were con‐

crete violations of the Agreement, which guarantees “three‐

well balanced meals per day to be served in a central loca‐

tion,” a community room, and available laundry facilities. At

a minimum then, Wetzel has a cognizable post‐acquisition

claim because discrimination affected the provision of ser‐

vices and facilities connected to her rental.  

Beyond that, the discrimination diminished the privileges

of Wetzel’s rental. Though she has not been constructively

evicted from her apartment, occupancy of the unit is not the

only privilege of rental. Use of the totality of the rented prem‐

ises is another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LAND. &

TEN. § 4.3; A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., 1 AMERICAN LAW OF

PROPERTY § 3.49 (1952). So too is the covenant of quiet enjoy‐

ment. See City of Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713; CASNER, supra,

§ 3.47.
18 No. 17‐1322

Contrary to St. Andrew’s assertion, this case is unlike

Halprin. There, the Halprin family sued its homeowners’ as‐

sociation because the association’s president incessantly har‐

assed them because they were Jewish. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 328.

The Halprin opinion took a limited approach to post‐acquisi‐

tion claims under section 3604(b), and so it had no reason to

reach the question whether the harassment was connected to

a term, condition, or privilege, or the provision of services, re‐

lated to homeownership. In Bloch, however, the en banc court

distinguished Halprin as a case in which the homeowners’ as‐

sociation had no contractual relationship to the Halprin fam‐

ily. Bloch, 587 F.3d at 780. St. Andrew tries to use Halprin by

noting that there was no contractual relationship between

Wetzel and any other tenant. True enough, but that is not the

relevant comparator. It is between Wetzel and St. Andrew,

and that relationship was governed by the Agreement and the

Tenant Handbook. Nothing in Halprin supports the dismissal

of Wetzel’s case at this time.  

IV

Wetzel separately alleged that after she complained about

the harassment, the management defendants restricted her

access to facilities and common spaces, downgraded her din‐

ing seat, halted her cleaning services, and attempted to build

a case for her eviction. In doing so, she says, they retaliated

against her in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617. St. Andrew offers

several reasons to affirm the district court’s dismissal of this

claim. It argues that the alleged retaliatory conduct was not

adverse action; if it was adverse, it was not causally related to

Wetzel’s complaints; and there is no allegation of discrimina‐

tory animus. St. Andrew conceded at oral argument that it ar‐

gued in the district court only that Wetzel’s retaliation claim
No. 17‐1322 19

lacked an allegation of discriminatory animus. We thus limit

our remark to that argument. Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,

624 F.3d 834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010).

To prove retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she en‐

gaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse action;

and (3) there was a causal connection between the two. See,

e.g., Owens v. Old Wisconsin Sausage Co., Inc., 870 F.3d 662, 668

(7th Cir. 2017) (elements of a Title VIIretaliation claim); Boston

v. U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 464 (7th Cir. 2016) (same for

ADEA); Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 686 F.3d 378, 388

(7th Cir. 2012) (same for Title IX). Proof of discriminatory an‐

imus is not on the list. We have said that a claim under section

3617 requires showing intentional discrimination only when

considering an interference claim. See Bloch, 587 F.3d at 783;

East‐Miller v. Lake Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 562–63

(7th Cir. 2005); see also Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330–31 (recogniz‐

ing that section 3617 creates different types of claims).

Indeed, if we were to read the FHA’s anti‐retaliation pro‐

vision to require that a plaintiff allege discriminatory animus,

it would be an anomaly. The FHA’s anti‐retaliation provision

makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere

with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account

of his having exercised or enjoyed, ... any right granted or

protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.”

42 U.S.C. § 3617. Like all anti‐retaliation provisions, it pro‐

vides protections not because of who people are, but because

of what they do. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
20 No. 17‐1322

V

The district court’s judgment is REVERSED and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opin‐

ion. We also instruct the district court to reinstate the state‐

law claims that were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.