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IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

UNITED STATES SENATE

AND

COMMITTEE ON

FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

JULY 24, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works

and the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

HARRY REID, Nevada

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

BARBARA BOXER, California

RON WYDEN, Oregon

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

KEN CONNOLLY, Majority Staff Director

DAVE CONOVER, Minority Staff Director

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

JULY 24, 2002

OPENING STATEMENTS

Chafee, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island .................. 71

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin ................ 93

Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska ............................ 78

Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont..................... 1, 100

Reports:

American Way to the Kyoto Protocol ....................................................... 24–68

Clean Energy: Jobs for America’s Future .................................................. 3–24

Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut ........... 102

Sarbanes, Hon. Paul S., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ..................... 69

WITNESSES

Connaughton, James, Chairman, White House Council on Environmental

Quality, Washington, DC ..................................................................................... 74

Prepared statement....................................................................................... 209–288

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 288

Dernbach, John C., Professor, Widener University Law School .......................... 89

Article, Synthesis .............................................................................................. 335

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 300

Horner, Christopher C., Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute ......... 91

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 304

Strong, Hon. Maurice, Chairman, Earth Council Institute Canada, Toronto,

Ontario, Canada ................................................................................................... 87

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 292

Supplemental testimony .................................................................................. 298

Turner, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and

International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of

State, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 71

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 103

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ......................... 108–209

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

Articles:

Investing in Health: Fighting Infectious Disease for Sustainable Development ............................................................................................................... 205

Modern Developments in the Treaty Process ................................................. 307

Synthesis, John Dernbach ............................................................................... 335

Lists, Attendees to world environmental summits............................................ 109, 119

Policy Books, Global Climate Change ................................ 215–246, 250–266, 266–288

Report, Working for a Sustainable World .......................................................... 125–201

Statements:

Global Climate Change, President George W. Bush.................................. 211, 246

Reisman, Jon ..................................................................................................... 333

(III)

(1)

IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL

TREATIES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 24, 2002

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m. in room

406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Jeffords [chairman

of the Committee on Environment and Public Works], presiding.

Present from the Committee on Environment and Public Works::

Senators Jeffords, Chafee, and Corzine.

Present from the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators Sarbanes and Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Senator JEFFORDS. This hearing will come to order.

I am glad to be here with my distinguished co-chair from the

Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Sarbanes, for this joint hearing. I appreciate his willingness to explore today’s topic and the

fact that he has joined me as a cosponsor of S. 556, the Clean

Power Act. I would also like to applaud him for his work to bring

some truth and sanity to America’s accounting nightmare. Good

luck.

The United States is an economic and military superpower, perhaps the lone superpower. But as the old adage goes, with great

power comes great responsibility. We are able to project great

might far beyond our borders. We are also capable of contributing

to environmental and natural resource damage far beyond our borders and far in excess of other countries.

The question is, are we acting responsibly to curb negative impacts abroad and at home?

Are we being good global neighbors and, at a minimum, keeping

our word?

It seems that we may be keeping our literal word, given the very

broad language in many of the agreements, but, in practical terms,

it seems that we are not trying very hard to keep up with the spirit

of some of our commitments.

The time is ripe for Congress to review how the Administration

is implementing our environmental agreements and commitments.

Leaders of many countries will be meeting in Johannesburg, South

Africa, in late August at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The occasion is the tenth anniversary of the United NaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
2

tions Conference on Environmental Development held in Rio. I am

pleased to note that the Secretary General of that conference, Mr.

Maurice Strong, is here today to give us an historical perspective

on the event and its lasting effect.

The conferees will be met by a very different U.S. delegation in

South Africa. The previous Bush Administration provided extensive

support to the Rio Earth Summit and brought many new initiatives

to the negotiating table. But this Administration is likely to send

a smaller and lower level delegation and has sought to narrow the

scope of its discussions. This has apparently included an effort to

keep the global climate change off the agenda.

I am troubled by the Administration’s approach to global warming, especially in light of the Sense of Congress approved by the

Foreign Relations Committee and made part of the Senate-approved Energy Bill in April. That resolution says the United States

should take responsible action to ensure significant and meaningful

reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from all sectors. But

it does not appear that responsible action is taking place and emissions continue to grow.

As my friend Senator Chafee pointed out during our committee’s

markup on the Clean Power Act, the Administration’s Climate Action Report says, ‘‘A few ecosystems such as alpine meadows in the

Rocky Mountains and some Barrier Islands are likely to disappear

entirely in some areas. Other ecosystems are likely to experience

major species shifts.’’ Our treaty commitment says, ‘‘The ultimate objective of the

Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at the level that will

prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a timeframe sufficient

to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change.’’ Since

these ecosystems are likely to disappear entirely because of the

man-made global warming and will not able to adapt naturally, it

appears that we have entered into a zone of ‘‘dangerous interference.’’

Since these are real threats of serious or irreversible damage, the

lack of full scientific certainty about cause and effect should not be

used as an excuse for not reducing emissions now. That is our commitment. Instead of acting to reduce emissions, the Administration’s approach guarantees that greenhouse gas emissions will rise.

According to Mr. Connaughton’s recent testimony, there is no question about that.

This kind of inaction does not compact with our commitments

under the Framework Convention and the Sense of Congress, common sense, or the National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA. In

1969, NEPA became law. It was probably the first adoption of a

sustainable development philosophy by a government in the world.

To paraphrase it, it says, ‘‘It is the continuing policy of the Federal

Government to use all practicable means and measures to create

and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in

productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.’’

Unfortunately, the Administration seems to have lost sight of

these future generations of Americans. Economic development that

3

does not factor in the environment of quality of life of those future

generations is not sustainable. The Administration and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol claim that the actions that significantly

reduce greenhouse gas emissions cost too much now. They need to

look at the long term. They also need to look at the many studies

that have been done that show a net positive impact of reducing

emissions.

I ask unanimous consent that the two studies by Tellus Institute

and a list of other studies be placed in the record.

[The referenced documents follow:]

[World Wildlife Fund, October 2001]

CLEAN ENERGY: JOBS FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE

A STUDY FOR WORLD WILDLIFE FUND

(By Alison Bailie, Stephen Bernow, William Dougherty, Michael Lazarus, Sivan

Kartha, Tellus Institute and Marshall Goldberg, MRG & Associates)

Acknowledgments

We wish to thank Katherine Silverthorne, Kathleen Sullivan, Brooks Yeager and

Freda Colbert of WWF for their assistance on this report. We thank Hal Harvey,

Marcus Schneider and Eric Heitz of Energy Foundation for their help in supporting

our modeling capabilities. The energy efficiency analyses and inputs to our modeling

effort for buildings, industry and light duty vehicles were provided by ACEEE

(Steve Nadel, Howard Geller, Neal Elliott and Therese Langer) and John DeDicco

of Environmental Defense. Modifications to the NEMS model, particularly as related

to renewables in the electricity sector, were made at Tellus with important input

from Alan Nogee, Deborah Donovan and Steve Clemmer of Union of Concerned Scientists; Laura Martin, Tom Petersik, Alan Beamon, Zia Haq, and Jeff Jones of EIA;

and other experts including Walter Short of NREL, Jack Cadogan of ORNL, Dan

Entingh of Princeton Economic Research, Inc., Etan Gummerman, Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Francis Wood of OnLocation, Inc., and Michael Brower. We also wish to

thank Francisco de la Chesnaye and Reid Harvey of USEPA, who provided important data on non-CO2 gases, and Kevin Gurney, who provided useful insights on

land-based carbon. We also thank Skip Laitner for his ongoing input and insight.

About the Tellus Institute

Founded in 1976 as a nonprofit research and policy organization, Tellus addresses

a broad range of environment and resource issues. The Institute’s staff of 50 scientists and policy analysts is active throughout North America and the world. Internationally, Tellus works closely with the Stockholm Environment Institute, hosting

SEI’s Boston Center since 1989. The transition to a sustainable world must occur

at many levels. Tellus contributes to this goal through its work on global scenarios,

regional and national strategies, community sustainability and industrial ecology.

Projects focus on such areas as energy, water, waste, transportation, and integrated

sustainability planning. This institutes diverse sponsors—foundations, governments,

multilateral organizations, nongovernmental organizations and business—reflect

this varied program.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Over the past three decades national energy policy has been the subject of intense

debate and policy innovation. Americans were buffeted by oil embargoes and price

increases in the 1970’s, enjoyed low energy prices in the 1980’s, and today face the

consequences of electricity deregulation, energy supplier market power and regional

price spikes. To meet these challenges the public and policymakers have called for

the expansion of policies to ensure that energy services remain readily available and

affordable, while protecting public health and the environment. These policies,

which helped to produce the low energy prices of the 1990’s, include appliance efficiency standards, energy-saving building codes, vehicle fuel efficiency and tailpipe

emissions standards, clean air legislation, and caps on pollution from power plants.

Over the 30-year period during which these policies have been in effect, the United

States has reduced its energy per unit Gross Domestic Product by about one-third,

even though the economy grew by 160 percent.

4

In order to create a responsible, forward-looking energy policy, the United States

will need to examine a number of important issues. Will the policy help meet America’s energy needs? Will it enhance national security? Will it contribute to a strong

economy? Will it help meet America’s needs for a safe and healthy environment? In

order to begin to answer these questions, World Wildlife Fund commissioned the

Tellus Institute to consider the potential impacts of implementing a broad suite of

clean energy policies over the next 20 years.

Our national choices regarding the production and use of energy have serious implications for our environment. At every step of the process, from extraction, to refining, to transport and combustion, fossil fuels have negative impacts on land and

water-based ecosystems. In addition to these well-known effects, it is now clear that

overreliance on fossil fuels is a major cause of climate change. Because we consider

climate change one of the greatest global threats to biodiversity, we chose to consider a suite of policies that would address our energy needs while reducing our dependence on fossil fuels and decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases. We call this

suite of policies the Climate Protection Scenario.

This study analyzes the employment, macroeconomic, energy and environmental

impacts of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario. These policies were compared with a base case based on Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2001).

Climate Protection Scenario

Buildings and Industry Sector

• Building Codes

• Appliance and Equipment Standards

• Tax Credits

• Public Benefits Fund

• Research and Development

• Voluntary Measures

• Cogeneration for Industrial and District Energy

Electric Sector

• Renewable Portfolio Standard

• NOx/SO2 Cap and Trade

• Carbon Cap and Trade

Transport Sector

• Automobile Efficiency Standard Improvements

• Promotion of Efficiency Improvements in Freight Trucks

• Aircraft Efficiency Improvements

• Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels

• Travel Demand Reductions and High Speed Rail

Implementing these policies would help address many of our most pressing concerns about energy supply, the economy, employment, energy security, and the environment. We found that they would lead to net increases in employment over the

next 20 years. They would reduce our dependence on oil and other fossil fuels, thereby greatly increasing our energy security. Household energy bills would decrease despite a small increase in the price of electricity. And, we could mitigate climate

change and other air pollution problems. A more detailed description of the benefits

can be found in the findings section below.

The benefits of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario would be spread

widely across all States and all sectors of the economy—including construction,

transportation, motor vehicles, manufacturing, services, retail trade and agriculture.

However, some industries within the energy sector would not share in the economic

benefits from this transition, as the economy’s reliance on carbon-intensive fossil

fuels would decline. This suggests that while there would be widespread gains to

workers throughout the economy, it would be necessary to provide assistance and

support in order to ensure a just transition for workers who would otherwise be displaced during the beginning of this transition.

FINDINGS

If Congress were to implement the policies outlined in WWF’s Climate Protection

Scenario, the United States could reap the following benefits:

• A net annual employment increase of over 700,000 jobs in 2010, rising to approximately 1.3 million by 2020;

• An 8.5 percent decline in carbon emissions between 2000 and 2010, as opposed

to the approximately 20 percent increase projected in the base case, and a 28 percent decline between 2000 and 2020 rather than a 36 percent increase;

5

• Twenty percent of the electricity generation needed in 2020 would come from

wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy; • Oil consumption would decline by approximately 8 percent between 2000 and

2020, rather than increase by about 31 percent, thereby saving money and reducing

the vulnerability of citizens and our economy to oil price shocks; • Overall dependence on the consumption of fossil fuels would decline more than

15 percent between 2000 and 2020, rather than increasing by 40 percent as in the

base case; • Households and businesses would accumulate savings of over $600 billion by

2020; • GDP would be about $43.9 billion above the base case in 2020; • Energy-related emissions of air pollution would be dramatically reduced—by

2020, emissions of sulfur dioxide would be virtually eliminated, while nitrogen oxide

emissions would be almost halved, and emissions of fine particulates, carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds and mercury would be substantially reduced; • An additional $51.4 billion in wage and salary compensation by 2020 relative

to the base case; • Each State would experience a positive net job impact, rising to about 140,000

in California by 2020; and • Electricity sales from central station power stations would be about half of projections for 2020, owing to the policy of promotion of more efficient equipment in

homes and offices and the use of waste heat in combined heat and power plants in

buildings and factories.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades national energy policy has been the subject of intense

debate and policy innovation. Americans were buffeted by oil embargoes and price

increases in the 1970’s, enjoyed low energy prices in the 1980’s, and today face the

consequences of electricity deregulation, energy supplier market power and regional

price spikes. To meet these challenges the public and policymakers have called for

the expansion of policies to ensure that energy services remain readily available and

affordable, while protecting public health and the environment. These policies,

which helped to produce the low energy prices of the 1990’s, include appliance efficiency standards, energy-saving building codes, vehicle fuel efficiency and tailpipe

emissions standards, clean air legislation and caps on pollution from power plants.

Over the 30-year period during which these policies have been in effect, the United

States has reduced its energy per unit Gross Domestic Product by about one-third,

even though the economy grew by 160 percent.

In order to create a responsible, forward-looking energy policy the United States

will need to examine a number of important issues. Will the policy help meet America’s energy needs? Will it enhance national security? Will it contribute to a strong

economy? Will it help meet America’s needs for a safe and healthy environment? In

order to begin to answer these questions, World Wildlife Fund commissioned the

Tellus Institute to consider the potential impacts of implementing a broad suite of

clean energy policies over the next 20 years.

Our national choices regarding the production and use of energy have serious implications for our environment. At every step of the process, from extraction, to refining, to transport and combustion, fossil fuels have negative impacts on land and

water-based ecosystems. In addition to these well-known effects, it is now clear that

overreliance on fossil fuels is a major cause of climate change. Because we consider

climate change one of the greatest global threats to biodiversity, we chose to consider a suite of policies that would address our energy needs while reducing our dependence on fossil fuels and decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases. We call this

suite of policies the Climate Protection Scenario.

This study analyzes the employment, macroeconomic, energy and environmental

impacts of implementing the Climate Protection Scenario. These policies were compared with a base case based on Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2001).

Climate Protection Scenario

Buildings and Industry Sector

• Building Codes

• Appliance and Equipment Standards

• Tax Credits

• Public Benefits Fund

• Research and Development

• Voluntary Measures

• Cogeneration for Industrial and District Energy

6

Electric Sector

• Renewable Portfolio Standard

• NOx/SO2 Cap and Trade

• Carbon Cap and Trade

Transport Sector

• Automobile Efficiency Standard Improvements

• Promotion of Efficiency Improvements in Freight Trucks

• Aircraft Efficiency Improvements

• Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels

• Travel Demand Reductions and High Speed Rail

A detailed description of the policies can be found in Annex A.

By implementing this suite of policies we can bring together the various strands

connecting our energy, environment, climate, and economic policies into a coherent

and harmonious strategy. The expected employment, energy and economic, and environmental impacts are discussed in separate sections below. A detailed description

of the methodologies applied can be found in Annex B.

I. EMPLOYMENT AND MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS

The study finds that implementation of the Climate Protection Scenario could lead

to a net annual employment increase of over 700,000 jobs by 2010, increasing to

about 1.3 million by 2020, while increasing overall national GDP and incomes.

These benefits are spread widely across all sectors of the economy—including construction, transportation, motor vehicles, manufacturing, services, retail trade and

agriculture. The benefits derive from using our energy resources more efficiently

and cost-effectively, commercializing cleaner technologies, and recycling the revenues of an electric sector carbon cap and permit trade system to households and

businesses. Each State would enjoy net increases in employment; incomes and economic output as benefits are likely to be spread widely across the country.

As the economy’s reliance on carbon-intensive fossil fuels declines, some industries within the energy sector would not share in the economic benefits from this

transition. This suggests that while there would be widespread gains to workers

throughout the economy, it would be necessary to provide assistance and support

that ensured a just transition for workers who would otherwise be displaced during

the beginning of this transition. One source of financial resources for this assistance

could be a portion of the revenues derived from the government auction of carbon

permits. At the same time, energy suppliers could offset some potential employment

losses by moving aggressively into the energy efficiency and renewable energy businesses and assisting their work forces in transitioning to these new fields. For example, with electric sector restructuring, some existing utilities and suppliers could

shift toward providing energy-efficiency services and alternative energy. Similarly,

natural gas and oil suppliers could shift toward providing alternative fuels such as

those derived from biomass, wind, and solar resources.

National Impacts

Estimation of the macroeconomic impacts of the climate protection policies was

based on the incremental investments and savings required to implement the policies found in the July 2001 study. The analysis tracks expenditures on more efficient lighting, high efficiency motors, more efficient automobiles and many other energy-using technologies that reduce consumption of high carbon fuels. These expenditures create incomes and jobs for the manufacturers and workers who produce the

equipment and for the industries and workers who supply and service those producers. They also reduce the energy bills of offices, firms and households who utilize

the more efficient technologies. The savings on energy bills will create additional income and jobs in the industries and services in which these new savings are spent.

7

The set of policies analyzed here gives rise to large energy savings, positive job

impacts and new opportunities that far exceed the losses that would occur in the

traditional energy supply sectors. The analyses also take account of recycling back

8

to households and business the revenues derived from government auction of carbon

permits to electricity suppliers.

Figures 1a, 1b and 1c show the positive macroeconomic impacts of the Climate

Protection Scenario—overall increases above base case in jobs, in incomes per household (a benefit in addition to household energy bill savings) and in GDP. By the

year 2020, there would be an additional $400 per household increase in annual

wage and salary earnings ($51.4 billion total), while about 1.3 million net new jobs

would be created, relative to the base case. At the same time, GDP is projected to

be about $43.9 billion above the base case in 2020. Major contributions to increases

in annual wage and salary earnings arise from purchases of energy efficient equipment and the spending of net energy bill savings by businesses and households.

While these increases are significant, the impacts are relatively small in comparison

to overall economic activity. For instance, increasing the nation’s GDP by $43.9 billion in 2020 represents only 0.4 percent of the $11.8 trillion (1998$) projected GDP

for that year.

Table 1a shows that by 2010 there could be a net job increase of almost 750,000

jobs, with a net increase in annual wage and salary compensation of about $220 per

household ($26 billion total) and a $23 billion net increase in GDP. Table 1b reveals

that by 2020 these figures could grow to a net job increase of slightly more than

1.3 million jobs, a net increase in annual wage and salary compensation of about

$400 per household ($51 billion total) and a net increase in GDP of $44 billion.

Table 1a: Macroeconomic Impacts of Policy Scenario by Sector, 2010

Net Change in Wage

Net Change and Salary

Net Change in

GDP (Million

In Jobs 1998$)

Compensation

(Million

1998$)

Agriculture ............................................................................................................... 18,600 $160 $530

Other Mining ........................................................................................................... 6,900 $420 $880

Coal Mining ............................................................................................................. (10,100) ($990) ($2,090)

Oil/Gas Mining ........................................................................................................ (26,900) ($2,280) ($9,040)

Construction ............................................................................................................ 353,200 $10,440 $14,990

Food Processing ...................................................................................................... 2,700 $110 $210

Other Manufacturing ............................................................................................... 52,500 $3,980 $6,020

Pulp and Paper Mills .............................................................................................. 2,800 $240 $390

Oil Refining ............................................................................................................. (2,600) ($260) ($780)

Stone, Glass, and Clay ........................................................................................... 14,100 $750 $1,260

Primary Metals ........................................................................................................ 11,800 $940 $1,360

Metal Durables ........................................................................................................ 30,400 $2,140 $3,520

Motor Vehicles ......................................................................................................... 36,500 $2,810 $4,610

Transportation, Communication, and Utilities ....................................................... 21,500 $1,100 $2,240

Electric Utilities ...................................................................................................... (18,400) ($1,900) ($10,070)

Natural Gas Utilities ............................................................................................... (16,700) ($1,520) ($5,510)

Wholesale Trade ...................................................................................................... 5,600 $350 $640

Retail Trade ............................................................................................................ 14,400 $290 $510

Finance .................................................................................................................... 31,600 $2,380 $4,890

Insurance/Real Estate ............................................................................................. (5,900) ($160) ($1,110)

Services ................................................................................................................... 191,900 $5,730 $8,080

Education ................................................................................................................ 3,800 $140 $140

Government ............................................................................................................. 27,200 $1,180 $1,550

Total ...................................................................................................... 744,900 $26,050 $23,220

Table 1b: Macroeconomic Impacts of Policy Scenario by Sector, 2020

Net Change in Wage

Net Change and Salary

Net Change in

GDP (Million In Jobs 1998$)Compensation

(Million

1998$)

Agriculture ............................................................................................................... 63,100 $620 $2,120

Other Mining ........................................................................................................... 11,200 $870 $1,830

Coal Mining ............................................................................................................. (23,900) ($2,340) ($4,940)

9

Table 1b: Macroeconomic Impacts of Policy Scenario by Sector, 2020—Continued

Net Change in Wage

Net Change and Salary

Net Change in

GDP (Million

In Jobs 1998$)

Compensation

(Million

1998$)

Oil/Gas Mining ........................................................................................................ (61,400) ($5,210) ($20,600)

Construction ............................................................................................................ 340,300 $10,460 $15,030

Food Processing ...................................................................................................... 16,100 $750 $1,380

Other Manufacturing ............................................................................................... 77,900 $9,360 $14,160

Pulp and Paper Mills .............................................................................................. 5,000 $570 $950

Oil Refining ............................................................................................................. (6,300) ($650) ($1,910)

Stone, Glass, and Clay ........................................................................................... 24,800 $1,630 $2,750

Primary Metals ........................................................................................................ 18,600 $2,190 $3,180

Metal Durables ........................................................................................................ 42,000 $4,670 $7,670

Motor Vehicles ......................................................................................................... 54,300 $5,090 $8,350

Transportation, Communication, and Utilities ....................................................... 50,500 $3,320 $6,750

Electric Utilities ...................................................................................................... (35,100) ($5,180) ($27,540)

Natural Gas Utilities ............................................................................................... (26,200) ($3,080) ($11,180)

Wholesale Trade ...................................................................................................... 12,400 $1,030 $1,890

Retail Trade ............................................................................................................ 190,300 $4,410 $7,680

Finance .................................................................................................................... 42,100 $4,570 $9,410

Insurance/Real Estate ............................................................................................. 11,900 $350 $2,420

Services ................................................................................................................... 394,600 $13,080 $18,460

Education ................................................................................................................ 33,200 $1,330 $1,340

Government ............................................................................................................. 78,900 $3,550 $4,660

Total ...................................................................................................... 1,314,300 $51,390 $43,860

State-By-State Employment Impacts

The preceding analysis suggests that implementing the Climate Protection Scenario policies would result in substantial net employment gains at the national

level. Yet, estimates of State-level impacts provide important additional insight into

the benefits of such a policy initiative.

The detailed distribution of the national employment impacts across the States is

difficult to predict. However, it is likely that the large net benefits found in tables

1a and 1b will be rather widely and evenly distributed across the States, largely

owing to the widespread effects of respending the energy savings. The results of our

indicative analysis of the State-level employment are given in table 2.

Table 2: Job Impacts by State

State Net Job Gain 2010 Net Job Gain 2020

01 ....... Alabama ..................................................................................................... 13,100 22,600

02 ....... Alaska ......................................................................................................... 2,800 5,000

04 ....... Arizona ........................................................................................................ 11,200 19,900

05 ....... Arkansas ..................................................................................................... 7,500 13,200

06 ....... California .................................................................................................... 77,400 141,400

08 ....... Colorado ..................................................................................................... 10,000 17,700

09 ....... Connecticut ................................................................................................ 7,800 14,100

10 ....... Delaware ..................................................................................................... 2,200 3,800

11 ....... District of Columbia ................................................................................... 1,600 3,500

12 ....... Florida ........................................................................................................ 37,000 66,800

13 ....... Georgia ....................................................................................................... 21,300 38,300

15 ....... Hawaii ........................................................................................................ 2,700 5,000

16 ....... Idaho .......................................................................................................... 3,500 6,200

17 ....... Illinois ......................................................................................................... 31,900 56,400

18 ....... Indiana ....................................................................................................... 20,900 36,000

19 ....... Iowa ............................................................................................................ 8,300 14,700

20 ....... Kansas ........................................................................................................ 7,100 12,500

21 ....... Kentucky ..................................................................................................... 11,500 19,300

22 ....... Louisiana .................................................................................................... 19,200 32,900

23 ....... Maine .......................................................................................................... 3,700 6,600

24 ....... Maryland ..................................................................................................... 12,500 22,000

25 ....... Massachusetts ........................................................................................... 14,500 26,700

10

Table 2: Job Impacts by State—Continued

State Net Job Gain 2010 Net Job Gain 2020

26 ....... Michigan ..................................................................................................... 29,800 51,000

27 ....... Minnesota ................................................................................................... 13,400 24,000

28 ....... Mississippi ................................................................................................. 7,200 12,600

29 ....... Missouri ...................................................................................................... 15,100 26,600

30 ....... Montana ..................................................................................................... 2,300 4,000

31 ....... Nebraska .................................................................................................... 4,700 8,500

32 ....... Nevada ....................................................................................................... 5,300 9,100

33 ....... New Hampshire .......................................................................................... 2,800 5,000

34 ....... New Jersey .................................................................................................. 20,200 36,200

35 ....... New Mexico ................................................................................................. 4,200 7,100

36 ....... New York .................................................................................................... 38,000 68,200

37 ....... North Carolina ............................................................................................ 22,400 38,900

38 ....... North Dakota .............................................................................................. 1,900 3,300

39 ....... Ohio ............................................................................................................ 34,600 59,900

40 ....... Oklahoma ................................................................................................... 8,200 13,700

41 ....... Oregon ........................................................................................................ 8,600 15,600

42 ....... Pennsylvania .............................................................................................. 31,600 55,500

44 ....... Rhode Island .............................................................................................. 2,100 3,900

45 ....... South Carolina ........................................................................................... 11,500 20,000

46 ....... South Dakota .............................................................................................. 2,000 3,500

47 ....... Tennessee ................................................................................................... 17,100 29,800

48 ....... Texas .......................................................................................................... 71,500 123,400

49 ....... Utah ............................................................................................................ 5,700 10,300

50 ....... Vermont ...................................................................................................... 1,600 2,800

51 ....... Virginia ....................................................................................................... 18,500 32,100

53 ....... Washington ................................................................................................. 16,600 29,700

54 ....... West Virginia .............................................................................................. 3,800 6,000

55 ....... Wisconsin ................................................................................................... 14,900 26,300

56 ....... Wyoming ..................................................................................................... 1,700 2,600

Total ........................................................................................................... 744,900 1,314,300

Some of these State-level employment impacts are associated with the direct expenditures made for more efficient equipment and renewable technologies and fuels.

Although manufacturers and venders of relevant products and services may not be

uniformly spread across the States, they are rather widely dispersed. For example,

manufacturers of advanced power plants, including gas turbines, natural gas combined cycle systems, combined heat and power units and fuel cells are located in

many regions of the country. Manufacture of more efficient and alternative-fuel

automobiles is likely to continue to be located largely with current manufacturers.

Petroleum companies with experience in industrial chemistry can play a role in providing cellulosic ethanol or other synthetic fuels. Biomass fuels for transport and

power generation will come from States that could provide biomass feedstock. In

some States, farms could become sites for wind electric generators and derive income from these facilities.

While these energy-related purchases can stimulate local economic activity and

jobs, the major drivers of the overall national employment increases are the net energy-bill savings to households and businesses, which tend to be spent on myriad

other purchases across the economy. This spending occurs broadly across all sectors,

with much of it local. In those States that supply fossil fuels, losses to these industries and related businesses would be more than offset by gains in other sectors of

those State’s economies, owing to the expenditures on more efficient equipment and

cleaner energy resources and re-spending of energy bill savings. Thus, the national

job increases—in construction, services, education, finance, government, miscellaneous manufacturing, agriculture and other sectors—would likely be widespread

throughout the country.

While this analysis indicates that there would be overall employment benefits at

the State as well as the national level, some industries could face near-term losses

before they could adapt to new energy markets or before the benefits of the energy

efficiency measures were fully realized. Some of the savings realized from implementing the policies could be used for assistance in a just transition for affected

workers and communities.

States such as Texas, which are large energy producers and have relatively low

energy prices compared with the national average, still enjoy large benefits. As table

2 indicates, the State of Texas, which currently leads the Nation in total energy conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
11

sumed and is second only to California in total energy expenditures, could expect

to have a net gain of about 120,000 jobs in 2020 if these national energy policies

were adopted.

II. ENERGY IMPACTS

In this section we analyze expected impacts of the Climate Protection Scenario

policy package on energy consumption, energy prices, and household and business

energy budgets.

Figure 2a shows how the Climate Protection Scenario policies affect our dependence on the consumption of fossil fuels, which declines by more than 15 percent between 2000 and 2020, rather than increasing by 40 percent as in the base case. Oil

consumption itself declines by about 8 percent between 2000 and 2020 instead of

increasing by 32 percent, largely from improved efficiency in vehicles and other

transportation modes, thereby saving money and reducing vulnerability of citizens

and our economy to oil price shocks. While most of this reduced fossil fuel dependence results from policies that induce energy efficiency, figure 2a also shows that

the policy case increases the use of renewable energy, which roughly doubles from

current levels instead of remaining essentially constant.

Figure 2b shows how electricity sales from central station power stations would

be less than half of projections for 2020, owing to the policy of promoting more efficient equipment in homes and offices and using waste heat in combined heat and

power plants in buildings and factories. Electricity sales would decline by 33 percent

from 2000 to 2020 rather than increase by 45 percent. By 2020, electricity purchases

by residential, commercial and industrial consumers would be 55 percent below

business as usual and 20 percent of the remaining generation would come from

wind, solar, biomass and geothermal energy.

Figures 3a and 3b show how the policies affect natural gas prices and the costs

to households for electricity. Natural gas prices would decline to about 25 percent

lower than the base case by 2020. All sectors would enjoy declines in their electricity

bills, owing to greater efficiency, even though prices per unit of power would increase in moving to cleaner generation. By 2020 residential consumers would pay

about $24 less per month.

12

Figures 4a and 4b show that net savings to households and business would be

substantial, reaching more than $600 billion combined by 2020.

III. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

Virtually every step in the process of supplying energy from fossil fuels damages

the environment. Drilling, mining and pipeline installation can disrupt whole ecosystems. Transportation of fossil fuels results in spills, threatening wildlife and

human communities that depend on the natural environment. Fossil fuel combustion emits pollutants that cause global warming, acid rain and smog. Smog and

other air pollutants can exacerbate lung disease and cause crop, forest and property

damage. Acid rain acidifies the soil and water, killing plants, fish and animals that

depend on them. The impacts of global warming pose the greatest global threat to

biodiversity.

These environmental threats could be mitigated by a proactive effort to direct our

energy supply system away from its current dependence on fossil fuels and toward

increased energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. However, current

U.S. policies point in the opposite direction. The fossil fuel and nuclear industries

continue to benefit from both direct and indirect subsidies from taxpayers, citizens

and the environment, while cleaner energy resources and more efficient technologies

are required to prove themselves in a not truly competitive marketplace. Despite the

proven economic and environmental track record of energy efficiency, renewables,

and pollution limitations, the administration’s energy plan and the House of Representative’s energy legislation continue to promote fossil fuels at the expense of the

environment and the economy.

The policies in the Climate Protection Scenario begin to reduce our dependence

on fossil fuels and would thereby dramatically change the trajectory of U.S. carbon

emissions from their current rapidly rising path to a downward trajectory needed

for long-term climate stabilization. Figure 5 shows that between 2000 and 2010, carVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
13

bon emissions would decline by 8.5 percent rather than increase by the 20 percent

projected in the base case. The July 2001 study shows that the Kyoto Protocol target

could be met by implementing these cost-effective policies, reducing non-energy related greenhouse gases and utilizing international trading mechanisms. Under the

Climate Protection Scenario, by 2020 carbon emissions would be 47 percent below

business as usual and 19 percent below 1990 levels.

At the same time, the proposed policies would virtually eliminate emissions of SO2

and reduce NOx emissions by almost 30 percent, as shown in figures 6a and 6b

below. In addition, the proposed policies would substantially reduce emissions of

fine particulates, carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds and mercury.

ANNEX A

POLICIES

This study examines a broad set of national policies that would increase energy

efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy technologies, and shift to less

use of carbon-intensive fossil fuels. The policies address major areas of energy use

in the buildings, industrial, transport, and electrical sectors. Analyses of the investment costs and energy savings of policies to promote energy efficiency and cogeneration in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors were taken primarily from

the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (1999; 2001).

Below we group these policies into the particular sector where they take effect,

and describe the key assumptions made concerning the technological impacts of the

individual policies. Unless otherwise indicated, each of the policies is assumed to

start in 2003.

14

As explained further in the methodology discussion in the next section, we adapted the Energy Information Administration’s 2001 Reference Case Forecast (EIA

2001) to create a slightly revised ‘‘base case.’’ Our policies and assumptions build

on those included in this base case forecast (i.e., we avoid taking credit for emissions

reductions, costs, or savings already included in the EIA 2001 Reference Case).

When taken together, the policies described in this section represent a Climate Protection Scenario that the United States could pursue to achieve significant carbon

reductions.

Policies in the Buildings and Industrial Sectors

Carbon emissions from fuel combustion in the buildings (including both residential and commercial) sector account for about 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas

emissions, while emissions from the industrial sector account for another 20 percent.

When emissions associated with the electricity consumed are counted, these levels

reach over 35 percent for buildings and 30 percent for industry. We analyzed a set

of policies that include new building codes, new appliance standards, tax incentives

for the purchase of high efficiency products, a national public benefits fund, expanded research and development, voluntary agreements, and support for combined

heat and power.

Building Codes

For this policy, we assume that DOE enforces the commercial building code requirement in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) and that States comply. We also

assume that relevant States upgrade their residential energy code to either the 1995

or 1998 Model Energy Code, voluntarily or following adoption of a new Federal requirement. Furthermore, we assume that the model energy codes are significantly

improved during the next decade, and that all States adopt mandatory codes that

go beyond current ‘‘good practice’’ by 2010. To quantify the impact of these changes,

we assume a 20 percent energy savings in heating and cooling in buildings in half

of new homes and commercial buildings.

New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards

For this policy, we assume that the government upgrades existing standards or

introduces new standards for key appliances and equipment types: distribution

transformers, commercial air conditioning systems, residential heating systems,

commercial refrigerators, exit signs, traffic lights, torchiere lighting fixtures, ice

makers, and standby power consumption for consumer electronics. We also assume

higher energy efficiency standards for residential central air conditioning and heat

pumps than was recently allowed by the Bush Administration. These are measures

that can be taken in the near term, based on cost-effective available technologies.

Tax Incentives

This policy provides initial tax incentives for a number of products. For consumer

appliances, we assumed a tax incentive of $50 to $100 per unit. For new homes that

are at least 30 percent more efficient than the Model Energy Code, we assumed an

incentive of up to $2,000 per home; for commercial buildings with at least 50 percent reduction in heating and cooling costs relative to applicable building codes, we

applied an incentive of $2.25 per square foot. For building equipment such as efficient furnaces, fuel cell power systems, gas-fired heat pumps, and electric heat

pump water heaters, we assumed a 20 percent investment tax credit. Each of these

incentives would be introduced with a sunset clause, terminating them or phasing

them out in approximately 5 years, to avoid their becoming permanent subsidies.

National Public Benefits Fund

Electric utilities have historically funded programs to encourage more efficient energy-using equipment, assist low-income families with home weatherization, commercialize renewables, and undertake research and development (R&D). Such programs have typically achieved electricity bill savings for households and businesses

that are roughly twice the program costs (Nadel and Kushler, 2000). Despite these

successes, electric industry restructuring, deregulation, and increasing price competition have caused utilities to reduce these ‘‘public benefit’’ expenditures over the

past several years. In order to preserve such programs, 15 States have instituted

public benefits funds that are financed by a small surcharge on all power delivered

to consumers.

This study’s policy package includes a national-level public benefits fund (PBF)

fashioned after the proposal introduced by Sen. Jeffords (S. 1333). The PBF would

levy a surcharge of 0.2 cents per kilowatt-hour on all electricity sold, costing the

typical residential consumer about $1 per month. This Federal fund would provide

matching funds for States for approved public benefits expenditures. In this study,

15

the PBF is allocated to several different programs directed at improvements in

lighting, air conditioning, motors, and other cost-effective energy efficiency improvements in electricity-using equipment.

Expand Federal Funding for Research and Development in Energy Efficient Technologies

Federal R&D funding for energy efficiency has been a spectacularly cost-effective

investment. The DOE has estimated that the energy savings from 20 of its energy

efficiency R&D programs has been roughly $30 billion so far—more than three times

the Federal appropriation for the entire energy efficiency and renewables R&D

budget throughout the 1990’s (EERE, 2000).

Tremendous opportunities exist for further progress in material-processing technologies, manufacturing processing, electric motors, windows, building shells, lighting, heating/cooling systems, and super-insulation, for example. EPA’s Energy Star

programs have complemented and amplified the impact of Federal R&D, by labeling

and certifying to increase consumer awareness of energy efficiency opportunities.

R&D efforts should be increased and EPA should be allocated the funds to broaden

the scope of its Energy Star program, expanding to other products (refrigerators,

motors) and building sectors (hotels, retailers), and the vast market of existing

buildings that could be retrofitted. In this study, we assume that increased funding

to expand research and development efforts in industry (e.g., motors), buildings

(e.g., advanced heating/cooling), and transport (e.g., more fuel-efficient cars and

trucks) will lead to more energy-savings products becoming commercially available.

Industrial Energy Efficiency through Intensity Targets

There is great potential for cost-effective efficiency improvements in both energyintensive and non-energy intensive industries (Elliott 1994). For example, an indepth analysis of 49 specific energy-efficient technologies for the iron and steel industry found a total cost-effective energy savings potential of 18 percent (Worrell,

Martin, and Price 1999). In this study, we assume Federal initiatives to motivate

and assist industry to identify and exploit energy efficiency opportunities. Government agencies would provide technical and financial assistance, and expand R&D

and demonstration programs. In addition to these carrots, government may need to

brandish a stick in order to induce a large fraction of industries to make serious

energy efficiency commitments. If industry does not respond to the Federal initiatives at a level sufficient to meet progressive energy efficiency targets, a mandatory,

binding energy intensity standard should be triggered to ensure the targets are attained.

Support for Co-generation

Cogeneration (or, combined heat and power—CHP) is a super-efficient means of

coproducing two energy-intensive products that are usually produced separately—

heat and electricity. The thermal energy produced in cogeneration also can be used

for (building and process) cooling or to provide mechanical power. While CHP already provides about 9 percent of all electricity in the United States, there are considerable barriers to its wider cost-effective implementation (Elliott and Spurr,

1999). In this study, we assume the adoption of policies to establish a standard permitting process, uniform tax treatment, accurate environmental standards, and fair

access to the grid to sell or purchase electricity. Such measures would help to unleash a significant portion of the enormous potential for CHP. In this study, we assumed 50 GW of new CHP capacity by 2010, and an additional 95 GW between 2011

and 2020. With electricity demand reduced by the various energy efficiency policies

adopted in this study, cogenerated electricity reaches 8 percent of total remaining

electricity requirements in 2010 and 36 percent in 2020.

Policies in the Electric Sector

A major goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to dramatically reduce carbon and other pollutant emissions from the electric sector, which is responsible for

more than one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the electric sector that include standards and mechanisms to help overcome

existing market barriers to investments in technologies that can reduce emissions.

Three major policies—a renewable portfolio standard, a cap on pollutant emissions,

and a carbon cap and trade system—were analyzed as described below.

Renewable Portfolio Standard

A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a flexible, market-oriented policy for progressively increasing the use of renewable energy resources and technologies for

electricity production. An RPS sets a minimum requirement for the fraction of total

electricity generation to be met by renewable electricity in each year, and requires

16

each supplier of electricity to meet the minimum either by producing that fraction

in its mix or by acquiring credits from suppliers that exceed the minimum. The market determines the portfolio of technologies and geographic distribution of facilities

that meet the national target at least cost. This is achieved by a trading system that

awards credits to generators for producing renewable electricity and allows them to

sell or purchase these credits. Thirteen States—Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa,

Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,

Texas, and Wisconsin—already have Renewable Portfolio Standards. Senator Jeffords has introduced a bill (S. 1333) that would establish a national RPS.

The RPS provides strong incentives for suppliers to design and site the lowest

cost, highest value and most reliable renewable electricity projects. It also provides

assurance and stability to renewable technology vendors, by guaranteeing markets

for renewable power and allowing them to capture the financial and administrative

advantages that come with planning in a more stable market environment. Yet it

still maintains a competitive environment that encourages developers to innovate.

Finally, by accelerating the deployment of renewable technologies and resources, the

RPS also accelerates the learning and economies of scale that will allow renewable

resources and technologies to become increasingly competitive with conventional

technologies. This is particularly important, as the demands of climate stabilization

in coming decades will require more renewable energy than we can deploy in the

next two decades.

In this study, we have applied an RPS that starts at a 2 percent requirement in

2002, grows to 10 percent in 2010, and to 20 percent in 2020, after all efficiency

policies are included. Wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and landfill gas are eligible

renewable sources of electricity, but environmental concerns exclude municipal solid

waste (owing to concerns about toxic emissions from waste-burning plants) and

large-scale hydro (which raises environmental concerns and need not be treated as

an emerging renewable resource as it already supplies nearly 10 percent of the nation’s electricity supply). We also assume a subsidy to grid-connected solar photovoltaic electricity generation, in order to introduce a small amount of this technology

into the generation mix. The purpose of this is to induce technology learning, performance improvement and scale economies to help achieve increased technology diversity and another zero emissions option for the longer term. The level is kept

small so that cost and price impacts are minimal.

Tightening of SO2 and NOx Emission Regulations

The Clean Air Act Amendments currently require minimal to modest emissions

reductions through 2010 and no reductions after that. Yet, despite the improvements brought about by the Clean Air Act and its amendments, recent studies have

confirmed that SO2 and NOx continue to damage lake and forest ecosystems, decrease agricultural productivity and harm public health through its impact on urban

air quality (Clean Air Task Force, 2000.)

In this study, we assume a tightened SO2 cap-and-trade system that reduces sulfur dioxide emissions to roughly 40 percent of current levels by 2010 and to onethird of current levels by 2020. We also impose a cap-and-trade system on NOx

emissions in the summertime, when NOx contributes more severely to photochemical smog. This system expands the current cap-and-trade program, which calls

on 19 States to meet a target in 2003 that then remains constant and includes all

States with a cap that is set first in 2003 but decreases in 2010, relative to 1999

levels. The cap results in a 45 percent reduction from current annual electric sector

NOx emissions by 2010 and 83 percent by 2020.

Carbon Cap-And-Trade Permit System

This study assumes that a cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide emissions is

introduced in the electric sector. The cap is set to achieve progressively more stringent targets over time, starting in 2003 at 2 percent below current levels, increasing

to 12 percent below current levels by 2010 and 30 percent below by 2020. A progressively more stringent target reduces demand for coal, and hence both combustionrelated air pollution and mining-related pollution of streams and degradation of

landscapes and terrestrial habitats.

In the SO2, NOx, and CO2 trading systems, permits are distributed through an

open auction, and the resulting revenues can be returned to households (e.g.,

through a tax reduction or as a rebate back to households). Recent analyses suggest

that an auction is the most economically efficient way to distribute permits, as it

would meet emissions caps at lower cost than allocations based on issuing grandfathered allowances or equal per kWh allowances (Burtraw, et al. 2001). Implementing such auctions for the electric sector also could set the stage for an economyVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
17

1Assuming a mean value at a market price of oil of $20/barrel.

2 Assuming a retail price of gasoline of $1.50/gallon, a 10-year life of the vehicle, and 12,000

miles per year. 3 Assuming typical vehicle load factors of 0.33 for autos and 0.6 for aircraft.

wide approach to carbon reduction in future years based on auctioning. In this

study, the price of auctioned carbon permits reaches $100 per metric ton carbon.

With a cap-and-trade system in place for CO2, SOx and NOx, this scenario reduces multiple emissions from power plants in a manner similar to proposals currently under consideration in Congress. The reductions in these three pollutants are

as deep as those imposed in four pollutant bills, and are achieved within a comparable timeframe. (The Department of Energy’s NEMS model unfortunately does

not explicitly track mercury, making it impossible to compare the results of this

study to the mercury requirement in S. 556 and H.R. 1256.)

Policies in the Transport Sector

Another goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to reduce oil use, carbon

emissions and pollution from the transport sector, which is responsible for about

one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the

transportation sector that include improved efficiency (light duty vehicles, heavy

duty trucks and aircraft), a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels, measures

to reduce road travel, and high speed rail.

Strengthened Fuel Economy Standards

Today’s cars are governed by fuel economy standards that were set in the mid1970’s. The efficiency gains made in meeting those standards have been entirely

overwhelmed by increases in population and driving, as well as the trend toward

gas-guzzling SUVs. When the fuel economy standards were implemented, light

trucks only accounted for about 20 percent of personal vehicle sales. Light trucks

now account for nearly 50 percent of new vehicle sales; this has brought down the

overall fuel economy of the light duty vehicle fleet, which now stands at its lowest

average fuel economy since 1981. If the fuel economy of new vehicles had held at

the levels for vehicles sold in 1981, rather than tipping downward, American vehicle

owners would be importing half a million fewer barrels of oil each day.

In this study, we introduce a strengthened Corporate Average Fuel Economy

(CAFE) standard for cars and light trucks, along with complementary market incentive programs. Specifically, fuel economy standards for new cars and light trucks

rise from EIA’s projected 25.2 mpg for 2001 to 36.5 mpg in 2010, continuing to 50.5

mpg by 2020. This increase in vehicle fuel economy would save by 2020 approximately twice as much oil as could be pumped from an Arctic National Wildlife Refuge oil field over its entire 50-year lifespan (USGS, 2001). Based on assessments

of near-term technologies for conventional vehicles, and advanced vehicle technologies for the longer-term, we estimate that the 2010 CAFE target can be met

with an incremental cost of approximately $855 per vehicle, and the 2020 CAFE target with an incremental cost of $1,900. 1 To put these costs in perspective, the fuel

savings at the gasoline pump for these more efficient vehicles would be two to three

times these incremental costs over the vehicle’s lifetime. 2

Improving Efficiency of Freight Transport

We also assume policies to improve fuel economy for heavy-duty freight trucks,

which account for approximately 16 percent of all transport energy consumption.

Improvements such as advanced diesel engines, drag reduction, rolling resistance,

load reduction strategies, and low friction drivetrains would increase the fuel economy, and thus decrease the oil requirements, of freight trucks. Many of these technologies are available today while others, such as advanced diesel and turbine engines, have been demonstrated technically but are not yet commercially available.

To accelerate the improvement in heavy duty truck efficiency, we have assumed

expanded R&D for heavy duty diesel technology, vehicle labeling and promotion, financial incentives to stimulate the introduction of new technologies, efficiency

standards for medium-and heavy-duty trucks, and fuel taxes and user-fees calibrated to eliminate the existing subsidies for freight trucking. Together, it is estimated that these policies could bring about a fuel economy improvement of 6 percent by 2010, and 23 percent by 2020, relative to today’s trucks.

Improving Efficiency of Air Travel

Air travel is the fastest growing mode of travel, and far more energy intensive

than vehicle travel. One passenger mile of air travel today requires about 1.7 times

as much fuel as vehicle travel. 3 We assume policies to improve the efficiency of air

18

travel, including R&D for efficient aircraft technologies, fuel consumption standards,

and a revamping of policies that subsidize air travel through public investments.

We assume that air travel efficiency improves by 23 percent by 2010, and 53 percent by 2020, owing to a combination of aircraft efficiency improvements (advanced

engine types, lightweight composite materials, and advanced aerodynamics), increased load factor, and acceleration of air traffic management improvements (Lee

et al., 2001; OTA, 1994; Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000). This is in contrast

to the base case in which efficiency increases by 9 percent by 2010 and 15 percent

by 2020. While we assume that air travel can reach 82 seat-miles per gallon by 2020

from its current 51, it is technologically possible that far greater efficiencies approaching 150 seat-miles per gallon could be achieved, if not in that time period

then over the longer term (Alliance to Save Energy et al., 1991).

Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels

Transportation in the United States relies overwhelmingly on petroleum-based

fuels, making it a major source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We introduce

here a full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels, similar in concept to the Renewable Portfolio Standard for the electric sector.

The policy assumed in this study requires a 3 percent reduction in the average

national GHG emission factor of fuels used in light duty vehicles in 2010, increasing

to a 7 percent reduction by 2020. Expanded R&D, market creation programs, and

financial incentives would complement this policy. Such a program would stimulate

the production of low-GHG fuels such as cellulosic ethanol and biomass-or solarbased hydrogen.

For this study, we assume that most of the low-GHG fuel is provided as cellulosic

ethanol, which can be produced from woody matter from agricultural residues, forest

and mill wastes, urban wood wastes, and short rotation woody crops (Walsh et al.,

1997; Walsh et al., 1999). As cellulosic ethanol can be coproduced along with electricity, we assume that electricity output reaches 10 percent of ethanol output by

2010 and 40 percent by 2020 (Lynd, 1997). We assume that the price of cellulosic

ethanol falls to $1.40 per gallon of gasoline equivalent by 2010 owing to the accelerated development of the production technology, and remains at that price thereafter

(Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000).

Improving Alternative Modes to Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled

The amount of travel in cars and light duty trucks continues to grow due to increasing population and low vehicle occupancy. Between 1999 and 2020, the rate of

growth in vehicle miles traveled is projected to increase in the base case by about

2 percent per year. The overall efficiency of the passenger transportation system can

be significantly improved through measures that contain the growth in vehicle miles

traveled through land-use and infrastructure investments and pricing reforms to remove implicit subsidies for cars, which are very energy intensive. We assume that

these measures will primarily affect urban passenger transportation and result in

a shift to higher occupancy vehicles, including carpooling, vanpooling, public transportation, and telecommuting. We consider that the level of reductions of vehicle

miles traveled that can be achieved by these measures relative to the base case are

8 percent by 2010 and 11 percent by 2020.

High Speed Rail

High speed rail offers an attractive alternative to intercity vehicle travel and

short distance air travel. In both energy cost and travel time, high-speed rail could

compete with air travel for trips of roughly 600 miles or less, which account for

about one-third of domestic air passenger miles traveled. Investments in rail facilities for key intercity routes (such as the Northeast corridor between Washington

and Boston, the east coast of Florida between Miami and Tampa, and the route linking Los Angeles and San Francisco) could provide an attractive alternative and reduce air travel in some of the busiest flight corridors (USDOT, 1997). High-speed

rail can achieve practical operating speeds of up to 200 mph. Prominent examples

include the French TGV, the Japanese Shinkansen and the German Intercity Express. An emerging advanced transport technology is the MAGLEV system in which

magnetic forces lift and guide a vehicle over a specially designed guideway. Both

Germany and Japan are active developers of this technology.

In this analysis we have taken the USDOT’s recent estimates of the potential

high speed rail ridership which, based on projected mode shifts from air and automobile travel in several major corridors of the United States, reaches about 2 billion

passenger miles by 2020 (USDOT, 1997). While this level of high speed rail ridership provides relatively small energy and carbon benefits by 2020, it can be viewed

as the first phase of a longer-term transition to far greater ridership and more advanced, faster and efficient electric and MAGLEV systems in the ensuing decades.

19

ANNEX B

METHODOLOGY: ECONOMIC IMPACTS ANALYSIS

The overall energy and economic analysis starts with a business-as-usual energyeconomic forecast based on the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook for 2001. This base case reflects a continuation of existing energy consumption and technology trends and policies, and presumes no efforts are taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Employment impacts from the policy scenarios were computed as net incremental

impacts in specified future years. They are derived from the changes in expenditures on energy:

. . . operating costs and fuel costs—brought about by investments in energy efficiency and renewable technologies in each sector. The net impacts of these

changes on the nation’s economy were computed from the following: 1) the net

changes in employment; 2) the net changes in wage and salary compensation,

measured in millions of 1998 dollars; and 3) the net changes in Gross Domestic

Product (GDP), also measured in millions of 1998 dollars.

The analysis used data derived from IMPLAN (IMpact Analysis for PLANning),

a widely used input-output (I-O) model that analyzes interactions between different

sectors of the economy. IMPLAN was used to track the changes in each sector’s demand and spending patterns, as caused by shifts in fuel consumption and energy

technology investments owing to the policies, and the shifts induced in other sectors’ levels of output (and the inputs required).

The results of these interactions are captured through appropriate sectoral multipliers (jobs, income, and GDP per dollar of output). For each benchmark year (2010

and 2020), each change in a sector’s spending pattern is matched to an appropriate

sectoral multiplier. The analytical approach used here is similar to that in Geller,

DeCicco and Laitner (1992); Laitner, Bernow and DeCicco (1998); Goldberg et al.

(1998); and Bernow et al. (1999). These reports offer a more in-depth discussion of

methodological issues.

Input-output models were initially developed to trace supply linkages in the economy. Thus, the impacts generated from the policy scenario depend on the structure

of the economy. For example, I-O models can show how increasing purchases of

more efficient lighting equipment, more efficient cars, high efficiency motors, modular combined heat and power plants, or biomass energy not only directly benefit

their respective producers, but also benefit those industries that provide inputs to

the manufacturers. I-O models also can be used to show the benefits from indirect

economic activity that occur as a result of these transactions (e.g., banking and accounting services) and the re-spending of energy bill savings throughout the economy. Therefore, spending patterns for energy have an effect on total employment,

income (i.e., wage and salary compensation), and GDP.

For each sector of the economy, multipliers were used to compute the impacts of

the incremental expenditures. These multipliers identified the employment or economic activity generated from a given level of spending in each sector. Changes in

expenditures were matched with appropriate multipliers. For instance, employment

multipliers show the number of jobs that are directly and indirectly supported for

each one million dollars of expenditure in a specific sector.

For this analysis, a job is defined as sufficient wages to employ one person fulltime for 1 year. The employment multipliers for key sectors of the economy are listed in table A.1, below.

The analysis in this study includes several modifications made to the methodology

of merely matching expenditures and multipliers. First, an assumption was made

that 85 percent of the efficiency investments would be spent within the United

States. While local contractors and dealers traditionally carry out upgrades of energy efficiency, this analysis recognizes that foreign suppliers and contractors may

also be involved.

Second, we made an adjustment in the employment impacts to account for future

changes in labor productivity in specific sectors. Utilizing data from the Bureau of

Labor Statistics Economic and Employment Projections 1988, 1998, and 2008, we

developed productivity trends for our analysis. These trends suggest that productivity rates are expected to vary widely among sectors. Annual productivity gains

are forecast to range from 0.4 percent annually in the construction sector (which

will experience a large influx of employment as those sectors become more important to the economy) to 7.4 percent annual productivity gain in oil and gas mining.

These factors are given in table A.2, below.

Third, we assumed that 80 percent of the investment upgrades would be financed

by bank loans carrying an average 10 percent real interest rate over a 5-year period.

20

No parameters were established to account for changes labor participation rates or

for changes in interest rates as less capital-intensive technologies (i.e., efficiency investments) are substituted for conventional supply strategies. Although the higher

cost premiums associated with the efficiency investments might be expected to increase the level of borrowing in the short term, and therefore, interest rates, this

could be offset somewhat by avoided investments in new power plant capacity, exploratory well drilling, and new pipelines. Similarly, while a demand for labor may

tend to increase the overall level of wages (and potentially lessen economic activity),

the employment benefits from the scenario are relatively small compared with the

national level of unemployment.

Fourth, for the residential and commercial sectors, it was assumed that program

and marketing expenditures would be required to help promote market penetration

of efficiency improvements due to the dispersed nature of the decisionmakers and

the need for greater efforts toward market transformation. This was set at 15 percent of the efficiency investments for those sectors. No program or marketing expense was included for the industrial sector or transportation sector. We assume

market penetration is naturally occurring in the industrial sector as decisionmakers

adopt cost-effective and more efficient processes and older, less efficient equipment

is replaced with newer, higher efficiency models. In the transportation sector efficiency improvements are assumed to be a part of all new vehicle purchases.

Finally, the analysis took account of the fact that the electric sector carbon capand-trade system would involve government auctioning of carbon allowances to electricity suppliers. This was modeled by (1) assuming purchases of the requisite allowances by utilities from the government; (2) payments for the corresponding higher

costs of electricity by households and businesses; and (3) a return of the revenues

collected by the government to households and businesses.

These results should be taken as indicative, as there are always limits to such

a modeling exercise. The analyses do not account for feedback through final demand

reductions, input substitution owing to price changes, feedback from inflation, and

the constraints on labor and money supplies. They also assume that available labor,

plant and materials are not fully utilized. Thus, for example, they assume that there

is unemployment in those existing or potential skill areas, for which demand could

be induced by policies that shift expenditures to nonenergy commodities. This is contrary to many other economic models, which in effect assume that there is full employment, and that the shift in expenditures from energy to other commodities

would not create new jobs. Their view would be that the shift in expenditures would

provide largely counter-recessionary jobs, but not many sustained job increases. Yet,

it is well known that there is structural as well as business-cycle unemployment.

Moreover, economic activity in some sectors such as construction (which enjoys the

largest amount of induced jobs in our analysis) where job entry is impeded by cyclical and unstable demand and expectations, could experience sustained increases if

a sustained path of increased final demands were established as they are in our policy scenarios.

In addition, while the models used for the energy analyses capture some policyinduced technology innovation, this is limited primarily to the electric sector. The

I-O analysis also does not include the potential productivity benefits that could stem

from the investments in new and more efficient equipment, and associated changes

in organization, know-how and inter-industry interactions. Industrial investments

that improve energy efficiency could be accompanied by improved product quality,

lower capital and operating costs, increased employee productivity, easier and less

costly environmental compliance, and entry into niche markets (see, e. g., Elliott et

al. 1997; Laitner 1995; OTA 1994; Porter and Van Linde 1995). Even under full employment, energy policies that improve the efficiency of the economy could increase

incomes per worker. Finally, such job-inducing policies could help counteract recessionary business cycles. It would be valuable to develop tools and refine the analyses

to account for some of these factors and obtain a more detailed characterization of

the results.

For the State-by-State employment impacts, we developed indicative estimates of

the distribution of the approximately 1.3 million net national jobs gained by 2020

across the 50 States and the District of Columbia. Absent a more detailed analysis

of each individual State or region, we allocated the national job impacts by

weighting the key variables to create an overall State-by-State assessment. This estimate reflects the significant energy and economic differences across the States.

The key variables used in this assessment were differences in energy prices; the

level of energy consumed for each dollar of economic activity in the State; the number of energy-related jobs as a percent of total State employment; and the number

of State jobs as a percent of national employment. The results are presented in table

21

2, which shows a positive net job impact in each State, ranging up to a high of about

140,000 in California by 2020.

Table A.1

Employment Multipliers for Select Economic Sectors

Sector Multiplier

Agriculture ................................................................................................................................................................ 27.3

Coal Mining .............................................................................................................................................................. 9.9

Oil/Gas Mining .......................................................................................................................................................... 8.2

Other Mining ............................................................................................................................................................. 10.4

Construction ............................................................................................................................................................. 18.1

Food Processing ........................................................................................................................................................ 16.9

Pulp and Paper Mills ............................................................................................................................................... 11.6

Oil Refining .............................................................................................................................................................. 6.9

Stone, Glass, and Clay ............................................................................................................................................. 13.2

Primary Metals ......................................................................................................................................................... 12.8

Metal Durables ......................................................................................................................................................... 13.1

Motor Vehicles .......................................................................................................................................................... 10.6

Other Manufacturing ................................................................................................................................................ 13.3

Transportation, Communication, and Utilities ......................................................................................................... 13.9

Electric Utilities ........................................................................................................................................................ 5.2

Natural Gas Utilities ................................................................................................................................................ 6.6

Wholesale Trade ....................................................................................................................................................... 13.4

Retail Trade .............................................................................................................................................................. 29.2

Finance ..................................................................................................................................................................... 10.7

Insurance/Real Estate .............................................................................................................................................. 8.1

Services .................................................................................................................................................................... 22.9

Education .................................................................................................................................................................. 28.9

Government ............................................................................................................................................................... 18.0

Table A.2

Labor Productivity Rates for Select Economic Sectors Employment Multipliers for Select Economic Sectors

Sector Rate

Agriculture ................................................................................................................................................................ 1.6 percent

Coal Mining .............................................................................................................................................................. 5.2 percent

Oil/Gas Mining .......................................................................................................................................................... 7.4 percent

Other Mining ............................................................................................................................................................. 2.4 percent

Construction ............................................................................................................................................................. 0.4 percent

Food Processing ........................................................................................................................................................ 1.0 percent

Pulp and Paper Mills ............................................................................................................................................... 3.0 percent

Oil Refining .............................................................................................................................................................. 3.3 percent

Stone, Glass, and Clay ............................................................................................................................................. 2.2 percent

Primary Metals ......................................................................................................................................................... 4.0 percent

Metal Durables ......................................................................................................................................................... 4.7 percent

Motor Vehicles .......................................................................................................................................................... 2.0 percent

Other Manufacturing ................................................................................................................................................ 4.7 percent

Transportation, Communication, and Other Utilities ............................................................................................... 2.5 percent

Electric Utilities ........................................................................................................................................................ 2.5 percent

Natural Gas Utilities ................................................................................................................................................ 1.5 percent

Wholesale Trade ....................................................................................................................................................... 3.0 percent

Retail Trade .............................................................................................................................................................. 1.4 percent

Finance ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3.7 percent

Insurance/Real Estate .............................................................................................................................................. 0.8 percent

Services .................................................................................................................................................................... 1.1 percent

Education .................................................................................................................................................................. 1.0 percent

Government ............................................................................................................................................................... 0.4 percent

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[From the Tellus Institute and Stockholm Environment Institute—Boston Center,

July 2001]

THE AMERICAN WAY TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO REDUCE

CARBON POLLUTION

A STUDY FOR: WORLD WILDLIFE FUND

(By Alison Bailie, Stephen Bernow, William Dougherty, Michael Lazarus, Sivan

Kartha)

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank Jennifer Morgan, Katherine Silverthorne and Freda Colbert of

WWF for their assistance on this report. We thank Hal Harvey, Marcus Schneider

and Eric Heitz of Energy Foundation for their help in supporting our modeling capabilities. The energy efficiency analyses and inputs to our modeling effort for buildings, industry and light duty vehicles were provided by ACEEE (Steve Nadel, Howard Geller, Neal Elliott and Therese Langer) and John DeDicco of Environmental

Defense. Modifications to the NEMS model, particularly as related to renewables in

the electricity sector, were made at Tellus with important input from Alan Nogee,

Deborah Donovan and Steve Clemmer of Union of Concerned Scientists, Laura Martin, Tom Petersik, Alan Beamon, Zia Haq, and Jeff Jones of EIA, and other experts

including Walter Short of NREL, Jack Cadogan of ORNL, Dan Entingh of Princeton

Economic Research, Inc., Etan Gummerman, Lawrence Berkeley Labs, Francis

Wood of OnLocation, Inc., and Michael Brower. We also wish to thank Francisco de

la Chesnaye and Reid Harvey of USEPA, who provided important data on non-CO2

gases, and Kevin Gurney, who provided useful insights on land-based carbon.

1. Executive Summary

This report presents a study of policies and measures that could dramatically reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over the next two decades. It examines a broad

set of national policies to increase energy efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy technologies, and shift energy use to less carbon-intensive fuels. The

policies address major areas of energy use in residential and commercial buildings,

industrial facilities, transportation, and power generation.

This portfolio of policies and measures would allow the United States to meet its

obligations under the Kyoto Protocol Together when combined with steps to reduce

the emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and land-based CO2 emissions, and the

acquisition of a limited amount of allowances internationally. This package would

bring overall economic benefits to the United States, since lower fuel and electricity

bills would more than pay the costs of technology innovation and program implementation. In 2010, the annual savings would exceed costs by $50 billion, and by

2020 by approximately $135 billion.

Currently, the Bush Administration is promoting an energy strategy based on

augmenting fossil fuel supplies. This strategy does not help the United States shift

away from diminishing fossil fuel supplies, it does not enhance U.S. energy security,

and it does not reduce the environmental impacts of energy use. America needs an

energy policy that takes us forward into the 21st Century by making climate change

mitigation an integrated part of the plan.

Far from being the economically crippling burden that the Bush Administration

alleges, ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and ambitiously reducing greenhouse gas emissions could initiate a national technological and economic renaissance for cleaner energy, industrial processes and products in the coming decades. In the United States,

we therefore face an important challenge. We can embrace the challenge of climate

change as an opportunity to usher in this renaissance, providing world markets with

the advanced technologies needed to sustain this century’s economic growth. Or we

can be followers, leaving other more forward-looking countries to assume the global

25

leadership in charting a sustainable path and capturing the energy markets of the

future.

Policies and measures

The climate protection strategy adopts policies and measures that are broadly targeted across the four main economic sectors: buildings, electricity generation, transportation, and industry. The policies considered for residential and commercial

buildings include strengthened codes for building energy consumption, new appliance efficiency standards, tax incentives and a national public benefits fund to support investments in high efficiency products, and expanded research and development into energy efficient technologies. For the electric sector, policies included a

market-oriented ‘‘renewable portfolio standard’’, a cap on pollutant emissions (for

sulfur and nitrogen), and a carbon emissions permit auction. In the transport sector,

policies are adopted to improve the fuel economy of passenger vehicles, freight

trucks, and aircraft through research, incentives, and a strengthened vehicle fuel efficiency standards. Policies are also modeled to set a fuel-cycle greenhouse gas

standard for motor fuels, reduce road travel through land use and infrastructure investments and pricing reforms, and increase access to high speed rail as an alternative to short distance air travel. In the industry sector, policies are adopted to

exploit more of the vast potential for cogeneration of heat and power, and to improve energy efficiencies at industrial facilities through technical assistance, financial incentives, expanded research, and demonstration programs to encourage costeffective emissions reductions.

Results

Energy use in buildings, industries, transportation, and electricity generation was

modeled for this study using the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). The NEMS model version, data and assumptions employed

in this study were those of EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2001), which also

formed the basis for the Base Case. We refined the NEMS model with advice from

EIA, based on their ongoing model improvements, and drawing on expert advice

from colleagues at the Union of Concerned Scientists, the National Laboratories and

elsewhere.

Table ES. 1 Summary of results.

19901 2010 Base

Case

2010 Climate

Protection

2020 Base

Case

2020 Climate

Protection

End-use Energy (Quads) ....................................... 63.9 86.0 76.4 97.2 72.6

Primary Energy (Quads) ........................................ 84.6 114.1 101.2 127.0 89.4

Renewable Energy (Quads)

NON-HYDRO ......................................... 3.5 5.0 10.4 5.5 11.0

Hydro ................................................... 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1

Net GHG Emissions (MtCe/yr) ............................... 1,648 2,204 1,533 — ——

Energy Carbon ..................................... 1,338 1,808 1,372 2,042 1,087

Land-based Carbon ............................. — — ¥58 — ——

Non-CO2 Gases ................................... 310 397 279 — ——

International Trade .............................. — — ¥60 — ——

Net Savings2

Cumulative present value (billion $) .. — — $105 — $576

Levelized annual (billion $/year) ........ — — $113 — $49

Levelized annual per household ($/

year) ................................................ — — $113 — $375

1 Under Kyoto, the base year for three of the non-CO2 GHGs (HFCs, PFCs, SF6) is 1995, not 1990, and the 1995 levels for these emissions

are reported here. 2 Savings are in 1999 $. The 2010 savings include $2.3 billion costs per year ($9 billion cumulative through 2010) of non-energy related

measures needed to meet the Kyoto target. Costs are not included in 2020 since these measures policies do not extend past 2010.

Table ES. 1 provides summary results on overall energy and greenhouse gas impacts and economic impacts of the policy set for the Base Case and Climate Protection Case for 2010 and 2020. The policies cause reductions below in primary energy

consumption that reach 11 percent by 2010 and 30 percent in 2020, relative to the

Base Case in those years, through increased efficiency and greater adoption of cogeneration of heat and power (CHP). Relative to today’s levels, use of non-hydro renewable energy roughly triples by 2010 in the Climate Protection Case, whereas in

the Base Case it increases by less than 50 percent. Given the entire set of policies,

non-hydro renewable energy doubles relative to the Base Case in 2010, accounting

for about 10 percent of total primary energy supplies in 2010. When the electric secVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
26

3Throughout this report we refer to U.S. emissions target for the year 2010 to mean the average of the 5 year period from 2008 to 2012.

tor RPS is combined with the strong energy efficiency policies of this study, the absolute amount of renewables does not increase substantially between 2010 and 2020

because the percentage targets in the electric sector have already been met. A more

aggressive renewables policy for the 2010–2020 period could be considered (ACEEE,

1999).

The reductions in energy-related carbon emissions are even more dramatic than

the reductions in energy consumption, because of the shift toward lower-carbon fuels

and renewable energy. Since 1990, carbon emissions have risen by over 15 percent,

and in the Base Case would continue to rise a total of 35 percent by 2010, in stark

contrast to the 7 percent emissions reduction that the United States negotiated at

Kyoto. In the Climate Protection case, the United States promptly begins to reduce

energy-related carbon emissions, and by 2010 emissions are only 2.5 percent above

1990 levels, and by 2020, emissions are well below 1990 levels. Relative to the Base

case, the 2010 reductions 3 amount to 436 MtC/yr.

Energy-related carbon emissions are the predominant source of U.S. greenhouse

gas emissions for the foreseeable future, and their reduction is the central challenge

for protecting the climate. However, because the United States has made only minimal efforts to reduce emissions since it ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, it may not be able to meet it’s Kyoto obligation with

net economic benefits based solely on reductions in energy-related carbon dioxide

emissions. Therefore, in order to meet the Kyoto target, the Climate Protection case

also considers policies and measures for reducing greenhouse gases other than energy-related carbon dioxide.

In the Climate Protection case, land-based activities, such as forestry, changes in

land-use, and agriculture, yield another 58 MtC/yr of reductions. (This figure corresponds to the upper limit for the use of land-based activities in the current negotiating text proposed by the current President of the U.N. climate talks Jan Pronk.)

Methane emissions are also reduced, through measures aimed at landfills, natural

gas production and distribution systems, mines, and livestock husbandry. The potent fluorine-containing greenhouse gases can be reduced by substituting with nongreenhouse substitutes, implementing alternative cleaning processes in the semiconVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
27

ductor industry, reducing leaks, and investing in more efficient gas-using equipment. In total, the Climate Protection case adopts reductions of these other greenhouse gases equivalent to 118 MtC/yr by 2010.

All together the reduction measures for energy-related carbon (436 MtC/yr), landbased carbon (58 MtC/yr), and non-carbon gases (118 MtCe/yr) amount to 612 MtCe/

yr of reductions in 2010. Through these measures, the United States is able to accomplish the vast majority of its emissions reduction obligation under the Kyoto

Protocol through domestic actions. This leaves the United States slightly shy of its

Kyoto target, with only 60 MtC/yr worth of emissions allowances to procure from

other countries though the ‘‘flexibility mechanisms’’ of the Kyoto Protocol—(Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism). The

Climate Protection case assumes that the United States will take steps to ensure

that allowances procured through these flexibility mechanisms reflect legitimate

mitigation activity. In particular, we assume that United States restrains its use of

so-called ‘‘hot air’’ allowances, i.e, allowances sold by countries that received Kyoto

Protocol targets well above their current emissions.

In addition to greenhouse gas emission reductions, the set of policies in the Climate Protection case also reduce criteria air pollutants that harm human health,

cause acid rain and smog, and adversely affect agriculture, forests, water resources,

and buildings. Implementing the policies would significantly reduce energy-related

emissions as summarized in Table ES. 2. Sulfur oxide emissions would decrease the

most—by half in 2010 and by nearly 75 percent in 2020. The other pollutants are

reduced between 7 and 16 percent by 2010, and between 17 and 29 percent by 2020,

relative to Base case levels in those years.

Table ES. 2: Impact of policies on air pollutant emissions

1900 2010 Base

Case

2010 Climate

Protection

2020 Base

Case

2020 Climate

Protection

CO .......................................................................... 65.1 69.8 63.8 71.8 59.8

NOx ........................................................................ 21.9 16.5 13.9 16.9 12.0

SO2 ........................................................................ 19.3 12.8 6.2 12.7 3.3

VOC ........................................................................ 7.7 5.5 5.1 5.9 4.9

PM10 ...................................................................... 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3

The complete Climate Protection package—including measures to reduce energyrelated, land-related, and non-carbon greenhouse gas emissions, as well as modest

purchases of allowances—provides a net economic benefit to the United States. It

also positively affects public health, by reducing emissions of the key air qualityreducing pollutants, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, particulates, and volatile organic compounds. By dramatically reducing energy consumption, the Climate Protection strategy reduces our dependence on insecure energy supplies, while enhancing the standing of the United States as a supplier of

innovative and environmentally superior technologies and practices.

2. Introduction

The earth’s atmosphere now contains more carbon dioxide than at anytime over

the past several hundred millennia. This precipitous rise in the major greenhouse

gas, due to the combustion of fossil fuels since the dawn of the industrial age and

the clearing of forests, has warmed the globe and produced climatic changes. What

further changes will occur over the coming decades depends on how society chooses

to respond to the threat of a dangerously disrupted climate. A concerted global effort

to shift to energy-efficient technologies, carbon-free sources of energy and sustainable land-use practices, could keep future climate change to relatively modest levels.

If, on the other hand, nations continue to grow and consume without limiting GHG

emissions, future climate change could be catastrophic.

Dramatic climate change could unleash a range of dangerous physical, ecological,

economic and social disruptions that would seriously undermine the natural environment and human societies for generations to come. Fortunately, a variety of effective policies, which have already been demonstrated, would mobilize current and

new technologies, practices and resources to meet the challenge of climate protection. Strong and sustained action to reduce the risk of climate change could also

reap additional benefits, such as reducing other air pollutants and saving money,

plus help to usher in a new technological and institutional renaissance consistent

with the goals of sustainable development. Here we focus on the U.S., which emits

almost one-fourth of global carbon dioxide emissions. As a Nation, we have both the

responsibility and the capability to take the lead in climate protection, and can diVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
28

rectly benefit from actions taken. Recently, however, the Bush Administration has

gravely disappointed the international community, proposing an energy strategy

that is devoid of significant steps to protect the climate.

This report presents a study of policies and measures through which the United

States could dramatically reduce its greenhouse gas emissions over the next two

decades, while spurring technological innovation, reducing pollution, and improving

energy security. The study is the latest in a series to which Tellus Institute has contributed, dating back to 1990, which have shown the economic and environmental

benefits of energy efficiency and renewable energy resources. It updates and refines

America’s Global Warming Solutions (1999), which found that annual carbon emissions could be reduced to 14 percent below 1990 levels by 2010, with net economic

benefits and reductions in air pollution.

Unfortunately, since that study, and indeed over the past decade since the Framework Convention on Climate Change was ratified by the U.S., the promise of these

technologies and resources has gone largely unfulfilled, and little has been done to

stem the tide of rapidly growing energy use and carbon emissions. This delay and

paucity of action has rendered even more difficult the goal of reaching our Kyoto

Protocol emissions target of 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2010. Nonetheless, the

present study shows the substantial carbon reduction and other benefits that could

still be achieved by 2010 with sensible policies and measures, even with this delayed

start, and even greater benefits over the following decade. The policy and technological momentum established through 2020 would set the stage for the further reductions needed over the longer term to ensure climate stabilization.

The Risk of Climate Change

The world’s community of climate scientists has reached the consensus that

human activities are disrupting the Earth’s climate (WGI, SPM, 2001; NAS, 2001;

Int’l Academies of Science, 2001). Global emissions of CO2 have steadily risen since

the dawn of the industrial age, and now amount to about 6 billion tons of carbon

released annually from fossil fuel combustion and 1 billion tons annually from landuse changes (mainly burning and decomposition of forest biomass). Without concerted efforts to curb emissions, atmospheric carbon dioxide levels would be driven

inexorably higher by a growing global population pursuing a conventional approach

to economic development.

While it is impossible to predict with precision how much carbon dioxide we will

be emitting in the future, in a business-as-usual scenario annual emissions would

roughly triple by the end of the century. By that time, the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide would have risen to three times pre-industrial levels (IPCC

WGI, 2001). The climatic impacts of these rising emissions could be dramatic.

Across a range of different plausible emissions futures explored by the IPCC, global

average temperatures are calculated to rise between 3 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit (1.5

to 6 degrees Centigrade), with even greater increases in some regions (IPCC 2001).

Such temperature changes would reflect a profound transformation of the Earth’s

climate system, of the natural systems that depend upon it and, potentially, of the

human societies that caused the changes.

The potential consequences of such climate change are myriad and far-reaching.

Sea level could rise between 3.5 to 35 inches (9—88 centimeters) (IPCC WGI, 2001),

with severe implications for coastal and island ecosystems and their human communities. Hundreds of millions of people in the United States and abroad live in coastal

regions that would be inundated by a 17 inch (44 cm) rise in sea level. Most of these

regions are in developing countries that can scarcely afford to expend resources on

building dikes and resettling communities. Climate disruption would also entail

more frequent, prolonged, and intense extreme weather events, including storms

and droughts, the timing, conditions and character of which would remain unpredictable.

Under the stresses courted by continuing current energy practices, climate and ecological systems could undergo very large and irreversible changes, such as a shift

in the major ocean currents. Global warming itself could increase the rate of greenhouse gas accumulation, uncontrollably accelerating global warming and its impacts. For example, a thawing of the arctic tundra could release methane at rates

far beyond today’s anthropogenic rates, and a warming of the oceans could shift

them from a net sink to a net source of carbon dioxide.

Moreover, large and irreversible changes could occur very rapidly. Recent scientific evidence from pre-historic ice cores shows that major climate changes have

occurred on the time scale of about a decade (Schneider 1998; Severinghaus et al.

1998). Rapid change could cause additional ecological and social disruptions, limiting our ability to adapt. This could render belated attempts to mitigate climate

change more hurried, more costly, less effective, or too late. Consequently, early and

29

sustained action, across many fronts, is needed to effect the technological, institutional and economic transitions to protect global climate and the ecological and social systems that depend on climate stability.

Protecting the Climate

The carbon dioxide already released by human activities will linger in the atmosphere for a hundred years or so. This carbon has already changed the climate, and

will continue to do so as long as it remains in the atmosphere. But the degree of

climate change to which we’re already committed pales in comparison to the disruption that humankind would wreak if it continues to recklessly emit more carbon.

An aggressive strategy to curb emissions might limit warming to less than 2 degrees F over the next century (on top of the 1.0 degrees C that has already occurred

over the past century). A temperature increase of about 0.2 degrees F per decade

would still exceed natural variability, but would occur gradually enough to allow

many, though not all, ecosystems to adapt (Rijsberman and Swart, 1990). To be

sure, this goal would not entirely eliminate the risks of disruptive climate change.

Warming in some areas would significantly exceed 2 degrees F, the rising sea level

would inundate some coastal areas, and changing rainfall patterns could make some

regions more prone to drought or floods. A more ambitious stabilization target might

well be warranted, but we suggest this goal as an illustration of what might be an

environmentally acceptable and practically achievable climate protection trajectory.

To achieve this goal, CO2 concentrations would have to be stabilized at approximately 450 ppm, which is about 60 percent above pre-industrial concentrations. This

would require keeping total global carbon emissions within a budget of 500 billion

tons of carbon over the course of the 21st century, whereas a business-as-usual trajectory would have us emitting about 1,400 billion tons. Annual global carbon emissions from fossil fuels would have to be at least halved by the end of the century,

from today’s 6 billion tons/yr to less than 3 billion tons/yr, and deforestation would

need to be halted, in contrast to a business-as-usual trajectory which grows to 20

billion tons/yr. With a growing global population, this implies a decrease in the annual per capita emissions from today’s 1 ton to about 0.25 tons, whereas the business-as-usual per capita emissions grow to almost 2 tons. Figure 2.1, which shows

these two radically different emissions trajectories, conveys the ambitiousness of

this target.

30

Figure 2.1: Global carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion (1890–2100)—Business-as-usual trajectory (IPCC IS92a scenario) and trajectory for climate stabilization at 450 ppm

The industrialized countries are responsible for about two-thirds of global annual

carbon, at more than 3 tons per-capita, with the United States at 5.5 tons per capita, while on average developing countries emit only 0.5 tons per capita. Even if

emissions in the developing countries were to vanish instantly, implying a nightmarish devolution of their economies, the industrialized world would still need to

almost halve its emissions in order to protect the climate.

31

Figure 2.2: Carbon emissions for stabilization of GHG concentrations at 450 ppm,

broken out by developing and industrialized countries

Figure 2.2 shows the global carbon trajectory for stabilization at 450 ppm, as

shown in Figure 2.1, broken out into emission paths for both the industrialized and

developing countries. In this illustrative allocation, emissions converge to equal per

capita emissions (?0.25 tC per capita) by the end of the 21st century. Clearly, it is

essential that the industrialized countries begin early and continue steadily to decrease their emissions on a trajectory to meet these climate protection requirements.

Industrialized countries on the whole would have to roughly reduce their per capita

emissions ten-fold, and the United States in particular would have to reduce by

more than a factor of twenty.

Emissions from the developing countries could grow in the near term, as they undergo economic development and transition toward advanced, efficient and low-carbon technologies, and then decline rapidly during the latter half of the century. Ultimately, the developing countries would need to halve their per capita emissions relative to today’s levels, notwithstanding the considerable economic growth that they

are expected to realize over this century. This would involve economic development

predicated upon use of energy technologies and energy resources that would entail

a ‘‘leap-frogging’’ over the fossil-based economic development that has occurred in

the industrialized countries directly to cleaner energy sources. Such a transition

would require concerted technology and institutional cooperation, with associated financial assistance, among developing and industrialized countries.

Stabilization and equalization would thus be served by a dual technological transition in which the industrialized countries can take the lead, by demonstrating

their commitment to addressing a problem for which it bears primary responsibility,

and fostering the first wave of technological innovation from which both developing

and industrialized countries could benefit.

The Kyoto Protocol

Although only a first small step, the Kyoto Protocol offers a pivotal opportunity

to shift away from the climate-disrupting path down which the world is now headed,

and onto a climate-protecting path. It is well understood that the Kyoto Protocol is

the basis for future emissions reductions as well. If it enters into force, the Kyoto

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4The GHGs that are covered by the Kyoto Protocol include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane

(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perflourocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur

hexaflouride (SF6). 5’’Joint Implementation’’ (JI) is the relevant mechanism if the host country is an industrialized country with a target, and ‘‘Clean Development Mechanism’’ (CDM) if the host country

is a developing country. 6Purchase of allowances is known as ‘‘Emissions Trading’’.

Protocol will legally bind industrialized countries that ratify it to specific GHG reduction targets, to be attained during the during the 5 year ‘‘budget period’’ from

2008 to 2012. For the United States, the target is 7 percent less than the 1990 emission levels. The limit is 6 percent for Japan, 0 percent for Russia, and an average

of 8 percent for the European Union countries. Across all industrialized countries,

the emissions budget is 5 percent below 1990 emissions rate, whereas the businessas-usual emissions rate is projected to increase by approximately 20 percent by

2010.

The Kyoto Protocol offers a number of options to lower the cost of meeting their

targets. Many of these so-called ‘‘flexibility mechanisms’’ were included at the request of the United States in Kyoto. They allow countries to carry out projects that

reduce carbon emissions (or enhance carbon absorption) from biological stocks such

as forests and possibly agricultural land, or can reduce emissions of GHGs other

than carbon. 4 Countries can also undertake GHG mitigation projects in other countries 5 and acquire credits for the resulting reductions, or can simply purchase excess carbon allowances from countries that surpass their targets. 6

However, these flexibility mechanisms should be implemented with caution, lest

they undermine effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. Given its modest reduction targets relative to the much deeper reductions ultimately needed for climate protection,

the main purpose of the Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by launching

a global transition in technologies and infrastructure for energy production and use.

The first budget period should end with a decisive shift away from conventional energy investments, real progress in institutional learning and technological innovation, and momentum to deepen and expand these changes over the longer term. An

over-reliance on the flexibility mechanisms may permit too slow a start, and too

weak a signal, to motivate this fundamental transition.

Excessive use of the flexibility mechanisms could undermine the needed transition

in several ways. First, the emissions trading system is in danger of being severely

diluted by cheap carbon allowances from the Russian Federation and Ukraine,

whose negotiated targets are far above the emission levels they will reach by 2010

even without reduction efforts. Second, inadequate rules for credits from projectbased mechanisms could generate ‘‘free-rider’’ credits that reflect inflated estimates

of their mitigation value, thereby undermining the Protocol’s targets. Third, mitigation activities that rely on biological sequestration strain our current technical ability to reliably measure carbon changes, are based on uncertain science, and take

pressure off of fossil fuel reduction. Perhaps more importantly, institutions are not

yet in place to ensure that such projects do not harm biodiversity and human communities.

The attraction and rhetoric of solutions that lie outside the borders of the industrialized countries is misguided at this time. To be sure, there are important opportunities to help developing countries advance along a sustainable, low carbon path.

But unfettered use overseas options, justified by lower short-term costs for the industrialized countries, would be a head-in-the-sand approach to the long-term responsibility of climate protection. The quantity of such offsets should be limited and

their quality guaranteed. Procedures should be established to help ensure that the

various flexibility mechanisms help protect the climate and advance sustainable development. These include consistency with local ecological, cultural, economic conditions and constraints, guaranteed public participation in project design, certification

and review, strong ecological and social criteria, human and institutional capacitybuilding goals, strong and equitable relationships for technology cooperation, and acceptable procedures for monitoring, verification and accreditation of offset actions

and transactions. Until then it is premature to rely on the CDM for more than a

very small part of the required emissions reductions.

If the United States relies too heavily on the flexibility mechanisms, it could forego opportunities to reap the co-benefits of decreasing carbon emissions at home.

These include the reduced health and ecological damages resulting from decreased

emissions of mercury, fine particulates and other pollutants, and the improvements

in technologies, skills and productivity accompanying deployment and use of more

advanced technologies and practices. It could also find itself in a poorer position to

meet the stricter emissions reduction commitments expected for subsequent budget

33

periods. The Nation could become a follower rather than a leader in advanced technologies in domestic and world markets. Thus, it could miss the opportunity provided by the Kyoto Protocol for a national technological and economic ‘‘renaissance’’ with cleaner energy, processes and products in the coming decades.

3. Policies

This study examines a broad set of national policies that would increase energy

efficiency, accelerate the adoption of renewable energy technologies, and shift to less

carbon-intensive fossil fuels. This policy package contrasts sharply with the Bush

Administration’s energy strategy, which heavily focuses on fossil fuels and lacks any

significant effort to protect the climate. The policies address major areas of energy

use in the buildings, industrial, transport, and electrical sectors. Analyses of the investment costs and energy savings of policies to promote energy efficiency and cogeneration in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors were taken primarily from the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (1999; 2001).

Below we group these policies into the particular sector where they take effect,

and describe the key assumptions made concerning the technological impacts of the

individual policies. Unless otherwise indicated, each of the policies is assumed to

start in 2003.

As explained further in the methodology discussion in the next section, we adapted the Energy Information Administration’s 2001 Reference Case Forecast (EIA

2001) to create a slightly revised ‘‘base case.’’ Our policies and assumptions build

on those included in this base case forecast (i.e., we avoid taking credit for emissions

reductions, costs, or savings already included in the EIA 2001 Reference Case).

When taken together, the policies described in this section represent a Climate Protection Scenario that the United States could pursue to achieve significant carbon

reductions.

3.1. Policies in the Buildings and Industrial Sectors

Carbon emissions from fuel combustion in the buildings (including both residential and commercial) sector account for about 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas

emissions, while emissions from the industrial sector account for another 20 percent.

When emissions associated with the electricity consumed are counted, these levels

reaches over 35 percent for buildings and 30 percent for industry. We analyzed a

set of policies that include new building codes, new appliance standards, tax incentives for the purchase of high efficiency products, a national public benefits fund,

expanded research and development, voluntary agreements and support for combined heat and power.

Building codes

Building energy codes require all new residential and commercial buildings to be

built to a minimum level of energy efficiency that is cost-effective and technically

feasible. ‘‘Good practice’’ residential energy codes, defined as the 1992 (or a more

recent) version of the Model Energy Code (now known as the International Energy

Conservation Code), have been adopted by 32 States (BCAP 1999). ‘‘Good practice’’

commercial energy codes, defined as the ASHRAE 90.1 model standard, have been

adopted by 29 States (BCAP 1999). However, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct)

requires all States to adopt a commercial building code that meets or exceeds

ASHRAE 90.1, and requires all States to consider upgrading their residential code

to meet or exceed the 1992 Model Energy Code.

This policy assumes that DOE enforces the commercial building code requirement

in EPAct and that States comply. We also assume that relevant States upgrade

their residential energy code to either the 1995 or 1998 Model Energy Code either

voluntarily or through the adoption of a new Federal requirement. Furthermore, we

assume that the model energy codes are significantly improved during the next decade and that all States adopt mandatory codes that go beyond current ‘‘good practice’’ by 2010. To quantify the impact of these changes, we assume a 20 percent energy savings in heating and cooling in buildings in half of new homes and commercial buildings.

New Appliance and Equipment Efficiency Standards

The track record for electricity efficiency standards is impressive, starting with

the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 and continuing through

the various updates that were enacted in early 2001 for washers, water heaters, and

central air conditioners. These standards have removed the most inefficient models

from the market, while still leaving consumers with a diversity of products. An analysis of Department of Energy figures by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, estimates nearly 8 percent of annual electricity consumption will be

saved in 2020 due to standards already enacted (Geller et al. 2001). However, many

34

7The bills include those introduced by Senators Murkowski and Lott (S. 389); Bingaman and

Daschle (S. 596), Smith (S. 207), Hatch (S. 760), and Representative Nussle (H.R. 1316).

appliance efficiency standards haven’t kept pace with either legal updating requirements or technological advances. The Department of Energy is many years behind

its legal obligation to regularly upgrade standards for certain appliances to the

‘‘maximum level of energy efficiency that is technically feasible and economically

justified.’’

In this study, we assume that the government upgrades existing standards or introduces new standards for several key appliances and equipment types: distribution transformers, commercial air conditioning systems, residential heating systems,

commercial refrigerators, exit signs, traffic lights, torchiere lighting fixtures, ice

makers, and standby power consumption for consumer electronics. We also assume

the higher energy efficiency standards for residential central air conditioning and

heat pumps than was allowed by the Bush Administration. These are all measures

that can be taken in the near term, based on technologies that are available and

costeffective.

Tax incentives

A wide range of advanced energy-efficient products have been proven and commercialized, but have not yet become firmly established in the marketplace. A major

reason for this is that conventional technologies get ‘‘locked-in’’; they benefit from

economies of scale, consumer awareness and familiarity, and already existing infrastructure that make them more able to attract consumers, while alternatives are

overlooked though they could be financially viable once mass-produced and widely

demonstrated. Initial, temporary tax incentives can help usher advanced alternatives into the market place, which—once established—can proceed to gain significant market share without further subsidy.

In this study, we consider initial tax incentives for a number of products. For consumer appliances, we considered a tax incentive of $50 to $100 per unit. For new

homes that are at least 30 percent more efficient that the Model Energy Code, we

considered an incentive of up to $2,000 per home; for commercial buildings with at

least 50 percent reduction in heating and cooling costs relative to applicable building codes, we applied an incentive equal to $2.25 per square foot. Regarding building equipment such as efficient furnaces, fuel cell power systems, gas-fired heat

pumps, and electric heat pump water heaters, we considered a 20 percent investment tax credit. Each of these incentives would be introduced with a sunset clause,

terminating them or phasing them out in approximately 5 years, so as to avoid their

becoming permanent subsidies. Versions of all of the tax incentives considered here

have already been introduced into bills before the Senate and/or House. 7

National Public Benefits Fund

Electric utilities have historically funded programs to encourage more efficient energy-using equipment, assist low-income families with home weatherization, commercialize renewables, and undertake research and development (R&D). Such programs have typically achieved electricity bill savings for households and businesses

that are roughly twice the program costs (Nadel and Kushler, 2000). Despite the

proven effectiveness of such technologies and programs, increasing price competition

and restructuring have caused utilities to reduce these ‘‘public benefit’’ expenditures

over the past several years. In order to preserve such programs, 15 States have instituted public benefits funds that are financed by a small surcharge on all power

delivered to consumers.

This study’s policy package includes a national level public benefits fund (PBF)

fashioned after the proposal introduced by Sen. Jeffords (S. 1369) and Rep. Pallone

(H. 2569) in the the 106th Congress. The PBF would levy a surcharge of 0.2 cents

per kilowatt-hour on all electricity sold, costing the typical residential consumer

about $1 per month. This Federal fund would provide matching funds for States for

approved public benefits expenditures. In this study, the PBF is allocated to several

different programs directed at improvements in lighting, air conditioning, motors,

and other cost-effective energy efficiency improvements in electricity-using equipment.

Expand Federal funding for Research and Development in Energy Efficient Technologies

Federal R&D funding for energy efficiency has been a spectacularly cost-effective

investment. The DOE has estimated that the energy savings from 20 of its energy

efficiency R&D programs has been roughly $30 billion so far—more than three times

the Federal appropriation for the entire energy efficiency and renewables R&D

35

budget throughout the 1990’s (EERE, 2000). At a time when energy issues are in

the forefront of the national debates, such R&D efforts should be increased and

should be thought of as a remedy for the real energy crises engendered by continued

fossil fuel dependence—climate change, environmental damage, and diminishing fossil fuel supplies.

Tremendous opportunities exist for further progress in material-processing technologies, manufacturing processing, electric motors, windows, building shells, lighting, heating/cooling systems, and super-insulation, for example. The EPA’s Energy

Star programs have also saved large amounts of energy, building on the achievements of R&D efforts and ushering efficient products into the marketplace. By certifying and labeling efficient lighting, office equipment, homes and offices, Energy

Star has helped foster a market transformation toward much more efficient products and buildings. Currently, roughly 80 percent of personal computers, 95 percent

of monitors, 99 percent of printers, and 65 percent of copiers sold are Energy Star

certified (EPA, 2001; Brown et al, 2001). In light of these successes, EPA should be

allocated the funds to broaden the scope of its Energy Star program, expanding to

other products (refrigerators, motors) and building sectors (hotels, retailers), and the

vast market of existing buildings that could be retrofitted. In this study, we assume

that increased funding to expand research and development efforts in industry (e.g.,

motors) buildings (e.g., advanced heating/cooling), and transport (e.g., more fuel efficient cars and trucks) will lead to more energy-savings products becoming commercially available.

Industrial Energy Efficiency through Intensity Targets

There is remarkable quantity of untapped, cost-effective energy efficiency potential in today’s industrial facilities (Elliott 1994), and some corporate managers have

shown impressive initiative in moving to realize that potential. In 1995, Johnson

and Johnson set a goal of reducing its energy costs 10 percent by 2000 through

adoption of ‘‘best practices’’ in its 96 U.S. facilities. Building on this work, in 2000

Johnson & Johnson pledged to reduce global warming gases by 7 percent below 1990

levels by the year 2010, with an interim goal of 4 percent below 1990 levels by 2005.

In 1998, British Petroleum announced it would voluntarily reduce its carbon emissions to 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2010, representing almost a 40 percent reduction from projected emissions levels in 2010 given ‘‘business-as-usual’’ emissions

growth (Romm 1999). And in September 1999, DuPont announced it would reduce

its GHG emissions worldwide by 65 percent relative to 1990 levels, while holding

total energy flat and increasing renewable energy resources to 10 percent of total

energy inputs, by 2010. DuPont appears to be on track for achieving earlier commitments to reduce energy intensity 15 percent and total GHG emissions 50 percent,

relative to 1990 levels, by 2000 (Romm 1999). Companies as diverse as Alcoa,

Kodak, Polaroid, IBM and Royal Dutch Shell also find it cost-effective to establish

worldwide greenhouse gas reduction targets. The practices these companies are developing make them better prepared for an economy that places a value on carbon

reductions.

There is substantial potential for cost-effective efficiency improvement in both energy-intensive and non-energy intensive industries (Elliott 1994). For example, an

in-depth analysis of 49 specific energy efficiency technologies for the iron and steel

industry found a total cost-effective energy savings potential of 18 percent (Worrell,

Martin, and Price 1999).

We consider in this study Federal initiatives to motivate and assist industry to

identify and exploit energy efficiency opportunities. Government agencies can support industry by providing technical and financial assistance, and by expanding Federal R&D and demonstration programs.

In addition to these carrots, government may need to brandish a stick in order

to induce a large fraction of industries to make serious energy efficiency commitments. If industry does not respond to the Federal initiatives at a level sufficient

to meet certain energy efficiency targets, a mandatory, binding energy intensity

standard should be triggered to ensure the required targets are attained.

Support for Cogeneration

Cogeneration (or, combined heat and power—CHP) is a super-efficient means of

co-producing two energy-intensive products that are usually produced separately—

heat and power. The technical and economical value of CHP has been widely demonstrated, and some European countries rely heavily on CHP for producing power

and providing heat to industries, businesses, and households. The thermal energy

produced in co-generation can also be used for (building and process) cooling or to

provide mechanical power.

36

While CHP already provides about 9 percent of all electricity in the United States,

there are considerable barriers to its wider cost-effective implementation (Elliott and

Spurr, 1999). Environmental standards should be refined to recognize the greater

overall efficiency of CHP systems, for example by assessing facility emissions on the

basis of fuel input, rather than useful energy output. Non-uniform tax standards

discourage CHP implementation in certain facilities. Moreover, utility practices are

generally highly hostile to prospective CHP operators, through discriminatory pricing and burdensome technical requirements and costs for connecting to the grid.

In this study, we consider the impact of introducing policies that would establish

a standard permitting process, uniform tax treatment, accurate environmental

standards, and fair access to electricity consumers through the grid. Such measures

would help to unleash a significant portion of the enormous potential for CHP. In

this study we assumed 50 GW of new CHP capacity by 2010, and an additional 95

GW between 2011 and 2020. With electricity demand reduced by the various energy

efficiency policies adopted in this study, co-generated electricity reaches 8 percent

percent of total remaining electricity requirements in 2010 and 36 percent percent

in 2020.

3.2. Policies in the Electric Sector

A major goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to dramatically reduce carbon and other pollutant emissions from the electric sector, which is responsible for

more than one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the electric sector that include standards and mechanisms to help overcome

existing market barriers to investments in technologies that can reduce emissions.

Three major policies—a renewable portfolio standard, a cap on pollutant emissions,

and a carbon cap and trade system—were considered as described below.

Renewable Portfolio Standard

A Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) is a flexible, market-oriented policy for accelerating the introduction of renewable resources and technologies into the electric

sector. An RPS sets a schedule for establishing a minimum amount of renewable

electricity as a fraction of total generation, and requires each generator that sells

electricity to meet the minimum either by producing that amount of renewable electricity in its mix or acquiring credits from generators that exceed the minimum. The

market determines the portfolio of technologies and geographic distribution of facilities that meet the target at least cost. This is achieved by a trading system that

awards credits to generators for producing renewable electricity and allows them to

sell or purchase these credits. Thirteen States—Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa,

Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,

Texas, and Wisconsin—already have RPSs, and Senator Jeffords introduced a bill

in the 106th Congress (S. 1369) to establish a national RPS.

The RPS provides strong incentives for suppliers to design the lowest cost, most

reliable renewable electricity projects, and to identify niche applications and consumers where the projects will have the greatest value. It also provides assurance

and stability to renewable technology vendors, by guaranteeing markets for renewable power, allowing them to capture the financial and administrative advantages

that come with planning in a more stable market environment. Yet it still maintains

a competitive environment that encourages developers to innovate. Finally, by accelerating the deployment of renewable technologies and resources, the RPS also accelerates the learning and economies of scale that allow renewables to become increasingly competitive with conventional technologies. This is particularly important, as

the demands of climate stabilization in coming decades will require more renewable

energy than we can deploy in the next two decades.

In this study, we have applied an RPS that starts at a 2 percent requirement in

2002, grows to 10 percent in 2010, and to 20 percent in 2020, after all efficiency

policies are included. Wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and landfill gas are eligible

renewable sources of electricity, but environmental concerns exclude municipal solid

waste (owing to concerns about toxic emissions from waste-burning plants) and

large-scale hydro (which also raises environmental concern and need not be treated

as an emerging energy technology as it already supplies nearly 10 percent of the

nation’s electricity supply).

As a modest addition to the RPS we provide a subsidy to grid-connected solar photovoltaic electricity generation. The purpose of this subsidy is to introduce a small

amount of this technology so that it can play a role in the generation mix, seeking

to induce technology learning, performance improvement and scale economies, and

ultimately increased fuel diversity and another zero emissions option for the longer

term. The level is kept small so that costs and price impacts are minimal.

37

8On December 15, 2000, the EPA announced that mercury emissions need to be reduced, and

that regulations will be issued by 2004.

Tightening of SO2 and NOx Emission Regulations

Acid rain and urban air pollution remain serious problems in the United States.

The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments attempted to address these problems, by introducing a cap-and-trade system to roughly halve the electric sector’s SO2 emissions

by 2000, and imposing technology-specific standards for NOx emissions. Compliance

with the SO2 standard proved markedly cheaper than initially expected; initial estimates were mostly based on investments in ‘‘scrubbers’’ but the discovery of large

low-sulfur coal reserves in the Wyoming basins and a sharp decline in the cost of

rail transport resulted in lower costs.

Despite the improvements brought about by the Clean Air Act and its Amendments, recent studies have confirmed that SO2 and NOx continue to harm lake and

forest ecosystems, decrease agricultural productivity and affect public health

through its damaging affects on urban air quality (Clean Air Task Force, 2000). The

Clean Air Act only calls for minimal reductions in the cap by 2010 and no reductions after that.

In this study, we tighten the SO2 cap so as to reduce sulfur emissions to roughly

40 percent of current levels by 2010 and one third of current levels by 2020. We

also impose a cap-and-trade system on NOx emissions in the summertime, when

NOx contributes more severely to photochemical smog. This system expands the current cap and trade program, which calls on 19 States to meet a target in 2003 that

then remains constant, to include all States with a cap that is set first in 2003 but

decreases in 2010, relative to 1999 levels. The cap results in a 25 percent reduction

of annual NOx emissions by 2003, and a 50 percent reduction by 2010.

Carbon Cap-And-Trade Permit System

This study introduces a cap-and-trade system for carbon in the electric sector;

with the cap set to achieve progressively more stringent targets over time, starting

in 2003 at 2 percent below current levels, increasing to 12 percent below current

by 2010 and 30 percent below by 2020. Restricting carbon emissions from electricity

generation has important co-benefits, including reduced emissions of SO2 and NOx,

as discussed above, fine particulate matter, which is a known cause of respiratory

ailments, and mercury, which is a powerful nervous system toxin and already contaminates over 50,000 lakes and streams in the United States. A progressively more

stringent target also reduces demand for coal, and hence mining-related pollution

of streams and degradation of landscapes and terrestrial habitats.

In the SO2, NOx, and CO2 trading systems, permits are distributed through an

open auction, and the resulting revenues can be returned to households (e.g.,

through a tax reduction or as a rebate back to households). Recent analyses suggest

that an auction is the most economically efficient way to distribute permits, meeting

emissions caps at lower cost than allocations based on grandfather allowances or

equal per kWh allowances (Burtraw, et al. 2001). Implementing such auctions for

the electric sector will also clear the way for an economy-wide approach in future

years based on auctioning. In this study, the price of auctioned carbon permits

reaches $100 per metric ton carbon.

While not specifically targeted by the trading programs, the operators of the 850

old ‘‘grandfathered’’ coal plants built before the Clean Air Act of 1970, which emit

3–5 times as much pollution per unit of power generated than newer coal power

plants, will likely retire these plants rather than face the cost of purchase the large

amount of credits necessary to keep them running. When the Clean Air Act was

adopted, it was expected that these dirty power plants would eventually be retired.

However, utilities are continuing to operate these plants beyond their design life,

and have in fact increased their output over the last decade. By subjecting these

old plants to the same requirements as newer facilities, as has been done or is being

considered in several States including Massachusetts and Texas, operators would be

obliged to modernize the old plants or to retire them in favor of cleaner electric generation alternatives.

With a cap and trade system in place for CO2, SOx and NOx, this scenario reduces multiple emissions from power plants, in a manner similar to that adopted

in the Four Pollutant Bill currently before the House (H.R., 1256) and the Senate

(S. 556). The reductions in these three pollutants are as deep as those imposed in

the Four Pollutant bills, and are achieved within a comparable timeframe. (The Department of Energy’s NEMS model unfortunately does not explicitly track mercury,

making it impossible to compare the results of this study to the mercury requirement in the Four Pollutant Bill. 8)

38

9Assuming a mean value at a market price of oil of $20/barrel.

10Assuming a retail price of gasoline of $1.50/gallon, a 10-year life of the vehicle, and 12,000

miles per year. 11Assuming typical load factors of 0.33 for autos and 0.6 for air.

3.3. Policies in the Transport Sector

Another goal of U.S. energy and climate policy will be to reduce carbon emissions

from the transport sector, which is responsible for about one-third of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We analyzed a set of policies in the transportation sector that

include improved efficiency (light duty vehicles, heavy duty trucks and aircraft), a

full fuel-cycle GHG standard for motor fuels, measures to reduce road travel, and

high speed rail.

Strengthened CAFE Standards

Today’s cars are governed by fuel economy standards that were set in the mid1970’s. The efficiency gains made in meeting those standards have been entirely

wiped out by increases in population and driving, as well as the trend toward gasguzzling SUVs. When the fuel economy standards were implemented, light duty

trucks only accounted for about 20 percent of vehicle sales. Light trucks now account for nearly 50 percent of new vehicle sales; this has brought down the overall

fuel economy of the light duty vehicle fleet, which now stands at its lowest average

fuel economy since 1981. If the fuel economy of new vehicles had held at 1981 levels

rather than tipping downward, American vehicle owners would be importing half a

million fewer barrels of oil each day.

We introduce in this study a strengthened Corporate Average Fuel Economy

standard for cars and light trucks, along with complementary market incentive programs. Specifically, fuel economy standards for new cars and light trucks rise from

EIA’s projected 25.2 mpg for 2001 to 36.5 mpg in 2010, continuing to 50.5 mpg by

2020. This increase in vehicle fuel economy would save by 2020 approximately twice

as much oil as could be pumped from Arctic National Wildlife Refuge oil field over

its entire 50-year lifespan (USGS, 2001). 9 Based on assessments of near-term technologies for conventional vehicles, and advanced vehicle technologies for the longerterm, we estimate that the 2010 CAFE target can be met with an incremental vehicle cost of approximately $855, and the 2020 CAFE target with an incremental cost

of $1,900. To put these incremental costs in perspective, they are two to three times

less than the fuel savings at the gasoline pump over the vehicle’s lifetime. 10

Improving Efficiency of Freight Transport

We also consider policies to improve fuel economy for heavy duty truck freight

transport, which accounts for approximately 16 percent of all transport energy consumption. A variety of improvements such as advanced diesel engines, drag reduction, rolling resistance, load reduction strategies, and low friction drivetrains offer

opportunities to increase the fuel economy of freight trucks. Many of these technologies are available today while other technologies like advanced diesel and turbine engines have been technically demonstrated but are not yet commercially available.

To accelerate the improvement in heavy duty truck efficiency, we have considered

measures that expand R&D for heavy duty diesel technology, vehicle labeling and

promotion, financial incentives to stimulate the introduction of new technologies, efficiency standards for medium- and heavy-duty trucks, and fuel taxes and user-fees

calibrated to eliminate the existing subsidies for freight trucking. Together, it is estimated that these policies could bring about a fuel economy improvement of 6 percent by 2010, and 23 percent by 2020, relative to today’s trucks.

Improving Efficiency of Air Travel

Air travel is the quickest growing mode of travel, and far more energy intensive

than vehicle travel. One passenger mile of air travel today requires about 1.7 times

as much fuel as vehicle travel. 11 We consider here policies for improving the efficiency of air travel, including R&D in efficient aircraft technologies, fuel consumption standards, and a revamping of policies that subsidize air travel through public

investments.

We assume that air travel efficiency improves by 23 percent by 2010, and 53 percent by 2020. This is in contrast to the Base Case where efficiency increases by 9

percent by 2010 and 15 percent by 2020, owing to a combination of aircraft efficiency improvements (advanced engine types, lightweight composite materials, and

advanced aerodynamics), increased load factor, and acceleration of air traffic management improvements (Lee et el, 2001; OTA, 1994; Interlaboratory Working Group,

2000). While we assume that air travel can reach 82 seat-miles per gallon by 2020

39

from its current 51, it is technologically possible that far greater efficiencies approaching 150 seatmiles/gal could be achieved, if not in that time period then over

the longer term. (Alliance to Save Energy et al, 1991).

Greenhouse Gas Standards for Motor Fuels

Transportation in the United States relies overwhelmingly on petroleum-based

fuels, making it a major source of GHG emissions. We introduce here a full fuelcycle GHG standard for motor fuels, similar in concept to the RPS for the electric

sector. The standard is a cap on the average GHG emissions from gasoline, and

would be made progressively more stringent over time. Fuel suppliers would have

the flexibility to meet the standard on their own or by buying tradable credits from

other producers of renewable or low-GHG fuel.

The policy adopted in this study requires a 3 percent reduction in the average national GHG emission factor of fuels used in light duty vehicles in 2010, increasing

to a 7 percent reduction by 2020. The policy would be complemented by expanded

R&D, market creation programs, and financial incentives. Such a program would

stimulate the production of low-GHG fuels such as cellulosic ethanol and biomassor solar-based hydrogen.

For this modeling study, we assume that most of the low-GHG fuel is provided

as cellulosic ethanol, which can be produced from agricultural residues, forest and

mill wastes, urban wood wastes, and short rotation woody crops (Walsh et al 1998;

Walsh, 1999). As cellulosic ethanol can be co-produced along with electricity, in this

study we assume that electricity output reaches 10 percent of ethanol output by

2010 and 40 percent by 2020 (Lynd, 1997). Due to the accelerated development of

the production technology for cellulosic ethanol, we estimate that the price falls to

$1.4 per gallon of gasoline equivalent by 2010 and remains at that price thereafter

(Interlaboratory Working Group, 2000).

Improving Alternative Modes to reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled

The amount of travel in cars and light duty trucks continues to grow due to increasing population and low vehicle occupancy. Between 1999 and 2020, the rate of

growth in vehicle miles traveled is projected to increase in the Base Case by about

2 percent per year. The overall efficiency of the passenger transportation system can

be significantly improved through measures that contain the growth in vehicle miles

traveled through land-use and infrastructure investments and pricing reforms to remove implicit subsidies for cars, which are very energy intensive.

We assume that these measures will primarily affect urban passenger transportation and result in a shift to higher occupancy vehicles, including carpooling, vanpooling, public transportation, and telecommuting. We consider that the level of reductions of vehicle miles traveled that can be achieved by these measures relative

to the Base Case are 8 percent by 2010 and 11 percent by 2020.

High Speed Rail

High speed rail offers an attractive alternative to intercity vehicle travel and

short distance air travel. In both energy cost and travel time, high speed rail may

be competitive with air travel for trips of roughly 600 miles or less, which account

for about one-third of domestic air passenger miles traveled. Investments in rail facilities for key inter-city routes (such as the Northeast corridor between Washington

and Boston, the East cost of Florida between Miami and Tampa, and the route linking Los Angeles and San Francisco) could provide an acceptable alternative and reduce air travel in some of the busiest flight corridors (USDOT, 1997).

High speed rail can achieve practical operating speeds of up to 200 mph. Prominent examples include the French TGV, the Japanese Shinkansen, and the German

Intercity Express. An emerging advanced transport technology is the maglev system

in which magnetic forces lift and guide a vehicle over a specially designed guideway.

Both Germany and Japan are active developers of this technology.

In this analysis we have taken the DOT’s recent estimates of the potential high

speed rail ridership which, based on projected mode shifts from air and automobile

travel in several major corridors of the United States, reaches about 2 billion passenger miles by 2020 (DOT, 1997). While this level of HRS ridership provides relatively small energy and carbon benefits by 2020, it can be viewed as the first phase

of a longer-term transition to far greater ridership and more advanced, faster and

efficient electric and MAGLEV systems in the ensuing decades.

4. Methods and Assumptions

The modeling for this study was based primarily on the National Energy Modeling

System (NEMS) of the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (DOE/EIA) (EIA, 2001). The NEMS model version, data and assumptions employed in this study were those of EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2001), which

40

12More detailed discussions of the approach taken for sectoral policy analyses upon which this

study was based can be found in Energy Innovations (EI 1997), the Energy Policy, Special Issue

on Climate Strategy for the United States (1998), and Bernow et al. (1998 and 1999).

also formed the basis for the Base Case. We refined the NEMS model with advice

from EIA, based on their ongoing model improvements, and drawing on expert advice from colleagues at ACEEE and the Union of Concerned Scientists, the National

Laboratories and elsewhere. 12

The NEMS model takes account of the interactions between electricity supply and

demand (aggregated residential, commercial and industrial), taking account of the

mix of competitive and still regulated pricing in the United States. It accounts for

the feedback effects between electricity market and power plant construction decisions, as well as the links between fuel demands, supplies and prices.

Our use of NEMS for this project focused on the Electricity Market Module

(EMM), complemented by the Oil and Gas Supply Module (OGSM). The EMM starts

with the detailed fleet of existing power plants in the 13 electric sector regions of

the U.S, and also represents power imports from neighboring Canadian regions. It

makes dispatch, construction, interregional purchase and retirement decisions based

upon the regional electricity demands and the cost and performance characteristics

of existing and new electric supply options, adhering to national pollutant caps and

any State-level RPS requirements. It also takes account of cost reductions of new

power plants with increased units in operation (learning and scale economies). The

OGSM tracks changes in prices of natural gas and petroleum fuels based on changes

in their demand.

Analyses of the costs and demand impacts of policies to promote energy efficiency

and cogeneration in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors were taken

primarily from American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE, 1999;

ACEEE, 2001). The electric generation, fuel, emissions and monetary savings from

these policies were obtained using NEMS, to take account of all of the interactive

and feedback effects described above. NEMS was used also to obtain the interactive

effects of the policies affecting electricity demand and those, such as renewable, carbon and emission standards, which affect the electricity supply mix.

For example, we used information from ACEEE to lower the fuel and electricity

demand within NEMS based on policies in the demand sectors. We ran NEMS to

determine the new mix of electricity generation (based on changes in both electricity

demand and the electricity sector policies). This resulted in decreased demand for

oil and gas, leading to lower prices. NEMS iterates internally between energy supply and demand to seek a consistent solution.

Analyses of the policy impacts in the transportation sector took account of vehicle

stock turnover, fuel-efficiencies and travel indices, and were benchmarked to the

structure, data and baseline projections of the AEO2001. Following assumptions for

light duty vehicle efficiency in ACEEE (2001) and other sources (DeCicco, Ross and

An, 2001), we accounted for both autonomous and policy-induced vehicle efficiency

improvement, shifts between transport modes, and changes in demand for transport

services.

5. Results

Carbon dioxide emissions in the United States have been rising over the past decade, and now exceed by more than 15 percent the 1990 emission rate of 1338 MtC/

yr (EIA, 2001b). The U.S. Department of Energy (EIA, 2001a) business-as-usual scenario projects that these emissions will to continue to rise to 1808 MtC/yr in 2010—

a 35 percent increase above 1990 levels. This is in stark contrast to the emissions

limit that the United States negotiated at Kyoto—a 7 percent decrease below 1990

levels.

5.1. Overview of Results

Table 5.1 provides summary results on overall energy and carbon impacts, pollutant emissions impacts, and economic impacts for the Base and Climate Protection

cases for 2010 and 2020. The portfolio of carbon-reducing policies and measures

composed for this Climate Protection scenario brings the United States a long way

toward meeting its Kyoto target, reducing carbon emissions from today’s level to

1372 MtC/yr by 2010—but still 2.5 percent above 1990 levels. Reductions continue

beyond 2010, and national emissions are reduced to 1087 MtC/yr in 2020, well below

1990 levels.

41

15This takes account of the percentage levels required by the Jeffords Bill for the electric sector (10 percent renewables by 2010, and 20 percent by 2020). However, when this RPS is comContinued

Table 5.1 Summary of results.

199013 2010 Base Case

2010 Climate

Protection

2020 Base Case2020 Climate

Protection

End-use Energy (Quads) ....................................... 63.9 86.0 76.4 97.2 72.6

Primary Energy (Quads) ........................................ 84.6 114.1 101.2 127.0 89.4

Renewable Energy (Quads)

Non-Hydro ............................................ 3.5 5.0 10.4 5.5 11.0

Hydro ................................................... 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1

Net GHG Emissions (MtCe/yr) ............................... 1,648 2,204 1,533 — ——

Energy Carbon ..................................... 1,338 1,808 1,372 2,042 1,087

Land-based Carbon ............................. — — ¥58 — ——

Non-CO2 Gases ................................... 310 397 279 — ——

International Trade .............................. — — ¥60 — ——

Net Savings14.

Cumulative present value (billion $) — — $105 — $576

Levelized annual (billion $/year) ........ — — $13 — $49

Levelized annual per household ($/

year) ................................................ — — $113 — $375

13 Under Kyoto, the base year for three of the non-CO2 GHGs (HFCs, PFCs, SF6) is 1995, not 1990, and the 1995 levels for these emissions

are reported here. 14 Savings are in 1999 $. The 2010 savings include $2.3 billion costs per year ($9 billion cumulative through 2010) of non-energy related

measures needed to meet the Kyoto target. Costs are not included in 2020 since these measures policies do not extend past 2010.

Overall, the national policies and measures were estimated to achieve an 11 percent reduction in primary energy use by 2010, and a nearly 30 percent reduction

by 2020, while maintaining the same level of energy services to consumers. The use

of renewable energy is doubled in 2010 relative to the Base case and remains roughly at that level through 2020.15 The policies would also produce reductions in air

42

bined with the strong energy efficiency policies of this study, the absolute amount of renewables

in the electric sector does not increase substantially between 2010 and 2020 because the percentage targets have already been met. A more aggressive renewables policy for the 2010–2020

period could be considered (ACEEE, 1999).

pollutant emissions owing to reduced fossil fuel consumption and greater use of renewable energy. This is most evident for SO2 for which 2010 levels in the Climate

Protection case are almost half of Base case levels, due in great part to the effect

of the more stringent cap in the electric sector.

The analysis showed that national savings in energy bills would exceed the net

incremental investments in more efficient technologies and expenditures for low carbon fuels. By 2010, the average savings exceed the additional costs of new equipment by $13 billion per year, or nearly $113 per household.

5.2. Sectoral Impacts

Figures 5.1a and 5.1b compare the carbon trajectories for the Base and Climate

Protection scenarios, and shows the carbon reductions obtained by the policies to reduce energy-related carbon emissions. Carbon emissions reductions can be reported

by where they are emitted (i.e., by source, 5.1a) or by the sectors to which the policies are directed (i.e., by policy, 5.1b).

Thus, for example: the refinery emissions reductions owing to decreased transportation oil use are attributed to the transport policies, while the refinery emissions

reductions owing to decreased industrial oil use are attributed to the industrial policies; the electric generation emissions reductions and emissions increased onsite fuel

use, owing to increased CHP are attributed to the industrial policies.

The first graph, Figure 5.1a, shows the emissions reductions in the sectors of their

origin, that is, in which the combustion of fossil fuels occurs. Thus, it shows emissions from onsite fossil fuel combustion in buildings, industry, transportation and

electricity production. The largest reductions arise in the electric sector, owing to

the enduse energy efficiency policies that reduce demand, plus the emissions and

renewables policies for power supply that change the generation mix for electricity

generation. Figure 5.1b shows the reductions from the various sectoral policies.

Table 5.2 summarizes the cost of saved carbon for each policy for 2010 and 2020.

These costs were computed by summing the incremental annualized capital costs,

administrative costs, incremental O&M and fuel costs, and subtracting O&M and

43

16Carbon emissions are discounted based on the presumption that they will have a commodity

value within some form of tradable permits regime.

fuel cost savings. A 5-percent discount rate was used for both costs and carbon emissions. 16 Overall, the cost of saved carbon for the Climate Protection policy package

results in net savings of $115/tC in 2010, and $576/tC in 2010. The net savings for

the demand policies more than offset the incremental costs of saved carbon for the

electric supply policies. Details regarding the impact of the policies within the sectors are summarized in the following sections.

Building and Industrial Sectors

The efficiency improvements in residential and commercial buildings, induced

through enhanced building codes, strengthened standards for appliances and equipment, tax incentives, as well as policies to encourage CHP, leads to a decrease in

net electricity usage of 19 percent by 2010 and nearly 50 percent by 2020. Despite

the additional natural gas required to fuel CHP in buildings, onsite fuel use declines

by 3 percent in 2010 and 10 percent in 2020, relative to the Base case. The net impact is a decline in carbon emissions by nearly one-third in 2010, and two-thirds

by 2020, relative to the Base case.

Industrial energy efficiency measures undertaken largely through voluntary measures and tax incentives, cause the industrial sector to reduce it’s direct energy consumption by 9 percent in 2010 and 14 percent in 2020 in the Climate Protection

case relative to the Base case. In addition, largely because of the aggressive introduction of cogeneration, net electricity consumption is lower dramatically, by 30 percent in 2010 and 70 percent in 2020. The combined impact of these is that carbon

emissions due to the industrial sector are lower by 26 percent in 2010 and 46 percent in 2020, relative to the Base case.

Table 5.2. Carbon reductions, net costs, and cost per saved carbon in 2010 and 2020

2010 2020

Carbon Savings MtC/yr

Cumulative Net

Cost

(present

value)

billion

(1999)$

Cost of

saved

carbon

(1999)$

per tC

Carbon Savings MtC/yr

Cumulative Net

Cost

(present

value)

billion

(1999)$

Cost of

saved

carbon

(1999)$

per tC

Buildings & Industry Sectors

Appliance standards .......................... 29 ¥$24 ¥$315 45 ¥$84 ¥$256

Building Codes ................................... 7 ¥$5 ¥$353 13 ¥$23 ¥$244

Voluntary measures ............................ 61 ¥$50 ¥$229 78 ¥$112 ¥$179

Research and design ......................... 21 ¥$18 ¥$257 37 ¥$53 ¥$186

Public Benefits Fund .......................... 50 ¥$29 ¥$224 73 ¥$101 ¥$187

Tax Credits ......................................... 4 ¥$4 ¥$292 7 ¥$8 ¥$152

CHP and DES ...................................... 21 ¥$53 ¥$611 33 ¥$151 ¥$554,

Subtotal ............................ 193 ¥$183 ¥$301 285 ¥$533 ¥$121

Electric Sector

RPS

NOx/SO2 Cap and Trade

Carbon trading see below .............. .............. see below

Subtotal ............................ 147 $140 $258 180 $258 $188

Transport Sector

Travel Reductions ............................... 29 ¥$50 ¥$496 37 ¥$126 ¥$495

LDV efficiency improvements ............. 38 ¥$19 ¥$270 136 ¥$149 ¥$296

HDV efficiency improvements ............. 8 ¥$3 ¥$179 33 ¥$22 ¥$214

Aircraft efficiency improvements ....... 10 ¥$3 ¥$106 28 ¥$14 ¥$129

Greenhouse Gas Standards ................ 11 $4 $136 22 $11 $99,

Subtotal ............................ 95 ¥$71 ¥$283 255 ¥$301 ¥$279,

TOTAL ................................ 436 ¥$114 ¥$82 721 ¥$576 ¥$124

Across both sectors, the policies result in combined fuel and electricity savings of

9.6 quads in 2010 and 24.6 quads by 2020. The cumulative investment in efficiency

measures to achieve these savings is $80 billion by 2010 and $365 billion by 2020

(discounted 1999$).

44

Electric Sector

The policies in the buildings and industrial sectors lead to major reductions in the

total amount of electricity required from the nation’s power stations. This impact

is illustrated in Figure 5.2a and shows that energy efficiency measures entirely displace growth in electricity demand after 2005. Relative to today’s level, electricity

demand declines 15 percent by 2010 and 35 percent by 2020.

In addition to this reduced demand for electricity, the mix of fuels used to generate electricity changes dramatically, as shown in Figure 5.2b. The electric sector

policies shift the generation mix away from a heavy reliance on coal, and avoid the

rapid buildup of natural gas generation, by relying much more on renewable energy

and, especially, cogeneration. Cogeneration grows from roughly 300 TWh today to

660 TWh in 2010, and 1260 in 2020, whereas in the Base case cogeneration increases modestly to 380 TWh in 2010 and 440 TWh in 2020. Non-hydro renewable

energy consumption increases almost five times by 2010 over the Base case, and remains roughly at this level through 2020.

While effective at reducing carbon emissions, the electric sector policies do so at

a net economic cost, increasing the average unit cost of electricity by about 2 cents

/ kWh in 2010. This effect diminishes over time as the electric sector is able to respond to the new policies and electricity demand reductions lead to fewer new power

plants; by 2020, the electricity price is only about 1 cent / kWh higher than the base

case. This price increase primarily reflects the fact that continued operation of existing coal plants, and construction and operation of new ones, remain economically

attractive in the emerging price competitive restructured industry. In part, this is

because the use of coal for electricity generation doesn’t include environmental

externalities.

45

By 2010, a total of 4.3 quads of fossil fuel reductions are achieved at power stations, and 6.5 quads by 2020. The cumulative investment to achieve these savings

and greater utilization of renewable energy is $166 billion by 2010 and $333 billion

by 2020 (discounted 1999$). Although the costs per unit of electricity increase, measures for demand-side efficiency lead to an overall decrease in endusers’ electricity

bills, and in the overall costs of electricity services.

Transportation

The vehicle efficiency and transportation demand management initiatives in the

Climate Protection case result in energy savings of 4.6 quads in 2010, and 12.6

46

quads by 2020 (12 percent in 2010 and 28 percent in 2020, respectively, relative to

the Base case). Carbon emissions fall slightly more relative to the base case (13 percent in 2010 and 31 percent in 2020) due to the small shift to less carbon-intensive

fuels (specifically, cellulosic ethanol). By 2010, ethanol is contributing about 2 percent of transport fuel demand, and 4 percent in 2020. As in other biomass-intensive

industries, this enables the co-production of electricity, thereby increasing the carbon benefits of this measure to the extent that it displaces fossil-fuel derived electricity. Reduced fuel production also adds to the carbon benefits, because it reduces

emissions from refineries.

The cumulative investment to achieve these savings and greater utilization of renewable energy is $52 billion by 2010 and $213 billion by 2020 (discounted 1999$).

The transport efficiency measures result in net savings, because fuel cost savings

offset the slight increase in investment costs. These net savings more than offset

the cost of the transportation fuel carbon content standard—which is the only netcost transportation policy considered here. The overall net economic benefit achieved

by the entire set of transportation policies provides an opportunity to pursue the

carbon content standard, which begins a process of progressive technological improvement that is a critical element of obtaining the much deeper carbon emissions

reductions in the transport sector needed later.

5.3. Air Pollution Reductions

A variety of air pollutants, associated with the use of fossil fuels, can cause or

exacerbate health problems and damage the environment. Reducing use of fossil

fuels would reap important local health benefits by lowering the amount of air pollutants inhaled. Recent scientific findings confirm that pollutants such as fine particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone (formed by a mix of volatile organic compounds

and nitrogen oxides in presence of sunlight) can lead to health damages, including

premature death. Research shows that small children and the elderly are particularly at risk from these emissions (Dockery et al., 1993; Schwartz and Dockery,

1992).

The policies would reduce national, regional and local pollution, owing to reduced

fossil fuel use, providing important environmental benefits and health benefits, especially for small children and the elderly. Table 5.3 summarizes the impacts of the

policies on criteria air pollutant emissions. Sulfur-dioxide emissions are about 52

percent lower in 2010 than the Base case, and about 68 percent below 1990 levels.

Nitrogen oxides are 16 percent lower in 2010, and about 37 percent below 1990 levels. Particulates are about 13 percent lower in 2010, and about 24 percent below

1990 levels. Carbon monoxide emissions are about 9 percent lower in 2010, and

about 2 percent below 1990 levels. Finally, volatile organic compounds are about 7

percent lower in 2010, and about 33 percent below 1990 levels.

Table 5.3: Impact of policies on air pollutant emissions

2010 Base

Case

2010 Climate

Protection

2020 Base

Case

2020 Climate

Protection

CO .......................................................................... 65.1 69.8 63.8 71.8 59.8

NOx ........................................................................ 21.9 16.5 13.9 16.9 12.0

SO2 ........................................................................ 19.3 12.8 6.2 12.7 3.3

VOC ........................................................................ 7.7 5.5 5.1 5.9 4.9

PM10 ...................................................................... 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3

Figure 5.3 shows the impacts of the Climate Protection policies over time. The

large reductions in particulates emissions arise from the substantial decrease in coal

generation in the policy cases. Sulfur-dioxide decreases in the baseline projections

arising from the cap/trade provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, are

augmented by the policies. Similarly, baseline declines in nitrogen oxides, volatile

organic compounds and carbon monoxide, which arise from tailpipe emissions standards as new cars enter the fleet, are augmented by the policies that affect vehicle

travel patterns.

The reductions in nitrogen, sulfur, and carbon are similar to those introduced in

the Four Pollutant Bill currently before the House and the Senate. The Climate Protection scenario achieves the required levels of reduction a few years earlier (for carbon) or later (for nitrogen and sulfur) than the Four Pollutant Bill’s 2007 target

date, with substantially deeper reductions continuing thereafter.

47

5.4. Economic Impacts

The portfolio of policies and measures considered here is a very aggressive package that goes a long way toward meeting the U.S. Kyoto Protocol obligation and continues to reduce emissions beyond the initial target period. Despite the ambitiousness of this package and the impressive carbon impacts, it would bring net economic

benefits to the United States.

Figure 5.4 shows the benefits and costs at similar levels up to 2010 but benefits

significantly outpacing costs in later years, reflecting in part the longer term benefits of reduced costs as new technologies are commercialized and as the system adjusts to the new policies. The costs derive from additional investments in more efficient lighting, high efficiency motors, more efficient automobiles, and other technologies that reduce the reliance on high carbon fuels. The savings derive from the

avoided fuel costs. Both the additional investment and the net savings create additional income and jobs in the industries and services (and their suppliers) in which

these funds are spent.

Figures 5.5 (demand side policies) and 5.6 (supply side policies) provide additional

details regarding the costs effectiveness of the policies in 2010 and 2020. These figure indicate the allocation of costs and benefits between equipment investments and

fuel savings and between demand and supply sectors. The policies in the demand

sector, where large savings exist for energy efficiency measures, are very cost-effective, and yield substantial net benefits. Fuel and O&M savings are over 3 times the

investment costs the in 2010 and about two and half times in 2020, yielding cumulative discounted net benefits of $259 billion and $844 billion, respectively, in those

years.

48

49

On the other hand, the supply sector policies are not cost-effective on their own

and result in net costs. These costs, in capital, fuel, and O&M, are due to moving

from coal generation to cleaner fuels like renewables and natural gas. The result

is that cumulative discounted net costs for electric sector policies reach of $144 billion in 2010 and $268 billion in 2020.

When all policies are combined, the cumulative savings exceed the costs by $114

billion in 2010, and by 2020 the net benefits amount to approximately $576 billion.

While the savings estimated here are significant, they are relatively small in comparison to overall economic activity. For instance, the annual net savings in 2010

of $48 billion is a small fraction of the $13.2 trillion projected GDP in that year.

50

17These gases can be controlled interchangeably, using 100 year Global Warming Potentials

(GWP), so long as the total carbon-equivalents (Ce) are reduced to 93 percent of their baseline

levels. In contrast to the main three gases (CO2, CH4, and N2O), which have a 1990 base year,

the high GWP gases have a base year of 1995.

6. Achieving Kyoto

The foregoing analysis addressed policies to curb emissions of carbon dioxide from

energy use in the U.S. Energy-related CO2 emissions are the predominant source

of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions for the foreseeable future, and their reduction is

the central and ultimate challenge for protecting the climate. However, because of

its delayed and weak emissions mitigation policies heretofore, and delayed ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States may not be able to rely solely on energy sector policies and technologies to meet its Kyoto obligation of emissions 7 percent reduction below 1990 levels with no net economic cost. As our analysis has

shown, such efforts, if aggressively pursued, would slow our growth in energy sector

CO2 emissions from a projected 35 percent to 2.5 percent above 1990 levels by 2010

and still achieve a small net economic benefit. This would be a major accomplishment, but would still leave us 128 MtC/yr short of achieving a target of 1244 MtC/

yr by 2010, if the Kyoto target were confined only to the domestic energy sector.

A tighter carbon cap for the electric sector could increase domestic energy-related

emission reductions to meet the Kyoto requirement, but this would incur incremental costs that could eliminate the net benefit and lead to a modest overall net

cost.

Of course, there is more to the Kyoto agreement. The Kyoto targets cover six

gases—methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs),

hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) and carbon dioxide (CO2) . The

use of these gases is currently growing, due to the ongoing substitution of ozone depleting substances (ODS) with HFCs, and to a lesser extent, to growth in CH4 emissions from livestock and coal and natural gas systems, in N20 from fertilizer use,

and in PFC emissions from semiconductor manufacture (EPA, 2000).

The U.S. commitment requires emissions of all six gases, in aggregate, to be reduced to 7 percent below their baseline levels. 17 When all of the six ‘‘Kyoto gases’’

are considered, baseyear emissions amount to 1680 MtCe/yr, making the—7 percent

Kyoto reduction target equal to 1533 MtCe/yr, as shown in the third column of Figure 6.1. The projected 2010 emissions for all six gases is 2204 MtCe/yr (first column), thus the total required reduction is expected to be 672 MtCe/yr. The energyCO2 policies described in the previous sections yield 436 MtCe/yr in reductions by

2010 (second column), leaving the United States with 236 MtCe/yr additional reductions to achieve from other policies and measures.

51

18For instance, different accounting methods and rules have been considered regarding: a)

what constitutes a forest; b) which biotic pools and lands are counted; c) which activities are

considered eligible for crediting under Article 3.4; and d) uncertainties in measuring above and

below ground carbon stocks. 19See ‘‘Consolidated negotiating text proposed by the President’’, as revised June 18, 2001,

FCCC/CP/2001/2/Rev.1, http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/02r01.pdf

The Kyoto agreement provides us with several options for obtaining the additional

236 MtCe/yr of reductions. Two of these options involve domestic reductions: the

control of non-CO2 gases (‘‘multi-gas control’’) and the use of ‘‘sinks’’ or biotic sequestration, through the land use, land use change and forestry options allowed under

the Protocol. The other options involve obtaining credits and allowances from international sources. Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries can purchase credits and allowances through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation,

or Emissions Trading (ET) to offset domestic emissions exceeding our 7 percent reduction target. This section examines how we might meet the Kyoto target through

the use of these options, and what the costs and other implications might be.

6.1. Domestic options Article 3.3/3.4 and Sinks

GHG emissions and removals from land use and land use change and forestry

(LULUCF) are a subject of great controversy and scientific uncertainty. The Kyoto

Protocol treats LULUCF activities in two principal categories: afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation under Article 3.3, and ‘‘additional human-induced activities’’ such as forest and cropland management under Article 3.4. Different interpretations of these two articles can have widely varying impacts on the U.S. reduction

commitment. 18 For instance, the U.S. estimate of business-as-usual forest uptake

during the first commitment period is 288 MtCe/yr. If fully credited as an Article

3.4 activity, this uptake could provide credit equal to more than 40 percent of the

U.S. reduction requirement, with no actual mitigation effort. However, the vast majority of countries do not interpret the Protocol as allowing credit for business-asusual offsets, and therefore believe they should be excluded.

The starting point of our LULUCF analysis is the assumed adoption of the ‘‘consolidated negotiating text’’ of Jan Pronk, President [of COP6], as issued on June 18,

2001. 19 The so-called ‘‘Pronk text’’ reflects an attempted compromise among various

52

20Our assumption of Pronk conditions is a matter of ‘‘what if’’ analysis, rather than a tacit

approval. The Pronk text may be insufficient in a number of ways, but the analysis and critique

of the Pronk text is not the focus of this report. 21The Pronk text would prohibit first commitment period crediting of CDM projects that avoid

deforestation. 22This figure is drawn from the Annex Table 1 of the April 9 draft of the Pronk text, which

adopts Pronk adopts the accounting approach for Article 3.3. activities suggested by the IPCC

Special Report of LULUCF. This approach yields an Article 3.3 debit of 7 MtCe/yr from net

afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation activity, which under the Pronk approach could be

offset fully by undiscounted forest management activities. Thus the 42 MtCe/yr estimate is

based on 85 percent x (288—7) MtCe/yr. 23The Pronk proposal also allows this cap to be filled through afforestation and deforestation

activities in the CDM. 24Missfeldt and Haites (2001) use a central estimate of 50 MtCe/year at $7.50/tCe for CDM

afforestation and reforestation projects. They also assume the availability of 150 MtCe/year at

$15/tCe for Article 3.4 sinks in Annex B countries. Note however that the Pronk 85 percent discount on forest management projects would, in principle, increase their cost accordingly (by 1/

.15 or 6.7 times). However, given the relatively small quantity (6 MtCe) that could be purchased,

lower cost opportunities in cropland management or the CDM should more than suffice. 25USEPA (1999, 2000) expects voluntary Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) activities to reduce 2010 methane and high GWP gas emissions by about 10 percent and 15 percent, respectively, reductions that are not included in their 2010 projections shown in Table 1. Instead these

reductions are embodied in both their and our cost curves.

parties on a number of contentious issues. The most relevant here is the proposal

for Articles 3.3 and 3.4. 20 In short, the Pronk text would cap total U.S. crediting

from Article 3.4 activities and afforestation and reforestation projects in the CDM

and JI at roughly 58 MtCe/yr. 21 Domestic forest management activities would be

subject to an 85 percent discount. Thus, if one assumes the U.S. estimate above,

the Pronk rules would result in 42 MtCe/yr of essentially zero-cost credit for forest

management activities that are expected to occur anyway. 22 In addition, agricultural management (e.g. no-till agriculture, grazing land management, revegetation)

would be allowed under a net-net accounting approach that would allow the United

States to count another expected 10 MtCe/yr of business-as-usual, i.e. zero-cost,

credit toward the cap. In sum, the Pronk proposal translates to 52 MtCe/yr of ‘‘free’’ carbon removals, and another 6 MtCe/yr that could be accrued through new domestic forest or agricultural management activities. 23 Based on a recent summary of

LULUCF cost estimates, we assume that this relatively small amount of offsets

could be purchased for $10/tCe. 24 A total of 58 MtCe/yr of LULUCF credit would

therefore be available to help meet the reduction requirement of 236 MtCe/yr remaining after having adopted the energy-related CO2 policies described above.

Multi-gas control

Multi-gas control is a fundamental aspect of the Protocol, and its potential for

lowering the overall cost of achieving Kyoto targets has been the subject of several

prominent studies (Reilly et al, 1999 and 2000). Table 6.1 shows baseline and projected emission levels for the non-CO2 gases. 25

Table 6.1. Baseline and Projected Emissions for non-CO2 Kyoto Gases (MtCe/yr)

Gas

Base

Year

(1990/

95)

7 percent

Below

Base

Year

Projected

2010

Reductions

Required 1

Sources

Methane ....................................................... 170 158 186 28 (EPA 1999)

Nitrous Oxide ............................................... 111 103 121 18 (Reilly et al 1999b; EPA 2001a)

High GWP Gases (HFC, PFC, SF6) .............. 29 27 90 63 (EPA 2000)

Total .......................................... 310 288 397 109

1 These are the reductions that would be needed if each gas were independently required to be 7 percent below its base year level.

Methane emissions are expected to grow by only 10 percent from 1990 to 2010,

largely because of increased natural gas leakage and venting (due to increased consumption), enteric fermentation and anaerobic decomposition of manure (due to increased livestock and dairy production). Methane from landfills, which accounted for

37 percent of total methane emissions in 1990, are expected to decline slightly as

a consequence of the Landfill Rule of the Clean Air Act (EPA, 1999), which requires

all large landfills to collect and burn landfill gases.

Several measures could reduce methane emissions well below projected levels.

USEPA estimates that capturing the methane from landfills not covered by the

Landfill Rule, and using it to generate electricity, is economically attractive at

53

26The result is a cost curve that is similar and more up-to-date than that used in widely cited

multiple gas studies (Reilly et al, 1999a; Reilly et al, 1999b; EERE, 2000). 27A similar assumption is used by European Commission (1998). Approximately 15 percent

of N2O emissions are a byproduct of fuel combustion, largely by vehicles equipped with catalytic

converters (USEPA, 2001a). 28We assume that coal production is a proportional to coal use (i.e. we ignore net imports/

exports). USEPA expects that the marginal methane emissions rate will increase with production as an increasing fraction is expected to come from deeper underground mines (USEPA,

1999).

enough sites to reduce projected landfill emissions by 21 percent (USEPA, 1999). At

a cost of $30/tCe, the number of economically attractive sites increases sufficiently

that 41 percent of landfill emissions can be reduced. Similarly, USEPA has constructed methane reduction cost curves for reducing leaks and venting in natural

gas systems, recovering methane from underground mines, using anaerobic digesters to capture methane from manure. and reducing enteric fermentation by changing how livestock are fed and managed.

We have used a similar USEPA study to estimate the emissions reductions available for the high GWP gases (USEPA, 2000). Table 1 shows that the high-GWP

gases, while only a small fraction of baseline emissions (first column), are expected

to rise so rapidly that they will account for majority of net growth in non-CO2 emissions relative to the 7 percent reduction target (last column). In many applications,

other gases can be substituted for HFCs and PFCs, new industrial process can implemented, leaks can be reduced, and more efficient gas-using equipment can be installed. For instance, minor repairs of air conditioning and refrigeration equipment

could save an estimated 6.5 MtCe/yr in HFC emissions by 2010 at cost of about $2/

tCe. New cleaning processes for semiconductor manufacture could reduce PFC emissions by 8.6 MtCe/yr by 2010 at an estimated cost of about $17/tCe. In all, USEPA

identified 37 measures for reducing high GWP gases, a list which is likely to be far

from exhaustive given the limited experience with and data on abatement methods

for these gases.

The major source of nitrous oxide in the United States is the application of nitrogen fertilizers, which results in about 70 percent of current emissions. Given the

tendency of farmers to apply excess fertilizer to ensure good yields, effective strategies for N2O abatement from cropping practices has thus far been elusive. Thus,

aside from measures to reduce N2O from adipic and nitric acid production (amounting to less than one MtCe/yr), and from mobile sources as a result of transportation

policies (see below), we have not included a full analysis of N2O reduction opportunities (USEPA, 2001).

Relying largely on recent USEPA abatement studies (1999, 2000, 2001b), we developed the cost curve for reducing non-CO2 gases depicted in Figure 2 below. 26 In

addition to what is covered in the USEPA studies, we assumed that:

• Only 75 percent of the 2010 technical potential found in the USEPA studies

would actually be achieved, and that policies and programs needed to promote these

measures would add a transaction cost of $5/tCe.

• The savings in 2010 fossil fuel use resulting from the policies and measures

implemented in the energy sector will yield corresponding benefits for several categories of non-CO2 emissions. In particular, we assumed that a) reduced oil use in

the transport sector (down 14 percent) will lead to a proportional decrease in N2O

emissions from mobile sources 27; b) reduced natural gas demand (down 13 percent)

will result in proportionately fewer methane emissions from leaks and venting; and

c) reduced coal production (down 49 percent) will lead to decreased underground

mining and its associated emissions. 28

Figure 6.2 shows that domestic options, taken together, are insufficient to reaching the Kyoto target. The line on the left is the ‘‘supply curve’’ of non-CO2 abatement options, and the line on the right is the reduction requirement after both energy-related and Article 3.3/3.4 sinks are accounted for. Under current conditions

(only 9 years left until 2010), the supply of remaining domestic options appears insufficient to satisfy demand. This gap ranges from 107 MtCe/yr at $10/tCe to 60

MtCe/yr at $100/tCe as shown. Therefore, to meet our Kyoto obligations, we are now

in a situation of looking to the international market to fill this gap.

6.2 International options

The Kyoto Protocol creates are two principal types of greenhouse gas offsets in

the international market: the purchase of surplus allowances from countries that

are below their Kyoto targets and the creation of carbon credits through projectbased mechanisms, CDM and JI.

54

29A range of 100–350 MtCe/yr is cited in Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000. Missfeldt and Haites, 2001

use a base estimate of approximately 240 MtCe/yr, with high estimate of 480 MtCe/yr. For this

analysis, we assume the availability of 200 MtCe/yr, based on a recent analysis by Victor et al

(2001). 30Since these credits are a form of windfall credits, it has been suggested that these economies could help protect the environmental integrity of the agreement by dedicating the income

from ‘‘hot air’’ sales to energy projects that will bring about additional emissions reductions. 31CDM projects are required to be ‘‘additional’’ emissions reductions but rules have not been

agreed to which would determine what is additional. In addition, credits will be given based

on reductions in comparison to a baseline. A methodology for establishing baselines is also the

subject of ongoing negotiations.

Emissions allowance trading/hot air

The combination of emission targets based on circa 1990 emissions and the subsequent restructuring and decline of many economies in transition (EITs) means that

these countries could have a large pool of excess emissions allowances, typically referred to as ‘‘hot air’’. Estimates of available hot air during the first commitment

period range from under 100 MtCe/yr to nearly 500 MtCe/yr, largely from Russia

and Ukraine. 29 This source of offsets could fulfill a significant fraction of the U.S.

demand for additional reductions at very low cost (depending upon the level of competing demands of other Annex 1 parties for these allowances). 30 We assume however, that relevant actors in government and/or private sector charged with meeting

emissions obligations will effectively limit the use of hot air. Relying heavily or entirely on hot air would be poor climate policy; as hot air supplants legitimate mitigation activity. It is also bad public relations; hot air has a stigma arising from years

of negotiations controversy. Therefore, we assume that hot air will constitute no

more than 50 percent of all international trading, and we assume a maximum availability of 200 MtCe/yr, based on a recent analysis (Victor et al, 2001).

CDM and JI

CDM and JI projects, can be an important part of a comprehensive climate policy,

providing they truly contribute to sustainable development in the host countries and

create genuine, additional GHG benefits. It is reasonable to expect that the U.S.

Government and other stakeholders will want to develop the CDM and JI market

in order to involve developing countries, engage in technology transfer, develop competitive advantages, and prepare for future commitment periods.

With the rules yet to be established on critical issues like additionality and baselines for CDM 31,and with a limited understanding of CDM/JI markets and transaction costs at high volumes of activity, cost and volume estimates for CDM and JI

remain highly speculative. As with all GHG mitigation analysis exercises, both bottom-up and top-down methods can be used to develop such estimates. We have examined the data and literature for both approaches in coming up with a rough, aggregate cost curve for CDM and JI.

A bottom-up CDM/JI cost assessments can examine emerging project-based GHG

trading markets—private broker transactions, the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF),

the Dutch ERUPT program, GEF activity, and so on—to get a sense of current ‘‘realVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
55

32For instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that the current international GHG emission credit market is at about $25 million in transactions per year. In addition the PCF and ERUPT

have committed another $225 million over the next few years. This figure compares with the

$10–20 billion/year market (about 400–500 MtCe/year at $20–40/tCe) that some analysts project

under CDM alone (Missfeldt and Haites, 2001). 33The EPPA and GTEM figures are drawn from the CERT model described in Grutter, 2001.

The EPPA scenario used here includes only CO2, while the GTEM scenario includes all gases.

All of these studies exclude sinks, which is largely consistent with the implications of the Pronk

proposal.

world’’ prices and transaction costs. However, the size of this market remains very

small in comparison with the total flows that are likely once CDM and JI are underway. 32 The type of activities being undertaken today, such as the first PCF project,

a landfill gas capture effort in Latvia, could well represent ‘‘lowhanging fruit’’ that

would be unable to supply the several hundreds MtCe/yr of CDM and JI activity

that are expected under some Kyoto compliance scenarios (Missfeldt and Haites,

2001; Grubb and Vrolijk, 2000).

To get a better sense of the costs of projects available at higher volumes, these

‘‘early project’’ estimates can be combined with non-Annex B ‘‘country studies’’—the

many national GHG abatement studies performed with support from UNEP, UNDP,

U.S. Country Studies, and other bilateral and national programs. A study by the

Dutch Energy Foundation (ECN, et al., 1999) provides a good example of such an

analysis. Extrapolating from GEF projects along with 25 country studies, this study

found that 440 MtCe/yr of non-Annex 1 reductions could be available at less than

$22/tCe.

However, the uncertainty related to these bottom-up studies is fundamentally

quite high. National studies typically exclude a significant number of abatement options due to sheer lack of data, resources, or necessity. At the same time, abatement

costing studies may understate transaction and barrier removal costs, especially

those specific to CDM and JI projects. For instance, transaction costs for project

preparation, baselines, certification, and monitoring and evaluation could also

change from current levels, once the CDM and JI markets take off and clear rules

are established. Finally, the ultimate approach adopted for deciding on project

additionality and baselines could have a major impact on the size and shape of the

market.

Similarly, the possibility of limited crediting lifetimes, or discounting of carbon reductions in future projects years, as proposed by some, could increase the effective

cost per tCe. In a recent analysis, Bernow et al. (2000) illustrated how different approaches to standardizing baselines could lead to differences in additional power

sector activity (tCe) of a factor of 4. These types of considerations are rarely included in CDM/JI analyses, either bottom-up or top-down.

Many climate policy assessments rely on CDM and JI cost curves developed by

a handful of ‘‘top-down’’ modelers. Ellerman and Decaux (1998) applied the MITEPPA computable general equilibrium model to develop parameterized cost curves

for five non-Annex 1 regions, which have since been widely used (Reilly et al, 1999;

Haites, 2000; Krause et al, 2001; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Grutter, 2001). Applications of the ABARE-GTEM model have been used in a similar manner (Vrolijk

and Grubb, 2000; Grutter, 2001; EMF, 1999). While compared with bottom-up studies, the EPPA and GTEM model runs provide more comprehensive assessments of

reduction potential and cost from an economy-wide perspective, they do a poorer job

of reflecting the dynamics of project-based investments.

It turns out that the GTEM, EPPA, and bottom-up ECN studies, do yield rather

similar results. At $20/tCe, the total CDM potential under the GTEM run is 470

MtCe/yr, while under EPPA it is 480 MtCe/yr, and as noted above, and for ECN

et al (1999), the figure is closer to 440 MtCe/yr. 33 Given the small differences, we

adopt the GTEM results, since they provide a fuller CDM curve, include multiple

gases, and provide a cost curve for JI investments as well.

6.3 Combining the options

There are two ways to combine the available options to meet our Kyoto target.

We can prioritize which options to rely on more heavily, based on their strategic advantages and co-benefits, as we have done for energy/CO2 policies. Or we can simply

seek lowest-cost solution for the near term. A long-term climate policy perspective

argues for the former approach. For example, rules and criteria for JI, and especially CDM, should be designed so that additionality, sustainability, and technology

transfer are maximized. Ideally, our cost curves for CDM and JI would reflect only

56

34We did briefly examine the potential contribution of a CDM fast track for renewables and

efficiency, as embodied in the Pronk text. Applying the power sector CDM model developed by

Bernow et al (2001), we found that a carbon price of $20/tCe would induce only 3 MtCe/yr of

new renewable energy project activity by 2010. At a price of $100/tCe, this amount rises to 18

MtCe/yr. Given that a large technical potential for energy efficiency projects exists at low or negative cost per tCe, fast track efficiency projects (under 5 MW useful energy equivalents according to Pronk text) could significantly increase the amount available at lower costs. 35For the estimated demand for CDM, JI, and ET/hot air from other Annex 1 parties, we used

a combination of EPPA and GTEM cost curves.35 (Reilly et al, 1999b, and Ellerman and

Decaux, 1998; Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000; Grutter, 2001). 36Our approach is similar to that used in a few other recent studies (Grutter, 2001; Haites,

2000; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Krause et al, 2001; Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000). 37The market clearing price is lower here than in other similar studies, due in large part to

a much lower U.S. demand for international trade, which results from of our aggressive pursuit

of domestic abatement options and the fact that we assume that domestic policies and investments should be done as a matter of sound energy and environmental policy (i.e. they are priceinelastic).

investments that are consistent with those criteria. However, our current ability to

reflect such criteria in quantitative estimates of CDM and JI potential is limited. 34

It is possible to model priority investment in the domestic reductions of non-CO2

gases by implementing some measures that are higher cost than the global market

clearing carbon price. Just as energy/CO2 measures like a Renewable Portfolio

Standard can be justified by the technological progress, long-term cost reductions,

other co-benefits that they induce, so too can some non-CO2 measures. While we

have not attempted to evaluate specific policies for nonCO2 gases as we have for

CO2, we have picked a point on the non-CO2 cost curve, $100/tCe, to reflect an emphasis on domestic action. At $100/tCe, domestic non-CO2 measures can deliver 118

MtCe/yr of reductions, still about 60 MtCe/yr short of the Kyoto goal, to which we

must turn to the international market.

To model the global emissions trading market, we used the CDM/JI cost curves,

and hot air assumptions described above, together with assumptions regarding the

demand for credits and allowances from all Annex B parties. 35 This model yields

market-clearing prices and quantities for each of the three principal flexible mechanisms: CDM, JI, and ET/hot air. 36 The results are shown in Table 6.2.

The first row of the table shows that 93 MtCe/yr are available at net savings or

no net cost, over half from the non-additional or ‘‘anyways’’ forest management and

other Article 3.4 sinks activities implicit in the Pronk text. Another 77 MtCe/yr of

non-CO2 gas savings are available as we climb the cost curve from $0–100/tC (second row). The net result is that nearly $1.8 billion per year is invested in technologies and practices to reduce non-CO2 GHG emissions by 118 MtCe/yr in 2010.

Another $60 million per year is directed toward the 6 MtCe/yr of expected additional

sinks projects allowed under the Pronk proposal. The third row shows that of the

60 MtCe/yr of international trading, half comes from CDM projects, and much of the

rest from hot air. The model we use estimates a market-clearing price of about $8/

tCe for this 60 MtC/yr of purchased credits and allowance, amounting to a total annual cost of less than $500 million. 37

Table 6.2: Reductions available in 2010 up from various sources (in MtCe)

Domestic Options International Trade

Total Non-CO2

gases Sinks CDM JI Hot air(ET)

Amount available at < or = $0/tCe (MtCe) .................... 41 52 .............. .............. .............. 93

Amount available at $0-$100 (MtCe) .............................. 77 6 .............. .............. .............. 83

Amount available at $8 (MtCe) ....................................... .............. .............. 30 6 25 60

Annual costs ($Million) .................................................... $1,783 $60 $235 $48 $196 $2,322

In summary, of the 672 MtCe/yr in total reductions needed to reach Kyoto by

2010, nearly 65 percent comes from energy sector CO2 reduction policies, 18 percent

from domestic non-CO2 gas abatement, 9 percent from domestic sinks, and 9 percent

from the international market. The net economic benefits deriving from the energyrelated carbon reductions reach nearly $50 billion/yr in 2010. The total annual cost

for the 35 percent of 2010 reductions coming those last three options—non-CO2 control, sinks, and international trading—is estimated at approximately $2.3 billion,

making the total package a positive economic portfolio by a large margin. Had we

taken the other approach noted at the beginning of the section—aiming for the lowest near-term compliance cost—we would rely more heavily on international trading.

57

We modeled this scenario, and found that it would nearly double the amount of

international trading, and lower the overall annual cost to $0.9 billion, and reduce

the amount of non-CO2 control by over 40 percent. This additional benefit is minor

in comparison to the economic and environmental benefits of the entire policy portfolio.

7. Conclusions

This study shows that the United States can achieve its carbon reduction target

under the Kyoto Protocol—7 percent below 1990 levels for the first budget period

of the Protocol. Relying on national policies and measures for greenhouse gas reductions, and accessing the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol for a small portion of its total reductions, the United States would enjoy net economic savings as

a result of this Climate Protection package. In order to achieve these reductions,

policies should be implemented as soon as possible to accelerate the shift away from

carbon-intensive fossil fuels and toward energy efficient equipment and renewable

sources of energy. Such action would lead to carbon emission reductions of about

24 percent by 2010 relative to the Base Case, bringing emissions to about 2.5 percent above 1990 levels. Furthermore, emissions of other pollutants would also be reduced, thus improving local air quality and public health.

Adopting these policies at the national level through legislation will not only help

America meet its Kyoto targets but will also lead to economic savings for consumers,

as households and businesses would enjoy annual energy bill reductions in excess

of their investments. These net annual savings would increase over time, reaching

nearly $113 per household in 2010 and $375 in 2020. The cumulative net savings

would be about $114 billion (present value 1999$) through 2010 and $576 through

2020.

Greenhouse emissions in the United States are now about 15 percent higher than

they were in 1990. Together with the looming proximity of the first budget period,

and a realistic start date no earlier than 2003 for the implementation of the national policies, reductions in energy-related carbon would have to be augmented by

other greenhouse gas reduction options in order to reach the Kyoto target. In total,

the Climate Protection case in 2010 includes 436 Mtc/yr energy-related carbon reductions, 58 MtC/yr domestic land-based carbon reductions, 118 MtC/yr reductions

in domestic non-carbon greenhouse gases, and 60 MtC/yr in allowances purchased

through the ‘‘flexibility mechanisms’’ of the Kyoto Protocol.

While implementing this set of policies and additional non-energy related measures is an ambitious undertaking, it represents an important transitional strategy

to meet the long-term requirements of climate protection. It builds the technological

and institutional foundation for much deeper long-term emission reductions needed

for climate protection. Such actions would stimulate innovation and invention here

in the United States while positioning the United States as a responsible international leader in meeting the global challenge of climate change.

8. List of References

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Bernow, S., S. Kartha, M. Lazarus and T. Page, 2000. Free-Riders and the Clean

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Brown, Rich, Carrie Webber, and Jon Koomey, 2000. ‘‘Status and Future Directions

of the ENERGY STAR Program,’’ In Proceedings of the 2000 ACEEE Summer

Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings, 6.33–43. Washington, DC.: American

Council for an EnergyEfficient Economy.

Clean Air Task Force, 2000. Death, Disease, & Dirty Power: Mortality and Health

Damages due to Air Pollution from Power Plants, October.

DeCicco, John, Feng An, and Marc Ross, 2001. Technical Options for Improving the

Fuel Economy of U.S. Cars and Light Trucks by 2010–2015, Washington, DC.:

American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy.

Dockery, D., Pope, C., Xu, X., Spengler, J., Ware, J., Fay, M., Ferris, B., and

Speizer, F., 1993. An Association between Air Pollution and Mortality in Six

U.S., Cities, The New England Journal of Medicine 329 (24): 1753–9.

ECN, SEI-B, and AED, 1999. Potential and Cost of Clean Development Mechansim

Options in the Energy Sector. Inventory of options in the non-Annex I Countries to reduce GHG emissions. ECN, The Netherlands.

EERE, 2000. Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future, Prepared by the Interlaboratory

Working Group on Energy-Efficient and Clean-Energy Technologies, Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.

58

EIA, 2001a. Annual Energy Outlook 2001 with Projections to 2020. U.S. Department

of Energy, Washington D.C.

EIA, 2001b. U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Energy Sources, 2000 Flash Estimate. U.S. Department of Energy. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/flash/

sld001.htm

Ellerman, A.D. and A. Decaux, 1998. Analysis of Post-Kyoto Emissions Trading

Using Marginal Abatement Curves, MIT Joint Program on the Science and

Policy of Global Change Report No. 40, October, Cambridge, MA.

EMF 1999. ‘‘The costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A multi-model evaluation.’’ 16th Energy

Modeling Forum, The Energy Journal, Special Issue.

EPA, 2001. ‘‘The Power of Partnerships, Climate Protection Partnerships Division,

Achievements for 2000-In Brief.’’ Washington, DC.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

European Commission, 1998. Options to Reduce Nitrous Oxide Emissions (Final Report): A report produced for DGXI by AEA Technology Environment, November. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/climate—change/nitrous—oxide—emissions.pdf

Grutter, J. 2001. World Market for GHG Emission Reductions: An analysis of the

World Market for GHG abatement, factors and trends that influence it based

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Harvey, R. and F. de la Chesnaye, 2000. ‘‘The Potential for Cost-Effective Reductions of NonCarbon Dioxide Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States’’

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IPCC 2001. Climate Change 2000, Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate

Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report

of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge/New York.

Krause, F., Baer, P., DeCanio, S. 2001. Cutting Carbon Emissions at a Profit: Opportunities for the U.S., International Project For Sustainable Energy Paths,

El Cerrito, California, April. www.ipsep.org

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Trucks, Cambridge, Mass.: Union of Concerned Scientists.

Missfeldt, F., and E. Haites. forthcoming 2001, The Potential Contribution of Sinks

to Meeting Kyoto Protocol Commitments.

Nadel, Steven and Marty Kushler. 2000. ‘‘Public Benefit Funds: A Key Strategy for

Advancing Energy Efficiency.’’ The Electricity Journal. Oct., pp. 74–84.

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www/rpt45.html)

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USEPA, 1999. U.S. Methane Emissions 1990—2020: Inventories, Projections, and

Opportunities for Reductions, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of

Air and Radiation, September. http://www.epa.gov/ghginfo.

USEPA, 2000. Estimates of U.S. Emissions of High-Global Warming Potential Gases

and the Costs of Reductions, Review Draft, Reid Harvey, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, March. http://www.epa.gov/

ghginfo.

USEPA, 2001a. Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:

1990—1999. EPA, Washington, DC, September, 2001.

USEPA, 2001b. Draft U.S. Nitrous Oxide Emissions 1990–2020: Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions. EPA, Washington, DC, September,

2001.

USEPA, 2001c. Draft Addendum to the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990–2020: Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions Report. EPA, Washington, DC, October, 2001.

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Victor, David G., Nakicenovic, Nebojsa, and Victor, Nadejda, 2001, ‘‘The Kyoto Protocol Emission Allocations: Windfall Surpluses for Russia and Ukraine,’’ Climatic Change 49 (3):263–277, May 2001

Vrolijk, C., Grubb, M. 2000. Quantifying Kyoto: How will COP–6 decisions affect the

market? Report of a workshop organized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK, in association with: Institute for Global Environmental

Strategies, Japan; World Bank National Strategies Studies Program on JI

and CDM; National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, Netherlands; Erik Haites, Canada; and Mike Toman, U.S. on 30–31 August 2000,

Chatham House, London.

APPENDIX 1: ENERGY AND CARBON SUMMARIES

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61

62

63

64

65

66

APPENDIX 2. MODELING GLOBAL CARBON MARKETS

We first construct an aggregate Annex 1 demand curve for international emissions

reductions from CDM, JI, and ET/hot air. This demand curve represents how short,

at a given price, Annex 1 countries are from meeting their Kyoto target using only

domestic options (energy sector CO2, non-CO2 gas, and Article 3.3/3.4options). We

can then compare this demand curve with the supply curve for CDM, JI, and ET/

hot air (based on the assumptions described above) to find the market-clearing price.

Our approach is similar to that used in a few other recent studies (Grutter, 2001;

Haites, 2000; Missfeldt and Haites, 2001; Krause et al, 2001; Vrolijk and Grubb,

2000).

To create the Annex 1 demand curve, we combine a U.S. demand curve—the ‘‘additional required reductions’’ line in Figure 6.2 minus the cost curve or amount

available from non-CO2 measures at a given price—with estimated demand for

CDM, JI, and ET/hot air from other Annex 1 parties, excluding EITs. We estimate

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38The first scenario is based on EPPA cost curves (Reilly et al, 2000 and Ellerman and

Decaux, 1998) and RIIA 1990 emission estimates (Vrolijk and Grubb, 2000), and yields an estimated 2010 demand from Annex II countries of 507 MtC. The second scenario uses GTEM results and assumed 1990 emissions reported via personal communication from the model developers, and yields an estimated 2010 demand from Annex II countries of 344 MtC. As found in

Grutter (2001).

the non-US demand using a combination of EPPA and GTEM cost curves. 38 There

is a resulting asymmetry in this approach, since the non-US cost curves we use do

not embody the aggressive pursuit of domestic energy sector reductions found in our

analysis for the United States. As a result the total demand for and use of international trading, as well as the resulting market clearing price, is significantly higher than it would be were we to have looked at a similarly aggressive approach in

all Annex 1 countries. The result is shown in the figure at right.

A PARTIAL LISTING OF STUDIES SHOWING A POSITIVE ECONOMIC BENEFIT FROM AN

INNOVATION-LED CLIMATE STRATEGY

Barrett, James P., J. Andrew Hoerner, Steve Bernow, and Bill Dougherty, 2002.

Clean Energy and Jobs: A Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change and

Energy Policy, Center for a Sustainable Economy, Washington, DC.

Bernow, Stephen, Karlynn Cory, William Dougherty, Max Duckworth, Sivan

Kartha, Michael Ruth, 1999. America’s Global Warming Solutions, Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund.

Energy Innovations, 1997. Energy Innovations: A Prosperous Path to a Clean Environment. Washington, DC: Alliance to Save Energy, American Council for an

Energy-Efficient Economy, Natural Resources Defense Council, Tellus Institute, and Union of Concerned Scientists.

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Geller, Howard, Stephen Bernow, and William Dougherty, 1999. Meeting America’s Kyoto Protocol Target: Policies and Impacts, Washington, DC: American

Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, November.

Hanson, Donald, and Skip Laitner, 2000. ‘‘An Economic Growth Model of Investment, Energy Savings, and CO2 Reductions: An Integrated Analysis of Policies that Increase Investments in Advanced Efficient/Low-Carbon Technologies,’’ by Proceedings of the 93rd Air & Waste Management Association

Annual Meeting, Salt Lake City, June 18-22, 2000.

Interlaboratory Working Group on Energy-Efficient and Clean-Energy Technologies,

2000. Scenarios for a Clean Energy Future, prepared for Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, U.S. Department of Energy.

Koomey, Jonathan G., R. Cooper Richey, Skip Laitner, Robert J. Markel, and Chris

Marnay, 2001. ‘‘Technology and greenhouse gas emissions: An integrated scenario analysis using the LBNL-NEMS model,’’. In Richard Howarth and Darwin Hall, editors, Beyond a Doubling: Issues in the Long-term Economics of

Climate Change, Elsevier Publishing.

Laitner, John A. ‘‘Skip’’, Stephen Bernow and John DeCicco, 1998. ‘‘Employment

and Other Macroeconomic Benefits of an Innovation-Led Climate Strategy for

the United States,’’ Energy Policy. Volume 26, Number 5, pages 425-432.

April.

Laitner, Skip, Kathleen Hogan, and Donald Hanson, 1999. ‘‘Technology and Greenhouse Gas Emissions: An Integrated Analysis of Policies that Increase Investments in Cost Effective Energy-Efficient Technologies,’’ Proceedings of the

Electric Utilities Environment Conference, Tucson, AZ, January.

Laitner, John A. ‘‘Skip’’, 1997. ‘‘WYMIWYG (What You Measure is What You Get):

The Benefits of Technology Investment as a Climate Change Policy,’’ a paper

given to the 18th Annual North American Conference of the USAEE/IAEE,

San Francisco, CA. September 7-10.

Peters, Irene, Stephen Bernow, Rachel Cleetus, John A. (‘‘Skip’’) Laitner, Aleksandr

Rudkevich, and Michael Ruth, 2001. ‘‘A Pragmatic CGE Model for Assessing

the Influence of Model Structure and Assumptions in Climate Change Policy

Analysis,’’ in Lawrence A. Kreiser, editor, Critical Issues in International Environmental Taxation, CCH Incorporated, Chicago, IL..

Sanstad, Alan H., Stephen J. DeCanio, and Gale A. Boyd, 2000. ‘‘Estimating Bounds

on the Economy-Wide Effects of the CEF Policy Scenarios,’’ Energy Policy 29

(2001) 1299- 1311.

Tellus Institute, 1997. Policies and Measures to Reduce CO2 Emissions in the

United States: An Analysis of Options for 2005 and 2010. Boston, MA: Tellus

Institute.

Senator JEFFORDS. There is no question that we must be concerned with threats of today, like the thousands of people dying

prematurely every year from power plant pollution. But we cannot

let the press of quarterly reports or the hunt for short-term profits

prevent us from acting to reduce the threats of tomorrow. That is

especially true in the case of terrorism or global warming where we

have been presented with credible information about the threats.

As some of my colleagues know, I have a special interest in the

U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification and pressed hard for its

ratification. Senator Helms was instrumental in moving that treaty

and I want to thank him for his work and that of his staff in helping me and others get that agreement approved. That treaty addressed land degradation in some of the most impoverished areas

of the world. It is designed to encourage participatory democracy

and stakeholder involvement. I look forward to seeing the implementation of that treaty.

I have an interest in ratifying and implementing the Convention

on Persistent Organic Pollutants. I have introduced legislation

maintaining the spirit of that treaty, and I hope we will be able

to get that moving as soon as the U.S. can participate in the ‘‘Conference of Parties’’ and the review committee.

There seems to be a general good news regarding chemicals that

harm the ozone layer. From all indications, the Montreal Protocol

69

has been a success, though I gather there are some additional

amendments coming soon. I will be interested to learn how our efforts have reduced that ozone hole.

There is less clear news on the status of the Convention of Biologic Diversity, which was signed in 1993 but which has been not

sent to the Senate for confirmation and ratification.

I would also appreciate hearing an update from our witnesses on

the progress made toward the implementation of the Basel Convention regarding the International Transportation of Hazardous

Waste.

Finally, I would note something that is a little different between

international agreements and our more conventional environmental

laws. They often seem to be missing performance criteria or include

very weak commitments. Unfortunately, in the case of climate

change, even when commitments are minimal, such as reporting on

the policies and measures we have adopted and achieved in 1990

levels, we have failed. So I would urge our negotiators to push for

more specific environmental laws using targets and timetables.

That will make it easier for the Senate to know whether the treaties we have ratified are succeeding. Also, I believe the result will

be better for the environment and sustainable development.

I want to thank you for being with us here today. I now turn to

my good co-chairman friend, Senator Sarbanes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Senator Jeffords. I am

very pleased to join my colleague, Senator Jeffords, in this joint

hearing between the Environment and Public Works Committee

and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the very important

issue of the review of the implementation of environmental treaties.

Senator Jeffords, as we all well know, has been a very strong advocate of the need to protect our environment across the range of

issues. I certainly want at the very outset to thank him for his

leadership. The country, not just the country, in a sense the world,

and I am going to make reference to this later, these environmental issues know no national boundaries, and we are all extremely grateful to him.

I also want to thank him for suggesting this idea of a joint hearing undertaken by the two committees. Joint hearings can I think

provide a useful opportunity to examine issues that cut across committee jurisdiction, and I think they also serve to encourage Members of Congress as well as the Administration and private sector

to think about the wider implications of the issues with which we

are wrestling. That is obviously one of our purposes here today.

Treaties are often negotiated over many months, indeed, even

longer, and in many cases in a very painstaking way. So when they

come into force many people heave a sigh of relief that the process

has been completed. Of course, we review the treaties in the Foreign Relations Committee and we try to carefully examine them,

and then once we ratify them we think well that is over and done

with. But the fact of the matter is that once the treaty is ratified,

the process has only begun. And what really matters, in addition

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to adopting the treaty to begin with, is how governments, including

our own, actually implement the treaties.

This hearing will examine a number of environmental treaties

that the United States has ratified. Just to mention a few, the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild

Flora and Fauna, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, and the U.N. Convention to Combat

Desertification, which Senator Jeffords made reference to. I do not

think that treaty would ever have been approved but for his efforts.

We will ask witnesses from the Administration and private sector specialists for their appraisal of our Government’s implementation of these various treaties. For example:

Are we living up to our commitments under these treaties?

Are we providing sufficient resources, both financial and technical, to help developing countries meet their commitments under

these treaties?

What are the success stories?

Where are we falling short, and what can be done to ensure that

we do a better job?

What are the international ramifications of a failure on our part

to meet our commitments under these treaties?

I look forward to hearing our witnesses address some of these

important questions.

The protection of the environment is something that I think we

have come to understand is a matter of the first priority, hopefully

here in the Congress, certainly across the country. In fact, I am inclined to think that the country is often ahead of the Congress and

ahead of the Administration on this very important issue. Not only

do we have an obligation to ensure that our Government is honoring its environmental commitments, but we should encourage our

Government to play a leading role in assisting others around the

world to help them meet their commitments. We constantly brag

that we are first, and we ought to be first in this regard, as well

as in other respects.

Environmental problems, as we all know, have no boundaries. An

environmental problem halfway around the globe can have adverse

consequences for our own families here in the United States. Similarly, an environmental problem here in this country can affect the

lives of millions of people overseas. The Chernobyl nuclear accident, to take but one example, had consequences far, far beyond

the boundaries of where the event occurred.

So I think this is an important joint effort here by the two committees and I want to again thank Senator Jeffords for suggesting

this. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.

Mr. Chairman, I ought to say at the outset, because of my involvement in the other bill to which you made reference, I do not

know that I am going to be able to stay through the morning but

I certainly wanted to be here at the outset. I may have to leave,

maybe I can get back. But this is certainly a very important initiative and I thank you for it.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you for being here. Your presence

makes this a much more rewarding situation for the hearing, but

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I do understand that you have got a few little problems you are

dealing with.

Senator CHAFEE.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much, Senator Jeffords, for

holding the hearing. As Senator Sarbanes said, certainly the world

is looking at us as to how we are going to act on these treaties and

are we going to be a responsible member of the global community

on these environmental issues which have such immense ramifications for future generations.

We hold a certain place in the world after the fall of the Berlin

Wall and are kind of at the top of the heap. With that comes enormous responsibility. We have to exercise it on these treaties that

have been negotiated over many, many months. It is my thought

that we have the responsibility to protect our world for future generations. And whether it is global warming or desertification or the

health of our fisheries, the onus is on us. Everybody is looking at

us to see, are we going to be a leader? Are we going to be a country

that all around the world people look at and say they are doing the

right thing, they are protecting these valuable resources? That not

only are they consuming resources at an enormous rate in the

United States of America, but they are looking ahead and trying

to do the right thing for many, many generations.

So thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing

today.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you, Senator Chafee. It is a pleasure

to have you with us.

Now on our first panel the first witness is John F. Turner, the

Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State,

Washington, DC, and the other member of our panel is Mr. James

Connaughton, Chair of the White House Council on Environmental

Quality, Washington, DC.

Welcome. It is a pleasure to have you with us.

Mr. Turner, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. TURNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. TURNER. Chairman Jeffords, Chairman Sarbanes, Senator

Chafee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today

with my colleague, Jim Connaughton, to review the U.S. implementation of some important environmental treaties initiatives.

I believe the United States has a strong record on global environmental issues. And as one who has been involved in conservation

most of my career, I want to pause and thank each one of you for

the dedication and commitment, leadership you have given to domestic and international environmental affairs. But I am proud of

the leadership our country has shown to spearhead the negotiation

agreements and their subsequent implementation on issues ranging from ozone depletion to stemming illegal trade in endangered

72

species. As an example of this continuing leadership, the President

just recently submitted to the Senate an important treaty between

the United States and Russia that would strengthen the conservation of our shared polar bear resources.

The State Department plays an important role in negotiating, coordinating, and monitoring the implementation of environmental

agreements and then working through the interagency and international processes to ensure U.S. interests are served. Often, however, as you realize, other agencies within our Government are actually responsible for implementation of some of these treaties.

In addition to my written statement submitted for the record, I

would just like to briefly describe our efforts related to five agreements the United States currently is implementing.

First, the Montreal Protocol. As you are aware, during the

1980’s, indeed, the United States led a global effort to negotiate an

agreement to phaseout the production and consumption of substances that deplete the ozone layer and threaten human health

with the deliberating effects of skin cancer and cataracts. Over the

last 15 years, the implementation of the Protocol and its subsequent amendments have yielded remarkable progress in protecting

the stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out much of the consumption and use of ozone depleting substances on a global scale. The

protocol does include a multilateral fund to provide financial and

technical assistance to developing countries to assist them in meeting their own obligations under the treaty. As the largest contributor to the fund, the United States has made available over $350

million to the fund since the beginning.

The second treaty I would like to discuss is the Convention on

International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

Flora, known as CITES. CITES conservation goals are to restrict

international trade in endangered species, and assist countries toward a sustainable management of species through international

trade.

CITES Parties regulate wildlife trade through controls and regulations on species listed in three distinct appendices. In addition,

each Party must appoint a CITES management authority and scientific authority. Of course, for the United States it is the Fish and

Wildlife Service at the Department of Interior that provides us

with the management authority and scientific authority for CITES.

That agency also plays a major law enforcement role in its implementation.

With regard to implementation, the U.S. implements CITES primarily through regulations developed under the Endangered Species Act and also under the Lacey Act. The United States is proud

of its record in implementing CITES. We are at the forefront of

CITES Parties in fulfilling these obligations.

Third, I would like to just briefly touch on the U.N. Framework

Convention on Climate Change, which I know you are very interested in. The Framework Convention creates a broad global framework for addressing the challenge of climate change. My colleague,

Jim Connaughton, will discuss the overall approach of this Administration to address this serious global challenge. Let me just briefly refer to a portion of this strategy where I believe the United

States is demonstrating superb leadership.

73

In the two major announcements of President Bush on our policy

regarding global climate change, he committed us to intensifying

efforts with other nations to address the challenge of climate

change. Toward this end, the United States has initiated a series

of bilateral climate change relationships with important partners,

including, and I would like to mention them, Australia, Central

America, the European Union, Canada, China, India, Italy, and

Japan. We have discussions underway on additional relationships

with Brazil, Mexico, Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa,

and the Ukraine. Including the U.S.’ participation, these relationships would represent 78 percent of the total greenhouse gas emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels around the world.

Fourth, let me just mention the North American Agreement on

Environmental Cooperation, commonly referred to as the NAFTA

environmental side agreement. This serves as an important framework for cooperation among the three North American governments on a wide range of environmental efforts. Among other

things, the NAFTA side agreement established the Commission on

Environmental Cooperation, the CEC, which coordinates such cooperation.

This agreement has promoted strong cooperation among the

three countries on a number of important environmental issues,

achieved primarily through the implementation of the CEC work

program funded at the level of $9 million annually where each

party contributes equally. These include the promotion of enforcement and compliance with environmental laws, protecting children’s environmental health, protecting animal species that migrate throughout North America, and minimizing the use of persistent toxic chemicals such as DDT.

Fifth, and last, Mr. Chairman, let me just touch on the U.N.

Convention to Combat Desertification, CCD. Indeed, I would like to

thank you, Senator Jeffords, for your leadership in the ratification

of this important global measure. As you are aware, this Convention arose out of the 1992 Earth Summit. The purpose of the Convention is to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of

drought on arid and semi-arid lands through effective local, national, regional, and global action.

The Convention’s central objective is to promote the sustainable

use of dry lands worldwide, but especially in Africa, and to make

more efficient use of aid resources, thereby helping to solve Africa’s

and other affected regions’ chronic hunger problems and availability of fresh water. Many of the principles used in the U.S. over

the past 70 years have been incorporated in the language of the

CCD.

In conclusion, let me observe that while significant progress in

protecting the environment has been made, we are all aware that

enormous challenges lie ahead. And as you have noted, Chairman

Jeffords, the upcoming World Summit on Sustainability in Johannesburg, South Africa, provides the United States with a unique

opportunity to take stock of our past accomplishments and to build

on them in helping to advance economic and social environmental

stewardship.

We have learned a great deal since Rio. WSSD gives the United

States a chance again to demonstrate its leadership, to create a

74

new paradigm that stresses sound economic policy, national capacity for good governance, anti-corruption, transparency, the role of

science, poverty reduction, and sound environmental stewardship.

Working with our international friends and allies, the Bush Administration is committed to the success of the Johannesburg Conference to ensure we all work together to build a positive legacy of

natural resources sustainability for current and future generations

of the global citizenry.

Thank you Chairmen. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have later on.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you very much.

Now we will hear from Mr. Connaughton, Chairman of the White

House Council on Environmental Quality. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES CONNAUGHTON, CHAIR, WHITE

HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Thank you Chairman Jeffords, Chairman

Sarbanes, Senator Chafee. I want to note at the outset, Mr. Chairman, your reference to NEPA. Certainly, I share your view that

NEPA was the original sustainable development statute. And the

fact that it has been adopted by I think more than 50 countries

worldwide and the legacy that that articulation of what sustainable

development is about is sort of a test case for the beginnings of

American leadership in this area.

Of particular note in that statute, and I think we had talked

about this a little bit during my confirmation hearing, is the concept of man and nature living together in productive harmony.

That is an important concept. And this hearing today, actually

bringing together the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, I think is a key important next step as we get various committees of jurisdiction looking across their lines, as we must, consistent with your statement,

to figure out how to better integrate our environmental and our social objectives into our other policies and into other activities. That

is really what was behind the spirit of NEPA. And I think that is

why today’s hearing is so important and useful, because it then

turns, Chairman Sarbanes, on what you referenced, that the largest questions before us are the questions of implementation: are we

implementing at the domestic level and equally, and perhaps today

even more importantly, at the international level; and where are

the important places where we can make meaningful progress on

implementing these documents that were so hard worked over. So

I look forward to our discussion today.

What I want to do is briefly spend some time talking about

where we are with implementation of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and then throw in just a little aside on the

world summit, my own view with respect to the upcoming World

Summit on Sustainable Development.

With respect to climate change, President Bush has committed

the Nation to ambitious, yet realistic, goals that are based on a set

of six principles that largely derive from the framework that we

have set out in that Convention. First is, consistency with the longterm goal of stabilizing atmospheric concentration of greenhouse

gases at a level that would prevent dangerous interference with the

75

climate system. This, of course, refers to the fundamental longterm obligation under the Convention, to which the President has

reaffirmed our Government’s strong commitment. Second is that

we should proceed with measured actions as we learn more from

the science and build on it. Third is the concept of flexibility, to adjust to new information and take advantage of new technology.

Fourth is ensuring continued economic growth and prosperity without which we actually cannot make the kinds of investments that

we will need to over the near-to mid-term to achieve our greenhouse gases emission reduction goals. We need to pursue marketbased incentives that will spur technological innovation. And finally, and very importantly, is the concept of global participation

along the lines that my good colleague John Turner just described.

We need to find ways to engage the developing countries in a constructive path, on a path whereby they, too, can make meaningful

progress together with their international partners.

The President has set a goal, a near-term goal, which is committing the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing America’s greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy by 18 percent in the next 10 years. This goal is comparable to the kinds of

emission reductions that countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol expected to achieve. We believe that this way of articulating

progress is a means by which we can open a dialog with developing

countries because it is consistent with their need for economic

growth, but to do it in the kind of efficient and more productive

way that we ourselves continue to demonstrate leadership on in the

United States of America.

Importantly, it will set us on a path to slow the growth of our

emissions. Our emissions are growing. Emissions around the world

are growing. A key first step in making meaningful progress on climate change is to, in fact, slow that growth significantly and, as

science justifies, to stop the growth in emissions, and then reverse

that growth. This will require a sustained commitment and significant investment and effort from our Nation’s farmers, small businesses, workers, industries, and, most important, individual citizens. In recent time, the largest growth in emissions have resulted

from the actions of individual citizens in their homes, in their

transport, in their commercial activities. We need to be working on

incentives and education and other methods, we have a whole series of programs, by which to engage the American citizens of the

whole toward this effort.

The President’s policy recognizes that meaningful progress depends on the development and deployment of new technology. That

is key. We all recognize that. There is a large international consensus on that. We need to advance the science further because

there are key gaps in our knowledge that can help us make smart

policy choices in the near-and mid-term. We need to develop and

promote energy efficiency, conservation, and sequestration technologies and practices in addition to building on international cooperation.

What I would like to do is just quickly run through the various

components, and I will just take a minute to do that. The President’s fiscal year budget calls for a $700 million increase in our

Federal effort in regard to climate change. That will support a $4.5

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billion program of research on climate science and energy technology and create significant new incentives that will help advance

those technologies and deploy them. That is unmatched in the

world. We are committed to a program of up to $7.1 billion over

the next 10 years that is dedicated to technology development and

the incentives to deploy that technology. That, too, is unmatched

in the world.

Senator Jeffords, you were a strong supporter of a strong conservation title in the Farm Bill, as was the Bush Administration.

That will unleash up to $49 billion, a significant portion of which

is going to enable and incentivize our farmers on their working

lands and our ranchers on their working lands to engage in the

kind of sequestration activities and smarter land management that

we would like to see while not putting them off their property. We

far outmatch anything along those lines in the rest of the world.

That said, I want to note that we have the upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development coming up in Johannesburg. We

have a real opportunity to forge the kinds of partnerships that will

in fact implement the rich tapestry and body of international

norms and international treaties and laws that we have all committed to over the last couple of decades. We are looking forward

to really setting off a dialog around which we can in fact make

meaningful progress on each of those commitments and come up

with real partnerships that can demonstrate measurable success.

So, again, we look forward to talking to you about that today.

Thank you.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you both.

Senator Corzine, do you have a brief statement you would like

to make?

Senator CORZINE. I will have one for the record, but thank you.

I appreciate your holding the hearing.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you.

Mr. Turner, President Bush attended the Earth Summit in 1992.

I understand that more than 100 heads-of-state plan to attend the

World Summit in Johannesburg. Will the President lead the

United States delegation to the World Summit?

Mr. TURNER. Senator, there is obviously considerable interest

around the world as to who will head the U.S. delegation. All I can

tell you is that decision has not been made yet. I can tell you that

the commitment to make the World Summit a success has captured

the interest of the White House, the National Security Council,

cabinet members, and the agencies. So we are committed to see

that we have a dynamic and bold agenda as we go to Johannesburg. But the decision on who would lead the delegation has not

yet been made.

Senator JEFFORDS. I just hope the President can because I think

it would be very, very helpful to the world.

Mr. Connaughton, in preparation for the Earth Summit of 1992,

CEQ held a series of regional public conferences around the United

States and compiled extensive documentation based on the concerns presented at these public meetings. What comparable effort

has CEQ undertaken in preparation for the World Summit?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I will speak to the process point and then

turn to the substance point. We are jointly working with the State

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Department and have coordinated a fairly extensive interagency

process to ensure that as we get to the World Summit we actually

have broad agency participation in that effort. That is the immediate process and we have been working on that.

In terms of the outreach, the first Rio Summit actually was critical in setting the agenda and setting the numerous areas in which

we needed to make meaningful progress. Whether it is reducing the

number of people without access to safe drinking water, whether

it is reducing the number of people without access to clean, reliable, affordable energy sources, issues such as biodiversity and the

like, all of those have unfolded in the last 10 years through quite

extensive both national and international dialog. So where we are

today is very different from where we were 10 years ago, and

where we are today is with this very complete agenda, whether it

is Agenda 21, or whether it is the Millennium Goals. We have this

very rich agenda. If anything, the level of outreach on an agencyby-agency basis, and certainly with the State Department through

our international fora, we have more fora engaged in the subject

of sustainable development than anyone might have in fact imagined in 1990.

Our effort, and certainly CEQ’s push, what we are trying to emphasize is can we in fact forge the kind of partnerships with respect to these commitments that have now developed and that we

have held ourselves to, can we forge the kind of real concrete partnerships where 2 years from now, 3 years from now, 5 years from

now we can actually say that with respect to our commitment, for

example, on access to safe drinking water we have real plans toward making meaningful progress on each of those goals. And so

that is where my office has come in and will stay diligent on that,

because also I think it is important to emphasize with the World

Summit, just as Rio was not the end of the conversation, it was actually the beginning of the conversation, we would like to see this

World Summit be the beginning of a very new and hard emphasis

on really implementing our goals toward lifting the world out of

poverty and assuring for them the kind of quality of life that we

enjoy here in America.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Connaughton, the Framework Convention

commits the United States and all the Parties to reporting detailed

information on its policies and measures ‘‘with the aim of returning

individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of these man-made emissions of greenhouse gases.’’ Which of the programs outlined in the

Administration’s Climate Action Report aims to return our emissions to the 1990 levels, and by when?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The Action Report, which, as you know, Senator, goes on at great length, outlines more than 60 Federal programs and mentions numerous activities at the State and local

level, all of which are oriented toward mitigating greenhouse gas

emissions. In addition, we have an extensive program of research

and development and technology deployment, not just on the pure

technology side, for example, in sequestration and how we can capture carbon, but also in the land management side of things in

terms of how we can better utilize our natural resources and the

acreage that we have in the United States toward meeting our Nation’s agricultural and wood products and other needs.

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That set of programs covers every sector of the economy. It includes a range of mandatory measures, a range of voluntary measures, a range of incentive-based measures. And, again, when you

sort of line it up program for program, it is a level of effort that

far outpaces much of what the rest of the world is currently doing.

In terms of a timeline of when, we cannot set one. I think the

non-binding aim of the Framework Convention was not met by the

United States or by most of the rest of the developed nations of the

world. I think we need to set ourselves on a realistic course, consistent with economic growth, by which we can all make meaningful progress toward that long-term goal of stabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

Senator JEFFORDS. I am sorry, but the question is, which ones

aim at 1990?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The entire package aims at reducing the

growth in our greenhouse gas emissions, Senator. There is no particular silver bullet program by which we could achieve that goal.

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator Jeffords. I have a little bit

of business. Senator Hagel, a member of the Foreign Relations

Committee, asked me to submit for the record his opening statement.

Senator JEFFORDS. It will be accepted, without objection.

[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

Mr. Chairman—Thank you for holding this hearing. This is an opportunity for the

Administration to discuss the progress that has been made on these five environmental treaties, all of which have been ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Of course, much of the talk today is also likely to focus on a treaty that was

signed by President Clinton but never submitted to the Senate, the Kyoto Protocol.

I would like to remind my colleagues of a bit of Senate history on this issue.

Tomorrow will mark the 5-year point since the Senate voted unanimously to provide President Clinton and Vice President Gore with clear advice regarding the

Kyoto Protocol. It is unfortunate that the Clinton Administration ignored the Senate’s 95–0 vote on S.Res. 98, or the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, but the conditions outlined in that resolution remain the guideposts for U.S. international climate change

policy.

I would also remind my colleagues, and this frequently gets forgotten in the discussion, perhaps even more significant than the 95–0 vote was that the Byrd-Hagel

Resolution had 65 bipartisan cosponsors.

As we know, the Byrd-Hagel Resolution was very clear. It called on the President

not to sign the Kyoto Protocol, or any other international climate change agreement,

unless two minimum conditions were met.

First, S. Res. 98 directed the President not to sign any treaty‘‘. . . unless the protocol or agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or

reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same

compliance period.’’ The message was simple. Yet as we know, the Kyoto Protocol

does not include a single developing nation. These are the very nations, such and

China and India, that will soon lead the world in manmade greenhouse emissions.

Any treaty that exempts them from participation is folly.

Second, the Resolution stated the President should not sign any treaty that‘‘...

would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.’’ The Kyoto Protocol would have legally bound the United States to reduce our greenhouse gas

emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels by the years 2008 to 2012. As President

Bush stated in February, this would have cost the U.S. economy $400 billion and

resulted in the loss of 4.9 million jobs.

The Clinton Administration never submitted it to the Senate for debate and consideration. I suspect it is because they knew what is still true today—if put to a

vote in the Senate, the Kyoto Protocol would face resounding defeat.

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Other nations are also reconsidering their early ardent advocacy for the Kyoto

Protocol. Japan has ratified the treaty, but has no enforceable plan to meet its obligations. The same is true for the European Union. Australia has joined the United

States in saying it will not ratify the protocol. Canada and Russia have not made

final commitments to ratification.

The Kyoto Protocol is collapsing under the weight of the reality of its economic

consequences.

Does that mean the United States should turn its back on international efforts

to address potential climate change? No, that would be irresponsible.

In his February 14 announcement of the Administration’s climate change policies,

President Bush stated, ‘‘I intend to work with nations, especially the poor and developing nations, to show the world that there is a better approach, that we can build

our future prosperity along a cleaner and better path.’’

he Administration has backed up the President’s words with funding and tangible

international cooperation. I’m sure the witnesses here today will expand on these

efforts and I look forward to their testimony.

Next month, nations will gather for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. We should stay focused on science, programs

and resources that enhance international cooperation to produce tangible environmental benefits for all nations. Not worn-out debates over dead treaties.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Mr. Turner, to follow up on the

Summit in Johannesburg, what are the goals that we will be setting out for us as we attend this summit? What do we hope to accomplish?

Mr. TURNER. Senator, I think we are committed to success. And

then you are asked the question, how will we measure success? I

think we will measure success by getting some commitments to

concrete actions by the world community to make a difference in

places around the world. By that, I think the United States is advancing themes based on the need for good governance, the need

to increase the total flow of resources to eradicate poverty and lift

the quality of people’s lives. We need concrete commitments. In

fact, the United States is working on deliverables in the following

areas. The three most important seem to be: Access to energy. We

have great opportunities in providing clean energy technology. It is

inexcusable that we have almost 2 billion people today without access to fresh water. So I think water will be a priority. Third, the

problem of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. So, health,

fresh water, and energy would be the top three areas for

deliverables. We are also working on packages in forestry, oceans

and fishery biodiversity, food security, and education. We feel this

package helps invest in people, it helps build a platform which will

not only help economic growth but environmental sustainability.

So I think our opportunity is to get beyond lofty rhetoric, the negotiation of text, and get into real partnership commitments. We

have an ongoing dialog with other countries, both developed and

developing, trying to forge these partnerships, a dialog with the

nonprofit community both domestically and internationally, and

business groups to see if for the first time we can build on a continuum offered us by the Doha Conference on Trade, the Monterrey

Conference, to increase the total flow of resources to impoverished

areas of the world. Johannesburg is an opportunity to bring this all

together with real concrete commitments. The United States, I

have to say, is really leading that international effort right now to

forge those commitments.

Senator CHAFEE. Very good goals to have for the conference. I

support them and wish you good luck at building consensus with

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other nations around the world. Certainly health and fresh water

and curtailing the spread of infectious diseases are a good place to

start and help build an economy. So I will certainly be supportive

of those efforts.

Mr. Connaughton, in your statement you talk about measured

actions as we learn more from science. I am curious as to when

does the science finally convince the Administration to take action.

Where is the Administration on global warming in relation to the

science? Is it a little apprehensive of it at this point, or beginning

to come to the point of this is an issue that needs aggressive action?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Where we are with the science is there is a

significant scientific enterprise that has produced a number of projections that are sufficient to give us cause for action. The issue is

are we calibrating our action to the current state of the science. I

believe the President’s plan does precisely that in terms of taking

us to the next step of slowing the growth in emissions and yet not

taking us so far down the road, given the uncertainties of the

science, that we are actually having significant detrimental effects

on jobs, the American workers, which is important, and it is not

just American workers, but it is the kinds of effects that you would

see with quite restrictive actions in other countries of the world.

So when is the science done? We have had a couple of decades

of scientific enterprise. We are looking at many more decades,

funded with the U.S. carrying the largest share of that funding, in

which we have to stay on top of this. Our research effort in climate

change, again, it is unmatched in the world and it far outpaces our

research in many other areas of more immediate consequence to

people in the United States of America. But it is important enough

to stay up with the science.

What we are trying to do, though, is we are trying to get a more

focused management program to some of that spending, not all of

it, but some of that spending so it can actually begin to answer

some of the more difficult questions that help us design programs

that would be meaningful. We need to know more about some of

the effects of, for example, the effects of aerosols, the effects of

clouds, the effects of changes and adaptations to climate. We need

to know more about that in order then to develop the kinds of policies that do not lead us to significant economic mistakes. Because,

of course, if we put our economy further into reverse, we actually

will not get the kinds of investments we need to make the progress

toward that next generation of capital that we need to deploy to get

new capital stock, to get the new cars everybody wants, to get more

efficient manufacturing, and, importantly, more efficient homes

and more efficient commercial enterprises, because that is where

the real growth is.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much.

Senator JEFFORDS. Senator Corzine.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to take

a little bit of what you just said, Mr. Connaughton, and ask whether you think that some of the capital investment that I think we

all think is important for generating economic growth is somewhat

inhibited because there is an uncertainty and a conflict between

what we sense are requirements of our international obligations

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and both the political debate that we have in America about climate change and the uncertainty that seems to revolve around

what certainly I read in our international requirements. For instance, I would cite under Article 3.3 of the Convention, talking

about the Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘‘Parties

should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects

where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage. Lack of

full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures.’’ Sometimes it does not feel that our policies are taking into account what we have as mandates, at least in some sense, from our

international conventions. I would think as an investor in dealing

with some of these needs that people might be confused, particularly as they see increasing evidence published that some of these

considerations, particularly with regard to carbon, are a serious

problem.

How is the United States resolving this sort of dilemma of debate

that exists in the context of what our international obligations are?

Not only yourself, but Mr. Turner as well, I would like to hear your

comments on that.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. First, I think that the President’s announcement on February 14 was a key next step in providing further clarity that you describe, Senator, in terms of making clear at least

what this Administration’s expectation is on the greenhouse gas

side of the equation in terms of a realistic but still ambitious goal

for further efficiency and productivity in our economy. That is our

expectation.

The second component of that, which has to do with perhaps the

investment uncertainty you describe, is we look very closely at the

approach that certainly Senator Chafee championed, that numerous members of the Senate championed, toward not just getting

our information flows better in terms of improving our registry of

reductions in the various sectors, but also to create a credible crediting system by which those who do make investments today have

some high level of assurance that those investments will be recognized in whatever a future policy could hold, whether it is an incentive-based policy, whether it is a market-based policy, which we

would emphasize as the better path forward, or through even additional mandatory programs that might come to the fore in terms

of where we are falling short of real action.

Senator CORZINE. Is the White House supporting the BrownbackCorzine amendment on registry of carbon dioxide emissions?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. We do not support that because we do not

think there is a need for at this time a mandatory reporting element. We think enhancing the registry is a great idea. I would

think creating——

Senator CORZINE. As you know, it is not mandatory for the first

5 years as long as we meet some kind of reduction standards, and

would not become mandatory if people met those standards.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. I am aware of that and that is our point of

departure.

Mr. TURNER. Senator, I want to respond and just offer some reflections of a trip I just returned from. China was my first trip and

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a real learning experience, where we completed some high level dialog with China on a diverse array of environmental issues, and

then I was able to travel through China. China, to me, was a great

reflection on the broader approach and its justification that the

United States is taking in engaging countries like China and India

and others that will represent a significant amount of emissions.

I was impressed in going to China that that is a country on the

move economically. To improve the lives of their citizens, their energy consumption is going to go up exponentially. Their technology

and science is extremely poor, and they are the first to admit that.

The emission of greenhouse gas is significant. They are making a

significant effort but the utilization is not good and not efficient.

So there is an excellent opportunity for the United States to take

science, to take technology and partnership with them.

I went to one of the poorest regions in China where they have

some significant desertification and erosion, over-grazing, dust

issues. They admit it, as our science admits it, that the dust is now

coming all the way across the United States from the MongolianTibetan plains of China.

We have been accused of being isolated on global climate. I submit the absolute opposite is true. The United States in fact is leading the effort to engage the developing world in this dialog and approach to collective strategies on climate. That impact has significant opportunities to address this serious issue. We need to do

much more in our international efforts, but the United States is

really leading, trying to get the attention of the President’s commitment to engage other nations in this whole effort on climate.

Senator JEFFORDS. What did you mean by trying to get the President’s attention?

Mr. TURNER. No, excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I mean in trying to

follow through on the President’s appropriate commitment of the

United States. Part of our strategy is to work with other nations,

engage other nations in approaches to the serious issue of climate.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Senate voted, and the President

concurred, that one of the failings of the Kyoto process was we

were leaving out too many countries, members of the world community that not only today emit a lot of greenhouse gases, but the potential for significant increases in the future based on old technology really has frightening ramifications for where we go in climate. So I am proud of what we are doing to engage other countries, especially the developing countries.

Senator JEFFORDS. I am very interested in this. I was in China

and I started an organization dealing with more efficient use of energy. They sent some men over who looked at China’s incredible

need. To just improve the technology, they could reduce their emissions immensely. What does the United States intend to do to try

to get these countries to be more efficient in their use and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

Mr. TURNER. Senator, obviously, in our discussion with other

countries, their needs and interests are different. But it is a spectrum going from providing science and technology, which seems to

be the biggest need, to, as Mr. Connaughton referred to, the need

for more information; i.e., climate research. We have committed to

a global climate research system. And, again, the United States is

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leading that effort to answer many of the legitimate questions that

we still have out on climate change, and we are partnering with

other countries in setting up global monitoring stations. I visited

a very remote one we put up in China. So science and technology,

global research, looking at opportunities to comment together and

work on global policy.

Japan, as an example, we have three working groups on research, science and technology, and how together we can go out

and help developing countries, and then looking at future markets,

which is business opportunities for both countries. In India, for an

example, Mr. Chairman, India, it is astounding to me that we have

600,000 women dying each year from indoor air pollution from the

use of pre-industrial fuel use, poorly ventilated stoves. So India’s

need for new types of energy for basic heating and so forth, that

is unique to India.

So each country has unique opportunities for the United States

to take its research, its technology, engage the private sector, engage the nonprofit community, engage the academic community.

There are so many significant needs out there in the world that I

think it will be an opportunity for the United States to contribute

significantly to where we go in the coming decades on climate

change.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Senator, if I might add.

Senator JEFFORDS. Yes.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. The Monterrey consensus by which we are

trying to create harder criteria for countries we think can be successful is also important to this overall enterprise. We need to create the kind of economic, social, and political environment in some

of the developing world in some of these larger developing countries by which we can actually get the kind of long-term investment

that we enjoy in the United States, which, as you know, tends to

deliver the better technologies. If you are in an unstable environment, if you are in an environment where capital is not protected,

if you are not engaged in the international trade world by which

you have to become competitive on efficiency and productivity

grounds, you just will not get those kinds of investments that will

turn things around faster.

So I do not want to leave off the other programs that do not necessarily obviously have the effect that we are discussing in terms

of the environmental dimensions of that. But from an environmental perspective and also from a greenhouse gas perspective,

those agendas are really critical toward making real progress on a

much shorter time line in some of these countries toward environmental protection. And it opens the door for the kinds of very rich

dialogs we have going on right now, but it will open the door for

even more consequential dialog as we are able to share technical

capacity, share regulatory mechanisms, the ones that work, the

ones that do not work, and maybe help them leapfrog through some

of our lessons as we now get to a more streamlined, more marketbased system of addressing some of our issues.

Senator JEFFORDS. A question for both of you. What are the top

three U.S. substantive priorities for the Summit of clear sustainable development outcomes? What do you think the Summit will

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achieve in terms of real sustainable development results at home

and abroad?

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I think I would answer that in a

couple of ways. The top three sectoral areas that we have opportunities to make commitments in are I think, as I mentioned, in the

area of fresh water, health, and the availability of energy. A more

thematic approach, I think it is an opportunity to implement the

realization that taking care of the environment starts with taking

care of people, the opportunity for the United States to reduce poverty around the world. And third, I think we have an opportunity

to change the way we have traditionally done assistance around

the world, and not just economic assistance for developing nations,

but to in fact incorporate a new theme where we help countries

help themselves with better ruling capacity, help them invest in

their own people, help them encourage entrepreneurship and involvement of the private sector.

So I think we have an opportunity to build a new paradigm of

partnerships out around the world.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Connaughton, why do you believe that

the more environmentally sound EPA straw proposal on multipollutant legislation was rejected by the White House?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. That was an initial straw proposal that then

went through extensive analysis, economic analysis, feasibility

analysis, toward what we think is a quite strong proposal, a 70 percent reduction in the three criteria pollutants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and mercury, but is also one that is attainable. We can

go quite far, Senator, as you know, but we can do it in a way that

keeps us within the realm of not having an impact on consumers,

making unprecedented strides in terms of the environmental protections that that would deliver and do it on a timeline by which

the economic community can actually make investments toward

these leapfrogging efforts and give them the long-term certainty

with their investments where they can actually do some significant

capital planning. So there were a number of factors that came into

our policy that led us to a different place, but not a markedly different place.

I would also note, and I want to emphasize because it comes up

frequently, the issue of coal. Coal represents 50 percent of electricity generation today. Coal is affordable, it is reliable, and it is

here, it is domestically secure. But what we need to do is we need

much cleaner coal-fired generation. The way you do that is to create the right kind of incentives, and we have got a lot of money

on the table toward clean coal technologies as part of our climate

policy as well as part of our air policy, but you also then need to

create the kind of timelines so that the plants can turn over in a

way that makes sense to business investors so that they will actually invest in the application of these technologies. As you know,

Senator, it is quite exciting the technologies that are potentially

available. If we create the right timeframe, make the levels economically reasonable, we think we can spur the investment toward

the application of those technologies, the broad application, which

then preserves a role for coal even as we continue with a more diversified energy system.

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We need more nuclear, we need more natural gas, we have to

look to solar wind and some of these other renewable technologies

in which we have quite a strong commitment. But we should not

lose sight of the incentive we have, not just for the United States,

because if we can advance coal technologies in the United States,

then we can take them to places like China where they are not

going to be creating massive wind farms to address their energy

needs. And they are putting in a lot of baseload capacity. It would

be really helpful for us to take our success here and take it international.

So a whole lot of factors went into it and we really did try to look

at this holistically and consistent with our overall energy and economic goals. We think we hit the right balance.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Turner, is the U.S. prepared to agree to

seek higher appropriations in the outyears to replenish the global

environmental facility GEF in order to leverage other donors?

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, the President

committed us to I believe $178 million on the GEF, realizing this

is an important outreach especially in developing countries. So for

the first time we recommended catching up with our arrears and

adding in $70 million for the first time.

Currently, the third replenishment negotiations are under way

and we plan to participate in those in a dialog with the world community to see where the world wants to go next. The focus of the

GEF is extremely important to the United States. But I am pleased

that we made a significant increase in our request to the Congress

on the GEF. The consideration of the next round is under review.

Senator JEFFORDS. I am pleased to hear that. It seems like this

would be necessary to fully implement the Convention to Combat

Desertification and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the prior informed consent Convention. So I

appreciate that information.

For both of you. The Senate-passed Sense of Congress on Climate

Change, Section 1001 of the Energy Policy Act of 2002, says the

U.S. should take responsible actions to ensure significant and

meaningful reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from all

sectors, and take part in international negotiations that lead to

U.S. participation in a fully binding climate change treaty. Is the

U.S. presenting anything at the World Summit in terms of clear

targets and timetables for addressing climate change and reducing

emissions consistent with this?

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. With respect to the World Summit, first off,

climate change will be discussed but it is not an agenda for action

because just a few short weeks later the Conference of the Parties

will be meeting again. And so there is a separate international

meeting to continue to carry out the discussions under the Framework Convention and under the Kyoto Protocol.

With respect the first point, I think the answer to that is yes,

we are moving forward with the kind of international bilateral and

multilateral process that Assistant Secretary Turner outlined for

you to, in fact, re-engage, since we are not participating in the

Kyoto Protocol, engage outside of that particular forum to come up

with common strategies, again, not just domestically but with our

international partners, including other countries who may or may

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not become part of the Kyoto Protocol. So we are not waiting for

decisions on that to take the kind of action that that resolution

urged.

We remain guided by the precursor resolution that we need to

have an approach that does not significantly impact the economy,

and also an approach that does engage developing countries, which

were the two key pieces that were missing. So we remain guided

by that as well. And we are looking forward to seeing significant

progress. I would note that the President’s commitment of an 18

percent reduction in greenhouse gas intensity, that alone in 2010

would result in 100 million metric tons avoided from business as

usual, which is quite a consequential amount of tons of carbon

avoided. We think that also is consistent with the spirit of the Senate resolution.

Senator JEFFORDS. As you both know, I have deep concerns over

the way we are handling the results of pollution from our power

companies. Have you been involved in any of the decisions related

to the release of the New Source Review documents to the Congress or in discussions of adopting a new policy and providing less

information to Congress? That is kind of a little nasty question.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. First of all, yes, the New Source Review policy was the—EPA was directed under the National Energy Plan, in

consultation with the Department of Energy, to prepare the report

on the impacts of the New Source Review program on electricity

supply. So that was a joint exercise between the two agencies in

which the various White House offices, as part of our interagency

process, we were apprised of its progress and where that was heading.

In terms of the recommendations that came from EPA, there too,

consistent with other processes, EPA kept us informed of where

that was going. We had extensive interagency conversations about

the various recommendations that EPA was considering. The end

product was produced by EPA and then was received back into the

interagency process to see what it meant.

When EPA’s regulatory proposals to implement the recommendations are complete, those will come over to the Office of Management and Budget and, consistent with our traditional processes,

those will receive interagency review as well, as do all other significant regulations, and we expect to be a part of the review of the

regulations at that time.

In response to your final point, the dig on information, we understand you had information requested out to EPA and they got some

information to you and others not to you on quite the timeframe

you expected. But it is my understanding that the large body of

that has made it up to the committee. And so while I suppose we

could talk about timelines for getting it to you, it is my understanding it has made its way to you. So, if there is more to discuss

on that, I would be happy to do what I can and talk to EPA.

Senator JEFFORDS. I cannot tell you how disturbing it is with

that particular issue, which is a life-saving issue, as you well know,

that we have had such troubles in that regard. So I appreciate

that.

There are other Senators who could not be here today because

of their busy schedules, and thus they will have the opportunity to

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submit questions to you to be responded to in writing. So I just

want to let you know that. I also want to thank you very much for

being here today and candidly participating in our question and answer period.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your time, and Chairman Sarbanes, and your interest in giving the Administration the

opportunity to discuss a very important subject matter, and that is

the implementation of our international obligations. So thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CONNAUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you both.

We will now move on to our next panel. Our first witness is the

Honorable Maurice Strong. He is a native of Canada and resides

in Buckhorn, Ontario. Mr. Strong has long-standing ties with the

private and public sectors and has served in an impressive array

of business, government, and nongovernmental organizations. Currently, Mr. Strong is a Special Advisor to the Secretary General of

the United Nations, President of the Council for the University for

Peace, a Senior Advisor to the President of the World Bank, and

Chairman of the Earth Council. Mr. Strong was the Secretary General of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and

Development, and the 1972 United Nations Conference on the

Human Environment, and subsequently became the Executive Director of the United Nations Environmental Program.

Mr. Strong, thank you for traveling all the way from Canada to

be here with us today. Let me introduce the other two on the panel

and then we will start with you for a statement.

The second member of the panel is Mr. John Dernbach. He is a

professor of law at Widener University Law School. He is editing

a book, ‘‘Stumbling Toward Sustainability,’’ that assesses progress

the U.S. has made on the sustainable development in the past 10

years and recommends the next steps. Welcome. We look forward

to hearing from you.

Also, we have Christopher Horner, who serves as a Senior Fellow

at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and as Counsel of the

Cooler Heads Coalition. That sounds like what we need.

Please proceed, Mr. Strong.

STATEMENT OF HON. MAURICE STRONG, CHAIRMAN, EARTH

COUNCIL INSTITUTE CANADA, TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA

Mr. STRONG. Distinguished Chairman, Senator Jeffords, Senator

Feingold, ladies and gentleman. First let me congratulate you, Senator Jeffords, on your leadership on these issues and say what a

privilege it is for me to have the opportunity of testifying before

these two important committees of the U.S. Senate as you consider

issues which are at the center of my own life interests and concerns. It is particularly encouraging to know that you are addressing these issues at a time when the position of the United States

of America in respect to these issues has never been more important to the human future.

The United States has been at the center of the movement to develop since the first Stockholm Conference first put these issues on

the international agenda an international regime of cooperation

and of institution-building to deal with the dilemma which StockVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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holm revealed. The fact that through our economic life we are impinging on the resource environmental and life systems on which

the future of all life on earth and, indeed, our economic welfare

also depend.

And as we move toward the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg that will meet next month, these issues

have special importance. Because if we fail at that conference to reignite the momentum that we achieved at Rio de Janeiro 10 years

ago, I do not know when that momentum is likely to be rejuvenated. So I am deeply encouraged by these hearings and pleased

and grateful at the opportunity you have provided to hear some

views. Those views are primarily reflected, Mr. Chairman, in my

written presentation. I have to say, I got your invitation when I

was down in Central America, so I had to do it rather hurriedly.

But I do hope they will help to amplify some of the comments I will

now make briefly.

The recent retreat by the United States from much of its long

stand role as the leading driver of these issues, as particularly evidenced by its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol of the Climate

Change Convention, threatens the progress that has been made in

collaborative management of our environmental problems in the

past thirty years and the prospects for further progress that is so

essential for our future. And let me say, Senator, I probably have

spent as much time in my life in the United States as I have in

my home country. I think I have paid more taxes here than I have

in my home country.

Senator JEFFORDS. We appreciate that very much.

Mr. STRONG. So I come here as a friend and admirer of all things

American. My comments are expressions of my concern, not to be

taken as criticism, but expressions of concern that I believe reflect

the concerns of many Americans and people throughout the world

concerning the nature of the U.S. position on these issues. They

have indeed cast a cloud over prospects for the World Summit on

Sustainable Development which will convene next month in Johannesburg.

What the United States does or fails to do matters, Chairman,

as you so well know, and that is why you have convened these

hearings. It matters immensely. Not only in substance, but in example. As the most powerful nation in the world, indeed you are

a nation that gives a signal to others. Therefore, any withdrawal

of your commitment to international negotiating processes and to

the agreements that have been reached over so many years really

does undermine the very fabric of international cooperation and the

international legal system, which the United States itself and the

whole world owes it a great debt of gratitude, Senator, for its leadership in these past thirty years in developing that framework. It

is still far from perfect. We cannot allow it to slip back.

So I am really encouraged by these hearings that you are focusing now on the whole process by which the United States, yes, and

others, have performed under existing commitments and decisions

of past conferences. There is a whole spectrum I do not need to

elaborate. There are agreements reached at conferences and ratified by fora such as the General Assembly of the United Nations.

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In Rio we made considerable progress. Yes, we did not do everything that we had hoped for. But we did make very significant

progress. And the United States and others really signed on to

some very important agreements: the agreement on climate

change, the Convention on Climate Change, the Framework Convention; the Convention on Biodiversity, both of which has now

been ratified by the United States; the Convention to Combat

Desertification, which you, Senator Jeffords, have taken such an

important leadership role in. And so we very much hope now that

there will be a renewal in that leadership.

I was pleased to hear Administration officials here, who I know,

presenting the case for continued strong support for so many of

these issues, but frankly not all of the ones where U.S. leadership

is important.

I see my time has lapsed, so I would be delighted to expand on

any of these concerns in the question period. And again thank you,

Senator Jeffords.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you very much.

Next is Professor John Dernbach. He is a Professor of law at

Widener University Law School. He is editing a book, ‘‘Stumbling

Through Sustainability,’’ that assesses progress that the U.S. has

made on sustainable development in the past 10 years and recommends next steps. Welcome, Professor.

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. DERNBACH, PROFESSOR, WIDENER

UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL

Mr. DERNBACH. Thank you, Chairman Jeffords, Senator Feingold. It is a delight to be here. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss U.S. adherence to its sustainable development commitments,

particularly those made at the Earth Summit in 1992. As you mentioned, I am the editor of a 32-chapter book on U.S. sustainable development efforts in this past 10 years. The book is being published

this week by the Environmental Law Institute here in Washington.

The book’s 42 contributors come from universities and law schools,

nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and State Government. They are respected experts in their fields.

What I would like to do is briefly review some of the book’s findings and then share some of its basic recommendations in a little

greater detail.

The U.S. has, unquestionably, begun to take some steps toward

sustainable development, largely because of our environmental and

conservation laws. Yet, on balance, the United States is now far

from being a sustainable society, and in many ways is farther away

than it was at the time of the Earth Summit in 1992.

International leadership begins at home. With 5 percent of the

world’s population, the United States was in 1992 responsible for

about 24 percent of the world’s energy consumption and almost 30

percent of the world’s raw materials consumption. Since the Earth

Summit, materials use has increased 10 percent, primary energy

consumption has increased 21 percent, and energy-related carbon

dioxide emissions have increased by 13 percent. Over and over, the

books contributors found increases in materials and energy efficiency, and in the effectiveness of pollution controls for individual

sources, were outweighed by increases in consumption and inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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creases in pollution related to the manner in which things were

made. Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling

in the past decade, for example, U.S. generation and disposal of

municipal solid waste per capita have been growing since 1996.

According to Harvard biologist Edward O. Wilson, ‘‘four more

planet Earths’’ would be needed for ‘‘every person in the world to

reach present U.S. levels of consumption with existing technology.’’ Yet the U.S. standard of living, equated with high levels of consumption and the ‘‘good life,’’ is widely envied and emulated

throughout the world.

In this and in many other ways, though not all ways, the United

States has not exercised the kind of leadership necessary for sustainable development. My sense is that we are often unwilling to

face such issues because we do not feel like we have the tools. The

book provides an issue-by-issue roadmap for sustainable development in the United States and ways that would enhance prosperity

and protect and restore our environment.

For starters, the Federal Government should adopt and implement a national strategy for sustainable development, with specific

goals and priorities, to harness all sectors of society to achieve our

economic, social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy

would lead to a stronger, more prosperous America with higher

quality of life because we would be pursuing these goals in ways

that support each other in greater and greater degrees over time,

rather than undermine each other. The strategy could be modeled

on that of the European Union or States such as Oregon and New

Jersey, and specifically address climate change, biodiversity, international trade, and other major issues. The President could get the

process started with an appropriate Executive Order to Federal

agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act and

the National Environmental Policy Act. An executive-level entity

would be needed to coordinate and assist in the implementation of

the strategy. A counterpart entity in Congress would also be helpful. A set of indicators to measure progress in achieving goals

would make the strategy more effective and meaningful.

In addition, the United States needs to recognize that its substantial consumption levels, coupled with domestic population

growth, have serious environmental, social, and economic impacts.

Americans also need to understand that human well-being can be

maintained and enhanced by more efficient and effective use of materials and energy and by less polluting means of production. There

are a variety of legal and policy tools available to deal with this,

including a number of policy and legal tools that have been applied

at the State level, including renewable energy portfolio standards,

Senator, as you know, and smart growth legislation. Northern European countries are also experimenting with a shift in taxes on

materials and energy, on one hand, they are shifting some of the

tax to there from labor and income, on the other hand. And there

is some very interesting research on that.

The U.S. needs to take a stronger and more constructive role

internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad range of

issues related to sustainable development. Congress should repeal

or modify laws, policies, and subsidies that encourage

unsustainable development. Protection of natural resources and the

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environment must focus more holistically on the resources to be

protected, and on understanding those resources. Finally, transportation, public health, and other social infrastructure and institutions should be designed and operated to further economic, environmental, and security goals at the same time.

We know what we need to do, and we also know why. The challenge I think is to deliver on what we know. Thank you.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is Christopher Horner. He serves as Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and is counsel to the

Cooler Heads Coalition. We need you. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER C. HORNER, SENIOR FELLOW,

COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. HORNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, for

your interest. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this

joint panel on what is a very important topic. The scope of the

hearing is broad, as evidenced by the Administration’s testimony

regarding all of its efforts and all of the treaties we have committed to. So I am going to limit my testimony to the propriety or

impropriety of the U.S. implementing or, more accurately, amending the Rio Treaty, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate

Change, by adopting or ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.

For whatever specific reasons, be they economic growth, failure

to foresee the energy requirements of the new economy, or other,

the U.S., like many nations, failed to meet its Rio targets, the specific numerical target of 1990 greenhouse gas emission levels, although not our funding targets and other efforts we did implement

successfully. Now some advocates assert, because the U.S. has not

met its Rio goal, we must commit to even greater, that is, more unrealistic, mandatory reductions, that is, Kyoto. Attempting instead

to comply with the initial treaty seems the more appropriate response, for several reasons.

Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did not request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation implementing Rio, which was not an inherently self-implementing treaty. Authority and precedent make clear that responsibility for proposing such programs lies with the White House. If our non-binding Rio obligations in fact bound the U.S. to achieve specific reductions, contrary to contemporary Senate and Executive assertions of

U.S. intentions, then the Executive interpretation of Rio Article 4

specifically throughout the 1990’s was actually incorrect, and is responsible. The pending question is apparently, does the U.S. respond by attempting to meet such Rio promises, or by making further, even deeper, binding promises?

Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.’ Rio promises, in favor of

Kyoto’s binding commitments even greater than those we have

failed to attain, seems highly illogical. Compounding this of course

is that precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, happy anniversary, the Senate unanimously spoke to what it recognized was an unacceptable

drift away from the U.S.’ Rio stance adamantly opposed to binding

commitments. The Senate, seeing what was developing, asserted its

‘‘advice’’ pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, passing Byrd-Hagel S. Res. 98 unanimously.

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Subsequent to and despite this advice, U.S. negotiators clearly

disregarded both major Byrd-Hagel recommendations: Kyoto did

not require developing countries to share our commitments, and

even the Clinton White House economic advisors have recanted

their refutations of the Kyoto cost estimates.

Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does not

still violate both key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is likely that

very few Senators, though new members have arrived, have

amended their position against a treating causing ‘‘serious economic harm.’’ However, Clinton Administration officials did admit

that they began working on the plan for binding commitments

within 1 year after Rio went into effect.

Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a ‘‘treaty

hopping’’ campaign; even the models on which it is based predict an undetectable climatic impact, at a cost to the U.S. of up to $400

billion annually, according to EIA, yet maybe 1/30th of what its

proponents seek. Rio and Kyoto offer differing commitments but

purport ‘‘the same ultimate objective.’’ The U.N. IPCC has said

that this means reducing greenhouse gas emissions by as much as

60 to 80 percent, which of course wildly exceeds Kyoto’s specified

ambitions.

As such, the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of ratifying

any further agreements, express acknowledgement not only of the

actual ‘‘ultimate goal,’’ but that it is committed to its practical requirements, in this case up to ‘‘30 Kyotos.’’ In this case, to a degree,

I agree with Professor Dernbach, which is we need to set out specifically where we are going and what this requires. Now, I do not

agree entirely with the Professor’s testimony, but in concept, if this

is where we are going, we need to expressly set it out in advance,

now given that knowledge has changed, the interpretation of the

ultimate goal has changed.

Such treaty hopping agendas illustrate the importance of Senate

treaty ‘‘reservations,’’ or the Senate’s second bite at the ‘‘advice’’ apple. This comes of course during the ‘‘consent’’ function, which

function the U.S. negotiators unfortunately eviscerated. After

agreeing to terms incompatible with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted Kyoto’s prohibition on reservations, or the Senate’s ability to specify the specific understandings or conditions of

the U.S. commitment. This despite the Senate having also forewarned the Administration about this in advance of Kyoto.

In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions of

having ‘‘reject’’ Kyoto with the requisite submission to the U.N. to

that effect, as was done regarding the International Criminal

Court. In the absence of that, the White House must at minimum

assist resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto—we sent that

letter to the U.N. for a reason. Signatures carry responsibilities—

by requesting the Senate disapprove of the treaty. In the absence

of that, the Senate should recognize that there is no reverse equivalent of the ‘‘presentment clause’’ regarding treaties. Only protocol,

not any constitutional prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of

a signed treaty. Certainly given the imperative rhetoric surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush insists on continuing the U.S.’

ambiguous role, the Senate should take matters into its own hands

and decide the fate of the treaty.

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That resolution should by definition, for the process problems I

identified, be rejection of Kyoto. Otherwise, by accepting this double indignity of ignoring advice and prohibiting reservations, this

body would condone Executive circumvention of the Senate’s constitutional treaty role. Thank you.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you for that advice. I appreciate it.

Senator FEINGOLD.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD,

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am

pleased to be here today. I think the idea of having the Foreign Relations and Environment and Public Works Committees come together to conduct oversight of the implementation of U.S. commitments under the environmental treaties that the Senate has ratified is both a good idea and it is long over-due. So I think you, as

I frequently feel toward this Chairman.

The United States was among the principal architects of each of

the agreements we are examining today. U.S. negotiators worked

hard to develop and craft these agreements and ensure our Government and our interests were well-represented. The Senate then

ratified these agreements with the view that desertification, ozone

depletion, global climate change, trade in endangered species, and

sustainable development through trade were important national

and global issues. I am concerned, given our history and leadership, about the growing perception internationally that the United

States is backing away from our international environmental commitments. I am pleased that the Administration testified on this.

I am eager to hear more because I suspect that much of the ongoing diplomatic effort on these agreements may be under-reported in

the press.

Nonetheless, I believe that there is a serious perception problem,

and one that needs remedied. It is my view that unless the United

States exercises leadership for sustainable development in all relevant international forums, it will continue to miss many opportunities to improve environmental and social conditions worldwide,

and it will perpetuate a perception that the United States does not

keep its sustainable development commitments.

As the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the

Foreign Relations Committee—excuse me, as the Chairman of the

subcommittee, thanks to Senator Jeffords——

[Laughter.]

Senator FEINGOLD. I used to be the Ranking Member. That is

why I said I thank him a lot. But I have had the opportunity to

see first-hand how valuable the provisions of these agreements are

to the people of Africa, where nearly one-quarter of dry lands are

moderately or severely desertified, ozone level changes only exacerbate that problem, and endangered species contribute significantly

both culturally and economically to many African states.

These issues cut across borders and affect entire regions. One of

the primary benefits, in my view, of U.S. participation in these

agreements is the opportunity to take advantage of multilateral coordination to address these problems.

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So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And if you would permit, I have

just a couple of questions.

Senator JEFFORDS. Please proceed.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me first say that I was pleased to come

here because of the importance of the hearing. But I am particularly thrilled because Professor Dernbach is a friend of mine who

I have not seen in about thirty years. We debated against each

other in high school. He is one of the smartest guys I have ever

met. I think we each won some, is that fair to say, John?

Mr. DERNBACH. Something like that, yes.

Senator FEINGOLD. I have admired his work on environmental

issues from afar. He is a wonderful choice to have before the Committee, and a native of our great State of Wisconsin.

Let me ask a question first of Mr. Strong. You mentioned in your

statement a concern that I share, as I have just indicated, that the

perception that the United States’ efforts on environmental issues

is dwindling and that it is affecting our bilateral relationship.

Would you share for the record the effects you have observed with

our closest neighbor, Canada.

Mr. STRONG. Yes. Thanks, Senator. I do not of course speak for

Canada, but I have less reticence to express my concerns about the

Canadian position that I do here in this Senate about the U.S. position. I have to say that your sum of the retreat, what I have called

retreat from leadership, and of course it is not an across-the-board

retreat on every issue, has spilled over to Canada.

We have a very serious national controversy now about whether

Canada should or should not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. That is

probably the most significant single impact. Of course the decision

of the United States has immense influence, and there are immense constituencies in the industry in which I used to be, the energy industry, there is quite strong resistance, though not acrossthe-board resistance. Our Prime Minister has committed his government to ratify, but the provinces in Canada have significant

rights and some of them, particularly Alberta and even Ontario,

where I live, have come out against that. So they have not made

their decision. But there is no question that on this issue and so

many others, what the U.S. does influences Canada.

And to just add to that, there is significant public concern about

the current U.S. position on some of these issues. The polls in Canada show, as I believe they do here in the United States, a higher

degree of public concern than is expressed yet at the top political

levels.

So, yes, what the U.S. says and does matters in Canada. But it

also I have to say, as one who spends a lot of my time outside of

this continent, it matters everywhere.

Senator FEINGOLD. Professor Dernbach, I think you would agree

that U.S. concern over cost of compliance contributes significantly

to the current difficulties with the Kyoto Protocol. I believe you

looked at this issue in some detail. Would you share with the committee some of the economically beneficial actions we have taken

to implement our commitments under the Framework Convention

on Climate Change, and just highlight briefly some opportunities

for further meeting our current commitments at low-cost, even if

the U.S. Government does not actually ratify Kyoto.

95

Mr. DERNBACH. A lot of the positive things that have been done

on climate change in the last 10 years have occurred at the State

level. There is actually a fairly large number of legal and policy

tools that have been employed at the State level—tax credits metering, which would allow somebody with a big windmill to sell

their excess electricity back to the grid; renewable energy portfolio

standards that require electricity providers to scale-up the amount

of renewable energy that they provide on a fairly steady basis.

There are many, many of those kinds of tools out there that are

being used.

What is particularly interesting about State use of those tools is

the justifications the States use, justifications that you do not hear

in the national climate debate. Let me share what I mean by that.

At the State level, there is a lot of conversation about creating

jobs, developing technology, protecting poor people from the adverse effects of fossil fuel price fluctuations, reducing other pollutants, and strengthening the economic base of the State. Climate

change is almost incidental in a lot of those discussions, even

though reducing greenhouse gases is surely one of the results.

I think that what that suggests is that if we look hard at the various types of things that States have been doing, looking at the effects of those, you could fashion I think a fairly potent, fairly effective, fairly economically beneficial package of legislation to deal

with climate change at the Federal level that would create jobs, develop technology, enhance our export markets, would attract capital investment, would drive down costs of renewable energy and

make electricity a lot more affordable for other folks, among many,

many other things.

So, in sum, the experience of the States on climate change suggests a very different way of thinking about both the benefits and

the costs of climate change than a lot of the conversation that I

hear at the national level.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Professor Dernbach. It is good to

see you again. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your

generous amount of time.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you for coming. We appreciate your

presence here. It is important.

Let me now turn to some questions. Mr. Strong, what do you see

as the major differences between preparations for Rio and Johannesburg, and what has impeded the current process?

Mr. STRONG. Mr. Chairman, part of the difference of course is the

change of political climate. The preoccupation of the United States

and other countries with the war against terrorism, the economic

implications of the downturn, I think this has all created a more

difficult climate. Also, I think there has been perhaps a less extensive involvement of the various constituencies, the civil society constituencies, et. cetera. And most of all, I would say the cloud cast

over the Summit by the recent actions of the United States that

have been reported here both internationally and domestically

which signal a significant backing away, should I say, of the kind

of leadership that the world community has looked to the United

States for for so much of the thirty years since Stockholm put the

issue on the agenda.

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There is a response to that. For the first time, as you know, Senator, some of the traditional friends of the United States which

have always followed its leadership in the past, even when they

were a little uncomfortable about it, are not necessarily now following its leadership on these issues. As you know, the European

Union and Japan, despite controversies, have ratified the Kyoto

Protocol. We still have not got enough to make that 55 percent. I

hope my own country will weigh in on that. The position of Russia

is still not certain. But this has cast a cloud.

Now it is true that the United States, as the Administration officials have said, are doing some very good work in some very good

areas. But on the more fundamental issues that literally affect the

future of our civilization and of our economies, there is a huge concern that Johannesburg will actually see some slippage from the

performance under the commitments reached at Rio and before.

So I see Johannesburg as a very, very important milestone, not,

Senator, because conferences solve everything, but because they

provide the gathering point where you can either breakdown in

your attempt to move forward or you can actually move forward.

At the moment, the signs are very, very disconcerting. I believe

that if we lose the opportunity of Johannesburg to move ahead on

these issues that literally we will face threats to our security and

our economy over time even greater than those that we face from

the horrendous terrorist acts.

May I mention one other thing, sir. In my statement, I would

like just to call your attention to a couple of specific suggestions

that I will not elaborate here. But my conviction is that the reason

for slippage fundamentally in our commitments is motivation. That

is why I am spending so much of my time on the motivational

issues. What are they? One is the economic motivation, the whole

system of fiscal measures, taxes, policies, regulations by which governments incent the behavior of corporations and industries. And

in all countries, including this, they are heavily skewed to continue

to incent unsustainable behavior. I believe it is quite possible for

those measures to meet their primary objectives without having the

same consequences. And I think if this body could even initiate a

review of that whole system, in a sense do an environmental performance review on fiscal tax subsidy policies, et. cetera.

The second motivational aspect is moral and ethical. That becomes very, very important and it is deeply important for America

which is based on values. A distinguished American, David Rockefeller, headed the group that has drafted the Earth Charter, a

statement of basic moral and ethical principles designed to guide

the conduct of nations and peoples toward the earth and toward

each other. That we hope the U.S. will support. It does not have

to agree to it in a formal manner, but we hope that the United

States delegation will recognize it. Your Conference of Mayors and

many U.S. organizations representing literally several millions of

Americans have endorsed this. We would like to see, sir, America

recognize this because, again, our moral and ethical values are at

the root of the way in which we set our priorities and the way in

which we respond to this challenge.

This country’s history and its example has been based on its

commitment to moral and ethical values. Therefore, I am hopeful

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and encouraged that you are going to rise to that. And this hearing

certainly underscores and reinforces that, sir. I am sorry I took a

little long to respond to your question, but I do feel strongly, as I

know you do, about these issues.

Senator JEFFORDS. Very excellent statement. I am taking it

under careful advisement. Thank you.

Mr. Horner?

Mr. HORNER. I would like to distinguish Rio and Johannesburg

and possibly break new ground for me and praise the Administration for what they are doing in preparation for Johannesburg.

First, with Rio we had a cue of treaties that had been developed

over years that were to be culminated in Rio. We do not really face

that now. We face, as the Administration witnesses testified, talking more about details, actual implementation, the state of implementation, next steps. And I do applaud what the Administration

is trying to do regarding good governance, saying in essence capacity-building, which is a term used in the environmental treaty context quite a bit, we will pay countries to be ready to receive what

they will receive under the treaties. We are trying to build capacity

for good governance through economic and judicial reforms, openness, to say are you ready to take this environmental and general

foreign aid and not have it go down the rat hole, for which I applaud them.

Now they did get off track with handling environmental issues

very poorly, including again recently, May-June, and with that submission their efforts at focusing on known problems that purportedly would be worse under, for example, climate change. They redirected the focus back to climate change, but they were doing very

well in advancing it toward safe drinking water, the world’s number one environmental threat, which purportedly would be worse.

But for a cost of a year of Kyoto you could make significant advances in that. AIDS, infectious diseases, they need to get the dialog back where it was.

They have made progress. The focus on good governance, capacity-building for receiving this aid so we can have actual environmental improvement for environmental aid, it is the right direction. I just hope they stay focused.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you.

Mr. Dernbach, what is your prognosis for the World Summit?

And what follow-up activities are needed?

Mr. DERNBACH. My hope for the World Summit is that we come

out of it with specific targets and timetables, not just for the social

issues, as important as the social issues are, but also for environmental issues. And what I mean by targets and timetables are the

kinds of things that have been suggested by a great many organizations including the OECD, which is to say by a certain date we

achieve a certain result, either internationally or regionally or nationally. Without targets and timetables, you have goals with no

deadline that are in some basic way as a result not goals at all.

So that is what I would hope would come out of the World Summit.

But beyond that, and I think this is the important message from

the book, is that what we do for sustainable development is not

just what we agree to or do not agree to in Johannesburg, it is

what we do at home. That is why the book is overwhelmingly diVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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rected at the United States and actions that decisionmakers in the

United States ought to be making at the national level, State level,

the local level, corporation decisionmakers, deans in colleges and

universities, businesses and others. And that is what I hope will

really come out of Johannesburg, that it will provide a kind of lift,

if you will, to the Rio process, engage people on the importance of

reconciling our environmental goals with our social, economic, and

security goals.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Horner?

Mr. HORNER. I just want to get back to leadership I guess, in following on Professor Dernbach’s comments. We need to recognize

that for all intents and purposes the Bush position, despite badmouthing Kyoto, is indistinguishable from the Clinton-Gore position on Kyoto. For twenty-five months after signing the treaty for

which it was open for ratification, they never sent it to the Senate.

My thesis in my testimony is that is not necessary. But they did

not do it. President Bush will not send it apparently. Neither

would withdraw from it. One bad-mouths it, one talks a good game

about killing it, though not really doing it. One talked a good game

about pursuing it, though not really doing it. The position is indistinguishable.

Leadership, of course, does not mean abandoning your own perspective, and the U.S. certainly has its own perspective on this, in

large part it is because it would be the most greatly impacted by

the treaty. So I think the Administration and the U.S. as a whole

deserves to maintain its own perspective without others claiming

that it has abandoned leadership by not doing what everybody else

has done.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Strong, comments?

Mr. STRONG. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to see some other

initiatives. Energy was one of the issues that our friends from the

Administration highlighted. It is at the heart of so many issues. I

come from the energy industry myself and so I feel very deeply

about that. One of the particular initiatives that I believe the

United States could put on the table that would totally in line with

I believe the general approach of this Administration is to call for

the creation of a consultant group on clean energy, modeled very

much on the consultant group on international agriculture research

which did so much in the last quarter century so to relieve the

prospect of an eminent food shortage in the world. And it is not

even an incorporated entity. It is a mechanism that brings private

and public interests together around the table to determine priorities for research and development, particularly in the developing

world, and how to mobilize the funds to permit the developing

countries, in particular, to afford the best available technologies.

And it is not a new organization, but it is a very effective mechanism. I believe it would be entirely feasible for the United States

to champion the establishment of such a thing.

I think you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, about the importance of

the global environment facility, of closing that gap that must be

closed, that must be closed almost immediately to permit the replenishment to take place. That would also give prospects and morale for Johannesburg a boost.

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And then, finally, one initiative that I believe could emanate

from this Senate, and that is we understand that you are to receive

a report from the General Accounting Office soon setting out the

U.S., and I am not sure if it covers others, performance under existing agreements. This could provide I suggest, Mr. Chairman, the

basis for establishment of a regular monitoring process with reports coming out each year or 2 years, very much like the State Department reports on human rights and one or two other things,

which would highlight the performance of the United States and

others in respect of the commitments that they have already put

in place. It would be a fairly easy thing to do based on the report

of the General Accounting Office, which I think is on its way. It

is just one modest suggestion, sir, of how in a practical way there

are still a lot of things that you could do working toward those

larger issues.

Most of all, sir, I am concerned that it really give people a new

sense that their leaders really are responding to this challenge,

that there is real movement, that there is a new spirit of international cooperation, and international faith in the United States

as the leader of that cooperation.

Senator JEFFORDS. Any final comments?

Mr. HORNER. I would like to say in the spirit of that, although

the State Department offers me a tortured definition of the term

‘‘Parties to Kyoto,’’ the United States can let other ratifying Parties

have what they claim to want. If the U.S. withdraws, we have 55

percent because 55 percent of X is now 55 percent of a much smaller number. It takes a very difficult interpretation of the Kyoto Protocol to read otherwise. If that is what they want, if some people

truly believe that will help save the Planet, while we have not arrived at that position, we ought to withdraw and let them have

what they want. If the other sides offer the interpretation of, well,

we cannot have this go into effect against us yet, that would be interesting, but it would also likely bring negotiations back to a sane

plane.

I hope we all remember when these negotiations fell apart. They

were in the Hague in 2000. The U.S. elections had occurred but

had not been decided. Pause, wait for comment. Some members of

the Foreign Relations Committee were there. I saw Senator Kerry.

The EU refused to take yes for an answer because they saw desperation in our eyes. They changed the definition of ‘‘sinks’’ from

‘‘sinks shall be used’’ to ‘‘but not really,’’ and then ‘‘but not really

if you are the U.S. but certainly if you are Russia,’’ giving them

millions of more dollars but making it very difficult for us to at

least initially even comply. They fell apart in November 2000 and

they have not recovered since.

I believe if this is something the Administration really wants to

negotiate, that is, a Byrd-Hagel compliant binding agreement, the

place to start is by withdrawing from Kyoto, have the other Parties

decide if they want it to go into effect against themselves, or interpret it otherwise and say we are going to now start renegotiating

with you but this time in a little better faith. Because what happened in the Hague really defies a good faith explanation.

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Dernbach?

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Mr. DERNBACH. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding

this hearing. I think this is an incredibly important issue. There

is a lot more at stake here than the environmental, and there is

a lot more at stake here than any specific environmental issue.

If we have learned anything in the last couple of decades, it is

that the environment is connected to everything else that we care

about—peace and security, economic development, national governance, and social well-being. We now face an enormous problem of

environmental degradation around the world and a growing gap between the rich and the poor. The problems are quite real and they

are not going to go away. Put a little different way, poverty and

environmental degradation are deeply destabilizing because they

stifle or reduce opportunities and quality of life for many, many

people.

The next fifty years global population is projected to increase by

3 billion. The global economy is likely to grow by four or five times.

As difficult as things now are, as challenging as the domestic and

international situation now is, environmental degradation and the

gap between the rich and the poor are likely to get worse and

greater if we continue with business as usual. The question that

I would leave is whether that should be our legacy for our children

and our grandchildren.

There are things that we can do. We know we can do them. We

ought to know that we need to do them. And I want to congratulate

you again for holding a hearing to focus on these questions. Thank

you so much.

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank all of you for your really excellent

presentations. I was listening very strongly and I just feel concerned, as you do, that we must change our ways if we are going

to be the leader that this Nation should and must be as we move

into the future.

And I want to especially thank all of those that are attending

here who have been very, very entertaining in the sense of looking

very interested, and I believe you all are. If I asked a show of

hands, how many agree with the last presentations that were made

here?

[No response.]

Senator JEFFORDS. Nobody?

[Laughter.]

Senator JEFFORDS. I just wanted to check on you.

Thank you everyone. It has been a very interesting and enlightening morning. We were pleased to have you all here.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committees were adjourned, to reconvene at the call of their respective Chairs.]

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

VERMONT

I’m glad to be here with my distinguished co-chair from the Foreign Relations

Committee for this joint hearing. I appreciate his willingness to explore today’s topic, and the fact that he has joined me as a sponsor of S. 556, the Clean Power

Act. I would also like to applaud him for his work to bring some truth and sanity

to America’s accounting nightmare.

The United States is an economic and military superpower, perhaps the lone superpower. But, as the old adage goes, with great power comes great responsibility.

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We are able to project great might far beyond our borders. We are also capable of

contributing to environmental and natural resource damage far beyond our borders

and far in excess of other countries. The question is, are we acting responsibly to

curb negative impacts abroad and at home?

Are we being good global neighbors and, at a minimum, keeping our word? It

seems that we may be keeping our literal word, given the very broad language in

many of the agreements. But in practical terms, it seems that we’re not trying very

hard to keep up with the spirit of some of our commitments.

The time is ripe for Congress to review how the Administration is implementing

our environmental agreements and commitments. Leaders of many countries will be

meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, in late August at the World Summit on

Sustainable Development. The occasion is the 10th anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio.

I’m pleased to note that the Secretary General of that Conference, Mr. Maurice

Strong, is here today to give us some historical perspective on that event and its

lasting effect.

The conferees will be met by a very different U.S. delegation in South Africa. The

previous Bush Administration provided extensive support for the Rio Earth Summit

and brought many new initiatives to the negotiating table.

But this Administration is likely to send a smaller and lower-level delegation and

has sought to narrow the scope of the discussions. This has apparently included an

effort to keep global climate change off of the agenda.

I am troubled by the Administration’s approach to global warming, especially in

light of the Sense of Congress approved by the Foreign Relations Committee and

made part of the Senate approved energy bill in April. That Resolution says the

United States should take responsible action to ensure significant and meaningful

reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases from all sectors.

But it doesn’t appear that responsible action is taking place and emissions continue growing. As my friend Senator Chafee pointed out during our Committee’s

markup of the Clean Power Act, the Administration’s Climate Action Report says,

‘‘A few ecosystems, such as alpine meadows in the Rocky Mountains and some barrier islands, are likely to disappear entirely in some areas. Other ecosystems . . .

are likely to experience major species shifts . . .’’

Our treaty commitment says, ‘‘The ultimate objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change is to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow

ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change....’’

Since these ecosystems are likely to disappear entirely because of manmade global

warming and will not be able to adapt naturally, it appears that we have entered

the zone of ‘‘dangerous interference.’’ Since these are real threats of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of full scientific certainty about cause and effect shouldn’t

be used as an excuse for not reducing emissions now. That is also our commitment.

Instead of acting to reduce emissions, the Administration’s approach guarantees

that greenhouse gas emissions will rise. According to Mr. Connaughton’s recent testimony, there is‘‘. . . no question about that.’’

This kind of inaction doesn’t comport with our commitments under the Framework Convention, the Sense of Congress, common sense or the National Environmental Policy Act (or NEPA). In 1969, NEPA became law. It was probably the first

adoption of a sustainable development philosophy by a government in the world. To

paraphrase, it says:‘‘. . . it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government . . .

to use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions

under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,

economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.’’

Unfortunately, the Administration seems to have lost sight of those future generations of Americans. Economic development that does not factor in the environment

or quality of life of those future generations is not sustainable.

The Administration and other opponents of the Kyoto Protocol claim that actions

to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions cost too much now. They need to

look at the long term. They also need to look at the many studies that have been

done that show a net positive impact of reducing emissions.

I ask unanimous consent that two such studies by the Tellus Institute and a list

of other studies be placed in the record.

There is no question that we must be concerned with the threats of today, like

the thousands of people dying prematurely every year from power plant pollution.

But, we can’t let the press of quarterly reports or the hunt for short term profits

prevent us from acting to reduce the threats of tomorrow. That’s especially true in

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the case of terrorism or global warming, where we have been presented with credible information about the threat.

As some of my colleagues know, I have a special interest in the U.N. Convention

to Combat Desertification and pressed hard for its ratification. Senator Helms was

instrumental in moving that treaty and I want to thank him for his and his staff’s efforts in helping me and others get that agreement approved. This treaty addresses

land degradation in some of the very impoverished parts of the world. It is designed

to encourage participatory democracy and stakeholder involvement. I look forward

to seeing how implementation is going.

I also have an interest in ratifying and implementing the Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. I have introduced legislation maintaining the spirit of

that treaty. I hope we’ll be able to get that moving soon so the U.S. can participate

in the Conference of Parties and the Review Committee.

There seems to be generally good news regarding chemicals that harm the ozone

layer. From all indications, the Montreal Protocol has been a success, though I gather there are some additional amendments coming soon. I’ll be interested to learn

how our efforts have reduced the ozone hole.

There is less clear news on the status of the Convention on Biological Diversity,

which was signed in 1993 but has not been sent to the Senate for ratification. I

would also appreciate hearing an update from our witnesses on the progress toward

implementation of the Basel Convention regarding the international transportation

of hazardous waste.

Finally, I would note something that is a little different between international

agreements and our more conventional environmental laws. They often seem to be

missing performance criteria or include very weak commitments.

Unfortunately, in the case of climate change, even when commitments are minimal, such as reporting on the policies and measures we have adopted to achieve

1990 levels, we have failed.

So, I would urge our negotiators to push for more specific environmental goals,

using targets and timetables. That will make it easier for the Senate to know

whether the treaties we have ratified are succeeding. Also, I believe the result will

be better for the environment and sustainable development.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

CONNECTICUT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing today on an essential topic—

our nation’s implementation of our international commitments on the environment.

I regret that I am unable to attend today, but I must preside over the markup of

the homeland security bill in the Governmental Affairs Committee.

Ten years ago, the world took a dramatic step toward a sustainable future when

it convened the Earth Summit in Rio De Janeiro during the tenure of the first President Bush. The Summit resulted in several of our most critical environmental agreements, including the Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity.

Unfortunately, as we prepare for the next ‘‘Earth Summit’’ a decade later, this

Bush Administration does not appear to have taken as aggressive an approach to

our global commitment to environmental protection as its predecessor did. In fact,

we appear to be going to the summit in Johannesburg with little more than a plan

to delay enforceable action on the planet’s critical needs.

The most visible—and most integral—of the Rio agreements for our sustainable

future may be the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. As is wellknown by now, however, this Administration has abdicated our nation’s leadership

on the issue, withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol and offering no alternative path

forward. That’s disturbing enough. But now we also appear ready to distract the

world’s attention from addressing this problem.

As I understand it, the United States has affirmatively stated to the world community that President Bush will not attend the conference in Johannesburg next

month if the climate change treaty is discussed. It is one thing to ignore this pressing problem domestically, as President Bush’s business-as-usual proposal is essentially doing. But it is entirely another to ask the rest of the world to put it aside

as well.

Luckily, in lieu of executive leadership, we have other branches and levels of government that can act, and are acting. The Environment Committee recently passed

the Clean Power Act, legislation limiting the release of greenhouse gases from power

plants. Governor Gray Davis of California just this week signed legislation limiting

greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. And many other proposals are in the

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works. The world understands we need to move ahead on this issue, the States understand we need to move ahead on this issue, and American citizens understand

we need to move ahead on this issue. It is time for the President to understand.

I therefore call on him to attend the Johannesburg summit and take the climate

change issue on, head on. Perhaps, when he does, he will see the light.

STATEMENT OF JOHN F. TURNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR OCEANS AND

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

STATE

Introduction

Chairmen Jeffords and Sarbanes, and other members of the Environment and

Public Works Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to review U.S. implementation of environmental treaties. The United States has a strong record on global environmental

issues. We are a leader in addressing environmental challenges on the international

level, having spearheaded efforts to negotiate environmental agreements on issues

ranging from ozone depletion to stemming illegal trade in endangered species. Just

a few weeks ago, the President submitted to the Senate an important treaty between the United States and Russia that would strengthen the conservation of our

shared polar bear population through a coordinated sustainable harvest management program.

In the case of toxic chemicals, the Administration submitted to Congress this

spring, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) and additional legislation that would allow the United States to implement this agreement,

in addition to a regional agreement POPs agreement and a treaty on Prior Informed

Consent. These multilateral agreements affirm the U.S. commitment to cooperate

with other countries on global health and environmental challenges. My distinguished colleague, Jim Connaughton, just discussed the enormous challenges we

face addressing climate change and how the Bush Administration intends to tackle

the problem while ensuring our economy continues to grow.

These treaties are just a few examples of environmental agreements that serve

as noteworthy tools in our foreign policy arsenal. The Department of State plays an

important role in monitoring the implementation of these agreements and working

inter-agency and international processes to ensure U.S. interests are served. For illustrative purposes, we would like to describe our efforts related to the following five

agreements we have ratified and currently are implementing—the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species (CITES); the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate

Change; the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation; and the

U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification.

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer

During the 1980’s, the United States led a global effort to negotiate an agreement

to phaseout the production and consumption of substances that deplete the ozone

layer. Scientific evidence showed that strong steps were needed to protect human

health from the debilitating effects of ozone depletion, such as increased incidence

of skin cancer and cataracts. These global efforts resulted in the adoption of the

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in September 1987,

which was ratified by the United States in 1988, and has now been ratified by 182

other countries.

Over the last 15 years, implementation of the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent amendments has yielded remarkable progress in protecting the stratospheric

ozone layer by phasing out the consumption and use of ozone depleting substances

on a global scale. The United States has met its obligations under the Montreal Protocol by phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), halons, carbon tetrachloride, and

methyl chloroform.

Although the State Department is the lead agency responsible for coordinating

our participation in the Protocol, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the

principal entity responsible for domestic implementation of the Protocol, under authority provided by the Clean Air Act. (The Clean Air Act specifically authorizes

EPA to take steps necessary to ensure that our domestic regulations are consistent

with our obligations under the Protocol.) Additionally, the Department of Justice

and EPA have played an important role by identifying and prosecuting individuals

engaged in illegal smuggling of ozone-depleting substances, making the United

States a world leader in these law enforcement activities.

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The Protocol also includes provisions to establish a Multilateral Fund to provide

financial and technical assistance to developing country Parties to assist them in

meeting their obligations under the Protocol. As the largest contributor to the Multilateral Fund, the United States has made available over $340 million to the Fund

since its inception.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

(CITES)

CITES, called by some the Washington Convention, concluded on March 3, 1973

in Washington, DC. and entered into force on July 1, 1975. As of July 1st of this

year, 158 Parties have adopted the Convention.

CITES conservation goals are to: monitor international trade in endangered species; maintain those species in an ecological balance; and assist countries toward a

sustainable use of species through international trade. The contracting Parties to

CITES recognize that international cooperation is essential for the protection of wild

flora and fauna.

CITES Parties regulate wildlife trade through controls and regulations on species

listed in three appendices. Appendix I lists species threatened by extinction which

are or may be affected by trade. Trade in Appendix I species is allowed only in exceptional, non-commercial circumstances and only with permits from both the exporting and importing country. Appendix II species include species which, while not

now threatened with extinction, may become so unless trade in such specimens is

subject to strict regulation. Export permits are required from the country of export,

and both exporting and importing countries must monitor the use of those permits.

Trade in Appendix III species requires a certificate of origin and an export permit

based on a finding of legal acquisition and satisfaction of preparation and shipping

conditions. Listing or de-listing of species in Appendix I or II requires consideration

by the Conference of the Parties of species proposals submitted by Parties. To succeed, such proposals must gain a two-thirds majority in a vote of the Parties. Individual Parties can list species under their jurisdiction in Appendix III for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation or if they deem a need for cooperation

in controlling the trade. A Party may take a reservation to the listing of a species

on Appendix I or II within 90 days of the vote and anytime after the addition of

a species to Appendix III. As the trade impact or other threats to a species increase

or decrease, species may be shifted between, added to, or removed from these Appendices.

CITES also regulates international trade through a system of import and export

permits that are required before specimens leave a country. Each Party must appoint a CITES Management Authority and a CITES Scientific Authority. The Fish

and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, is the Management Authority and

Scientific Authority for CITES for the United States and also plays the major law

enforcement role. The Management Authority is responsible for issuing permits and

implementation of the trade controls of the convention, as well as maintaining

records of trade in specimens in the Appendices. The Scientific Authority is responsible for making scientific findings on whether trade will be detrimental to the survival of a species and for monitoring the export permits granted against the actual

level of trade for a species. CITES also requires law enforcement capability to enforce the CITES provisions and penalize illegal trade.

With respect to implementation, the U.S. implements CITES primarily through

regulations developed under the Endangered Species Act as well as enforces it

through other existing laws such as the Lacey Act. The United States ensures compliance through extensive regulatory systems; Washington based policy, scientific

and permitting offices; and enforcement personnel at designated CITES ports. These

are administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Interior and/or

the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Department of Agriculture.

The United States is proud of its record in implementing its CITES obligations.

We are at the forefront of CITES parties in fulfilling these obligations. CITES studies have recognized these accomplishments. For example, one determined that the

United States has effective national legislation implementing CITES obligations,

and another found that the United States was effectively controlling the trade in

tigers and tiger parts. A strong and professional staff at the Fish and Wildlife Service, together with good coordination with the State Department, the Animal and

Plant Health Inspection Service and other agencies, have made this notable success

possible.

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Negotiations that led to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) began in Chantilly, Virginia, in February 1991 at the invitation of PresiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
105

dent George H.W. Bush. The negotiations concluded on May 9, 1992, in New York

where the convention was adopted. It was subsequently opened for signature at the

June 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The

UNFCCC entered into force on March 21, 1994, after ratification by 50 Parties. The

United States ratified the UNFCCC on October 15, 1992, becoming the first industrialized Nation and the fourth Nation overall to do so. As of July 2002, the

UNFCCC has 186 Parties.

The UNFCCC creates a broad global framework for addressing the challenge of

climate change. It establishes an objective, commitments for different groups of

countries, and a set of institutions to enable governments to consider and adopt appropriate actions and to monitor the Convention’s implementation. The Convention

groups countries into two annexes. Annex I lists most members of the Organization

for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) plus the states of Central and

Eastern Europe as well as several states of the Former Soviet Union. Prior to the

year 2000, Annex I Parties were to adopt policies and measures aimed at returning

their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels. Annex II lists a smaller subset of

Annex I Parties who agreed to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in implementing their Convention commitments.

The ultimate objective of the Convention is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse

gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-induced] interference with the climate system. The Convention’s objective further provides that: ‘‘Such a level should be achieved within a

time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to

ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development

to proceed in a sustainable manner.’’

All Parties to the Convention are committed to respond to climate change and to

cooperate in various ways toward this end. In particular, each Party is required to

prepare and submit a national inventory of its emissions by sources and removals

by sinks (forests and other natural systems that remove greenhouse gases from the

atmosphere) of greenhouse gases. Each party is also required to prepare a national

communication describing the steps it is taking to implement the Convention. The

United States submitted its Third National Communication (the U.S. Climate Action Report) to the Convention’s secretariat in May 2002.

In addition, the Convention requires that all Parties:

• Formulate national or regional programs containing measures to mitigate climate change;

• Promote the development and diffusion of technologies that control, reduce or

prevent greenhouse gas emissions;

• Promote sustainable management and conservation of sinks and reservoirs of

greenhouse gases;

• Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change;

• Take climate change considerations into account to minimize adverse effects of

steps taken to mitigate or adapt to climate change on the economy, on public health,

and on the quality of the environment by carefully considering climate change actions;

• Promote and cooperate in research, systematic observation and the development of data archives related to the climate system so as to further understanding

and reduce uncertainties about the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of climate

change and the consequences of response strategies;

• Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of scientific and

other information related to the climate system and the consequences of response

strategies, and

• Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to

climate change.

Annex I Parties have more extensive requirements under the Convention to report

on the steps they are taking to address climate change and, as noted, prior to the

year 2000 they were to aim to return their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990

levels. Annex II Parties have certain additional requirements under the Convention.

They agreed to provide financial assistance to developing country Parties to help

them meet their Convention commitments, and they agreed to assist developing

country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate

change in meeting the costs of adaptation to those adverse effects. Annex II Parties

also agreed to assist other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, with

technology transfer and access to environmentally sound technologies and knowhow.

The Global Environment Facility serves as an operating entity of the Convention’s

financial mechanism. All Annex II Parties contribute to the Global Environment FaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
106

cility, including the United States. In addition, however, developed country Parties

may also provide financial resources related to the implementation of the Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels. The U.S. Climate

Action Report contains detailed information both with respect to U.S. contributions

to the GEF as well as with respect to the other means through which the United

States is meeting its obligations under the Convention.

The work of the Convention takes place in two subsidiary bodies—the Subsidiary

Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation—which meet normally twice a year to prepare for an annual meeting of the

Conference of the Parties, the supreme body under the Convention. The subsidiary

bodies held their most recent session from June 3–14 in Bonn, Germany, the seat

of the Convention’s secretariat. The 8th Conference of the Parties will take place

from October 23 to November 1, 2002, in New Delhi.

Negotiations to strengthen the commitments of Annex I Parties began in 1995,

following a decision—the so-called ‘‘Berlin Mandate’’—taken at the first session of

the Conference of the Parties. In July 1997, the Senate adopted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by a vote of 95–0 urging the administration to sign no agreement that would

harm the U.S. economy or that did not contain specific scheduled quantified commitments for developing countries. In December 1997, Parties to the Convention adopted the Kyoto Protocol at their third session. The United States signed the Kyoto

Protocol on November 12, 1998. The previous administration never subsequently

sent the Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent, maintaining that the Kyoto

Protocol was a ‘‘work in progress’’ and that key developing countries would need to

agree to ‘‘meaningful participation’’ for the United States to ratify it.

After taking office in 2001, President Bush announced that the United States

would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol because it would harm the U.S. economy and

it contained no commitments for 80 percent of the world. At the same time, the

President indicated that each Nation must decide whether to ratify the Kyoto Protocol based on an assessment of its national interest and that the United States

would not interfere with the decisions of other nations in this regard. As of July

2002, 74 nations and one regional economic integration organization (the European

Union) had ratified or acceded to the Kyoto Protocol. Collectively, these countries

represent 36 percent of the 1990 carbon dioxide emissions of the Convention’s Annex

I Parties. Under its terms, the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force once 55 Parties

to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted for

at least 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

President Bush has made two major announcements of U.S. policy regarding global climate change—on June 11, 2001, and on February 14, 2002. Both of these announcements call for intensified efforts with other nations to address the challenge

of climate change. Toward this end, the United States has initiated a series of bilateral climate change relationships with important partners, including: Australia,

Central America (CONCAUSA), the European Union, Canada, China, India, Italy

and Japan. Discussions toward additional climate change relationships have begun

or are contemplated also with: Brazil, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian

Federation, South Africa and Ukraine.

These bilateral climate change relationships range from those devoted largely to

undertaking cooperative science and technology projects to those that may focus

more on the exchange of information and views related to climate change policy.

Along this continuum—from S&T projects at one end to policy at the other—each

relationship usually involves a particular mix of the two. In the case of Japan, for

example, we have three working groups focused on: (1) S&T cooperation; (2) developing countries; and (3) market mechanisms.

Both with our continued, active participation under the UNFCCC and in our bilateral relationships that complement and enhance our multilateral cooperation, we

are seeking to build relationships that will enable us and others to address the long

term challenge of climate change on a balanced and measured basis, consistent with

the need to ensure the continued economic prosperity for our citizens and our Nation.

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), commonly referred to as the NAFTA environmental side agreement, serves as an important framework for cooperation among the three North American governments on

a wide range of environmental affairs. Among other things, the NAAEC established

the Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), which coordinates such cooperation. The United States remains committed to the agreement, which has been

107

in force since 1994, and to the North American environmental cooperation that

takes place under it.

The Commission established by the agreement is composed of a Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. The Council is the governing body,

and is composed of representatives of the governments. The three environment ministers represent their governments on the Council. The EPA Administrator is the

designated U.S. representative on the Council and EPA has lead responsibility for

managing the interagency process that develops U.S. positions and guides our participation in the CEC. The Department of State works closely with EPA and maintains responsibility on all questions regarding the interpretation of the agreement.

We play an active role in implementation of the NAAEC and in developing work

through the CEC.

The NAAEC is notable for a high degree of citizen participation. A trilateral Joint

Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) participates in CEC deliberations, including direct interaction with the Council. The governments each appoint five members to

the JPAC, who represent a wide array of stakeholders from industry, academia, and

nongovernmental organizations. Each country also maintains governmental and/or

non-governmental domestic advisory bodies. The structure of the CEC has produced

fluid communication among our countries that has enhanced significantly our broader relationships.

The NAAEC also contains a public submission process in which citizens may submit claims to the Secretariat regarding the failure of a government to enforce its

environmental laws and the Council may direct the development and release of a

‘‘factual record’’ concerning the claim in response.

The NAAEC has promoted strong cooperation among the three countries on a

number of important environmental issues, achieved primarily through implementation of the CEC work program funded at US$9 million annually with equal contributions by the Parties. These include promotion of enforcement of and compliance

with environmental laws, protecting children’s environmental health, protecting animal species that migrate throughout North America, and minimizing the use of certain persistent toxic chemicals such as DDT. Trilateral cooperation under the

NAAEC has provided an impetus for the development of certain types of environmental legislation, particularly the new mandatory Pollutant Release and Transfer

Register in Mexico.

The United States has fully complied with our obligations under the NAAEC. Unlike some other environmental agreements that call for very specific actions or the

achievement of specific targets in a designated timeframe, the NAAEC sets up a

general framework for cooperation, which is then developed and implemented over

time through the CEC. This has proven to be an effective framework for promoting

environmental cooperation within North America.

The U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification

The U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) arose out of the 1992

Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro at which African countries argued that the U.N.

Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity did not address their major concern—desertification. Desertification—the degradation of dry lands—is not limited to Africa: it affects millions of people inhabiting

one quarter of the world’s land area from the American west, to the Aral Sea in

Russia, to Argentina and the islands of the Caribbean, Indonesia and the Mediterranean.

The United States played a key role in negotiating the UNCCD—a role which is

a natural outgrowth of the United States’ experience during the Dust Bowl of the

1930’s and our long-standing concern about desertification in developing countries,

particularly in Africa. Negotiations on the CCD concluded in June 1994 and the

Convention entered into force in December 1996.

The purpose of the Convention is to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought on arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid lands through effective local,

national, regional and global action, particularly in Africa. The Convention’s central

objective is to promote the sustainable use of drylands worldwide, but especially in

Africa, and to make more efficient use of aid resources, thereby helping to solve Africa’s and other affected regions’ chronic hunger problems. The CCD employs a

unique grass-roots approach, emphasizing a ‘‘bottom-up’’ approach with strong local

participation in decisionmaking.

Under the Convention, the United States, with approximately 40 percent of our

landmass considered arid, semi-arid or dry sub-humid and therefore susceptible to

the processes of desertification, is an affected Party. As an affected Party, the

United States is required to have strategies to address desertification. Given our extensive system of land management strategies, practices and programs, no changes

108

were or are required in our domestic policies or programs for the U.S. to meet this

obligation under the Convention. (The Convention acknowledges that Parties may

implement their obligations through ‘‘existing or prospective’’ arrangements). Many

of the principles used successfully in the U.S. over the past 70 years have been incorporated in the language of the Convention. All Parties are required to submit reports to the Secretariat of the CCD on activities undertaken in support of the CCD,

on a timetable determined by the Conference of the Parties. The first U.S. Report

on Activities Undertaken in Support of the U.N. Convention to Combat

Desertification was officially submitted July 3, 2002.

The United States is also required to provide support for developing country efforts to combat desertification, including by providing financial resources, although

the Convention does not impose a specific amount or timing with respect to this requirement.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U. S. government agency implementing the CCD overseas. The Department of the Interior (Bureau of Land Management) and the Department of Agriculture also carry out program activities in support of the implementation of the Convention. Bilaterally and

regionally, the United States works with affected developing country Parties, local

and international non-governmental organizations, and multilateral development

banks on anti-desertification program activities, including education, community development, and capacity building, with the goal of empowering local people to combat desertification by identifying needs and solving problems themselves. An important aspect of CCD implementation is the dissemination of technology and scientific

and technical information. The U.S. has made and will continue to make an important contribution in this area, given our 70 years of experience combating

desertification in the American West.

Looking Ahead

While significant progress in protecting the environment has been made, enormous challenges lie ahead. The upcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa, provides the United States with a

unique opportunity to take stock of our past accomplishments and to build on them

in helping to advance economic and social growth and environmental stewardship.

We have learned a great deal since the Rio Earth Summit. WSSD gives us a chance

to create a new paradigm that stresses sound economic policies, national capacity

for good governance, anti-corruption, transparency and the role of science. The Bush

Administration is committed to its success.

RESPONSES OF JAMES F. TURNER TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR

JEFFORDS

Question 1. Please provide a complete list of the status of all environmental treaties that the United States has signed and ratified (or only signed) since 1945, including all dates of signature and ratification. Please note the environmental treaties since 1945 that the United States has neither ratified nor signed.

Response. The State Department does not maintain a separate data base of environmental treaties, and is in the process of compiling the requested information

from the official records.

Question 2. What is the best way for the public to determine whether the United

States is complying with its international environmental agreements?

Response. One useful method is to review the obligations contained in the agreements and consider what steps the United States has taken with respect to each

such obligation. In some cases the latter will involve considering a wide range of

U.S. Government programs and activities.

Question 3. Your boss, Ms. Dobriansky, and others in the Administration have

been quoted as saying ‘‘Sustainable Development begins at home.’’ What exactly

does that mean and how is it measured?

Response. The Administration uses the phrase ‘‘sustainable development begins at

home’’ to describe a provision in the agreement reached at the U.N. Conference on

Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico in March this year, specifically,

‘‘Each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social development . . .’’ We advocate that development be sustainable, and that to achieve this

sustainable development, nations must practice good domestic governance. Good domestic governance is characterized by robust democratic institutions (including a

popularly elected legislature and an independent judiciary); effective measures to

combat corruption; adherence to the rule of law (i.e., fair and consistent application

of law); public participation in decisionmaking; and the use of sound science to guide

109

those government decisions to the extent possible. A country that is not committed

to these goals, including being good stewards of its natural resources, cannot expect

development to occur optimally, because the full range of development resources,

both domestic and foreign, will not be mobilized and effectively used to foster economic and social development and environmental protection. International cooperation and development assistance will continue to play an important support role.

However, the commitment to sustainable development, and to establish the needed

framework to promote such development must begin domestically.

Question 4. One of the purposes of the World Summit is to re-energize efforts at

the national level in regard to sustainable development and the implementation of

Agenda 21. What domestic actions is the Administration considering as followup to

Johannesburg?

Response. The Administration plans to continue efforts to implement Agenda 21

through a number of mechanisms including innovative public-private partnerships.

The Council on Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of the Interior, Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture and

other government agencies are actively working with the public and private sectors

to ensure that sustainable development is a priority? at the national level.

Question 5. Could you please provide a list for the record of the U.S. delegation

representatives that will be attending, and the list of U.S. delegation representatives that attended the Rio Earth Summit?

Response. We have attached a provisional list of the U.S. delegation to the World

Summit on Sustainable Development and a list of the U.S. delegation to the United

Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) held in

Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,

JOHANNESBURG, AUGUST 26—SEPTEMBER 4, 2002

Ex Officio Head of Delegation

The Honorable Colin L. Powell

Secretary of State

Representatives

The Honorable Paula J. Dobriansky

Under Secretary for Global Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable John F. Turner

Assistant Secretary for Oceans and

International Environmental and

Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Alternate Representatives

The Honorable Claude A. Allen

Deputy Secretary

Department of Health and Human

Services

The Honorable Robert G. Card

Under Secretary for Energy, Science

and Environment

Department of Energy

The Honorable James L. Connaughton

Chairman

Council on Environmental Quality

Executive Office of the President

The Honorable Linda J. Fisher

Deputy Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

The Honorable Cameron R. Hume

United States Ambassador

Pretoria

The Honorable Conrad C. Lautenbacher,

Jr.

Under Secretary for Oceans and

Atmosphere

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of Commerce

Jonathan A. Margolis

Director

Office of Policy Coordination and

Initiatives

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Richard T. Miller

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Bureau of International Organization

Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable James R. Moseley

Deputy Secretary

Department of Agriculture

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The Honorable Andrew S. Natsios

Administrator

Agency for International Development

Anthony F. Rock

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

for Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable Sichan Siv

Ambassador

United States Representative to the

Economic and Social Council

United States Mission to the United

Nations

The Honorable Peter S. Watson

President and Chief Executive Officer

Overseas Private Investment

Corporation

The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman

Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

Senior Advisers

Alan Hecht

Council on Environmental Quality

National Security Council

Executive Office of the President

Donald K. Steinberg

Deputy Director

Office of the Policy Planning Staff

Department of State

Advisers

Kate Almquist

Special Assistant

Office of the Administrator

Agency for International Development

Christo Artusio

Office of Global Change

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Deborah M. Atwood

Special Assistant to the Deputy

Secretary

Department of Agriculture

The Honorable Judith E. Ayres

Assistant Administrator for

International Affairs

Environmental Protection Agency

Adela Backiel

Director of Sustainable Development

Department of Agriculture

Janice F. Bay

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Economic and Business

Affairs

Department of State

John Beale

Deputy Assistant Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

Karin Berry

Senior Policy Analyst

Department of Energy

Robert Blair

Office of International Health Affairs

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Evan T. Bloom

Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser

for Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Office of the Legal Adviser

Department of State

The Honorable Richard A. Boucher

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs

and Department Spokesman

Department of State

Marcel Bouquet

Interpreter

Office of Language Services

Department of State

Sarah K. Brandel

Office of Ocean Affairs Bureau of

Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

William J. Brennan

Deputy Assistant Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration Department of

Commerce

Gayleatha Brown

111

Counselor for Political Affairs

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Lori Brutten

Office of Policy Coordination and

Initiatives

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Steven Buckler

Counselor for Administrative Affairs

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Jeffry Burnam

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Stephanie Childs

Senior Adviser

Office of the Under Secretary for

International Trade

International Trade Administration

Department of Commerce

Brent Christensen

Economic Officer

United States Embassy Beijing

Cynthia Church

Deputy Press Secretary

Department of State

Karen Clark

Department of the Interior

Lawrence E. Clark

Associate Chief

Natural Resource Conservation Service

Department of Agriculture

Gerald Clifford

Deputy Assistant Administrator

Office of International Activities

Environmental Protection Agency

Sally D. Collins

Associate Chief

United States Forest Service

Department of Agriculture

William E. Craft

Director

Office of Multilateral Trade Affairs

Bureau of Economic and Business

Affairs

Department of State

Jonathan Crock

Office of the Ambassador-at-Large For

War Crime Issues

Department of State

The Honorable Patrick M. Cronin

Assistant Administrator

Agency for International Development

Wayne D’Angelo

Advance Director

Environmental Protection Agency

John Davison

Deputy United States Representative

to the Economic and Social Council

United States Mission to the United

Nations

Jill Derderian

Environment, Science and Technology

Officer

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Stewart Devine

Advance Line Officer

Executive Secretariat

Department of State

Joseph Martin Dieu

Coordinator for the World Summit on

Sustainable Development

Office of International Activities

Environmental Protection Agency

Dirk Dijkerman

United States Agency for International

Development Director

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Larisa Dobrianaky

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Department of Energy

James R. Dunlap

Executive Assistant

Bureau of African Affairs

Department of State

112

Dennie Ege

Office of International Conferences

Bureau of International Organization

Affairs

Department of State

Virginia L. Farris

Public Affairs Officer

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Joseph Ferrante

Assistant to the Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

Cory A. Firestone

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental, and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable Emil Frankel

Assistant Secretary for Transportation

Policy

Department of Transportation

The Honorable Jendayi E. Frazer

Special Assistant to the President And

Senior Director for African Affairs

National Security Council

Executive Office of the President

Joseph Freedman

Associate General Counsel

Environmental Protection Agency

William M. Frej

Director for Development Issues

National Security Council

Executive Office of the President

William R. Gaines

Coordinator for International Affairs

Office of Science and Technology Policy

Executive Office of the President

The Honorable David Garman

Assistant Secretary for Energy

Efficiency and Renewable Energy

Department of Energy

Isabel N. Gates

Office of the Executive Director

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Joanne B. Giordano

Deputy Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Legislative and Public

Affairs

Agency for International Development

Virginia Green

Vice President

Investment Policy

Overseas Private Investment

Corporation

Jeff J. Grieco

Chief

Multimedia Communications Division

‘‘Bureau for Legislativeand Public

Affairs

Agency for International Development

Joseph B. Ham

Trade Specialist

Department of Agriculture

Robert K. Harris

Attorney Adviser

Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser

for Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Office of the Legal Adviser

Department of State

John J. Hartley, II

Minister-Counselor for Economic

Affairs

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Jennifer A. Haverkamp

Assistant United States Trade

Representative for Environment and

Natural Resources

Office of the United States Trade

Representative Executive Office of the

President

Richard Helm

Counselor for Agricultural Affairs

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Leonard A. Hirsch

Adviser

Smithsonian Institution

Teresa D. Hobgood

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

113

Department of State

Ronald Neil Hoffer

Environmental Protection Agency

The Honorable Jeffrey Holmstead

Assistant Administrator for Air and

Radiation

Environmental Protection Agency

Heather Hopkins

Legislative Program Specialist

Congressional Liaison Division

Bureau for Legislative and Public

Affairs

Agency for International Development

Robert P. Hopkins

Director

External Affairs

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of Commerce

Chase M. Huntley

Analyst

Natural Resources and Environment

General Accounting Office

Kelly A. Johnson

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

Environment and Natural Resources

Division

Department of Justice

The Honorable Walter H. Kansteiner

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Department of State

Roy S. Katayaina

Adviser

Agency for International Development

Craig Kelly

Executive Assistant

Office of the Secretary

Department of State

Carol Kramer-LeBlanc

Adviser on Food Security

Foreign Agricultural Service

Department of Agriculture

Luisa Joy G. Labez

Senior International Affairs Analyst

General Accounting Office

Washington, DC.

Karen T. Levine

United States Representative to the

United Nations Environment Program

United States Embassy

Nairobi

Herbert Levitan

National Science Foundation

Frances C. Li

National Science Foundation

Clay Lowery

Deputy Assistant Secretary for

International Debt, Development and

Quantitative Policy Analysis

Department of the Treasury

James A. Mahoney

Vice President

Engineering and Environment

Export-Import Bank of the United

States

Joe Martyak

Associate Administrator for

Communications, Education and

Media

Environmental Protection Agency

Jan L. McAlpine

Office of Ecology and Terrestrial

Conservation

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

John McCutcheon

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Department of Energy

Elizabeth McLanahan

International Affairs Specialist

Department of Commerce

Thomas K. McNeil, Jr.

Personal Assistant to the

Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

James Metzger

Military Adviser to the Secretary of

State and

114

Special Assistant to the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gillian Milovanovic

Deputy Chief of Mission

United States Embassy

Pretoria

Linda V. Moodie

Chief

Application and Information Services

Branch

International and Interagency Affairs

Office

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of Commerce

Franklin Moore

Director

Global Center for the Environment

Agency for International Development

Melinda Moore

Deputy Director

Office of Global Health Affairs

Department of Health and Human

Services

Sahar Moridani

Special Assistant to the Assistant

Secretary for Public Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable Everett L. Mosley

Inspector General

Agency for International Development

Jacob Moss

Special Assistant

Environmental Protection Agency

The Honorable Constance Berry

Newman

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Africa

Agency for International Development

Rachel Nugent

National Institutes of Health

Department of Health and Human

Services

Elisha Nyman

Special Assistant to the Under

Secretary for Global Affairs

Department of State

Jennifer M. O’Connor

Adviser

Department of Agriculture

Richard Parker

Assistant to the Deputy Secretary

Department of Health and Human

Services

The Honorable Elizabeth Anne Peterson

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Global Health

Agency for International Development

C. Anne Pence

Executive Assistant

Office-of the Under Secretary for

Economic, Business and Agricultural

Affairs

Department of State

Brett Pomainville

Office of Policy Coordination and

Initiatives

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Susan Povenmire

Office of Public Diplomacy

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable Pierre Prosper

Ambassador-at-Large for War Crime

Issues

Department of State

Scott C. Rayder

Chief of Staff

Office of the Under Secretary for

Oceans and Atmosphere

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration Department of

Commerce

Henry David Reese

Environmental Protection Specialist

Department of Transportation

Daniel Rochberg

Office of Policy Coordination

and.Initiatives

Bureau of Oceans and International

115

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Peter Roussopoulos

Adviser on Sustainable Development

United States Forest Service

Department of Agriculture

James W. Rubin

Assistant Chief

Policy, Legislation and Special

Litigation

Department of Justice

Aaron Salzberg

Office of Policy Coordination and

Initiatives

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Brenda Scarborough

Advance Communications

Executive Secretariat

Department of State

Walter Gary Sharp

Congressional Relations Adviser

Bureau of Legislative Affairs

Department of State

Betsi Shays

Adviser

Peace Corps

Marysue Shore

Senior Adviser to the President and

Director of, African Affairs

Overseas Private Investment

Corporation

The Honorable Eimny B. Simmons

Assistant Administrator

Bureau for Economic Growth,

Agriculture and Trade

Agency for International Development

Daniel Smith

Deputy Executive Secretary

Department of State

Dean Thompson

Advance Line Officer

Executive Secretariat

Department of State

Griffin M. Thompson

Director

Office of Energy, Environment and

Technology

Center for the Environment

Agency for International Development

Eileen Ramira Travoto

Deputy Assistant Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

Michael C. Trulson

Office of Environmental Policy

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

David J. van Hoogstraten

Office of Environmental Policy

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Darci L. Vetter

Office of the United States Trade

Representative

Executive Office of the President

Harlan Watson

Office of Global Change

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Eric B. Wilson

Senior Program Analyst

Bureau of Indian Affairs

Department of the Interior

William Stanley Wilson

Senior Scientist

National Environmental Satellite,

Data and Information Service

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of Commerce

Whitney Witteman

Office of International Conferences

Bureau of International Organization

Affairs

Department of State

Private Sector Advisers

Geraldine Barrows

Special Assistant

Office of the Mayor

Hempstead, New York

116

Manley A. Begay

Director

Native Nations Institute

Navajo Tribe

Tucson, Arizona

George D. Carpenter

Director of Corporate Sustainable

Development

Procter and Gamble Company

Cincinnati, Ohio

Richard Coombe

Chair and Chief Executive Officer

Watershed Agricultural Council

Walton, New York

Dianne Dillon Ridgely

Director

The Center for a New American

Dream

Iowa City, Iowa

Daniel Esty

Director

Yale Center on Environmental Law

and Policy

Yale Law School

New Haven, Connecticut

The Honorable James A. Garner

Mayor

Hempstead, New York

Hank Habicht

Chief Executive Officer

Global Environment and Technology

Foundation

Annandale, Virginia

Lauren Inouye

Stanford Institute for International

Studies

Center for Environmental Science and

Policy

Washington, DC.

John Klink

Montecito, California

F. Sherwood Rowland

National Academy of Sciences

Irvine, California

Chris Tucker

Actor and Comedian

Los Angeles, California

UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO THE

WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT JOHANNESBURG, AUGUST 26—SEPTEMBER 4, 2002

Members of the House of Representatives

The Honorable Thomas H. Allen

House of Representatives

The Honorable Earl Blumenauer

House of Representatives

The Honorable James C. Greenwood

House of Representatives

The Honorable Dennis J. Kucinich

House of Representatives

The Honorable George Miller

House of Representatives

The Honorable Christopher Shays

House of Representatives

Congressional Staff

Sara Elizabeth Barth

Legislative Assistant

Office of Senator Barbara Boxer

U.S. Senate

Janine Benner

Legislative Assistant

Office of Congressman Earl

Blumenauer

House of Representatives

Floyd DesChamps

Senior Professional Staff Member

Committee on Commerce, Science and

Transportation

U.S. Senate

Greg Dotson

Counsel

Committee on Government Reform

and

Office of Congressman Henry A.

Waxman

House of Representatives

117

Deb Fiddelke

Press Director

Office of Senator Chuck Hagel

U.S. Senate

Kenneth W. Flanz

Deputy Legislative Director

Office of Senator Michael D. Crapo

U.S. Senate

Amy A. Fraenkel

Counsel

Committee On Commerce, Science and

Transportation

U.S. Senate

Richard Frandsen

Senior Counsel

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

Stephen E. Moody

Legislative Assistant

Office of Congressman George Miller

House of Representatives

Maurice A. Perkins

Professional Staff member

Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. Senate

Eric Pfuehler

Administrative Assistant

Office of Congressman David Bonior

House of Representatives

Johanna F. Polsenberg

Legislative Fellow

Office of Congressman Sam Farr

House of Representatives

Tiffany Anne Prather

Legislative Fellow

Committee on Environment and Public

Works

U.S. Senate

Paul L. Oostburg Sanz

Deputy Chief Counsel

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

Dallas Scholes

Counsel/Legislative Assistant

Office of Senator Michael Enzi

U.S. Senate

Alison Leigh Taylor

Chief Counsel

Committee on Environment and Public

Works

U.S. Senate

The following Congressional Staff spouse will accompany the delegation: Jacqueline Kae DesChamps.

Question 6. What measures should we look at to determine whether U.S. programs and resources are achieving the goals of Agenda 21?

Response. There are a number of measures that could be considered to evaluate

our progress in achieving the goals of Agenda 21. The body of international environmental agreements to which the United States is a party provides one important

measure. Beyond U.S. participation in and implementation of treaties and conventions, however, is an important body of domestic activities undertaken by both the

U.S. Government and the private sector to advance sustainable development objectives. Examples of government activities include enactment and implementation of

Brownfields legislation (to promote cleanup and reuse of contaminated land) and

TEA–21 (which, among other things, promotes sustainable transportation) and voluntary policy initiatives such as the U.S.-led International Coral Reef Initiative

(ICRI), the U.N. Forest Forum (which is developing a set of indicators for the sustainable management of the world’s most endangered forest resources), and the Arctic Council (which has identified and implemented voluntary measures to reduce

toxic chemicals that pose a particular bioaccumulation risk in animals and humans

in polar regions). Voluntary measures implemented by the private sector in the

United States, such as the Energy Star program for energy efficient appliances and

the adoption of clean production technologies and methods, have also contributed

significantly to achievement of the goals of Agenda 21.

Question 7. The Administration has strongly promoted the concept of concrete

‘‘partnerships,’’ or Type II initiatives, including ones on sustainable energy and

clean water. What is the status of these efforts and does the Administration plan

to provide new financial resources for such partnerships? How will the Administration guarantee that voluntary partnerships will deliver real progress for sustainable

development, especially if they are not designed to implement specific international

agreements with targets and timetables? How can the Administration guarantee

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that any partnerships that involve corporations are carried out in a responsible

manner if there is no independent oversight framework?

Response. The United States is proposing four ‘‘signature’’ partnerships that have

been created as a result of preparations for WSSD. These are in the fields of energy,

water, hunger and forests. These partnerships are ‘‘coalitions of the willing’’, voluntary in nature and open to those governments, NGO’s, private sector entities, and

civil society groups who wish to participate. In other words, they do not require the

negotiation of an international treaty, but rather are invitations to cooperate to

achieve a shared goal. We would expect that each partnership would identify its

goals and periodically provide a report on its progress. Such reports should be accessible and open to the public. The Commission on Sustainable Development could be

used as the forum in which partnerships provide their reports, further increasing

transparency and thereby accountability. The Administration plans to finance these

partnerships through existing resources.

Question 8. The Administration has (rightly) been very strong on the importance

of ‘‘good governance’’ to sustainable development. The President announced in a

speech at the Inter-American Development Bank on March 14 that the United

States will increase its core development assistance by 50 percent over the next 3

years, resulting in a $5 billion annual increase over current levels. These additional

funds will go to a new Millennium Challenge Account that will fund initiatives to

help developing nations improve their economies and standards of living. The Millennium Challenge Account will set criteria for how the additional $5 billion the

United States has pledged will be allocated. But ‘‘good governance’’ does not come

cheap. How does the Administration propose to assist countries to bring about ‘‘good

governance,’’ as opposed to rewarding countries exhibiting it? How much of U.S. aid

is currently spent on ‘‘good governance’’?

The Federal Government currently funds many programs that promote good governance across in almost every developing country of the world. U.S. assistance for

governance programs was over $1.5 billion in fiscal year 02 for programs supporting,

among other things; policy training for civil servants and elected officials, government information management, promotion of civil society groups, election monitoring, anti-corruption, judicial and prosecutorial. capacity-building, women’s and

workers’ rights, public-private partnerships, and food security. These programs,

among many others, will continue within the framework of existing development assistance.

Tbe MCA will be a new account that will supplement, not replace, existing programs. The MCA will assist countries that have made a commitment to ruling justly, investing in people, and promoting economic freedom. MCA funds will be distributed in flexible and innovative ways so that they can have a maximum impact on

economic growth and poverty reduction. Country ownership is a critical component

of the MCA. The uses of the funds will be determined by full engagement with recipient countries. We will partner with, not dictate to, MCA countries.

Competition for the MCA will inspire non-recipient countries to improve their performance on governance. Countries that do improve their performance will be in a

position to compete for MCA funding in the future. Existing U.S. Government programs can help those countries that are willing to engage in serious policy reform.

Question 9. What are the criteria for the Millennium Challenge Account? Why is

it proposed to announce these after WSSD? What will be’ the role of environmental

measures in the criteria? What environmental criteria will apply to expenditure of

the funds?

Response. The Administration is still evaluating criteria to determine how funds

from the Millennium Challenge Account would be disbursed. We are consulting with

development partners in developed countries as well as with potential developing

country recipients as we develop these criteria. This thorough process, which began

immediately after the Financing for Development Summit in Monterrey in March,

is independent of the timetable for WSSD.

Question 10. What effect has the U.S. farm bill had on U.S. negotiating capacity

and leverage, particularly with respect to the issue of reducing environmentally

harmful subsidies? How has this affected U.S. credibility?

Response. The United States is strongly committed to an ambitious outcome reducing global trade distortions in agriculture through the WTO. As Ambassador

Zoellick has made clear, our strategy in pursuing this goal rests on a three-legged

stool consisting of the new U.S. proposal for the Doha WTO negotiations to reduce

agricultural subsidies, the U.S. Farm Bill, and trade promotion authority.

Many, particularly in the international community, have exaggerated the provisions in the U.S. Farm Bill and claimed it throws into question our true interest

in seeking reduced agricultural subsidies. But the bottom line is that domestic supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
119

port under the farm bill is entirely consistent with WTO obligations. Under WTO

rules, the United States is allowed to provide up to $19.1 billion annually in ‘‘tradedistorting’’ support. The Farm Bill, for the first time, was consciously drafted with

these limits in mind. Not only did Congress consider how support under the farm

programs would be counted against the U.S.-allowed support level, but also it included an unprecedented ‘‘circuit breaker’’ mandating the Secretary of Agriculture

to modify programs to ensure compliance with U.S. international obligations.

If other countries agree with the U.S. Government that world agricultural tariffs

and subsidies are too high, we urge them to join us at the negotiating table. Congress has just renewed the President’s trade promotion authority, and we believe

a successful conclusion to the WTO negotiations will ensure congressional support

for necessary modifications to our domestic agricultural programs required under

any new WTO commitments.

Regarding environmentally harmful subsidies, it is worth noting that the farm bill

pays directly for conservation programs that are important to the Americanpublic.

This reflects our consistent stand that it is important for governments to support

farmers and rural communities in ways that are targeted, transparent, and nontrade distorting. By setting these examples, the farm bill, if anything, strengthens

the Administration’s ability to work toward the environmental objectives laid out in

the Trade Promotion Authority act.

Question 11. Please list all the new ‘‘Type I’’ commitments—the more conventional

negotiated declarations and action plans—that the United States intends to enter

into at WSSD.

Response. The text is still under negotiation. The final outcomes will be determined in Johannesburg. We will supply you with the final Johannesburg Plan of

Action and political declaration after the Summit has ended. We note that any Type

I outcomes will not be ‘‘commitments’’ in a legal sense because the WSSD outcomes.

will all be non-binding.

Question 12. Explain the linkage between the Type I and Type II initiatives.

Aren’t strong Type II partnerships connected to having some type of concrete framework?

Response. The international community has already agreed to a large number of

goals, targets and timetables. For example, the United States strongly supports the

internationally agreed Millennium Declaration goals. In our view, partnerships are

clearly linked to such goals in that partnerships are one of the main mechanisms

through which to implement such goals.

Question 13. How many Type II partnerships is the United States proposing for

WSSD? Where is the full list? What government agencies and private companies are

to be involved?

Response. While the major Type II partnerships under development for WSSD are

still under active review, they are outlined in the response to question 7. Broad

inter-agency teams composed of relevant U.S.G agencies are working on these efforts. We welcome the broad participation of business, NGO’s, and other major

groups in such partnerships. We plan to continue building partnerships well after

the Johannesburg Summit has finished: this is not a process that ends with the

Summit.

Please see the attached list of our Type II partnerships.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT

AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) RIO DE JANEIRO, JUNE 3–14, 1992

Representative

The Honorable William K. Reilly

Administrator, Environmental Protection

Agency

Alternate Representatives

The Honorable Curtis Bohien

Assistant Secretary for Oceans’and

International Environmental and

Scientific Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable J. Michael Davis

Assistant Secretary for Conservation and

Renewable Energy

Department of Energy

The Honorable Michael R. Deland

Chairman

Council on Environmental Quality

Executive Office of the President

The Honorable Robert Grady

Associate Director for Natural Resources,

Energy and Science

Office of Management and Budget

Executive Office of the President

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The Honorable Richard H. Melton

Ambassador

United States Embassy

Brasilia

The Honorable Edward J. Perkins

Ambassador

Permanent, Representative of the United

States to the United Nations

New York

The Honorable Ronald W. Roskens

Administrator

Agency for International Development

The Honorable Robert J. Ryan, Jr.

Coordinator for United Nations

Conference on Environment and

Development Preparations

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable Michael K. Young

Deputy Under Secretary for Economic

and Agricultural Affairs

Department of State

Advisers

Meredith Attwell

Office of Legislative Management

Bureau of Legislative Affairs

Department of State

Maureen Bannon, Lieutenant

Commander, USN

Office of the Representative for Oceans

Policy Affairs

Office of the Secretary

Department of Defense

Susan Biniaz

Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans,

International Environmental and

Scientific Affairs Office of the Legal

Adviser

Department of State

Patricia Bliss-Guest

Associate Director for International Law

and Policy

Council on Environmental Quality

Executive Office of the President

Thomas A. Campbell

General Counsel

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of Commerce

Nancy O’Neal Carter

Coordinator for Population Affairs

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Ed Cassidy

Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy

Assistant Secretary for Policy

Office of Policy, Management and

Budget Department of the Interior

Stephanie J. Caswell

Office of Ecology, Health and

Conservation

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Melinda Chandler

Attorney-Adviser

Office of Oceans, International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Office of the Legal Adviser

Department of State

David Cottingham

Director

Office of Ecology and Conservation

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration

Department of Commerce

Anthony A. Das

Director

Office of Public Communications

Bureau of Public Affairs

Department of State

Christine L. Dawson

Special Adviser for Environmental

Issues

Office of the Under Secretary for

Economic and Agricultural Affairs

Department of State

Michael S. Delello

Special Assistant

Office of the Secretary

Department of Energy

Susan F. Drake

Office of Environmental Protection

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and

Scientific Affairs

Department of State

121

Milton K. Drucker

Office of International Commodities

Energy, Resources and Food Policy,

Bureau of Economic and Business

Affairs

Department of State

L. Val Giddings

Office of Biotechnology Biologics and

Environmental Protection

Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service

Department of Agriculture

Alan D. Hecht

Deputy Assistant Administrator for

International Activities

Environmental Protection Agency

Matthew P. Hennesey

Director

Office of Multilateral Development

Banking

Department of the Treasury

Twig Johnson

Director

Office of Environment and Natural

Resources

Bureau of Research and Development

Agency for International Development

Gerald L. Kamens

Office of Policy Analysis and Resources

Directorate for Policy

Agency for International Development

Mark P. Kindall

Office of International Activities

Environmental Protection Agency

Stephen Klein

U.S. UNCED Coordination Center

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

Department of State

Jeffrey D. Kovar

Attorney-Adviser

Office of Legal Adviser

Department of State

William Lake

Consultant to the Administrator

Environmental Protection Agency

Gary L. Larsen

International Forestry

Forest Service

Department of Agriculture

The Honorable Thomas E. Lovejoy

Assistant Secretary for External Affairs

Smithsonian Institution

Washington, DC.

John P. McGuinness

Office of Technical Specialized Agencies

Bureau of International Organization

Affairs

Department of State

The Honorable Jonathan Moore

Ambassador

United States Representative to the

Economic and Social Council of the

United Nations

New York

Carol Ann Petsonk

Director

Office of Environmental Affairs

Office of the United States Trade

Representative

Executive Office of the President

Eleanor W. Savage

Director

Office of Ecology, Health and

Conservation

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

John P. Schmitz

Deputy Counsel to the President

Executive Office of the President

R. Tucker Scully

Director

Office of Ocean Affairs

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Jeff N. Sirmon

Deputy Chief for International Forestry

United States Forest Service

Department of Agriculture

Zell Steever

U.S. UNCED Coordination Center

122

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Linda Strachan

Special Assistant for Congressional

Relations

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Scott B. Styles

Office of Legislative Management

Bureau of Legislative Affairs

Department of State

Neal A. Walidrop III

Office of Global Change

Bureau of Oceans and International

Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Harlan Watson

Acting Assistant Secretary for Water and

Science and Science Adviser to the

Secretary

Department of the Interior

Dr. Frank E. Young

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health

(Science and Environment)

Public Health Service

Department of Health and Human Services

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON

ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) RIO DE JANEIRO, JUNE 3–14, 1992

1. The following individuals comprise the United States Congressional Delegation

to UNCED:

A. Members of the Senate

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.

(Chairman of the Senate Delegation)

U.S. Senate

The Honorable John N. Chafee (Vice

Chairman of the Senate Delegation)

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Max Baucus

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Bob Graham

U.S. Senate

The Honorable John Kerry

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Frank H. Lautenberg

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Claiborne Pell

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Larry Pressler

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Steve Symms

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Paul Wellstone

U.S. Senate

The Honorable Timothy B. Wirth

U.S. Senate

B. MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Honorable George Miller (Chairman

of the House Delegation)

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Anthony C. Beilenson

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Ben C. Blaz

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Cardiss Collins

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert W. Davis

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Edward F. Feighan

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Bill Green

U.S. House of Representatives

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The Honorable Dennis N. Hertel

U.S. House OF Representatives

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable James H. Scheuer

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Gerry Sikorski

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Robert C. Torricelli

U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable Jolene Unsoeld

U.S. House of Representatives

1

C. CONGRESSIONAL STAFF SUPPORTING THE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 ABOVE:

Unclassified

Daniel P. Beard

Staff Director

Committee on Interior and Insular

Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

Nancy M. Carman

Staff Consultant

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

Carol Doherty

Senior Staff Assistant

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

Susan Fagan

Legislative Assistant

Office of Senator Symms

U.S. Senate

David B. Finnegan

Majority Counsel

Committee on Energy and Commerce

U.S. House of Representatives

Susan R. Fletcher

Specialist, Environmental Policy

Environment and Natural Resources

Policy Division

Congressional Research Service

Library of Congress

Gamier Jaszczaks, Colonel, USAF

Air Force Liaison Office

U.S. House of Representatives

Roy Kienitz

Professional Staff

Committee on Environment and Public

Works

U.S. Senate

Jessica Laverty

Minority Counsel

Committee on Energy and Commerce

U.S. House of Representatives

John A. Lawrence

Administrative Assistant

Office of Congressman Miller

U.S. House of Representatives

Eileen Lee

Staff Director

Subcommittee on Environment

Committee on Science, Space and

Technology

U.S. House of Representatives

Kathleen McGinty

Legislative Assistant

Office of Senator Gore

U.S. Senate

Thomas O. Melius

Professional Staff for Fish and Wildlife

Committee on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries

U.S. House of Representatives

Julia Moffett

Professional Staff

Committee on Interior and Insular

Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

Charly Moore

Counsel

Committee on Merchant Marine and

Fisheries

U.S. House of Representatives

Frank Norton, Colonel, USA

Army Liaison Office

U.S. Senate

124

John Robert Nunnally, Major, USAF

Air Force Liaison Office

U.S. House of Representatives

Joseph C. Pallone, Major, USA

Army Liaison Office

U.S. Senate

Jan Paulk

Director

Office of Interparliamentary Services

Office of the Secretary of the Senate

U.S. Senate

Steven N. Polansky

Professional Staff

Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. Senate

Marl A. Ronash

Press Secretary

Office of Senator Gore

U.S. Senate

Joan Teague Rose

Staff Assistant

Committee on Agriculture

U.S. House of Representatives

Dr. Artie L. Shelton, Colonel, USA

Army Liaison Office

U.S. Senate

Steven J. Shimberg

Minority Staff Director and Counsel

Committee on Environment and Public

Works

U.S. Senate

Russell J. Wilson

Minority Staff Consultant

Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle

East

Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

Daniel Weiss

Director for Public Affairs

Committee on Interior and Public Affairs

U.S. House of Representatives

2. Following Congressional spouses will accompany the delegation: Tipper Gore,

Virginia Chafee, Nuala Pell, Harriett Pressler, Loretta Symms, Wren Wirth, Adele

Graham, Ann Blaz, Nadine Feighan, Paul Pelosi and Emily Scheuer.

Question 14. How and what is the United States commitment to WEHAB (Water,

Energy, Health, Agriculture, and Biodiversity)? What specific actions will we take

in these areas?

Response. WEHAB refers to the acronym that Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed as priority areas for the Johannesburg Summit. We support all five of the

areas identified: water, energy, health, agriculture, and biodiversity. The development assistance programs run by USAID, USDA, EPA and other Federal agencies

clearly reflect an emphasis in these areas, as a survey prepared by USAID with

input from over 15 U.S. agencies indicates. Please see the attached document,

‘‘Working for a Sustainable World: Government Initiatives to Promote Sustainable

Development.’’

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Question 15. The United States, with other nations, has subscribed to the UN’s

Millennium Development Goals on the alleviation of poverty, access to safe drinking

water, health and education, etc. But in the preparatory meetings leading up to

WSSD, the United States has been isolated in remaining resolutely opposed to international efforts to set out how these Millennium Development Goals are to be

achieved. Why is there a gap. between rhetoric and reality?

Response. The United States strongly supports efforts to implement the internationally agreed Millennium Development goals. In our view, based on our 60

years of development experience, partnerships are the most effective way to implement those goals. The United States has taken the lead in pursuing partnerships

and pushing this effort forward. We hope that other countries will join us in focusing on the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. We have prepared

a compendium of success stories in water and energy, for example, which details

how partnerships in these sectors has led to concrete, on-the-ground results improving the lives of individuals. (Please see the attachment referred to in question 14).

202

We have emphasized this view throughout the preparatory process leading up to

WSS]J.

Question 16. To what extent, financially or otherwise, will the U.S. Government

support President Mbeki’s New Economic Partnership for African Development

(NEPAD)?

Response. NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, was adopted

by African heads of State in October 2001. The United States and others have welcomed NEPAD for its African origins and emphasis on good economic and political

governance, including peer review and monitoring. The real test of NEPAD will be

whether the bold rhetoric is reflected in concrete action and change. The objectives

set out in NEPAD are consistent with the President’s Compact for Development initiative, which emphasizes aid effectiveness through performance-based development

assistance, accountability, measurable results, and local ownership.

In response to NEPAD, the United States and its G–8 partners developed an Action Plan for Africa in which we committed to enter into enhanced partnership, including providing additional resources, with countries whose performance reflects

the NEPAD commitments. Specifically, our efforts will focus on countries that demonstrate a commitment to good governance and the rule of law, investing in their

people, and pursuing policies that promote democracy, spur economic growth, and

alleviate poverty.

Question 17. How effective has the NAFTA environmental side agreement the

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC)—been at protecting the environment? Where could it be improved?

Response. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

(NAAEC) has proven to be a useful tool for protecting the environment. Pursuant

to the NAAEC, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established and has evolved into an effective international environmental institution. The

CEC consistently demonstrates the benefits of continental cooperation in addressing

the environmental components of liberalized trade, serving as a complement to the

NAFTA.

The implementation of the NAAEC has led to environmental achievements’ including:

• The phase-out and reduction of toxic chemicals in North America, including

DDT;

• The protection of biodiversity through the North American Bird Conservation

Initiative, Species of Common Conservation Concern, North American Marine Protected Areas Network, and the bilateral U.S.-Mexico Wildlife Without Borders program; the sharing of environmental management information through the North

American Biodiversity Information Network; and

• The development of micro-financing partnerships to promote pollution prevention for small and medium-sized businesses; the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices for small scale producers; and the establishment by Mexico of a Pollutant Release and Transfer Register.

The NAAEC provides members of the public with avenues for input through several advisory bodies and a public submission process. As a result, the CEC has become an important forum for cooperation, including public dialog and participation.

Over time, the CEC’s cooperative work program has significantly expanded and,

gained momentum in addressing a wide array of environmental issues of continental

concern. At the same time, the CEC’s resource base has remained constant since

its inception in 1995 at $3 million from each country annually. As such, the effectiveness of this unique international environmental institution might be vastly improved by increased funding and/or more focused work on priority activities. In another area, the parties are working to strengthen communication and cooperation

between trade and environment officials as envisioned in NAAEC Article 10(6),

which calls for cooperation between the CEC and the NAFTA Free Trade Commission ‘‘to achieve the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA....’’.

Question 18. The United States has a good record with respect to promoting the

Export Credit Agencies in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Where do things stand on ECAs?

Response. The United States has led the effort to strengthen environmental guidelines for official Export Credit Agencies (ECA5), both at the G–8 and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG).

We have made progress, but the current OECD proposal, ‘‘Common Approaches

to the Environment’’, falls short of our objectives of securing a clear commitment

on the part of ECAs to adhere to a minimum set of common environmental standards and credible transparency provisions, modeled on current World Bank standVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00206 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
203

ards. While our Export-Import Bank has had environmental guidelines since 1995,

only a few of our competitors have standards that even approach the quality of EmIm Bank’s. Others in the OECD insist that ECAs focus now on implementing the

‘‘Common Approaches’’ that some Members said they would implement on a voluntary basis at the November 2001 meeting, and then review our respective experiences in 2003. Although we see the 2003 review as an important opportunity to

apply lessons learned to strengthening and standardizing guidelines for ECAs, we

do not intend to let this matter rest, and will continue to take every opportunity

to make progress.

Question 19. National laws are not able to address the striking decline in the

world’s fishing stocks and the overall biomass of the world’s oceans in that portion

of the earth’s surface beyond any national jurisdiction. What commitments are you

prepared to make regarding the creation and enforcement of international standards

to prcitect this area of the high seas from unsustainable mining activities and fishing practices, such as bottom trawling and unwanted by-catch problems that cause

massive destruction of marine life?

Response. Under this Administration, the Department of State is taking a lead

role in efforts to strengthen both the rules governing the conservation and management of living marine resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction, and the enforcement of those rules.

In recent years, a new international framework has been established to accomplish this goal. Much of this work has focussed on global instruments such as the

U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance A9reement and the FAO Code

of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. Together, these and other recent agreements

provide an effective toolbox for addressing issues such as overfishing, bycatch of

non-target species, excess capacity of fishing fleets, lack of enforcement of existing

rules and other problem areas.

It is now up to the United States and other countries that support the principles

embodied in these agreements to work for their effective implementation at the regional and sub-regional levels through existing and newly created regional fisheries

management organizations. This is not an easy task. Most international fisheries organizations operate by consensus, giving great weight to those who oppose serious

efforts to effect necessary changes. However, we are committed to making every possible effort to promote sustainable fishing practices on fish stocks in areas both

within and beyond national jurisdiction.

One area where much work needs to be done is the area of bycatch and discards

of small fish as well as other non-target fish species and other species including sea

turtles and sea birds. Bycatch of sea birds and sea turtles in commercial longline

fisheries, in particular, are issues that require more international attention. Again,

this is difficult in that affected fleets may oppose conservation efforts that could adversely impact their operations. Because we have limited market leverage or other

ways to compel action, we must work with other nations and their fishing industries

to convince rather than coerce. Industry involvement and cooperation will be vital

if we are to identify and introduce the technological solutions that will be necessary

to address these issues.

As part of this process, the Western Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Council, based in Honolulu, will convene this November the Second International Fishers

Forum (IFF2). The conference will bring together representatives from the fishing

industry, governments and the environmental and academic communities to address

these and other issues. We strongly support this effort and will look carefully at the

results of that meeting to identify possible next steps by Governments to mitigate

sea bird and sea turtle bycatch in longline fisheries.

As to mining activities on seabed areas beyond the jurisdiction of any nation, the

United States participates as an observer in the International Seabed Authority

(ISA). The ISA is a body created by the United Nations Convention on the Law of

the Sea, to which the United States is not yet a party. The ISA has completed Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules, which include

measures to protect the marine environment from mining activities. Through its role

as observer, the United States has worked hard to develop measures that are consistent with U.S. interests.

Question 20. One of the significant outcomes of the Rio Earth Summit was the

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, which President George Herbert

Walker Bush signed and which the U.S. Senate subsequently ratified unanimously

in a voice vote.’ The Kyoto Protocol gives effect to the objectives agreed to in the

Climate Convention, and it is likely to enter into force sometime this year, perhaps

at WSSD. The current Administration has said it does not support the Kyoto Protocol’. Nevertheless, the United States is still a Party to the Climate Convention.

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At the hearing, Mr. Connaughton admitted that the United States has not fulfilled

its commitments to report to the United Nations on policies and measures to

achieve 1990 levels of emissions. What steps will the Administration take to rectify

this noncompliance?

Response. The United States is in compliance with its commitments to report on

its policies and measures under Article 4 of the Convention. The United States has

submitted detailed information on our policies and measures, in accordance with the

procedures under the Convention. Most recently, policies and measures are’ detailed

in the U.S. Climate Action Report, the third National Communication from. the

United States to the Convention, submitted in May 2002. Concerning the non-binding ‘‘aim’’ of returning emissions to their 1990 levels, this aim refers to the year

2000, not the time period beyond 2000.

Question 21. Please explain how the Administration’s policies on climate change

are consistent with our commitments under and the spirit of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Response. The Framework Convention’s commitments relate principally to:

• Support for research and systematic observation;

• Promotion of education, training, and public awareness;

• Various forms of cooperation among Parties;

• For Annex I Parties (which includes the United States), adoption of policies

and measures on the mitigation of climate change, as well as reporting on such policies and measures;

• For Annex II Parties (which includes the United States), support for developing countries in terms of financial resources and environmentally sound technologies.

The Administration’s policies implement all applicable commitments under the

Convention. Most recently, the U.S. national communication, submitted in May

2002, detailed U.S. policies and measures to address climate change.

The Administration’s climate change policies involve extensive cooperation with

other Convention Parties, are consistent with U.S. commitments under the Convention, and are designed to be economically sustainable. They represent a significant

contribution to the global effort to address climate change both under the UNFCCC

and elsewhere.

• The Administration’s greenhouse gas intensity goal and the measures we will

be taking over the next 10 years is both ambitious and reasonable, and is in line

with past administration forecasts of the domestic reductions likely to be achieved

under the Kyoto Protocol, and forecasts of other countries’ efforts with respect to

climate change policies.

• The Administration’s commitment to climate change-related research and development is unmatched in the world, and represents what is truly a unique contribution toward a longterm climate change approach that is consistent with sustainable development. The President’s National climate Change Technology Initiative confirms America as the leader in technology and innovation within the climate

change area. The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposal dedicates nearly $1.8

billion to fund basic scientific research on climate change and $1.3 billion to fund

research on advanced energy and carbon sequestration technologies. The Administration has substantially increased funding for climate-related technical assistance

to developing countries.

Overall, the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget seeks $4.5 billion in total climate

spending—an increase of nearly $700 million. To the extent that there could be said

to be a ‘‘spirit’’ of the Convention, the Administration’s efforts are fully compatible

with that spirit.

Question 22. In view of the recent EPA study that substantiated the fact’ that

global warming is occurring, and the even more recent study by Alaskan scientists

published in the Washington Post on Friday, July 19, 2002 that the Alaskan glaciers are melting at over twice the rate previously supposed, and the very real national security interest that the United States has in ceasing its dependence on foreign oil, will this Administration commit at the WSSD to increase its international

cooperation to reduce the generation of greenhouse gases?

Response. The Secretary General of the United Nations has outlined five priority

areas for the Summit: water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture, and biodiversity. The United States is actively pursuing concrete initiatives to the Summit

that are in line with these priorities, namely on water, agriculture, health, energy,

oceans and forests. Climate change is not one of the Summit’s priority areas, because the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change serves as the internationally agreed forum for addressing climate change. The Administration is pursuing ambitious steps to address climate change domestically, and is actively engagVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00208 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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ing in cooperative activities with countries around the world. For example, the

President’s plan seeks to continue the process of developing new technologies while

nurturing the growth’ of the economy. To this end, the President is creating the National Climate Change Technology Initiative, which will confirm America as the

leader in technology and innovation within the climate change area. Furthermore,

the President’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposal dedicates $1.7 billion to fund basic

scientific research on climate change and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced

energy and sequestration technologies. Overall, the President’s fiscal year 2003

budget seeks $4.5 billion in total climate spending—an increase of nearly $700 million. This level of commitment is unmatched in the world.

Question 23. Has the United States or its representatives, officially or unofficially,

discouraged countries from bringing climate change initiatives or issues to the

World Summit for consideration?

Response. The United States has not discouraged countries from bringing climate

change initiatives or issues to the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The

United States delegation has engaged constructively on a substantial amount of text

on a variety of climate change issues occurring in the Plan of Implementation. Most

of the climate change-related text in the draft Plan of Implementation has been

agreed.

Several delegations have put forward textual proposals that have the effect of asking the United States to endorse the Kyoto Protocol, or to take on new climate-related commitments in the WSSD. The United States does not support the Kyoto

Protocol’, and we have indicated to those delegations that we cannot support text

that is contrary to our national position. The United States also has not agreed to

additional climate change commitments at WSSD because the internationally

agreed forum for negotiating climate change commitments is the U.N. Framework

Convention on Climate Change. The Eighth Conference of the Parties to the Convention (COP–8) will take place in October 23—November 1, 2002.

Question 24. Throughout the process, many governments have complained that

the United States has turned a blind ear/eye to Rio. The Secretary General thinks

that recognition of the Rio Principles will be key for successful implementation in

Johannesburg. How will we recognize and implement the ‘‘spirit of’’ the Rio Principles?

Response. We strongly support the principles of Rio, and would like to see these

principles reaffirmed within the Johannesburg Plan of Action.

Question 25. What is the Administration’s position on the Corporate Accountability Convention that many non-governmental organizations have called for?

Response. We strongly support efforts to promote corporate responsibility.

We believe such efforts are best accomplished at the national level through a combination of government regulations and oversight along with voluntary corporate

standards and practices implemented by the public sector, elected officials, and the

private sectors in respective countries, not by a new multilateral treaty negotiation.

Question 26. The President has announced that he will ask Congress for an extra

$5 billion in overseas aid. Right now., the United States spends about 0.1 percent

of its GDP on aid—the lowest percentage of any industrial country and below the

average of 0.39 percent. Even with the increase, we’ll still be the lowest in the

world. Why is that?

Response. Excluding the Administration’s new commitment of $5 billion for the

Millennium Challenge Account, Official Development Assistance is being increased

by 10 percent in fiscal year 2002. If the Administration’s fiscal year 2003 budget

request is approved, funding for HIV/AIDS over the past 2 years will have increased

by 73 percent, funding for education will have increased by 65 percent and funds

focused on Sub-Saharan Africa will have increased by 30 percent, reaching $1 billion

for the first time. In our view, how funds are spent is more important than increased funding, which represents only part of solution to address sustainable development. The Administration believes that’ assistance is most effective when it reinforces peace and stability, domestic governance, investments in people through

health and education and private sector development.

INVESTING IN HEALTH: FIGHTING INFECTIOUS DISEASE FOR SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT

KEY ACTION

The Bush Administration is building upon recent announcements of efforts to

combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.

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• In June, President Bush announced a new $500 million Mother-and-Child HIV

Prevention Initiative for Africa and the Caribbean, • The U.S. pledge of $500 million to the Global Fund to Fight HW/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria represents approximately one-fourth of all commitments to

date.

Goal: To have, by 2015, halted, and begun to reverse, the spread of HP//AIDS, the

scourge of malaria and other major diseases that afflict humanity. (United Nations

Millennium Declaration)

Description: This multi-year initiative will:

• Enhance technical assistance for Global Fund application development and

project implementation. • Strengthen surveillance and monitoring, research, prevention, and care activities. • Expand efforts to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV/AIDS. • Pursue global partnerships and increased investment in fighting HP//AIDS,

TB, and Malaria.

Resources

U.S. resources for international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, including

meeting the President’s pledge to the Global Fund are: • $1.1 billion committed in fiscal year 2002

?• $1.2 billion requested for fiscal year 2003

Partners

The United States works with a wide array of partners including governments,

international organizations, private corporations, foundations, faith-based groups

and non-governmental organizations.

South Africa Housing Initiative

KEY ACTION

?The United States will commit $15 million in support of the construction of

90,000 homes in South Africa over the next 5 years. This initiative, announced by

the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), builds on a 10-

year legacy of strengthening housing finance for South Africa’s poor begun by the

United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Home ownership and community building are inextricably linked. According to

the National Department of Housing of South Africa, one of the factors contributing

to the deficit in construction of low-income housing is insufficient sources of construction financing, particularly for middle-to low-income wage earners.

Under the South Africa Housing Initiative, construction financing will be made

available for contractors constructing homes for middle-to low-income families.

Under this Initiative, a for-profit U.S. sponsor will work with a South African Bank

which, in turn, will be able to lend the equivalent of $20 million to the NTJRCHA

Equity Services (NES), a for-profit entity operating under the National Urban Housing Association (NURCHA) of South Africa.

The South Africa Housing Initiative is expected to stimulate South Africa’s con- struction sector through loans to for-profit builders, contractors, and sub-contractors, and to efficiently expand employment, skills, and training in an essential sector of the economy of South Africa. Over the past 10 years, USAID has underwritten $90 million in private sector loans to enable South African banks to make available $250 million in housing loans

to benefit 110,000 needy households. USAID has also financed considerable urban

infrastructure (water, sewers, and roads) to enable the construction of new neighborhoods. The new OPIC initiative broadens this support for the transition of middle-to low-income households to homeownership and so contributes to long-term sustainable development for South Africa. Moreover, the delivery of potable water

through the construction of new homes and the establishment of new housing communities for 90,000 households and almost 500,000 South Africans will contribute

to improved health and achievement of Millennium Declaration goals.

Resources

• The United States will commit $15 million in support of this important initiative.

Oceans

White Water to Blue Water. This initiative, involving U.S. Government agencies,

the UK, France, and Spain, Caribbean governments, the Caribbean Environment

Program, other international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and

the private sector, emphasizes a cross-sectoral approach to ecosystem management

beginning with upstream sectors (watersheds, inland forests, agricultural areas, and

population centers) and extending through wetlands, mangrove swamps and coral

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reefs into the ocean. The initiative aims to improve capabilities of coastal States to

manage coastal-marine ecosystems and to promote regional coordination among the

partners to make best use of resources. The initial focus will be on the Wider Caribbean region.

Geographic Information and Learning

• Geographic Information for Sustainable Development. This initiative brings together U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and academia to improve the quality and availability of data needed to understand better and monitor the environment. Recent applications of data from satellite

earth observation systems, the Global Positioning System, Geographic Information

Systems, and data base management can help decisionmakers address sustainable

development problems in Africa, including food security, sustainable’ agriculture,

natural resource management, disaster mitigation, and poverty alleviation. More

than 100 GISD-related projects are currently underway In Africa. The initiative already has funded 15 projects in the areas of Upper Niger, East African Great Lakes,

Kenya-Tanzania coast, and the Limpopo-Zambezi Basin.

• My Community, Our Earth. This partnership involves partners such as the

U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Geographic Society, the Association of

American Geographers, the Environmental Systems Research Institute (a geographic information system and mapping company), and the U.N. Environmental

Programme. The partnership is using maps, images, and graphs to help secondary,

college, and university students worldwide learn about sustainable development

issues such as biodiversity, deforestation, pollution, food production, fresh water

supply, health, rural development, and urbanization. It aims to increase awareness

about the value of geographic information systems technology, especially satellite

images. Nearly 500 volunteer mentors have registered to help over 2000 students

from more than 90 countries develop projects.

Biodiversity

• Shade Coffee. This partnership helps small-to medium-scale coffee producers

produce more profitable, high-quality coffees (organic, shade-grown, or ‘‘Bird Friendly’’ coffees), thereby promoting conservation while meeting rural development needs.

The Commission for Environmental Cooperation, which is supported by the United

States, Canada, and Mexico, is facilitating establishment of a North American sustainable agriculture debt facility that would make strategic credit guarantees/interventions to enhance the ability of small-scale producers groups, conservation groups,

and private investors to collaborate more effectively at the local and international

levels. Shade Coffee partners include the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID), U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of Agriculture, the

Smithsonian Institution’s Migratory Bird Center, Conservation International,

Rainforest Alliance, Specialty Coffee Association of America, and Starbucks Coffee.

• Invasive Alien Species. This initiative aims to understand the vectors and processes by which invasive alien species are introduced and to develop mechanisms for

detection, rapid response, and mitigation. Partners include the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and South Africa; the Global Invasive Species Program; the U.S. Departments of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and State; the Environmental Protection Agency; USAID; the Smithsonian. Institution; many U.S.

universities; State and local management authorities; and non-governmental organizations.

• Biological Diversity Informatics. This partnership seeks to develop and expand

availability of user-friendly, internet-based access data that will allow users to link,

integrate, analyze, and visualize existing data and ongoing research pertaining to

species distribution. Partners include the U.S. National Invasive Species Council,

Global Diversity Information Facility, Inter-American Biodiversity Information Network, North American Biodiversity Information Network, U.S. Department of the

Interior, Smithsonian Institution, the Universities of California and Kansas, Conservation International, and the International Union for the Conservation of? Nature and Natural Resources.

Agriculture and Natural Resources

• Building-a Partnership for Global Exchange of Conservation Stewardship Practices. This partnership seeks to build capacity in agriculture and natural resource

conservation and stewardship practices for sustainable agriculture and forest and

watershed management. A worldwide network will facilitate global peer-to-peer

learning and exchanges for short-term, on-the-ground, community-and watershedbased activities, such as integrated land, water and coastal management; land restoration and rehabilitation; individual and community capacity building; and enterprise development. This public/private partnership, initiated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, will increase the application of agriculture and natural reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00211 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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source conservation practices, exchange of integrated resource management approaches, and community participation in local decisionmaking.

Principles of Sound Science in Decision-Making

• Strengthening Science-Based Decision-Making. This partnership brings together the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. National Academies of

Science, the American Chemistry Council, and others in an effort to develop and

strengthen linkages between science and decisionmakers in developing countries so

that policy decisions can be based on the best available knowledge and so that research priorities can take into account the needs of decisionmakers.

Health

• Netmark: A Public-Private Partnership for Sustainable Malaria Prevention.

This partnership, involving USAIr, works with country governments and the commercial private sector to promote effective use of insecticide-treated bednets for the

prevention of malaria. At the heart of Netmark is an innovative use of public-sector

funds to reduce and eliminate the barriers to expanded commercial investment in

the manufacture and distribution of insecticide-treated bednets. Netmark activities

are underway in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zambia and there are plans to expand the partnership to other countries in Africa and elsewhere.

• Controlling Tuberculosis in High HIV Prevalence Populations. Under the new

WHO/ Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS strategic framework to decrease the burden of the intersecting epidemics of tuberculosis and HP//AIDS, the Uni?ed States

and the government of Japan will work with partners to improve coordination on

TB prevention and control (intensified case-finding and cure) and interventions

against HIV (and therefore indirectly against tuberculosis).

• Universal Flour Fortification. This public-private partnership seeks to replicate

a successful iodized salt fortification model and address selected major remaining

micronutrient deficiencies through fortification of flour with iron, folic acid, and

other appropriate micronutrients. The partnership involves the U.S. Departments of

Health and Human Services and Agriculture; the Australian, Canadian and U.S.

Wheat Boards; the North American Millers’ Association; the North American Grain

Exports Association; and others.

• Health Promotores. This partnership will share experiences and best models

related to community health outreach and education using lay community members

in underserved areas. The promotores concept derived from Mexico and Latin American countries and is currently being pursued in U.S.-Mexico border communities.

Partners include the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Health Resources and Services Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, the government of Mexico, and the University of Arizona.

• Children’s Environmental Health Indicators. This initiative proposes the creation of an international forum of governments, U.N. agencies, intergovernmental

and nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and communities to advance

a global effort to create children’s environmental health indicators. This may involve

proposing modifications to the existing data collection surveys in the U.N. system

to incorporate children’s environmental health, which may include developing, testing, and promoting the use of indicators.

Education

• Africa Education Initiative. This Presidential initiative, which was announced

in June 2002, will provide $200 million over the next 5 years to train more than

160,000 new teachers and provide in-service training for more than 260,000 existing

teachers in Africa, partner with historically black colleges and universities in America to provide 4.5 million more textbooks and other learning tools for children in Africa, provide 250,000 scholarships for African girls, and increase the role of parents

in their children’s education by working to make school systems more transparent

and open to reforms from parents.

• Global Food for Education. This multilateral school feeding pilot program may

help as many as seven million school children, especially girls. The 2002 Farm Bill

provides $100 million in fiscal year 2003 to continue the pilot program. The United

States is reviewing the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the program in meeting its educational and food aid objectives.

Sustainable Tourism

• Vilanculos Coastal Wildlife Sanctuary. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is helping to finance this $10 million coastal and wildlife eco-tourism

project in Mozambique’s Bazaruto Archipelago. Backed by the Global Environmental

Facility, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Union for the

Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the Sanctuary has followed world

standards with regard to social and environmental issues. The project will provide

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economic development from tourism and job creation, and community development,

including a health clinic, school, and housing.

Transport

• Nacala Port and Railway Network. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation will provide financial assistance up to $35 million to a U.S. project sponsor to

develop and rehabilitate the railway corridor through Malawi and Mozambique and

to refurbish the exiting port at Nacala. This will provide a less expensive alternative

to Durban, South Africa, for moving goods to and from landlocked countries and enhance agricultural productivity and exports by reducing transport costs.

STATEMENT OF JAMES L. CONNAUGHTON, CHAIRMAN, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Mr. Chairmen, Senator Smith, Senator Lugar and Members of the Committee: I

appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today to discuss the

Bush Administration’s strategy to address the important, long-term, and highly

complex challenge of global climate change. I am pleased to share this panel with

my colleague Mr. Turner.

President Bush has committed the Nation to ambitious, focused and meaningful

goals, programs and initiatives that provide a sensible and constructive path forward. The President’s strategy is predicated on ensuring the strength and growth

of the American economy, building on our nation’s tremendous and demonstrated

record of leadership in science and the promise of continued American technological

innovation. As the President stated over a year ago: ‘‘We will act, learn, and act

again, adjusting our approaches as science advances and technology evolves.’’ He

elaborated on this point this past February: ‘‘[G]lobal climate change presents a different set of challenges and requires a different strategy [from policies designed to

reduce air pollution]. The science is more complex, the answers are less certain, and

the technology is less developed. So we need a flexible approach that can adjust to

new information and new technology.’’ The flexible path toward long term progress

that I will outline for you today sharply contrasts with the view of some that the

only acceptable policy approach is near term, legislated restrictions that will needlessly hurt our economy and cost American jobs.

The President committed the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing America’s

greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy by 18 percent in the

next 10 years. This will set America on a path to slow the growth of our greenhouse

gas emissions and, if science justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions. I would emphasize that achieving this ambitious, yet realistic, national goal

will require a sustained commitment and significant investment and effort from our

nation’s farmers, small businesses, workers, industries, and citizens that rivals the

hard gains in efficiency and productivity we have earned over the last several decades.

To achieve this goal, the Administration is actively engaged and moving forward

on many fronts, looking at every sector of our economy, with the recognition that

meaningful progress depends on the development and deployment of new technology. With the continued support of Congress, we are advancing climate science,

developing and promoting energy efficiency, conservation, and sequestration technologies and practices, pursuing near term greenhouse gas mitigation programs and

expanding international cooperation.

The President has reaffirmed America’s commitment to the goal of stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous interference with the climate. At the same time, the President noted that given current scientific uncertainties, no one knows what that level is. This underscores the

importance of the President’s focus on science and technology.

The President has called for nearly $700 million in additional funding for the Federal Government’s commitment to climate change in Fiscal Year 1903—a 17 percent

increase from last year—to support a $4.5 billion program of research on climate

science and energy technology, mitigation incentives and programs, and international technology transfer and outreach. This commitment is unmatched in the

world. The President’s recent Report to Congress on Federal Climate Change Expenditures details the numerous programs that this funding will support. And there

is a Cabinet-level effort to bring more effective, high level management and focus

to this significant investment of public resources.

Importantly, the President’s request includes $555 million in clean energy tax incentives, the first part of a $4.6 billion commitment over the next 5 years, reaching

$7.1 billion over the next 10 years. These incentives will spur investments in and

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purchases of renewable energy—including solar, wind, and biomass—as well as advanced hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. We

also are promoting clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power—which produces

no greenhouse gas emissions—and are working to safely improve fuel economy for

our cars and trucks. And we are advancing the prospect of breakthrough technologies, such as the promise of zero-emission fuel cell vehicles through the Department of Energy’s Freedom Car Initiative.

Under the recently enacted Farm bill and existing authorizations, we will invest

up to $47 billion in the next decade for conservation on our farms and forest lands.

Not only will this partnership with farmers and small land owners help protect the

water and air, and secure and enhance habitat for wildlife, it will also provide opportunities to store significant quantities of carbon in trees and the soil, and promote other activities to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.

We also are making substantial progress on the effort to create world-class standards for measuring and registering greenhouse gas emissions reductions, with organizations receiving transferable credits for the reductions in emissions they secure.

At the same time, we are making progress on the President’s challenge to businesses to further reduce their emissions. EPA’s Climate Leaders Program is well underway. We look forward to seeing new commitments and even greater reductions.

These are simply a few significant examples of more than 60 Federal programs—

some mandatory, some incentive-based, some voluntary—that will help to slow the

growth in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions over the next decade and beyond.

The President’s strategy has also created a new framework for expanding international cooperation. We are investing $25 million in climate observation systems

in developing countries, increasing funding for tropical forest conservation to $50

million, and providing $178 million for the Global Environmental Facility next year,

which includes a substantial $70 million payment for arrears incurred during the

prior administration. The President’s fiscal yea4r 2003 budget also requests $156

million in funding for USAID climate change programs. And in the past year alone,

the Administration has entered into bilateral agreements with Japan, Australia,

Canada, Italy, the European Union, CONCAUSA, China and India on climate

change science, energy and sequestration technology, and policy approaches.

The President’s climate change strategy is the product of an ongoing, combined

working group of the National Security Council, the Domestic Policy Council and

the National Economic Council. Our actions have been and will continue to be guided by the six principles that the President outlined last June:

1. Consistency with the long-term goal of stabilizing concentrations of greenhouse

gases in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous interference with the

climate system, recognizing that we currently do not know what that level is;

2. Measured actions, as we learn more from science and build on it;

3. Flexibility to adjust to new information and take advantage of new technology;

4. Ensuring continued economic growth and prosperity for the United States and

the world;

5. Pursuing market-based incentives and spurring technological innovation; and

6. Global participation, including developing countries.

The Bush Administration’s strategy for action and progress—a solid policy framework, a meaningful national emissions reduction goal, and a suite of policies to

achieve that goal—is calibrated to the actual state of scientific knowledge and

guards against costly and misdirected policy errors. Commentary that continues to

equate action on climate change with acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol ignores the

bipartisan record of opposition to its approach. The Kyoto Protocol would have cost

our economy up to $400 billion and caused the loss of up to 4.9 million jobs, risking

the welfare of the American people and American workers. And without the participation of the world’s developing countries, many of which will experience rapid

growth in coming decades, it represented an ineffective policy response to this global

challenge.

President Bush’s philosophy—which ties our benchmark for progress with economic growth—represents a careful balancing that promises significant emissions

reductions over the course of the next decade, while preserving the strength of the

American economy. Only sustained economic growth, both here and abroad, will

allow for the significant new investments in energy and sequestration technologies

that will be needed to address this long term challenge.

Again, thank you for inviting me today. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have and ask that the written material accompanying my testimony be entered into the record.

211

APPENDICES

1. STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH (JUNE 11, 2001)

THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

For Immediate Release June 11, 2001

PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSES GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

The Rose Garden

11:10 A.M. EDT

President George W. Bush. Good morning. I’ve just met with senior members of

my administration who are working to develop an effective and science-based approach to addressing the important issues of global climate change.

This is an issue that I know is very important to the nations of Europe, which

I will be visiting for the first time as President. The earth’s well-being is also an

issue important to America. And it’s an issue that should be important to every Nation in every part of our world.

The issue of climate change respects no border. Its effects cannot be reined in by

an army nor advanced by any ideology. Climate change, with its potential to impact

every corner of the world, is an issue that must be addressed by the world.

The Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways. But the process used

to bring nations together to discuss our joint response to climate change is an important one. That is why I am today committing the United States of America to

work within the United Nations framework and elsewhere to develop with our

friends and allies and nations throughout the world an effective and science-based

response to the issue of global warming.

My Cabinet-level working group has met regularly for the last 10 weeks to review

the most recent, most accurate, and most comprehensive science. They have heard

from scientists offering a wide spectrum of views. They have reviewed the facts, and

they have listened to many theories and suppositions. The working group asked the

highly respected National Academy of Sciences to provide us the most up-to-date information about what is known and about what is not known on the science of climate change.

First, we know the surface temperature of the earth is warming. It has risen by

.6 degrees Celsius over the past 100 years. There was a warming trend from the

1890’s to the 1940’s. Cooling from the 1940’s to the 1970’s. And then sharply rising

temperatures from the 1970’s to today.

There is a natural greenhouse effect that contributes to warming. Greenhouse

gases trap heat, and thus warm the earth because they prevent a significant proportion of infrared radiation from escaping into space. Concentration of greenhouse

gases, especially CO2, have increased substantially since the beginning of the industrial revolution. And the National Academy of Sciences indicate that the increase

is due in large part to human activity.

Yet, the Academy’s report tells us that we do not know how much effect natural

fluctuations in climate may have had on warming. We do not know how much our

climate could, or will change in the future. We do not know how fast change will

occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it.

For example, our useful efforts to reduce sulfur emissions may have actually increased warming, because sulfate particles reflect sunlight, bouncing it back into

space. And, finally, no one can say with any certainty what constitutes a dangerous

level of warming, and therefore what level must be avoided.

The policy challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the limits of

our knowledge. While scientific uncertainties remain, we can begin now to address

the factors that contribute to climate change.

There are only two ways to stabilize concentration of greenhouse gases. One is

to avoid emitting them in the first place; the other is to try to capture them after

they’re created. And there are problems with both approaches. We’re making great

progress through technology, but have not yet developed cost-effective ways to capture carbon emissions at their source; although there is some promising work that

is being done.

And a growing population requires more energy to heat and cool our homes, more

gas to drive our cars. Even though we’re making progress on conservation and energy efficiency and have significantly reduced the amount of carbon emissions per

unit of GDP.

Our country, the United States is the world’s largest emitter of manmade greenhouse gases. We account for almost 20 percent of the world’s man-made greenhouse

emissions. We also account for about one-quarter of the world’s economic output. We

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recognize the responsibility to reduce our emissions. We also recognize the other

part of the story—that the rest of the world emits 80 percent of all greenhouse

gases. And many of those emissions come from developing countries.

This is a challenge that requires a 100 percent effort; ours, and the rest of the

world’s. The world’s second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases is China. Yet, China

was entirely exempted from the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.

India and Germany are among the top emitters. Yet, India was also exempt from

Kyoto. These and other developing countries that are experiencing rapid growth face

challenges in reducing their emissions without harming their economies. We want

to work cooperatively with these countries in their efforts to reduce greenhouse

emissions and maintain economic growth.

Kyoto also failed to address two major pollutants that have an impact on warming: black soot and tropospheric ozone. Both are proven health hazards. Reducing

both would not only address climate change, but also dramatically improve people’s health.

Kyoto is, in many ways, unrealistic. Many countries cannot meet their Kyoto targets. The targets themselves were arbitrary and not based upon science. For America, complying with those mandates would have a negative economic impact, with

layoffs of workers and price increases for consumers. And when you evaluate all

these flaws, most reasonable people will understand that it’s not sound public policy.

That’s why 95 members of the U.S. Senate expressed a reluctance to endorse such

an approach. Yet, America’s unwillingness to embrace a flawed treaty should not

be read by our friends and allies as any abdication of responsibility. To the contrary,

my administration is committed to a leadership role on the issue of climate change.

We recognize our responsibility and will meet it—at home, in our hemisphere, and

in the world. My Cabinet-level working group on climate change is recommending

a number of initial steps, and will continue to work on additional ideas. The working group proposes the United States help lead the way by advancing the science

on climate change, advancing the technology to monitor and reduce greenhouse

gases, and creating partnerships within our hemisphere and beyond to monitor and

measure and mitigate emissions.

I also call on Congress to work with my administration to achieve the significant

emission reductions made possible by implementing the clean energy technologies

proposed in our energy plan. Our working group study has made it clear that we

need to know a lot more.

The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change commences to stabilizing

concentrations at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the

climate; but no one knows what that level is. The United States has spent $18 billion on climate research since 1990—three times as much as any other country, and

more than Japan and all 15 nations of the EU combined.

Today, I make our investment in science even greater. My administration will establish the U.S. Climate Change Research Initiative to study areas of uncertainty

and identify priority areas where investments can make a difference.

I’m directing my Secretary of Commerce, working with other agencies, to set priorities for additional investments in climate change research, review such investments, and to improve coordination amongst Federal agencies. We will fully fund

high-priority areas for climate change science over the next 5 years. We’ll also provide resources to build climate observation systems in developing countries and encourage other developed nations to match our American commitment.

And we propose a joint venture with the EU, Japan and others to develop stateof-the-art climate modeling that will help us better understand the causes and impacts of climate change. America’s the leader in technology and innovation. We all

believe technology offers great promise to significantly reduce emissions—especially

carbon capture, storage and sequestration technologies.

So we’re creating the National Climate Change Technology Initiative to strengthen research at universities and national labs, to enhance partnerships in applied research, to develop improved technology for measuring and monitoring gross and net

greenhouse gas emissions, and to fund demonstration projects for cutting-edge technologies, such as bioreactors and fuel cells.

Even with the best science, even with the best technology, we all know the United

States cannot solve this global problem alone. We’re building partnerships within

the Western Hemisphere and with other like-minded countries. Last week, Secretary Powell signed a new CONCAUSA Declaration with the countries of Central

America, calling for cooperative efforts on science research, monitoring and measuring of emissions, technology development, and investment in forest conservation.

We will work with the Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research and

other institutions to better understand regional impacts of climate change. We will

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establish a partnership to monitor and mitigate emissions. And at home, I call on

Congress to work with my administration on the initiatives to enhance conservation

and energy efficiency outlined in my energy plan, to implement the increased use

of renewables, natural gas and hydropower that are outlined in the plan, and to increase the generation of safe and clean nuclear power.

By increasing conservation and energy efficiency and aggressively using these

clean energy technologies, we can reduce our greenhouse gas emissions by significant amounts in the coming years. We can make great progress in reducing emissions, and we will. Yet, even that isn’t enough.

I’ve asked my advisors to consider approaches to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, including those that tap the power of markets, help realize the promise of

technology and ensure the widest-possible global participation. As we analyze the

possibilities, we will be guided by several basic principles. Our approach must be

consistent with the long-term goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in

the atmosphere. Our actions should be measured as we learn more from science and

build on it.

Our approach must be flexible to adjust to new information and take advantage

of new technology. We must always act to ensure continued economic growth and

prosperity for our citizens and for citizens throughout the world. We should pursue

market-based incentives and spur technological innovation.

And, finally, our approach must be based on global participation, including that

of developing countries whose net greenhouse gas emissions now exceed those in the

developed countries.

I’ve asked Secretary Powell and Administrator Whitman to ensure they actively

work with friends and allies to explore common approaches to climate change consistent with these principles. Each step we take will increase our knowledge. We

will act, learn, and act again, adjusting our approaches as science advances and

technology evolves.

Our administration will be creative. We’re committed to protecting our environment and improving our economy, to acting at home and working in concert with

the world. This is an administration that will make commitments we can keep, and

keep the commitments that we make.

I look forward to continued discussions with our friends and allies about this important issue.

Thank you for coming.

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2. POLICY BOOK ACCOMPANYING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT (JUNE 11, 2001)

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3. STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH (FEBRUARY 14, 2002)

THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

For Immediate Release February 14, 2002

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLEAN AIR

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Silver Spring, Maryland

2:05 P.M. EST

The President: Thank you very much for that warm welcome. It’s an honor to join

you all today to talk about our environment and about the prospect of dramatic

progress to improve it.

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Today, I’m announcing a new environmental approach that will clean our skies,

bring greater health to our citizens and encourage environmentally responsible development in America and around the world.

Particularly, it’s an honor to address this topic at NOAA, whose research is providing us with the answers to critical questions about our environment. And so I

want to thank Connie for his hospitality and I want to thank you for yours, as well.

Connie said he felt kind of like Sasha Cohen—I thought for a minute he was going

to ask me to talk to his mother on his cell phone.

I also want to tell you one of my favorite moments was to go down to Crawford

and turn on my NOAA radio to get the weather. I don’t know whether my guy is

a computer or a person. But the forecast is always accurate, and I appreciate that.

I also want to thank you for your hard work, on behalf of the American people.

I appreciate my friend, Don Evans’s leadership. I’ve known him for a long time.

You’re working for a good fellow, if you’re working at the Commerce Department,

or at NOAA. And I want to thank Spence Abraham and Christie Todd Whitman for

their service to the country, as well. I’ve assembled a fabulous Cabinet, people who

love their country and work hard. And these are three of some of the finest Cabinet

officials I’ve got.

I want to thank Jim Connaughton, who is the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. He’s done a fabulous job of putting this policy together, a policy

that I’m about to explain. But before I do, I also want to thank some Members of

Congress who have worked with us on this initiative. I want to thank Bob Smith

and George Voinovich, two United States senators, for their leadership in pursuing

multi-pollutant legislation; as well as Congressmen Billy Tauzin and Joe Barton.

And I want to thank Senator Chuck Hagel and Larry Craig for their work on climate issues. These Members of Congress have had an impact on the policies I am

just about to announce.

America and the world share this common goal: we must foster economic growth

in ways that protect our environment. We must encourage growth that will provide

a better life for citizens, while protecting the land, the water, and the air that sustain life.

In pursuit of this goal, my government has set two priorities: we must clean our

air, and we must address the issue of global climate change. We must also act in

a serious and responsible way, given the scientific uncertainties. While these uncertainties remain, we can begin now to address the human factors that contribute to

climate change. Wise action now is an insurance policy against future risks.

I have been working with my Cabinet to meet these challenges with forward and

creative thinking. I said, if need be, let’s challenge the status quo. But let’s always

remember, let’s do what is in the interest of the American people.

Today, I’m confident that the environmental path that I announce will benefit the

entire world. This new approach is based on this common-sense idea: that economic

growth is key to environmental progress, because it is growth that provides the resources for investment in clean technologies.

This new approach will harness the power of markets, the creativity of entrepreneurs, and draw upon the best scientific research. And it will make possible a

new partnership with the developing world to meet our common environmental and

economic goals.

We will apply this approach first to the challenge of cleaning the air that Americans breathe. Today, I call for new Clean Skies legislation that sets tough new

standards to dramatically reduce the three most significant forms of pollution from

power plants, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury.

We will cut sulfur dioxide emissions by 73 percent from current levels. We will

cut nitrogen oxide emissions by 67 percent. And, for the first time ever, we will cap

emissions of mercury, cutting them by 69 percent. These cuts will be completed over

two measured phases, with one set of emission limits for 2010 and for the other for

2018.

This legislation will constitute the most significant step America has ever taken—

has ever taken—to cut power plant emissions that contribute to urban smog, acid

rain and numerous health problems for our citizens.

Clean Skies legislation will not only protect our environment, it will prolong the

lives of thousands of Americans with asthma and other respiratory illnesses, as well

as with those with heart disease. And it will reduce the risk to children exposed

to mercury during a mother’s pregnancy.

The Clean Skies legislation will reach our ambitious air quality goals through a

market-based cap-and-trade approach that rewards innovation, reduces cost and

guarantees results. Instead of the government telling utilities where and how to cut

pollution, we will tell them when and how much to cut. We will give them a firm

deadline and let them find the most innovative ways to meet it.

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We will do this by requiring each facility to have a permit for each ton of pollution

it emits. By making the permits tradable, this system makes it financially worthwhile for companies to pollute less, giving them an incentive to make early and cost

effective reductions.

This approach enjoys widespread support, with both Democrats and Republicans,

because we know it works. You see, since 1995 we have used a cap-and-trade program for sulfur dioxide pollution. It has cut more air pollution, this system has reduced more air pollution in the last decade than all other programs under the 1990

Clean Air Act combined. And by even more than the law required. Compliance has

been virtually 100 percent. It takes only a handful of employees to administer this

program. And no one had to enter a courtroom to make sure the reductions happened.

Because the system gives businesses an incentive to create and install innovative

technologies, these reductions have cost about 80 percent less than expected. It

helps to keep energy prices affordable for our consumers. And we made this

progress during a decade when our economy, and our demand for energy, was growing.

The Clean Skies legislation I propose is structured on this approach because it

works. It will replace a confusing, ineffective maze of regulations for power plants

that has created an endless cycle of litigation. Today, hundreds of millions of dollars

are spent on lawyers, rather than on environmental protection. The result is painfully slow, uncertain and expensive programs on clean air.

Instead, Clean Skies legislation will put less money into paying lawyers and regulators, and money directly into programs to reduce pollution, to meet our national

goal. This approach, I’m absolutely confident, will bring better and faster results in

cleaning up our air.

Now, global climate change presents a different set of challenges and requires a

different strategy. The science is more complex, the answers are less certain, and

the technology is less developed. So we need a flexible approach that can adjust to

new information and new technology.

I reaffirm America’s commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention

and its central goal, to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at a

level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate. Our immediate goal is to reduce America’s greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of

our economy.

My administration is committed to cutting our nation’s greenhouse gas intensity— how much we emit per unit of economic activity—by 18 percent over the next 10

years. This will set America on a path to slow the growth of our greenhouse gas

emissions and, as science justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions.

This is the common sense way to measure progress. Our Nation must have economic growth—growth to create opportunity; growth to create a higher quality of

life for our citizens. Growth is also what pays for investments in clean technologies,

increased conservation, and energy efficiency. Meeting our commitment to reduce

our greenhouse gas intensity by 18 percent by the year 2012 will prevent over 500

million metric tons of greenhouse gases from going into the atmosphere over the

course of the decade. And that is the equivalent of taking 70 million cars off the

road.

To achieve this goal, our Nation must move forward on many fronts, looking at

every sector of our economy. We will challenge American businesses to further reduce emissions. Already, agreements with the semiconductor and aluminum industries and others have dramatically cut emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases. We will build on these successes with new agreements and greater reductions.

Our government will also move forward immediately to create world-class standards for measuring and registering emission reductions. And we will give transferable credits to companies that can show real emission reductions.

We will promote renewable energy production and clean coal technology, as well

as nuclear power, which produces no greenhouse gas emissions. And we will work

to safely improve fuel economy for our cars and our trucks.

Overall, my budget devotes $4.5 billion to addressing climate change—more than

any other nation’s commitment in the entire world. This is an increase of more than

$700 million over last year’s budget. Our Nation will continue to lead the world in

basic climate and science research to address gaps in our knowledge that are important to decisionmakers.

When we make decisions, we want to make sure we do so on sound science; not

what sounds good, but what is real. And the United States leads the world in providing that kind of research. We’ll devote $588 million toward the research and development of energy conservation technologies. We must and we will conserve more

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in the United States. And we will spend $408 million toward research and development on renewables, on renewable energy.

This funding includes $150 million for an initiative that Spence Abraham laid out

the other day, $150 million for the Freedom Car Initiative, which will advance the

prospect of breakthrough zero-emission fuel cell technologies.

My comprehensive energy plan, the first energy plan that any administration has

put out in a long period of time, provides $4.6 billion over the next 5 years in clean

energy tax incentives to encourage purchases of hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, to promote residential solar energy, and to reward investments in wind, solar and biomass

energy production. And we will look for ways to increase the amount of carbon

stored by America’s farms and forests through a strong conservation title in the

farm bill. I have asked Secretary Veneman to recommend new targeted incentives

for landowners to increase carbon storage.

By doing all these things, by giving companies incentives to cut emissions, by diversifying our energy supply to include cleaner fuels, by increasing conservation, by

increasing research and development and tax incentives for energy efficiency and

clean technologies, and by increasing carbon storage, I am absolutely confident that

America will reach the goal that I have set.

If, however, by 2012, our progress is not sufficient and sound science justifies further action, the United States will respond with additional measures that may include broad-based market programs as well as additional incentives and voluntary

measures designed to accelerate technology development and deployment.

Addressing global climate change will require a sustained effort over many generations. My approach recognizes that economic growth is the solution, not the problem. Because a Nation that grows its economy is a Nation that can afford investments and new technologies.

The approach taken under the Kyoto protocol would have required the United

States to make deep and immediate cuts in our economy to meet an arbitrary target. It would have cost our economy up to $400 billion and we would have lost 4.9

million jobs.

As President of the United States, charged with safeguarding the welfare of the

American people and American workers, I will not commit our Nation to an unsound international treaty that will throw millions of our citizens out of work. Yet,

we recognize our international responsibilities. So in addition to acting here at

home, the United States will actively help developing nations grow along a more efficient, more environmentally responsible path.

The hope of growth and opportunity and prosperity is universal. It’s the dream

and right of every society on our globe. The United States wants to foster economic

growth in the developing world, including the world’s poorest nations. We want to

help them realize their potential, and bring the benefits of growth to their peoples,

including better health, and better schools and a cleaner environment.

It would be unfair—indeed, counterproductive—to condemn developing nations to

slow growth or no growth by insisting that they take on impractical and unrealistic

greenhouse gas targets. Yet, developing nations such as China and India already

account for a majority of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, and it would be irresponsible to absolve them from shouldering some of the shared obligations.

The greenhouse gas intensity approach I put forward today gives developing countries a yardstick for progress on climate change that recognizes their right to economic development. I look forward to discussing this new approach next week, when

I go to China and Japan and South Korea. The United States will not interfere with

the plans of any Nation that chooses to ratify the Kyoto protocol. But I will intend

to work with nations, especially the poor and developing nations, to show the world

that there is a better approach, that we can build our future prosperity along a

cleaner and better path.

My budget includes over $220 million for the U.S. Agency for International Development and a global environmental facility to help developing countries better

measure, reduce emissions, and to help them invest in clean and renewable energy

technologies. Many of these technologies, which we take for granted in our own

country, are not being used in the developing world. We can help ensure that the

benefits of these technologies are more broadly shared. Such efforts have helped

bring solar energy to Bangladesh, hydroelectric energy to the Philippines, geothermal electricity to Kenya. These projects are bringing jobs and environmental

benefits to these nations, and we will build on these successes.

The new budget also provides $40 million under the Tropical Forest Conservation

Act to help countries redirect debt payments toward protecting tropical forests, forests that store millions of tons of carbon. And I’ve also ordered the Secretary of

State to develop a new initiative to help developing countries stop illegal logging,

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a practice that destroys biodiversity and releases millions of tons of greenhouse

gases into the atmosphere.

And, finally, my government is following through on our commitment to provide $25 million for climate observation systems in developing countries that will help

scientists understand the dynamics of climate change.

To clean the air, and to address climate change, we need to recognize that economic growth and environmental protection go hand in hand. Affluent societies are

the ones that demand, and can therefore afford, the most environmental protection.

Prosperity is what allows us to commit more and more resources to environmental

protection. And in the coming decades, the world needs to develop and deploy billions of dollars of technologies that generate energy in cleaner ways. And we need

strong economic growth to make that possible.

Americans are among the most creative people in our history. We have used radio

waves to peer into the deepest reaches of space. We cracked life’s genetic code. We

have made our air and land and water significantly cleaner, even as we have built

the world’s strongest economy.

When I see what Americans have done, I know what we can do. We can tap the

power of economic growth to further protect our environment for generations that

follow. And that’s what we’re going to do.

Thank you.

4. POLICY BOOK ACCOMPANYING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT (FEBRUARY 14, 2002)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

‘‘Addressing global climate change will require a sustained effort, over many generations. My approach recognizes that sustained economic growth is the solution,

not the problem—because a Nation that grows its economy is a Nation that can afford investments in efficiency, new technologies, and a cleaner environment.’’

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH. The President announced a new approach to the challenge of global climate

change. This approach is designed to harness the power of markets and technological innovation. It holds the promise of a new partnership with the developing

world. And it recognizes that climate change is a complex, long-term challenge that

will require a sustained effort over many generations. As the President has said,

‘‘The policy challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the limits of our

knowledge. While scientific uncertainties remain, we can begin now to address the

factors that contribute to climate change.’’ While investments today in science will increase our understanding of this challenge, our investments in advanced energy and sequestration technologies will provide the breakthroughs we need to dramatically reduce our emissions in the longer

term. In the near term, we will vigorously pursue emissions reductions even in the

absence of complete knowledge. Our approach recognizes that sustained economic

growth is an essential part of the solution, not the problem. Economic growth will

make possible the needed investment in research, development, and deployment of

advanced technologies. This strategy is one that should offer developing countries

the incentive and means to join with us in tackling this challenge together. Significantly, the President’s plan will: • Reduce the Greenhouse Gas Intensity of the U.S. Economy by 18 Percent in

the Next Ten Years. Greenhouse gas intensity measures the ratio of greenhouse gas

(GHG) emissions to economic output. This new approach focuses on reducing the

growth of GHG emissions, while sustaining the economic growth needed to finance

investment in new, clean energy technologies. It sets America on a path to slow the

growth of greenhouse gas emissions, and—as the science justifies—to stop and then

reverse that growth:

• In efficiency terms, the 183 metric tons of emissions per million dollars GDP

that we emit today will be lowered to 151 metric tons per million dollars GDP in

2012.

• Existing trends and efforts in technology improvement will play a significant

role. Beyond that, the President’s commitment will achieve 100 million metric tons

of reduced emissions in 2012 alone, with more than 500 million metric tons in cumulative savings over the entire decade.

• This goal is comparable to the average progress that nations participating in

the Kyoto Protocol are required to achieve.

• Substantially Improve the Emission Reduction Registry. The President directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the

Secretary of Agriculture, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency, to propose improvements to the current voluntary emission reduction registration program under section 1605(b) of the 1992 Energy Policy Act within 120

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days. These improvements will enhance measurement accuracy, reliability and

verifiability, working with and taking into account emerging domestic and international approaches. • Protect and Provide Transferable Credits for Emissions Reduction. The President directed the Secretary of Energy to recommend reforms to ensure that businesses and individuals that register reductions are not penalized under a future climate policy, and to give transferable credits to companies that can show real emissions reductions. • Review Progress Toward Goal and Take Additional Action if Necessary. If, in

2012, we find that we are not on track toward meeting our goal, and sound science

justifies further policy action, the United States will respond with additional measures that may include a broad, market-based program as well as additional incentives and voluntary measures designed to accelerate technology development and deployment. • Increase Funding for America’s Commitment to Climate Change. The President’s fiscal year 1903 budget seeks $4.5 billion in total climate spending—an increase of $700 million. This commitment is unmatched in the world, and is particularly notable given America’s focus on international and homeland security and domestic economic issues in the President’s fiscal year 1903 budget proposal. • Take Action on the Science and Technology Review. The Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Energy have completed their review of the Federal Government’s science and technology research portfolios and recommended a path forward.

As a result of their review, the President has established a new management structure to advance and coordinate climate change science and technology research. • The President has established a Cabinet-level Committee on Climate Change

Science and Technology Integration to oversee this effort. The Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Energy will lead the effort, in close coordination with the

President’s Science Advisor. The research effort will continue to be coordinated

through the National Science and Technology Council in accordance with the Global

Change Research Act of 1990. • The President’s fiscal year 1903 budget proposal dedicates $1.7 billion to fund basic scientific research on climate change and $1.3 billion to fund research on advanced energy and sequestration technologies. • This includes $80 million in new funding dedicated to implementation of the

Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI) and the National Climate Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI) announced last June. This funding will be used to address

major gaps in our current understanding of the natural carbon cycle and the role

of black soot emissions in climate change. It will also be used to promote the development of the most promising ‘‘breakthrough’’ technologies for clean energy generation and carbon sequestration. • Implement a Comprehensive Range of New and Expanded Domestic Policies,

Including:

• Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, Cogeneration, and New Technology. The

President’s fiscal year 1903 budget seeks $555 million in clean energy tax incentives, as the first part of a $4.6 billion commitment over the next 5 years ($7.1 billion over the next 10 years). These tax credits will spur investments in renewable

energy (solar, wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, cogeneration, and

landfill gas conversion. Consistent with the National Energy Policy, the President

has directed the Secretary of the Treasury to work with Congress to extend and expand the production tax credit for electricity generation from wind and biomass, to

develop a new residential solar energy tax credit, and to encourage cogeneration

projects through investment tax credits.

• Business Challenges. The President has challenged American businesses to

make specific commitments to improving the greenhouse gas intensity of their operations and to reduce emissions. Recent agreements with the semi-conductor and aluminum industries and industries that emit methane already have significantly reduced emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases. We will build upon

these successes with new agreements, producing greater reductions.

• Transportation Programs. The Administration is promoting the development of

fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks, researching options for producing cleaner

fuels, and implementing programs to improve energy efficiency. The President is

committed to expanding Federal research partnerships with industry, providing

market-based incentives and updating current regulatory programs that advance

our progress in this important area. This commitment includes expanding fuel cell

research, in particular through the ‘‘FreedomCAR’’ initiative. The President’s fiscal

year 1903 budget seeks more than $3 billion in tax credits over 11 years for consumers to purchase fuel cell and hybrid vehicles. The Secretary of Transportation

has asked the congressional leadership to work with him on legislation that would

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authorize the Department of Transportation to reform the Corporate Average Fuel

Economy (CAFE) program, fully considering the recent National Academy Sciences

report, so that we can safely improve fuel economy for cars and trucks.

• Carbon Sequestration. The President’s fiscal year 1903 budget requests over $3

billion—a $1 billion increase above the baseline—as the first part of a 10-year

(2002–2011) commitment to implement and improve the conservation title of the

Farm Bill, which will significantly enhance the natural storage of carbon. The President also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide recommendations for further, targeted incentives aimed at forest and agricultural sequestration of greenhouse gases. The President further directed the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy,

to develop accounting rules and guidelines for crediting sequestration projects, taking into account emerging domestic and international approaches.

• Promote New and Expanded International Policies to Complement Our Domestic Program. The President’s approach seeks to expand cooperation internationally

to meet the challenge of climate change, including:

• Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences’ recommendation for better

observation systems, the President has allocated $25 million and challenged other

developed nations to match the U.S. commitment.

• Tripling Funding for ‘‘Debt-for-Nature’’ Forest Conservation Programs. Building upon recent Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) agreements with Belize,

El Salvador, and Bangladesh, the President’s fiscal year 1903 budget request of $40

million to fund ‘‘debt for nature’’ agreements with developing countries nearly triples funding for this successful program. Under TFCA, developing countries agree

to protect their tropical forests from logging, avoiding emissions and preserving the

substantial carbon sequestration services they provide. The President also announced a new agreement with the Government of Thailand, which will preserve

important mangrove forest in Northeastern Thailand in exchange for debt relief

worth $11.4 million.

• Fully Funding the Global Environmental Facility. The Administration’s fiscal

year 1903 budget request of $178 million for the GEF is more than $77 million

above this year’s funding and includes a substantial $70 million payment for arrears

incurred during the prior administration. The GEF is the primary international institution for transferring energy and sequestration technologies to the developing

world under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC).

• Dedicating Significant Funds to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget requests $155 million

in funding for USAID climate change programs. USAID serves as a critical vehicle

for transferring American energy and sequestration technologies to developing countries to promote sustainable development and minimize their GHG emissions

growth.

• Pursue Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan continue their HighLevel Consultations on climate change issues. Later this month, a team of U.S. experts will meet with their Japanese counterparts to discuss specific projects within

the various areas of climate science and technology, to identify the highest priorities

for collaborative research.

• Pursue Joint Research with Italy. Following up on a pledge of President Bush

and Prime Minister Berlusconi to undertake joint research on climate change, the

U.S. and Italy convened a Joint Climate Change Research Meeting in January 2002.

The delegations for the two countries identified more than 20 joint climate change

research activities for immediate implementation, including global and regional

modeling.

• Pursue Joint Research with Central America. The United States and Central

American Heads of Government signed the Central American-United States of

America Joint Accord (CONCAUSA) on December 10, 1994. The original agreement

covered cooperation under action plans in four major areas: conservation of biodiversity, sound use of energy, environmental legislation, and sustainable economic development. On June 7, 2001, the United States and its Central American partners

signed an expanded and renewed CONCAUSA Declaration, adding disaster relief

and climate change as new areas for cooperation. The new CONCAUSA Declaration

calls for intensified cooperative efforts to address climate change through scientific

research, estimating and monitoring greenhouse gases, investing in forestry conservation, enhancing energy efficiency, and utilizing new environmental technologies.

NATIONAL GOAL

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The President set a national goal to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of the

U.S. economy by 18 percent over the next 10 years. Rather than pitting economic

growth against the environment, the President has established an approach that

promises real progress on climate change by tapping the power of sustained economic growth. • The President’s Yardstick—Greenhouse Gas Intensity—is a Better Way to

Measure Progress Without Hurting Growth. A goal expressed in terms of declining

greenhouse gas intensity, measuring greenhouse gas emissions relative to economic

activity, quantifies our effort to reduce emissions through conservation, adoption of

cleaner, more efficient, and emission-reducing technologies, and sequestration. At

the same time, an intensity goal accommodates economic growth. • Reducing Greenhouse Gas Intensity by 18 Percent Over the Next Ten Years

is Ambitious but Achievable. The United States will reduce the 183 metric tons of

emissions per million dollars GDP that we emit today to 151 metric tons per million

dollars GDP in 2012. We expect existing trends and efforts in technology improvement to play a significant role. Beyond that, our commitment will achieve 100 million metric tons of reduced emissions in 2012 alone, with more than 500 million

metric tons in cumulative savings over the entire decade. • Focusing on Greenhouse Gas Intensity Sets America on a Path to Slow the

Growth of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and—as the Science Justifies—to Stop and

Then Reverse That Growth. As we learn more about the science of climate change

and develop new technologies to mitigate emissions, this annual decline can be accelerated. When the annual decline in intensity equals the economic growth rate

(currently, about 3 percent per year), emission growth will have stopped. When the

annual decline in intensity exceeds the economic growth rate, emission growth will

reverse. Reversing emission growth will eventually stabilize atmospheric concentrations as emissions decline.

• As We Advance Science and Develop Technology to Substantially Reduce

Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Long Term, We Do Not Want to Risk Harming

the Economy in the Short Term. Over the past 20 years, greenhouse gas emissions

have risen with economic growth, as our economy benefited from inexpensive, fossilfuel based—and greenhouse gas emitting—energy. While new technologies promise

to break this emission-economy link, a rapid reduction in emissions would be costly

and threaten economic growth. Sustained economic growth is essential for any longterm solution: Prosperity is what allows us to dedicate more resources to solving environmental problems. History shows that wealthier societies demand—and can afford—more environmental protection.

• The Intensity Based Approach Promotes Near-Term Opportunities to Conserve

Fossil Fuel Use, Recover Methane, and Sequester Carbon. Until we develop and

adopt breakthrough technologies that provide safe and reliable energy to fuel our

economy without emitting greenhouse gases, we need to promote more rapid adoption of existing, improved energy efficiency and renewable resources that provide

cost-effective opportunities to reduce emissions. Profitable methane recovery from

landfills, coal mines and gas pipelines offers another opportunity—estimated by the

EPA at about 30 million tons of carbon equivalent emissions. Finally, carbon sequestration in soils and forests can provide tens of millions of tons of emission reductions

at very low costs.

• The Intensity Based Approach Advances a Serious, but Measured Mitigation

Response. The President recognizes America’s responsibility to reduce emissions. At

the same time, any long-term solution—one that stabilizes atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at safe levels—will require the development and deployment of new technologies that are not yet cost-effective. The President’s policy balances the desire for immediate reductions with the need to protect the economy and

to take advantage of developing science and technology.

The President’s Goal is Ambitious and Responsible

• Reducing Greenhouse Gas Intensity by 18 Percent Over the Next Ten Years

is Comparable to the Average Progress that Nations Participating in the Kyoto Protocol are Required to Achieve. Our goal translates into a 4.5 percent reduction beyond forecasts of the progress that America is expected to make based on existing

programs and private activity. Forecasts of the average reductions required by nations implementing the Kyoto Protocol range from zero to 7 percent.

• While Producing Results Similar to What the Kyoto Protocol Participants Are

Required to Achieve on Average, the President’s Approach Protects the Economy

and Develops Institutions for a Long-Term Solution. The focus on greenhouse gas

intensity separates the goal of reducing emissions from the potential economic harm

associated with a rigid emission cap. By measuring greenhouse gas emissions relative to economic activity, we have a solid yardstick against which we can measure

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progress as we pursue a range of programs to reduce emissions. As we develop technologies to produce more goods with fewer greenhouse gas emissions, this yardstick

does not penalize economic growth.

• Greenhouse Gas Intensity Is a More Practical Way to Discuss Goals with Developing Countries. The close connection between economic growth, energy use and

greenhouse gas emissions implies that fixed appropriate emission limits are hard to

identify when economic growth is uncertain and carbon-free, breakthrough energy

technologies are not yet in place. Such targets are also hard to identify for developing countries where the future rate of emissions is even more uncertain. Given

its neutrality with regard to economic growth, greenhouse gas intensity solves or

substantially reduces many of these problems.

Enhanced National Registry for Voluntary Emissions Reductions

The Administration will improve the current Federal GHG Reduction and Sequestration Registry that recognizes greenhouse gas reductions by non-governmental organizations, businesses, farmers, and the Federal, State and local governments.

Registry participants and the public will have a high level of confidence in the reductions recognized by this Registry, through capture and sequestration projects,

mitigation projects that increase energy efficiency and/or switch fuels, and process

changes to reduce emissions of potent greenhouse gases, such as methane. An enhanced registry will promote the identification and expansion of innovative and effective ways to reduce greenhouse gases. The enhanced registry will encourage participation by removing the risk that these actions will be penalized—or inaction rewarded—by future climate policy.

• Improve the Quality of the Current Program. A registry is a tool for companies

to publicly record their progress in reducing emissions, providing public recognition

of a company’s accomplishments, and a record of mitigation efforts for future policy

design. This tool goes hand-in-hand with voluntary business challenges, described

below, by providing a standardized, credible vehicle for reporting and recognizing

progress.

• Although businesses can already register emission reductions under section

1605(b) of the 1995 Energy Policy Act, participation has been limited.

• The President directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Agriculture, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to propose improvements to the current voluntary emissions reduction registration program within 120 days.

• These improvements will enhance measurement accuracy, reliability and

verifiability, working with and taking into account emerging domestic and international approaches.

• Protect and Provide Transferable Credits for Emissions Reduction. The President directed the Secretary of Energy to recommend reforms to ensure that businesses and individuals that register reductions are not penalized under a future climate policy, and to give transferable credits to companies that can show real emissions reductions. These protections will encourage businesses and individuals to

pursue innovative strategies to reduce or sequester greenhouse gas emissions, without the risk that future climate policy will disadvantage them.

• Background on Current Registry Program. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 directed the Department of Energy (with EIA as the implementing agency) to develop

a program to document voluntary actions that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases

or remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.

• Under the Energy Policy Act, EIA was directed to issue ‘‘procedures for the accurate reporting of information on annual reductions of greenhouse gas emissions

and carbon fixation achieved through any measures, including fuel switching, forest

management practices, tree planting, use of renewable energy, manufacture or use

of vehicles with reduced greenhouse gas emissions, appliance efficiency, methane recovery, cogeneration, chlorofluorocarbon capture and replacement, and power plant

heat rate improvement.’’

• In 1999, 207 companies and other organizations, representing 24 different industries or services, reported on 1,722 projects that achieved 226 million metric tons

of carbon dioxide equivalent reductions—equal to 3.4 percent of national emissions.

Participating companies included Clairol, AT&T, Dow Chemical, Johnson & Johnson, IBM, Motorola, Pharmacia, Upjohn, Sunoco, Southern, General Motors and DuPont.

• EIA released a February 2002 report demonstrating that this program continues to expand. In 2000, 222 companies had undertaken 1,882 projects to reduce

or sequester greenhouse gases. These achieved 269 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent reductions—equal to 3.9 percent of national emissions.

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• A number of proposals to reform the existing registry—or create a new registry—have appeared in energy and/or climate policy bills introduced in the past

year. The Administration will fully explore the extent to which the existing authority under the Energy Policy Act is adequate to achieve these reforms.

Progress Check in 2012

The domestic programs proposed by the President allow consumers and businesses to make flexible decisions about emission reductions rather than mandating

particular control options or rigid targets. If, however, by 2012, our progress is not

sufficient, and sound science justifies further action, the United States will respond

with additional measures that may include a broad, market-based program, as well

as additional incentives and voluntary measures designed to accelerate technology

development and deployment.

DOMESTIC INITIATIVES

Summary

Key domestic initiatives to contribute to achieving our goal:

• Tax Incentives for Renewables and Cogeneration. The Administration’s fiscal

year 2003 budget proposal seeks $4.6 billion in clean energy tax incentives over the

next 5 years. These tax credits will spur investments in renewable energy (solar,

wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas. As

directed in the National Energy Policy, the Secretary of the Treasury will work with

Congress to extend and expand the production tax credit for electricity generation

from wind and biomass, to develop a new residential solar energy tax credit, and

to encourage cogeneration projects through investment tax credits. • Business Challenges. The President challenges American businesses and industries to reduce emissions. Already, agreements with the semi-conductor and aluminum industries, and industries that emit methane, have dramatically reduced

emissions of some of the most potent greenhouse gases. We will build on these successes, with broader agreements and greater reductions. • Transportation Programs. The Administration is promoting the development of

fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks, researching options for producing cleaner

fuels, and implementing programs to improve energy efficiency. The President is

committed to expanding Federal research partnerships with industry, market-based

incentives and updating current regulatory programs that advance our progress in

this important area. The Administration has expanded fuel cell research, such as

the ‘‘FreedomCAR’’ initiative, and the President’s 1903 budget seeks more than $3

billion in tax credits over 11 years for consumers to purchase fuel cells and hybrid

vehicles. The Secretary of Transportation has asked the congressional leadership to

work with him on legislation that would authorize the Department of Transportation to reform the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program, fully considering the recent National Academy Sciences report, so that we can safely improve

fuel economy for cars and trucks. • Carbon Sequestration. The President’s fiscal year 1903 budget requests over $3

billion—a $1 billion increase above the baseline—as the first part of a 10-year

(2002–2011) commitment to implement and improve the conservation title of the

Farm Bill, which will significantly enhance the natural storage of carbon. The President also directed the Secretary of Agriculture to provide recommendations on further, targeted incentives for forest and agricultural sequestration of greenhouse

gases. The President further directed the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation

with the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Energy, to develop accounting rules and guidelines for crediting sequestration projects, taking

into account emerging domestic and international approaches.

Incentives and Programs for Renewables and Industrial Cogeneration

The President’s fiscal year 1903 budget proposes providing $4.6 billion in clean

energy tax incentives over the next 5 years ($7.1 billion over 10 years) for investments in renewable energy (solar, wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles,

co-generation, landfill gas conversion, and ethanol. These incentives are important

to meeting the nation’s long-term energy supply and security needs, and reducing

pollution and projected greenhouse gas emissions. These clean energy tax incentives

include:

• New 10 Percent Tax Credit for Co-Generation (Combined Heat and Power Systems). The President has proposed a new 10 percent tax credit for investments in

combined heat and power systems between 2002 and 2006. The credit will encourage investments in highly efficient CHP projects and spur innovation in improved

CHP technologies. No income tax credits are currently available for investment in

CHP property.

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• Cogeneration. Combined heat and power (CHP), also known as ‘‘co-generation’’, is a highly efficient form of electric generation that recycles heat which is normally

lost under traditional power combustion methods. CHP captures the heat left over

from industrial use, providing a source of residential and industrial heating and air

conditioning in the local area around the power plant. CHP systems achieve a greater level of overall energy efficiency, thereby reducing energy consumption, costs, and

carbon emissions. • EPA Combined Heat and Power Partnership. The new tax credit would enhance efforts underway by the Environmental Protection Agency to streamline the

permitting process for cogeneration plants, promote their location in brownfields and

other industrial sites, and clarify how companies can use cogeneration to stay in

compliance with Clean Air Act pollution standards. On October 5, 2001, in partnership with 17 Fortune 500 companies, city and State governments and nonprofits,

EPA announced the Combined Heat and Power Partnership. Current CHP projects

of the founding partners represent more then 5,800 megawatts of power generating

capacity, an amount capable of serving almost 6 million households. The projects annually reduce carbon dioxide by more than 8 million tons; the annual energy savings

equal 19 million barrels of oil. A similar program by the Department of Energy challenges the heat and power industry to double usage of cogeneration in the United

States by 2010. • First-Ever Tax Credit for Residential Solar Energy Systems. The President has

proposed a new 15 percent tax credit for individuals who purchase photovoltaic

equipment or solar water heating systems used in a residence, up to a maximum

credit of $2,000 for each type of equipment. Currently, no credit is available for noncommercial purchases of solar energy equipment. The credit would be available for

photovoltaic equipment purchased between 2002 and 2007, and for solar water heating equipment purchased between 2002 and 2005. This credit will encourage businesses and homeowners to invest in solar power systems. • Expanded Tax Credit for Electricity Produced from Wind or Biomass. The

President has proposed extending and modifying the tax credit for electricity produced from wind or biomass. Currently, wind energy accounts for 6 percent of renewable electricity generation and 0.1 percent of total electricity supply. Advances

have helped cut costs by more than 80 percent during the last 20 years. This proposal would help make electricity produced from wind and biomass competitive with

other sources of electricity supply. The proposal would: • Extend for 3 years (2002–2004) the present 1.7 cent-per-kilowatt hour credit

for electricity produced from wind and closed-loop biomass (plants grown exclusively

to produce electricity); and • Expand eligible biomass sources to include certain biomass from forest-related

resources, agricultural and other sources. For existing biomass facilities, the credit

for electricity produced from new sources is 1.0 cent-per-kilowatt hour for 3 years

(2002–2004) of production. For coal fired facilities, electricity produced from co-firing

biomass from new sources is 0.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour for 3 years of production

(2002–2004).

• Tax Credit for New Methane Landfill Projects. The President has proposed encouraging the development of a new alternative source of energy by providing tax

credits for energy produced from landfill gas. The credit would be approximately 1.0

cent-per-kilowatt hour (or the equivalent in dollars per million metric BTU) for energy produced from methane from landfills regulated by the EPA to collect and flare

methane, and 1.5 cents-per-kilowatt hour for unregulated landfills. The credit would

be available for energy produced from new facilities through 2010.

• New Tax Credit for New Hybrid or Fuel-Cell Vehicles. The President has proposed a new temporary tax credit of up to $4,000 for the purchase of new hybrid

vehicles and up to $8,000 for the purchase of fuel cell vehicles between 2002 and

2007. These credits would be available for all qualifying light vehicles, including

cars, minivans, sport utility vehicles, and light trucks. The tax credits will encourage the purchase of highly fuel-efficient vehicles that incorporate advanced automotive technologies and will help to move hybrid and fuel cell vehicles from the laboratory to the highway.

• Increased Funding for Geothermal Energy. The President’s 2003 budget proposal for the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) supports alternative, non-fossil fuel energy development. The budget includes an increase for USGS to investigate the nature and extent of geothermal systems and produce updated assessments of available geothermal energy resources in selected regions of the United States. The nearterm focus of this effort will be in the Great Basin region, where most of the public

land available for geothermal leasing lies. This region encompasses most of Nevada

and large portions of California, Oregon, Idaho, and Utah. Available data indicate

the presence of a substantial undeveloped geothermal energy resource that could be

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tapped to help provide for the growing energy requirements of the western United

States.

• Increased Funding for Renewable Energy Resources on Public Lands. The

President’s 1903 budget proposal calls for a major effort by the Bureau of Land

Management (BLM) to increase its renewable energy activities in support of the

President’s National Energy Policy. In 2003, BLM will encourage the study, exploration, and development of renewable energy resources from public lands. Emphasis

will be directed to advancing the use of geothermal, hydropower, wind, solar, and

biomass resources.

Business Challenges

The President challenged American businesses and industries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Already, agreements with the semi-conductor and aluminum

industries, and with industries that emit methane, are dramatically reducing emissions of the most potent greenhouse gases. The President’s plan will build on these

successes, with broader agreements and greater reductions.

Company Challenges

• EPA’s ‘‘Climate Leaders’’ Initiative: EPA will launch a new, voluntary Climate

Leaders program with a group of major companies including: Florida Power and

Light, GM, Lockheed Martin, Miller Brewing Company, Bethlehem Steel, Interface

Inc., SC Johnson and Holcimus Inc. These companies have agreed to test new greenhouse gas reporting guidelines as the basis for agreeing to targets in the future.

Each participant will establish an individual goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and will voluntarily report those emissions. The Climate Leaders program

provides a significant opportunity to achieve the greenhouse gas intensity reductions

set forth in this policy through a voluntary approach. In the coming months, the

Administration will aggressively pursue additional corporate partners representing

a wider spectrum of the U.S. economy.

Sector Challenges

• Semiconductors: On March 13, 2001, EPA and the Semiconductor Industry Association signed a new voluntary agreement, the PFC Reduction Climate Partnership. Under this partnership, the industry agreed to reduce emissions of

perfluorocarbons (PFCs) by 10 percent from 1995 levels by the end of 2010. The expected reduction of 13.7 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2010

alone is comparable to taking 12 million cars off the road. PFCs have, on average,

10,000 times the potency of carbon dioxide over 100 years, and persist in the atmosphere 2,000 to 50,000 years.

• Aluminum: Twelve of the 13 U.S. primary aluminum producers, representing

96 percent of the U.S. primary aluminum production capacity, have joined EPA’s

Voluntary Aluminum Industrial Partnership. Companies participating in this program have committed to make reductions in two potent PFCs, tetrafluoromethane

(CF4) and hexafluoroethane (C2F6). The program met its 2000 goal to reduce PFC

emissions from U.S. primary aluminum smelting by 45 percent—equivalent to 1.8

million metric tons of carbon—using cost-effective approaches that make economic

and environmental sense for the partners.

• Methane: Because of the potency of methane relative to carbon dioxide, a

‘‘methane-first’’ strategy for greenhouse gas mitigation is cost-effective. A variety of

U.S. industry and government partnerships have reduced methane emissions, and

they are expected to hold emissions at or below 1990 levels through and beyond

2010. Partners in EPA’s methane programs are projected to maintain emissions

below 1990 levels through 2010.

• EPA’s Natural Gas STAR program includes companies representing 40 percent

of the U.S. natural gas production, 72 percent of transmission company pipeline

miles, 49 percent of distribution company service connections, and 23 percent of

processing throughput. This partnership has achieved significant reductions. In

2000, EPA estimates a reduction in methane emissions of 4 million metric tons of

carbon equivalent, and projects for 2010 a reduction of 6 million metric tons of carbon equivalent.

• EPA’s Coalbed Methane Outreach Program (CMOP) encourages industry to reduce methane emissions from underground coal mines. The program provides technical assistance to mining companies on technologies for recovered methane. EPA

estimates that CMOP reduced 2 million metric tons carbon equivalent in 2000.

• In the agriculture sector, USDA and EPA have partnered on the Ag-STAR program and the Ruminant Livestock Efficiency Program (RLEP), which focus on reducing methane emissions. The overall impact of these two programs on greenhouse

gas emissions has been small on a national scale, but program stakeholders in the

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agricultural community have demonstrated that the practices can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and increase productivity.

Improving Fuel Economy

Developing new technologies to improve the energy efficiency of transportation in

the United States will be a key element in achieving future reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Cars, trucks, aircraft and other parts of the nation’s transportation system are responsible for about one-third of the carbon dioxide emissions in

the United States. The Administration is currently promoting the development of

fuel-efficient motor vehicles and trucks, researching options for producing cleaner

fuels, and implementing programs to improve energy efficiency. The President is

committed to the expansion and improvement of Federal research partnerships with

industry, market-based incentives, and reforming current regulatory programs that

advance our progress in this important area.

• The ‘‘FreedomCAR’’—Advancing Hydrogen-Based Fuel Cells. On January 9,

2002, Energy Secretary Abraham, with the heads of General Motors, Ford Motor Co.

and the Chrysler arm of DaimlerChrysler, announced a new partnership,

FreedomCAR (Cooperative Automotive Research), to promote the development of hydrogen as the primary fuel for cars and trucks. The ‘‘FreedomCAR’’ program embraces the long-term strategic goal of developing a new breakthrough technology—

the hydrogen-powered fuel cell—with a vision of ultimately eliminating our reliance

on foreign oil.

• The Department Of Energy’s Public-Private Projects for Low-Cost, Breakthrough Fuel Cell Technology. In August 2002, Energy Secretary Abraham announced new partnerships, totaling $500 million, with Honeywell, Siemens, Westinghouse Power Corporation, Delphi Automotive Systems, Battelle, Cummins

Power Generation, and McDermott Technologies. The partnerships build upon President Bush’s commitment to fuel cell research and cutting edge technologies. The

goal of this initiative is to cut the costs of fuel cells to as low as one-tenth the cost

of currently marketed systems and to one-third the cost of the more advanced concepts now beginning to reach commercial readiness.

• Tax Credits for New Hybrid or Fuel Cell Vehicles. The President has proposed

a new temporary tax credit of up to $4,000 for the purchase of new hybrid vehicles

and up to $8,000 for the purchase of fuel-cell vehicles between 2002 and 2007. These

credits would be available for all qualifying light vehicles, including cars, minivans,

sport utility vehicles, and light trucks. The tax credits will encourage the purchase

of highly fuel-efficient vehicles that incorporate advanced automotive technologies

and will help to move hybrid and fuel cell vehicles from the laboratory to the highway.

• Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE). A key recommendation

of the President’s National Energy Policy directed the Secretary of Transportation

to review and provide recommendations on establishing updated CAFE standards,

with due consideration of the July 2001 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report.

The NAS report included several recommendations pertaining to options for structuring the CAFE system, including permitting manufacturers to trade fuel economy

credits.

• The Administration supports increasing automobile fuel economy and encouraging new technologies that reduce our dependence on imported oil, while protecting

passenger safety and jobs.

• On February 1, 2002, Transportation Secretary Mineta asked the congressional

leadership to ‘‘work . . . on legislation that would authorize the Department of

Transportation to reform the CAFE program, fully considering the NAS report. Possible reforms include: (1) adopting fuel economy targets that are dependent on vehicles attributes, such as vehicles weight, that inherently influence fuel use and have

minimal adverse safety consequences; (2) utilizing market-based incentives, such as

trading of fuel economy credits, to obtain fuel savings at the lowest possible cost

to consumer while providing continuous incentives for additional fuel economy enhancement; (3) encouraging development and implement of new technologies; and

(4) establishing realistic, long-term targets and deadlines to increase economy safely

while providing greater long-term product planning for vehicles manufacturers.’’

• On July 10, 2001, Transportation Secretary Mineta urged Congress to lift the

appropriations ban on new rulemaking of CAFE standards by the National Highway

Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) ‘‘to improve vehicle fuel efficiency

standards.’’ In December 2001, Congress responded by lifting the ban, and last week

NHTSA initiated a public review process for safely improving the fuel economy of

new light truck standards for model year 2005 through 2010, and for reforming the

CAFE program.

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• Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS). The Department of Transportation’s National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) will finalize this year a rule requiring the installation of tire pressure monitoring systems

(TPMSs) in all new cars and light trucks. Properly inflated tires improve fuel efficiency and reduce maintenance costs. NHTSA estimates that the annualized benefits range from $120–480 million in fuel savings and $75–165 million in reduced

tread wear. NHTSA predicts TPMS will save between .31 and 1.27 million metric

tons of carbon equivalent per year when applied to the entire on-road fleet. That

reflects between 128 and 528 million gallons of gasoline per year. • First-Ever EPA Agreement with Ford to Develop High-Efficiency Auto Technology. In September 2001, EPA agreed to license to the Ford Motor Company a

unique, high-efficiency ‘‘hydraulic hybrid’’ technology that has the long-term potential to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. The first application of this technology, planned for model year 2005, will result in a minimum 30

percent improvement in vehicle fuel economy; the second phase, planned for as early

as year 2009, should double the fuel economy of selected new vehicles. This is the

first-ever licensing agreement between EPA and an automobile company involving

vehicle powertrain technology.

Promoting Domestic Carbon Sequestration

In the agriculture sector, activities including fertilizer use, animal waste management and on-farm fuel use account for 148 million metric tons of carbon equivalent

emissions, about 8 percent of total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The President’s

fiscal year 2003 budget requests $3 billion above the base-line over 10 years (2002–

2011) for a new, conservation-focused Farm Bill that will enhance the natural storage of carbon dioxide.

Increased Funding for USDA’s Conservation Programs:

• The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) assists farm owners and operators

to conserve and improve soil, water, air and wildlife resources by removing environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production and keeping it under long-term

resource-conserving cover. Currently, USDA estimates that the CRP removes nearly

34 million acres of environmentally sensitive cropland from production, which generates long-term environmental benefits, including the annual savings of about 15

million metric tons of carbon emissions per year. The CRP would expand to 40 million acres, saving roughly 19 million metric tons of carbon per year. The Administration’s fiscal year 1903 budget proposes an increase of $89 million over the fiscal

year 1902 enacted level.

• The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) helps producers make

beneficial and cost-effective changes to cropping and grazing systems; improve manure, nutrient and pest management, and implement conservation measures to improve soil, water, and related natural resources. USDA estimates that the EQIP program (in combination with conservation technical assistance) provides assistance to

farmers for planning and implementing soil and water conservation practices and

removes roughly 12 million metric tons of carbon per year. The Administration’s fiscal year 2003 proposes an increase of $800 million over the fiscal year 1902 enacted

level.

• The Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) has enrolled just over 1 million acres to

date. Under current authority, the program is capped at 1,075,000 acres, and has

already reached that level this year. Estimated soil carbon sequestration resulting

from conversion of cropland on wetland soils to grassland or forest by 1997 (1.4 million acres) has resulted in carbon sequestration rates of over 2 million metric tons

of carbon per year. The Administration has supported a version of the Farm Bill

that would expand the WRP to 2.225 million acres, saving roughly 4 million metric

tons of carbon per year. The Administration’s fiscal year 1903 proposes an increase

of $176 million over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level.

• The Forest Stewardship Program provides technical and financial assistance to

nonindustrial, private forest owners. About 147 million hectares of U.S. forests are

nonindustrial, private forestlands and provide many ecological and economic benefits and values. These forests provide about 60 percent of our nation’s timber supply,

with increases expected in the future. The acceleration of tree planting on nonindustrial, private forestlands and marginal agricultural lands can help meet resource

needs and provide important ancillary benefits that improve environmental quality,

such as wildlife habitat, soil conservation, water quality protection and improvement, and recreation. Additionally, tree planting and forest management increases

uptake of carbon dioxide and the storage of carbon in living biomass, soils, litter,

and long-life wood products. The Forest Service, in cooperation with State forestry

agencies, manages both programs, and estimates that these programs provide

700,000 metric tons of carbon reductions per year. The Administration’s fiscal year

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1903 budget proposes an increase of $16 million over the fiscal year 1902 enacted

level.

PROMOTE NEW AND EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

Summary

The President’s approach will actively pursue the integration of our domestic

goals and policies with those of other nations. The President has submitted provisions in the fiscal year 1903 budget includes:

• Tripling Funding for ‘‘Debt-For-Nature’’ Programs. Building upon recent Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) agreements with Belize, El Salvador, and Bangladesh, the President’s fiscal year 1903 budget request of $40 million to fund ‘‘debt

for nature’’ agreements with developing countries nearly triples funding for this

highly successful program. The President also announced a new deal with the Government of Thailand, which will preserve important mangrove forest in Northeastern Thailand in exchange for debt relief worth $11.4 million.

• Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences’ recommendation for better

observation systems, the President has allocated $25 million and challenged other

developed nations to match the U.S. commitment.

• Expanding Technology Transfer and Capacity Building in the Developing

World:

• Fully Funding the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The President’s fiscal

year 1903 budget requests $178 million for the GEF, a $77 million increase, which

includes a substantial $70 million payment for arrears incurred during the prior Administration. These funds will support transfer of advanced energy and sequestration technologies to the developing world.

• Dedicating Significant Funds to the United States Administration on International Development. The President’s 1903 budget requests $155 million in funding

for USAID climate change programs. USAID serves as a primary vehicle for transferring American energy and sequestration technologies to developing countries to

promote sustainable development and minimize their GHG emissions growth.

• Building on International Cooperative Agreements:

• Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan continue their High-Level

Consultations on climate change issues. Later this month, a team of U.S. experts

will meet with their Japanese counterparts to discuss specific projects within the

various areas of climate science and technology, to identify the highest priorities for

collaborative research.

• Joint Research with Italy. The U.S. and Italy have identified more than 20

joint climate change research activities for immediate implementation and more topics for further development in critical areas of global and regional climate modeling,

atmospheric studies related to climate, carbon cycle research, low-carbon technologies and other related areas.

Increased Funding for Tropical Forest Conservation

The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) reflects America’s commitment to

preserving tropical forests worldwide. Created in 1998 and reauthorized in 2001

with broad bipartisan support, the program offers eligible countries the opportunity

to reduce their debt to the United States while preserving their tropical forests.

TFCA encourages and empowers local communities and nongovernmental organizations to develop and implement grassroots solutions to conservation problems.

Grants from the local fund can be used to support a wide range of activities, such

as training programs to increase the capacity of individuals and organizations involved in forest conservation areas; restoration of forested areas; and the protection

of parks and other protected areas. The President’s 2003 budget proposal seeks $50

million in funding for tropical forestry conservation, of which $40 million may be

used for TFCA.

Estimates of the carbon sequestration value of tropical forests suggest a wide

range of values. The World Resources Institute estimates that carbon sequestration

value ranges from 6 to 72 tons per acre of rainforest. The 1995 IPCC report further

analyzed the global potential for carbon storage. Slowing tropical deforestation on

700 million hectares (nearly the size of the US, but only 17 percent of the global

forest area) could store 60 to87 million gigatons of carbon in 55 years. Annual carbon storage could be over two gigatons by 2050, about 14 percent of projected emissions.

• Agreements During the Bush Administration. TFCA agreements have been negotiated with Belize, El Salvador, and Thailand during this administration.

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• Leverage. The four TFCA agreements to date—Bangladesh, Belize, El Salvador, and Thailand—generate approximately $40 million in forest conservation

funding at a cost of $19.2 million.

• Bangladesh. Debt reduction agreement signed September 12, 2000; saves Bangladesh $10 million in hard currency payments and will generate $8.5 million in

local currency interest payments for tropical forest conservation of Sundarban mangrove forests, which shields the coastline from typhoons and provides habitat for the

last genetically viable population of Royal Bengal tigers.

• Belize. In August, 2001, the U.S. and Belize concluded a ‘‘debt-for-nature’’

agreement to protect 23,000 acres of tropical forests. The agreement leveraged $1.3

million in private finds raised by The Nature Conservancy.

• El Salvador. Debt reduction agreement signed July 12, 2001; Tropical Forestry

Agreement signed September 14, 2001. Reduced country’s official debt to the U.S.

by $3 million, generating $14.3 million for tropical forest conservation in local currency interest payments. Initial target of TFCA funds will be reforestation of hillsides.

• Thailand. Debt reduction agreement signed September 19, 2001; agreement

was approved by the Thai Cabinet on February 12, 2002. Debt agreement saves

Thailand’s $11.4 million in hard currency payments and will generate $9.5 million

for conservation activities. Initial targets for TFCA funds include reforestation

projects in northeastern Thailand, protection of mangrove forests.

Expanding Technology Transfer and Capacity Building in Developing Countries

The President’ fiscal year 1903 budget significantly expands funding for current

programs that transfer advanced energy and sequestration technologies to developing countries, and provide technical assistance and training to their citizens.

Eighty-one percent of the growth in global carbon emissions from fossil fuel use in

1990–2010 is expected to come from developing countries, according to projections

by the Energy Information Administration. Reducing this projected, exponential

growth of emissions in developing countries therefore must be a critical element of

any rational policy to address global climate change. First, the ‘‘breakthrough’’ technological advances achieved under the President’s National Climate Change Technology Initiative will benefit all nations, and will not be confined to applications in

the United States. Second, America will increase its commitment to helping the developing world gain access to advanced energy efficiency and sequestration technologies, by reinvigorating and expanding support for existing technology transfer

programs.

• Investing $25 Million in Climate Observation Systems in Developing Countries. In response to the National Academy of Sciences’ recommendation for better

observation systems, the President has allocated $25 million and challenged other

developed nations to match the U.S. commitment.

• Fully Funding the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The U.S. contribution

to the GEF and leading a robust, multinational 5-year replenishment commitment.

• The Administration’s Fiscal Year 1903 budget requested $178 million in funding for the GEF, a 77 percent increase over the fiscal year 1902 enacted level of

$100.5 million. It includes $107.5 million to fully fund the first installment of the

U.S. pledge of $430 million to the GEF’s ‘‘Third Replenishment’’ (GEF–3) for 2003–

2006. The fiscal year 1903 budget also includes $70 million to clear one-third of the

$211 million arrears balances incurred by the United States during the last Administration.

• The GEF fulfills a critical role in improving the environment globally, particularly in financing developing countries’ ability to address environmental issues relating to climate change, biodiversity conservation, and land degradation. The GEF,

operating as the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change’s primary ‘‘financial mechanism,’’ funds the extra costs (over normal development costs)

of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in energy and other projects. The GEF’s

project portfolio has demonstrated a wide range of approaches to promoting energy

efficiency and renewable energy, often through initiatives in partnership with the

private sector. GEF grant projects are implemented at the country level through the

World Bank, U.N. Development Program, U.N. Environment Program and regional

development banks.

• Since beginning regular operations in 1994, the GEF has designed and implemented over 800 projects in 160 countries. The GEF has committed $3.2 billion to

date, leveraging well over $8 billion from other sources. Co-financiers include the

developing countries themselves, bilateral aid agencies and other multilateral financial institutions, NGO’s and the private sector. Leveraging for clean energy projects

is often as high as $5 from other sources for every GEF dollar. U.S. companies are

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the largest beneficiaries of contracts extended for GEF projects, securing 30 percent

of all contracts. • Recent examples of highly successful GEF projects include: • Mexico. The Mexico High Efficiency Lighting Project under which Mexican consumers and businesses have installed almost 40 percent more efficient lights than

originally projected; • India. The India Alternate Energy Project promoting investment in 41

megawatts of wind power through the provision of low-market loans, stimulating

massive followup investment with wind power now supplying 850 megawatts of energy in India; • Brazil. The Brazil Biomass Power Commercial Demonstration Project promotes

the use of high-efficiency agricultural byproducts as fuel for electric power and agroindustry process heat; • China. The Chinese Coalbed Methane Project demonstrates technologies in

Chinese coal mines for capturing clean-burning methane as fuel; • Latvia. The Latvia Solid Waste Management and Landfill Gas Recovery project ($25 million total, with $5 million from GEF) will harness landfill gas for electricity

production and facilitate separation of recyclable materials; • Philippines. The project supports the connection of a grid-connected power

plant on Mindanao which combines solar and hydroelectric power; • Bangladesh. The Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development

project promotes solar energy in rural areas implemented by established

Bangladeshi institutions and is expected to provide solar power to as many as

130,000 additional rural households; • Ecuador. The Renewable Energy for Electricity Generation, Renewable Electrification of the Galapagos Islands project is aimed at reducing Ecuador’s energyrelated carbon dioxide emissions by introducing solar and wind energy to the Galapagos Archipelago, and is expected to provide wind and solar re-powering of village

mini-grids on three islands serving more than 5,000 people; and • Kenya. The Ormat Olkaria III Geothermal Power Development project will

provide GEF financing for the first private sector financed and managed geothermal

electric project in Africa and among the first private power projects in Kenya and

East Africa. • Dedicating Significant Funds to United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The President has maintained a strong commitment to technology

transfer and capacity building in developing countries by requesting $155 million

dedicated to climate change in the USAID fiscal year 1903 budget. • Following up on the recently concluded Technology Cooperation Agreement

Pilot Project (TCAPP), USAID is working with partners in Brazil, Egypt, Mexico,

the Philippines, and Southern Africa to implement projects and activities designed

to encourage the accelerated adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy

technologies and practices in several key sectors.

• Brazil. Technology cooperation efforts are focused on the development of new

sustainable, energy efficient and renewable energy technologies to meet the development needs in the Northeast region. This effort provided startup financing for rural

energy entrepreneurs through a combination of enterprise development services and

startup financing.

• Philippines. Technology cooperation efforts are supporting national goals to expand rural electrification by using renewable energy sources such as, wind power.

• Southern Africa. USAID is supporting activities designed to promote the widespread use of solar water heaters in selected areas. Program-wide efforts also include a focus on the development and dissemination of outreach and communication

tools in an effort to encourage information sharing.

• The Cairo Air Improvement Project (CAIP) is a $60 million USAID program

that is designed to reduce vehicular emissions, such as particulates and lead. The

CAIP is reducing air pollution by:

• operating a vehicle emission testing, tune-up, and certification program and

promoting the conversion of diesel-fueled, public sector, municipal bus fleets to compressed natural gas; and

• reducing the concentration of air pollution from smelters.

• Building on International Cooperative Agreements:

• Joint Research with Japan. The U.S. and Japan continue their High-Level

Consultations on climate change issues. Later this month a team of U.S. experts

will meet with their Japanese counterparts to discuss specific projects within the

various areas of climate science and technology to identify which of the highest priority opportunities to pursue.

• Joint Research with Italy. The United States and Italy convened a ‘‘Joint Climate Change Research Meeting’’ in Rome on January 22–23, 2002, following upon

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a pledge of President Bush and Prime Minister Berlusconi to undertake joint research on climate change. This pledge recognized the need to draw on sound science

and the power of technology to reduce the uncertainty associated with future global

climate and environmental challenges. The two sides identified more than 20 joint

climate change research activities for immediate implementation and more topics for

further development in critical areas of global and regional climate modeling, atmospheric studies related to climate, carbon cycle research, low-carbon technologies and

other related areas. The climate science research activities for immediate implementation will improve the capability to understand, monitor and predict climatic variations and their impacts. In addition, the technology research activities for immediate implementation will contribute to the development of advanced low carbon

technologies to limit net emissions of greenhouse gases.

• Pursue Joint Research with Central America. The United States and Central

American Heads of Government signed the Central American-United States of

America Joint Accord (CONCAUSA) on December 10, 1994. The original agreement

covered cooperation under action plans in four major areas: conservation of biodiversity, sound use of energy, environmental legislation, and sustainable economic development. On June 7, 2001, the United States and its Central American partners

signed an expanded and renewed CONCAUSA Declaration, adding disaster relief

and climate change as new areas for cooperation. The new CONCAUSA Declaration

calls for intensified cooperative efforts to address climate change through scientific

research, estimating and monitoring greenhouse gases, investing in forestry conservation, enhancing energy efficiency, and utilizing new environmental technologies.

ENHANCED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Summary

The President’s policy builds on his June 11 commitments to global climate

science and technology: 1) fully fund high-priority areas for climate change science

over the next 5 years; and 2) strengthen technology research at universities and national labs, to enhance partnerships in applied research, develop improved technology for measuring and monitoring gross and net greenhouse gas emissions, and

fund demonstration projects for cutting-edge technologies, such as bioreactors and

fuel cells.

• Increase Support for America’s Commitment to Climate Science and Technology Initiatives. The Administrations fiscal year 2003 budget seeks an additional

$700 million for climate change programs, bringing total climate spending up to $4.5

billion per year. This commitment to climate change research and development is

unmatched in the world, and is particularly notable given America’s focus on domestic and international security issues in the fiscal year 1903 budget. A key element

of this effort is dedicated to funding for the Climate Change Research Initiative and

the National Climate Change Technology Initiative. These initiatives are core components of the President’s 1903 budget. They are designed to fund high-priority research to address major gaps in our current understanding of climate science and

to promote the development of the most promising ‘‘breakthrough’’ technologies for

clean energy generation and carbon sequestration.

• The Climate Change Research Initiative. The U.S. will spend $1.7 billion in

fiscal year 2003 for basic research on climate change, $40 million of which is dedicated to leverage other funding to address major gaps in understanding the carbon

cycle and the role of black soot.

• The National Climate Change Technology Initiative. The U.S. will spend $1.3

billion on climate change technologies, of which $40 million will be spent on development and deployment of advanced energy and sequestration technologies critical to

long-term emission reduction.

• The President Has Established a New High-Level Committee on Climate

Change Science and Technology Integration (CCCSTI). This Committee consists of

the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, State, Agriculture, Interior, Health and

Human Services, Defense, and Transportation, EPA Administrator, OMB Director,

NEC Director, NASA Administrator, NSF Director and CEQ Chairman. The Executive Director of the committee will be the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The functions of the CCCSTI include but are not limited to: 1) providing recommendations concerning climate science and technology to the President;

2) recommending the movement of funding and programs across agency boundaries;

and 3) coordination with the Office of Management and Budget on the Committee’s

recommendations. The Chair of CCCSTI is responsible for the final review of recommendations to the Climate Change Panel. Research will continue to be coordiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00267 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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nated through the Nation Science and Technology Council in accordance with the

Global Change Research Act of 1990.

Climate Change Research Initiative

On June 11, 2001, the President announced a new commitment to developing a

science-based climate change policy, and a new commitment to funding research on

‘‘breakthrough technologies’’ that will help meet the long-run climate change challenge. To study areas of scientific uncertainty and identify priority areas where investments can make a difference, the President created the Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI). The CCRI promotes a vision focused on the effective use

of scientific knowledge in policy and management decisions, and continued evaluation of management strategies and choices.

The President’s fiscal year 1903 budget requested $40 million for CCRI to be

shared among five agencies (NOAA, NSF, NASA, DOE, and USDA). This investment will focus on answering key questions recently identified by the National

Academy of Sciences in its 2001 report, ‘‘Climate Change Science: An Analysis of

Some Key Questions.’’ The CCRI will improve the integration of scientific knowledge, including measures of uncertainty, into effective decision support systems and

will adopt performance metrics and deliverable products useful to policymakers in

a short timeframe (2–5 years).

Specific priorities identified for fiscal year 2003 include:

• Understanding the North American Carbon Cycle. An intensive research effort

will be focused on understanding North American terrestrial and oceanic carbon

sources and sinks, to improve monitoring techniques, reconcile approaches for quantifying carbon storage, and elucidate key controlling processes and land management practices regulating carbon fluxes between the atmosphere, land, and the

ocean. This effort will develop automated carbon dioxide and methane sensors, and

improve ground-based measurements and inventories of forest and agricultural

lands.

• Developing Reliable Representation of the Global and Regional Climatic Forcing by Atmospheric Aerosols. Aerosols and tropospheric ozone play unique but poorly quantified roles in the atmospheric radiation budget. CCRI investments will implement plans developed by the interagency National Aerosol-Climate Interactions

Program to define and evaluate the role of aerosols that absorb solar radiation, such

as black carbon and mineral dust. Proposed activities include field campaigns (including aircraft fly overs), in situ monitoring stations, and improved modeling and

satellite data algorithm development.

• Investing in Computer Modeling. The continued development and refinement

of computer models that can simulate the past and future conditions of the Earth’s

climate system is important for providing more accurate projections of future climate change. NOAA will establish a Climate Modeling Center within the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL) at Princeton, New Jersey, to focus on

model product generation research, assessment, and policy applications.

• Ensuring High-Quality, Long-Term Climate Data Records. This is a long-term

effort to develop high fidelity climate data records from satellite observing systems.

Initial work will target calibration and validation of instruments planned for the

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite System (NPOESS) to ensure a smooth transition and guarantee climate-quality data.

National Climate Change Technology Initiative

On June 11, 2001, the President announced a new commitment to developing a

science-based climate change policy, and a new commitment to funding research on

‘‘breakthrough technologies’’ that will help meet the long-run climate change challenge. To advance and bring focus to technologies that offer great promise to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the President created the National Climate

Change Technology Initiative (NCCTI). The President charged the Secretaries of

Commerce and Energy, working with other agencies, to:

• Evaluate the State of U.S. Climate Change Technology Research and Development and Make Recommendations for Improvement. The U.S. Government funds

many different technologies that can help mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Some

are designed to improve energy efficiency or create opportunities to switch to fuels,

products, and processes that emit lower amounts of greenhouse gases. Others enhance carbon removal or storage in terrestrial, ocean, and geological sinks, or explore innovative concepts and breakthrough technologies.

• Provide Guidance on Strengthening Basic Research at Universities and National Laboratories, Including the Development of Advanced Mitigation Technologies

that Offer the Greatest Promise for Low-Cost Reductions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. There are many scientific and technological challenges regarding costs, enviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00268 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
265

ronmental impacts, and public acceptability that must be resolved before climate

change mitigation technologies can reach their full potential. Federal research efforts can help meet these challenges.

• Develop Opportunities to Enhance Private-Public Partnerships in Applied Research and Development to Expedite Innovative and Cost-Effective Approaches to

Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions. The U.S. Government has established partnerships with the private sector to advance technologies that mitigate greenhouse

gas emissions. It is critical to enhance this role and ensure that partnerships with

industry are directed toward the most mutually beneficial outcomes.

• Make Recommendations for Funding Demonstration Projects for Cutting-Edge

Technologies. Cutting-edge technologies hold the promise of significantly reducing

greenhouse gas emissions.

• Evaluate Improved Technologies for Measuring and Monitoring Gross and Net

Terrestrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Private sector investors are reluctant to participate in projects without reliable and credible quantification of the uncertainties

associated with different land management practices. Cost-effective measurement

systems will not only increase the attractiveness of agricultural greenhouse gas

projects to investors, but can also provide valuable information to individual farmers

and ranchers optimizing the use of fuel, fertilizers, and other substances.

The President’s fiscal year 1903 Budget requests $40 million within the Department of Energy to begin work on NCCTI. Specific research areas are being identified through an interagency review process. The NCCTI will build on an existing

base of research and development in climate change technologies, primarily at the

Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department

of Agriculture. A complete report on the findings and recommendations of the

NCCTI will be issued soon.

ADDENDUM TO THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY BOOK

The Global Climate Change Policy Book distributed with the President’s February

14th speech on Clear Skies and Global Climate Change included several calculated

statistics:

• 2002 emission intensity: 183 metric tons of carbon equivalent emissions per

million dollars GDP

• 2012 emissions intensity: 158 metric tons of carbon equivalent emissions per

million dollars GDP

• 2002–2012 decline in emission intensity based on current forecasts with existing policies and efforts: 14 percent

• Expected emission reductions in 2012 resulting from the President’s commitment to reduce intensity by 18 percent: more than 100 million metric tons carbon

equivalent

This document and accompanying spreadsheet describes the data used to produce

these numbers.

Three primary forecasts underlie these intensity and emission reduction estimates: real GDP, energy-related carbon dioxide emissions, and other carbon dioxide

and greenhouse gas emissions. The sources of these forecasts are described below,

followed by an explanation of the calculated intensities and emission reductions.

Real GDP forecasts (spreadsheet row 28) are based on the Annual Energy Outlook

2002, published by the Energy Information Administration in December 2001. In

turn, these are based on the DRI-WEFA July 2001 Trend Growth scenario. Although these forecasts were made before September 11 and before the exact nature

of last year’s recession was clear, the forecast growth of 38 percent over 2002–2012

matches the recent forecasts published in the 2003 Budget of the U.S. Government.

Real GDP forecasts are converted from 1996 dollars to 2001 dollars (spreadsheet

row 29) using the implicit GDP deflator, published in the National Income and

Product Accounts.

Forecasts of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions (spreadsheet row 25) are also

based on the Annual Energy Outlook 2002. These emissions are derived from the

use of fossil fuels forecast by the National Energy Modeling System developed by

the Energy Information Administration, incorporating the economic growth assumptions described above.

Forecasts of other carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions (spreadsheet row

26) are based on two sources. The projections begin with 1999 inventories reported

in Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1999, published by the Energy Information Administration. Future emission levels are estimated using growth

rates derived from reports published by the Environmental Protection Agency: Addendum to the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990–2020: Inventories, Projections and OpVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00269 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
266

portunities for Reductions, Climate Action Report 2001, U.S. High GWP Gas Emissions 1990–2010: Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions.

There are two alternative forecasts provided on the accompanying spreadsheet.

The first (spreadsheet row 39) is based on similar growth rates, but using inventories published in Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:

1990–2000. The second (spreadsheet row 44) is based on inventories and projections

in the Climate Action Report 2001 and uses growth rates estimated to include existing policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gases.

Greenhouse gas intensity is computed as the ratio of total greenhouse gas emissions (spreadsheet rows 27, 40 and 45) to real GDP (spreadsheet row 29). This is

multiplied by 1000 to convert to units of metric tons carbon equivalent (mtce) per

million dollars of GDP.

The intensity decline is measured as one minus the ratio of 2012 greenhouse gas

intensity to 2002 greenhouse gas intensity. For example, in the reference case intensity declines from 183 to 158 mtce/$million. 14 percent = 1—158/183.

Emission reductions from business as usual are computed by first determining the

emissions implied by the President’s goal. Specifically, forecast GDP in 2012, multiplied by (1—18 percent), multiplied by intensity in 2002, and divided by 1000 (the

latter converts from thousands to millions of tons). In the reference case, this works

out to 14,459 x 0.82 x 183.3 / 1000 = 2173 million metric tons of carbon. This is

then subtracted from forecast emissions in 2012, 2279, to yield the reported estimate of 106 million tons of reductions.

Note that the exact intensity goal in 2012 will not be known until accurate inventory data for 2002 is available as a basis for the 18 percent decline. The exact emission goal will then depend on the eventual GDP level in 2012.

References

Annual Energy Outlook 2002. http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/

Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 1999. http://www.eia.doe.gov/

oiaf/1605/gg00rpt/

Climate Action Report 2001. http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/car/

index.html

Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2000. http://

www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/emissions/us2002/index.html

Addendum to the U.S. Methane Emissions 1990–2020: Inventories, Projections and

Opportunities for Reductions. http://www.epa.gov/ghginfo/pdfs/final—

addendum2.pdf

U.S. High GWP Gas Emissions 1990–2010: Inventories, Projections, and Opportunities for Reductions. http://www.epa.gov/ghginfo/reports/index.htm

Table A20.

Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook 2002, page 13.

Table S–14.

Table A19.

Table 1.

Table 5–2.

Exhibit 1.4

[July 9, 2002]

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE EXPENDITURES

‘‘The challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the limits of our

knowledge.’’

President GEORGE W. BUSH, June 11, 2001.

Introduction

The following is a detailed account of Federal spending and performance goals for

climate change programs and activities, both domestic and international, as included in the President’s fiscal year 2003 Budget. This report is being provided in

response to Section 559(b) of Public Law 107–115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002.

On February 14, 2002, President Bush announced a new national goal to reduce

the ‘‘greenhouse gas intensity’’ of the American economy by 18 percent during the

next decade. Achieving this goal will require an enhanced and sustained national

effort to develop and deploy advanced energy and sequestration technologies, while

maintaining a strong American economy. As reflected in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to which the United States is a

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party, global climate change represents a serious, long-term challenge for all of the

nations of the world. The Administration has proposed a comprehensive plan for

achieving meaningful progress in tackling this challenge. Progress will be achieved

by relying on a range of significant investments in reducing the fundamental scientific uncertainties associated with anthropogenic climate change, advancing the

development and introduction of energy-efficient and renewable technologies, and

incentivizing emissions reductions throughout our economy. The budget information

presented in this Report reflects the Administration’s intensified focus and

prioritization of meeting our international commitments under the UNFCCC and responsibility to the American people for preserving a strong American economy.

The President’s fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $4,475 million. This figure is $653 million, or 17 percent, higher than fiscal year 2002 enacted for spending programs and tax policies related to or associated with climate change. The Budget request for climate change programs is the highest level ever, though some programs

were reduced to eliminate unrequested earmarks or certain projects approaching

commercialization that are more properly now funded by the private sector. Other

higher priority programs were increased. At this level, the United States leads the

world in climate change research, and has invested nearly $20 billion in such research over the past decade. However, in its June 2001 Report, Climate Change

Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, the National Research Council concluded that major challenges still remain to meaningfully improve our current understanding of the science of global climate change:

‘‘Making progress in reducing the large uncertainties in projections of future climate will require addressing a number of fundamental scientific questions relating

to the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the behavior of the climate system. Issues that need to be addressed include: a) the future usage of fossil

fuels; b) the future emissions of methane; c) the fraction of the future fossil-fuel carbon that will remain in the atmosphere and provide radiative forcing versus exchange with the oceans or net exchange with the land biosphere; d) the feedbacks

in the climate system that determine both the magnitude of the change and the rate

of energy uptake by the oceans, which together determine the magnitude of and

time history of the temperature increases for a given radiative forcing; e) details of

the regional and local climate change consequent to an overall level of global climate

change; f) the nature and the causes of the natural variability of climate and its

interactions with forced changes; and g) the direct and indirect effects of the changing distributions of aerosols. Maintaining a vigorous, ongoing program of basic research, funded and managed independently of the climate assessment activity, will

be crucial for narrowing those uncertainties.’’

‘‘Because there is considerable uncertainty in our current understanding of how

the climate system varies naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases and

aerosols, current estimates of the magnitude of future warming should be regarded

as tentative and subject to future adjustments (either upward or downward).’’

And recently, the U.S. Climate Action Report 2002 to the United Nations stressed:

‘‘One of the weakest links in our knowledge is the connection between global and

regional predictions of climate change. The National Research Council’s response to

the President’s request for a review of climate change policy specifically noted that

fundamental scientific questions remain regarding the specifics of regional and local

projections (NRC 2001). Predicting the potential impacts of climate change is compounded by a lack of understanding of the sensitivity of many environmental systems and resources B both managed and unmanaged B to climate change.’’

The Report notes the ‘‘considerable uncertainty’’ about the science of global climate change, including the uncertainty regarding natural climate variability and

the role of aerosols, and ‘‘recognize[s] that definitive prediction of potential outcomes

is not yet feasible.’’ The Report does not identify new risks, but rather provides a

complete review of the numerous, often conflicting ‘‘what if’’ scenarios of potential

impacts of climate change, both dire and beneficial. This Report makes clear that

models, such as those used by the prior Administration’s 2000 National Assessment,

cannot yet be relied upon to make Aaccurate predictions of the specific changes in

climate that will occur over the next hundred years.’’ The Administration’s fiscal year 2003 budget request to Congress includes the initial response to President Bush’s direction last June for a Climate Change Research

Initiative (‘‘CCRI’’) to address many of these major gaps in our current understanding of global climate change. Specific CCRI priorities will focus on improving

our understanding of the North American carbon cycle and the role of aerosols and

tropospheric ozone in climate change, enhancing computer modeling of climate and

developing high quality, long term climate observation data. The Administration

will continue to determine where financial resources in the climate change portfolio

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can be redirected from lower priority work to higher priority projects that address

specific areas of research identified by the National Research Council.

Additionally although not included in this Report, the recently enacted Farm Bill

will significantly expand conservation programs on farm and forest lands, accompanied by expanded carbon sequestration services. See Addendum B.

In addition to describing our investments in global climate science, the programs

and tax policies in this report represent one way to inventory a set of programs and

tax policies associated with energy use, carbon sequestration and climate change.

Funding generally falls into four major program areas.

U.S. Global Change Research Program. The United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) seeks to provide a sound scientific understanding of both

the human and natural forces that influence the Earth’s climate system. The information produced by USGCRP’s scientists is used by national and international policymakers to inform decisions on global change issues. The fiscal year 2003 Budget

proposes $1,714 million for the USGCRP, an increase of $44 million over fiscal year

2002 enacted. See Table 2 for detailed information about the USGCRP.

In addition to the USGCRP, the fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $40 million for

the new Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI), which was created by the

President to advance and bring focus to and leverage climate change research

spending. The CCRI complements the existing USGCRP. CCRI funding will be

shared among five agencies (NOAA, NASA, NSF, USDA, DOE), and the program

will adopt performance metrics and deliverable products useful to policymakers in

a short timeframe (2 to 5 years). It will enhance observation and monitoring systems and improve the integration of scientific knowledge, including measures of uncertainty, into effective decision support systems. See Table 3 for information about

the CCRI.

Technology Research, Development and Deployment. The programs in this category have the effect of stimulating the development and use of renewable energy

technologies and energy efficient products that can help improve energy efficiency

and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $1,757

million in discretionary spending and tax incentives, an increase of $539 million

over fiscal year 2002 enacted. In addition to programs administered by the Department of Energy (DOE), this category also includes programs within the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA). See

Tables 4–5 for detailed information about the programs and tax proposals in this

category.

In June, 2001, the President committed the United States to work within the

United Nation’s framework to develop an effective and science-based response to the

issue of global climate change. He noted that the United States is a leader in innovation and technology and that technology offers great promise to address this issue.

As part of this commitment, he created a National Climate Change Technology Initiative. The National Climate Change Technology Initiative integrates a number of

interdependent facets of the technological component of this approach to the global

climate change issue: applied research and development; supporting basic research

carried out by universities and national laboratories; partnering with industry and

others, including international partners, in order to move technologies into the marketplace; promoting cutting-edge technologies through demonstration projects; and

measuring and monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, inventories and flows. This

Initiative will provide a framework for guiding the technology component of climate

change related Federal R&D.

International Assistance. International assistance programs support developing

country efforts to address climate change through improvements in energy efficiency, renewable energy, land use changes and forestry practices. The fiscal year

2003 Budget proposes $211 million, an increase of $32 million over fiscal year 2002

enacted, for climate change programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development and to support the Secretariat of the Framework Convention

on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. See Table

6 for information on international assistance programs related to climate change,

and Appendix A for obligations and expenditures by country and activity for the

Agency for International Development as requested in Section 559 (b)(2) of Public

Law 107–115.

Other Climate-Related Programs. There are several programs that have multiple

environmental benefits including their contribution to improving energy efficiency

and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The programs identified in this category include: DOE’s Weatherization and State Energy Grants; DOE programs that promote

cleaner coal and natural gas combustion, and nuclear energy R&D; and; U.S. contributions to the Global Environment Facility (GEF). GEF funding helps address

trans-border environmental problems like international water pollution, biological

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diversity conservation, and climate change. The GEF’s climate change projects are

related to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, not the Kyoto Protocol. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $807 million, an increase of $20 million

over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for the programs in this category. See Table 7 for

more details on these programs.

SUMMARY OF FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE EXPENDITURES

Table 1. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change—FY 2003 Budget

(Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Directly Related Programs & Policies:.

U.S. Global Change Research Program ....................... 1,728 1,670 1,714 +44

Climate Change Research Initiative ............................ — — 40 +40

Technology Research, Development and Deployment:.

Spending Programs .................................... 1,176 1,218 1,202 -16

Tax Incentives 1 ......................................... — — 555 +555

National Climate Change Technology Initiative2 ................................................... ————

International Assistance .............................................. 177 179 211 +32

Other Climate-Related Programs:.

DOE—Weatherization & State Energy Grants ............. 191 275 316 +41

DOE—Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal & natural

gas) ......................................................................... 274 442 398 -44

DOE—Nuclear Energy R&D (NERI) .............................. 34 32 25 -7

Treasury B Global Environment Facility 3 ................... 41 38 68 +30

TOTAL 4 ...................................................... 3,603 3,822 4,475 +653

1The cost of the five energy tax incentives related to climate change included in the President’s fiscal year 2003 Budget is $4.6 billion

over 5 years; $7.1 billion over 10 years. 2 The National Climate Change Technology (NCCTI) will build on an existing base of research and development in climate change tech- nology, primarily at DOE, EPA, and USDA. The President’s fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $40 million for NCCTI within the DOE budget. Specific research areas are being identified through an interagency review process. 3 The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million. Approximately 38 percent of total GEF

funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g. expanding clean energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which

also provides funding for other global environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type. 4 Total may not add due to rounding. Total adjusted to eliminate double counts.

U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM

Table 2. By Agency/Appropriation Account—FY 2003 Budget

(Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Department of Health and Human Service:.

National Institutes of Health ....................................... 54 60 68 +8

National Aeronautics and Space Administration:.

Science, Aeronautics, and Technology ......................... 1,176 1,090 1,109 +19

Department of Energy:.

Science (Biological & Environmental Research) ......... 116 120 126 +6

National Science Foundation:.

Research and Related Activities ................................. 181 188 188 0

Department of Agriculture:.

Agricultural Research Service ...................................... 29 30 30 0

Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension

Services ................................................................... 4 9 17 +8

Research and Education ............................ 4 9 17 +8

Economic Research Service ......................................... 1 1 1 0

Forest Service.

Forest and Rangeland Research ............... 17 17 17 0

Subtotal—USDA ......................................... 51 57 65 +8

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Table 2. By Agency/Appropriation Account—FY 2003 Budget—Continued

(Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Department of Commerce:.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Operations, Research, and Facilities ...................... 93 100 100 0

Department of the Interior:.

U.S. Geological Survey Surveys, Investigations, and

Research .................................................................. 27 28 28 -2

Environmental Protection Agency:.

Science and Technology ............................................... 23 21 22 +

Smithsonian Institution:.

Salaries and Expenses ................................................. 7 7 7 0

TOTAL1 ........................................................ 1,728 1,670 1,714 +44

1 Total may not add due to rounding.

CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH INITIATIVE

Table 3. By Agency/Appropriation Account—FY 2003 Budget

(Discretionary budget authority; dollars in millions)

FY 2001 Ac- tualFY 2002 Esti- mateFY 2003 Pro- posedChange

2002–2003

Department of Commerce:.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Operations, Research, and Facilities ...................... — — 18 +18

National Science Foundation:.

Research and Related Activities ................................. — — 15 +15

National Aeronautics and Space Administration:.

Science, Aeronautics, and Technology ......................... — — 3 +3

Department of Energy:.

Science (Biological & Environmental Research) ......... — — 3 +3

Department of Agriculture:.

Forest Service/Natural Resources Conservation Service1 .......................................................................... — — 1 +1

TOTAL ......................................................... — — 40 +40

1 Based on $500,000 for the Forest Service and $500,000 for the Natural Resources Conservation Service.

U.S. Global Change Research Program. Much of the U.S. investment in research

on climate and other global environmental changes is coordinated through the U.S.

Global Change Research program (USGCRP). The USGCRP has existed for more

than a decade, and provides funding at nine different agencies for fundamental research on natural and human-induced changes in the global environment, with the

goal of attaining a more complete understanding of global climate change to better

respond to the challenges it presents. The fiscal year 2003 Budget proposes $1,714

million for the USGCRP, an increase of $44 million over the fiscal year 2002 enacted level.

Climate Change Research Initiative. In addition to the USGCRP, the fiscal year

2003 Budget requests $40 million for the new Climate Change Research Initiative

(CCRI), which was created by the President to advance and bring focus to climate

change research. The CCRI complements the existing USGCRP. CCRI funding in

fiscal year 2003 will be shared among five agencies (NOAA, NASA, NSF, USDA,

DOE), and the program will adopt performance metrics and deliverable products

useful to policymakers in a short timeframe (2 to 5 years). It will enhance observation and monitoring systems as well as improve the integration of scientific

knowledge, including measures of uncertainty, into effective decision support systems. CCRI funding in 2003 will focus on two main areas: reducing the uncertainties in climate science, and supporting policy and management decisions. In the first

category, specific priorities include understanding the North American carbon cycle,

developing reliable representation of global and regional climatic forcing by atmosVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00274 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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pheric aerosols, and investing in computer modeling. In the second category, specific

priorities include developing tools for risk management under uncertainty and ensuring high-quality, long-term climate data records.

ENERGY POLICY PROPOSALS

Table 4. Tax Incentives—FY 2003 Budget

(Revenue effect in millions of dollars)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 2003–07

Homes.

Provide tax credit for residential solar energy systems ................................ -6 -7 -8 -17 -24 -62

Renewable Energy.

Extend the tax credit for

electricity produced from

wind and biomass for 3

years; expand eligible

biomass sources to include certain biomass

produced from forest-related resources, agricultural sources, and other

specified sources ............ -227 -303 -212 -143 -146 -1031

Transportation.

Provide tax credit for purchase of certain hybrid

and fuel cell vehicles ..... -80 -181 -349 -530 -763 -1903

Industry.

Provide tax credit for energy

produced from landfill

gas .................................. -34 -59 -86 -120 -140 -439

Provide tax credit for combined heat and power

property ........................... -208 -235 -238 -296 -139 -1116

TOTAL1 ................................. -555 -785 -893 -1106 -1212 -4551

1 Total may not add due to rounding.

Energy Policy Proposals B Tax Incentives. The President is proposing $4,551 million in clean energy tax credits over 5 years ($7.1 billion over 10 years) for investments in renewable energy (solar, wind, and biomass), hybrid and fuel cell vehicles,

co-generation, and landfill gas conversion. (see Table 2). These incentives are important to meeting the nation’s long-term energy supply and security needs, reducing

pollution, and projected greenhouse gas emissions. The following is an explanation

of the clean energy tax incentives proposed in the fiscal year 2003 Budget.

Homes

• Tax credit for residential solar energy systems. Current law provides a 10-percent investment tax credit to businesses for qualifying equipment that uses solar energy to generate electricity; to heat, cool or provide hot water for use in a structure;

or to provide solar process heat. No credit is available for nonbusiness purchases

of solar energy equipment. The Administration proposes a new tax credit for individuals who purchase photovoltaic equipment and solar water heating systems for use

in a dwelling unit that the individual uses as a residence. Equipment would qualify

for the credit only if used exclusively for purposes other than heating swimming

pools. An individual would be allowed a cumulative maximum credit of $2,000 per

residence for photovoltaic equipment and $2,000 per residence for solar water heating systems. The credit for solar water heating equipment would apply only if

placed in service after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2006, and to photovoltaic systems placed in service after December 31, 2001 and before January 1,

2008.

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Renewable Energy

• Tax credit for electricity produced from wind or biomass. Current law provides

taxpayers a 1.5 cent-per-kilowatt hour tax credit (adjusted for inflation after 1992)

for electricity produced from wind, ‘‘closed-loop’’ biomass, and poultry waste. Biomass refers to trees, crops and agricultural wastes used to produce power, fuels or

chemicals. The electricity must be sold to an unrelated third party and the credit

applies to the first 10 years of production. The current tax credit covers facilities

placed in service before January 1, 2002, after which it expires. The new proposal

would:

• Extend current biomass credit. This proposal would extend for 3 years the 1.5

cent-per-kilowatt hour biomass credit for facilities placed in service before January

1, 2005.

• Expand definition of eligible biomass. This proposal expands the definition of

eligible biomass to include certain forest-related resources and agricultural and

other sources for facilities placed in service before January 1, 2002. Electricity produced at such facilities from newly eligible sources would be eligible for the credit

only from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2004. The credit for such electricity would be computed at a rate equal to 60 percent of the generally applicable

rate. Electricity produced from newly eligible biomass co-fired in coal plants would

be eligible for the credit only from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2004.

Transportation

• Tax credit for hybrid and fuel cell vehicles. Currently, a 10 percent tax credit

up to $4,000 is provided for the cost of a qualified electric vehicle. A qualified electric vehicle is a motor vehicle that is powered primarily by an electric motor drawing current from rechargeable batteries, fuel cells, or other portable sources of electric current. Electric and hybrid vehicles have the potential to increase energy efficiency as well as reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. To encourage

the purchase of such vehicles the Administration is proposing the following tax credits:

• A credit of up to $4,000 for qualified hybrid vehicles purchased after December

31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008. The amount of the credit would depend on

the percentage of maximum available power provided by the rechargeable energy

storage system and the amount by which the vehicle’s fuel economy exceeds the

2000 model year city fuel economy.

• A credit of up to $8,000 for new qualified fuel cell vehicles purchased after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2008. A minimum credit of $4,000 would be

provided, which would increase as the vehicle’s fuel efficiency exceeded the 2000

model year city fuel economy, reaching a maximum credit of $8,000 if the vehicle

achieved at least 300 percent of the 2000 model year city fuel economy.

Industry

• Tax credit for energy produced from landfill gas. Taxpayers that produce gas

from biomass are eligible for a credit equal to $3 per barrel-of-oil equivalent. To

qualify, the gas must be produced domestically from a facility placed in service before July 1, 1998 and sold to an unrelated person before January 1, 2008. The new

proposal would extend the credit to fuel produced from landfill methane produced

from a facility in service after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2011. The

credit for fuel produced at landfills subject to EPA’s 1996 New Source Performance

Standards/Emissions Guidelines would be limited to two-thirds of the otherwise applicable amount if any portion of the facility for producing fuel at the landfill was

placed in service before July 1, 1998, and beginning on January 1, 2002, in all other

cases.

• Tax credit for combined heat and power property. Combined heat and power

(CHP), also known as co-generation, is a highly efficient form of electric generation

that recycles heat which is normally lost under traditional power combustion methods. CHP captures the heat left over from industrial use, providing a source of residential and industrial heating and air conditioning in the local area around the

power plant. CHP systems achieve a greater level of overall energy efficiency, thereby reducing energy consumption, costs, and carbon emissions. No income tax credit

is available for investment in CHP property. The Administration is proposing a new

10 percent investment credit for qualified CHP systems placed in service after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 2007.

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TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

Table 5. Program Details by Agency/Account—FY 2003 Budget

(Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Department of Energy (DOE).

Energy Supply .............................................................. 375 393 408 +15

Renewable Energy Resources R&D ............ (370) (386) (408) (+22)

Nuclear Energy ........................................... (5) (7) (0) (-7)

Energy Conservation R&D ............................................ 619 640 588 -52

Fossil Energy R&D (sequestration R&D) ..................... 18 32 588 -52

Science ......................................................................... 35 35 35 0

Energy Information Administration .............................. 3 3 3 0

Subtotal—DOE ............................................................. 1,050 1,103 1,088 -15

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Environmental Programs & Management .................... 96 89 91 +2

Science and Technology ............................................... 27 26 17 -9

Subtotal—EPA ............................................................. 123 115 108 -7

Department of Agriculture (USDA).

Forest Service ............................................................... 3 0 1 +1

Forest and Rangeland Research Agricultural Research Service ......................................................... 0 0 5 +5

Subtotal—USDA ........................................................... 3 0 6 +6

TOTAL 1 ...................................................... 1,176 1,218 1,202 -16

1Total may not add due to rounding.

Technology Research, Development and Deployment. The fiscal year 2003 Budget

proposes $1,202 million in discretionary funding, a decrease of $16 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for research, development, and deployment of renewable energy technologies and energy efficient products that help reduce the use of fossil

fuels and U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Better methods to measure and monitor

carbon dioxide in soils and from forests are also funded. Table 5 provides a detailed

accounting by agency of the technology programs in this report related to energy

efficiency, conservation, renewable energy, and carbon sequestration. The reduction

in funding reflects a decrease in conservation R&D for technologies that can be

picked up by the private sector and a shift of conservation funds to weatherization

grants. The following sections highlight selected agency programs.

1. Buildings

The buildings sector is responsible for about 33 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas

emissions.

Most of the emissions result from the electricity needed to run appliances and

equipment in buildings, such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)

equipment. The budget includes programs within DOE and EPA designed to develop

highly efficient new appliances and HVAC systems, and to more rapidly deploy energy efficient products for buildings and homes throughout the marketplace. The following is a summary of the major activities by agency in the buildings sector:

• DOE Building Technology Program. The budget includes $93 million for DOE’s

building technology and related activities, a decrease of $12 million from fiscal year

2002 enacted. DOE has been working with industry to define technology ‘‘roadmaps’’

toward more efficient buildings, and is using that process to guide its R&D programs.

One major component is the Building America program, which creates partnerships with traditional housing developers and manufacturers of industrialized housing to demonstrate how new technologies can be integrated into homes cost-effectively and to disseminate that knowledge to other builders. DOE works with States

to encourage them to voluntarily upgrade their commercial and residential building

energy codes to require greater energy efficiency in all new construction. DOE’s Rebuild America program is the centerpiece of a newly consolidated Community Energy Program—community partners in Rebuild America have committed to improving the energy efficiency of building space.

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DOE also funds significant research on more efficient building equipment and appliances, such as advanced lighting, heat pumps, chillers, and commercial refrigeration. DOE develops and promulgates energy efficiency standards for many categories of appliances and also develops testing methodologies used to set standards

and to provide efficiency rating labels. (DOE’s rating and labeling programs are performed in partnership with the Federal Trade Commission.) Standards and test procedure development will continue for a variety of appliances and will continue to

support the joint EPA-DOE Energy Star program. • EPA Buildings Programs. The budget proposes $50 million, an increase of $1

million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for EPA’s ENERGY STAR partnerships (including ENERGY STAR Labeling and the ENERGY STAR Buildings Program). EPA

will work toward the goal of offsetting about 24 percent of the growth in greenhouse

gas emissions above 1990 levels expected by 2010 in this sector.

EPA will actively promote its new buildings benchmark tool and work with building owners and mangers to benchmark a total of 29,000 buildings nationwide. EPA

will expand its public sector work to increase the number of partnerships with

schools and universities and State and local governments to over 1,200. EPA will

also continue to actively recruit new small businesses and organizations into ENERGY STAR with the goal of reaching over 7,000 participants in 2003. EPA will

continue to play a key role in advancing the efficiency of the Federal Government

by enhancing the ability of agencies to procure energy efficient products as well as

assist agencies in benchmarking and labeling their high-performing buildings.

2. Transportation

Cars, trucks, aircraft, and other parts of the Nation’s transportation system emit

about one third of the total anthropogenic U.S. greenhouse gases. A range of new

technologies should make it possible for Americans to continue to enjoy the best personal transportation in the world while significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, many communities are developing innovative ways to reduce

congestion and transportation energy needs by improving highway designs and

urban planning, and by encouraging mass transit.

• DOE Transportation Technology Programs. The budget proposes $223 million,

a decrease of $30 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted (excludes $53 million in

biofuels R&D funded in Renewable Energy Resources and included in the electricity

sector below). DOE’s Office of Transportation Technologies (OTT) funds research,

development, and deployment of technologies that can significantly alter current

trends in oil consumption. Commercialization of innovative vehicle technologies and

alternative fuels presents an opportunity for reducing reliance on oil. These advanced technologies could also result in dramatic reductions in criteria pollutants

and greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector. DOE funds research

and development for advanced power-train technology (direct-injection) engines, hybrid-electric drive systems, advanced batteries, fuel cells, and light weight materials

and for alternative fuels (including ethanol from biomass, natural gas, methanol,

electricity, and biodiesel). About half of OTT’s R&D funding supports FreedomCAR,

a new partnership with the auto industry that builds on the technical successes of

its predecessor (Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles or PNGV), and improves on management and focus.

DOE also funds research to improve the engine efficiency of heavy-duty truck engines while reducing oxides of nitrogen emissions to near-zero levels. This research

includes both fuel injection/combustion research and exhaust after-treatment for

particulates and nitrogen oxide. This research will be complemented by R&D to reduce parasitic loses from aerodynamic drag and rolling resistance (including computer aerodynamic modeling of new truck body designs); and to make greater use

of lower-weight, high-strength materials for all classes of trucks.

• EPA Transportation Programs. The budget proposes $22 million, a decrease of

$9 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for EPA’s clean automotive technology initiative and activities that promote partnerships with State and local governments

and transportation authorities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution.

The reduction in EPA funding reflects a shift in emphasis from PNGV to the new

Freedom CAR program managed by DOE. The funding requested will enable EPA

to continue its work under Cooperative Research and Development Agreements

(CRADAs) with the automotive industry covering both SUVs and urban delivery vehicles. The successful technology development patented by EPA, the hydraulic hybrid vehicle technology, will help to lay the foundation for cost-effective commercialization of high fuel economy, low emission vehicles for delivery to market between 2005 and 2010.

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tion. Additionally, EPA will develop projects to reduce diesel idling time at truck

stops and along highways. EPA will partner with States and manufacturers of idling

control devices to help install idle control technologies on trucks and at truck stops

that could save one gallon of diesel fuel for each hour a vehicle idles.

3. Industry

Programs in the industry sector support Federal research efforts to develop innovative technologies and production methods which can help businesses achieve productivity gains and prosper in a competitive marketplace while leading to major reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases. Many technologies can help reduce emissions. • DOE Industry Technology Program. The budget proposes $138 million, a de- crease of $11 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, for DOE’s industrial research

and related programs. Key DOE industry programs include: • Industries of the Future. This DOE program works cooperatively with the nation’s most energy-intensive industries—such as aluminum, glass, chemicals, forest

products, mining, and steel—on developing technologies that increase energy and resource efficiency. Promising collaborative efforts include improvements in the process of making steel, pulp and paper, and other energy-intensive products that could

dramatically increase efficiency, lower greenhouse gas emissions, and improve competitiveness.

The Industries of the Future/Crosscutting program supports work that has benefits across many industry sectors. The Integrated Materials program supports development of a range of other advanced materials with special properties, such as

intermetallic compounds, metal-matrix composites, and inorganic membranes. Assistance to innovative industries will continue with expanded NICE3 and Inventions

and Innovations programs that support the development of energy-efficiency and

pollution/waste control technologies. The Industrial Assessment Centers will continue to perform energy and waste-management audits at small and medium sized

businesses. The Best Practices programs provide technical expertise and information

products to businesses of all sizes on how to use motors, compressed air and steam

in an integrated system context. The program also provides plant-wide energy assessments, documented energy savings case studies, and helps to accelerate the

adoption by industry of the best available and emerging technologies and best practices.

• EPA Industry Programs. The budget proposes $26 million, an increase of less

than $1 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for EPA’s programs in the industrial

sector focusing on reducing carbon dioxide emissions and continuing the successful

initiatives to reduce methane emissions and emissions of the high global-warming

potential gases. EPA’s goals for these efforts are to: 1) greatly enhance the rate of

energy and resource efficiency improvements in industry between now and 2010

(working with DOE); 2) cost-effectively return emissions of methane to 1990 levels

or below by 2010; 3) cost-effectively limit emissions of the more potent greenhouse

gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6); and 4) facilitate the use of clean energy technologies and

purchases of renewable energy.

• Stewardship Programs for the Reduction of Potent Greenhouse Gases. EPA

will continue its programs to reduce the more potent greenhouse gases, including

methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur

hexafluoride (SF6). EPA will expand partnerships with the magnesium industry and

with the electric power industry to reduce emissions of SF6 and will work with the

semiconductor, aluminum, and chemical industries to reduce HFC and PFC emissions.

• Methane Programs. EPA will continue its programs to reduce emissions of

methane, a gas with more than 20 times the heat trapping capability as carbon dioxide. EPA will work with the natural gas industry, the coal mining industry, the

waste management industry, and the agricultural industry to promote cost-effective

reductions of methane emissions resulting in a return of methane emissions to 1990

levels or below by 2010. This program has significant potential to achieve cost-effective and meaningful greenhouse gas emission reductions in the American economy.

• ENERGY STAR for Industry. EPA’s ENERGY STAR for Industry (formerly

Climate Wise) program will continue to work with individual partnership companies. EPA will enhance and expand the ENERGY STAR program for industry by

developing energy and related productivity benchmarks of industrial plant performance for five U.S. industries.

• Combined Heat and Power. EPA’s Combined Heat and Power (CHP) program

is currently funded at about $1 million per year and will continue to promote efficient systems that generate heat and electricity simultaneously at greatly improved

conversion efficiencies over single purpose units. This program, unveiled in the fall

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of 2001 with 18 partners, currently has more than 50 partners and is expected to

grow to 100 partners by the end of 2003. This program is expected to facilitate

about 20 CHP projects in 2001 across the industrial and commercial sector yielding

about 450 MW of power and to facilitate an additional 35 projects in 2003 yielding

about 850 MW. This effort could double the capacity of U.S. combined heat and

power systems employed by commercial, industrial, and institutional buildings, and

in communities throughout the Nation. EPA will work to identify and eliminate the

regulatory and institutional barriers that are currently preventing more rapid dissemination of this important technology.

4. Electricity

The generation of electricity in the U.S. is responsible for more than a third of

U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The budget funds programs in renewable energy

technologies. The key DOE programs in this sector are:

• DOE Renewable Energy Resources Programs. The budget proposes $408 million, an increase of $22 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for DOE’s renewable

programs. These include varieties of solar energy (generating electricity either

through concentrated heat or photovoltaics), biomass power, wind energy, geothermal power, hydropower, and hydrogen production and storage.

• Solar Energy. Over the past 20 years, Federal R&D has resulted in a 80 percent cost reduction in solar photovoltaics. DOE will maintain R&D of the next generation photovoltaic cells; manufacturing R&D; research in buildings-integrated applications; and fund efforts to develop new, unconventional technologies.

• Biopower. Biomass represents a tremendous renewable resource whose use can

help strengthen our energy security, protect the environment, and enhance our

rural economy. DOE is testing and demonstrating biomass co-firing with coal; developing advanced technologies for biomass gasification; developing and demonstrating

small modular systems; and conducting R&D to help develop ‘‘biorefineries’’ of the

future.

• Wind. Use of wind energy is growing very fast. Technologies under development by DOE and its partners can enable a twentyfold or more expansion of usable

wind resources, and make wind energy economically viable without the need for

Federal incentives. Wind R&D will now focus on advancing the technology so it can

be used in low wind speed areas, greatly enhancing the potential use of this renewable energy source.

• Geothermal. Geothermal represents a huge renewable resource which could

provide 25,000–50,000 megawatts of generating capacity from currently identified

hydrothermal resources if technology existed to develop these resources at a reasonable cost. DOE’s R&D program focuses on exploration and drilling to enable industry to locate and characterize new geothermal fields at reduced risk, and to access

deeper resources with lower drilling costs. DOE also supports advanced technology

in heat conversion and power systems for application to a broad range of geothermal

resources. Researchers work in partnership with U.S. industry to establish geothermal energy as an economically competitive contributor to the U.S. energy supply. DOE’s R&D program and activities to reduce barriers to development will allow

geothermal energy to supply electrical power and heat to homes and businesses

across the country.

• Hydropower. DOE is funding the development of a new generation of hydropower turbines that will kill far fewer fish than current designs do, and will also

maintain higher levels of dissolved oxygen in the water, which keeps river ecosystems healthier. Hydropower is an important form of zero-carbon electricity generation for the Nation.

• Hydrogen. DOE will continue to fund its research on low-cost hydrogen production and storage, prerequisites to the widespread use of hydrogen as a fuel. The program now looks toward the Proton-Exchange Membrane (PEM) fuel cells being developed for hybrid vehicles and for cogeneration in buildings as the first significant

markets for hydrogen, which will be ready within 5 years. More than half of the

hydrogen budget supports the new FreedomCAR public-private partnership.

The program funds R&D on thermal (steam and advanced auto-thermal reforming) production on hydrogen from both natural gas and biomass, and on methods

to use either algae and bacteria or photocatalytic techniques to produce hydrogen.

The hydrogen storage research program is exploring a number of novel adsorption

mechanisms, including carbon nanotubes and improved metal hydrides. DOE’s Technology Validation effort is funding demonstrations of prototype fuel cells, a fueling

station for vehicles, and onsite storage systems for solar production of hydrogen. The

latter includes a reversible electrolyzer/fuel cell that can produce hydrogen from

electricity while the sun is shining, and electricity from hydrogen when it is dark.

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• Deployment. DOE funds the Renewable Energy Production Incentive (REPI),

which provides payments to public and non-profit utilities in lieu of renewable energy tax credits. Public and non-profit utilities are not eligible for these tax credits

because they pay no taxes. DOE’s International Renewable Energy program provides technical assistance to developing countries and U.S. industries to help them

put together climate change projects. The program also funds market and trade development activities and works with other agencies to incorporate solar and renewable energy into disaster-relief programs. • Transmission and Distribution. DOE funds development of advanced storage

systems to supply ultra-high power quality to sensitive loads, smooth the power output form distributed generation sources including intermittent renewable sources,

and enhance the reliability of the transmission and distribution systems. DOE also

addresses power grid reliability, and efficient electricity market operation issues by

developing real-time measurement and control systems for electric grid management. This work also investigates the use of load management techniques to mitigate emergency power shortages and price spikes. In order to promote and facilitate

the integration of distributed sources into the grid, DOE funds development of uniform interconnection standards for distributed power generation, and funds studies

to identify barriers to the wider use of distributed generation. • High Temperature Superconductivity. DOE supports industry-led projects to

capitalize on recent breakthroughs in superconducting wire technology, aimed at developing devices such as advanced motors, power cables, and transformers. These

technologies would allow more electricity to reach the consumer without an increase

in fossil fuel input.

• Distributed Energy Resources. DOE has combined the development of Distributed Energy Resources (distributed generation, energy storage and load management) into one office to lead the seamless integration of these technologies into the

distribution system, the power grid, competitive markets, and the individual customer site. The office is supporting work to increase the efficiency, and reduce the

cost and emissions of advanced natural gas-driven microturbines, fuel cells, and reciprocating engines, and developing advanced high temperature materials to improve their performance. High system efficiencies are achieved from these sources

by linking them into building combined heat and power systems with advanced absorption heat pumps, chillers and desiccant systems that are also being developed

in the program.

5. Carbon Sequestration

Carbon dioxide can be sequestered (stored) through changes in both forestry and

agricultural practices. These programs focus on methods to capture and store carbon

dioxide, measure and monitor carbon in soils and from agricultural practices, and

to improve estimates of carbon fluxes from forests.

• DOE Carbon Sequestration Science Programs. The budget proposes $35 million, the same level as fiscal year 2002 enacted, for DOE carbon removal programs

in the Office of Science. DOE’s programs include research into the feasibility of capturing and storing carbon dioxide in underground geological structures and in the

deep ocean.

• DOE Fossil Energy Carbon Sequestration Programs. The budget proposes $54

million, an increase of $22 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for DOE fossil energy carbon sequestration programs. Carbon sequestration is potentially one of the

lowest cost approaches for significantly reducing or perhaps virtually offsetting

greenhouse gas emissions. The purpose of the fossil energy program is to develop

and demonstrate technically, economically, and ecologically sound methods to capture and reuse, store or permanently isolate carbon dioxide from the environment.

The program goal is to make available sequestration options starting in 2015 at a

cost of no more than $10 per ton of carbon (or about two tenths of a cent in the

cost of electricity). When linked with new advanced clean coal power technologies

now under development, the program will enable the deployment of clean coal power

plants with essentially zero emissions.

The principal thrust of the carbon sequestration program is to develop the applied

science and new technologies for addressing the cost-effective management/sequestration of carbon emissions from the production and use of fossil fuels. The program

primarily selects research topics and projects through competitive solicitations involving industry, university, and national laboratory performers. Close collaborations with other DOE, government, industry, and international organizations are

maintained providing an integrated approach to advancing the science and technology of carbon sequestration.

• EPA Carbon Removal Programs. The budget proposes $2 million, about the

same level as fiscal year 2002 enacted, to allow EPA to enhance efforts to better

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quantify the associated environmental co-benefits that result from carbon sequestration. These benefits include improving soil quality, reducing soil erosion, improving

water quality, providing wildlife habitat, and enhancing other environmental and

conservation goals. EPA will continue to collaborate with USDA to address the

misperceptions regarding carbon sequestration and to ensure that this important

mitigation option is developed in an environmentally sound and economically efficient way. EPA and USDA will identify and develop specific opportunities to sequester carbon in agricultural soils, forests, other vegetation and commercial products.

• USDA Technology Research. The budget proposes approximately $6 million to

strengthen basic climate change technology research and to develop methods for

measuring carbon in soils. USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) will develop

methods to manage crops, soils, and grazing systems to achieve the best balance of

agricultural productivity, resource conservation, and carbon sequestration. Work

will also focus on methods for managing livestock to minimize methane emissions.

The Forest Service will support the development of measuring tools and monitoring

technologies to improve estimates of carbon fluxes from forests.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Table 6. International Climate Change Assistance

(Discretionary budget authority; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Agency for International Development:.

Development Assistance (DA) ...................................... 112 110 109 -1

Economic Support Fund (ESF) ..................................... — 12 6 -6

Assistance for the Independent States of the Former

Soviet Union (FSA) ................................................... 31 32 27 -5

Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States

(AEEB) ...................................................................... 13 10 8 -2

International Disaster Assistance (IDA) ...................... — 4 5 +1

Development Credit Authority (DCA) ............................ 1 ———

Tropical Forest Conservation1 ...................................... — — 50 +50

Subtotal—AID ............................................ 157 167 205 +38

Department of Treasury.

Debt Restructuring Tropical Forest Conservation2 ...... 13 5 — -5

Department of State.

International Organizations and Programs ................. 7 7 6 -1

Total3 .......................................................... 177 179 211 +32

1Prior to the fiscal year 2003 Presidents Budget request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) was appropriated to the

Treasury Department. 2 In fiscal year 2002, an additional $20 million in existing balances may be used. 3 Total may not add due to rounding.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The budget proposes $205

million, an increase of $38 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for USAID’s climate change programs and for tropical forest conservation. The goal of USAID’s climate change programs are to promote development that minimizes the associated

growth in greenhouse gas emissions and reduces vulnerability to climate change. To

accomplish this goal, USAID works in developing and transition countries to implement ‘‘win-win’’ solutions that provide climate-related benefits while also meeting

development objectives in the energy sector, urban areas, forest conservation, agriculture, and disaster assistance. These solutions include activities that: 1) promote

the transfer of clean energy technologies; 2) measure reductions in greenhouse gas

emissions; 3) promote carbon capture through improved land use; 4) support countries to participate more effectively in the U.S. Framework Convention on Climate

Change; and 5) assess vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and increase

adaptive capacity. Although USAID works on climate change issues in more than

40 countries, the Agency has focused its climate change activities in three sub-regions: Central Africa, Central America and Central Asia, and eight countries: Brazil,

India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine.

The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposal seeks $50 million in funding for

tropical forest conservation, of which $40 million may be used for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA). One purpose of this initiative is to enable developing

279

countries to play an increased role in addressing the world’s climate change problem

through storing carbon in forests. The main elements of the initiative will be: (1)

remote sensing and developing capacity to monitor deforestation and enable local

governments to better control illegal and destructive logging in their countries; (2)

addressing the problem of illegal and destructive logging practices, working with

governments, non-governmental organizations and private industry; and (3) addressing deforestation through the use of the Tropical Forest Conservation Act as

well as other innovative funding mechanisms such as commercial debt for nature

swaps under the Foreign Assistance Act Title I, Chapter 7 authority and new partnerships with U.S. industries and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s).

Department of State. The budget includes $6 million to support the work carried

out by the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

The Secretariat is responsible for work related to the Convention and oversees the

consideration of communications submitted by countries. The Panel’s assessment efforts provide information on the scientific and technical underpinnings of domestic

and international policies to combat the threat of global climate change, and its

findings influence policy options available within and between countries.

OTHER CLIMATE-RELATED PROGRAMS

Table 7. Other Climate Change-Related Programs—FY 2003 Budget

(Budget authority; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Department of Energy.

Energy Conservation R&D Weatherization & State Energy Grants .............................................................. 191 272 316 +41

Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal/natural gas) ............ 274 442 398 -44

Energy Supply:.

Nuclear Energy R&D (NERI) ....................... 34 32 25 -7

Subtotal—DOE ........................................... 499 749 739 -10

Department of the Treasury.

International Development Assistance Global Environment Facility1 .......................................................... 41 38 68 +30

Total2 .......................................................... 540 787 807 +20

1The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million. Approximately 38 percent of total GEF fund- ing from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g. expanding clean energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which also

provides funding for other global environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type. 2 Total may not add due to rounding.

Other Climate-Change Related Programs. The fiscal year 2003 budget includes $807 million, an increase of $20 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for several

programs in which there is, or can be, significant greenhouse gas co-benefits. These

include programs that have multiple environmental benefits, including reducing fossil fuel use or improving energy efficiency. The programs in this category include: • DOE—Low Income Weatherization and State Energy Grants. The budget pro- poses $316 million, an increase of $41 million over fiscal year 2002 enacted, for programs that facilitate energy efficiency investments at the State and local level.

These programs provide energy conservation services, such as insulation, to low-income Americans, reducing energy costs for consumers, improving health and safety,

and reducing carbon emissions. The State Energy Program provides grants that enable States to tailor energy efficiency programs to local needs and leverage non-Federal resources. • DOE—Cleaner Coal and Natural Gas Efficiencies. The budget includes $398 million, a decrease of $44 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, to support DOE’s

R&D effort to help industry develop advanced technologies to produce and use coal,

and gas resources more efficiently and cleanly. federally funded development of

clean, highly efficient gas-fired and coal-fired generating systems aims to reduce gas

emission rates, while reducing electricity costs compared to currently available technologies. Programs also include efforts to discover effective, efficient, and economical

means of sequestering carbon dioxide.

• DOE B Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI). The budget proposes $25

million, a decrease of $7 million from fiscal year 2002 enacted, to continue investigator-initiated research and development at universities, national laboratories, and

280

industry to advance nuclear power technology. NERI research and development focuses on proliferation-resistant reactor and fuel technologies, high performance/efficient reactor technology, advanced nuclear fuels, and new technologies for the minimization and management of nuclear waste.

• Department of the Treasury B Global Environment Facility (GEF). See Addendum A.

DETAILED ACCOUNTING OF FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE EXPENDITURES

Table 8. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change—By Appropriation Account/Line

Item—FY 2003 Budget

(Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Programs and Tax Policies Directly Related to Climate Change

U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP).

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

National Institutes of Health (NIH).

National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 9 10 11 +1

National Eye Institute .................................................. 14 17 18 +1

National Cancer Institute ............................................ 31 34 39 +5

National Institute of Arthritis & Musculoskeletal &

Skin Diseases .......................................................... * * * *

Subtotal—HHS/NIH1 .................................. 54 60 68 +8

National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Science, Aeronautics, and Technology ......................... 1,176 1,090 1,109 +19

Department of Energy.

Science (Biological & Environmental Research) ......... 116 120 126 +6

National Science Foundation.

Research and Related Activities ................................. 181 188 188 0

Department of Agriculture (USDA).

Agricultural Research Service ...................................... 29 30 30 0

Cooperative State Research, Education, & Extension

Services.

Research and Education .............................................. 4 9 17 +8

Economic Research Service ......................................... 1 1 1 0

Forest Service.

Forest and Rangeland Research ................................. 17 17 17 0

Subtotal—USDA ......................................... 51 57 65 +8

Department of Commerce.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Operations, Research, and Facilities ...................... 93 100 100 0

Department of the Interior.

U.S. Geological Survey Surveys, Investigations, and

Research .................................................................. 27 28 28 0

Environmental Protection Agency.

Science and Technology ............................................... 23 21 22 +1

Smithsonian Institution.

Salaries and Expenses ................................................. 7 7 7 0

Subtotal—USGCRP2 ................................... 1,728 1,670 1,714 +44

Climate Change Research Initiative (CCRI)

Department of Commerce.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Operations, Research, and Facilities ...................... 0 0 18 +18

National Science Foundation.

Research and Related Activities ................................. 0 0 15 +15

National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Science, Aeronautics, and Technology ......................... 0 0 3 +3

Department of Energy.

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Table 8. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change—By Appropriation Account/Line

Item—FY 2003 Budget—Continued

(Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 ActualFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 ProposedChange

2002–2003

Science (Biological & Environmental Research) ......... 0 0 3 +3

Department of Agriculture (USDA).

Forest Service.

Forest and Rangeland Research ................................. 0 0 1 +1

Subtotal—CCRI ......................................... 0 0 40 +40

Technology Research, Development and Deployment

Department of Energy (DOE).

Energy Supply.

Renewable Energy Resources R&D ............ 375 393 408 +15

Nuclear Energy ........................................... (5) (7) (0) (-7)

Energy Conservation R&D ............................................ 619 649 588 -52

Fossil Energy R&D (sequestration R&D) ..................... 18 32 54 +22

Science (Basic Science) ............................................... 35 35 35 0

Energy Information Administration .............................. 3 3 3 0

Subtotal—DOE ........................................... 1,050 1,103 1,088 -15

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Environmental Programs and Management ................ 96 89 91 +2

Science and Technology ............................................... 27 26 17 -9

Subtotal—EPA ........................................... 123 115 108 -7

Department of Agriculture (USDA).

Forest Service.

Forest and Rangeland Research ................................. 3 0 1 +1

Agricultural Research Service ...................................... 0 0 5 +5

Subtotal—USDA ......................................... 3 0 6 +6

Subtotal—Technology Research, Development and Deployment3 .......................... 1,176 1,218 1,202 -16

Revenue Effect of Tax Proposals ................................................ 0 0 555 +555

International Assistance

Agency for International Development (AID).

Development Assistance (DA) ...................................... 112 110 109 -1

Economic Support Fund (ESF) ..................................... — 12 6 -6

Assistance for the Independent States of the Former

Soviet Union (FSA) ................................................... 31 32 27 -5

Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States

(AEEB) ...................................................................... 13 10 8 -2

International Disaster Assistance (IDA) ...................... — 4 D5 +1

Development Credit Authority (DCA) ............................ 1 ———

Tropical Forest Conservation4 ...................................... — — 50 +50

Subtotal—AID5 .......................................... 157 167 205 +38

Department of Treasury.

Debt Restructuring.

Tropical Forest Conservation6 ...................................... 13 5 — -5

Department of State.

International Organizations and Programs ................. 7 7 6 -1

Subtotal—International Assistance7 ......... 177 179 211 +32

Other Climate Change-Related Programs

Department of Energy.

Energy Conservation R&D ............................................ 191 275 316 +41

Weatherization & State Energy Grants ........................ 274 442 398 -44

Fossil Energy R&D (cleaner coal & natural gas).

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Table 8. Programs and Tax Policies Related to Climate Change—By Appropriation Account/Line

Item—FY 2003 Budget—Continued

(Budget authority and tax incentives; in millions of dollars)

FY 2001 Ac- tualFY 2002 Esti- mateFY 2003 Pro- posedChange

2002–2003

Energy Supply.

Nuclear Energy R&D (Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI)) ........................ 499 749 739 -10

Subtotal—DOE ........................................... 499 749 739 -10

Department of the Treasury.

International Development Assistance, Multilateral

Assistance, International Financial Institutions—

Global Environment Facility8 ................................... 41 38 68 +30

Subtotal—Other Climate Change Programs9 ................................................... 540 787 807 +20

Total—All Programs and Tax Policies10 ... 3,603 3,822 4,475 +653

Table 8 is a detailed listing of Federal climate change expenditures by agency with account level information as provided in the President’s fiscal year 2003 Budget Appendix. All numbers represent budget authority unless otherwise noted. The line items in the Program and

Financing schedule in the Budget Appendix use obligations, not budget authority, so the numbers may not be comparable.

* less than $500,000

1 Subtotal may not add due to rounding.

2 Subtotal may not add due to rounding.

3 Subtotal may not add due to rounding.

4 Prior to the fiscal year 2003 Budget request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) was appropriated to the Treasury Department. 5 Subtotal may not add due to rounding.

6 In fiscal year 2002, an additional $20 million in existing balances may be used.

7 Subtotal may not add due to rounding.

8 The total fiscal year 2003 request for the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is $177.8 million. Approximately 38 percent of total GEF funding from all sources supports climate-related projects (e.g. expanding clean energy production and efficient energy use). The GEF, which

also provides funding for other global environmental concerns, does not allocate funds by project type. 9 Subtotal may not add due to rounding.

10 Total may not add due to rounding. Total adjusted to eliminate double counts.

ADDENDUM A

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (GEF)—FY 2003 BUDGET REQUEST

The fiscal year 2003 Budget requests $107.5 million for the GEF for the first of

four annual payments under the third GEF replenishment (GEF–3) and $70.3 million to clear one-third of the U.S. arrears to GEF–2. The clean energy portion of

the GEF portfolio B its climate change focal area B accounts for about 38 percent

of its financial commitments, which is about $68 million for climate-related activities in fiscal year 2003.

Background on the Organization

The GEF was created in 1991, before any climate convention or protocol existed,

to specialize in trans-border environment problems, of which climate is only one. In

addition to climate change, GEF funding is focused on international water pollution

and overfishing; better forestry, wildlife management, and biological diversity conservation; and phasing out use of ozone-depleting chemicals (in Eastern Europe, to

complement Montreal Protocol Fund work in developing countries).

The 1992 Climate Convention (the ‘‘1992 Convention’’) provided that there should

be a ‘‘financial mechanism’’ to: (1) help developing countries evaluate, quantify, and

report publicly on their greenhouse gas emissions; and (2) make investments in

cleaner development in developing countries. In 1994, more than 3 years before conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. and other countries chose the GEF as the

institution to run the financial mechanism of the Climate Convention, in part to

avoid creating new institutions. The GEF was by far the best existing institution

for the job.

By 1995, donors had concluded a first GEF replenishment that extensively restructured the GEF and improved its operational effectiveness. This restructuring

also cemented a governance structure in which donors exercise much more power

than in the 1992 Convention or in any standard ‘‘UN-configured’’ institution.

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GEF Operations

The GEF focuses on innovative, cost-effective and generally small projects that

can be duplicated elsewhere with financing from non-GEF sources. Since beginning

regular operations in 1994, the GEF has designed and initiated over 1,047 investment and capacity building projects in over 161 countries that are now being implemented by developing countries with the help of three agencies—the World Bank,

the U.N. Development Program, and the U.N. Environment Program. GEF has committed about $3.7 billion to date, leveraging over $15 billion from other sources. Cofinanciers include the developing countries themselves, bilateral aid agencies, the

GEF’s three implementing agencies and other multilateral financial institutions,

and, in some cases, private sector investors and non-governmental organizations.

Leveraging for clean energy projects is significant: $799 million in cofinancing was

leveraged in association with $86 million in GEF grants in fiscal year 2002. GEF

operations take two forms: (1) technical assistance to help developing countries

frame more environmentally sound policies in key sectors such as energy production

and land management; and (2) direct investments to demonstrate innovative technology projects, such as rural solar power, that countries then can copy on a larger

scale.

No Projects That Are Kyoto-Specific

The GEF predates both the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 1992 Convention, and

the Protocol places no new obligations on the GEF as the Convention’s financial

mechanism. With regard to development finance, the Protocol is related to the GEF

through the Protocol’s umbrella, the 1992 Convention, since the GEF acts as the financial mechanism for the Convention; it simply underscores existing 1992 Convention agreements on financial assistance for developing countries: • Supporting developing country reporting requirements under the 1992 Convention; and • Providing the extra cost over normal development costs of reducing greenhouse

gas emissions in energy or other projects. For example, the GEF covers only the incremental cost of a clean wind power plant relative to a regular oil-fired plant of

identical capacity.

GEF Climate Change-Related Clean Energy Activities

The GEF supports five categories of climate-change related projects, all but one

focused on the energy sector. The first category is small activities (generally costing

about $350,000) to assist countries in preparing reports required under the 1992

Convention. These reports provide detailed inventories of countries’ greenhouse gas

(GHG) emissions and sources (power plants, etc.), their GHG ‘‘sinks’’ (forests,etc.),

and policies and programs that affect GHG emissions (energy pricing policies, etc.).

The four other categories, briefly illustrated with project examples below, all support clean energy development, usually combined with capacity-building for good

policies and effective institutions. These programs make sense on their own terms

and are all initiatives the U.S. has been pursuing domestically for years. None of

them is directed by the Protocol.

The GEF already undertakes systematic annual portfolio performance evaluation.

Criteria include quality of overall project management, financial management, policy impacts, country capacity development, civil society engagement, and pollution

abatement. For example, for energy efficiency projects, evaluators compare investments in efficient equipment following the GEF intervention to a baseline scenario

of efficiency investments. An extensive effort to update and improve measurement

criteria at both project and program levels for climate change activities has been

concluded. These measurements are now being used to ensure projects and programs achieve their objectives.

Promoting Energy Efficiency and Conservation

The GEF’s Mexico High Efficiency Lighting Project aimed to reduce energy waste

and power plant pollution by proving the commercial viability of energy efficient

lighting. $10 million from GEF leveraged over $13 million in initial cofinancing.

Since the project’s completion, its long-term impacts have outstripped all expectations. Mexican consumers and businesses have installed almost 40 percent more efficient lights than the GEF’s most optimistic projections. The project’s success also

convinced Mexico to expand dramatically energy efficiency programs in other locations and sectors.

Promoting Renewable Energy

In Sri Lanka, a GEF project has succeeded in supplying electricity by employing

renewable technologies and demonstrating the advantages of such technologies to

rural households and the country in general. This $5.9 million GEF grant has leverVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00287 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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aged $49.4 million in cofinancing, including $24.2 million from the World Bank. Approximately 30 megawatts of mini-hydropower has been added to the grid through

private developers, and a total of 8,800 households have been provided with electricity through village hydropower and solar photovoltaic power. The aim is to provide for the replication of such renewable energy schemes by private businesses in

Sri Lanka and many other countries.

Lowering the Long-Term Cost of Advanced Clean Energy Technologies

The Brazil Biomass Power Commercial Demonstration Project uses high-efficiency

technology to use agricultural byproducts as fuel for electric power and agro-industry process heat. A $40.5 million GEF investment leverages $82 million, mostly from

Brazilian public and private sources. The project should help increase economies of

scale for this promising technology and thus help it become commercially viable. By

conservative estimates, biomass power could supply clean electricity to 100 million

rural people, particularly needed in Africa and South Asia.

Clean Fossil-Fuel Combustion and Other Short-Term Measures

The GEF’s $10 million Coal Bed Methane Project demonstrated at three sites a

wide variety of techniques and technologies that Chinese coal mines can employ to

reduce methane emissions and capture clean-burning methane as a fuel. It also

spawned landmark policy and institutional reforms, including the creation of the

China United Coal Bed Methane Corporation, that support replication of coal-bed

methane recovery. The Chinese Ministry of Coal has since negotiated agreements

with BP-Amoco and other companies for coal-bed methane projects. Based on the

GEF’s early work, the Asian Development Bank, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,

and the China United Coal Bed Methane Corporation are all working to expand

coal-bed methane development in China.

ADDENDUM B

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2002 FARM BILL

Over the next 10 year we will invest $47.2 billion for conservation on our farms

and forest lands, partnering with farmers and small land owners to protect the

water and air, provide habitat for wildlife, and storing carbon in trees and the soil.

The 2002 Farm Bill reauthorizes and increases funding for most USDA conservation

programs. These programs will provide a range of environmental benefits, including

improved air, soil, and water quality and wildlife habitat. Activities implemented

through a number of USDA conservation programs can result in positive greenhouse

gas benefits by reducing emissions and enhancing terrestrial carbon sequestration.

For example, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) program is

expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by providing incentives that encourage

the voluntary adoption of conservation practices on working lands and waste management systems for livestock operations such as methane capturing technologies.

A new provision of EQIP, the Conservation Innovations Grant Program, could be

used to promote carbon sequestration practices by leveraging private and public sector investments. In addition, reserve programs, such as the Conservation Reserve

Program, are expected to have sizable greenhouse gas benefits, by sequestering carbon through vegetation growth and improved soil conditions.

Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) provides technical assistance,

cost-sharing, and incentive payments for conservation practices on working lands.

The 2002 Farm Bill increased funding for EQIP and increased the flexibility of the

program by allowing exceptions to the maximum cost-share amount of 75 percent,

removing restrictions on eligibility based on operation size, and expanding options

for contract lengths.

While both crop and livestock producers are eligible, funding is prioritized for livestock producers with 60 percent of program funding targeted for conservation practices on livestock operations (up from 50 percent in the 1996–2001 Farm Bill).

The Conservation Innovation Grants program is a new provision under EQIP that

allows the Secretary to make grants to governmental and non-governmental entities, as well as persons, to leverage investment in conservation activities. Projects

funded through this program may include market-based pollution credit trading,

adoption of best management practices, or carbon sequestration.

The 2002 Farm Bill provides for direct spending for regular EQIP activities and

the Conservation Innovation Grants program of $5.8 billion in Commodity Credit

Corporation (CCC) funding for fiscal years 2002–2007. Funding is scheduled to increase steadily starting at $400 million in 2002 and $700 million in 2003, increasing

each year to a maximum of $1.3 billion annually by fiscal year 2007. This represents

a substantial increase from the 1996 Farm bill authorization of $200 million per

285

year. Additional CCC funding is provided for a new EQIP provision targeting

ground and surface water conservation at $310 million over fiscal year 2002–2007

and an additional $50 million is provided for water conservation activities in the

Klamath Basin as soon as possible.

Reserve Programs compensate landowners for taking environmentally sensitive

land out of production.

• Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is a voluntary program where the government offers annual rental payments and cost-share assistance to farmers in exchange for taking land out of production and establishing an approved vegetation

cover. The 1996 Farm Bill authorized a maximum enrollment of 36.4 million acres

in the CRP. The 2002 Farm Bill reauthorizes the program and increases the enrollment cap to 39.2 million acres. Additional provisions allow for automatic extension

of expiring contracts. In addition, 2002 Farm Bill provisions permit some management practices to continue on CRP lands (i.e., haying and grazing, and placement

of wind turbines). Spending for this program is estimated to increase by $1.5 billion

over 10 years.

• Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) is authorized under the

CRP but is administered through a State-Federal partnership and targets State-specific as well as National agricultural environmental problems. Because the CREP

is authorized under the CRP, acres enrolled under CREP count toward the CRP enrollment cap. The estimated costs of the CREP are incorporated in the estimate

above.

• Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) provides easements or restoration cost-share

agreements to producers who agree to restore wetlands on agricultural lands. The

1996 Farm Bill authorizes a maximum area of 1.075 million acres. The 2002 Farm

Bill increases the total enrollment acreage to 2.275 million acres, with a maximum

annual enrollment set at 250,000 acres per year. Spending for this program is estimated to increase by $1.5 billion over 10 years.

APPENDIX A

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Global Climate Change Funding (GCC)

(Dollars in thousands)

BUREAU/COUNTRY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NAME

Reporting

Category

FY 2001 Obli- gationsFY 2002 Esti- mateFY 2003 Pro- posed

Africa (AFR).

Guinea ................... Increased use of Sustainable Natural Resources Mgmt Practices.3 1,000 2,000 2,000

Madagascar Biologically Diverse Ecosystems Conserved 3 2,500 2,500 2,500

Malawi Sustainable Use, Conservation, & Mgmt

of Renewable Natural Resources.

3 2,000 1,000 1,000

Mali Increased Value-Added of Specific Economic Sectors.3 1,000 1,500 —

Accelerated Economic Growth .................... 3 — — 1,500

Mozambique Increased Rural Household Incomes ......... 3 2,000 2,000 2,000

Senegal More effective Management of Services &

Resources.

3 — 1,000 1,000

South Africa .................... Improved Capacity to Implement Economic Policy.1 500 — —

Housing and Municipal Services ............... 1 2,500 3,000 3,000

Uganda Expanded Opportunities for Rural Sector

Growth.

3 3,500 2,500 2,500

AFR/Regional/SD Central Africa Regional Program for Environment (CARPE).3 3,000 3,000 3,000

(CARPE) Climate Monitoring & Observing 5 — — 500

FEWS Climate Monitoring and Observing .. 5 1,000 6,000 6,000

Western Africa Regional

Program.

Food Security, ENV and Natural Resource

Mgmt Strengthened.

3 1,000 — —

Climate Monitoring and Observing ............ 5 — — 500

Initiative for Southern

Africa.

Increased Regional Cooperation in Natural

Resource Mgmt.

3 — 500 500

Climate Monitoring and Observing ............ 5 — — 500

286

Global Climate Change Funding (GCC)—Continued

(Dollars in thousands)

BUREAU/COUNTRY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NAME

Reporting

Category

FY 2001 ObligationsFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 Proposed

Regional Economic Dev.

Service Office (REDSO/

E).

Climate Monitoring and Observing ............ 5 — — 500

TOTAL AFR ............. 20,000 25,000 27,000

Asia and the Near East

(ANE)

Afghanistan .................... Climate Monitoring and Observing ............ 5 — — 1,000

Bangladesh ..................... Improved Performance of the Energy Sector.1 1,000 3,470 3,470

Improved Performance of the Energy Sector.

1 — 1,500 1,500

Egypt ............................... Mgt. of Env. and Natural Resources in

Targeted Sectors Improved.

1 — 7,280 1,155

India ............................... Increased Environmental Protection in Energy, Industry, & Cities.1 2,843 6,050 6,050

Increased Environmental Protection in Energy, Industry, & Cities.1 — 3,000 3,000

Indonesia ........................ Energy Sector Governance Strengthened ... 1 3,823 3,130 3,130

Nepal .............................. Increased Private Sector Participation &

Investment in Hydropower.

1 2,000 2,200 2,200

Philippines ...................... Protection of Productive Life Sustaining

Natural Resources.

1 2,997 3,000 3,000

USAEP ............................. U.S. Asia Environmental Partnership ........ 1 4,100 2,000 3,100

SARI/E ............................. South Asia Regional Initiative—Energy

Program.

1 3,900 2,900 2,900

ANE/Regional .................. Program Development & Learning ............. 1 — 150 150

Climate Monitoring and Observing ............ 5 — — 1,000

TOTAL ANE ............. 20,663 34,680 30,655

Latin American and the

Caribbean (LAC)

Bolivia ............................. Sustainable Forest Management and

Parks.

3 4,527 4,550 5,764

Brazil .............................. Env & Socioeconomically Sustainable Alternatives for Sound Land Use.3 2,500 1,465 2,840

Clean and Efficient Energy Production

and Use.

1 2,368 1,000 1,000

Dominican Republic ....... Sustainable Forestry .................................. 3 1,492 1,500 1,500

Ecuador ........................... Conserving Ecuador’s Forests .................... 3 3,688 3,057 850

Guatemala ...................... Conserving and Sustainable Using Forests 3 570 600 450

G-CAP (Central America) Improved Management in the

Mesoamerican Biological Corridor.

3 510 415 595

Improved Management in the

Mesoamerican Biological Corridor.

1 1,300 230 230

Improved Management in the

Mesoamerican Biological Corridor.

5 1,050 180 580

Honduras ........................ Protecting Honduran Forests ..................... 3 3,691 2,600 4,800

LAC Regional .................. Improved Conservation of the Region’s Biological Resources.3 964 4,636 2,800

Mexico ............................. Protecting Tropical Forest .......................... 3 4,164 3,365 4,765

Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency ........ 5 600 400 500

Fires ........................................................... 1 1,421 1,750 1,500

Nicaragua ....................... Improving Park Management ..................... 3 4,970 4,723 1,129

Panama .......................... Conserving Forests ..................................... 3 240 — —

Paraguay ......................... Conserving Paraguay’s Sub-Tropical Forests.3 1,000 1,000 1,000

Peru ................................ Improved Environmental Management ...... 3 1,621 — —

Strengthen Environmental Management ... 3 — 1,227 1,500

TOTAL LAC ............. 36,676 32,697 31,803

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Global Climate Change Funding (GCC)—Continued

(Dollars in thousands)

BUREAU/COUNTRY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NAME

Reporting

Category

FY 2001 ObligationsFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 Proposed

Europe and Eurasia

(E&E)

Albania ........................... Growth in Number of Self-Sustaining Private Enterprises.1 1,500 750 500

Bulgaria .......................... Special Initiatives ...................................... 3 1,200 500 500

Accelerated Development & Growth of the

Private Sector.

1 — 400 450

Croatia ............................ Growth of a Dynamic and Competitive

Private Sector.

1 — 500 —

Romania ......................... Economically Sustainable and Environmentally Sound Energy Sector.1 1,100 1,900 1,500

CEE Regional .................. Economically Sustainable and Environmentally Sound Energy Sector.1 7,576 5,726 4,901

Increased Environmental Mgmt Capacity

to Sppt Sustainable Ec Growth.

3 932 — 215

Increased Environmental Mgmt Capacity

to Sppt Sustainable Ec Growth.

1 214 — 87

Sub-total Europe ... 12,522 9,776 8,153

Armenia .......................... Economically Sustainable and Environmentally Sound Energy Sector.1 4,750 590 5,100

More Sustainable Water Management for

Enhanced Env Quality.

1 — 300 500

Georgia ........................... Economically Sustainable and Environmentally Sound Energy Sector.1 6,860 14,500 6,400

Kazakhstan ..................... Improved Management of Critical Natural

Resources, including Energy.

1 2,000 1,000 500

Kyrgyzstan ....................... Improved Management of Critical Natural

Resources, including Energy.

1 750 650 1,500

Moldova .......................... Private Enterprise Growth Creates Jobs

and Generates Income.

1 4,575 4,575 5,150

Russia ............................. Accelerated Development and Growth of

Private Enterprises.

1 400 883 718

Cross-Cutting Programs ............................ 3 1,600 2,717 2,282

Tajikistan ........................ Improved Management of Critical Natural

Resources, including Energy.

1 — 20 30

Turkmenistan .................. Improved Management of Critical Natural

Resources, including Energy.

1 10 200 200

Ukraine ........................... Economically Sustainable and Environmentally Sound Energy Sector.1 8,284 3,475 3,275

Increased Env Mgmt Capacity to Support

Sustainable Development.

1 1,645 460

NIS Regional ................... Economically Sustainable and Environmentally Sound Energy Sector.1 1,060 935 935

Increased Environmental Mgmt Capacity

to Spt Sustainable Ec Growth.

1 940 340 340

Sub-total Eurasia .. 31,229 31,830 27,390

TOTAL E&E .... 43,751 41,606 35,543

Economic Growth, Agriculture & Trade

(EGAT).

EGAT/ENV ........................ Office of Environment and Natural Resources.3 8,324 7,626 7,626

EGAT/ENV ........................ Office of Environment and Natural Resources.1 ———

EGAT/ENV ........................ Office of Environment, Energy and Technology.1 16,000 12,000 10,000

EGAT/ENV ........................ Global Climate Change .............................. 1 3,000 2,575 1,000

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Global Climate Change Funding (GCC)—Continued

(Dollars in thousands)

BUREAU/COUNTRY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE NAME

Reporting

Category

FY 2001 ObligationsFY 2002 EstimateFY 2003 Proposed

EGAT/ENV ........................ Global Climate Change .............................. 5 — 900 750

EGAT/ENV ........................ Global Climate Change .............................. 3 3,000 500 325

EGAT/EGAD ...................... AFS ............................................................. 3 2,022 2,775 2,775

EGAT/EGAD ...................... AFS ............................................................. 3 3,000 3,000 3,000

TOTAL EGAT ........... 35,346 29,376 25,476

Democracy, Conflict,

and Humanitarian

Assistance (DCHA)

DCHA/OFDA ..................... Worldwide Climate Monitoring and Observing 5.— 4,000 5,000

TOTAL DCHA ........... 4,000 5,000

Tropical Forest Conservation (A).[13,000] [5,000] 50,000

Development Credit Authority (DCA).

Bulgaria (B) .................... 1 ................................................................. 625 — —

TOTAL DCA ............. 625 — —

TOTAL USAID 157,061 167,359 205,477

(A) Before the fiscal year 2003 Request, funding for the Tropical Forest Conservation Act was appropriated to the Treasury Department. In

fiscal year 2002, up to an additional $20 million in existing Treasury Department balances may be used. The bracketed amounts are not included in AID’s totals. (B) Development Credit Authority is a competitive program funded by transfer authority. The fiscal year 2001 level is the subsidy amount

obligated. The leveraged amount through fiscal year 2000 is $22.3 million.

FY 2002 Legislative Reporting Categories

1) Activities that promote the transfer and deployment of United States clean energy technologies: Under USAID’s Climate Change Program,

technology transfer is promoted to assist developing countries to achieve sustainable growth and development but is not tracked as an individual goal within the program. USAID’s energy-related climate change programs demonstrate U.S. technologies and/or work to address the

policy, legal and regulatory barriers that limit clean technology deployment.

2) Activities to assist in the measurement, monitoring, reporting, verification, and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions: USAID does not

currently separate measuring, monitoring, reporting and verification of GHG emissions from the energy and land use sector activities in which

these occur. All of the activities that assist with technology transfer and carbon capture promote the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

3) Activities/programs to promote carbon capture and sequestration measures

4) Activities/programs to help meet such countries’ responsibilities under the Framework Convention on Climate Change: The spending for

this category has not been formally tracked under USAID’s Climate Change Program. It has been tracked as a performance indicator of program results and information concerning results through fiscal year 2000 and can be provided upon request.

5) Activities to develop assessments of the vulnerability to impacts of climate change and response strategies

RESPONSES OF JAMES CONNAUGHTON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR

JEFFORDS

Question 1. What measures should we look at to determine whether U.S. programs and resources are achieving the goals of Agenda 21?

Response. One measure of accomplishment is the ratification and implementation

of new multilateral environmental agreements. The Bush Administration has submitted the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) and implementing legislation is to the Senate for its advice and consent. This convention

seeks the ultimate worldwide elimination of certain persistent organic pollutants.

Implementing legislation on two related international agreements have also be sent

to the Congress: 1) The Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary

Air Pollution on Persistent Organic Pollutants, an earlier agreement similar to

POPs which covers a slightly different set of chemicals already controlled in the

U.S., and therefore applies only to the U.S., Europe and Canada; and 2) The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent (PlC) Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, which requires exporters

to obtain the prior informed consent of importing countries and to provide safety information on health effects of hazardous substances and pesticides. Another important treaty concluded and ratified by the United States since Rio is the Deserts Convention (which deals with dry land management and desertification).

The international community has also developed a number of programs and other

implementation measures to be undertaken by governments, the private sector and

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NGO’s. These include the U.S.-led international Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), which

now has a large number of participating countries, the U.N. Forum on Forests,

which has made significant progress in developing a set of criteria and indicators

for the sustainable management of the world’s most endangered forest resources,

and the Arctic Council, which as a group has identified and implemented measures

to reduce toxic chemicals which pose a particular bioaccumulation risk in animals

and humans in polar regions.

Programs implemented by U.S. industry often in partnership with government

and NGO’s, such as the Energy Star program for energy efficient appliances and the

adoption of clean production technologies and methods have also contributed significantly toward achieving the goals set out in Agenda 21.

Sustainable development criteria related to Agenda 21 are being utilized in the

reporting of program performance by U.S. Government departments and agencies.

Goals for particular programs are drawn from specific chapters and sections of

Agenda 21. An example is the goal of USAID’s protected area work in Latin America, which addresses Section 15.5g of Agenda 21 by seeking to preserve biological

diversity. Agenda 21 will continue to provide a broad framework as the U.S. executes targeted results-oriented programs that are designed to address local situations.

Question 2. We understand that earlier this year 41 American environmental

leaders, including the heads of almost all of the major U.S. environmental groups,

wrote to President Bush urging him to commit to attending the Johannesburg Summit and to reasserting American leadership on a range of critical global environmental issues. Their letter sets out a number of recommended actions. Has the Administration considered these recommendations and taken concrete actions on any

of them?

Response. The Bush Administration greatly appreciates having heard from this

group. I have, met with many of the NGO leaders who signed the letter to discuss

these and other issues. The Administration is also working with many NGO’s in

preparing our deliverables for the World Summit. We have taken actions on implementing several international environmental agreements (as described above) At the

recently completed talks for replenishment of the Global Environmental Facility

(GEF) the U.S. pledged a significant increase in funding to help developing countries mitigate environmental problems with potential global impact. The United

States pledged $500 million over the next 4 years for the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The commitment is a 16 percent increase over its contribution to the previous replenishment. This in turn will help leverage about $2.2 billion in total new

donor contributions. My office and other agencies discussed the importance of this

funding with several groups who I understand are complimentary of our ultimate

decision and leadership.

Question 3. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change commits the United States to working to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gases at

concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Please provide the Administration’s definition of what phenomena would indicate or constitute ‘‘dangerous anthropogenic interference.’’ (For example, does that mean more frequent and more destructive hurricanes, excessive wildfires, anomalous droughts, etc.?)

Response. The objective of the Framework Convention, set out in Article 2, does

not impose commitments on Parties. It does provide that the long term stabilization

level ‘‘should be achieved within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt

naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and

to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.’’

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes in its Third Assessment

Report that the question of what would constitute dangerous anthropogenic interference is one that it cannot answer, because danger is a function of the degree to

which effects are negative and the degree to which those effects are unacceptable.

The latter, as noted in the Third Assessment Report, is a value judgment. (IPCC

Working Group II Third Assessment Report, page 917).

At this point, it not possible to make such a judgment. There remain substantial

uncertainties in critical areas with respect to climate behavior, as well as natural

and socio-economic impacts. These include, among other things:

• feedbacks in the climate system that determine the magnitude and rate of future increases; future usage of fossil fuels and future emissions of methane;

• how much carbon is sequestered by oceans and other sinks and how much remains in the atmosphere;

• the details of regional climate change resulting from global climate change;

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• the nature and causes of the natural variability of climate, its interactions

with forced changes, and the direct and indirect effects of aerosols;

• the ability of humans and ecosystems to adapt to changing climate conditions.

The Administration is taking measured and serious steps to respond to the challenge of climate change, by taking significant short-term measures to reduce the

projected growth in global emissions, both through enhanced domestic policies and

technology transfer to developing countries, and by substantially increasing our nation’s investment in science and technology. By so doing, we can both reduce remaining uncertainties and prepare ourselves to address climate change in a manner

that also ensures our continuing prosperity. We believe that these steps are fully

consistent with the United States’ commitments under the Framework Convention.

The President committed the Nation to an immediate goal of reducing America’s

greenhouse gas emissions relative to the size of our economy by 18 percent in the

next 10 years. This will set America on a path to slow the growth of our greenhouse

gas emissions and, if. science justifies, to stop and then reverse the growth of emissions. To achieve this goal, the Administration is actively engaged and moving forward on many fronts, looking at every sector of our economy, with the recognition

that meaningful progress depends on the development and deployment of new technology. With the continued support of Congress, we are advancing climate science,

developing and promoting energy efficiency, conservation, and sequestration technologies and practices, pursuing near term greenhouse gas mitigation programs and

expanding international cooperation.

The President has called for nearly $700 million in additional funding for the Federal Government’s commitment to climate change in Fiscal Year 1903—a 17 percent

increase from last year—to support a $4.5 billion program of research on climate

science and energy technology, mitigation incentives and programs, and international technology transfer and outreach. This commitment is unmatched in the

world. The President’s recent Report to Congress on Federal Climate Change Expenditures details the numerous programs that this funding will support.

Importantly, the President’s request includes $555 million in clean energy tax incentives, the first part of a $4.6 billion commitment over the next 5 years, reaching

$7.1 billion over the next 10 years. These incentives will spur investments in and

purchases of renewable energy—including solar, wind, and biomass—as well as advanced hybrid and fuel cell vehicles, cogeneration, and landfill gas conversion. We

also are promoting clean coal technology, as well as nuclear power—which produces

no greenhouse gas emissions—and are working to safely improve fuel economy for

our cars and trucks.

Question 4. Please identify the early warning system that the Administration supports domestically and internationally that is designed to detect when ‘‘dangerous

anthropogenic interference’’ (as defined in response to the previous question) has

begun to occur.

Response. The United States is involved in a variety of research activities designed to enhance our understanding of the climate system. Together, these will

help reduce the significant remaining uncertainties identified last year by the National Academy of Science’s in Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key

Questions, and provide better understanding of potential impacts associated with

greenhouse gas emissions.

The Administration has requested $1.7 billion in basic scientific research, under

the U.S Global Change Research Program and the President’s Climate Change Research Initiative in fiscal year 2203, which is roughly half of the world’s research

budget, and more than Japan and the 15 member states of the European Union

combined. This includes funding for the Climate Change Research Initiative, which

is designed to focus on information that can be developed within 2 to 5 years to assist the nation’s evaluation of optimal strategies to address global change risks.

In addition, the Administration is leading the way in the revitalization of a comprehensive global observation system, which is critical to understanding climate

change. This includes greater emphasis on climate observation and monitoring systems here and abroad. As part of his climate change policy, the President committed

$25 million to improve observing and monitoring capability in developing countries.

These investments will help to better understand current conditions as well as improve future projections at the global level.

Question 5. The Framework Convention commits the United States and all the

parties to reporting ‘‘detailed information on its policies and measures . . . with the

aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these anthropogenic

emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.’’ When will the United

States comply with that commitment?

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Response. The United States submitted detailed information on our policies and

measures, in accordance with the procedures under the Convention. Most recently,

policies and measures are detailed in the Climate Action Report submitted as the

third National Communication from the United States to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, submitted in May 2002.

You mention as a ‘‘commitment’’ the Framework Convention’s aim of returning to

1990 levels by the end of the last decade. This is not an obligation under the Convention, but rather is stated as a general objective. The last Administration ultimately found this general aim unachievable, as did virtually all of the developed

country parties of the Convention. Article 4 of the Convention does, however, contain a number of specific commitments, with which the United States has fully complied. This includes the requirement for us to develop methodologies for assessing

our greenhouse gas emissions and making that information publicly available. It includes the adoption of policies specifically aimed to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and to develop programs to adapt to climate change that may occur, whether

natural or human influenced. It commits us to develop and disseminate new technologies to reduce or prevent emissions, looking at all sectors. It commits us to promote the effective management and conservation of sinks in the agricultural and

forestry sectors. It commits developed nations to provide assistance to developing

nations to help them comply with their own obligations under the Convention. Finally, it commits all nations to report periodically to the United Nations on their

compliance with these obligations, which the Bush Administration did recently

through its Climate Action Report.

Question 6. Has the United States or any of its representatives, officially or unofficially discouraged countries from bringing climate change initiatives or issues to the

World Summit for consideration?

Response. No. The United States delegation has engaged constructively on a substantial amount of text on a variety of climate change issues occurring in the Johannesburg Plan of Action. Most of the climate change-related text in the draft Johannesburg Plan of Action has been agreed upon. In addition the partnerships the U.S.

will discuss in the areas of energy, agriculture and forests will also be quite consequential to the issue of greenhouse gas mitigation, even as they are directed at

near-term poverty reduction and human health imperatives.

Several delegations have put forward textual proposals that have the effect of asking the United States to endorse the Kyoto Protocol, or to take on new climate-related commitments in the WSSD. The United States will not be a Party to the Kyoto

Protocol, and we have indicated to those delegations that we cannot support text

that is contrary to our national position. The United States does not intend to agree

to additional climate change commitments at WSSD. The internationally agreed

forum for negotiating climate change commitments is the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Eighth Conference of the Parties to the Convention

(COP–8) will take place October 23-November 1, 2002, in New Delhi, India.

Question 7. The Canadian government has put forward a Type I partnership entitled ‘‘Health and Environment: Moving from Knowledge and Experience to Action.’’

The purpose of this initiative is to synthesize existing information on environmental

health linkages and build on the capacity of developing countries to apply this

knowledge, in a manner consistent with local conditions, to planning and policymaking at the national level. Will the U.S. support the Canadian initiative and if

so, what resources is the U.S. planning to offer to ensure its success?

Response. The United States is currently considering the Canadian proposal. In

general, the proposal parallels work that is supported by the Health and Environment Ministerial of the Americas, which was agreed to by the United States and

all the governments of the Western Hemisphere. Further, the Canadian proposal

supports the data sharing initiatives underway through the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation.

One key issue that remains to be resolved is whether this should be categorized

as a Type I or Type II initiative. As a Type II initiative, the United States may support the initiative. Type II partnership does not require the consensus of each Nation participating in the WSSD. If the Canadian proposal were to become a Type

II partnership, current U.S. Government funding levels could support this activity.

The United States will continue to work with the Canadian Government with a goal

to coming to agreement in support of the proposal.

Question 8. I have heard that EPA and other agencies are in the process of developing a number of Type II partnership proposals that the U.S. delegation in Johannesburg will announce. Specifically, I understand that EPA is developing initiatives

on drinking water/sanitation, clean air, and children’s environmental health. What

can you tell us about the status of these proposals? Will new financial resources be

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earmarked in future budgets to ensure that these initiatives add value to existing

development assistance and make a meaningful and lasting contribution to the

WSSD process?

Response. We are in the final stages of designing partnerships proposals which

we will announce in Johannesburg and discussed with prospective additional partners. All the partnerships will be based on current appropriated funding and are

within the budget targets for fiscal year 04. The Administration will brief appropriators in Congress on the proposals before the World Summit. EPA and other agencies have participated in preparing the partnerships, especially in water. Specifically

regarding children’s health, EPA is exploring with USAID and the Department of

Health and Human Services to develop a proposal for children’s environmental

health indicators. EPA is also consulting with the World Health Organization on

possible collaboration.

Question 9. Given that EPA is a lead agency on a number of initiatives and proposals, will EPA Administrator Whitman participate personally in the WSSD and

if so, what will her role be?

Response. EPA Administrator Whitman is scheduled to participate in the WSSD.

She and several other high-level delegates from her agency will actively engage with

their counterparts, work to forge lasting partnerships on U.S. development priorities, and identify opportunities for collaboration beyond the WSSD.

Question 10. How is the United States affected by the fact that we don’t have a

true environment minister?

Response. The Bush Administration has accorded Cabinet Rank status to the Administrator of the EPA. The U.S. EPA Administrator is recognized as a peer among

her international ministerial colleagues.

STATEMENT OF MAURICE F. STRONG, CHAIRMAN, EARTH COUNCIL FOUNDATION

Distinguished Chairman, Honorable Senators, ladies and gentlemen. First let me

say what a privilege it is for me to have the opportunity of testifying before these

two important committees of the U.S. Senate as you consider issues which are at

the center of my own life interests and concerns. It is particularly encouraging to

know that you are addressing these issues at a time when the position of the United

States of America in respect of them has never been more important to the human

future.

We face an ominous paradox as the evidence of our destructive impacts on the

earth’s environment and life-support systems has become more compelling while

there has been a serious loss of momentum in the political will to deal with them.

The United States is at the center of this dilemma. Thanks largely to the leadership

of the United States the world community has made impressive progress in its understanding of environment issues and their inextricable relationship with the economic development processes to which they give since the first global conference on

the human environment convened by the United Nations in Stockholm in 1972 put

the environmental issue on the international agenda. The world has looked to the

United States for leadership in its national policies and legislation and in development of the system of international cooperation, conventions and agreements

through which governments have sought to cooperate in managing issues that even

the greatest nations cannot manage alone.

The recent retreat by the United States from its long standing role as the leading

driver of these issues, as particularly evidenced by its withdrawal from the Kyoto

Protocol of the Climate Change Convention, threatens the progress that has been

made in collaborative management of our environmental problems in the past 30

years and the prospects for the further progress that is so essential to our common

future. This has cast a cloud over prospects for the World Summit on Sustainable

Development which will convene next month in Johannesburg, South Africa and the

unique opportunity it provides to give new impetus and momentum to the processes

of international cooperation which the effective management of these issues requires. Thus your hearings are especially timely and important.

If I now speak candidly of some of the concerns I share with many others as to

the position of the United States on the issues you are now addressing I do so not

as a critic but as a long standing and committed friend of the United States with

a deep affinity and admiration for the values and qualities that have made this such

a great nation. Sharing these concerns as to the unilateral withdrawal by the

United States of its support for international agreements and negotiating processes

in which it has been such an active and influential participant, is not in any way

to question its right to do so. Indeed it is understandable that with a new Administration and Congress the United States would take a new look at and bring new

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perspectives to bear on these issues, also that in its preoccupation with the war on

terrorism and other urgent issues it is taking your Government some time to develop its position on these matters.

I have great confidence in the sound instincts and values of the American people

which in poll after poll affirm the continuing priority they accord to the environment

issue and that through the processes of American democracy this will ultimately be

reflected in the actions and policies of their Government. At the same time I must

confess my deep concern as to the signals that have emerged thus far of the nature

and the direction of the changes that are now in process.

It is particularly germane that this hearing is focusing on the international agreements and negotiating processes to which the United States is a party. These are

perhaps the best indicators of the current State of political will toward international

environmental cooperation and the prospects of revitalizing and strengthening it.

Let me review briefly the larger context in which I view the importance of your

consideration of these issues.

At the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm

in 1972, the first global intergovernmental environmental conference, we lost our innocence. We recognized that much of what we had been doing in pursuit of our economic goals had, however inadvertently, been producing environmental damage and

social dichotomies, which were undermining our quality of life and prospects for the

future. The eyes of the more developed countries were opened to the very different

perspectives and priorities of the majority of the world’s people living in developing

countries where the daily struggle for relief from poverty and progress toward a better life through development are the overriding priorities. As Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi in her memorable statement to the Conference stated, in developing countries ‘‘poverty is the greatest polluter’’. The Declaration and Plan of Action agreed following intense negotiations at Stockholm recognized in a number of important respects the need to create a positive synthesis between the environment and economic development.

It is, after all, through our economic behavior and practices that we have our impacts on the environment and these impacts affect our social as well as our physical

environment. From this insight has emerged the concept of sustainable development, the process by which we bring the economic, environmental and social dimensions of the development process into appositive synthesis. Sustainable development

should therefore be seen as the means by which our security, prosperity and well

being can become secure and sustainable rather than as an end in itself.

Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair said recently, ‘‘you don’t have to be an expert

to realize that sustainable development is going to become the greatest challenge

we face this century’’. The Stockholm Conference gave rise to a proliferation of initiatives—establishment in virtually all countries of environmental agencies, policies and regulations;

a broad range of international treaties and agreements and an explosion in the

number of environmental non-governmental organizations and citizen movements as

well as a major expansion of the environmental programs of international organizations. The United Nations General Assembly in December 1972, based on the Conference’s recommendation, established the United Nations Environment Program as

the centerpiece of the emerging global network of environmental actors to lead the

process of following up and implementing its results.

Since 1972 we have learned a great deal more about the nature and the causes

of our environmental dilemma and have made notable progress in developing the

technologies, the tools and the capacities to manage these problems successfully. Indeed there have been many individual success stories which demonstrate that it is

possible to bring our economic life into a positive balance with our environmental

and social systems through the transition to a sustainable development pathway.

By the mid–1980’s some of the momentum generated by Stockholm had subsided.

Progress toward achieving the environmental objectives set there was lagging. In response the United Nations General Assembly decided to establish a World Commission on Environment and Development headed by Norway’s former Prime Minister

Gro Harlem Brundtland. The Commission’s report in 1987, Our Common Future,

made a compelling case for sustainable development as ‘‘the only secure and viable

pathway to the future of the human community’’. With the political impetus generated by the Brundtland Commission, the U.N. General Assembly decided to convene on the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference in 1992 a Conference on

Environment and Development and accepted the invitation of Brazil to host it.

Now known as the ‘‘Earth Summit’’ the Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992

brought together more heads of government that had ever before assembled as well

as an unprecedented number and range of civil society actors and media representatives. The Earth Summit agreed on a Declaration of Principles building on the

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Stockholm Declaration, a comprehensive program of action—‘‘Agenda 21’’—to give

effect to these principles and Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity

which provided the framework for continuing negotiations following Rio. It also

mandated a negotiating process that led to the completion since then of the Convention to Combat Desertification.

As you know the United States has ratified the Climate Change Convention and

the Desertification Convention and in spite its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

it is still bound by its adherence to the Climate Change Convention to reduce its

green house gas emissions. Although it has now opted to do this outside of the Kyoto

Protocol the world community continues to look to the United States for the kind

of parallel actions that will correspond to and hopefully exceed, the targets and

timetables provided for by Kyoto.

While the results of the Earth Summit inevitably fell short in some important respects of the ambitious expectations that we had for it, the agreements it produced

nevertheless provided the basic foundations and guidelines for the transition of the

world community to a sustainable development pathway. And the fact that there

were agreed by virtually all world governments, most of them at the level of their

leader, gave them a high degree of political authority. Nevertheless, as I cautioned

in my closing remarks to the Conference, it did not guarantee their implementation.

Unfortunately, this proved all too prophetic.

Agenda 21 provides a comprehensive road-map for the transition to a sustainable

development pathway. Although it does not carry the force of law the fact that it

was agreed by all the governments of the United Nations, most of them at the level

of their heads of State or Government, gives it a high degree of political authority.

While its implementation has thus far been and on the whole disappointing, it has

nevertheless served as a basis for the adoption of their national Agenda 21 by a

number of governments of which China was one of the first. It has also inspired

the establishment of local Agendas 21 by more than 3000 cities and towns throughout the world and such important industries as the tourism and travel and the road

transport industries. It is particularly important that at Johannesburg governments

re-affirm their commitment to Agenda 21 and to strengthening and building on it

in those areas in which it is still inadequate or incomplete.

The risks to the future of the earth’s environment and life-support systems identified in Stockholm and elaborated in Rio de Janeiro remain, while the forces driving

them persist—increased population concentrated in those countries least able to

support it, and even greater increases in the scale and intensity of the economic activities which impact on the environment. These have reached a point in which we

are literally the agents of our own future; what we do or fail to do, will in the first

decades of this new millennium in all probability, determine the future course of

human life on earth. It is an awesome responsibility the implications of which we

have not yet recognized. Certainly they have not yet been reflected in our policies

and priorities.

As an optimist I continue to believe that the necessary change of course is possible. But as a realist I am deeply concerned that despite all the knowledge we have

gained and progress we have made we have still not demonstrated the degree of political will or sense of priority that such a transition requires.

The transition to a sustainable development pathway is, I submit, as essential to

the future of the human community today as it was before the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, on New York and Washington. The preoccupation

with the ominous consequences of these horrendous acts is understandable and, indeed, necessary. But we must not allow this to sidetrack or undermine our efforts

to achieve economic, environmental and social sustainability and security.

The tragic events of September 11th dramatically brought home to us that the

phenomena we now refer to as globalization, which has opened up so many new and

exciting opportunities, has also united us in facing a new generation of risks, imbalances and vulnerabilities. Risks to our personal security, the security of our homes,

offices and communities and, more fundamentally, risks to the earth’s’ life-support

systems on which the survival and well being of the entire human family depends.

These risks and vulnerabilities are inextricably linked through the complex, systemic processes of globalization by which human activities are shaping our common

future. They cannot be understood or dealt with in isolation. Nor can they be managed alone by any nation, however powerful. Indeed, they require a degree of cooperation beyond anything we seem yet prepared to accept.

Stockholm, in its historic Declaration stated that ‘‘to defend and improve the

human environment for present and future generations has become an imperative

goal for mankind—a goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony with, the

established and fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social

development’’. It thus pointed up the systemic linkages between the environment

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and the issues of peace and security, economic and social development through

which human activities are shaping our common future.

In a 1973 Foreign Affairs article I stressed that the principal insight arising from

the Stockholm Conference was the need for a ecological, systemic approach to the

management of the issues through which we are impacting on our own future. This

is essential to our understanding and management of the broader complex of issues

and processes that we now generally refer to as globalization.

The September 11th, 2001 tragedy demonstrated dramatically the vulnerabilities

of even the most advanced and powerful of societies to destructive attacks, however

misguided, by relatively small groups of alienated people. This underscores the need

for international cooperation, not only to conduct the war against terrorism, but also

to deal with the whole complex of issues integral to the globalization process. These

include eradication of poverty, environmental protection, notably the risk of climate

change, meeting the development and security needs of developing countries, and

redressing the gross and growing imbalances that divide rich and poor and nourish

the enmities and frustrations that are the seedbeds of conflict.

Peace and security are an indispensable pre condition to sustainability and overcoming poverty. War and violent conflict produce devastating damage to the environment. And the human costs of such wars and conflicts go far beyond the immediate deaths and suffering that result from them in destroying and undermining the

resources on which even larger numbers of people depend for their livelihoods. This

essential link between peace and sustainable development is the reason that United

Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook to revitalize the University for

Peace headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica, and that it has established a strategic

partnership with the Earth Council to re-enforce its capacities in the field of environmental security.

International cooperation is as indispensable to the effective management of the

other elements of the globalization process as it is to the prevention of terrorism.

But cooperation based on coercion will not long be effective. Sustainable cooperation

requires a true sharing in the decisionmaking and in responsibilities on the part of

the majority of nations which can only be achieved if the major nations of the world

take the lead. We regret the retreat from multi-lateral cooperation on these issues

on the part of the United States which has performed such immensely valuable

service to the world community in leading it so effectively through most of the period since World War II. No individual Nation in the position to replace the United

States in this role and while we continue to hope for and expect the return to leadership on the part of the United States, we cannot afford at this critical time to

allow a leadership vacuum to prevail which would put at risk the very future of life

on earth as we know it. There are some encouraging first signs of the emergence

of a new configuration of leadership in the ratification by the European Union, and

Japan of the Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Change Convention despite its repudiation by the United States. I look to my own country, Canada, to do so too.

The need for new and revitalized leadership is reinforced by the sobering realization that much of what has been agreed in the past has not been implemented and

there is a disturbing tendency even to back-track on past agreements. It is important to be reminded that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in affirming the

right of States to develop their own resources in accordance with their own environmental policies, have the ‘‘responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of

areas beyond their limits of national jurisdiction’’. Implementation of this principle

would in itself require those States which are contributing disproportionately to the

deterioration of the global environment, as for example in continuing to produce

more than their share of green house gas emissions, to take the measures required

to reduce their impacts. This responsibility is at the very heart of the challenge to

the new generation of leadership which must be faced at Johannesburg.

The power and the influence of the United States in today’s world is unrivaled

and indeed without precedent in history. This gives the United States a freedom of

action not enjoyed by other nations. Other nations are not in a position to hold the

United States accountable for the performance of its obligations under international

law. Nevertheless when it does act unilaterally it inevitably pays a cost in terms

of the resentment and reluctance of others to cooperate on other issues of importance to the United States. It is important to note that already there is clear evidence that even traditional friends of the United States have not followed it in opting out such important international agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the Land

Mines Convention and the International Criminal Court. This is a departure from

their longstanding practice of following the U.S. lead even in instances where they

are not entirely comfortable with it.

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The unprecedented power of the United States carries with it unprecedented responsibility, particularly at a time when the human future depends on the actions

we take or fail to take in this generation. When the United States acts selectively

to carry out its international obligations or to force other nations to carry out theirs

it serves to undermine the credibility and effectiveness of international law which

is the indispensable foundation for world peace, security and order. As the principal

architect of the system of international treaties, conventions and agreements which

constitute the current imperfect but indispensable international legal regime and

the only Nation capable of insisting on enforcement, what the United States does

or fails to do is an immense and often decisive influence on the behavior of other

nations. The world community must be grateful to the United States for having for

most part exercised its responsibility admirably. But in those instances in which it

has not done so or has insisted only selectively on enforcement by others of their

international obligations, this is an understandable cause of concern, even dismay,

on the part of other nations for its weakening effect on the entire process of international law and prospects of its equitable enforcement.

In drawing the lessons of our experience in the last 30 years, it is clear that we

have made a great deal of progress, notably in improving but by no means resolving,

the more immediate and visible environmental conditions in the more industrialized

countries. Impressive improvements have been effected in the environmental performance of industry and in development of technologies which promise solutions to

most problems as, for example, the prospect of emission-free motor vehicles and the

transition to a hydrogen-based energy economy. At the same time, developing countries have become more aware of and concerned with the environmental problems

which inhibit their own development. These problems exact immense human and

economic costs, produce deteriorating conditions in their cities, and destructive exploitation of the natural resources on which future development depends. They undermine the immense challenge of meeting their growing needs for water and ensuring its quality, prevention and care of destructive and debilitating diseases, and

most of all their primary need to lift their people out of the quagmire of poverty.

Yet developing countries which are custodians of most of the world’s precious biodiversity resources are expected to care for them with only sporadic and limited support from industrialized countries. As their economies grow they will contribute increasingly to the more remote and less visible global problems for which the industrialized countries are largely responsible, notably the risk of climate change which

affects the interests and the future of all nations.

Despite progress on many fronts, the environmental health of the earth which

was first diagnosed at Stockholm has deteriorated overall since then while the

forces driving it persist-increased population, primarily concentrated in developing

countries, and even greater growth of the world economy. The benefits have been

largely concentrated in industrialized countries, even as newly developing countries,

notably China, are now accounting for an increasingly large share of the global

economy.

As their economies grow, developing countries are finding that the environmental

impacts of their development are undermining the purposes of development and exacting a heavy cost in terms of impacts on their natural resources, human health

and productivity. At the Stockholm Conference developing countries made clear

their willingness to participate in international environmental cooperation insisted

that they required ‘‘new and additional resources’’ to enable them to do so. This has

been a constant refrain in all international fora in which these issues are discussed

and negotiated since then.

One of the most disappointing trends since the Earth Summit in 1992 has been

the lack of response by OECD countries to the needs of developing countries for the

additional financial resources which all governments at Rio agreed were required

to enable them to make their transition to a sustainable development pathway and

to implement international agreements. What has been particularly discouraging is

that progress toward meeting with these needs has been further set back since Rio

as a number of donors have reduced their Official Development Assistance. Thus the

commitment by the United States and others at a recent United Nations Conference

in Monterrey to increase their assistance is a welcome signal. This should not be

seen as charity but as a necessary investment in our own environmental security.

An especially urgent priority is to complete agreement on replenishment of the

Global Environment Facility, the only new source of funding the environmental

needs of developing countries to result from the Earth Summit.

With the reductions in Official Development Assistance we must be more innovative in motivating private capital—now the principal source of financial flows to developing countries-to contribute more to meeting their environmental and sustainable development needs.

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We have for the first time in history the capacity to meet these monumental challenges. Indeed, on a global basis we are the wealthiest civilization ever and have

the capacity to produce wealth at an unprecedented rate. It is clearly a question of

how we set our priorities for the use of our wealth. Business leaders at Rio made

the point that our current approach to setting those priorities is not sustainablethat we must ‘‘change course’’. And I am convinced that if we do not make this

change of course in the first years of this new millennium the prospects for the

world’s future will be ominous indeed.

Much of what we must do to meet these formidable challenges has already been

articulated and agreed at Stockholm, Rio and various other international for a and

affirmed in a variety of international agreements. But implementation depends on

motivation and this is at the heart of our current dilemma. Most of the changes we

must make are in our economic life. The system of taxes, subsidies, regulations and

policies through which governments motivate the behavior of individuals and corporation continues to incent unsustainable behavior.

At the deepest level, all people and societies are motivated by their moral, ethical

and spiritual values. To build on these a set of basic moral and ethical principles

which are broadly acceptable is certainly not easy. But a process that has taken several years and involved millions of people around the world has succeeded in producing a ‘‘peoples’’ Earth Charter as a major contribution to establishing the moral

and ethical foundations for sustainable development.

I am pleased to say the United States has been deeply involved in the Earth

Charter movement. The distinguished, American Professor Steven Rockefeller,

chaired the committee which drafted the Charter in cooperation with people of different faiths and beliefs throughout the world. Some 500 organizations in the

United States have joined with thousands around the world which have contributed

to and/or endorsed the Earth Charter. These include the Humane Society of the

United States, the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the

Orion Society, the Sierra Club, the World Resource Institute, the Yale University

School of Forestry and Environmental Studies and the United States Conference of

Mayors as well as dozens of individual cities and towns.

The environmental movement has its roots in the concerns and initiatives of people well before it moved on to the agendas of governments. Today the primary impetus to environmental action and responsibility comes from civil society, with the

support of scientists and the increasingly constructive engagement of industry. The

alarm bells being sounded by some sectors of industry as to the high costs to economy of environmental measures, notably the reductions in greenhouse gas emission

called for under the Kyoto Protocol, are countered by the increasing in evidence that

such measures open up more new opportunities for industry than they negate.

Surely we must accept that the benefits of environmental security and sustainability are well worth and indeed less expensive that the ultimate costs of inaction.

The United States has long accepted the high costs of maintaining its military

strength and indeed this has produced an important economic spin-offs as for example in driving United States leadership in development and application of new technologies. I am convinced that in applying the same approach, the costs of environmental security would produce even more opportunities and benefits to the economy.

What, then, can be expected from the Johannesburg Summit? First and foremost

there must be no retreat from the agreements reached at Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro

and other international fora and the many legal instruments to which they gave

rise. Indeed it is important that there be a strong re-affirmation by governments

in Johannesburg of their commitments to these past agreements and to implementing and building on them in the post-Johannesburg period. In this respect, the

position of the United States will be pivotal.

An a priori requirement for this is the successful completion of agreements on the

issues that were left on resolved in the final preparatory meeting in Bali, Indonesia.

It is now too late in the process to seek consensus on new initiatives but not too

late to place new initiatives on the table in Johannesburg. These could include:

• A commitment to strong support for United Nations Secretary General Kofi

Annan in strengthening the capacities and coordination of the organizations, programs and agencies of the United Nations which deal with the environment, poverty

alleviation, and sustainable development.

• A call for the establishment of a Consultative Group on Clean Energy (CGCE),

or similar entity, drawing on the successful experience of the Consultative Group

on International Agriculture Research (CGIAR). Its purpose would be to provide an

international consultative mechanism, not a new organization, to facilitate privatepartnerships in identifying priorities for research and development of sustainable

energy technologies, particularly those most relevant to the needs and interests of

developing countries. It would also help mobilize and deploy the financial and techVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00301 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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nological assistance required to ensure their availability to developing countries

under conditions conducive to their adoption and use.

• A call for governments to undertake a review of the system of fiscal, tax and

other incentives, regulations and policies through which they motivate the behavior

of individuals and corporations to provide positive incentives for environmentally

and socially sound and sustainable development.

• Recognition of the Earth Charter as an important expression of the commitment by civil society of the world and ethical basis for sustainable development.

The convening of this hearing by your two extremely important and influential

committees demonstrates your deep sense of the interest in and responsibility of the

United States for its position on these issues. Recognizing that their fundamental

nature does not lend itself to quick or easy solutions, there are none-the-less some

very practical measures which you could undertake to make an important contribution to resolving them. You are, I understand, about to receive a report by the General Accounting Office of the current status of existing international agreements and

their implementation. These could provide the basis for mandating a continuing

process of monitoring, adherence to and performance under such agreements by the

United States and others. The results could be incorporated in periodic reports very

much like the reports that the State Department issues in respect of human rights.

Such a monitoring and reporting system would provide an important stimulus to implementation of both the letter and the spirit of these agreements.

Developing countries face very special constraints both in negotiating and implementing international agreements because of their lack of sufficient financial resources to support the professional and technical expertise that this requires. Yet

their active participation in and adherence to these agreements is essential to their

effectiveness. A very modest investment by the United States in supporting the

strengthening by developing countries of their own capacities to negotiate and service, these agreements would represent an important contribution to alleviating one

of the main obstacles to negotiating and implementing them effectively. It would

also require only a very modest investment to increase support for the international

secretariats which are responsible for the servicing of such agreements. Of course,

others would follow the U.S. lead if it were to take such initiatives. This could be

a small but important step toward the revitalization of U.S. leadership.

If the United States were to take a lead in presenting or supporting such initiatives it would have an immense impact on prospects for success at Johannesburg.

This threats face in common from the mounting dangers to the environment, resource life-support systems on which all life on Earth depends are as great or greater than the risks we face of conflicts with each other. The revitalization of the system of international cooperation of which the United States was the primary architect is the only feasible basis on which we can manage the risks and realize the

immense potential for progress and fulfillment for the entire human family which

is within our reach.

All people and nations have in the past been willing to accord high priority to the

measures required for their own security. We must give the same kind of priority

to civilizational security and sustainability. This will take a major shift in the current political mind-set. If this seems unrealistic in today’s political context we

should recall that history demonstrates that what seems unrealistic today becomes

inevitable tomorrow. Necessity will compel this shift eventually the question is can

we really afford the costs and the risks of waiting. Most of all we need the renewed

leadership of this great nation. I commend you for this encouraging manifestation

that this renewal is well under way.

SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY PROVIDED BY MAURICE STRONG, EARTH COUNCIL

INSTITUTE

THE INTEGRATION OF ANIMAL PROTECTION AND RIGHTS INTO OUR ENVIRONMENTAL

CONCERNS

It is important that the United States provide leadership and support to binding

international agreements that protect animals and their environment. Fundamental

principles such as transparency, binding dispute resolution, enforcement measures,

and the precautionary approach should always be supported and advanced by the

United States when such principles are absent from multi-lateral environmental

agreements.

Moreover, where there is evidence of the pernicious and ever-growing practice of

‘‘vote-buying’’, one country providing foreign aid to developing countries in exchange

for favorable votes, the United States is in the best position to put an end to such

egregious practices. For nothing more quickly undermines a treaty and erodes interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00302 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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national cooperation than when one country exacts another’s allegiance in return for

financial aid.

While progress in protecting animals has been made—and the United States

should be congratulated for its contribution to this—enormous challenges still lie

ahead. There are several key agreements that the United States has yet to ratify

and others where it and others need to work harder in order to prevent the weakening of significant gains already achieved.

International Whaling Commission (IWC)

There has been subtle erosion of The United States’ strong anti-whaling position

over the last several years. It is imperative that the United States become a leader

once again in the fight to protect whales from an inhumane commercial slaughter.

The U.S. Delegation to the IWC should continue to make all efforts to prevent the

lifting of the commercial whaling moratorium and institute tough measures against

those countries that continue to kill whales and undermine the agreement. Further,

I would strongly urge the United States to advocate a global whale sanctuary, as

it is the only way to ensure that whales will be a part of our future.

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)

In 1997, despite opposition from a large coalition of animal and environmental

protection organizations, U.S. Legislation was passed that weakened the definition

of the well-known and trusted dolphin-safe label. The new label, if implemented,

will allow the chasing, harassing and encircling of dolphins with nets as a method

of catching tuna and still be labeled as dolphin-safe. As a result, dolphins will get

caught in these nets and drown. If the label is weakened, consumers will feel betrayed when they learn that the dolphin-safe label no longer means what is stated

on the can. The United States should not, I submit, be promoting a weakened dolphin-safe label to appease the fishing industry of another country. Rather the U.S.

Delegation to the IATTC should be protecting dolphins and U.S. consumer concerns

by arguing for the non-encirclement of dolphins by all countries participating in the

Convention and fishing in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

(CITES)

The United States has continued to take a leadership role in implementation of

the CITES treaty, both domestically and abroad. The next Conference of the Parties,

scheduled for 315 November 2002, will consider several proposals submitted by the

United States, that, if passed, will enhance protection from international commercial trade for species ranging from turtles to seahorses to cacti. The United States

is expected to oppose proposals to allow international commercial trade in the meat

and blubber of minke and Bryde’s whales (proposed by Japan) and hawksbill sea

turtle shells (proposed by Cuba).

However, there is deep concern that United States may waiver from its longstanding position in opposition to the international elephant ivory trade. With

United States support, CITES banned the international ivory trade in 1.989 after

a decade of widespread poaching reduced wild African elephant herds from 1.2 million to about 600,000. The ban succeeded in stopping the precipitous population decline. However, renewed poaching and illegal trade have taken a toll on elephant

populations. In 1997, CITES allowed Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to sell, as

a one-time experiment, almost 50 metric tons of ivory to Japan. Subsequently, some

countries noted an increase in poaching and illegal trade. Between 1 January 2000

and 21 May 2002, a minimum of 11.9 tons of ivory, 2542 tusks, and 14,648 pieces

of ivory were seized worldwide, representing over two thousand dead elephants.

During. the same period of time, a minimum of 965 African elephants and 39 Asian

elephants were poached. Clearly, more control over elephant poaching and illegal

ivory trade is needed instead of a renewal of the legal ivory trade. That is why

Kenya and India have submitted a proposal, to be considered at the upcoming

CITES meeting, to stop all international commercial trade in elephants and their

parts and products. In contrast, five southern African countries (Zimbabwe, South

Africa, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana) have proposed that CITES allow them to

sell 87 metric tons of elephant ivory in the international marketplace—the tusks of

approximately 11 thousand dead elephants. Four of these countries have also asked

to be allowed to sell an additional 13,000 metric tons of ivory in the international

marketplace each year. Finally, two of these countries have also asked to trade in

ivory for non-commercial purposes, such as ivory souvenirs.

It is important that the United States, which has led opposition to the international ivory trade since 1989, oppose the proposals of Zimbabwe, South Africa,

Namibia, Zambia and Botswana to sell ivory in the international marketplace and

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support the proposal of Kenya and India to halt elephant trade. A return to a legalized international ivory trade would spell doom for elephants.

Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife (SPAW)

The SPAW protocol protects ecosystems, habitats, and endangered and threatened

species residing in the Wider Caribbean region. SPAW is an international Agreement which paves the way for the greater coordination and protection of animals

and their habitat. It is of deep concern that the United States has not ratified the

Agreement. SPAW was adopted in 1990 and came into force in 2000, and though

the United States has signed the Protocol, it has not ratified. The United States

must ratify the Protocol and participate in its evolution to ensure that it offers the

highest possible protection for animals and their habitats.

Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS)

The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (also

known as CMS or the Bonn Convention) aims to conserve terrestrial, marine and

avian migratory species throughout their range. It is a small number of intergovernmental treaties concerned with the conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats on

a global scale. Since the Convention’s entry into force in November 1983, its membership has grown steadily to include 80 Parties from Africa, Central and South

America, Asia, Europe and Oceania. Parties to CMS work together to conserve migratory species and their habitats by providing strict protection for the endangered

migratory species listed in Appendix I of the Convention; by concluding multilateral

Agreements for the conservation and management of migratory species listed in Appendix II; and by undertaking co-operative research activities.

There is great potential for cooperative international conservation in the CMS.

However, the problem is that the United States is not a member. There is much

work that needs to be done to protect migratory species and unless the United

States ratifies the CMS this country will be missing out on—a valuable opportunity

to fully utilize this Agreement to protect such a wide range of species.

Trade and the Environment

United States leadership in international trade and economic issues as they relate

to animal welfare and the environment is essential. Unquestionably, these issues

are intertwined with international trade and economic issues. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in the midst of negotiations concerning the overlap between

multilateral environmental agreements and international trade rules. These negotiations are important and must be given the necessary attention and resources to

ensure a successful outcome. Members of the WTO are also engaged in serious negotiations concerning agricultural reform and increased market access for agricultural

products. In the context of these negotiations the European Union proposed that

animal welfare be addressed. I understand that the United States has yet to give

its full support to this proposal. I strongly urge Members of Congress to engage the

Administration on this issue and work toward the shared goal of including animal

welfare in the agricultural negotiations.

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. DEHRNBACH, PROFESSOR OF LAW, WIDENER UNIVERSITY

Committee Chairmen Jeffords and Biden, Subcommittee Chairman Sarbanes, and

members of the Committees: good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. adherence to its sustainable development commitments, particularly those

made at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

I am the editor of a 32-chapter book on U.S. sustainable development efforts in

the 10 years since the Earth Summit, entitled Stumbling Toward Sustainability.

The book is being published this week by the Environmental Law Institute. The

book’s 42 contributors come from universities and law schools, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and State government. They are respected experts

in their fields.

A list of chapters and authors is attached to this statement. The book’s synthesis,

which pulls together the major themes of the book and summarizes each of the

chapters, is also attached.

Ten-Year Assessment: U.S. Made Little Progress

The U.S. has unquestionably begun to take some steps toward sustainable development, largely because of our environmental and conservation laws. Yet, on balance, the United States is now far from being a sustainable society, and in many

respects is farther away than it was at the time of the Earth Summit in 1992. Unlike many other developed countries, the United States has not used a strategic

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process to move the country toward a sustainable future and has not educated the

American people about the opportunities and challenges of sustainable development.

With 5 percent of the world’s population, the United States was at the time of

the Earth Summit responsible for about 24 percent of the world’s energy consumption and almost 30 percent of the world’s raw materials consumption. Since the

Earth Summit, materials use has increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption

has increased 21 percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide emissions have increased by 13 percent. Over and over, increases in materials and energy efficiency,

and in the effectiveness of pollution controls for individual sources, were outweighed

by increases in consumption. Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling in the past decade, for example, the U.S. generation and disposal of municipal

solid waste per capita have been growing since 1996. According to Harvard biologist

Edward O. Wilson, ‘‘four more planet Earths’’ would be needed for ‘‘every person in

the world to reach present U.S. levels of consumption with existing technology.’’ Yet

the U.S. standard of living-equated with high levels of consumption and ‘‘the good

life’’—is widely envied and emulated throughout the world.

The United States has not exercised the kind of international leadership necessary to encourage or support sustainable development around the world. U.S. law

and policy continue to encourage unsustainable development in a variety of ways,

including subsidies and fragmented local decisionmaking that encourages sprawl. As

a whole, the condition of America’s natural resources and ecosystems has not improved, and appears to have deteriorated slightly, over the past decade. Our infrastructure and social support systems continue to cause environmental degradation

and underserve the poor.

National Sustainable Development Strategy is Needed

The Federal Government should adopt and implement a national strategy for sustainable development, with specified goals and priorities, to harness all sectors of

society to achieve our economic, social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy would lead to a stronger, more prosperous America with higher quality of life

because we would be pursuing these goals in ways that support each other in greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermining each other. The strategy

could be modeled on that of the European Union or States such as Oregon and New

Jersey, and specifically address climate change, biodiversity, international trade,

and other major issues.

The President could get the process started with an appropriate executive order

to Federal agencies under the Government Performance and Results Act and the

National Environmental Policy Act. An executive-level entity would be needed to coordinate and assist in the implementation of the strategy. A counterpart entity in

Congress would also be helpful. A set of indicators to measure progress in achieving

goals would make the strategy more effective and meaningful.

In addition, the U.S. needs to recognize that its substantial consumption levels,

coupled with domestic population growth, have serious environmental, social, and

economic impacts. Americans also need to understand that human well-being can

be maintained and enhanced by more efficient and effective use of materials and

energy. A shift in taxes from labor and income, on one hand, to materials and energy consumption, on the other, would encourage both greater efficiency and reduced negative environmental impacts. A variety of other legal and policy tools that

have successfully been used at the State level to reduce environmental effects of

consumption and for other purposes are also available, including renewable energy

portfolio standards and smart growth legislation.

The U.S. needs to take a stronger and more constructive leadership role internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad range of issues related to sustainable development. Congress should repeal or modify laws, policies, and subsidies

that encourage unsustainable development. Protection of natural resources and the

environment must focus more holistically on the resources to be protected, and on

understanding those resources. Transportation, public health, and other social infrastructure and institutions should be designed and operated to further economic, environmental, and social goals at the same time.

In virtually every area of American life, a few people and organizations are exercising leadership for sustainability. The United States would take a large and decisive step toward sustainability if individuals, businesses, educational institutions,

local and State governments, Federal agencies and others would simply adopt and

build on the leading sustainability practices of their counterparts. A properly conceived and implemented strategy would lead to that result.

These and other recommendations are set out in detail in the book. They provide

an issue-by-issue roadmap for sustainability in the United States.

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Toward a Brighter Future for Our Children and Grandchildren

We now face growing environmental degradation around the world and a growing

gap between rich and poor. These are related problems, and they hinder or undermine everything else we care about—security, economic development, social wellbeing, and even effective governance. Put differently, poverty and environmental

degradation are deeply destabilizing because they stifle or reduce opportunities and

quality of life for many, many people.

In the next 50 years, global population is projected to increase by three billion

people, and the global economy is likely to grow by four or five times. As difficult

as things now are, environmental degradation and the gap between rich and poor

are likely to get much worse if continue business as usual. Should that be our legacy

for our children and grandchildren?

We know what we need to do to move toward sustainability, and we also know

why. As Americans, we are called to face these challenges, and to seize this opportunity.

ATTACHMENT 1

(Environmental Law Institute 2002)

STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY

(John C. Dernbach, Editor)

INTRODUCTION

Synthesis

I. Who Cares?

1. Sustainable Development: Now More Than Ever, John C. Dernbach, Professor of

Law, Widener University

II. Consumption and Population

2. Production and Consumption of Materials

Amit Kapur, Doctor of Forestry and Environmental Studies Candidate, Center for

Industrial Ecology, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University

Thomas E. Graedel, Clifton R. Musser Professor of Industrial Ecology and Director,

Center for Industrial Ecology, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies,

Yale University

3. Production and Consumption of Energy

Lynn Price, Deputy Group Leader, International Energy Studies Group, Environmental Energy Technologies Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Mark D. Levine, Division Director, Environmental Energy Technologies Division,

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

4. Population

Anne H. Ehrlich, Policy Coordinator, Center for Conservation Biology, Stanford University

James Salzman, Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law

III. International Trade, Finance, and Development Assistance

5. International Trade

Sanford E. Gaines, Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center

6. Official Development Assistance

Royal C. Gardner, Professor of Law and Director of Graduate and International

Studies, Stetson University College of Law

7. Development Assistance and Poverty

James Gustave Speth, Dean and Professor of Environmental Policy and Sustainable

Development, School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University

8. Private Finance

Frances Seymour, Director, Institutions and Governance Program, World Resources

Institute

Lisa Dreier, Graduate Student, University of California, Berkeley

Lily Donge, Social Research Analyst, Calvert Asset Management Company

IV. Conservation and Management of Natural Resources

9. Fresh Water

Robert W. Adler, Professor of Law, Wallace Stegner Center for Law, Resources and

the Environment, University of Utah College of Law

10. Oceans and Estuaries

Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law

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11. Air Pollution

David M. Driesen, Professor of Law, Center for Global Law and Practice, Syracuse

University College of Law

12. Climate Change

Donald A. Brown, Director, Pennsylvania Consortium for Interdisciplinary Environmental Policy

13. Biodiversity and Endangered Species

A. Dan Tarlock, Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law

14. Forestry

Robert L. Fischman, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington

15. Agriculture

John H. Davidson, Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law

16. Land Use

Patricia E. Salkin, Professor of Government Law, Associate Dean, and Director,

Government Law Center, Albany Law School

V. Waste and Toxic Chemicals

17. Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides

Lynn R. Goldman, Professor of Environmental Health Sciences, Bloomberg School

of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University

18. Lead

K.W. James Rochow, Project Director, Alliance to End Childhood Lead Poisoning

19. Hazardous Waste and Superfund

Joel A. Mintz, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Law Center

20. Brownfields Redevelopment

Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law and Director, Robert P. Merhige Jr., Center of Environmental Law, University of Richmond Law School

21. Municipal Solid Waste

Marian R. Chertow, Director, Industrial Environmental Management Program,

School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University

22. Radioactive Waste

James D. Werner, Director, Reprocessing Policy Project, and Senior Policy Advisor,

Missouri Department of Natural Resources

VI. Nongovernmental Actors

23. Public access to information, participation, and justice

Frances Irwin, Fellow, World Resources Institute

Carl Bruch, Staff Attorney, Environmental Law Institute

24. Business and Industry

William L. Thomas, Senior Attorney, Pillsbury Winthrop, LLP

25. Sustainability as a Religious and Ethical Concern

Dieter T. Hessel, Director, Program on Ecology, Justice, and Faith

VII. Education

26. Kindergarten Through Twelfth Grade

Carmela M. Federico, Associate Director, Sustainability Education Center

Jaimie P. Cloud, President, Sustainability Education Center

Jack Byrne, Project Director, Center for a Sustainable Future

Keith Wheeler, Director, Center for a Sustainable Future

27. Higher Education

Wynn Calder, Associate Director, University Leaders for a Sustainable Future and

the Center for Respect of Life and Environment

Richard M. Clugston, Executive Director, University Leaders for a Sustainable Future, Center for Respect of Life and Environment, and Earth Charter USA

Campaign

VIII. Institutions and Infrastructure

28. Transportation

F. Kaid Benfield, Senior Attorney and Director of Smart Growth and Transportation

Policy, Natural Resources Defense Council

Michael Replogle, Transportation Director, Environmental Defense

29. Medical and Public Health Services

Edward P. Richards III, Professor of Law, Louisiana State University School of Law

IX. Governance

30. Local Governance

Jonathan D. Weiss, Professorial Lecturer in Law and Executive Director, Center on

Sustainability and Regional Growth, George Washington University Law

School

31. State Governance

John A. Pendergrass, Staff Attorney, Environmental Law Institute

32. National Governance

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John C. Dernbach, Professor of Law, Widener University

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER C. HORNER, SENIOR FELLOW, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE

INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this joint panel on

a topic of great importance. The scope of today’s hearing is broad, so I focus my testimony upon the propriety of the U.S. agreeing to amend the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC, or Rio Treaty), by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.

For whatever specific reasons (economic growth, failure to foresee the energy requirements of the ‘‘new economy’’, or other), the U.S., like many nations, failed to

meet its voluntary Rio targets.

Now some advocates assert, ‘‘Because the U.S. has not met its Rio goal, we must

commit to even greater mandatory reductions (Kyoto)’’. Attempting instead to comply with the initial treaty seems the more appropriate response, for several reasons.

Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did not request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation implementing Rio, which was not an inherently

self-executing treaty. Authority and precedent make clear that responsibility for proposing such programs lies with the White House. If our ‘‘non-binding’’ Rio obligations in fact ‘‘bound’’ the U.S. to achieve specific reductions—contrary to contemporary Senate and Executive assertions of U.S. intent—then the Executive interpretation of Rio Article 4 throughout the 1990’s was actually incorrect, and is responsible. The pending question is apparently: does the U.S. respond by attempting to

meet such Rio promises, or by making further, even deeper, binding promises?

Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.’ Rio promises, in favor of Kyoto’s binding

commitments even greater than those we’ve failed to attain, seems highly illogical.

Compounding this of course is that, precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, the Senate

unanimously spoke to what it recognized was an unacceptable drift away from the

U.S. Rio stance adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing

what was developing, asserted its ‘‘Advice’’ pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the

U.S. Constitution, passing S. Res. 98.

Subsequent to and despite this Advice, U.S. negotiators clearly disregarded both

major Byrd-Hagel recommendations: Kyoto did not require developing countries to

share our commitments, and even the Clinton White House economic advisors have

recanted their refutations of the Kyoto cost estimates.

Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does not still violate both

key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is likely that very few Senators have amended

their position against a treaty causing ‘‘serious economic harm.’’ However, Clinton

Administration officials did admit that they began working on the plan for binding

commitments within 1 year after Rio went into effect.

Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a ‘‘treaty hopping’’ campaign:

even the models on which it is based predict an undetectable climatic impact—at

a cost to the U.S. of up to $400 billion annually—but instead may be 1/30th of what

its proponents seek. Rio and Kyoto offer differing commitments but purport ‘‘the

same ultimate objective.’’ The U.N. IPCC has said this means reducing GHG emissions by as much as 60–80 percent, which wildly exceeds Kyoto’s specified ambitions.

As such the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of ratifying any further

agreements, express acknowledgement not only of the actual ‘‘ultimate goal’’, but

that it is committed to its practical requirements, in this case up to ‘‘30 Kyotos’’.

Such ‘‘treaty hopping’’ agendas illustrate the importance of Senate treaty ‘‘reservations’’, or the Senate’s second bite at the ‘‘Advice’’ apple. This comes of course

during the ‘‘Consent’’ function, which function the U.S. negotiators unfortunately

eviscerated. After agreeing to terms incompatible with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted Kyoto’s prohibition on reservations, or the Senate’s ability to

specify the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S. commitment. This despite the Senate also having forewarned the administration about this in advance

of Kyoto.

In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions of having ‘‘rejected’’

Kyoto with the requisite submission to the U.N. to that effect, as was done regarding the International Criminal Court. In the absence of that act, the White House

must at minimum assist resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto by requesting the Senate disapprove of the treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate should

recognize that there is no reverse equivalent of the ‘‘presentment’’ clause, regarding

treaties. Only protocol, not any constitutional prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a signed treaty. Certainly given the imperative rhetoric surrounding Kyoto,

305

if President Bush insists on continuing the U.S.’ ambiguous role the Senate should

take matters into its own hands, and decide the fate of this agreement.

That resolution should by definition be rejection of Kyoto. Otherwise, by accepting

this double indignity of ignoring advice and prohibiting reservations, this body

would condone Executive circumvention of the Senate’s constitutional treaty role.

As part of my testimony for the record, I include an article I have prepared for

the Federalist Society, though still in draft form, addressing relevant issues surrounding the propriety of ratifying Kyoto, and recommending courses for withdrawal

or otherwise pursuing clarification of the U.S.’ ambiguous treaty status. Thank you

again for the opportunity to appear.

In Rio in 1992 the U.S. made, and the Senate unanimously ratified, various commitments regarding reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, both thematic and

with a specific emission target (1990 levels).

See, e.g., http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunc3.pdf. The EU, which under

Kyoto has negotiated a ‘‘bubble’’ such that it could pool its increases and ‘‘reductions’’, announced in May that it met its Rio target. It said it had reduced greenhouse gases by 3.5 percent below 1990 levels in 2000. This is commonly attributed

to the ending of coal subsidies in Great Britain in their push to replace coal with

gas, shutting down East German industry and that Europe did not match the U.S.’

decade-long economic expansion. Russia, e.g., met its target by regressing economically.

As the party charged with ‘‘making’’ treaties the Executive is responsible for meeting, or at minimum proposing legislation to affect, treaty commitments. President

Clinton proposed a Btu tax, though not expressly in pursuit of Rio. It failed once

and did not emerge again. He instituted his Climate Action Plan, which with minor

recent modifications continues to this day with more than 50 voluntary programs,

though a quick search of Thomas revealed no implementing legislation. Congress

did appropriate money in response to proposals by the Executive. See, e.g., ‘‘Treaties

and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, S. Rpt. 106–71,

p.4.

‘‘Implementation The executive branch has the primary responsibility for carrying

out treaties and ascertaining that other parties fulfill their obligations after treaties

and other international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire

Congress share in the following phases.’’ ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements’’, p. 12. ‘‘A question that may be raised under U.S. law is whether or not Congress has a duty to implement a treaty which is in force internationally, but which

requires additional legislation or implementation or an appropriation of funds to

give effect to obligations assumed internationally by the United States. When implementation of a treaty requires domestic legislation or an appropriation of funds,

only the Congress can provide them.’’ Id. at pp. 166–67.

The FRC Report continues, ‘‘The extent of congressional obligation to implement

a treaty under U.S. law has not been resolved in principle. FN 61 According to an

often-cited authority, Congress has generally responded to a sense of duty to carry

out what the treaty-makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President (especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to make the

U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .’’’ Id. at 167, quoting Henkin,

Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution. 2d ed. 1996, pp. 205–206.

The referenced FN 61 says in pertinent part, ‘‘[F]ailure to implement an internationally perfected treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by

the United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12, 1976, by

Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in U.S. Department

of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 1976. 1977, p. 221.’’ This begs

the question: ‘‘to precisely what extent was the ‘‘non-binding’’ Rio binding?

Addressing the question, above (FN 5), prior to ratification, ‘‘[t]he [Senate Foreign

Relations] Committee made clear, in other words, its view that ‘‘[t]he final framework convention contains no legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas

emissions . . .’’ While these statements may not be as legally binding as a formal

condition to the Senate’s ratification of the 1992 Convention [ed: reservations were

prohibited by Rio’s terms], it is doubtful that any administration could ignore them.’’

‘‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol’’, p. 4.

CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521

(Oct. 7, 1992)(statement of Sen. McConnell).

To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 (105th Cong., 1st Sess., adopted

at 143 CONG. REC.S. 8138 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)), the Senate ‘‘stated the view

that any agreement which would require Senate advice and consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its economic impact and of any legislation and

regulations necessary to implement the agreement.’’ See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.

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‘‘In mid–1997, as these negotiations were underway, the Senate passed S. Res. 98

[ed.: ‘‘Byrd-Hagel,’’ S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105–54 July 21, 1997)], which stated

that the Senate would not approve any agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not include commitments by developing countries as well as

developed/industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S. economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to date not been willing to

consider making binding commitments regarding their greenhouse gas emissions.’’

‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements’’, p. 276.

The operative language is as follows: ‘‘Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate

that—

(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of

1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would—

(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for

the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or

(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States’’.

‘‘Economists from the Clinton White House now concede that complying with

Kyoto’s mandatory reductions in greenhouse gases would be difficult—and more expensive to American consumers than they thought when they were in charge.’’ USA

Today, 12 June 2001.

In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance asserted that ‘‘the

administration has been working on this policy for more than a year’’, quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996.

See, Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee on Environment

and Public Works, at http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/

envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051–450&CID=1051–031302C.

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. ‘‘Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy

markets and Economic Activity.’’ Washington, DC. October 1998.

‘‘Yet the climate simulations lead to the conclusion that the Kyoto reductions will

have little effect in the twenty-first century (15), and ‘30 Kyotos’ may be needed to

reduce warming to an acceptable level.’’ James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy,

Andrew Lacis, and Valdar Oinas, ‘‘Global warming in the twenty-first century: An

alternative scenario,’’ Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences, August 29,

2000.

Hansen was citing Malakoff, D. (1997) Science 278, 2048.

‘‘[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that

would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’’ See,

e.g., Rio Article 2.

See ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements,’’ at 274.

The President manifested that this is how the United States makes ‘‘its intention

clear to not become a party to the treaty,’’ as required by ‘‘customary’’ law and the

Vienna Convention Article 18. ‘‘[S]ignature by the U.S. does impose an obligation

on the U.S. under international law to refrain from actions that would undermine

the Protocol’s object and purpose. That obligation continues to apply until such time

as the U.S. ratifies the Protocol or makes clear its intent not to do so.’’ ‘‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol’’, CRS Report for

Congress (March 29, 2001).

Though it has not yet done so, precedent indicates the Senate can also effect this

outcome by passing a Sense of the Senate expressing disapproval of a signed, not

ratified treaty. See, ‘‘Withdrawal,’’ in attached article.

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1 This paper attempts to clarify common misunderstandings about the treaty process, particularly as involve the United States and ambiguities arising from inconsistent treatment of various treaty commitments. Certain assertions made herein, for example regarding the history of

Kyoto and specifically certain negotiating developments, are not formally documented but based

upon the author’s observations attending these negotiations, both as an attorney representing

a nongovernmental organization, and writing on the proceedings for various publications. 2 See various definitions, FN 53, infra. Treaty topics even range to taxation of foreign motor

vehicles and unification of road signals. For the compendium of ‘‘[e]very treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations’’, see http://

untreaty.un.org/. For a selection of treaties signed, though not necessarily ratified by the United

States, see http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/ tradeagr.htm. 3 The latter actually involves sanction by a supranational body of private entities and individuals acting on behalf of a state. For such matters agreements have created ad hoc bodies, for

example the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (see http://www.un.org/

icty/index.html), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (see http://www.ictr.org/

), both under auspices of the U.N. Security Council. 4 For a compendium of treaties addressing ‘‘Penal Matters,’’ see http://untreaty.un.org/

ENGLISH/bible/ englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/chapterXVIII.asp. 5 U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 10: ‘‘No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or

Confederation . . . No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . .’’ 6 For discussion of a recent example, see ‘‘New England Governors Pledge to Implement

Kyoto, Violate Constitution’’, Jon Reisman, Downeast, Coastal Press, July 16, 2002. Reisman is

an associate professor of economics and public policy at the University of Maine at Machias. 7 Kyoto also imputes emissions to covered states from activities in international airspace and

waters, even national security and international peacekeeping missions despite an initial U.S.

effort to exclude the latter. 8 ‘‘This is about international relations, this is about economy about trying to create a level

playing field for big businesses throughout the world. You have to understand what is at stake

Continued

[Prepared for the Federalist Society July 2002]

MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TREATY PROCESS

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING ADVICE AND CONSENT, WITHDRAWAL, AND THE

GROWING ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AGREE- MENTS WITH PARTICULAR EXAMINATION OF THE 1997 KYOTO PROTOCOL

(By Christopher C. Horner, Esq., Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute;

Tyler Dunman, Research Assistant]

INTRODUCTION TO THE TREATY PROCESS1

Treaties are agreements between nations, or States. They range from bilateral

agreements to multilateral pacts including each of the 189 member states of the

United Nations. Throughout history treaties have addressed all manner of international discourse, from rules of military engagement to mutual defense and termination of hostilities, creating a U.N. and a European Union, international border delineation, liability in international transportation, establishing trade terms and intellectual property protections.2

As such treaties, or ‘‘conventions’’ with amendments thereto called ‘‘rounds’’, protocols, etc. which are typically discrete treaty agreements requiring independent

ratification, are the manner by which states formalize codes for their relationships,

both civil and criminal.3 Depending on their nature treaties are therefore properly

viewed either as contracts, in that they establish civil procedures, or as establishing

the equivalent of laws applicable to the parties.4

In modern practice states have increasingly turned to treaties to address matters

not clearly involving international discourse such as trade or conduct on the high

seas but establishing norms of purely domestic behavior. States, which under the

Constitution have no treaty power,5 have nonetheless waded into areas which are

the subject of modern treaties, negotiating international agreements addressing topics such as the theory of ‘‘man-made global warming’’.6

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, also addressing that theory of man-made global warming is exemplar of efforts addressing (principally) domestic activities.7 It does claim

a purported global phenomenon as its basis and the bulk of the world’s recognized

states as parties, but selectively commits certain developed nations to reduce domestic energy use emissions. Given current technology, for the foreseeable future Kyoto

thereby effectively rations and redistributes particular domestic economic activity by

instituting this selective cap, in perpetuity and not indexed for economic or population growth. As such, Kyoto is arguably in truth an economic instrument by which

foreign competitors hope to mitigate U.S. competitive advantages.8

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and that is why it is serious.’’ European Union Commissioner for the Environment Margot

Wallstrom, quoted by The Independent (London), March 19, 2002, p. 14. 9 Rabkin, ‘‘Why Sovereignty Matters,’’ (1998 AEI Press), p. 22, citing Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, vol. 23 (1929), pp. 194–6. 10 Not all treaties purport binding commitments. The parent agreement of the principal case

study cited herein (Kyoto), is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC). The UNFCCC was typical of treaties merely expressing mutual goals, or ‘‘promises’’ of voluntary undertakings (in this case, voluntary commitments to attempt to reduce man-made

‘‘greenhouse gases’’, or GHGs). 11 ‘‘The Court, in existence since 1946, serves as the successor to the Permanent Court of

International Justice established by the League of Nations and derives its mandate from a Statute which forms an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations.’’ http://www.un.org/

Depts/dhl/resguide/specil.htm#icj. For text, see http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/contents.html. 12 Id. The Permanent International Court of Justice was established with the chartering of

the United Nations (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/). The United States withdrew its August 1946 accession to this court in October 1985 in response to an unfavorable verdict in an

action brought against it by Nicaragua. For the text of the declaration see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. l, p. 9. That does not resolve the matter but actually leaves the U.S. status regarding this treaty as rather ambiguous, also. The implications of this move, regarding proper

venue for pursuit of actions by (or against) the United States is a topic more appropriate for

a separate paper.

Recently, sufficient signatory nations submitted ratification instruments of the Rome Treaty

to bring into effect a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)(http://www.un.org/law/icc/

statute/romefra.htm), and questions persist over the potential application of its terms not merely

against ratifying nations but others—specifically the U.S.—whose, e.g., troops assigned to U.N.

peacekeeping duty may be deemed by parties to Rome to have transgressed to the detriment

of ratifying nations. The United States signed the Rome Treaty, but rescinded its signature, as

detailed, infra.

For the panoply of international legal bodies see http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/

specil.htm. 13 Still, this apparent view of a discipline not properly in the exclusive realm of the executive

or legislative realm was a factor in bifurcating the roles in treaty accession. See esp. Hamilton

in Federalist No. 75. 14 ‘‘The United States views most of the Vienna Convention as codifying customary international law.’’ ‘‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol’’, p. 3, FN 9. CRS

Report for Congress (March 29, 2001). See also, e.g., http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/international.html. For text, see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331. See FN 76 infra

for a discussion regarding who accedes to Vienna’s terms. See also http://untreaty.un.org/

ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/ chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp, for signatories and ratifications, reservations, and related details. 15 Vienna Articles 31 and 32 open the door for such considerations.

Cornell University Professor of Law Jeremy Rabkin writes:

‘‘In 1929 Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court—who had already

served as a justice on the Permanent Court of International Justice—reaffirmed the

doctrine that the treaty power cannot be invoked as a mere pretext for altering domestic policies:

‘‘[T]he treaty making power was intended for the purpose of having treaties made

relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the United States

in their internal concerns through the exercise of the asserted treaty-making

power.9

Nonetheless, agreements such as Kyoto now proliferate. In this context, it seems

fair to paraphrase Clausewitz on war: treaties are the extension of politics by organized state lobbying.

Treaties purporting to involve binding commitments are enforceable against parties to the agreement.10 Disputes over compliance or implementation of the bulk of

treaties, best characterized as civil agreements, are heard before the International

Court of Justice.11 ‘‘The Court has two functions: to render judgments on disputes

submitted to it by States and to furnish advisory opinions on questions referred to

it by authorized bodies.’’12

Originally, the Framers conceived of treaties not as the creation of laws, but more

contracts between states bearing the force of law.13 Time and intervening ‘‘criminal’’

agreements, of course, have further clouded this assessment.

A body of international common or ‘‘customary’’ law evolved to assist in treaty interpretation. This body of law was purportedly codified by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.14 In the pursuit of enforcing such agreements, canons

of statutory and contractual construction recognized domestically by an individual

state may offer insight and even guidance as to what a party intended, but do not

strictly apply.15

309

16 For a listing of such popular names, see http://untreaty.un.org/English/sample/

SimpleSample.asp. 17 For a roadmap of how the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Section, views the various

stages of the treaty process, see http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm.

Specifically, see Kyoto, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/treaties/l07a01.pdf), the basic

treaty structure agreed to at the ‘‘Third Conference of the Parties’’ to the UNFCCC, or COP–

3, the details of which were to be worked out at subsequent COPs. Since Kyoto, five COPs have

taken place with another scheduled for October 2002, narrowing the treaty’s broad assertions

each time (with one exception; see discussion November 2000 Hague discussions in ‘‘Ratification’’, infra). The treaty was open for signature between March 1998 and March 1999. Kyoto

has been open for ratification since March 1999. It goes into effect when ratification instruments

are submitted by covered, or ‘‘Annex I’’ countries (of which there are 36), representing 55 percent of 1990 GHG emissions.

By the end of July 2002, 75 countries had submitted ratification instruments representing

35.8 percent of the covered 1990 GHG emissions, despite the necessity of negotiations to craft

a document with sufficient detail to be enforceable. 55 of the 75 ratifying states are among the

140 states bearing no emission reduction obligations (whose tanks include large industrial players China, Mexico, Brazil, India, South Korea, Indonesia). This does leave Kyoto 19.2 percent

shy of the 55 percent threshold to come into force, leaving solely Russia (17.4 percent) or the

United States (36.1 percent) as determinative of Kyoto’s fate.

It is logical that countries with actual obligations proceed more deliberately given the undefined terms threaten real impact on them. Further, with treaty effectiveness at hand, recent

COP negotiations indicate that remaining covered non-ratifying signatories are driving hard

bargains to minimize the initial economic harm—or maximize initial economic gain, as the case

may be. For example, due to its unique circumstances Russia stands to make quite a large sum

from Kyoto. Upon becoming indispensable to Kyoto’s fate, Russia secured larger allowances for

sale of valuable ‘‘sinks’’ (see FN112, infra), and recently added debt forgiveness to their list of

requirements in return for their determinative ratification. 18 See Decision1/CP.3 of the Conference of the State Parties to the Convention at its third

session (UNEP, UNFCCC). The U.S. State Department asserts that it agreed to Kyoto (‘‘Treaty

Actions’’ page). ‘‘Environment—Climate Change Amendments to Annex I of the Framework Convention on Climate Change of May 9, 1992. Adopted at Kyoto Dec. 11, 1997. Entered into force

Aug. 13, 1998. (http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal—affairs/treaty—actions.html).

The Vienna Convention speaks to the process issue in Article 9, ‘‘Adoption of the text’’:

‘‘1. The adoption of the text of a treaty takes place by the consent of all the States participating in its drawing up except as provided in paragraph 2.

2. The adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the vote

of two-thirds of the States present and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide

to apply a different rule.’’ 19 ‘‘Parties that have not yet signed the Kyoto Protocol may accede to it at any time.’’ http:/

/unfccc.int/ resource/convkp.html#kp. For examples of non-signatory ratifications, see http://

untreaty.un.org/. Curiously, however, in response to a June 2002 inquiry by the author as to

the U.S. status under Kyoto given the ambiguity between President Bush’s verbal ‘‘rejection’’

and the absence of a withdrawal, the Secretary General of the UNFCCC asserted the following:

‘‘Simple signature does not affect entry into force which depends entirely on ratifications/accessions. Signature qualifies the signatory State to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval.’’

This belies that several nations ratified Kyoto without signing the document. Further, the author’s follow-up request as to whether this indicates the UNFCCC does not recognize the Vienna

Convention has gone unanswered to date.

Individual agreements obtain their popular name, typically, from the site of some

meaningful level of agreement, e.g., Ghent, Vienna, Rome, Kyoto.16 Occasionally a

treaty is popularly characterized by its formal name, e.g., the General Agreement

on Tariffs and Trade (or GATT, agreed to in 1947, subsequently the subject of further rounds, e.g., its 8-year ‘‘Uruguay Round,’’ etc.).

The agreed-to language emerging from organic treaty negotiations can, though

does not universally, rise to the level of an enforceable treaty. That is, it can but

does not always include sufficient detail to make it a ‘‘meeting of the minds’’. Even

treaties open for ratification are not necessarily completed to the point of offering

sufficient detail for coherent, uniform understanding and compliance. Indeed, states

have ratified treaties including Kyoto despite numerous negotiations remaining to

define what was actually agreed. The obvious problems associated with this phenomenon are discussed briefly, in ‘‘Ratification’’, infra. Regardless of whether the

treaty terms declare the document open for ratification, such language is occasionally merely a starting point, or near thereto.17

The initial level of agreement is typically manifested by publication of the terms

agreed, and listing the agreeing parties.18 This is an at best a symbolic practice.

That is, a state not ‘‘agreeing’’ to a document at its inception does not impede it

from subsequently following the treaty’s terms toward accession. Indeed, numerous

countries not even signing, for example the Kyoto Protocol, ratified it nonetheless.19

It is theoretically possible, though not in the case of the United States, for a treaty

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20 See Vienna Article 12, ‘‘Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by signature’’: ‘‘1. The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by the signature of its representative when:

(a) the treaty provides that signature shall have that effect;

(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States were agreed that signature should

have that effect; or

(c) the intention of the State to give that effect to the signature appears from the full powers

of its representative or was expressed during the negotiation.’’ 21 U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. Vienna acknowledges such requirements, recognizing exchange of instruments, ratification (also called acceptance or approval), accession, and

deposit of instruments. See Vienna Articles 13, 14, 15 and 16 respectively. 22 For example, ‘‘the current version of [the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)]

allows private litigants to challenge certain U.S. trade measures before a supranational panel,

the decisions of which cannot be reviewed but must still be enforced by U.S. domestic courts.’’ Rabkin at 4, citing NAFTA reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) Art. 1904. Further, ‘‘the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and its successor, NAFTA, already provide for appeals by private

parties from U.S. administrative proceedings to supranational tribunals’’. Rabkin at 18. This latter reality clearly conflicts with Article III, Section 2, Clause 1: ‘‘The judicial Power shall extend

to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the Untied States,

and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority’’. Modern legal scholarship on the treaty power is thus reasonably analogized to the shift of authority away from states to the Federal Government that began with the New Deal in the

1930’s. See Rabkin for a discussion of the comparison of diminution of constitutional limits on

Federal power, and the treaty power. 23 For example, the Constitution not only recognized ‘‘a law of nations’’ (in granting Congress

the power to remedy offenses against same, Article I Section 8). The Framers provided treaties

parity with the ‘‘supreme law of the land’’ (Article VI), or Federal statutes, despite that treaty

bodies to which the U.S. accedes clearly may assume authorities and create rules in conflict with

domestic law (not to mention the Constitution)(see Jay in Federalist No. 64).

Vienna Article 27 offers the provocative assertion: ‘‘Internal law and observance of treaties:

A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.’’ The latter provision tempers the friction somewhat, enabling a U.S. constitutional defense: ‘‘ Invalidity of Treaties, Article 46, Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties:

1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed

in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law

of fundamental importance.

2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in

the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.’’ This paper does not explore such tensions and what areas treaties may permissibly seek to

resolve, instead restricting its discussion to the treaty process. For a detailed discussion on this

and limitations on the treaty power, see Rabkin. 24 Controversy has arisen in recent years over the reluctance of particular U.N. bodies to accommodate or even recognize groups less inclined to support particular treaty efforts. Such

groups are typically fairly characterized as ‘‘conservative’’ advocacy groups. See FN 34, infra. 25 See http://www.ngo.org/. The UN-sponsored NGO interface is the NGO Network, which happens to be sponsored by the U.N. It asserts the goal of NGO’s is to ‘‘more effectively partner

with the United Nations and each other to create a more peaceful, just, equitable and sustainable world for this and future generations.’’

to impose legally enforceable obligations at the ‘‘agreement’’ stage, given that some

states’ constitution permits such commitment by executive signature alone.20

The U.S. Constitution is more typical in that it requires a level of legislative concurrence with an executive treaty commitment for the treaty to be binding.21 The

U.S. Constitution requires Senate ‘‘advice and consent’’ to any treaty prior to it coming into effect against the U.S., both the language and application of which having

created tensions between our Constitution and international law. Treaty commitments inherently cede some level of sovereignty by transferring accountability to a

supranational authority without the safeguards of our system, developing binding

policy without the U.S. Constitution’s checks and balances.22 Therefore these agreements, the permissibility of which was authorized by the Constitution, also inherently create tensions with its framework.23

Treaty negotiations formally involve only participant states, although in multilateral negotiations a (not quite) quasi-formal role exists for interested—and U.N. approved—third parties. These nongovernmental organizations, or NGO’s, if approved

obtain credentials and participate in the summits in an informal capacity.24 They

are provided access to negotiators, attendance in plenary and subsidiary body sessions, and briefings denied the public but have no voting or formal negotiating role.

NGO’s are, in short, lobbying organizations. The UN’s system is akin to a more controlled (i.e., subjectively selective) version of the pre-1995 U.S. Congressional practice of issuing special passes allowing special access.25

There are four necessary stages prior to a treaty taking binding effect against the

United States. This is typical of most systems, with minor exceptions. These stages

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26 International law and individual treaties recognize differential requirements, from unilateral power of binding commitment in an executive to some version of legislative approval. See

Vienna, e.g., Article 14. 27 One need not look beyond the ‘‘environmental’’ context to find numerous such agreements,

e.g., various individual Protocols to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes

and their Disposal, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary

Context, and so on. The relevant inquiry, as discussed herein in the Kyoto and Rome contexts,

is what risk does an ambiguous status regarding a particular instrument pose. 28 See letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/

9968.htm. 29 For a comprehensive assessment of NGO participation, see Sheehan, ‘‘Global Greens’’ (Capital Research Center, 1998). 30 Generally, and the DPI disclaimer, supra, notwithstanding, members of accredited NGO’s are accorded preferred access and privileges not available to the public, to facilitate interaction

with U.N. operations, which interaction can vary based on the subject matter discipline involved. See http://www.ngo.org/ index2.htm, link to ‘‘NGO Access to UNHQ’’. Indeed, UNDPI/

NGO asserts: ‘‘The Department of Public Information and NGO’s cooperate regularly. NGO’s associated with DPI disseminate information about the U.N. to their membership, thereby building knowledge of and support for the Organization at the grassroots level. This dissemination

includes: Publicizing U.N. activities around the world on such issues as peace and security, economic and social development, human rights, humanitarian affairs and international law; Promoting U.N. observances and international years established by the General Assembly to focus

world attention on important issues facing humanity.’’ See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, link

to ‘‘applications for associative status with DPI’’. The general public is not permitted access to

functions. A state’s delegation, however, may include parties who do not have negotiating authority and who need not even hold some governmental post, though they are afforded full access, and limited participation. Senator Al Gore was a member of the United States delegation

to Rio, from which perch he vocally criticized the delegation. Also, NGO participation is feasible,

for example, in bilateral negotiations, if the parties agree.

are, in this order: agreement; signature—a discrete window for which is provided

by each treaty; ratification—also provided for in each treaty;26 and submission of

ratification instruments.

Also relevant are post-ratification requirements—is a treaty self-implementing, or

does it require implementing legislation?—and withdrawal—at what point is a commitment real enough that withdrawal is required, and how is it effected at various

relevant stages?

This paper examines this process and certain implications arising from the stages

of treaty agreement. It particularly explores unsettled questions regarding modern

application of ‘‘advice and consent’’, including the scenario where an executive eschews ‘‘advice’’, what requirements exist of the U.S. post-signature but prior to Senate ‘‘consent’’, must a president transmit a treaty to the Senate before the Senate

may attempt ‘‘consent’’, and which branch of government may withdraw us at what

stage, and how? It also examines the burgeoning role of NGO’s in the treaty process.

Thus discussion occurs principally in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. That

unique agreement is signed, but not ratified.27 President Bush assures Americans

that by his being unhappy with the U.S. signature on the document the U.S. has

‘‘rejected’’ it, yet the signature remains unmolested. Compare this with the Rome

Treaty, the Administration’s rhetorical ‘‘rejection’’ of which was identical yet followed by formal expression of this position to the U.N. consistent with Vienna Article 18.28 Also, the Bush State Department has in fact actually rejected a request

to submit an instrument to the same effect. Kyoto’s highly charged politics, and the

treaty-status limbo those political pressures have yielded begs so many questions

that it provides an excellent vehicle to study the relative commitments accompanying each step.

ROLE OF NONGOVERNMENTAL NGO’S IN THE TREATY PROCESS29

Treaty negotiations occur at formal summits, as well as intervening subsidiary

body and preparatory sessions, all of which when conducted under the auspices of

the United Nations do not limit participation to potential signatory states. Nongovernmental organizations, representing any conceivable interest group so long as

approved by the United Nations, are permitted a quasi-formal role.30 According to

the U.N. Department of Public Information (DPI), NGO Section: ‘‘A non-governmental organization is any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group

which is organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and

driven by people with a common interest, NGO’s perform a variety of services and

humanitarian functions, bring citizens’ concerns to Governments, monitor policies

and encourage political participation at the community level. They provide analysis

and expertise, serve as early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement

international agreements. Some are organized around specific issues, such as

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31 See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, link to ‘‘applications for associative status with DPI’’.

This dynamic began, according to UNDPI, ‘‘The importance of working with and through NGO’s

as an integral part of United Nations information activities was recognized when the Department of Public Information was first established in 1946. The General Assembly, in its resolution 13 (I), instructed DPI and its branch offices to ‘‘’ . . . actively assist and encourage national

information services, educational institutions and other governmental and non-governmental organizations of all kinds interested in spreading information about the United Nations. For this

and other purposes, it should operate a fully equipped reference service, brief or supply lecturers, and make available its publications, documentary films, film strips, posters and other

exhibits for use by these agencies and organizations.’ In 1968, the Economic and Social Council,

by Resolution 1297 (XLIV) of 27 May, called on DPI to associate NGO’s, bearing in mind the

letter and spirit of its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968, which stated that an NGO‘‘... shall undertake to support the work of the United Nations and to promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with its own aims and purposes and the nature and scope

of its competence and activities’’. Id. 32 See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, ‘‘applications for associative status with DPI’’. 33 Id. See FN 30, supra, re: disclaimer/privileges. 34 See http://www.ngo.org/index2.htm, link to ‘‘applications for associative status with DPI’’.

The UN’s NGO home page offers a feel for the type of organizations it seeks to include, the description of which rings of the U.N. endorsement of its typical endeavors, with which the NGO’s

are to have input: ‘‘Its aim is to help promote collaborations between NGO’s throughout the

world, so that together we can more effectively partner with the United Nations and each other

to create a more peaceful, just, equitable and sustainable world for this and future generations.’’

human rights, the environment or health. Their relationship with offices and agencies of the United Nations System differs depending on their goals, their venue and

their mandate.

Over 1,500 NGO’s with strong information programmes on issues of concern to the

United Nations are associated with the Department of Public Information (DPI),

giving the United Nations valuable links to people around the world. DPI helps

those NGO’s gain access to and disseminate information about the range of issues

in which the United Nations is involved, to enable the public to understand better

the aims and objectives of the world Organization.’’31

The process for becoming an accredited NGO is subjective, offering the United Nations discretion in who or what group it allows for what purpose(s). Recently, on an

ad hoc basis, the relevant accrediting body has requested information on financial

donors and required proof of an international presence as conditions precedent of

selective (and, to the author’s knowledge, exclusively ‘‘conservative’’) NGO’s.

UNDPI criteria for NGO’s to become associated with DPI are as follow:

‘‘Organizations eligible for association with DPI are those which:

• Share the ideals of the U.N. Charter; • Operate solely on a not-for-profit basis;

• Have a demonstrated interest in United Nations issues and proven ability to

reach large or specialized audiences, such as educators, media representatives, policymakers and the business community;

• Have the commitment and means to conduct effective information programmes

about U.N. activities by publishing newsletters, bulletins, and pamphlets; organizing conferences, seminars and round tables; and enlisting the cooperation of the

media.’’32

UNDPI describes the procedure to become an associated NGO as follows:

‘‘An NGO that meets the established criteria should send an official letter from

its headquarters to the Chief of the NGO Section, Department of Public Information, expressing interest in association with DPI. The letter should state the reasons

why the organization seeks such association and should briefly describe its information programmes. This letter should be accompanied by at least six samples of recent information materials produced by the applying organization. Letters of reference from U.N. Departments, U.N. Programmes and Specialized Agencies, and/or

U.N. Information Centres and Services (UNICs and UNISs) will greatly enhance

consideration of the application.

Once the application process is completed, the DPI Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations will review applications at its scheduled sessions. Applicants

are notified immediately of the results of the Committee’s deliberations. Associated

NGO’s are then invited to designate their main and alternate representatives to the

Department of Public Information.

Please note: Association of NGO’s with DPI does not constitute their incorporation

into the United Nations system, nor does it entitle associated organizations or their

staff to any kind of privileges, immunities or special status.’’33

Clearly, the application process is subjective and, arguably, institutionally biased

toward participation by a preponderance of groups considered sympathetic to the

relevant summit’s cause (that is, against dissent).34

313

That is, organizations whose application reference materials demonstrate opposition to UN-sponsored initiatives face an adversarial review of their application. For a report on bias in the selection process, see, e.g., http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020511–32784532. htm, in the context of the 2002 U.N child Summit (UNICEF). 35 See http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/treaties/conv.htm. 36 See http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html. 37 Among the international ‘‘agreements’’ being developed were the Rio Declaration, and the

similar if much more exhaustive (600 pages) Agenda 21. These were enormous if non-binding

documents containing a lot of ‘‘shoulds’’, but as accurately characterized by the Cato Institute’s P.J. O’Rourke, each ‘‘having the same approximate force in law as a note passed in study hall.’’ (All the Troubles in the World, p. 214, 1994). 38 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, actually finalized in Rio. United Nations,

Treaty Series, vol. 1760, p. 79; and depositary notification C.N.329.1996.TREATIES–2 of 18

March 1996. 39 See UNFCCC NGO roster, at http://unfccc.int/sessions/97feb/ngo.htm. 40 For the schedule of Johannesburg NGO events, see http://www.worldsummit.org.za/. 41 Under Kyoto this would be pursuant to Article 17: ‘‘The Conference of the Parties shall

define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading. ‘‘ 42 See, e.g., ‘‘Cashing in on Global Warming’’, http://www.cei.org/gencon/005,01248.cfm.

For an example of NGO participation, consider the 1992 the U.N. Conference on

Environment and Development (UNCED or ‘‘Earth Summit’’) in Rio de Janeiro, likely the largest treaty summit in recent memory, though soon to be eclipsed by ‘‘Rioplus–10’’ the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, August

2002. Rio is commonly recognized as ushering in the boom era of mass NGO participation. Rio has the added relevance for these purposes as being the session that produced, inter alia, the UNFCCC,35 that the Kyoto Protocol amends by making its

universal voluntary ‘‘commitments’’ mandatory for certain among the world’s economic powers.

In the summer of 1992, as the United States Presidential and general elections

prepared to launch, nations of the world convened in Rio for the UNCED under the

guise of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which is under the

direction of the U.N. General Assembly.36 Numerous non-binding, in effect, position

papers were generated with great effort, though disagreement tended to be more

fairly characterized as disputes over whose priority was granted highest esteem.37

Several other documents emerged from the fortnight-long diplomacy, the binding nature of which are arguable given a great degree of voluntariness but which nonetheless rose to the level of ‘‘treaty’’.38

Participants at Rio included delegations from all recognized national governments

including scores of heads of state. 95 NGO’s plus numerous among their subsidiaries

were accredited representing national, regional and international common interests

or agendas. These interests ranged from scientific and even architectural and various other professional societies, industry and laborers, gender and environmentalist

pressure groups and/or their legal arms, spiritual to indigenous peoples.39 These

were condensed in practice at the summit under the ‘‘Global Forum,’’ to centralize

their presence, and voice. The latter act presumes NGO support for the summit undertakings.

NGO activities ranged from the informal—media availabilities, pamphlet and

newsletter distribution—to quasi-formal—presentation of the product of petition

drives before the plenary and subsidiary body sessions.40

Though NGO’s have no formal vote or role at negotiations, efforts have been underway for some time to find paying roles for NGO’s in implementing and monitoring compliance with treaty agreements. Specifically, for example, environmentalist advocates seek a formal paying role as an independent auditing and

verification monitors of company and country GHG emissions/reductions.41 Indeed,

domestically, NGO’s have already received literally millions of taxpayer dollars to

advocate Kyoto.42

Many agreements, be they addressing environment or human rights, offer the potential for such business opportunities. That is one way the NGO’s elevate their ‘‘negotiating’’ presence. They do have potential interests at stake to pursue, just as they

possess an impressive media presence and potentially valuable approval to grant to

or withhold from parties.

Representatives of groups directly impacted by potential commitments—industry

and labor—were fairly limited in Rio (approximately 20 percent of the accredited

NGO’s) and fairly split between those standing to lose economic activity—anti-energy-suppression interests such as the coal industry, energy users, mine workers—

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43 For example, an immediate post-negotiation internal Enron memo, dated December 12 1997

and written by the Enron Corp. ’s representative attending Kyoto, excitedly described Kyoto as ‘‘precisely what [Enron has] been lobbying for,’’ cited numerous ‘‘wins’’, and concluded: ‘‘This

agreement will be good for Enron stock!!’’ The reasons for Enron’s advocacy are numerous, and

similar to various other business NGO participants’. Enron held positions as owner of the

world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer and half owner of the world’s largest solar energy

venture, both of which would have faced tremendously increased markets under Kyoto’s effective

requirement of dramatically lowered fossil fuel use (particularly coal) among developed countries. For similar reasons, Enron faced tremendous earnings prospects from its large natural gas

holdings and its gas pipeline network, the world’s largest outside of Gazprom. For disclosure,

the author briefly worked for Enron, during which time this effort was a source of disagreement. 44 Re: the former, see, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, ‘‘An Enron Tale of Strange Bedfellows,’’ Los

Angeles Times (December 28, 2001). The latter is manifested by the ‘‘Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future’’ and its European counterpart, constituted by (at the time) Enron and

like-minded interests. 45 For NGO claims of influence see ‘‘Greens’ Success at Kyoto’’, http://www.cei.org/gencon/

014,02873.cfm 46 See FN 123, infra. 47 This clearly does not require 67 votes as is often asserted. ‘‘Although the number of Senators who must be present is not specified, the Senate’s practice with respect to major treaties

is to conduct the final treaty vote at a time when most Senators are available.’’ See, ‘‘Treaties

and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, p. 11, at http://

frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 106—cong—senate— print&docid=f:66922.pdf. Compare this ‘‘present’’ requirement with other ‘‘two thirds’’ requirements, Article I, Section 5, regarding House impeachments; Article I Section 7 re: veto override;

and Article V re: proposing amendments to the Constitution.

Hamilton addressed the deliberation over two-thirds of those ‘‘present’’, vs. of the body as constituted, in Federalist No. 75. There, he identified the fear about ‘‘as constituted’’, that a minority of Senators could impede ratification through simple, convenient absences. See ‘‘Consent’’, infra, for further discussion.

and those seeking ‘‘rents’’ through GHG restrictions with mechanisms such as credit-trading schemes.43

By the time of the July 2002 ‘‘COP 6.5’’ in Bonn, Germany, sufficient ‘‘industry’’

NGO’s, falsely presumed as a matter of practice to be ‘‘anti-Kyoto’’, attended that

the U.S. State Department had informally begun addressing two discrete constituencies in separate, restricted briefings. This did not accurately bifurcate the ideological or substantive positions of the groups, but rather manifest a common predisposition—that State representatives simply had to know was false—that Kyoto,

and environmental agreements generally, created a clash of ‘‘industry vs. environmentalists.’’ In fact, industry groups are among the most aggressive ‘‘direct’’ protreaty lobbying forces at treaty negotiations and elsewhere, and aggressive in their

indirect advocacy (funding green and business advocacy groups).44

Therefore, while State deemed a separation of ideologies as appropriate it did so

such that pro-Kyoto NGO’s constituted one group, while the other advocacy section

supposedly competing for State’s ear consisted of a deeply split ‘‘Industry’’ cadre, despite pro-Kyoto industry being at least equally represented as Kyoto opponents. This

skews the NGO input at least so far as concerns the U.S. delegation, offering proKyoto NGO advocates a de facto greater advocacy role.45 This matters because, as

discussed, infra, the U.S. has not withdrawn from Kyoto but retains its signature

and continues to send a full delegation to negotiations, even if they curiously assume a reduced role.46

In conclusion, treaty negotiations take place among delegates, though NGO’s

serve as welcome pressure groups, with a limited formal role but a select membership chosen by proponents of the agreement on the table.

THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

In the United States, treaty power is governed by Article II Section 2 of the Constitution, stating ‘‘[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and

Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators

present concur’’. Therefore, the Executive may negotiate agreements, the terms of

which do not, pursuant to our own Constitution, become effective against the U.S.

until and unless the Senate ratifies the agreement by two-thirds of those voting.47

It does not seem there was any doubt during its formulation that the Constitution

would permit treaties, which, to the extent they transfer any authority outside of

the system the Constitution established, potentially threaten the very document authorizing such agreements. Discussion of the treaty power among the Framers appears principally confined to the necessity to concentrate it at the Federal level, so

as to not be ‘‘liable to the infractions of 13 different legislatures, and as many difVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00318 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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48 See Hamilton, Federalist No. 22, sentiments repeated by Madison in Federalist No. 44. 49 Federalist No. 75. 50 ‘‘Sovereignty’’ at 18. The same can be said for policymakers, be they elected, appointed or

career. See Chief Justice Hughes’ admonition, supra. 51 Id. at 22. 52 Farewell Address, delivered on September 17, 1796. Washington similarly urged that the

US must ‘‘Act for ourselves and not for others,’’ by forming an ‘‘American character wholly free

of foreign attachments.’’ See http://www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2002/tst041502.htm. 53 This issue arises from other powers found in Article II of the Constitution, specifically the

Executive Power Clause (Section I), the Commander-in-Chief Clause (Section 2) and, most interesting, the duty to take Care that the laws are ‘‘faithfully executed’’, which concludes Section

3. ‘‘Where the powers of the President are exclusive—as the Commander in Chief power—the

President may make an international agreement solely on his own. Such agreements are often

called sole executive agreements.’’ National Treaty Law and Practice (Austria, Chile, Columbia,

Netherlands, U.S.) eds. Monroe Leigh, Merritt R. Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington. Washington, DC, American Society of International Law 1999, Chapter 6, National Treaty Law and

Practice: United States (Robert E. Dalton), ‘‘Section G, Legal Bases for Agreements Not Formally Approved By the Legislature’’. See http://www.asil.org/ dalton.pdf. This document offers

an extensive discussion of this issue, including a discussion of United States v. Belmont (301

U.S. 324 (1937)), involving an intermingling in one document of assignment of funds and U.S.

recognition of the Soviet Union. There, the Court asserted as regards the particular agreement

at issue, ‘‘[A]n international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty that requires the participation of the Senate,’’ but in this case an exercise of the President’s power to enter executive

agreement pursuant to his independent authority. Id. at 330.

The Court asserted limits to the reach of this duty to ‘‘take Care’’, in Youngstown Sheet &

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The Court determined that President Truman usurped

the lawmaking power of Congress by his claim of independent constitutional authority to take

control of and operate the nation’s steel mills during the Korean War on the basis of on an ‘‘inherent’’ power to protect the well-being and safety of the Nation as well as his Article II exclusive powers as Commander-in-Chief and executive.

Finally, see also ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’,

pp. 25–26, at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106—cong—senate—

print &docid=f:66922.pdf.

The State Department defines ‘‘treaty’’ as follows: ‘‘International agreements (regardless of

their title, designation, or form) whose entry into force with respect to the United States takes

place only after the Senate has given its advice and consent’’. See ‘‘Department of State Circular

175, Procedures on Treaties’’, Foreign Affairs Manual, 11 FAM 700, Treaties and Other International Agreements, TL:POL–36, Revised February 25, 1985, Sec. 11 FAM 721.2 ‘‘Constitutional Requirements’’.

Continued

ferent courts of final jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures’’, and thus ‘‘protect the faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole union.’’48

In Federalist No. 64 Jay addressed an apparent, similar multiple actor problem

but through vesting the treaty power in a dynamic, impressionable ‘‘popular assembly’’, advocating instead housing principal authority in the executive. In Federalist

No. 69 Hamilton weighed the merits of vesting the power solely in the executive,

musing over what he later described as ‘‘the trite topic of the intermixture of powers,’’ albeit one addressed amongst the Framers ‘‘with no small degree of vehe- mence.’’49

Arguably, modern conflicts arising from signed-but-not ratified treaties are a

problem easily avoided, or at least mitigated, were the treaty power fixed solely

within one branch (certainly, if with the Executive). Still, the practical, political

problems discussed herein, borne of the simple bifurcation of authority, do not seem

to have registered discussion by the Framers. One can safely presume this is because the Framers did not envision ‘‘permanent alliances’’ becoming so profuse that

hundreds of modern instruments would emerge to the extent even of addressing unification of road signals.

Pertinent to this discussion, the Framers likely also could not envision commission to a treaty such as Kyoto: international agreements to curb domestic behavior

to retard what is inarguably a marginal contribution to a hypothetical risk—man- made climate change—even in advance of science advancing the hypothesis some

appreciable degree toward knowledge. Similarly, it is difficult to fathom the Framers envisioning administration of their creation such that scores of treaties would

receive an executive signature yet never face Senate consideration. Times change,

and with them perspectives. As Rabkin plainly asserts ‘‘[l]egal scholars no longer

take the constitutional strictures of earlier times so seriously.’’50 Now, ‘‘in the view

of legal scholars, anything might be the proper subject of a treaty.’’51 This, in an

undeniable spiral of cheapening the seriousness of ‘‘permanent alliances’’ against

which President Washington warned in his Farewell Address.52

One constitutional ambiguity arises in the question of which agreements rise to

the level of a ‘‘treaty’’ requiring Senate ratification?53 Further, notwithstanding the

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The Vienna Convention, Article 2, defines ‘‘treaty’’ for its purposes as: ‘‘an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular

designation’’. 54 See ‘‘Signature’’ discussion, infra. 55 A simple answer might seem to be that the Constitution cannot be read to permit commitments in violation of its terms, which terms may only be amended by the prescribed amendment

process. Things are not that simple, however, such that this question is beyond the scope of this

paper. See Rabkin, pp. 10–22. Commitments raising this tension are nonetheless made. Consider the Vienna Convention, a document that claims to bind parties to such documents, to some

degree, by mere signature. Does that signature in fact violate the Constitution? Can a signatory

state plausibly claim they are not bound to any degree by a treaty that acknowledges signature

as imputing a level of pre-ratification commitment? 56 See discussion of ‘‘Submission,’’ infra. Senate rules indicate it has indirectly established ‘‘transmission’’ as a condition precedent. These rules do not, however, make clear that the Foreign Relations Committee can refuse to consider a treaty on the basis that it was never transmitted—an unlikely controversy. A more likely battle would pit a White House opposed to ratification objecting to FRC consideration of a treaty on the basis that there was never a transmittal. The prospect of such a conflict, though facially bizarre prospect given a president apparently retains the right to effectively withdraw the U.S. signature until some point in the preratification stage (pre-transmittal, or pre-vote, or post-defeat but returned to Committee as

pending matter). See, e.g., http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.

These prospects further warrant consideration not merely because the signature by an executive poses some level of commitment to a treaty’s objectives, if not its specific terms. Consider

also a Senate and White House deeply divided, rhetorically at least, over a signed-but-not-ratified treaty as they appear to be over Kyoto, and the potential showdown over ‘‘advice and consent’’ which that conflict poses. 57 ‘‘22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656.—Management of foreign affairs. The Secretary of State shall perform

such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or intrusted to him by the President relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions to or with public ministers or consuls

from the United States, or to negotiations with public ministers from foreign states or princes,

or to memorials or other applications from foreign public ministers or other foreigners, or to

such other matters respecting foreign affairs as the President of the United States shall assign

to the Department, and he shall conduct the business of the Department in such manner as

the President shall direct.’’ It is certainly this general authority that State exercised in notifying

the U.N. that the US has no intention to be bound by the Rome Treaty (its 6 May 2002 letter

to U.N. Secretary General Annan (see text at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm). 58 See e.g. Kyoto, signed by USA’s functioning U.N. Ambassador, Peter Burleigh. See http:/

/www.bellona. no/en/b3/air/climate/buenos—aires/10952.html. 59 ‘‘Byrd-Hagel,’’ S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105–54, 1997). The operative language is as follows: ‘‘Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that—— (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in

Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would—— (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I

Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the

same compliance period, or

(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States’’. Kyoto nonetheless emerged, clearly not satisfying Byrd-Hagel condition (1)(A), by differentiating not only between 36 ‘‘covered’’ countries, but by differentiating the commitments among

those countries. Regarding condition (1)(B), among prominent economic analysts only the Clinton White House’s Council of Economic Advisors, contended that no ‘‘serious economic harm’’. President Clinton never submitted the treaty to the Senate over the course of the remaining

27 months of his presidency. Upon leaving office the relevant CEA professionals publicly amended their assertions regarding Kyoto’s economic impact. (See USA Today, June 12, 2001). See discussion of ‘‘Advice, infra.

ratification requirement, the treaty process inherently requires executive commitment of a sort. What are the other implications of such a commitment, now that

we have seen that this practice does not in fact even serve the protocol function of

a qualifying a state for ratification?54 Can an Executive validly agree to treaty language circumventing constitutional requirements?55 These questions and their answers, to the extent they exist, are exemplar of the murky nature of this field of

law, driven in practice less by established legal rules than protocol. This curiosity

extends to U.S. practice, whereby both the executive branch and Senate operate on

the presumption that the Senate may not consider a treaty until a President transmits it to the Senate, though such requirement is found neither in the Constitution

nor U.S. laws.56

Congress has formalized this delegation power, for certain Presidential authorities

regarding the conduct of foreign affairs, in the State Department’s authorizing statute.57 In practice this delegation includes signing (and withdrawing from) treaties.58

The requirement of Senate ‘‘Advice’’ is not as straightforward as a plain reading

of Article II intimates. Here, Kyoto also offers an interesting case study, as a treaty

entered in spite of formal if non-binding (and unsolicited) Senate advice.59 An ExecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00320 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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A fair question is: which is the more constitutionally offensive practice? 1) Eschewing advice

and committing to a treaty yet not offering the Senate its opportunity to consent or disapprove;

or 2) rescinding the U.S. signature from one ‘‘rejected’’, signed-but-never-submitted treaty, on

the express basis that ‘‘even without ratification, the president’s signature conveys standing and

a U.S. obligation to support and not undermine the Treaty’’ (see Rumsfeld comments, p. 27,

infra), yet not similarly treating other rhetorically ‘‘rejected’’ agreements. 60 ‘‘(6) Treaties Reported by the [Foreign Relations] Committee but neither approved nor formally returned to the President by the Senate are automatically returned to the Committee calendar at the end of a Congress; the Committee must report them out again for the Senate to

consider them.’’ Therefore, a ‘‘defeated’’ treaty is not necessarily rejected until it is returned to

the President. See ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, p. 12; see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov /cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106—cong—senate— print&docid=f:66922.pdf. The Senate may also keep a ‘‘defeated’’ treaty alive by adopting or entering a motion to reconsider. Id. at 3. 61 ‘‘The conditions included by the Senate in its resolutions of advice and consent to ratification fall into four general categories: reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos.’’ National Treaty Law and Practice (Austria, Chile, Columbia, Netherlands, U.S.) eds. Monroe

Leigh, Merritt R. Blakeslee, and L. Benjamin Ederington. Washington, DC, American Society

of International Law 1999, Chapter 6, National Treaty Law and Practice: United States (Robert

E. Dalton), p. 6.

Vienna Article 2 defines ‘‘reservation’’ as: ‘‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named,

made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby

it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their

application to that State’’. Part Two of Vienna, Articles 19–23, address reservations exclusively. 62 See, e.g., Rabkin, p.ix. 63 Kyoto Article 26 asserts, in toto: ‘‘No reservations may be made to this Protocol.’’ 64 ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, p. 2. 65 Id. at p. 274. 66 Id. at 276. 67 ‘‘In mid–1997, as these negotiations were underway, the Senate passed S. Res. 98, which

stated that the Senate would not approve any agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse

gases that did not include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/industrialized countries, or that would result in harm to the U.S. economy. The administration has not

transmitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate because, among other reasons, developing counContinued

utive eschewing Senate advice does not as a matter of law doom a treaty as failing

to meet constitutional muster. An Executive subsequently nullifying the U.S. signature, or a Senate vote on ratification, should be the final word on that though, again

matters in practice have not developed quite so simply.60

The concerns raised by an Executive ‘‘freelancing’’ treaty commitments without

seeking or heeding Senate advice can be further compounded by a treaty barring

the standard practice of a party to set forth objections and/or reservations.61 It is

through such objections and reservations, asserted by the Senate as a condition of

ratification, that makes policy development by supranational bodies constitutionally

tolerable given their lack of checks and balances, and limited accountability.62 Yet

the U.S. agreed to and then signed the Kyoto Protocol despite it having exacerbated

the sin of omission of seeking Senate advice with the rare, express prohibition of

reservations.63

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report serving as the Senate’s most formal statement on these matters outside of Standing Senate Rules states the following regarding nearly this precise circumstance, except for the compounding factor of eschewing advice prior to the ‘‘no reservation’’ constraint:

‘‘Some multilateral treaties have contained an article prohibiting reservations.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has taken the position that the executive

branch negotiators should not agree to this prohibition. The Senate has given its

advice and consent to a few treaties containing the prohibition, but the committee

has stated that approval of these treaties should not be construed as a precedent

for such clauses in future treaties. It has further stated that the President’s agreement to such a clause could not constrain the Senate’s right and obligation to attach

reservations to its advice and consent.’’64

Specifically addressing the UNFCCC, which the Senate nonetheless quickly ratified despite its own ‘‘no reservations’’ clause, the same Report cautions ‘‘The Foreign

Relations Committee has cautioned the administration that Senate consent in these

cases should not be construed as a precedent.’’65 The Report went on to caution

against any attempt to alter the UNFCCC’s voluntary scheme by committing to

mandatory reductions, asserting any such commitment would require ratification.66

The Report then recites Senate intervention when the negotiations appeared to be

headed toward not merely binding commitments requiring subsequent ratification,

but differential commitments among parties with likely serious U.S. economic impacts.67

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tries have to date not been willing to consider making binding commitments regarding their

greenhouse gas emissions.’’ Id. 68 See, e.g., S. 2062 (107th Congress), ‘‘The Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act

of 2002’’. The express logic behind providing this authority is to provide the President’s negotiators the ability to strike deals not subject to subsequent modification as a condition of ratification, and their counterparts confidence in U.S. promises. It is arguable that congressional approval of such authority constitutes advice, if uninformed advice, still conditioned upon Senate

ratification of the deal itself. 69 Rabkin at 18. 70 See Rabkin pp. 12–16. 71 See FN 19, supra. Kyoto Article 24 states: ‘‘1) . . . This Protocol shall be open for accession

from the day after the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 2. Any regional economic

integration organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol without any of its member

States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Protocol. In the case of

such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to this Protocol, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organization and the member

States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Protocol concurrently. 3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this

Protocol. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.’’ 72 Vienna sets forth generally, followed by an illustrative roster of, who may commit a state: ‘‘Article 7, Full powers: 1. A person is considered as representing a State for the purpose of

adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of

the State to be bound by a treaty if:

(a) he produces appropriate full powers; or (b) it appears from the practice of the States concerned or from other circumstances that their intention was to consider that person as representing the State for such purposes and to dispense with full powers.’’ A state may subsequently confirm an unauthorized signature (Article 8). 73 ‘‘The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention but this portion likely represents customary international law on the subject.’’ ‘‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal

Questions about the Kyoto Protocol’’, p. 3, FN 9. CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001).

Kyoto nonetheless emerged as such a ‘‘take it or leave it’’ document but with no

‘‘fast-track’’ type authorization or abdication. Indeed, it is fair to say the opposite

vote was registered though non-binding by necessity given the nature and timing

of such a preemptive strike. NAFTA can therefore hardly be analogized to Kyoto as

both having been similarly foisted upon the Senate, though it is noteworthy that the

composition of Congress can certainly change measurably in the interim between

fast-track approval (or Byrd-Hagel) and the opportunity to offer consent.

This combination found in Kyoto of not obtaining (ignoring) Senate advice and restricting permissible consent is constitutionally indefensible in theory, though it

does not impede Senate ratification. Indeed, it is now accepted practice for Congress

to offer advance approval of suspending the Senate ability to provide objections and/

or reservations when voting on ratification of specific agreements.68 ‘‘Some scholars

have pointed out the constitutional difficulties of this scheme, but it did not raise

any great controversy.’’69

Signature

Individual agreements provide a window during which the document may be

signed. For example, the Kyoto Protocol, agreed to in December 1997, was open for

Party signature for a finite period of 1 year. As discussed, supra, that window and/

or failure to sign the document were meaningless, as non-signatories subsequently

ratified the Protocol. Whether signing the document is meaningless, however, is discussed, infra. The U.S. signed Kyoto on 12 November 1998.

It is clear from Article II, Section 2 that the Executive has the power to negotiate

agreements if not de jure unilateral power to craft their content. This power to negotiate treaties doubtless includes the ability to make various, sub-ratification levels

of commitment such as agreement and signature, so long as the agreement makes

no pretense of abrogating the ratification requirement.70 The ‘‘advice’’ limitation on

this negotiating power is subject to Senate forgiveness (for the failure to seek advice), via providing consent nonetheless.

Most treaties provide for a discrete signing function as a condition precedent to

being eligible to accede via ratification.71 Signatures may be challenged but barring

such challenge are presumed valid.72 Questions arise, certainly in the recent contexts of the Rome Treaty and Kyoto Protocol, of other signature implications. Like

most individual treaty documents ‘‘customary law’’ and its ‘‘codification’’ the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties73 recognize the requirement of many systems of

legislative approval for an agreement’s specific terms to be binding.

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74 Vienna manifests throughout, e.g., Articles 11, 12, 18, manifest that states operate on the

presumption that a signature is the promise of a binding relationship, presumably through ratification. ‘‘A paramount principle of international law is pacta sunt servanda-that treaties must

be kept.’’ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements:

The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, S.Rpt. 106–71, p. 7; see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov /cgi-bin/

getdoc.cgi?dbname=106—cong—senate—print& docid=f:66922.pdf. What of the documents that a

country signs, but does not ratify? That question and the ambiguous answers, to the extent they

exist, prompted President Bush to withdraw from the unratified Rome Treaty. Specifically, the

U.S. sought to avert legitimate concerns that its signature would impute some form of acquiescence with Rome.

However, many treaties are signed but not ratified, particularly by the US. The same ambiguities underlie the concerns over Kyoto discussed, herein. As with Rome, the President voiced his

disagreement with his predecessor’s signature. As regards Kyoto, however, he has not manifested this rhetoric with action. Consider that the President then offers and formally proceeds

with a proposal clearly running counter to Kyoto’s goals and objectives, as he did with his pending proposal to address U.S. GHG emissions. This proposal envisions emissions increasing,

clearly in violation of Kyoto’s objective of massive reductions. Certainly, mere proposals likely

do not run hard afoul of Vienna. But what if the proposal is enacted? 75 See ‘‘Withdrawal’’, infra. 76 Consider a prospective automobile purchaser talking terms then taking the car off the lot

for a spin, though without finalizing any deal. He parks it in his garage, and otherwise treats

the offer of sale as a deal he accepted, for some period of time. Now consider the U.S. signing

a treaty, though never formalizing the deal, yet also acting as if it had ‘‘bought’’ the agreement

for 30 years through various and sundry diplomatic and administrative actions, or merely on

the basis that it waited three decades before testing its strictures?

It is likely that such a doctrine of constructive acceptance exists in the law of international

agreements. Vienna Article 11, ‘‘Means of expressing consent to be bound by a treaty,’’ does not

offer much guidance, asserting ‘‘The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed

by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval

or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.’’ However, Part 5, ‘‘Invalidity, Termination and

Suspension of the Operation of Treaties’’ makes the case more plainly: ‘‘Article 45 Loss of a right

to invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation

of a treaty: A State may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing

from or suspending the operation of a treaty under articles 46 to 50 or articles 60 and 62 if,

after becoming aware of the facts:

(a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or continues in

operation, as the case may be; or

(b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the

treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be.’’ Media reports indicated that President Bush intended to withdraw from Vienna concurrent

with his Rome withdrawal, though this did not occur. This would (or will) occur after having

satisfied Vienna’s Article 18 test for ‘‘withdrawal’’ of the unratified ICC. Clearly, therefore, such

a move would be intended to impact the status of other signed-but-not-ratified agreements. Presuming this was successful (see FN 76, supra), particular implications of such a move as regards

Kyoto include that the U.S. would be free of the Vienna Article 18 argument of commitment

to Kyoto’s object and purpose (if not residual ‘‘customary’’ doctrine, if any exists). The U.S. position would be that it is ‘‘out’’ of Kyoto solely on the basis that one executive verbally claimed

that to be the case, with no formalization of that position. That is, the signed document remains

available for ‘‘re-entry’’ by a subsequent executive solely on the basis that he verbally asserts

that this is the U.S. position. To pursue or even enable such a dynamic is shortsighted and flies

in the face of the bulk of the rationale behind treaties.

The principle that a signature cannot be truly meaningless, developed likely for

purposes of ensuring sincere negotiations, nonetheless was formalized as Vienna Article 18. That provision asserts international agreement that a pre-ratification commitment, e.g., signature, as nonetheless binding a state to certain degree.74 Yet how

seriously do states take this testament to the issue of a non-ratifying signatory

state: ‘‘a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,’’ until and unless ‘‘it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty, or it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty’’?75 It is either ironic, or proof positive that this effort failed, that the U.S. bears

an enormous inventory of signed-but-not-ratified instruments including many never

even ‘‘transmitted’’ to the Senate.

Defending a claim that the U.S. somehow violates Vienna Article 18 via, e.g.,

Kyoto, the U.S. would likely posit the argument that it never ratified Vienna. Particularly as regards Article 18, this argument is sophisticated. It requires a state

to argue that it is not bound by signing a treaty that purports to govern the interpretation of treaties, the terms of which establish that signing a treaty in the absence of ratification still binds the signatory to the treaty’s goals and objectives.76

It was presumably in recognition of the perils of feel-good treaty signature when

a state has no intention of ratifying leading the Bush Administration to formally

disavow its signature on the Rome Treaty. Consider the following statements by

Cabinet officers:

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77 Compare Administration statements on Kyoto remarkably similar to its rhetoric establishing why Rome must be ‘‘unsigned’’:

President Bush—‘‘I’ll tell you one thing I’m not going to do . . . I’m not going to let the United

States carry the burden for cleaning up the world’s air, like the Kyoto treaty would have done.’’

ABCNews.com, March 28, 2001

President Bush—‘‘I do not support the Kyoto Treaty . . . The Kyoto treaty would severely

damage the United States economy and I don’t accept that.’’ Washington Times, June 5, 2002

Vice-President Cheney—‘‘We do not support the approach of the Kyoto treaty.’’ MSNBC March

17, 2001

Secretary of State Colin Powell—‘‘The Kyoto Protocol, as far as the United States is concerned, is a dead letter.’’ Interview with Fox News’ Tony Snow, June 17, 2001

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice—to European diplomats, the ’’protocol is totally

unacceptable and already dead at the arrival of the Bush Administration’’; also quoted at the

same meeting asserting Kyoto was ‘‘dead on arrival’’ in the United States. March 17th, 2001

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice—‘‘It might have been better to let people know

in advance, including our allies, that we were not going to support the protocol.’’

USATODAY.com June 7, 2001

Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christie Todd Whitman—‘‘We have no interest in implementing that treaty.’’ Washington Post, March 28, 2001

White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer—‘‘The president has been unequivocal. He does not

support the Kyoto treaty. It is not in the United States’ economic interest.’’ CNN.com, March

29, 2001 78 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7: ‘‘Every Bill which shall have passed the House of

Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President

of the United States’’.

‘‘Since we have no intention of ratifying it, it is appropriate for us, because we

have such serious problems with the ICC, to notify the . . . secretary-general that

we do not intend to ratify it and therefore we are no longer bound in any was to

its purpose and objective’’ Secretary of State Colin Powell, CNN.com, May 5, 2002

‘‘Even without ratification, the president’s signature conveys standing and a U.S.

obligation to support and not undermine the Treaty’’. Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld, State Department Info, Jan. 11, 2001

Now, of course, the Administration faces the unavoidable question of why does it

refuse to disavow the U.S. signature on Kyoto? That is, should it desire to avoid

having, e.g., its proposed ‘‘Climate Action Plan’’ challenged as violative of Vienna,

via Kyoto.77

These implications of treaty signature and the related quagmire of ‘‘how much

sovereignty does (the U.S.) cede at what step?’’ is exemplar of the murky nature of

this field of law, driven in practice less by established legal rules than protocol.

In sum, achieving the signature stage enters a state into an ambiguous level of

commitment; obligations begin to emerge, such that a notification of intent not to

become a party action is required to truly change a nation’s status.

Executive Transmittal of a Treaty

Is there a reverse equivalent to the Constitution’s ‘‘presentment’’ clause, for treaties?78 A plain reading of Article II, Section 2 indicates an Executive’s function is

complete upon treaty signature, or at least that the signature reasonably triggers

the Senate’s ability to attempt consent though the Executive may not be stripped

of authority to continue relevant treaty functions. Certainly, if a president transmits

a treaty to the Senate with its concomitant request for a vote, there is no doubt that

the Senate may vote upon it. But what about a treaty signed but not submitted to

the Senate?

An authoritative Foreign Relations Committee report asserts the Senate’s most

formal position on the matter, outside of its standing rules which are largely silent

or ambiguous:

‘‘Consideration by the Senate

A second phase begins when the President transmits a concluded treaty to the

Senate and the responsibility moves to the Senate.

Following are the main steps during the Senate phase.

(1) Presidential submission.-The Secretary of State formally submits treaties to

the President for transmittal to the Senate. A considerable time may elapse between

signature and submission to the Senate, and on rare occasions a treaty signed on

behalf of the United States may never be submitted to the Senate at all and thus

never enter into force for the United States. When transmitted to the Senate, treaties are accompanied by a Presidential message consisting of the text of the treaty,

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79 ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, S.Rpt.106– 71, p. 7. 80 ‘‘Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . .’’ Article I, Section 5. 81 With or without transmittal it would be fair for a Member (or private litigant who can establish standing) to call on the Senate to vote on the entire spate of modern treaties signedbut-not-ratified treaties. It seems particularly disrespectful of the Constitution, however, for the

Senate not to at minimum vote on aberrations such as Kyoto, qualifying for immediate rejection

because of the unacceptable combination of the Executive breaching specific Senate instruction,

then accepting the disavowed terms also with a prohibition on reservations. 82 Such a request does not necessarily accompany a transmittal recommendation. See discussion of President Reagan’s transmittal of the Protocols to the Geneva Convention, infra. 83 In May 2002, the author formally petitioned the State Department on behalf of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, to replicate the withdrawal from Rome, re: Kyoto. State responded

in June 2002. It elected to not assert which of the two ambiguous U.S. Kyoto positions—rhetorical vs. submitted—is operative. Its response was mildly incoherent in attempting to avoid addressing the merits presented in the request, merely rejecting this request for clarification of

the ambiguity on the simple basis that ‘‘[w]e have gone to considerable lengths, internationally,

over the past year to make our position with respect to the Kyoto Protocol clear and unambiguous.’’ In short, they’re not confused about the position—whatever it is—so it requires no clarification. 84 1 U.S.C Sections 112a and 112b; as added by act of September 23, 1950, 64 Stat. 980; and

added by Public Law 92–403 [Case-Zablocki Act, S. 596], 86 Stat. 619, approved August 22,

1972.

lier letter of submittal of the Secretary of State which usually contains a detailed

description and analysis of the treaty.’’79

The Senate is historically conditioned to wait for executive transmittal prior to

considering an agreement and its rules now recognize this practice, having in effect

manufactured a ‘‘presentment’’ equivalent. The FRC Report offers in fact an explanation of protocol, and nothing more, serving as the principal impediment to the

Senate considering a treaty absent the Executive transmitting it to them. There is

no constitutional bar. Though the Senate has the constitutional right to set its own

rules of operation,80 there exists no express prohibition in the rules, either.81 It is

a matter of interpretation. These rules are binding of course only on the Senate but

are a matter of interpretation, and that is largely irrelevant:

Yet these Senate rules do not make clear that the Foreign Relations Committee

can refuse an Executive request to consider a treaty on the basis that it was never

transmitted. Such a battle is of course unlikely: if an Executive desired a treaty vote

he would in all likelihood ‘‘transmit’’ a treaty with such a request.82 A conflict is

more likely to involve a White House opposed to ratification, objecting to FRC consideration on the basis that there was never a transmittal. The prospect of such a

conflict is also, however, facially bizarre given a president apparently retains the

right to effectively withdraw the U.S. signature until some point in the pre-ratification stage (see ‘‘Withdrawal’’, infra).

As also discussed, in Kyoto we see a Senate and White House deeply divided, rhetorically at least, over a particular signed-but-not-ratified treaty. This merits consideration of the potential showdown over authority to ultimately commit the U.S. In

this instance, we face a president asserting a position (‘‘rejects’’ the treaty) but unwilling to formalize it. Indeed, this administration actually has rejected the idea of

withdrawal.83

Whether an executive must ‘‘transmit’’ a treaty, or whether the Senate may vote

on signed agreements of its own accord, is a question that has yet to be adjudicated.

It has yet to even be legislated other than Senate internal rules of operation. Congress addressed transmittal of international agreements other than treaties in the

Case-Zablocki Act.84 This Act did not, however, indirectly establish Executive discretion regarding transmittal of treaties to Congress, as its clear import was to inform

Congress of agreements in which Congress had had no consultative or approval role.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee possesses exclusive congressional jurisdiction over treaties (though as was seen regarding Kyoto, other committees, both

House and Senate, may weigh in on various aspects of the agreement). That is, FRC

is the gatekeeper determining which treaties may be reported for floor consideration:

‘‘RULE 1—JURISDICTION

(a) Substantive.—In accordance with Senate Rule XXV.1(j), the jurisdiction of the

Committee shall extend to all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials,

and other matters relating to the following subjects: . . .

17. Treaties and executive agreements, except reciprocal trade agreements.... (b) Oversight.—The Committee also has a responsibility under Senate Rule

XXVI.8, which provides that ’ . . . each standing Committee . . . shall review and

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85 Found at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule30.htm (emphasis added). 86 See FN 57, supra.

study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those

laws or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of the

Committee.’

(c) ‘Advice and Consent’ Clauses.—The Committee has a special responsibility to

assist the Senate in its constitutional function of providing ’advice and consent’ to

all treaties entered into by the United States and all nominations to the principal

executive branch positions in the field of foreign policy and diplomacy . . .

RULE 9—TREATIES

(a) The Committee is the only Committee of the Senate with jurisdiction to review

and report to the Senate on treaties submitted by the President for Senate advice

and consent. Because the House of Representatives has no role in the approval of

treaties, the Committee is therefore the only congressional committee with responsibility for treaties.’’

FRC Rule 9 then seemingly creates a transmittal condition precedent to considering a treaty:

‘‘(b) Once submitted by the President for advice and consent, each treaty is referred to the Committee and remains on its calendar from Congress to Congress

until the Committee takes action to report it to the Senate or recommend its return

to the President, or until the Committee is discharged of the treaty by the Senate.’’

It does appear a Member is not able to move a treaty toward a floor vote in the

absence of at least FRC consideration, though the relevant rule does not seem to

resolve the question of whether the Senate can vote absent transmission (that is,

take matters into its own hands to, e.g., clarify an ambiguous U.S. position):

‘‘RULE XXX EXECUTIVE SESSION—PROCEEDINGS ON TREATIES

1. (a) When a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for ratification, it shall be

read a first time; and no motion in respect to it shall be in order, except to refer

it to a committee, to print it in confidence for the use of the Senate, or to remove

the injunction of secrecy . . .

2. Treaties transmitted by the President to the Senate for ratification shall be resumed at the second or any subsequent session of the same Congress at the stage

in which they were left at the final adjournment of the session at which they were

transmitted; but all proceedings on treaties shall terminate with the Congress, and

they shall be resumed at the commencement of the next Congress as if no proceedings had previously been had thereon.85

So, the Senate seemingly manufactures a ‘‘requirement’’ of presentment. This does

not make that requirement law but likely demonstrates that a court might well

defer a legal challenge to an ambiguous U.S. treaty posture under the ‘‘political

question’’ doctrine. Such a challenge, for example, could seek formal withdrawal

from Kyoto as a necessary step given the Executive’s avowed rejection of a signed

treaty. The State Department manifested the position, in the context of its communication to the U.N. regarding Rome, that withdrawal from such a document requires this transmission pursuant to the delegation of certain ‘‘Management of foreign affairs’’ in 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2656.86 This because by that act the Bush Administration formally recognized the legal implications to signing a treaty, seemingly giving merit to such an effort to compel other withdrawals to resolve similar ambiguities and potential risks.

Still, this language raises an interesting debating point as to whether there is the

equivalent of a ‘‘presentment’’ requirement. That is, the Senate arguably hereby distinguishes between ‘‘Treaties transmitted by the President to the Senate for ratification’’, and, ‘‘When a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for ratification’’, that is,

of the accord of one of its Members.

There clearly is no constitutional prohibition to the Senate taking a signed treaty

upon itself to consider, only a Senate rule possibly indicating they have decided otherwise. The Senate has the right to establish its rules of operation under Article I,

Section 5, but that language offers no prohibition and indeed is ambiguous at best

as to this matter. Certainly given the rhetoric of potential natural catastrophe surrounding Kyoto, if President Bush insists on continuing the U.S.’ ambiguous role in

Kyoto the Senate should take matters into its own hands, and decide the fate of

this agreement.

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87 See, e.g., ‘‘The President’s Transmittal Message’’, H.Doc. 107–20; http://

frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ cgibin/

useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=td007.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/107— cong—documents. 88 United States: Message From the President Transmitting Protocol II Additional to the 1949

Geneva Conventions, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts,

January 29, 1987 (http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/ABARespID.pdf). 89 Id. 90 Id. (emphasis added). 91 See http://www.icrc.org/eng/party—gc.

Regarding the transmittal itself, by practice, this communication is considered formally as part of the Senate Treaty Document sent by the White House.87 Clearly,

a transmittal message need not request ratification, but an Executive certainly may

ask the Senate to reject a treaty. Similarly, though not identical, is that in practice

a transmittal letter does not require ‘‘transmission’’ of the particular treaty language for a vote, but can include a mere request that the Senate express its sense

that the treaty is not acceptable. This likely satisfies the Vienna test for manifesting

a state’s intention to not be bound by a treaty, if it does not equate with rejection.

President Reagan’s transmittal of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention offers an example of what may be considered ‘‘risk-free transmittal’’, that is, asking

for disapproval while not risking present or future ratification of the actual agreement.

After transmitting and asking for ratification of Protocol II, additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, President Reagan requested the Senate express its sense of disapproval of Protocol I,

which he did not transmit. Addressing in part a topic very timely to a current debate, specifically the status of certain combatants, President Reagan wrote: ‘‘While I recommend that the Senate grant advice and consent to this agreement

[Protocol II], I have at the same time concluded that the United States cannot ratify

a second agreement on the law of armed conflict negotiated during the same period.

I am referring to Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which would

revise the rules applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all other efforts associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross, this agreement has certain meritorious elements.’’88

Calling Protocol I ‘‘fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed’’, Reagan described its

flaws in principle and with some specific examples, then shifted the burden to the

Senate without actually transmitting the Protocol with a recommendation to reject,

stating in relevant part: ‘‘These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot be remedied

through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to submit the Protocol to the

Senate in any form, and I would invite an expression of the sense of the Senate that

it shares this view.’’89

The deviation from form—sending treaty language for ratification—extended to

the request—mere disapproval of non-transmitted language. Yet Reagan described

his desired outcome as if it were a mere, standard ‘‘rejection’’: ‘‘It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would have preferred to

ratify such a convention, which as I said contains certain sound elements. But we

cannot allow other nations of the world, however numerous, to impose upon us and

our allies and friends an unacceptable and thoroughly distasteful price for joining

a convention drawn to advance the laws of war . . . The repudiation of Protocol I

is one additional step, at the ideological level so important to terrorist organizations,

to deny these groups legitimacy as international actors. Therefore, I request that the

Senate act promptly to give advice and consent to the ratification of the agreement

I am transmitting today, subject to the understandings and reservations that are

described more fully in the attached report. I would also invite an expression of the

sense of the Senate that it shares the view that the United States should not ratify

Protocol I, thereby reaffirming its support for traditional humanitarian law, and its

opposition to the politicization of that law by groups that employ terrorist practices.’’90

This quasi-transmittal offers a model for Executive request of the Senate regarding other commitments through which the U.S. presents an ambiguous posture. It

does not, however, guarantee clarification: The Senate elected to vote on neither

Protocol, adding them to the heap of literally dozens of treaties signed but not ratified, not to mention those of which never were the subject of a ‘‘transmittal’’ to the

Senate.91

This does offer authority for the proposition that the Senate need wait for neither

a Presidential transmission of language, nor a request to ratify a treaty in order

to speak to the issue of whether it accepts the commitment. In the case of Kyoto,

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92 Per Kyoto’s Preamble, it developed, de jure, ‘‘Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention,’’ (Principles), which was the omnibus ‘‘protect the planet’’ provision. This rationalization emerged,

de facto, however directly pursuant to the new U.S. administration’s assertion of ‘‘changed circumstances’’. The next step, of actually drafting a binding document, came ‘‘Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at

its first session,’’ as also set forth in Kyoto’s preamble. 93 Specifically, in 1993, the new Clinton-Gore Administration created a State Department slot

for former Senator Tim Wirth, Undersecretary of State of Global Affairs, including in its portfolio ‘‘environment’’. Wirth was famous for his statement in 1990 as a Democratic Senator from

Colorado, ‘‘We’ve got to ride the global warming issue. Even if the theory of global warming is

wrong, we will be doing the right thing in terms of economic and environmental policy.’’ Cited

in ‘‘Global Warming: Just a Lot of Hot Air?’’, The Actuarial Review, August 1998 (Fred

Kilbourne) (see http://www.casact.org/pubs/actrev/aug98/gwfredk. htm). Rio, in hindsight, soon

began to look like an agreement whose authors had no sincere intent of determining its effectiveness when it was almost immediately used as a springboard to obtain mandatory, reduction

commitments. In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance asserted that ‘‘the

administration has been working on this policy for more than a year’’, quoted in Nature, 25 July

1996.

Byrd-Hagel has no relevant ‘‘consent’’ impact—though potentially great influence as

‘‘advice’’ eschewed—Kyoto not having been agreed at the time this (inherently) nonbinding resolution passed.

Another question involves the implications of ‘‘transmitting’’ a treaty to Senate.

Upon such communication, has the President ceded his ability to withdraw, as

President Bush withdrew from Rome? If so, is it for a reasonable period for the Senate to act, say, the term of one Congress, which ability is revived by the absence

of Senate action over another reasonable period of time?

Such resolution seems unnecessarily complex and, presuming no presentment requirement exists for treaties, two outcomes appear equally possible. The courts

could determine some form of ‘‘mutual jurisdiction’’ during a post-transmittal, prevote stage, during which either branch may decide or at least advance the fate of

an agreement. Alternatively, the courts could determine that such an Executive

function should not be undertaken lightly. In such instance, they might reason,

given that even post-transmission—whatever the request—the President retains the

ability to formally request Senate rejection decide that upon transmission the Senate obtains sole jurisdiction.

Finally, the courts may determine that there is indeed a presentment requirement

for treaties. In such case, it would be reasonable to rule that, just as the President

has the right to sit on a treaty until presentment, the senate has the same right

after presentment. Of course, even President Bush’s recent withdrawal from Rome

appears unprecedented, if precisely what longstanding international policy held to

be appropriate behavior. Thus, despite that all of this remains conjecture, the increased possibility of challenge to these questionable modern practices merits inquiry.

ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE TREATY PROCESS—ADVICE AND CONSENT

What obligations and impediments arise from the constitutional requirement of

‘‘advice and consent’’, particularly in the unique circumstances offered by development of Kyoto? Further, what role does the Senate play in possible withdrawal in

such unique circumstances? Finally, if a ratified agreement is amended, is it subject

to further advice and consent?

Advice: Kyoto Example

We have already examined the nontraditional role the Senate played in offering

advice to the Executive regarding the Kyoto Protocol, development of which began

soon after—and, arguably, partially as a consequence of—the inauguration of a new

U.S. administration. As discussed, this process toward binding international commitments regarding domestic energy use emissions not declared, for the most part,

‘‘pollutants’’ by any nation in the world, came almost immediately on the heels of

agreeing in Rio to the UNFCCC’s voluntary campaign.92 This, certain domestic efforts,93 and a lack of administration solicitation of advice alarmed many within the

Senate. As negotiations advanced, Senators took it upon themselves to register advice.

The Senate, seeing what was developing, unanimously passed a non-binding,

‘‘Sense of the Senate Resolution’’:

‘‘Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that——

(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of

1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would——

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94 ‘‘Byrd-Hagel,’’ S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105–54 July 21, 1997). 95 Specifically, parties committed to varying percentages of reduction from 1990 levels of GHG

emissions. Some were permitted to increase emissions (e.g., Australia, by 8 percent), others permitted to pool their emission increases/reductions under a bubble (the EU), while the U.S. committed to reduce GHG emissions by 7 percent below 1990, or 19 percent below today’s emission

levels according to the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA). 96 EIA, e.g., estimated Kyoto’s economic impact upon the U.S. economy at $400 billion annually. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Admin., Office of Integrated Analysis and

Forecasting. Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic Activity.

Washington, DC. October 1998. 97 See USA Today, June 12, 2001. 98 True, as described, supra, several non-signatory nations ratified Kyoto nonetheless. These

nations share neither our Constitution, nor our adherence to protocol, and it seems implausible

that the U.S. Senate should ever reverse an Executive having rejected a signed, unratified treaty that the Senate has made no move to consider. It seems an open question whether Article

II prohibits such an act. 99 Some systems, as recognized by individual treaties and the Vienna Convention, allow for

binding treaty commitments to arise from this signature, equivalent with, e.g., U.S. Senate ratification. 100 See FN 47, supra. 101 See FN 55, supra. 102 See FN 53, supra.

(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for

the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or

(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States.’’94

Subsequent to this advice, and upon other nations of the world resisting U.S. positions, Vice President Al Gore arranged to fly to Kyoto, where he encouraged U.S.

negotiators to show ‘‘increased negotiating flexibility.’’ Kyoto emerged, clearly not

satisfying Byrd-Hagel condition (1)(A) by differentiating between 38 ‘‘covered’’ countries. Opponents were also angry over the agreement to differentiate various commitments among those countries.95

Regarding condition (1)(B), among prominent economic analysts only the Clinton

White House’s Council of Economic Advisors, contended that no ‘‘serious economic

harm’’ would result.96 President Clinton never submitted the treaty to the Senate

over the course of the remaining 25 months of his presidency. Upon leaving office

the relevant CEA professionals publicly amended their assertions regarding Kyoto’s

economic impact.97

Administration disregard for Senate advice was exacerbated when the White

House soon adopted a mantra of seeking ‘‘meaningful participation by key developing countries,’’ a rhetorical sleight of hand to facilitate ratification. Still, this received no widespread condemnation, despite the administration’s ploy being an apparent, significant diminution of the Senate’s most prominent ‘‘Advice’’.

The composition of the Senate can change appreciably over a short time and, so

long as the U.S. remains a signatory, it may feasibly ratify Kyoto.98 All past sins

of omission, and commission regarding the Article II ‘‘Advice’’ requirement are

absolvable through a ratification vote.

‘‘Consent’’, or Ratification

As noted, it is clear from Article II Section 2 that the executive has the power

to negotiate agreements, and principal role therein. This typically involves at minimum one signature stage, at minimum as a protocol, formalizing’’ the signatory’s

eligibility for ratification.99 However, it is also clear pursuant to Article II the terms

of any agreement negotiated by the executive do not become effective against the

U.S. until and unless the Senate ratifies the agreement by two-thirds of those voting.100 This presumably intimates a limitation on the treaty power of an executive

not being able to validly enter agreements circumventing the constitutional ratification requirement.101 Further, this raises the possible issue of what rises to the level

of a treaty requiring Senate ratification?102

Treaties typically recognize that a significant number of countries do not permit

the ‘‘Executive’’ to formally bind his nation through a signature, but that it is a fairly common requirement that one or more legislative bodies approve of the document.

To the extent a particular document does not address this issue, the Vienna Convention codifies the ‘‘customary’’ recognition of this practice. Treaties also typically provide a window for ratification. We have already seen, supra, the ambiguities surrounding whether the Senate may of its own accord consider a treaty for ratification.

326

103 See the UN’s Model Instrument of Reservation at http://untreaty.un.org/English/

TreatyHandbook/ annex6.htm. 104 See EPA statement on POPs Treaty at http://www.epa.gov/oppfead1/cb/csb—page/updates/

popsleg.htm. 105 See, e.g., Kyoto Article 20. 106 See Articles 41, 42. 107 In consenting to the Genocide Convention, the Senate added a reservation that the U.S.

must first specifically consent to IJC jurisdiction before submitting any dispute to which the

United States was a party. ‘‘Treaties and other International Agreements’’, p. 21. 108 In response to this very practice of treaties moving far along in the development stage

that it takes political capital, often not spent, to extricate from even that level of agreement,

the Bush Administration has initiated an informal policy group to look down the road at potential such entanglements particularly in the environmental context. This would seem to be a lesson learned from Rio and Kyoto. Participants are drawn, inter alia, from the State Department,

Council on Environmental Quality, and National Security Council.

The ‘‘Consent’’ function offers the Senate a second bite as the ‘‘Advice’’ apple. That

is, with the rare exception found in Kyoto, treaties typically allow reservations and/

or objections to particular provisions.103 The executive may make suggestions regarding such objections, as it at issue in the current debate regarding Senate ratification of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs Treaty).104 Domestic U.S. parties whose products or businesses would be covered by this

agreement’s restrictions seek ratification, but conditional upon one of two options

in the treaty language over the addition of new chemicals to the list of covered substances.

Specifically, these parties seek a reservation to the effect that each addition to the

list of covered chemicals requires discrete ratification by countries recognizing this

addition. This raises another relevant ‘‘Consent’’ issue: whether treaty amendments

require individual ratification. The treaty itself typically addresses this matter.105

To the extent an agreement does not address this matter, Vienna offers ambiguous

guidance as to what rule governs.106 This contributes to the reality in practice that

Senate ratification clearly can be made contingent upon any modifications to the

particular treaty being subject to ratification prior to being binding on the U.S.107

Kyoto’s amendment mechanism is set forth through various Articles. First, specifically discussing ‘‘non-compliance’’ and consequences,’’ Article 18 reads, in pertinent

part, ‘‘Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol.’’ Such

amendment occurs as set forth in Article 20:

‘‘1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol.

2. Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the

Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed

amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting.

The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.’’ (emphasis added)

Kyoto then proceeds to indicate that Senate ratification of Kyoto even in its current, incomplete form and without a specific reservation to this effect, nonetheless

permits the U.S. to claim it is not bound by any subsequent narrowing of Kyoto’s

terms without separate ratification:

‘‘4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with

the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall

enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the

date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three

fourths of the Parties to this Protocol.’’

This is reassuring to some degree given that Kyoto permits all nations to vote on

binding consequences applicable only to those 36 countries actually covered by

Kyoto’s restrictions. Reassuring as this ‘‘out’’ may be, it remains foreseeable that the

requisite three-fourths of, e.g., all 178 parties to Kyoto should they ultimately ratify,

can occur if that large universe of countries facing all benefit, no pain under Kyoto

merely coalesce. The incentive to ‘‘stick it’’ to particular countries, for example the

U.S., is enormous, given the amounts of money involved under a fully implemented

rationing structure that is Kyoto. Given international pressures to proceed ‘‘with the

flow’’ should the U.S. actually ratify Kyoto, this presents alarming opportunities for

other nations to extract even more benefits out of the U.S. in this context than

Kyoto’s generous ‘‘capacity building’’ and ‘‘development’’ funds already envision.108

327

109 See Rabkin, pp. 12–16. 110 See discussion of NAFTA, supra. 111 Of course, these ratifying nations were not those facing actual emission reduction obligations under Kyoto, but among the 140 ‘‘exempt’’ nations, who were principally made eligible to

receive wealth transfers under the treaty’s auspices. 112 These negotiations occurred after the U.S. Presidential election but prior to its resolution.

There, the EU negotiators, likely sensing desperation on the part of Clinton Administration negotiators aware an administration opposed to Kyoto might well be inaugurated soon, refused to

take ‘‘yes’’ for an answer on key issues on the table. Specifically, they held to a unique assertion

Continued

Senate ratification cannot constitutionally be abrogated by the Executive,109

though as we have seen Congress can anticipatorily abdicate the Senate’s ability to

modify an agreement’s language, and thus its ability to offer substantive objections

or reservations (though not to reject a treaty).110

Consideration of treaties must begin in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Again, and contrary to that reality that scores of treaties formally transmitted to

the Senate lie dormant, Senate FRC Rule 9 calls for swift initiation of the consideration process:

d) Insofar as possible, the Committee should conduct a public hearing on each

treaty as soon as possible after its submission by the President. Except in extraordinary circumstances, treaties reported to the Senate shall be accompanied by a

written report.

As also discussed in ‘‘Transmittal’’, Senate Standing Rule XXX governs Senate

treaty procedure.

The Constitution requires two-thirds of those ‘‘present,’’ or voting. As mentioned,

Alexander Hamilton foresaw possible political gamesmanship in the ratification

process, detailed in Federalist No. 75. Hamilton argued that requiring two-thirds of

those ‘‘present’’ would mitigate these opportunities. Hamilton’s fears were prescient,

though the resolved language suffers a similar soft underbelly for political hijinks.

Imagine one party seeing great political gain in voting for a politically charged

treaty so long as it failed, and great peril—political and otherwise—if enacted. This

describes the dynamic between many Senators and Kyoto. Extensive polling data

show, for example, that the concept of ‘‘doing something’’ about ‘‘global warming’’ enjoys popular support so long as it remains a proposal potentially warding off future

catastrophe. The actual requirements of massive energy use reductions, and how to

attain them, are not quite so popular.

Consider a height of media and trade competitor outrage about a U.S. President

having informally ‘‘rejected’’ a treaty, say after one World or Kyoto summit. The

savvy Majority Leader might schedule a treaty vote (see debate over ‘‘Transmittal,’’

supra). The intent would be the near-certain, near-unanimous support of one party

and a nicely contrasting party bloc voting nearly unanimously against. Two-thirds

would not be achieved. Whispers to the Majority party’s business supporters could

issue that the treaty stands no chance, so do not become alarmed. This display

would provide one party an opportunity to declare their concern and support for a

document that is politically advantageous among certain constituencies, while casting its opposition as heartlessly standing in the way. That party would carry a powerful rhetorical weapon into the next elections.

This scenario collapses should most, e.g., Republicans simply not be ‘‘present’’

come vote time. In such case, it seems highly likely the attempted ploy would severely backfire, to great fanfare and political heat from the other party’s own

‘‘green’’ base. Members would rush to the well to change their vote, and/or the treaty would ultimately be pulled from consideration, naturally amid claims of the opposition’s irresponsibility. The alternative to this retreat would be a party singlehandedly responsible for the U.S. committing itself to a treaty wildly unpopular

even in theory among most labor and energy consuming interests. For this reason,

the required Senate vote remains subject to gamesmanship.

Further, and as referenced, supra, in theory problems can arise with agreements

open for ratification though they are subject to further negotiations, and indeed may

require significant narrowing of the meaning of its various provisions before offering

sufficient detail to be enforceable or even considered a meeting of the minds. Kyoto

is a sterling example of such problems.

Kyoto’s express window for ratification was already open by, e.g., the November

2000 COP–6 in The Hague, and numerous countries had already ratified the agreement such that it could go into effect against them should it gain sufficient ratifications.111 The Hague negotiations collapsed with no alteration or narrowing of the

terms after the EU and U.S. avowed wildly divergent opinions on the meaning of

several terms key to the agreement’s financial impact on the U.S.112 The parties imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00331 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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regarding the significant limitation upon sinks (credits for land use practices which actually remove GHGs from the atmosphere), simply not visible to the naked eye when reading the relevant Kyoto title (Article 3). The EU implausibly insisted that parties intended the language

that sinks ‘‘shall be used to meet the commitments under this article’’ really only intended allowance for insignificant sink credits. Given the U.S. intended to meet a major portion of its

Kyoto commitment through sinks, this initiated the beginning of the (temporary?) ‘‘end’’ of fullfledged U.S. participation in Kyoto talks. 113 See ‘‘Submission’’, supra, for discussion of the necessity of communicating a treaty to the

Senate, or whether the Executive’s signature is sufficient justification for the Court to assert

the Senate’s ability to ratify the document 114 See the UN’s ‘‘Model Instrument for Ratification’’, at http://untreaty.un.org/English/

TreatyHandbook/ annex4.htm. 115 ‘‘Implementation The executive branch has the primary responsibility for carrying out

treaties and ascertaining that other parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire Congress share in the following phases.’’ ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, p. 12. ‘‘A question that may be raised under U.S. law is whether or not Congress has a duty

to implement a treaty which is in force internationally, but which requires additional legislation

or implementation or an appropriation of funds to give effect to obligations assumed internationally by the United States. When implementation of a treaty requires domestic legislation or an

appropriation of funds, only the Congress can provide them.’’ Id. at pp. 166–67. Despite no specific implementing legislation, however, the Senate has indeed appropriated funds in pursuit of

administrative programs seeking to advance Rio’s objectives.

The FRC Report continues, ‘‘The extent of congressional obligation to implement a treaty

under U.S. law has not been resolved in principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority,

Congress has generally responded ’to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President (especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .’’’ Id. at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution. 2d ed.

1996, pp. 205–206. The referenced FN 61 says in pertinent part, ‘‘[F]ailure to implement an

internationally perfected treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the

United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12, 1976, by Monroe Leigh,

Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 1976. 1977, p. 221.’’ This begs the question: ‘‘to precisely what extent

was the ‘‘non-binding’’ Rio binding?’’ Addressing this question prior to ratification, ‘‘[t]he [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee

made clear, in other words, its view that ’[t]he final framework convention contains no legally

binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions’ . . . While these statements may not

be as legally binding as a formal condition to the Senate’s ratification of the 1992 Convention

[ed: reservations were prohibited by Rio’s terms], it is doubtful that any administration could

ignore them.’’ ‘‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol’’, p.

4. CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC. 33521 (Oct. 7,

1992)(statement of Sen. McConnell).

To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 the Senate ‘‘stated the view that any agreement

which would require Senate advice and consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis

of its economic impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to implement the agreement.’’ See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25.

mediately called ‘‘COP–6.5’’, held in Marrakech in September 2001, to resume negotiations. By that time, President Bush had taken office and repeated his campaign

opposition to Kyoto, solidifying the rhetorical, if not de facto, ‘‘rejection’’ by the U.S.

initiated at The Hague collapse.

Therefore, Kyoto actually collapsed, so far as U.S. participation is concerned,

under the prior administration. The more relevant lesson is that treaties open for

ratification can, and often do, present little in the way of an actual meeting of the

minds permitting implementation and compliance. Ratification should always be undertaken warily, but, as this shows, should not even be considered when the treaty

remains subject to determining what it is that parties actually agreed.

Deposit of Ratification Instrument

Despite the Clinton Administration negotiating Kyoto, for example, over the

course of 25 months it never ‘‘communicated’’ the treaty to the Senate for a ratification vote.113

Still, though a ratification vote would create a stronger argument of commitment,

under Vienna Article 18, than would mere signature, it does not formalize ‘‘consent

to be bound by the treaty’’, pursuant to the terms of most pacts. Even after agreement, signature, and a ratification vote a country is not formally bound to the terms

of a treaty until it submits its instrument of ratification.114

Post-Ratification

Treaties can either require parties to enact implementing legislation, or be ‘‘selfimplementing’’, that is, needing no new authority to implement its terms.115 Clearly,

of course, as authorities vary by state, a self-implementing treaty to one party may

require implementing legislation by another. Typically, however, self-implementing

329

116 I.L.M. 11:963–976; September 1972. This Convention entered force on December 21, 1975,

after the required signatures of seven countries. The U.S. Senate consented to ratification of the

Convention on October 9, 1986, and the President signed instruments of ratification on November 10, 1986. 117 See http://laws.fws.gov/lawsdigest/treaty.html#list. 118 Yet this is not the case, be the treaty in effect or otherwise. ‘‘Domestically, the Constitution does not prescribe a process for the United States to terminate a treaty, and the process

remains controversial. Treaties have been terminated in a variety of ways, including by the

President following a joint resolution of Congress, by the President following action by the Senate, by the President and with subsequent congressional or Senate approval, and by the President alone.’’ ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements,’’ at 14.

Regarding ABM, controversy exists in that numerous Members of Congress have filed suit

against President Bush’s invocation of the withdrawal provision in the anti-ballistic missile

(ABM) treaty, signed with the now-defunct Soviet Union. See also S. 1565 (107th), proposed Senate resolution of disapproval. 119 There is also little room to dispute that an ‘‘agreed to’’ treaty as yet unsigned requires

no withdrawal, given that even the ‘‘troublemaking’’ provision Vienna 18, is triggered by the signature, not some even less formal level of ‘‘commitment’’. Specifically: ‘‘A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when (a) it has signed

the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval . . .’’ The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius would indicate that ‘‘commitments’’ begin with the signature. Also, the pre-signature, ‘‘agreement’’ stage as in the 1997

Kyoto ‘‘agreement’’ likely does not rise to the level of ‘‘exchanging documents.’’ See the canons

noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.

treaties provide reporting and accounting functions generally available to any relevant regulatory or administrative body.

An example of a self-ratifying treaty is the Rasmar Convention, or Convention on

Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitats.116

The Convention requires no implementing legislation as it merely requires maintenance of a list of wetlands of international importance and encourages ‘‘wise use’’

of wetlands in order to preserve the ecological characteristics from which wetland

values derive. The required function(s) can be effected under existing regulatory

and/or administrative authority, in this case the task is merely the U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service serving as an administrative authority, in consultation with the Department of State.117

The Kyoto Protocol, however, is an entirely different story. Even in theory it is

highly suspect that Kyoto could possibly proceed without implementing legislation.

This because for the U.S. to achieve its obligations realistically requires significant

reduction in emissions from energy use. The former, emissions, are for the most part

not considered ‘‘pollutants’’ and therefore not regulated; the latter, actual energy

use, is not regulated in any governmental sense but by market forces. Kyoto reductions would in fact require a massive series of initiatives to implement its regime,

from emissions limitations and myriad tax provisions to internal versions of, inter

alia, the international verification and trading infrastructures. That maze is illustrative of a treaty that is decidedly not self-implementing.

Withdrawal

The U.S. Constitution is silent as to the process for treaty withdrawal. Treaties

provide their own provisions for withdrawal from their commitments. Kyoto’s procedure, for example, is set forth in Article 27, as follows:

‘‘1. At any time after 3 years from the date on which this Protocol has entered

into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written

notification to the Depositary.

2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of 1 year from the date of

receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as

may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.

3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Protocol.’’

Clearly, Senate ratification of a treaty that includes a withdrawal mechanism

should resolve the question of the legitimacy of an executive acting pursuant to such

mechanism. Though withdrawal can be politically contentious, little controversy appears likely over the actual process of withdrawal from treaties in-effect.118

That focused upon in this paper, however, is the curious, topical matter of withdrawing from agreements not ratified because of the possibility of obligations arising from pre-ratification commitments.119 The treaty may merely be signed, and not

transmitted to the Senate. The document may have been transmitted but not yet

taken up. As discussed in ‘‘Submission’’, supra, that transmittal may or may not

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120 Does the latter circumstance satisfy the Vienna test of making ‘‘its intention clear not to

become a party to the treaty’’? This is a fascinating question given that ‘‘(6) Treaties Reported

by the [Foreign Relations] Committee but neither approved nor formally returned to the President by the Senate are automatically returned to the Committee calendar at the end of a Congress; the Committee must report them out again for the Senate to consider them.’’ Therefore, a ‘‘defeated’’ treaty is not necessarily rejected until it is returned to the President. See ‘‘Treaties

and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, p. 12, at http://

frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106—cong—senate—print&docid=f:66922.

pdf. 121 For an example of withdrawal from a treaty in effect, see U.S. termination of recognition

of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice Treaty Series, vol. l, p. 9. 122 Vienna does permit rejection or withdrawal, if not elsewhere provided otherwise and only

under certain conditions, by ‘‘denunciation.’’ See, e.g., Articles 42–44, 56, etc. However, that appears to be a term of art applicable only to executives with unilateral power to effect a treaty.

Clearly, given the discussion above, that does not by itself seem to exclude the U.S. and its own

system’s peculiarities, when a treaty has yet to be ratified. Still, President Bush’s precedent regarding Rome has established how the U.S. expresses its rejection. Mere badmouthing can reasonably be viewed as a negotiating ploy for a better offer. 123 One reason provided by the Bush Administration, publicly if informally for the U.S. not

having submitted any communication to the UNFCCC indicating its intent to not be bound by

Kyoto is that the U.S. must remain a part of ‘‘the Kyoto process’’. There is no ‘‘Kyoto process,’’

however, until the treaty achieves sufficient ratification to go into effect. Until that time, these

negotiations remain part of the Rio Process (e.g., Kyoto emerged not from COP–1, or a Kyoto

process, but COP–3, of the Rio Process pursuant to Rio Article 7). The U.S. delegation now assumes a second-class citizen posture, communicating desires through a proxy nation (typically

Canada, one of the ‘‘umbrella group’’ nations; other such groups are the EU, the G–77 and

China, etc.). This seems a wasted exercise as until Kyoto goes into effect, as a ratifying party

to Rio the U.S. has every right to actively participate in the current round of COPs. This is

another example of how protocol, or the desire to not upset other parties, dominates treaty process more than legal requirements. 124 The Administration are likely incorrect. Specifically, the U.S. is informally spreading the

word that because it has not ratified Kyoto it is not a ‘‘Party’’, but thereby eligible for Article

15 ‘‘observer’’ status. Yet it is clear that ‘‘Party’’ status originated with the agreement to Kyoto’s terms at the close of COP–3. Specifically, Kyoto’s own language belies a claim that until Kyoto

is made effective by sufficient ratifications there are no ‘‘Parties’’ to the agreement.

The relevant provisions include, but are in no way limited to, the following: a) Kyoto’s preamble prior to its articles states ‘‘The Parties to this Protocol . . . Have agreed as follows: [Articles] . . .’’, dated December 1997 and setting forth articles clearly reading in the present tense,

and not as if relevant solely upon ratification; b) Articles 6.2, 7.4, 16, 18 and 20, among others,

all reference activities which to the extent they have been addressed in the days since COP–

3 manifest that it is ‘‘Parties’’—to the Protocol, not the UNFCCC—who have been deliberating

since; c) Article 13.2 makes clear that any decisions made regarding further narrowing of the

Kyoto language, subsequent to COP–3, were made by Parties to the Protocol; and d) Article 13.7

appears to set forth the mechanism by which COP–6.5 (Bonn) was called and particularly timed,

at the request of a Party to Kyoto.

matter. Finally, a treaty may have been taken up for Senate consideration, but

failed to achieve the requisite two-thirds vote.120

Kyoto’s sole relevant provision addresses only a treaty having entered into force

and offers no guidance as to how a state extracts itself from whatever commitments

are incurred through signature.121 This is seemingly true with the Vienna Convention’s numerous relevant Articles (54—72), though those seem arguably susceptible

to claims that they translate at minimum in spirit to state efforts to ‘‘[make] its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty’’. The UNFCCC ought to serve as an authority on this issue, but, curiously, the

same UNFCCC correspondence to the author regarding the U.S. status re: Kyoto,

cited in FN 19, supra, also asserted: ‘‘There is no procedure for the withdrawal of

a signature in the [UNFCCC or Kyoto].’’ A follow-up request as to whether this indicates the UNFCCC does not recognize the Vienna Convention has gone unanswered

to date.

We can be confident that, at least in the case of the U.S., the Vienna Article 18

requirement is not satisfied by senior officers merely speaking ill of a treaty.122

As regards the never ratified, never transmitted Kyoto (or Rome), President

Bush’s badmouthing of the treaty, though he may clearly still reject it, would not

be considered to constitute rejection by ‘‘denunciation.’’ The U.S. continues to send

delegations to the relevant negotiations, though in a strange, voluntarily mitigated

role that is a matter of some controversy.123 Kyoto provides for ‘‘observers’’ in Article 15: ‘‘2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies.

When the subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions

under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.’’ It is this provision the Administration seems to believe it is invoking by attending

negotiations in full force, but in a somewhat ‘‘backbench’’ role.124

331

In sum, it takes remarkable creativity to contend under the language of Kyoto that no Parties

to Kyoto exist until sufficient ratifications to bring Kyoto into effect have been submitted to the

Directorate. 125 See Vienna Article 67. 126 Further, would the U.S. extending, or even permitting the continued application of, oil and

gas depletion allowances (tax breaks facilitating lower-priced energy) also constitute a violation

of Vienna via Kyoto? If so, how about recently extended state subsidies for the German coal

industry, a nation which subsequently ratified Kyoto? 127 See, e.g., http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/eunc3.pdf. The EU, which under Kyoto has negotiated a ‘‘bubble’’ such that it could pool its increases and ‘‘reductions’’, announced in May that

it met its Rio target. It said it had reduced greenhouse gases by 3.5 percent below 1990 levels

in 2000. This is commonly attributed to the ending of coal subsidies in Great Britain in their

push to replace coal with gas, shutting down East German industry and that Europe did not

match the U.S.’ decade-long economic expansion. Russia, e.g., met its target by regressing economically. 128 As the party charged with ‘‘making’’ treaties the Executive is responsible for meeting, or

at minimum proposing legislation to affect, treaty commitments. President Clinton proposed a

Btu tax, though not expressly in pursuit of Rio. It failed once and did not emerge again. He

instituted his Climate Action Plan, which with minor recent modifications continues to this day

with more than 50 voluntary programs, though a quick search of Thomas revealed no implementing legislation. Congress did appropriate money in response to proposals by the Executive.

See, e.g., ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the U.S. Senate’’, S. Rpt.

106–71, p.4. 129 ‘‘Implementation The executive branch has the primary responsibility for carrying out

treaties and ascertaining that other parties fulfill their obligations after treaties and other international agreements enter into force, but the Senate or the entire Congress share in the following phases.’’ ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements’’, p. 12. ‘‘A question that may be

raised under U.S. law is whether or not Congress has a duty to implement a treaty which is

in force internationally, but which requires additional legislation or implementation or an appropriation of funds to give effect to obligations assumed internationally by the United States.

When implementation of a treaty requires domestic legislation or an appropriation of funds, only

the Congress can provide them.’’ Id. at pp. 166–67.

The FRC Report continues, ‘‘The extent of congressional obligation to implement a treaty

under U.S. law has not been resolved in principle. FN 61 According to an often-cited authority,

Congress has generally responded ’to a sense of duty to carry out what the treaty-makers promContinued

Instead, withdrawal from a treaty (in effect) sufficient to satisfy Vienna is accomplished by communicating this intent to the other parties to the treaty.125 As regards the unratified Rome Treaty, President Bush doubtless satisfied the relevant

requirement by submitting an instrument rescinding the signature to the same body

to which the signature was communicated. Regarding such treaties, however, until

such communication, any nation is free to pursue an action seeking to have, for example, either the Bush energy plan calling for the construction of more coal-fired

power plants, or its ‘‘Climate Action’’ proposal allowing increased greenhouse gas

emissions, for they clearly violate Kyoto’s ‘‘object and purpose’’.126

Finally, reconsider the Geneva Convention Protocol I. President Reagan transmitted a statement to the Senate whereby he did not send the language and ask

for an unsuccessful vote on ratification, but asked for an ‘‘expression of the sense

of the Senate’’ that it shared his disapproving view of the agreement. This appears

to be a mere semantic distinction, but by so doing President Reagan performed a

burden shift, establishing by precedent a position on which very few hard and fast

rules govern. This transmittal intimated that the treaty was purely in the Senate’s

realm upon Executive signature, when in fact it is likely in the province of either

the Executive or the Senate at this point to act.

CONCLUSION

The Kyoto Protocol, and its predecessor the Rio Treaty, offer an excellent example

of the distorted modern application of the Treaty Power. This article intends to expose the impropriety of the U.S. agreeing to amend the U.N. Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCC, or Rio Treaty), by ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.

For whatever specific reasons (economic growth, failure to foresee the energy requirements of the ‘‘new economy’’, or other), the U.S., like many nations, failed to

meet its voluntary Rio targets.127

Now some advocates assert, ‘‘Because the U.S. has not met its Rio goal, we must

commit to even greater mandatory reductions (Kyoto)’’. Attempting instead to comply with the initial treaty seems the more appropriate response, for several reasons.

Rio went into force in March 1994. President Clinton did not request, nor did Congress enact, independent legislation implementing Rio, which was not an inherently

self-executing treaty.128 Authority and precedent make clear that responsibility for

proposing such programs lies with the White House.129 If our ‘‘non-binding’’ Rio obliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00335 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
332

ised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President (especially after he can no longer retreat), to an unwillingness to make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous . . .’’’

Id. at 167, quoting Henkin, Louis. Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution. 2d ed.

1996, pp. 205–206. The referenced FN 61 says in pertinent part, ‘‘[F]ailure to implement an

internationally perfected treaty would constitute a violation of obligations assumed by the

United States under international law. See Memorandum of April 12, 1976, by Monroe Leigh,

Legal Adviser, Department of State, as quoted in U.S. Department of State. Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law 1976. 1977, p. 221.’’ This begs the question: ‘‘to precisely what extent

was the ‘‘non-binding’’ Rio binding? 130 Addressing the question, above (FN 5), prior to ratification, ‘‘[t]he [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee made clear, in other words, its view that ’[t]he final framework convention contains no legally binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions’ . . . While these

statements may not be as legally binding as a formal condition to the Senate’s ratification of

the 1992 Convention [ed: reservations were prohibited by Rio’s terms], it is doubtful that any

administration could ignore them.’’ ‘‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the

Kyoto Protocol’’, p. 4. CRS Report for Congress (March 29, 2001), citing in part 138 CONG. REC.

33521 (Oct. 7, 1992)(statement of Sen. McConnell).

To avoid future such uncertainty, in S.Res. 98 (105th Cong., 1st Sess., adopted at 143 CONG.

REC. S 8138 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)), the Senate ‘‘stated the view that any agreement which

would require Senate advice and consent should be accompanied by a detailed analysis of its

economic impact and of any legislation and regulations necessary to implement the agreement.’’

See CRS Report at p. 6, FN 25. 131 ‘‘In mid–1997, as these negotiations were underway, the Senate passed S. Res. 98 [ed.:

‘‘Byrd-Hagel,’’ S.Res. 98 105th Congress (105–54 July 21, 1997)], which stated that the Senate

would not approve any agreement on binding reductions in greenhouse gases that did not include commitments by developing countries as well as developed/industrialized countries, or that

would result in harm to the U.S. economy. The administration has not transmitted the Kyoto

Protocol to the Senate because, among other reasons, developing countries have to date not been

willing to consider making binding commitments regarding their greenhouse gas emissions.’’

‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements’’, p. 276.

The operative language is as follows: ‘‘Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that——

(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in

Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would——

(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I

Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the

same compliance period, or

(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States’’. 132 ‘‘Economists from the Clinton White House now concede that complying with Kyoto’s mandatory reductions in greenhouse gases would be difficult—and more expensive to American consumers than they thought when they were in charge.’’ USA Today, 12 June 2001. 133 In 1996, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rafe Pomerance asserted that ‘‘the administration has been working on this policy for more than a year’’, quoted in Nature, 25 July 1996. 134 See, Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public

Works, at http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051–450&CID=1051–

031302C.

gations in fact ‘‘bound’’ the U.S. to achieve specific reductions130—contrary to contemporary Senate and Executive assertions of U.S. intent—then the Executive interpretation of Rio Article 4 throughout the 1990’s was actually incorrect, and is responsible. The pending question is apparently: does the U.S. respond by attempting

to meet such Rio promises, or by making further, even deeper, binding promises?

Skipping specific pursuit of the U.S.’ Rio promises, in favor of Kyoto’s binding

commitments even greater than those we’ve failed to attain, seems highly illogical.

Compounding this of course is that, precisely 5 years ago tomorrow, the Senate

unanimously spoke to what it recognized was an unacceptable drift away from the

U.S. Rio stance adamantly opposed to binding commitments. The Senate, seeing

what was developing, asserted its ‘‘Advice’’ pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the

U.S. Constitution, passing S. Res. 98.131

Subsequent to and despite this Advice, U.S. negotiators clearly disregarded both

major Byrd-Hagel recommendations: Kyoto did not require developing countries to

share our commitments, and even the Clinton White House economic advisors have

recanted their refutations of the Kyoto cost estimates.132

Since then, nothing has emerged to indicate that Kyoto does not still violate both

key Byrd-Hagel conditions, and it is likely that very few Senators have amended

their position against a treaty causing ‘‘serious economic harm.’’ However, Clinton

Administration officials did admit that they began working on the plan for binding

commitments within 1 year after Rio went into effect.133

Kyoto, too, is clearly intended to be a similar step in a ‘‘treaty hopping’’ campaign:

even the models on which it is based predict an undetectable climatic impact134—

333

135 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting. ‘‘Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy markets and Economic Activity.’’ Washington, DC. October 1998. 136 ‘‘Yet the climate simulations lead to the conclusion that the Kyoto reductions will have

little effect in the twenty-first century (15), and 1930 Kyotos’ may be needed to reduce warming

to an acceptable level.’ James Hansen, Makiko Sato, Reto Ruedy, Andrew Lacis, and Valdar

Oinas, ‘‘Global warming in the twenty-first century: An alternative scenario,’’ Proceeding of the

National Academy of Sciences, August 29, 2000.

Hansen was citing Malakoff, D. (1997) Science 278, 2048.

137 ‘‘[S]tabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would

prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’’ See, e.g., Rio Article 2. 138 See ‘‘Treaties and Other International Agreements,’’ at 274. 139 The President manifested that this is how the United States makes ‘‘its intention clear

to not become a party to the treaty,’’ as required by ‘‘customary’’ law and the Vienna Convention

Article 18. ‘‘[S]ignature by the U.S. does impose an obligation on the U.S. under international

law to refrain from actions that would undermine the Protocol’s object and purpose. That obligation continues to apply until such time as the U.S. ratifies the Protocol or makes clear its intent

not to do so.’’ ‘‘Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions about the Kyoto Protocol’’, CRS

Report for Congress (March 29, 2001). 140 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7: ‘‘Every Bill which shall have passed the House of

Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President

of the United States’’.

Though it has not yet done so, precedent indicates the Senate can also effect this outcome

by passing a Sense of the Senate expressing disapproval of a signed, not ratified treaty. See,

‘‘Withdrawal,’’ in attached article. 1Committee on the Environment and the Northeast International Committee on Energy of the

Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, Climate Change Action

Plan 2001. http://www.scics.gc.ca/pdf/850084011—e.pdf

at a cost to the U.S. of up to $400 billion annually135—yet may be 1/30th of what

its proponents seek.136 Rio and Kyoto offer differing commitments but purport ‘‘the

same ultimate objective.’’137 The U.N. IPCC has said this means reducing GHG

emissions by as much as 60–80 percent, which wildly exceeds Kyoto’s specified ambitions.

As such the U.S. should require, prior to and as part of ratifying any further

agreements, express acknowledgement not only of the actual ‘‘ultimate goal’’, but

that it is committed to its practical requirements, in this case up to ‘‘30 Kyotos’’. Such ‘‘treaty hopping’’ agendas illustrate the importance of Senate treaty ‘‘res- ervations’’, or the Senate’s second bite at the ‘‘Advice’’ apple. This comes of course

during the ‘‘Consent’’ function, which function the U.S. negotiators unfortunately

eviscerated. After agreeing to terms incompatible with Byrd-Hagel, the Administration also accepted Kyoto’s prohibition on reservations, or the Senate’s ability to

specify the specific understandings or conditions of the U.S. commitment. This despite the Senate also having forewarned the administration about this in advance

of Kyoto.138

In summation, President Bush ought to match his assertions of having ‘‘rejected’’

Kyoto with the requisite submission to the U.N. to that effect, as was done regarding the International Criminal Court.139 In the absence of that act, the White House

must at minimum assist resolution of the ambiguous U.S. role in Kyoto by requesting the Senate disapprove of the treaty. In the absence of that, the Senate should

recognize that there is no reverse equivalent of the ‘‘presentment’’ clause140, regarding treaties. Only protocol, not any constitutional prohibition, impedes Senate consideration of a signed treaty. Certainly given the imperative rhetoric surrounding

Kyoto, if President Bush insists on continuing the U.S.’ ambiguous role the Senate

should take matters into its own hands, and decide the fate of this agreement.

That resolution should by definition be rejection of Kyoto. Otherwise, by accepting

this double indignity of ignoring advice and prohibiting reservations, this body

would condone Executive circumvention of the Senate’s constitutional treaty role.

STATEMENT OF JON REISMAN, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC

POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MAINE AT MACHIAS

I would like to call the attention of the Committees on Foreign Relations and Environment and Public Works to a troubling development in New England, where all

six New England Governors (NEG) have entered into an unconstitutional agreement

with the Eastern Canadian Premiers (ECP) to implement the Kyoto Protocol’s caps

on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 1

In my view, the NEG/ECP climate change agreement:

• Violates Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution: ‘‘No State shall enter into

any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation . . . No State shall, without the Consent of

334

2News summary of the 2001 meeting at http://www.edie.net/news/Archive/4632.cfm

3National Academy of Sciences. Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions

(2001) http://books.nap.edu/books/0309075742/html/ 4Testimony of Dr. Sallie Baliunas to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works

http://www.techcentralstation.com/1051/envirowrapper.jsp?PID=1051–450&CID=1051–031302C

Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a

foreign Power . . .’’ and • Seeks to implement the Kyoto Protocol before the U.S. Senate has ratified it,

and when, in fact, it has been rejected explicitly by the President and implicitly by

the terms of Senate Resolution No. 98 by a vote of 95–0.

The NEG/ECP climate change agreement is a transparent attempt to implement

the Kyoto Protocol, without reference to the complex terms of the Protocol itself. It

calls for reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 and to 10 percent

below 1990 levels by 2020. This level of reduction substantially exceeds the 7 percent reduction target that the United States would need to meet by 2008–2012

under the Kyoto agreement.

Action steps under the NEG/ECP climate agreement include:

1) establishing a regional, standardized greenhouse gas emissions inventory and

emissions reduction plan;

2) ‘‘educating’’ the public about the ‘‘problem, causes and solutions’’ of global

warming;

3) decreasing emissions from the electricity and transportation sectors, and

4) creating a regional registry and emissions trading mechanism.

The New England Governors are scheduled to travel to Quebec this August and

likely will sign an agreement with the Eastern Canadian Premiers to begin implementing the unconstitutional pledge they made last year. 2 This year, they intend

to work out specific goals and implementation schemes.

There is settled precedent supporting the position that the NEG/ECP climate

agreement violates the U.S. Constitution. In Holmes v. Jennison, Chief Justice

Taney emphasized the broad intent of the framers underlying Section 10: ‘‘As these words (’agreement or compact’) could not have been idly or superfluously used by the framers of the Constitution, they cannot be construed to mean

the same thing with the word treaty. They evidently mean something more, and

were designed to make the prohibition more comprehensive. . . . The word ‘agreement’ does not necessarily import and direct any express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in writing.... ‘‘And the use of all of these terms, ‘treaty,’ ‘agreement,’ ‘compact,’ show that it was

the intention of the framers of the Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they anxiously desired to cutoff all connection or communication between a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word ‘agreement’ its most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or

informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties.’’ 14 Pet.

(39 U.S.) 540, 570–572 (1840).

In addition to these legal concerns, the policy wisdom of implementing Kyoto may

certainly be debated in the face of the National Academy of Sciences’ recent finding

that anthropogenic vs. natural causality is still clouded by considerable uncertainty 3. Correlation is not causation, and the atmospheric models that global warming advocates rely upon predict that the upper atmosphere will warm first, something that has not happened and is still unexplained. Furthermore, those same

flawed models predict that the reductions in CO2 envisioned in Kyoto will essentially have no effect on climate 4.

The Committee on Foreign Relations should hold a separate inquiry on the purpose and Constitutional legitimacy of the NEG/ECP climate change agreement. Allowing six New England States to move forward to implement the Kyoto Protocol

would support the proposition that States are free to ignore Article 1, Section 10,

and are at liberty to negotiate and implement international agreements without the

advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.

These concerns are far from academic. Suppose, for example, that Vermont had

disagreed with the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations, and had recognized

and joined that entity? Article 1, Section 10 exists precisely to avoid such situations.

If the Environment and Public Works Committee supports the efforts of New England’s Governors, it should introduce legislation to implement Kyoto’s caps on a nationwide basis, and let that legislation be fully debated on the floor of the Senate.

There is absolutely no defensible environmental or economic rationale for piecemeal

regional implementation of an international agreement that fails, by its terms, to

address future emissions growth by rapidly growing developing nations such as

335

China and India. Implementing Kyoto targets on a regional basis would lead only

to competitive disadvantage, lost wages and jobs, and larger State budget deficits

at a time of increasing economic uncertainty.

I hope that the Committees will join me in urging the Administration to notify

the New England Governors that the United States Constitution still applies in New

England, even on environmental matters. We have not, as yet, dispensed with the

formality of having the President negotiate and the Senate ratify international

agreements before we implement them. States are proscribed from making foreign

or interstate agreements. That Constitutional principle is at risk here.

Jon Reisman is an associate professor of economics and public policy at the University of Maine at Machias, where he teaches a variety of courses including Environmental Policy and Political Correctness in American Society. He has a B.A. in

economics and environmental studies from Colby College, an M.A. in economics from

Brown University and an M.A. in public policy and management from the University of Southern Maine.

Reisman worked for Gov. Angus King in 1995 getting rid of federally mandated

car testing in Maine. Upon returning to rural Downeast Maine, he led the effort opposing the endangered species listing of Atlantic salmon. In 1998 he was the GOP

nominee in Maine’s 2d congressional district.

Reisman pioneered an innovative course offering, ‘‘Political Correctness in American Society’’ at the University of Maine at Machias. The course is now offered on

the web. Reisman’s home page is http://www.umm.maine.edu/faculty/jreisman/

jreisman.html

SYNTHESIS

(by John C. Dernbach)

In June 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, or Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, the nations of the world agreed

to implement an ambitious plan for sustainable development. The United States

was one of those countries. Has the United States moved toward or away from sustainable development in the 10-year period since Rio? What should the country do

next? The book has sought to answer both questions.

Sustainable development is ecologically sustainable human development; it includes but is not limited to economic development. Sustainable development affirms

the basic goals of development since the end of World War II, but changes them in

one key way. Development is based on peace, economic development, social betterment, and effective national governance. Its goals are human freedom, opportunity,

and quality of life, and it has succeeded in many ways.

Unfortunately, we now face growing environmental degradation around the world,

and a growing gap between rich and poor. Increasingly, these problems undermine

and hinder traditional methods of economic and social development. Deforestation

and overfishing mean that many people and businesses can no longer earn a livelihood. Pollution impairs human health and thus human betterment. Conflicts over

water and other resources lead to violence and civil strife. These and other problems

are profoundly destabilizing because they mean less freedom and opportunity and

lower quality of life.

Sustainable development responds to these problems by adding environmental

protection to the goals of traditional development. Instead of development at the environment’s expense, or environmental protection at the expense of development,

sustainable development would achieve both traditional development and environmental protection or restoration at the same time. Sustainable development affirms

the importance of freedom, opportunity, and quality of life, for both present and future generations.

Sustainable development should matter to the United States because freedom, opportunity, and quality of life are among our core goals as a Nation. Providing a better life for those who come after us is also a basic American value. Sustainable development would lead to a stronger, more efficient, and more productive America,

because this country’s economic, environmental, social, and security goals would

support each other in greater and greater degrees over time, rather than undermine

one another. Sustainable development would also both require and promote effective

governance and legal systems, which Americans also value. By addressing the destabilizing effects of poverty and environmental degradation around the world, the

United States could help make the world more secure. In addition, U.S. economic

336

and military power, as well as the ethical and religious foundations for sustainability, suggest a special obligation to work for sustainable development.

The United States has, unquestionably, begun to take some steps toward sustainable development. In fact, those who see sustainable development as including prior

and ongoing efforts, such as conservation and pollution control, could rightly say

that the 1990’s saw a continuation of activities that began before the Earth Summit.

Yet, on balance, the United States is now far from being a sustainable society, and

in many respects is farther away than it was in 1992.

While there is ‘‘good news’’ and ‘‘bad news’’ to report, the bad news is told in general trends, broad studies, and for entire economic sectors or program areas. All too

frequently, the good news is limited to specific examples and particular programs.

The United States has not responded in a way that corresponds to the seriousness

of the problems we face or to the opportunities provided by sustainable development. Nevertheless, legal and policy tools are available to put the United States on

a direct path to sustainability, to our great advantage and without major dislocations-if we can muster the will and the vision to use them.

This synthesis begins with an overview of the book’s findings and recommendations, followed by an explanation of sustainable development and its importance to

the United States. It then summarizes each of the book’s major sections, which concern consumption and population; international trade, finance, and development assistance; conservation and management of natural resources; waste and toxic chemicals; education; institutions and infrastructure; and governance. Throughout, the

synthesis summarizes and often excerpts from individual chapters.

OVERVIEW

A Little Good News

In virtually every area of American life, a few people and organizations are exercising leadership for sustainability. A small number of Federal agencies, State governments, local governments, corporations, universities, and others have taken a

leadership role in moving toward sustainable development over the past decade.

Nearly all of these efforts contain room for improvement. Still, they demonstrate

that it is both possible and desirable to reconcile environmental, social, and economic goals. For instance:

The Federal Government greatly expanded its use of habitat conservation plans

in the past decade to reconcile conflicts between economic development and endangered species protection. A few States have begun to implement strategies for sustainable development and use indicators for sustainability.

At the community level, some sustainability initiatives have been undertaken,

and are yielding some positive results.

A handful of major corporations are seriously embracing the ‘‘triple bottom line’’

of environment, economy, and society or equity as a way of setting and achieving

goals. A small minority of primary schools, high schools, and higher education institutions are teaching students to perform the kind of integrated and interdisciplinary

analysis needed to make decisions that simultaneously further social, economic, and

environmental goals.

In a few areas, the United States has played a significant and constructive international leadership role. These include the protection of high seas fisheries, the prevention of lead poisoning, integration of environmental considerations into trade

agreements, and incorporation of environmental impact reviews and public participation in World Bank projects.

The President’s Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD), an advisory council

that existed between 1993 and 1999, developed hundreds of recommendations that

would foster national security, economic development, job creation, and environmental protection at the same time. The PCSD and others outlined a policy framework showing that the United States actually could make significant progress toward sustainable development.

There is much better information about many environmental problems now than

there was 10 years ago, and generally greater access to it. We also have a much

better idea of the steps needed to achieve sustainable development, and have made

significant progress in creating the policy and legal tools necessary to do so.

A Lot of Bad News

Energy and materials consumption grew substantially in the past decade, and reduced or outweighed many specific environmental achievements. With 5 percent of

the world’s population, the United States was at the time of the Earth Summit responsible for about 24 percent of the world’s energy consumption and almost 30 percent of the world’s raw materials consumption. Since the Earth Summit, materials

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use has increased 10 percent, primary energy consumption has increased 21 percent, and energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions have increased by 13 percent. Over and over, increases in materials and energy efficiency, and in the effectiveness of pollution controls for individual sources, are outweighed by increases in

consumption. Despite a significant increase in municipal waste recycling in the past

decade, for example, the U.S. generation and disposal of municipal solid waste per

capita have been growing since 1996. U.S. population-the number of people consuming resources and energy-grew by 32.7 million, or 13.2 percent, from 1990 to

2000, the largest single decade of growth in the nation’s history.

Moreover, the United States has not exercised the kind of international leadership

necessary to encourage or support sustainable development around the world. The

United States is not a Party to many treaties and international agreements that are

intended to foster sustainable development in specific contexts, including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Kyoto Protocol. Current patterns of international trade cause environmental harm and impair sustainable development in

part because U.S. trade policy tends to put short-term domestic economic goals

ahead of sustainable development. U.S. official development assistance has declined

since Rio. Although the United States was the second largest provider of official development assistance in 2000, its contribution was the lowest of all industrialized

countries, measured as a percentage of gross domestic income.

U.S. law and policy continue to encourage unsustainable development in a variety

of ways. These include subsidies, ‘‘grandfather’’ provisions for existing and more-polluting facilities and activities in pollution control laws, and fragmented local decisionmaking that encourages sprawl. Such laws and policies mean that individuals

and corporations have fewer choices, and less sustainable choices, than they would

otherwise.

The United States has no national strategy for achieving sustainable development, and no generally accepted indicators to mark progress along the way. Nor

does the United States have a meaningful or effective strategy to address climate

change, biodiversity, and many other issues. Neither the executive branch nor the

U.S. Congress systematically analyze proposed activities to find ways to make significant progress on economic, environmental, social, and security goals at the same

time.

As a whole, the condition of America’s natural resources and ecosystems has not

improved, and appears to have deteriorated slightly, over the past decade. There

was no discernible improvement in our rivers, streams, and lakes, and the quality

of our ocean coastal waters appears to have deteriorated. Greenhouse gas (GHG)

emissions increased, and a large number of plant and animal species continue to

be at risk of extinction. U.S. agriculture is less sustainable, and urban sprawl continues relatively unabated. Air quality improved slightly, but not enough to fully

protect human health.

The social and institutional infrastructure and supports needed for sustainable

development continue to cause environmental degradation and underserve the poor.

The negative environmental impacts of transportation increased during the past

decade, despite significant legislative changes. The U.S. sanitation system remains

vulnerable to breakdowns, the level of communicable diseases is high when compared to other developed countries, and there has been no discernible progress in

improving access to medical care.

Recommendations for the Next Decade

The path to sustainability is not an easy one, but it is marked by basic American

values. These include freedom, opportunity, and quality of life; greater efficiency;

more effective and responsive governance; a desire to make a better world for those

who follow us; a willingness to find and exploit opportunities; a quest for a safer

world; and a sense of calling to play a constructive role in international affairs. All

of these are underscored by our ethical and even religious obligations toward each

other and the environment.

The United States would take a large and decisive step toward sustainability if

individuals, businesses, educational institutions, local and State governments, Federal agencies and others would simply adopt and build on the leading sustainability

practices of their counterparts here and in other nations.

A national strategy for sustainable development, with specified goals and priorities, would harness all sectors of society to achieve our economic, social, environmental, and security goals. The strategy could be modeled on that of the European

Union (EU) and States such as New Jersey, and specifically address climate change,

biodiversity, and other major issues. An executive-level entity would be needed to

coordinate and assist in the implementation of the strategy. A counterpart entity

in Congress would also be helpful. The strategy would more likely be effective if

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there were a set of indicators to measure progress in achieving its goals. Comparable State and local strategies and indicators are also needed.

The United States needs to recognize that its substantial consumption levels, coupled with domestic population growth, have serious environmental, social, and economic impacts. Americans also need to understand that human well-being can be

decoupled from high consumption of materials and energy. A shift in taxes from

labor and income, on one hand, to materials and energy consumption, on the other,

would encourage both greater efficiency and reduced negative environmental impacts.

Congress should repeal or modify laws, policies, and subsidies that encourage

unsustainable development. The elimination of subsidies would also have positive

budgetary impacts. The repeal or modification of such laws would provide more and

better opportunities for individuals and corporations to act in a more sustainable

manner, and would remove an important set of barriers to sustainability.

Protection of natural resources and the environment must focus more holistically

on the resources to be protected, and on understanding those resources. Congress

and the States need to assure that these resources are protected from all significant

threats, and are protected from those threats to the same degree. In addition, the

type of substantive goals that exist in the air and water pollution control programs,

as well as supportive implementing mechanisms, should be applied to biodiversity,

climate change, oceans under U.S. jurisdiction, forests, and other natural resources.

The United States also needs to fund or support the development of more complete

and reliable information about ecosystems as well as about the connections among

its economic, environmental, social, and security goals.

Social infrastructure, institutions, and laws should be designed and operated to

further economic, environmental, and social goals at the same time. Public health

services and, at a minimum, basic medical services should be available to all. Transportation infrastructure should be more efficient and diverse, and provide people

with more choices.

The United States needs to take a stronger and more constructive leadership role

internationally, not only on terrorism but on the broad range of issues related to

sustainable development. The United States should further increase its official development assistance, while taking measures to ensure that the money is spent effectively and for sustainable development. More broadly, U.S. foreign policy, including trade policy, needs to be more supportive of the development aspect of sustainable development. The United States should also become a Party to many of the

international treaties that would foster sustainable development, including the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Aarhus

Convention on Access to Information, the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed

Consent, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and the Basel

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes.

Some longer term changes are also needed if the United States is to achieve sustainable development. They include the evolution of judicial understanding of property to update expectations about the productive value of ecosystems and the establishment of more inviting avenues for public participation in and challenge to decisions affecting sustainability.

What Is Sustainable Development?

Sustainable development is human development that is ecologically sustainable.

Its aims are human freedom, opportunity, and higher quality of life. It is not another name for economic development, although it includes economic development.

Because ‘‘sustainable’’ modifies ‘‘development,’’ it is first important to understand

what development means. Although Americans understand development to mean

the transformation of a field or woodlot into housing or a mall, development has a

different meaning at the international level. Since the end of World War II, the

United States and most of the world community have successfully sought greater

peace and security, economic development, and social development or human rights.

They have also sought national governance that supports these goals, even though

they recognize that international efforts are also needed. As understood internationally, these are the four elements of development. This understanding of development

grew out of the experiences of the last world war and the great depression that preceded and contributed to it, and a firm desire to ensure that the conditions that led

to them would not occur again. More positively, development is intended to foster

human freedom, opportunity, and quality of life.

For more than half a century, we have measured progress by the extent to which

we have realized these goals. And there has been a great deal of progress. The world

is more free, there is more opportunity, and most humans have a higher quality of

life now than they did in 1945.

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But until recently, protecting and restoring the environment was not among these

goals. Indeed, progress in achieving these other goals was considered to outweigh

or even justify any environmental degradation that may have occurred.

As the World Commission on Environment and Development concluded in 1987,

progress in the past half century has come with a price we cannot ignore and can

no longer afford-massive and growing environmental degradation, and a growing

number of people in poverty. The commission concluded that countries should seek

sustainable development-’’development that meets the needs of the present without

compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’’ Sustainable development would thus meet human needs over the long term; the present

generation would not benefit at the expense of future generations. When nations of

the world endorsed sustainable development at the Earth Summit in 1992, they redefined progress to include environmental protection and restoration.

Sustainable development is based on a sober and realistic appraisal of how humans need to approach the problems of the next half century or more. Like traditional development, it is premised on a recognition of what can happen when freedom, opportunity, and quality of life are inequitably realized or are diminishing.

Every major international and regional report on the condition of the environment

shows continuing and deteriorating environmental conditions. The gap between the

rich and poor continues to grow. Poverty and environmental degradation are mutually reinforcing; poor people live in the most polluted or degraded environments, and

this contributes to their poverty. Although poverty and environmental degradation

are important in their own right, they also can cause or contribute to wars, starvation, ethnic tensions, and terrorism, which are more likely to get headlines than

their underlying causes. Like terrorism, poverty and environmental degradation are

destabilizing. The pressures caused by poverty and environmental degradation are

likely to increase in the next half century. Global population is expected to grow

from roughly six to nine billion, or 50 percent, by 2050. The global economy is likely

to grow by a factor of three to five in the same period. As difficult and challenging

as things now appear, they are likely to become much more difficult and challenging

in the decades ahead.

Sustainable development also has deep ethical and religious roots. Sustainable development leads to two major shifts in ethical thinking and action. It recognizes the

connections between humanity’s social, ecological, and economic obligations, and it

recognizes responsibility for future as well as present generations. Agenda 21, the

blueprint for sustainable development adopted at the Earth Summit, thus calls for

distributive justice, or a fair sharing of environmental resources by humans. The

distributive justice theme was in response to demands by developing countries that

they have the same right to use natural resources as developed countries. Agenda

21 also suggests that humans have a moral responsibility to limit activities that,

if not curtailed or redirected, will severely degrade or even destroy ecosystems. Because human damage to the environment also hurts other humans, sustainable development recognizes the relationship between environmental protection and social

justice.

The sacred texts and beliefs underlying the world’s religions also support sustainable development, even if that has not been true of their practices. These religious

traditions support appreciation for all life; human stewardship of creation; harmony

among humans, their communities, and their environment; and a caring for place.

They also indicate that the natural world is valuable in itself, not simply insofar

as humans may value it. They articulate the importance of deep respect for creation,

both human and nonhuman, and living in a manner that is ecologically sustainable.

These texts and beliefs also indicate the importance of fair and equitable sharing

of resources, which would mean both ceilings and floors for consumption. Finally,

they suggest that people be given an opportunity to participate in decisions that will

affect their lives and their communities.

To achieve sustainable development, nations at the Earth Summit endorsed two

important but nonbinding texts, Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. (They also

agreed to a separate set of principles for forestry.) As a global plan of action for sustainable development, Agenda 21 is intended to be carried out primarily, but not

exclusively, by countries within their own borders. Agenda 21, which contains 40

separate chapters, runs several hundred pages regardless of how it is printed. These

chapters focus on the social and economic dimensions of sustainable development,

e.g., poverty, human health, and population; conservation and management of natural resources, e.g., atmosphere, forests, biological diversity, and various wastes and

toxic chemicals; the role of major groups, e.g., children and youth, women, farmers,

workers, and business and industry, in attaining sustainable development; and

means of implementation, e.g., financial resources, technology transfer, science, education, and public information. Each chapter identifies specific actions to be taken,

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explains generally why these actions are necessary, identifies the persons or institutions who are to take action, and describes specific means of implementation.

The Rio Declaration is a set of 27 principles for sustainable development. Key

principles include the integration of environment and development in decisionmaking, sustainable patterns of resource production and consumption, the polluterpays principle, the precautionary approach or principle, developed country leadership, intergenerational equity, and public participation. The polluter-pays principle

would have polluters bear the costs of preventing and cleaning up environmental

problems rather than impose the costs of those problems on others. According to the

precautionary principle, the absence of complete scientific certainty about serious

problems is not an excuse for refusing to take action. These principles also are

woven into Agenda 21.

In Rio, the international community also established a process for reviewing national and international progress toward sustainable development. Agenda 21 has

been, and continues to be, the focal point of that process.

When countries agreed to Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, they agreed to implement these agreements, both at home and in their foreign policy. The United

States, under the leadership of President George H.W. Bush, was one of those countries.

Why Should Sustainable Development Matter to the United States?

Americans should care about sustainable development because its goals-human

freedom, opportunity, and quality of life-are also our goals. We sought independence

for these purposes, established a legal and economic system premised on their importance, endured a civil war to protect that system and expand its opportunities

to others, and fought two world wars and numerous other conflicts to protect ourselves and help make those same opportunities available to others.

Sustainable development, moreover, is not just about us, the current generation

of Americans. It is, in the U.S. Constitution’s words, about ‘‘ourselves and our posterity,’’ our children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews, and others not yet born who

will someday inhabit this country. We pride ourselves on providing our descendants

greater opportunities and a better quality of life. Sustainable development would do

precisely that. Without it, we cannot assure our children and grandchildren a better

life, and are likely to leave them a poorer one.

Sustainable development would lead to a stronger and more efficient America because we would be pursuing social, economic, environmental, and security goals in

ways that are more mutually reinforcing or supportive over time, not contradictory

or antagonistic. The result would be a stronger, more efficient country that provides

its citizens and their descendants increasingly more opportunities in a quality natural environment. Increased energy efficiency would reduce energy costs for manufacturers and consumers, and would also mean reduced pollution. In addition to securing an ongoing supply of timber and paper products, sustainable forestry matters

because we rely on forests for watershed maintenance, pollution abatement, climate

control, jobs, and recreation. Similarly, a sustainable transportation system would

make it easier, less expensive, and less environmentally damaging for people of all

incomes to travel from home to work and other destinations. Cleaner production is

likely to be less costly and more efficient, reduce the economic and social burdens

created by human exposure to hazardous wastes and substances, and improve the

occupational health and safety of workers.

Sustainable development would also lead to better and more responsive governance, which is another basic American value. Ensuring that our economic, social, environmental, and security goals are mutually supportive would require that the government does not subsidize with one hand what it controls on the other. It would

also require more public involvement in many decisionmaking processes because

public input is more likely to ensure that these goals are harmonized.

Sustainable development would also lead to a safer, more stable and secure world

outside American borders. That would have important and positive consequences for

both ourselves and others, particularly after September 11, 2001. The world is deeply divided between haves and have-nots, and the risk of evolution toward an unstable, two-class world, with a huge global underclass, is quite real. Americans have

a large stake in the prevention or avoidance of humanitarian emergencies, national

and regional conflicts, environmental deterioration, terrorism, illicit drugs, the

spread of diseases, illegal migration, and other disasters. These threats to our security do not need passports to cross borders. None of the goals that this country has

pursued around the world-peace and stability, human rights and democratization,

expansion of trade and markets, environmental protection, or putting an end to

hunger and extreme deprivation-can be accomplished effectively except in the context of sustainable development. Thus, while sustainable development assistance in

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developing countries can be justified on humanitarian grounds, it is also consistent

with the strategic interests of the United States.

Americans have a special role to play in sustainable development. We have the

largest economy and the most powerful military in the world. Not only do we have

enormous capability to bring to bear in the pursuit of sustainable development, we

also bear a significant share of the responsibility for the global environmental problems that sustainable development is intended to address. The United States is the

world’s largest producer and consumer of materials and energy. Since the U.S.

model of production and consumption is widely emulated throughout the world, U.S.

domestic actions could also have a major international effect.

It is often said that nations or individuals can lead, follow, or get out of the way.

The United States is in an unparalleled position to play a key international leadership role on sustainable development. The United States could instead permit the

EU, Japan, and other developed countries to play the leadership role, and follow

their lead. That would be unpalatable to many, but it would be better than doing

nothing. Because of its dominant role in international affairs, however, the United

States cannot simply get out of the way. If the United States does not lead or follow,

it will be an obstacle to international efforts to achieve sustainable development.

The ethical and religious justifications for sustainable development also provide

a reason that Americans should care. U.S. actions do not simply affect us; they affect others as well. Historic and continuing U.S. emissions of GHGs are likely to

adversely affect others by contributing to rising sea levels and higher temperatures

around the world, for example. Moreover, the texts and beliefs of each of the world’s

major religions teach responsibility toward other humans as well as the environment. Because Americans see themselves as a religious people, they should respond

accordingly.

Finally, our government agreed to Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration at the

Earth Summit. These texts are not legally binding, but a nation’s political commitment is not a trivial thing. Indeed, it is in the national interest to honor international political commitments.

The decisions we make about sustainable development are defining decisions for

the United States. They will define the values for which our country stands.

SUMMARY

The major sections of this book focus on consumption and population; international trade, finance, and development assistance; conservation and management

of natural resources; waste and toxic chemicals; education; institutions and infrastructure; and governance. What follows is a summary of each section, including a

summary or excerpts from relevant individual chapters. For almost all chapters, the

summary includes a review of efforts over the past decade and recommendations.

While most of the recommendations are directed to the United States, a few are directed to the international community.

Consumption and Population

‘‘To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people,’’

the Rio Declaration states, governments ‘‘should reduce and eliminate unsustainable

patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.’’ As Agenda 21 observes, ‘‘the major cause of the continued deterioration of the

global environment is the unsustainable pattern of consumption and production,

particularly in industrialized countries.’’ Agenda 21 also describes world population

growth, in combination with unsustainable consumption patterns, as placing ‘‘increasingly severe stresses on the life-supporting capacities of our planet.’’

A simple model developed in the 1970’s describes the relationship between population and consumption. The model is expressed as a formula: I = PAT. The formula

expresses a community’s overall environmental impact (I) as the product of its population size (P), its affluence or per capita level of consumption (A), and the technology and social arrangements that underlay each unit of consumption (T). While

consumption of materials, consumption of energy, and population are not wholly determinative of environmental impacts, they are enormously influential.

Materials

Sustainable use of materials or resources can be measured by answering two

questions. First, how is the rate of resource use related to the overall stock of resources? Second, what portion of resources in use are lost to the environment? The

first question measures utilization of resources, and the second measures consumption. Put another way, the first reflects the sustainability of supply, and the second

the sustainability of the receiving ecosystems. Almost all levels of resource use and

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many types of environmental impacts in the United States have increased from levels already generally agreed to be unsustainable.

At the time of the Earth Summit, the average American was responsible for the

extraction and employment of more than 100 pounds of material daily, which is

more than any other country in world. These materials include metals, wood products, paper, agricultural products, construction materials, and fossil fuels. Ten years

later, the quantity has increased by about 10 percent. The biggest increase over the

past decade was for nonrenewable organic materials (including fossil fuels). The

hike in overall materials use is also due in part to increases in the use of construction materials, such as sand, gravel, and stone, whose utilization requires large

amounts of energy. Iron, steel, and other heavy metals continue to be used less,

while light metals (particularly aluminum), plastics, and composites are used more.

This latter trend is favorable, because the depletion time for heavier metals is shorter than that for aluminum.

Environmental impacts of resource consumption in the United States appear to

have increased by about 15 percent over the past decade because of population

growth and an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Americans

produce more municipal waste per capita than any other country, are the leading

producer of GHG emissions, and are probably the world’s largest producer of toxic

wastes. This increase in U.S. consumption has occurred despite a movement from

more resource-intensive production to greater use of services.

U.S. Government programs and policies have promoted inefficient utilization and

use of natural resources. These policies include many types of direct and indirect

subsidies for, among other things, timber cutting, agriculture, hard rock mining, and

extraction and use of fossil fuels. While there are success stories in reduction of materials use and environmental impacts in the past decade (specific eco-industrial

parks, corporate programs, and even government programs), these efforts have not

changed the overall pattern or result.

To make significant progress toward sustainability, the U.S. Government should

gain a better understanding of what resource sustainability really means, and

should put in place a framework for achieving specific goals related to sustainability

of materials. The United States should also lead international efforts to discuss and

achieve sustainable production and consumption patterns in this and other developed countries.

Subsidy reform and restructuring existing taxes are two of the biggest challenges

to sustainable consumption and production. Environmentally harmful subsidies

need to be phased out gradually. In addition, the United States should begin shifting taxes from labor and income to materials and energy. This tax shift should result in more efficient use and reuse of materials and energy. Norway, Sweden, and

other countries have already begun such a tax shift.

Public education is also essential to this effort, and is perhaps needed more than

anything else. The principal cause of unsustainable resource use is largely a social

system that promotes ‘‘conspicuous consumption’’ rather than intelligent, conservative resource use. Technological innovation can modify this trend somewhat, as can

policy initiatives. But true sustainability will require that we satisfy our needs, not

by increased use of resources, but by more intelligent use. Laws and policies alone

will not lead to that understanding, but they might result from it.

Energy

Primary energy consumption in the United States increased by approximately 20

percent between 1992 and 2000, an annual average rate of 2.4 percent. This growth

rate was higher than the 0.8 percent average annual growth rate of the two prior

decades. At the same time, the average annual GDP increase for 1992 to 2000 was

50 percent higher than it was between 1972 and 1992, indicating that economic

growth drove energy consumption.

For the production and consumption of energy, the journey toward sustainability

can be measured by progress toward three goals: increased energy efficiency (or reduced energy intensity), increased renewable energy use, and reductions in energyrelated CO2 emissions. For the first goal, progress in the past decade continued at

the same pace as the previous two decades. Energy efficiency, measured in terms

of amount of energy consumed per dollar of GDP, continued to decline at the same

steady pace it has declined since 1972-about 2 percent per year. While the United

States is improving energy efficiency at a faster rate than other industrialized countries, it is less energy-efficient (or more energy-intensive) than these countries. For

the second and third goals, the United States achieved less since 1992 than it did

in the two decades that preceded the Earth Summit, and appears to be moving

away from sustainability. Renewable energy consumption grew at a slower annual

pace since 1992 (1.3 percent) than in the previous two decades (1.6 percent). In fact,

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renewable energy’s share of total U.S. energy consumption actually declined from

7.2 percent in 1992 to 6.9 percent in 2000. In addition, energy-related CO2 emissions

increased by 13 percent since 1992. The annual rate of increase in CO2 emissions

since 1992 (1.8 percent) is more than three times the annual increase of the previous two decades (0.5 percent).

In every major sector, energy use grew over the past decade. Energy use for residential and commercial buildings increased because of population growth and the

trend toward larger and more energy-consuming homes as well the proliferation of

electricity-using devices. These trends offset energy efficiency and energy conservation gains for appliances and home building materials. Energy use for passenger

transportation increased because of the popularity of sport utility vehicles and light

trucks and an increase in vehicle miles traveled. Energy use for freight transport

increased because of rapid growth in the volume of freight shipped and a shift toward more energy-intensive trucking. Industrial use of energy increased, despite a

shift away from energy-intensive industry, because of growth in manufacturing.

While the United States had in place numerous energy conservation and renewable energy laws at the time of the 1992 Earth Summit, the country has done little

to strengthen those laws since then. Many of these early laws grew out of the Arab

oil embargoes of the 1970’s. Among other things, these laws established corporate

average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles, required the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to develop mandatory energy efficiency standards for home

appliances, provided tax credits to encourage investments in solar and wind technologies, and required utilities to make greater use of renewable energy and energy

conservation. A few major changes in law and policy have occurred since 1992. Federal research and development funding for energy efficient technologies has increased, and standards continue to be issued for increasingly more efficient appliances. But CAFE standards for new vehicles have not been improved, despite substantial improvements in automotive technology.

Progress in sustainability for production and consumption of energy in coming

decades can be measured in terms of progress in reduction of energy-related CO2

emissions. Because reducing such emissions would require increases in energy efficiency and renewable energy, a decrease in CO2 emissions is a useful way of summarizing progress toward all three goals. Analyses have shown that vigorous implementation of cost-effective energy efficiency and renewable energy policies could result in reduction of energy-related CO2 emissions in the United States to 1990 levels

by 2020 or earlier, which would be a major step toward energy sustainability goals.

However, U.S. emissions in 2000 were more than 15 percent above 1990 levels, and

are projected to continue to increase under business-as-usual scenarios.

The policies needed to achieve energy production and consumption sustainability

goals are indicative of the seriousness of the needed effort. They include a carbon

fee or charge that begins at a relatively low level and then increases over time.

Money received from this fee or charge could be returned to the taxpayer in the

form of lower income taxes or used to support sustainable energy programs. An

emissions trading system should be coupled with the fee or charge to enhance its

economic efficiency. Increased spending for Federal research and development for

energy efficiency and renewable energy would likely lead to the development of

more efficient, less costly, and more reliable technologies. In addition, a variety of

policies should be employed to improve energy efficiency in buildings, industry,

transportation, and electrical generation. Energy efficiency policies include a mix of

tax credits, voluntary programs, increased energy efficiency standards for motors

and appliances, improved fuel economy standards for motor vehicles, policies to increase use of telecommuting, and a requirement to increase the percentage of electricity generated by renewable energy.

U.S. population reached 281.4 million in 2000, an overall increase of 32.7 million,

or 13.2 percent, since 1990. This is the largest population increase in any 10-year

period in U.S. history, surpassing even the postwar baby boom. U.S. population is

growing more rapidly today than is the Chinese population. One American consumes 17 times as much energy as the average Indian, and 9 times as much as the

average Chinese. Thus, while the billion-plus populations in China and India obviously raise serious concerns, at the margin population growth is a bigger issue in

the United States than in China or India. The reason is simple: an additional American consumes so much more than an additional Chinese or Indian.

In 2000, the average number of children born per woman in the U.S. population

was 2.1, which is the replacement rate. Population grew significantly because of the

‘‘population momentum’’ caused by the higher birthrates of previous generations and

because of immigration. Immigration is currently contributing roughly one-half of

the annual population growth.

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The sustainability of the current U.S. population can be questioned on a variety

of grounds. The United States depends increasingly on imports of oil and other natural resources. Americans and other residents of industrialized countries are also

living beyond their means, depleting vital ecosystems and nonrenewable resource

stocks. A U.S. population with grossly disproportionate consumption patterns slated

to grow by 10 percent or more per decade, while striving to raise its per capita consumption even further, is not a recipe for sustainability.

While the United States has no explicit policy regarding population size or

growth, it does have one in practice. The tax code as well as laws on women’s rights,

inheritance, and labor all indirectly influence people’s choices regarding family size.

The legality and availability of family planning and abortion services have more direct influences on family size choices. Immigration laws and policies also play a

large role in determining U.S. population.

The most basic thing the United States can do is simply recognize that population

is a domestic as well as a foreign issue, and that the domestic and foreign aspects

of population are linked. People seek to immigrate to the United States, for instance, because conditions in their own countries are not tolerable to them. The

United States also needs to examine seriously its carrying capacity. The United

States cannot claim that it is taking steps toward sustainable development without

first analyzing its environmental resource base. This country should develop policies

to ensure that the population does not exceed its carrying capacity, including its

ability to draw on foreign resources. Immigration policies should be analyzed and

developed in this context, and not the other way around.

International Trade, Finance, and Development Assistance

For better and for worse, America’s domestic activities have a great influence on

domestic activities in other countries. But U.S. foreign policy also has direct consequences for sustainable development. As Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration make

clear, a country’s sustainable development commitments extend to both its domestic

and foreign policy. This section summarizes U.S. international efforts regarding

trade, official development assistance, and family planning assistance. It also summarizes U.S. efforts concerning an issue that has gained importance since the Earth

Summit-private financial flows to developing countries.

International Trade

The United States has played a leading and generally positive role in steering

trade rules in the direction of sustainable development, with modest success. Yet

10 years after Rio, the discrepancy between the vision of sustainable development

and reality is too obvious to deny-current patterns of international trade cause environmental harm and impair sustainable development. By decreasing rather than increasing its attention to the profound problems of global underdevelopment and poverty, U.S. policy over the past decade has not only failed to serve the substantive

policy goal of sustainable development but has also contributed to the polarization

of international diplomacy between rich and poor.

Two major trade agreements were adopted in the past decade, and provide a context for this analysis. The United States negotiated the North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada to reduce trade barriers among the

three countries, and then ratified it. Several environmental issues were directly addressed in NAFTA, and the Parties also concluded two separate environmental

agreements. In addition, the United States and other countries concluded the longrunning Uruguay round of trade negotiations, which established the World Trade

Organization (WTO). The Clinton Administration secured congressional approval of

the Uruguay Round results.

The United States has taken significant positive steps over the past decade to enhance consideration of the environmental and developmental consequences of its

trade policy, and has actively supported institutions and polices that would promote

such procedural integration of policy in other governments and international organizations. In 1992, the worlds of trade policy and environmental policy still knew very

little about each other and seldom interacted. The use of an environmental assessment for NAFTA deepened awareness of the issues at stake for both government

officials and the public. These and other experiences led President William J. Clinton to issue an Executive Order in 1999 requiring the preparation of an environmental review for most major trade agreements. On the other hand, the United

States continues to subsidize and thus protect domestic agricultural producers and

others that perpetuate environmental harms in the United States.

The United States has also been a pioneer in opening up its international trade

processes to public participation and has been the leading proponent of participatory

reforms in international institutions. The United States enhanced and structured

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the access of environmental interests to trade policy during the 1990’s. The United

States has also been the most active and persistent proponent of increased public

participation in dispute settlement procedures under WTO and NAFTA.

Yet America’s substantive trade policies are very uneven in fostering sustainable

development. Promoting the economic interests of the United States remains the

central consideration in trade policy. As a result, U.S. trade policies often put shortterm and purely domestic goals ahead of a broader sustainable development strategy. The widely publicized failure of the 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle

occurred in large part because developing countries saw the U.S. position as giving

short shrift to their needs.

In a broad sense, too, the structure of international trade still works against sustainable development. The fault, though, does not lie exclusively, or even primarily,

with tradeofficials and trade policies. What goods are produced where and what

services are provided where are influenced not by trade policy but by the economic,

social, and geographical conditions of each country and the economic and social policies of national governments. A major problem has been the insistence by the

United States and other developed countries that trade should replace aid as the

main vehicle for transferring economic resources to developing countries, without attending in a timely or adequate manner to other conditions that must also be addressed if the resource flows of trade are to promote development on a sustainable

basis. These other conditions include debt repayments and deteriorating environmental conditions in developing countries.

Domestically, the United States needs to deepen and institutionalize its policy integration. The United States should establish a sustainable development coordinating entity within the executive office of the president that would include the U.S.

trade representative. Congressional responsibility for trade policy should also be reallocated to better incorporate environmental and developmental considerations. The

United States should continue to advocate in all forums for increased transparency,

including public availability of documents and summaries of confidential deliberations, enhanced access for the public to key processes, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) representation on national delegations at every appropriate international negotiation on trade issues.

To exercise greater international leadership, the United States needs to observe

more faithfully in its domestic policies the policy prescriptions it advances for international trade and economic development in other countries, especially by removing

barriers to access to the U.S. market and by eliminating substantial subsidies to key

trade-relevant sectors of the American economy. The United States also needs to

work more actively and constructively with developing countries to resolve key impediments relevant to international trade that are restricting their economic development and leading to continued environmental degradation. Moreover, while the

‘‘trade, not aid’’ mantra has substantial validity, aid continues to be a vital policy

element, substantively and symbolically. As part of its trade policy, the United

States needs to increase its official development assistance.

Official Development Assistance

U.S. official development assistance (ODA) has declined significantly since Rio.

Developed countries agreed at Rio to provide ODA to developing countries in an

amount equal to 0.7 percent of their GDP. The provision of this aid was part of the

Rio bargain between developed and developing countries; developing countries were

unwilling to have environmental conditions imposed on their development, but

agreed to integrate environmental considerations and outcomes into their development process if they received financial help. The United States specifically declined

to accept the 0.7 percent commitment, however. Part of the developed world’s broad

responsibility for sustainable development under Agenda 21 nonetheless includes

assisting developing countries, especially when these countries are asked to respond

to environmental threats that are largely not of their own making.

More broadly, sustainable development includes the antipoverty agenda of traditional development. The gap between rich and poor continues to grow. Among the

4.6 billion people who live in developing countries, three-fifths live in communities

without basic sanitation, one-third are without safe drinking water, one-quarter lack

adequate housing, and one-fifth are undernourished. One-half of humanity ‘‘survives’’ on less than $2 per day. The eradication of poverty is a worthy goal in itself.

But from a strategic perspective, the eradication of poverty would also help reduce

conflicts, social disruption, and disease. In addition, improved economic conditions

may reduce the pool of the disillusioned and disaffected from which terrorist campaigns have frequently drawn.

Average annual U.S. ODA disbursements from 1990–1992 (set at 1999 prices)

were approximately $12.38 billion; from 1998–2000, U.S. disbursements averaged

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approximately $9.27 billion, representing slightly more than a 25 percent drop in

real dollars. The United States still provides more ODA than any other country except Japan. As a percentage of gross domestic income, however, U.S. ODA declined

from an average of .22 percent in 1984–1988 to .10 percent in 1998–2000, the lowest

of all industrialized countries.

ODA does not account for all U.S. governmental assistance that could contribute

to sustainable development. For example, it does not include U.S. aid to former Soviet bloc countries or the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Nor

does ODA include private financial flows to developing countries. Nevertheless, ODA

levels indicate general trends and help identify the extent to which the United

States is engaged with the rest of the world. ODA also does things that private financial flows do not; ODA supports peace and security, alleviates health and environmental crises, encourages educational improvements, and rewards countries that

move toward democracy and the rule of law. In this way, it can help provide the

infrastructure that will attract or encourage private investment.

Two funds for international environmental assistance were made permanent after

Rio. The U.S. record in fostering sustainable development under these funds is

mixed. The Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund exists to aid developing countries

in meeting their obligations to reduce their production and consumption of substances that cause depletion of stratospheric ozone. Funds are disbursed for approved projects that contribute to phasing out ozone-depleting substances. Over the

life of the fund, the United States has contributed its full assessed share-$327 million, or slightly more than one-quarter of the entire fund. The Global Environment

Facility (GEF) provides funds to developing countries for specific projects to reduce

GHG emissions and to protect biodiversity, international waters, and the stratospheric ozone layer. The United States paid its full share during the GEF’s pilot

phase, but has paid much less than its share since then. Because the United States

was in arrears, other countries held off paying some of their commitment.

The United States should increase ODA for sustainable development, although it

needs to ensure that this aid is actually effective. President George W. Bush’s com- mitment in early 2002 to an additional $5 billion in foreign assistance is a step in

the right direction. The United States would reap benefits from increased aid in the

form of a more stable world and improved environmental conditions. By resolving

questions concerning its financial commitments to multilateral organizations, the

United States would also send a message that it is engaged in global issues and

follows through on its international obligations. In addition to continuing its aid

under the Multilateral Fund, the United States should clear up its arrears with respect to the GEF.

Beyond resources, there needs to be a new structure for development cooperation,

not just an architecture for international finance. It should include not only development assistance but also trade, debt management, private investment and capital

flows, private sector development, and access to technology. Instead of operating on

a government-to-government basis, development assistance should be synergistic

with private sector development and the strengthening of civil society as a whole.

Development assistance must also be based on common interests and the complementary needs of the rich and the poor, defined to some extent by international

agreements. In that sense, development assistance is part of the price we pay to prevent the root cause of threats to our security. Development assistance should, in addition, support sustainable human development, and not simply build economies

and dams. Economies exist for people, not vice versa. Growth should replenish environmental heritage, not replace it. Development cooperation should also promote democratization and good governance, and it should be driven by the needs of the receiving country. Finally, for much of the world, development assistance should be

recognized as an essential building block to a vibrant private sector and successful

financial markets.

The international community should set firm financial and other commitments for

developed countries to help realize the goals set by the U.N. General Assembly in

its 2000 Millennium Declaration. These include, for example, the goal of reducing

by one-half, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is

less than $1 a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. The international community should also ensure adherence to these commitments. At day’s

end, the only world that works is one in which the aspirations for fairness and opportunity by poor people and developing nations are being realized. Such commitments should, in addition, help strengthen developing country interest in cooperation on environmental objectives.

The results of aid matter a great deal. Accordingly, there should be some type of

specific and regular reporting on how aid is used in developing countries, and what

results it is achieving. This aid should foster sustainable development; it should not

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support environmentally harmful activities or be lost to corruption. Such information should help inform and persuade the public and policymakers in developed

countries about the benefits of international assistance for sustainable development.

Family Planning Assistance

Since 1992, the United States has provided an average of $430 million annually

for family planning programs, and is the largest single donor to such programs.

Still, the world’s population is expected to grow to 9.3 billion by 2050, and nearly

all of that growth will occur in developing countries. In addition to contributing to

increases in poverty, resource consumption, and pollution, population growth plays

a critical role in generating urbanization, migration, and political instability. At the

1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, countries agreed to curb

population growth, not by setting numerical targets and focusing on birth control

efforts, but rather by improving people’s (particularly young women’s) education,

health, and social standing, on the theory that this would lead to smaller families.

Developed countries agreed to provide one-third of the cost of implementing the

Cairo program ($5.7 billion annually). Developed countries together, though, are

providing only about one-third of what they promised in Cairo. And twice in the

past decade, the United States has reversed its position on whether this family

planning assistance can go to organizations that perform or actively promote abortion as a family planning method. The United States needs to be a more generous

and consistent contributor to international family planning.

The international community should also build on the work of the Cairo Conference on Population and Development, which connected population growth to

women’s roles, rights, and reproductive health issues. Countries should collectively

consider the relationships among population growth, distribution, and mobility; environmental degradation; and the spread of diseases. Two key sets of connections

involve fresh water and global warming. Population growth is an exceedingly important factor in increasing demand for fresh water, and causing environmental degradation that compromises its availability. Population growth is also related, directly or indirectly, to national rates of fossil fuel use as well as land clearing and

conversion, both of which are major sources of GHG emissions. It should also be

noted that the populations most vulnerable to global warming and least able to

adapt are among the most rapidly growing ones.

Private Finance

At the time of the Earth Summit, about one-half of the net flow of capital from

developed to developing countries was ODA, and about one-half was private. By

2000, despite a series of financial crises in the late 1990’s, private investment outstripped public assistance by a factor of almost seven to one. In 2000, private flows

from the United States constituted 38 percent of total private financial flows to developing countries (as well as countries in transition to a market economy, such as

Russia and Poland), a much larger portion than any other country. National-level

capacity to promote sustainable development in many countries has lagged behind

the rapid pace of economic globalization, and many investments affect

transboundary or global ecosystems for which there is no governance infrastructure.

This surge in private finance was not anticipated in Rio. As a consequence, Agenda 21 provides little explicit guidance regarding the goals or policies that developed

country governments should undertake to ensure that private North-South flows

promote sustainable development. The Rio Declaration, however, provides some

guidance, stating the importance of integrating sustainability into mainstream economic decisionmaking and of public participation in those decisions. Although there

are many policy levers for influencing private finance, the two most significant institutions for influencing the environmental character of private financial flows to developing countries are bilateral export and investment promotion agencies and multilateral financial institutions.

The United States supports two key bilateral export and investment promotion

agencies-the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), an investment promotion agency, and the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), an export credit agency.

Environmental and social evaluation and disclosure requirements for OPIC and

Eximbank have strengthened over time, particularly in the past decade. Projects

funded by both are subject to environmental impact statements and detailed environmental reviews, for example. Some disclosure requirements, in fact, represent

international best practice. But while reforms at OPIC and Eximbank have provided

a basis for challenging environmentally and socially damaging projects, they fall

short of an explicit mandate to promote sustainable development.

Multilateral development banks (MDBs), particularly the World Bank Group, also

play a significant role in channeling private financial flows through their direct parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00351 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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ticipation in a variety of private sector transactions. MDBs have also played a significant indirect role in influencing North-South financial flows, particularly

through their promotion of the ‘‘Washington consensus.’’ The Washington consensus

emphasizes the role of capital market and trade liberalization, privatization, and removal of other constraints on integration into the international economy. The

United States controls the largest single share of capital subscription as well as the

largest number of votes on the World Bank Group boards.

Even before Rio, the United States demonstrated significant international leadership in MDB reform by advocating environmental impact reviews and public participation in projects, but the United States has not yet adequately addressed the role

of MDBs in leveraging private finance. For instance, environmental impact statements are still not required for structural adjustment loans from any of the MDBs,

even though such loans are arguably the most potent vehicle for leveraging the policy environment in which private investment takes place. Experience during the

1980’s and 1990’s, moreover, showed that the Washington consensus could undermine sustainable development if not accompanied by strong independent regulatory

capacity and other improvements in governance. In some cases, U.S. policy has promoted the Washington consensus at the expense of sustainable development.

The United States should work for further progress with both bilateral agencies

and MDBs to move private finance toward sustainable development. For OPIC and

Eximbank, the United States should move private financial flows to developing

countries in a more sustainable direction by maintaining high environmental and

disclosure standards. It should also promote the upward harmonization of sustainable development policies and procedures for export credit agencies. The United

States should push harder for the integration of sustainability objectives into the

private sector development activities of MDBs. The United States should proactively

monitor the performance of MDBs in complying with agreed policies and strategies.

Finally, OPIC and Eximbank, and the private sector arms of MDBs, should go beyond mere compliance with environmental standards and disclosure requirements,

and shift their portfolios toward investments insustainability.

Conservation and Management of Natural Resources

Our environment provides the basis for our lives and well being, and also helps

give meaning and context to our lives. Fresh water is essential for human life, for

the growing of food and other ‘‘natural services’’ to humans, and for natural communities. Oceans and estuaries provide food, recreation, and jobs for humans. We need

to be able to breathe healthy air. A stable climate has provided part of the basis

for our civilization, ensuring reasonably consistent temperatures and precipitation

from year to year, and thus providing a predictable basis for agriculture and other

human essentials. Biodiversity can provide valuable products to humans, but it also

has intrinsic value. Forests and agriculture provide necessary products and food, as

well as a source of human livelihood. The land provides a basis for almost all

human activities, and its proper use can make life easier or harder. Each of these

is addressed here.

Fresh Water

Relatively little change in fresh water quality or the law governing fresh water

has occurred in the decade since Rio. Agenda 21 promotes more sustainable, reliable, and healthy water supplies for both human consumption and economic uses,

while seeking to restore and sustain the health of aquatic ecosystems. In 1992, the

United States already had in place a detailed set of laws and institutions designed

to protect and manage fresh water resources that implemented the basic tenets of

Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. They include the Clean Water Act (CWA) and

other Federal statutes, as well as State laws governing allocation and protection of

water supplies. These measures laid the framework for sustainable use and protection of fresh water resources. As a result, most Americans have access to adequate

supplies of fresh water of at least acceptable quality relative to much of the world,

and U.S. agriculture and industry have similar adequate quantity and quality.

These laws and institutions also provide the basis for integrated decisionmaking in

the area of water resources, watershed-based restoration and protection programs,

and aquatic ecosystem integrity. Legal tools exist to implement the precautionary

principle for some, but not all, sources of water pollution.

The law governing fresh water has changed in only marginal ways since Rio, partly because legal tools for water resource protection were relatively sophisticated at

the time. The lack of significant legal change is also due in part to political barriers

to further improvements designed to address issues and problems that have evaded

solutions under existing law. While additional regulations have been implemented

to address more point sources of pollution, a comprehensive regime to tackle runoff

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from agriculture, city streets, and other land uses remains elusive. Moreover, efforts

to address the cumulative impacts of multiple sources of pollution on specific water

bodies have been reinvigorated, but progress has been slow due to legal and political

controversy. Similarly, legal tools to address physical impairments to U.S. aquatic

ecosystems remain fragmented and poorly implemented. Some of the gaps in national and State programs to protect water resources have been filled by a

wellspring of local and regional watershed programs around the country designed

to promote collaborative, holistic solutions to problems in individual watersheds.

Little improvement has been realized in actual water quality since 1992. Longterm ambient water quality trends are difficult to evaluate, but available data suggest that, on a nationwide basis, there has been no clear trend in water quality over

the past decade. Meanwhile, between 35 percent and 45 percent of the nation’s rivers and lakes remain impaired for at least some beneficial uses. Threats to human

health continue through contamination of swimming waters, fish and shellfish, and

drinking water. Similarly, fresh water aquatic species and the ecosystems on which

they depend remain impaired due to chemical pollution as well as widespread habitat loss and impairment. Indeed, fresh water ecosystems are among the most, if not

the most, threatened ecosystems in North America.

The United States could make progress in reducing these problems through

changes and improvements in U.S. freshwater policy. In addition to continued efforts to control industry and sewage treatment plants, an analogous comprehensive

program to reduce polluted runoff from rural and urban sources remains imperative

if additional water quality improvements are to be realized. These programs should

involve both new pollution controls and changes in agricultural policy designed to

prevent or to discourage farming of surplus crops on environmentally sensitive

lands. Integrated, holistic watershed protection efforts need to be strengthened both

by encouraging and supporting existing and new watershed programs, and by

strengthening the legal tools in the CWA designed to address pollution from multiple sources. Aquatic habitat can be restored by including a broader range of impairments within the broad definition of ‘‘pollution’’ in the CWA. In addition, there

should be improvements in Federal and State programs to protect wetlands,

floodplains, and other habitats; to restore aquatic ecosystems that have been modified by dams, channelization, and other artificial structures; and to protect critical

minimum-instream-flow regimes.

Oceans and Estuaries

Although the United States has played a leading role in protecting high seas fisheries, the ocean under its control appears to be in poorer shape now than it was

in 1992. The United States controls more than four million square miles of ocean,

an area larger than the country’s land mass. Agenda 21 identifies four program

areas that are particularly relevant to U.S. responsibilities for this area: integrated

management and sustainable development of coastal areas, controlling marine pollution, protecting marine living resources of the high seas, and protecting marine

living resources under national jurisdiction.

Coastal Areas

Existing laws have been insufficient to prevent the overall degradation of the nation’s coastal zones or to make significant progress in restoring degraded areas, particularly degraded wetlands. Through Agenda 21, nations committed themselves to

integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including the

application of preventive and precautionary measures to protect and preserve sensitive offshore ecosystems. Even before Rio, the United States had laws in place to

encourage coastal zone management and to protect its wetlands and estuaries. However, one-half of the U.S. population lives in a county that has an ocean coastline,

and the coastal population is growing faster than the Nation as a whole. If current

projections are correct, population pressures are likely to result in further degradation of coastal wetlands, beaches, and waters and the services they provide, despite

fairly extensive State and Federal regulation. To address these problems, Congress

should decide that (1) preserving viable coastal zones for future generations is a national priority, and (2) preserving functional nearshore and offshore ecosystems and

the services that they provide for the future requires buying, restoring, and preserving coastal property now, particularly functional wetlands and other buffer

areas between the land and the sea.

Marine Pollution

Agenda 21 seeks to halt and reverse degradation of the marine environment from

various sources of pollution. By the time of the Rio conference, the United States

already had a reasonably effective legal structure in place to control pollutants from

identifiable industrial, municipal and ship-based sources of marine pollution, and

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from oil pollution. Runoff, however, is not effectively addressed. Most marine pollution now comes from sources that are not well regulated under the CWA-especially

urban runoff and agricultural runoff. Congress thus should require States to have

enforceable measures to control runoff, and should give private citizens a right to

sue such polluters when they impair ocean quality. Congress should also amend the

CWA to require the establishment of water quality standards for the part of the

ocean that is under U.S. control.

Marine Species on High Seas

The United States was a world leader in international conservation of marine species before Rio, and it maintained that role throughout the last decade. Agenda 21

encourages sustainable use and conservation of living resources of the high seas. A

number of commercially important fish species, such as tuna, mackerel, and marlin,

as well as the great whales, spend much of their lives in waters outside any nation’s regulatory jurisdiction. U.S. efforts over the last few years have included initiating

new programs to protect species, such as sharks, that have only relatively recently

become commercial fishing targets. But basic status of one-half of the fished highly

migratory species is unknown. The United States should thus fund, or help fund,

comprehensive international scientific research to obtain basic information about

international marine living resources, and to reduce, and encourage other nations

to reduce, catch limits for all species known to be or suspected of being in danger

of being overfished.

Marine Species Under U.S. Jurisdiction

Fish stocks under U.S. Federal management are suffering, and there is insufficient information to determine the status of 65 percent of U.S. fish stocks. Yet there

is reason to believe that Federal fisheries and fishery management may have improved since 1992. As Agenda 21 explains, although the marine living resources and

nearshore fish existing mostly within a nation’s jurisdiction can help meet a nation’s nutritional and social needs, they can do so only if they are not overfished or overharvested. The 1976 statute governing fisheries was amended by the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act to incorporate sustainable thinking and a precautionary approach

into U.S. domestic fisheries management. Still, it may take a decade before we can

measure the true biological effects of legal changes in fisheries management, and

the unintentional catching of nontarget species remains a problem. To make further

progress, the United States needs to fund and support research to discover the complex interactions of marine living species and their environment. Without understanding marine ecosystems, truly sustainable management measures cannot be implemented. To facilitate comprehensive ecosystem management of its seas, the

United States should also work toward overhauling its current species-by-species,

medium-specific, multistatute, multigovernment, and multiagency legal regime for

the oceans.

More generally, the United States currently lacks two visions of the ocean necessary to promote sustainable development-visions that it should articulate in the

next few years. First, the United States needs a philosophical vision of the marine

environment as an integrated ecosystem that should be used with caution. Second,

the United States needs a more concrete vision of what the oceans under its territorial control should be. The Oceans Act of 2000, which establishes a commission

whose sole function is to make recommendations for a coordinated and comprehensive ocean policy, offers the Federal Government a means to identify and articulate

these two visions.

In the last years of the decade, and especially since 2000, the Federal Government

has shown decidedly more interest in protecting its marine resources. This interest

appears in the Oceans Act of 2000, in the Coral Reef Conservation Act of 2000, in

President Clinton’s Marine Protected Area Executive Order (which the Bush Administration has now adopted), and in the 2-year-long effort to turn the northern Hawaiian Islands into a national marine sanctuary. While recovery of ocean ecosystems can take decades, these recent legislative and executive efforts to protect

the ocean suggest that the issue of sustainable ocean ecosystems may finally have

arrived on the U.S. political agenda.

Air Pollution

Air pollution can make life unsustainable by harming the ecosystem upon which

all life depends and harming the health of both future and present generations. The

air pollution control activities described in Agenda 21 are broadly consistent with

long-term U.S. law and policy, particularly the Clean Air Act (CAA). Several Rio

Declaration principles taken together, including the right to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature and the elimination of ‘‘unsustainable patterns of

production,’’ suggest the importance of focusing on the economic activities and techVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00354 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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nologies that produce air pollution. The overwhelming majority of air pollution

comes from a single class of activities-burning fossil fuels. Emissions of most air pollutants declined somewhat over the past decade. Despite these improvements, the

United States has not achieved the goals of the Rio Declaration because we have

generally failed to do what we need to do-substitute clean sustainable technologies

for the basic dirty ones in use when the CAA was enacted more than 30 years ago.

Since the Earth Summit, the United States has reduced emissions contributing

to urban air pollution and acid rain, except for nitrogen oxides. Air pollution levels

are still too high, however, to ensure all human beings have a healthy and productive life. Inspite of strong economic growth and growing population, carbon monoxide declined by 2 percent, volatile organic compound emissions by 13 percent, particulate matter by 7 to 13 percent, and hazardous air pollutants by perhaps 39 percent. Still, large sections of the country are not in compliance with health-based air

quality standards. If the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) succeeds in

an effort it began several years ago to strengthen air quality standards, the CAA

may deliver further benefits in the future.

An ambitious program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, created by the 1990

Amendments to that Act, resulted in an overall reduction of emissions from all

sources by 17 percent between 1992 and 1999. This program has not stopped

transboundary harms, however, and has not fully protected ecosystems; most lakes

and ecosystems remain damaged. By contrast, the United States has made substantial progress in reducing pollutants responsible for stratospheric ozone depletion.

The United States has made only very modest progress toward deployment of sustainable technology. It has made substantial technological changes in sectors once

served by ozone-depleting chemicals, and some progress with respect to sustainable

vehicle technology (thanks to California’s low emission vehicle (LEV) program), but

almost no progress in changing how electricity is generated. New electric-generating

facilities, which are built and operated to meet increased demand, tend to rely on

less polluting fuels, particularly natural gas. Still, less efficient and more polluting

electrical generating plants that were operating in 1970 continue to do so.

To move toward sustainable development on air quality, the country must move

away from its dependence upon fossil fuels, especially fuels that produce such large

contributions to urban air pollution, acid rain, and global warming. As a first step,

the United States should phaseout coal-fired power generation, which supplied 51

percent of the power generated by electric utilities in 1998. The United States

should also expand and strengthen the LEV program in order to replace the internal

combustion engine. Government policy should be used to ensure that new technologies are continuously more efficient and less polluting than existing ones, and

that existing technologies are actually retired on a periodic basis rather than allowed to operate indefinitely. Several legal mechanisms have the potential to create

an economic dynamic favoring such a change. These include increasingly stringent

mass-based limits, pollution taxes, and an ‘‘environmental competition law.’’

Climate Change

In late 1992, the United States became the fourth country in the world to ratify

the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Five years later,

in 1997, the United States agreed to a protocol in Kyoto, Japan, under which developed countries would reduce their GHG emissions by about 5 percent from 1990 levels by 2008–2012, and the United States would reduce its emissions by 7 percent

from 1990 levels in the same period. Although President Bush repudiated the Kyoto

Protocol in 2001, the United States is still a Party to the UNFCCC. While the convention is a framework on which more explicit agreements are to be based, it nonetheless contains commitments. And these commitments are different from those in

Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, because they are legally binding. For GHG

emissions, the United States has failed to comply with the spirit, if not the letter,

of the convention.

The United States is the world’s single largest producer of GHG emissions. By

2000, U.S. GHG emissions were 13.6 percent higher than 1990 emissions measured

in carbon equivalents. More recently, U.S. emissions were projected to exceed 1990

levels by more than 46 percent by 2020. (CO2, a principal GHG, is not directly regulated under the CAA.)

The United States has generally adhered to UNFCCC obligations that are not related to emissions. Parties agreed to annually report their national GHG emissions

and to develop plans to mitigate climate change. The United States has done so.

In addition, Parties agreed to support and further develop research on global warming. The United States has consistently supported scientific research and has shared

information about global warming with other Parties.

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Although the UNFCCC contains no ‘‘hard’’ or ‘‘numerical’’ emission limitations, it

does contain two commitments regarding emissions. First, developed countries

agreed on a short-term goal-to ‘‘aim’’ to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels by

2000. The United States and other developed countries thus promised to adopt policies and measures that had a reasonable expectation of reducing GHG emissions to

1990 levels by 2000. A strong case can be made that the United States has failed

to abide by this promise. President Clinton’s proposed energy tax was rejected in

1993 by Congress. Then the Clinton Administration initiated a climate change program based on voluntary initiatives, but emissions continued to increase significantly.

The UNFCCC also contains a long-term goal, and commitments that go with it.

Developed countries agreed to adopt policies and measures ‘‘consistent with the objective of the Convention.’’ The convention’s objective is ‘‘stabilization of [GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’’ However, the U.S. actions described

above, including repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, are inconsistent with achieving

the convention’s long-term objective. In early 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change (IPCC), an international group of climate scientists organized

under the United Nations, concluded that the earth’s average surface temperature

could rise by 2.5 to 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit (F) from 1990 to 2100, which is higher

than the IPCC’s estimate of 5 years earlier. This report also strengthened the

IPCC’s prior conclusion that human-caused global warming is already happening.

A strong case can be made that the IPCC’s projections of future climate change

would constitute ‘‘dangerous interference with the climate system’’ even toward the

lower end of the IPCC projection, and that it is already too late to prevent some

atmospheric damage from global warming. The likely effects of global warming include rising sea levels, more frequent floods and droughts, and an increase in tropical diseases.

The excuses used by the United States for not acting are also inconsistent with

the convention. Many U.S. decisionmakers have said it would be unfair to the

United States to have to reduce GHG emissions if developing nations aren’t required

to do so. But in the UNFCCC, developed countries agreed to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions because they are responsible for the largest share of historic and

current emissions, and because they have greater capability to reduce them. Many

decisionmakers also claim that global warming science is too uncertain to justify

programs that might turn out to be an unnecessary drag on the U.S. economy. Yet

the United States and other UNFCCC Parties specifically agreed to take ‘‘precautionary measures’’ to reduce GHG emissions, and recognized that the ‘‘lack of full

scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing’’ cost-effective

measures. Notably, many such cost-effective measures are available.

The United States should adopt GHG emission reduction programs that will reduce U.S. GHG emissions to 1990 levels as soon as technically feasible. Because the

United States is already 13.6 percent above 1990 levels, and because a business-asusual approach to GHG emissions is expected to significantly increase this difference in the next 6 years, the United States will also need to participate in emissions trading and use carbon sequestration projects, coupled with aggressive policy

responses, to achieve this reduction. In addition, the United States should commit

to make further reductions to achieve the Kyoto target of 7 percent below 1990 levels as soon as possible after achieving the first goal. This would allow the United

States to merge with the approach taken by the rest of the world pursuant to the

Kyoto Protocol even though it may be technically infeasible for the United States

to comply with the Kyoto goal between 2008 and 2012. The United States needs to

make it clear that it will eventually catch up with commitments being made by the

rest of the world.

The record on voluntary global warming programs has demonstrated that they

alone cannot be relied upon to achieve the type of reductions required. Therefore,

the United States needs to adopt both emissions caps for various sectors and a mix

of financial incentives and regulatory requirements. Moreover, the United States

should take leadership on getting an international consensus on what atmospheric

concentrations of GHGs will not present a dangerous interference with the climate

system. That would help the international community better understand what national obligations will be needed to prevent dangerous interference with the climate

system.

Biodiversity

The Convention on Biological Diversity, which seeks to ensure both the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, was opened for signature in Rio. The convention is a major innovation because it provides a legal foundation that did not

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previously exist in the United States and in most other countries for the conservation of biodiversity. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Convention

on Biological Diversity. Agenda 21, which the United States did agree to, also provides for biodiversity conservation. Both Agenda 21 and the Convention on Biological Diversity would have nations adopt national strategies for the conservation and

sustainable use of biological resources. Key elements of a national strategy include

an inventory and monitoring of important biodiversity resources, and the creation

of in situ (in place) biodiversity reserves. Ten years after Rio, the United States has

no explicit comprehensive biodiversity conservation program in place, and a great

many species and ecosystems are at risk.

Biodiversity conservation is still not a generally accepted legal standard in the

United States. At best, it is an objective which may be considered along with other

competing objectives when resource managers make allocation decisions that promote or impair biodiversity. The reason is simple. Biodiversity emerged as a concept

after the basic public land and environmental laws were in place, and domestic politics have prevented ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity and all efforts to develop a national biodiversity conservation strategy.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 does not provide a complete foundation for such a strategy. The ESA imposes a duty on public and private parties to

prevent the extinction of a limited number of endangered or threatened speciesthose that are listed under the Act. In 2000, more than 1,200 species were listed,

but an estimated 66,000 were at risk of extinction. The ESA is also a backward approach to biodiversity because it only indirectly addresses the major cause of biodiversity loss-habitat destruction-and it does not address other causes such as the

invasion of exotic species and air and water pollution. Since 1992, however, the ESA

has evolved to encourage the use of large-scale multispecies habitat conservation

plans and other forms of ecosystem management. By the end of 2000, the U.S. Department of the Interior had approved habitat conservation plans covering 20 million acres. While this suggests that it is possible to move from individual species

to general biodiversity conservation within the framework of the ESA, the results

of this approach have yet to be tested by time.

Since the Earth Summit, many biodiversity conservation initiatives have been

started in the United States by all levels of government and by private parties. But

they are often ad hoc efforts to solve a single example of past environmental degradation, such as the restoration of sheet flows to the Everglades, or efforts to avoid

a worst-case enforcement scenario under the ESA. The U.S. Government has also

tried to manage large blocks of public lands on an ecosystem basis and has participated in ecosystem restoration experiments on a collaborative stakeholder basis.

These efforts have occurred in national forests, wilderness areas, national parks,

and Bureau of Land Management lands-areas that in many cases could be turned

into public land biodiversity reserves. These efforts are extremely fragile because

they lack a firm legal foundation, can be modified in response to changed political

conditions, and include no clear performance standards to measure their success

should they endure. Thus, the future of many of the biodiversity-related conservation initiatives implemented since 1992 is in doubt.

To implement the Earth Summit’s objectives, the United States should immediately take four steps. First, it should ratify the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Ratification would establish biodiversity conservation as an overarching legal objective in the United States and stimulate the development of a comprehensive national biodiversity conservation strategy. Second, the legal mandates of the major

Federal land management and regulatory agencies should be revised to require

them to conserve biodiversity to the maximum extent consistent with due process

and the sustainable use of natural resources. This would include clarifying the role

of State and local governments as well as private parties in habitat conservation

plans. Third, the United States should create a Biological Survey, equal in stature

to the U.S. Geological Survey, to inventory the nation’s biodiversity heritage and to

provide the necessary scientific support for the establishment of biodiversity indices

and conservation performance standards. Finally, although biodiversity conservation

is primarily a national responsibility, private land stewardship must be recognized

and supported.

Forestry

The United States made halting steps in law reform and in the implementation

of forest sustainability during the past decade. The governments meeting in Rio

agreed to a separate set of principles for sustainable development of forests. In general, sustainable forestry is based on ecosystem integrity, economic viability, and social responsibility. Other principles relevant to the United States include opportunity for stakeholder participation in forestry decisions, ‘‘timely, reliable, and accuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00357 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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rate’’ information, comprehensive assessment of forest values, integration of forest

management with management of adjacent areas to protect viability or unique ecosystems, and the incorporation of environmental costs and benefits into market

mechanisms.

Forest ecosystems cover one-third of the land area of the United States, and twothirds of that land is productive enough to have value as commercial timberland.

Public forests account for 42.4 percent of the forest area in the United States; they

are owned and managed by the Federal, State, and local governments; and have

contributed disproportionately to sustainability through demonstration programs

and innovative practices. Private forests account for the rest. The basic structure

of forestry law, firmly established prior to 1992, provides the background against

which to discern recent trends.

The physical area of forests changed little in the past decade. Data on species diversity, forest structure, water quality, and many other dimensions of ecological sustainability are not cumulated nationally for forests in a way that invites evaluation

of changes since 1992. Information on economic viability and social responsibility is

even more elusive.

After the Rio Summit, the U.S. Forest Service began a slow, but steady, shift toward general sustainable development principles. The most important legal vehicle

for promoting this change is the Government Performance and Results Act, which

was enacted in 1993. The legislation requires all agencies to set both long-and shortterm measurable performance objectives and to conduct periodic assessments and

revisions. This spurred the Forest Service to employ adaptive management to monitor and evaluate its activities based on parameters relating to such sustainability

criteria as the health of the land, quality of water, and user satisfaction. These

changes help provide ‘‘timely, reliable, and accurate information’’ about forests. The

Forest Service also shifted its emphasis under the ESA from interagency coordination and prohibitive policy to the broader use of habitat conservation plans. In 2000,

the Forest Service promulgated a new framework for planning that establishes

maintenance and restoration of ecological sustainability as the first priority for management. The 2000 rule, and a 2001 rule prohibiting logging and road building in

many roadless areas of the national forests, constitute the single most important

positive development in the application of substantive standards to promote sustainable development of public lands. The Bush Administration, however, has indicated

that it will alter both regulations.

On private lands, a slight strengthening of State forest practice laws and increased promotion of best management practices have improved the legal regime,

but these changes tended to be overwhelmed by market forces. Until water pollution

control begins to force abatement and mitigation of runoff, private forest owners will

not face significantly heightened incentives for sustainable practices. On the other

hand, new certification systems for sustainable practices have arisen in the past

decade; under these programs, third parties such as the Forest Stewardship Council

certify forest products as ‘‘sustainable,’’ and major purchasers confine their purchases to certified products. These systems have begun to reshape market demand.

In the coming decade, the United States should strengthen its legal mechanisms

for promoting public participation, citizen enforcement, best forestry management

practices, and landscape-level planning. These recommendations are top priorities

for facilitating sustainable development. Existing property, market, and administrative regimes can all be deployed in the service of more sustainable forestry by flexibly demanding that environmental performance indicators be achieved through mitigation, ecosystem services, and adaptive management. In addition, the 2000 and

2001 rules should be supported, not altered. These regulations are important because large-scale, e.g., forestwide, planning is needed to implement ecosystem management. Federal and State governments should also throw their purchasing weight

behind the Forest Stewardship Council’s certification program.

Agriculture

The United States has a diverse and dynamic system of agriculture. If it is to be

sustainable, it must meet at least three criteria that are explicit in or logically derived from Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. Agriculture must become internally

sustainable, which requires that it preserve its resource base; avoid pollution,

salinization, or other degradation of the soil and water; and be able to respond to

plant and animal disease, pests, periodic climate variation, and changing market

conditions. Agriculture must also be externally sustainable. That is, it must not impose external costs on nonagricultural society or surrounding natural resources. Finally, agriculture must exhibit responsive sustainability; it must be sufficiently dynamic and flexible that it is able to respond to change and help the Nation respond

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to crises in other sectors of the economy, e.g., to participate in global warming remedies through the use of sequestered carbon.

Internal sustainability is being challenged in the West by competing demands for

irrigation water, although the increased use of water conservation practices eases

this somewhat. From 1992 to 1997, however, one-quarter of all agricultural land

converted to urban uses was prime farmland.

U.S. agriculture is not externally sustainable. Since 1985, there has been a gradual and fundamental change unfolding in Federal agricultural policy. A series of

programs (evidenced by the 2002 farm bill) now encourage farmers to adopt conservation or environmental protection practices on some of their land. Taken together, these mostly voluntary agricultural programs represent a vast investment

in conserving practices. Still, farm policy continues to direct farmers away from sustainability. The system of support payments, which will grow even larger now that

the 2002 farm bill has become law, encourages farmers to grow commodity crops,

which have greater adverse environmental effects, and drives small, family farms

out of business. There are larger and fewer farms employing ever more intensive

practices, usually in the form of monoculture. There is almost universal reliance on

inorganic fertilizers to replace lost natural soil nutrients. Chemical pesticides are

heavily relied on to deal with the vulnerability of monocultures to pests. Pollution

of both surface and groundwater from agricultural sources may be the single largest

source of pollution in the Nation. Waterways of all types suffer from sedimentation.

Responsive sustainability is challenged by several uncertainties, perhaps the

clearest of which is climate change. Rapid changes in climate, including more frequent droughts and floods, could be disastrous for agriculture. Another example of

uncertainty is the effect of specialization in the use of genetic stock. Because the

United States operates an agricultural system that is close to monocultural, future

pests, diseases, or human dilemmas could create large problems unless we preserve

the broader genetic stock, or germplasm, from which current plant varieties are derived. Other sources of uncertainty are created by the increased use of genetically

modified organisms and by world markets.

Steps needed to move the United States toward sustainable agriculture include

the stabilization of irrigation agriculture through greater water conservation and

protection against salinity. The United States should also renew its campaign to reduce erosion. Prime agricultural land must be protected against urban and suburban development. The nation’s larger drainage systems should be re-engineered to

achieve systematic control of polluted runoff. In addition, affirmative steps should

be taken to protect germplasm. More generally, the internalization of environmental

costs should be an obligation of contemporary agriculture. For the long term, the

science of ecology must be fully integrated into agricultural research.

Land Use

Sprawl continued during the past decade. The ‘‘smart growth’’ movement has led

to some legislative and policy changes, particularly at the State level. But there is

a wide gap between the talk of reform and actual reform, and not enough time has

elapsed to fairly assess whether any of the policy changes are making a meaningful

difference.

Sustainable land development requires consistent integration of social, environmental, and economic considerations in decisionmaking to produce a sound, coordinated, and harmonious built environment. Our system of land use controls and decisionmaking must be consistent both horizontally (among and between neighboring

jurisdictions) and vertically (from one level of government to the next). Achieving

this result requires heightened levels of intergovernmental cooperation, coordination, and support. Effective sustainable land development policies must minimize

sprawl and maximize sound development opportunities so that the United States

may conserve important lands, preserve the natural environment, protect air and

water quality, promote affordable housing through compact development and urban

renewal, and encourage urban ‘‘infill’’ rather than rural development.

Agenda 21 asserts that national governments should delegate ‘‘planning and management responsibilities to the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective action.’’ This is the lightning rod of land use reform debate in the United

States-whether traditional local land use planning and decisionmaking can achieve

sustainable development.

The smart growth movement is proving to be, at least in rhetoric, a solution for

both the disorganized and inefficient system of land use controls of the past and a

framework for a new future paradigm. In general, smart growth principles mirror

many of the implementation strategies for sustainable land development under

Agenda 21.

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At the national level, there has been a lot of talk, some bits and pieces of reforms,

but overall very little action. The Federal Government has taken notice of allegations of environmental injustice in the siting of various locally unwanted land uses,

and has taken initial steps to foster greater social equity.

There is a much greater level of activity in many States than at the national

level. While there were some State-level comprehensive land use planning reforms

before 1992, the last decade has witnessed an unprecedented level of attention and

activity at the State level. Some States have undertaken a comprehensive recodification of State planning and zoning enabling statutes that provide local governments

with tools to promote sustainable land use. More than one-half the States explored

reform options through task forces or study commissions. Some States have adopted

changes through public referendum initiatives. Yet on balance States are just starting to make significant statutory changes that offer the promise of promoting more

sustainable land development practices. It will take even more time for these reforms to translate into observable and quantifiable changes in our neighborhoods

and communities once States have provided the opportunity for changed behaviors.

Sustainable land use will require continued leadership for, and interest in, meaningful land use reforms. States must create a new culture of cooperative and intergovernmental decisionmaking at the local level. State and Federal Governments

must target spending on initiatives and programs that promote urban renewal and

infill, and thus revitalize our cities. The Federal Government should also modify existing programs so that, where State and local participation is optional, access to

Federal money is conditioned on implementation of sustainable land use plans.

Waste and Toxic Chemicals

According to Agenda 21, the root cause of waste and toxic chemicals problems is

unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. These patterns are

unsustainable because they harm humans and ecosystems, deplete materials and

energy, and, in some cases, may threaten national security. This section summarizes

U.S. efforts concerning toxic chemicals as well as pesticides. It also summarizes U.S.

efforts concerning three types of waste-hazardous waste (including Superfund), municipal solid waste, and radioactive waste. In addition, it summarizes State and

Federal legislation facilitating private cleanups of brownfield sites-sites contaminated with hazardous substances.

Toxic Chemicals and Pesticides

The United States made significant progress in moving toward a more sustainable

approach to chemicals and pesticides over the past decade, but still has a long way

to go. The most relevant sustainable development principles are the precautionary

principle, intergenerational equity, access to information, integrated decisionmaking, and control of trade of hazardous chemicals in international trade. They

apply with particular force to chemicals and pesticides because of incomplete information about their risks, their potential to cause future harms, and the need for

public information about them.

Little progress was made in reducing the risks of chemicals that are currently

being used in commerce. The 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) requires

manufacturers of new chemicals to submit information about the environmental and

health risks of these chemicals to EPA before they can be manufactured. Relatively

little information exists concerning the 60,000 or so chemicals already in commerce

that were grandfathered under TSCA, and little progress was made in assessing

their risks over the past decade. Several voluntary information collection initiativesone for high production volume chemicals and another for chemicals to which children are commonly exposed-are promising, but it remains to be seen whether anything more than assessments will be conducted.

Similarly, little progress was made concerning the introduction of new chemicals

into commerce. Although premanufacture approval is required under TSCA for new

chemicals, the United States requires relatively little information before giving that

approval. While both EPA and the EU have concluded that requiring better information would reduce risks, EPA has not taken steps to do so. The EU runs a premarket approval program rather than, in the case of the United States, a

premanufacturing approval program. Because only 10 percent of new chemicals are

likely to go to market, the EU program focuses more intensely on fewer chemicals,

and thus permits a more certain hazard prediction than the system of review used

in the United States.

The toxics release inventory (TRI) led to continued reductions in chemical releases

over the past decade. Under TRI, manufacturing facilities with 10 or more employees report releases and transfers of several hundred toxic chemicals. Between 1988

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ently over that time declined by 45.5 percent, although total production waste increased slightly. The TRI was expanded in the 1990’s to include hundreds of new

chemicals, Federal facilities, and new industry groups. These expansions have increased the information available to citizens, which may lead to further reductions.

Pollution prevention would further many of the goals of sustainable development

because it relies on more efficient processes and practices to reduce the amount of

pollution that is created. Although much progress was made in the development of

pollution prevention tools and education, it is not clear to what extent pollution prevention has been adopted in practice.

Use of pesticides in agriculture has leveled off since 1985, and utilization of the

most highly toxic pesticides has declined. But the most important change in pesticide regulation over the past decade occurred with the adoption of the 1996 Food

Quality Protection Act. The Act focuses on pesticide residues in food, and requires

EPA to assess the aggregate and cumulative risks of these pesticides, rather than

assessing safety based on one pesticide and one medium at a time. The Act also requires safety factors, reflecting both the precautionary principle and

intergenerational equity.

The United States made some progress in the regulation of genetically modified

organisms (GMOs) under TSCA, but it did not put in place a framework for regulating the new GMO plants that are being bred to produce chemicals. Such organisms are increasingly the technology of choice for the manufacture of chemicals

and pesticides.

In the international arena, the United States has been at the table for negotiations and has been among the world’s leaders in developing and adopting international standards for chemicals, some legally binding, and some not. However, the

United States has not yet ratified certain recent treaties and protocols. These include the Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent (prohibiting the export

of specified chemicals without explicit agreement by the importing country), the

Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (protecting health and environment from specified pollutants), the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (setting up

an international framework for managing trade of GMOs and seeds), and the Biodiversity Convention on which the Cartagena Protocol is based.

To make progress, or further progress, toward sustainable development, Congress

should modify TSCA to provide a clearer standard for health and safety to encourage greater pollution prevention. TSCA should also be amended to shift the presumption that chemicals are ‘‘innocent until proven guilty’’ to a burden on manufacturers to prove that chemicals are safe as used in the market. In addition, TSCA

should be amended to level the playing field between new and existing chemicals;

the present approach perversely creates disincentives for bringing new and safer

technologies to market. New chemicals should be reviewed on a premarket, not a

premanufacture, basis, and manufacturers should be required to submit the same

kind of information they would to the EU. EPA also needs to broaden its use of tools

for the management of chemical risks, including labels and hazard classification. As

new chemical hazard information is generated by EPA through voluntary screening

initiatives, TRI listings should be modified accordingly.

The United States should evaluate its pollution prevention efforts to determine

where they have succeeded and failed. The United States also needs to expand efforts to integrate pollution prevention into core regulatory efforts for air, water, and

waste management. EPA needs to implement the Food Quality Protection Act on a

priority basis, in a transparent manner, and with full public disclosure. In addition,

the United States needs to revise the regulatory framework for regulation of biotechnology and assure that it will effectively cover both new and existing products.

Moreover, the United States needs to seriously consider whether a labeling approach might have a place in enhancing consumer confidence, if not the safety, of

such foods. Finally, the United States should ratify the agreements described above.

In the longer term, the United States needs to recognize that many of the major

chemical risks do not respect national boundaries.

Lead

In the past 10 years, the United States has used its domestic efforts on lead poisoning prevention and abatement to help support efforts in other countries. Lead

poisoning remains a serious threat to health and development, particularly but not

exclusively in developing countries. Because lead poisoning is expensive and difficult

if not impossible to cure, prevention is the best approach. The United States should

maintain and intensify its leadership role on lead poisoning prevention in an internationalized context by supporting adoption of a Global Lead Initiative (GLI) and

by playing a leadership role in implementing it thereafter. The GLI should be designed to complete a worldwide phaseout of leaded gasoline on an expedited basis,

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and use the momentum from that success to address the multiple other sources of

lead exposure. The United States should continue to support the global phaseout of

leaded gasoline in all relevant international fora. The United States should also support such complementary activities as the development of an international network

dedicated to raising public awareness and exchanging best practices for phaseout

and prevention, including those based on U.S. experience.

In addition to the United States, the international community should support the

establishment and implementation of a GLI to complete the phaseout of leaded gasoline and then other sources of lead poisoning. While the conquest of lead poisoning

would constitute a signal victory in itself, its concrete achievement should also serve

as an optimism-engendering model of international cooperation adaptable to solving

other threats to sustainable development.

The project should initially convene a technical advisory group to work in partnership with identified government focal points, as well as NGO’s and the private sector, to prepare action plans for phaseout that include milestones and timelines for

national action. Mandating, not merely recommending, the formation of the technical advisory process and funding, not merely morally encouraging, the GLI as a

sustained project are essential to its success.

Hazardous Waste and Superfund

The basic structure of U.S. domestic laws with respect to hazardous waste was

established in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or the Superfund Act) created a multifaceted scheme for eliminating dangerous conditions created by hazardous waste

spills and improper disposal of hazardous substances. The Resource Conservation

and Recovery Act (RCRA) focused on ‘‘cradle-to-grave’’ regulation of ongoing hazardous waste generation, transportation, and disposal.

Agenda 21 is premised on an ‘‘overall cleaner production approach,’’ with the goal

of preventing or minimizing further hazardous waste generation, which would have

the United States go further. Rio Declaration principles supporting integrated decisionmaking and the reduction and elimination of unsustainable patterns of production and consumption provide a foundation for that. Indeed, a zero level of hazardous waste generation appears to be a worthwhile long-term goal. In addition,

Agenda 21 calls for environmentally effective management of the waste that is generated. Agenda 21 also urges ratification of the Basel Convention on the Control of

Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, which sets forth more effective

rules with respect to the transboundary shipping of hazardous wastes.

Cleanup activity under CERCLA has been completed on about one-half of all

Superfund sites listed on the national priority list, and more than 6,400 removal actions have been undertaken since 1993 to remove immediate and direct public

health and environmental threats. Although CERCLA has been very modestly

amended in the decade since Rio and subject to some intermittent administrative

‘‘fine tuning,’’ those legal changes have diminished or, for the most part, left unimproved the statute’s overall environmental effectiveness. While the legislation was

amended in early 2002 to encourage private cleanups at contaminated or

‘‘brownfield’’ sites, the statute still excludes oil-based wastes at non-brownfield sites,

and the exemption for secured creditors was actually broadened in 1996. Moreover,

EPA’s tax-based Superfund trust fund has not been replenished since the special

Superfund taxes expired at the end of 1995, and the fund will run out of money

in 2003 unless significant changes are made.

Similarly, RCRA has never been comprehensively amended with a view to implementing sustainable development for hazardous waste. While the statute intensively

regulates certain wastes, the legal definition of hazardous waste creates many regulatory uncertainties, and the statute excludes ‘‘solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage’’ and ‘‘solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows’’-two major

and environmentally unsound loopholes. Moreover, the statute lacks any enforceable

provisions directly intended to decrease or eliminate the generation of hazardous

wastes. EPA’s biennial hazardous waste reports reflect relatively little recent

progress in decreasing the generation of hazardous wastes. Nor has the United

States ratified the Basel Convention.

To move toward sustainable development, CERCLA should be amended to narrow

its exemption for secured creditors, to eliminate the statute’s ‘‘petroleum exclusion,’’

and to provide a stable source of funding for the Superfund program, at realistic

levels, for at least another decade. RCRA (and CERCLA) should be altered to mandate phased decreases in the generation of hazardous wastes (by dates certain) at

U.S. industrial facilities, to provide that hazardous wastes in domestic sewage and

irrigation return flows be made subject to RCRA regulation, and to replace RCRA’s

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forward, and comprehensive definition. The United States should also ratify the

original version of the Basel Convention and amend domestic hazardous waste laws

to conform with the convention.

Brownfields Redevelopment

The United States has as many as 500,000 brownfield sites, properties that are

underdeveloped or abandoned because of actual or potential contamination from

past industrial or commercial use. Because of CERCLA and counterpart State laws,

ownership or use of these properties could result in significant liability. In the past

decade, virtually every State has adopted laws to facilitate the reuse of brownfield

sites through voluntary cleanup programs. These laws confer three principal advantages on private sector actors and others who are willing to remediate a site-streamlined administrative cleanup procedures, relaxed cleanup standards, and liability

protection. Brownfields revitalization is widely viewed as successful, as thousands

of sites have been remediated in State programs. In early 2002, similar provisions

under CERCLA were signed into law.

Each decision to remediate and reuse a brownfield site eliminates environmental

health risks while promoting reinvestment, creating jobs, slowing the acceleration

of suburban ‘‘greenfields’’ development, decreasing polarization of communities, and

fostering public involvement in every aspect of redevelopment efforts. Brownfield redevelopment thus involves integrated decisionmaking, promotion of sustainable

human settlements, and public participation-all central features of sustainable development. In principle, too, State leadership in brownfields revitalization fulfills

the Agenda 21 recommendation that national governments delegate institutional responsibility for sustainable development ‘‘to the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective action.’’

States should modify their programs in three ways to make them more fully consistent with sustainable development, however. First, a higher level of government

oversight is needed to ensure early, simultaneous, and coordinated consideration of

social, environmental, and economic goals. There is typically no comprehensive review of the project and little if any supervision of the cleanup process. The assumption is that redevelopment will result in less contamination, but that is merely an

assumption. States should modify their laws to provide for State oversight throughout the process.

Second, a shortcoming of virtually every brownfields program is the relative lack

of concern for future generations. State and Federal programs define success in

terms of short-term results based on specific uses that could change over time or

with future ownership. States should modify their laws to guarantee long-term protection of sites where remediation has taken place.

Third, there is relatively little opportunity for public participation in the cleanup

process. Public participation is especially important because many brownfield sites

are located in neighborhoods with higher than average concentrations of persons of

color and other minorities. Public involvement helps ensure equity in the decisionmaking process and helps ensure consistency between community plans and developer plans. States should thus require full and active citizen participation throughout the revitalization process.

Municipal Solid Waste

Solid waste, according to Agenda 21, is all waste that is not radioactive or legally

hazardous. In the United States, the term encompasses nonhazardous industrial, oil

and gas, mining, agricultural, and municipal solid wastes. While municipal solid

waste, also known as trash or garbage, comprises only a fraction of these wastes,

it is easily the best known and best studied of these types of waste. Accordingly,

this part of the review focuses on municipal solid waste.

Agenda 21’s objectives for solid waste are contained in a hierarchy of (1) minimizing wastes that are produced, (2) maximizing environmentally sound reuse and

recycling of wastes, and (3) the environmentally sound disposal and treatment of

wastes that cannot be used or reused or recycled. Underlying this hierarchy are estimates of relative environmental impact and cost. Each successive tier of the hierarchy involves more materials use and loss. That, in turn, means more loss of economic value and, generally, more environmental impact than the previous level.

Based on this hierarchy, the following three indicators or goals appear to be a useful way of measuring a move toward sustainable waste management: (1) decreasing

per capita generation; (2) decoupling of waste generation from GDP; and (3) even

if waste generation rises, decreasing per capita waste disposal though increased recycling, composting, and resource recovery.

A threshold problem in analyzing U.S. efforts in meeting these three goals is a

lack of standardization about what is and should be counted. Three prominent data

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sources that should be useful in analyzing sustainability trends at the national level

collect data in different ways and make different assumptions in accounting. Still,

it is possible to discern basic trends.

First, per capita waste generation in the United States declined somewhat from

1990 to 1995, but has increased steadily since 1996, perhaps owing to the strong

economy. Second, there does not appear to be any decoupling of waste generation

from GDP; in fact, GDP increases seem to automatically include commensurately increasing waste generation rates. A trend toward lighter packaging appears to have

been offset by increases in purchasing and waste. Finally, even after recycling and

composting, the numbers of pounds of waste generated per capita per day have been

increasing since 1996, according to both California and EPA data.

These three trends are particularly notable, because the past decade saw large

changes in how municipal solid waste is managed. The trash capacity crisis that the

country faced in the late 1980’s created tremendous enthusiasm for recycling and

waste reduction programs. These programs have had a significant and positive effect. EPA reports that, in 1999, although 230 million tons of municipal solid waste

were generated, 50 million more tons of waste were not created due to waste prevention programs. The trash capacity crisis also led to the development of larger,

more environmentally protective landfills and incinerators, as a result of which capacity is no longer a significant issue. That growth in infrastructure, however, has

reduced pressure for recycling and waste reduction.

To move toward sustainability, the United States should make progress on all

three goals or indicators. To reduce per capita waste generation, States could follow

the lead of an Oregon statute that sets goals for stabilizing and reducing per capita

waste generation. To decouple waste generation from GDP growth, the United

States should explore examples of where decoupling has already occurred, e.g., yard

waste, and develop programs that are targeted at specific waste streams. To reduce

per-capita waste disposal, more recycling and composting is needed, coupled with incentives to reduce waste being disposed. Better and more nationally consistent data

is necessary for all of these recommendations, and for all solid wastes.

Radioactive Waste

Radioactive waste results from nuclear-powered electric generation and other civilian uses as well as the manufacture and disposal of nuclear weapons. In addition

to its radioactive nature, it differs from other wastes because it can be highly dangerous for thousands of years and because some radioactive waste can be used to

make new nuclear weapons. As a result, the control of radioactive waste deeply implicates the security aspects of sustainable development.

While the cold war ended just before the 1992 Earth Summit, the full meaning

of this change had not yet permeated the nuclear establishment. Since 1992, an

enormous rethinking of the role of nuclear technology and the management of nuclear waste has begun. Enormous stockpiles of ‘‘special nuclear materials’’ and other

radioactive materials that were painstakingly built up for nuclear weapons arsenals

have been rendered surplus, raising difficult questions about what to do with them.

Moreover, Agenda 21 focused only on commercial nuclear waste, not on radioactive

waste from nuclear weapons production. Because of greater public awareness and

disclosure about problems related to nuclear weapons production since the Earth

Summit, it is now apparent that the cost of radioactive waste cleanup at nuclear

weapons productionsites far exceeds the costs of civilian radioactive waste controls.

In the 10 years since Rio, the United States took a number of actions that move

the country closer to sustainability in nuclear waste control, if measured by the limited recommendations set forth in Agenda 21. Among other things, Agenda 21 calls

on countries to minimize radioactive waste, transfer radioactive waste control technologies, and support international efforts for radioactive waste control. Private industry has reduced the amount of low-level commercial waste per unit of activity.

The amount of high-level nuclear waste from nuclear weapons material production

was reduced largely by DOE’s lower level of nuclear weapons production, but not

by efficient operations. The United States has generally supported technology transfer in radioactive waste control. On the other hand, some technologies promoted for

radioactive waste control may present significant risks of facilitating nuclear proliferation. The United States provided significant and broad support for international and regional cooperation and coordination, even though its efforts were uneven.

When measured against the broader principles in the Rio Declaration, however,

the United States has fallen short of making significant progress toward sustainability in radioactive waste controls. U.S. controls on most radioactive waste generally contain explicit, if imperfect, requirements that intergenerational or longterm impacts be considered. The issue of intergenerational impacts has been a focus

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of debates about the effectiveness of proposed geologic repositories for such wastes.

However, neither a complete understanding of the implications, nor a mature ability

to deal with this issue, have yet evolved.

Significant progress has been made in opening up radioactive waste control to

public knowledge and participation. Much remains to be done, however, and some

backsliding has already begun. DOE began an ‘‘openness’’ initiative to provide the

public more information about radioactive waste control, but that effort has waned,

and large amounts of information that were previously available on websites from

the United States have been eliminated, ostensibly for security purposes.

Since 1992, two events have improved worker safety, but the overall problem of

DOE self-regulation remains intractable. First, DOE has begun to encourage modern integrated safety management techniques to involve all workers in safety planning. Second, Congress passed a landmark worker compensation bill that provides

Federal compensation for cancer, chronic beryllium disease, and silicosis to current

and former nuclear workers and their surviving family members. Unfortunately,

DOE is retreating toward its traditional insular culture of self-regulation and contractor self-assessments, thus reversing the momentum toward greater contractor

accountability and safety that was developed in the 1990’s.

The polluter-pays principle is particularly problematic in the case of radioactive

waste. The intergenerational nature of radioactive waste almost guarantees that

some of the costs will be borne by future generations rather than by those who benefited from electric power or nuclear weapons. A limited trust fund was established

for one site, and there were proposals for other trust funds. To the extent that waste

and liability producing practices fail to internalize the full costs of doing business,

the same practices will continue to produce environmental problems.

To make progress toward sustainability in radioactive waste control, the United

States will need to rely on existing laws and institutions more effectively. But new

organizations and institutions will likely be required to operate new facilities for

plutonium disposition and for long-term stewardship of facilities where radioactive

waste has been stabilized or contained, but not removed. A dedicated trust fund and

politically insulated organization will likely be required to ensure the availability of

funds for post-cleanup stewardship of nuclear facilities. The United States needs to

invest in better science and technology to provide a stronger and more publicly acceptable basis for decisionmaking. The government needs to acknowledge the seamless connection between certain aspects of radioactive waste control and nuclear

weapons proliferation. It should therefore support changes in the International

Atomic Energy Agency to separate its regulatory safety and safeguards functions

from its nuclear promotion activities. Finally, the government should seek to bridge

the gap between current policies and the public’s understanding and support for

those policies. A major challenge is whether technical concerns about the security

of radioactive wastes and related nuclear operations are compatible with open and

democratic decisionmaking processes.

Nongovernmental Actors

As Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration recognize, an informed and active civil society plays an integral role in realizing sustainable development. A democratic society

can only accomplish the far-reaching individual and organizational changes required

for sustainable development by making readily available the information that citizens need to make their own choices and by involving citizens in making societal

choices. More generally, sustainable development is not simply the responsibility of

governments. Every part of civil society has a role to play, not just in influencing

government decisions, but also in the activities it conducts on a daily basis. Public

access to information and governmental decisionmaking processes is one key aspect

of this issue. Another is the role played by business and industry. A third is the

extent to which sustainable development is understood in ethical or religious terms.

Public Access to Information, Participation, and Justice

In 1992, the United States already had in place basic laws and practices to promote transparency, participation, and accountability. These include the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA), the Administrative Procedure Act, the Government in the

Sunshine Act, and access provisions in most environmental laws. During the past

decade, FOIA was amended to include electronic as well as written material. Executive Orders began to build a structure to incorporate the goals of the environmental

justice movement into the Federal Government, and bring some new voices into decisionmaking.

Yet overall change in the past decade was not measured primarily by new laws,

but rather by practical changes in access to information. The 1990’s brought a dramatic growth in access to information through the Internet. Research on indicators

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to track sustainable development flourished. As an alternative to litigation, collaborative decisionmaking processes became more common, bringing more perspectives,

information, and ideas for finding solutions to the table. Environmental Defense, an

environmental advocacy organization, developed a web-based scorecard that allows

residents to find emissions from factories or power plants in their community.

Even as new technology greatly increased the public’s ability to share and use

data, though, public reporting and analysis of information and participation in decisions stalled or lost ground in some respects. It proved difficult to develop a more

unified and integrated information system that would give citizens easier access to

government information. Such efforts often faced bitter political divisions and an entrenched legacy of fragmented information systems and structures developed around

separate laws and programs of an earlier era. In a period of declining civic engagement, much of the country’s innovative energy and investment went into technical

developments rather than improving governance structures and norms, despite efforts to reinvent government to serve citizens. Judicial action made it more difficult

to utilize established citizen suit provisions. Internationally, the United States

sometimes took the lead but often stood on the sidelines on access issues.

The United States has not taken the basic step of adopting-let alone using-a set

of indicators and institutionalizing a process to involve the public in decisions aimed

at sustainable development. A new Administration refused to make public the list

of companies consulted in developing its energy plan, constrained access to Presidential records, and adopted a narrower interpretation and application of FOIA.

The assumptions for expanding access were abruptly reframed following September 11 as the country struggled to address the potential use of information by

terrorists. After the first, hurried decisions to remove some information from the

Internet, the debate has begun to be reframed in terms of identifying specific types

of data for which the danger of generalized public availability outweighs the public’s

interest in access. Yet this framing also recognizes that public access is, itself, a way

to reduce risk by providing information that spurs public awareness and action.

In this changed setting, the United States can take seven steps to put information

and participation at the center of action to achieve sustainability, both at home and

internationally. The United States should develop, adopt, and make regularly available to the public indicators of sustainable development. The United States should

also develop environmental indicators and use them in preparing and publishing an

annual state of the environment report. More broadly, the United States needs to

adopt a set of principles that reflect the significant role of information in good governance and in enabling the public to play its role in sustainable development. The

United States should also make significant investments in developing websites and

web-based tools to tailor information to the needs of individuals and organizations.

In addition, the United States should establish a national forum to engage citizens

and NGO’s on sustainable development. The government should find ways to

strengthen public access to justice, reversing the past decade’s general trend toward

restricted public access to the courts. Finally, the United States should play a lead

international role in promoting transparency, public participation, and accountability. To do so, the United States should, among other things, ratify the Aarhus

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decisionmaking and

Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.

Business and Industry

Sustainable development can only be accomplished with the support of business

and, as some firms are beginning to discover, there are profits to be made from sustainability. Agenda 21 charted a course of action for business and industry in five

main areas: (1) global corporate environmental management; (2) environmentally

sound production and consumption patterns; (3) risk and hazard mitigation; (4) full

cost accounting; and (5) international environmental support activities. For its part,

American business has tended to ignore sustainable development since Rio. Of the

firms that have engaged the concept, most have concentrated exclusively on its environmental dimension. That is not to say there has not been meaningful advancement since Rio, particularly in business’ ability to manage the environmental aspects of operations, goods, and services. In addition, some American companies are

among those pioneers working on the sustainability frontier. But the journey is in

its early stages, and the U.S. business community is by and large still formulating

a case for, and a plan of action on, sustainable development.

Over the last several years, many large and medium-sized firms, and to a lesser

extent even smaller enterprises, have been continuously improving techniques to

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print, increase competitiveness, and capitalize on opportunities created by next-generation policy initiatives that work with the grain of the market. Some of these

firms can point to significant progress toward sustainability, especially in areas

such as eco-efficiency, environmental management systems, communications with

stakeholders, and transparency. Changing internal and external perceptions of social equity, the prospect of cost reductions and market share growth through innovation, increased shareholder value, positive brand recognition, and a variety of other

factors are gradually but perceptibly prompting business to adopt strategies founded

on sustainability principles. Only a limited number of companies have endeavored

to incorporate sustainable development into operations and strategy, however, and

some of these firms have been much more active than others.

Building on insights gained in dealing with globalization, and guided by a sharper

perspective of national security and the benefits of multilateral action in the wake

of the terrorist attacks of September 11, government and private enterprise need

to come together to forge a tighter alliance on all three dimensions of sustainable

development: the social, the economic, and the environmental. To make further

progress, government, business, and other interested stakeholders should consider

the following framework. First, business needs to operationalize the concept of sustainable development in practical business terms. Second, the Administration, together with leaders from business and environmental organizations, needs to build

a stronger constituency for sustainable development in the business community and

Congress. Third, the Administration and business both need to gain a better understanding of the interdependent relationship between globalization and sustainable

development. Fourth, Congress, the executive branch, and the business community

need to work together to promote and facilitate good governance through national

implementation and international cooperation.

Fifth, business, working with government, financiers, investors, insurers, consumers, NGO’s, and the public needs to develop sustainability indicators, data, and

communication techniques that will enable informed distinctions among companies,

goods, and services. Sixth, business, working with NGO’s, supply chains, and other

stakeholders, needs to significantly expand the web of existing partnerships and

strategic alliances in order to promote new and better techniques and tools, and to

spread best practices more widely. Seventh, lawmakers and policy decisionmakers

(at the Federal, State, and local levels) need to work with leaders from business,

NGO’s, the bar, and the community to achieve consensus on a satisfactory blend of

policy instruments to foster sustainable business practices. Eighth, changes in the

nature of management education are needed so that graduates emerge from business schools with the ability to incorporate sustainable development and considerations of corporate social responsibility as elements of competitive strategy.

Sustainability as a Religious and Ethical Concern

The United States should support, and the U.N. General Assembly should endorse, the Earth Charter. The Earth Charter, which was completed in 2000 after

a 5-year process that involved extensive consultations and outreach, articulates the

inspirational vision, basic values, and essential principles needed for a global ethic

to support sustainable development. The Earth Charter contains 16 principles and

61 supporting principles, and has broad resonance among the world’s major religions and ethical systems. Its main purpose is to establish a sound ethical foundation for the emerging global society, and to help build a sustainable world based on

respect for nature, universal human rights, economic justice, and a democratic culture of peace. The Earth Charter is intended to help people of all ages in every walk

of life to better understand the spirit and implement the substance of truly sustainable development. Besides showing what sustainable living is all about, it offers a

coherent, integrated standard for evaluating possible responses to particular issues.

And, as one of its drafters stated, the Earth Charter is intended ‘‘to give the emerging global consciousness the spiritual depth-the soul-needed to build a just and

peaceful world community and to protect the integrity of Earth’s ecological systems.’’

Endorsement of the Earth Charter by the U.N. General Assembly would not, of

course, make it legally binding. But it would signal recognition by the world’s leaders that sustainable development has a compelling ethical and religious foundation.

That, in turn, could have a powerful and positive effect on efforts to move toward

sustainable development, including efforts in the United States.

Education

Aside from the word ‘‘government,’’ ‘‘education’’ appears more often than any other

term in Agenda 21. Education underlies and has the potential to reinforce every

other priority. Education also provides future voters and decisionmakers with the

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cate people by providing information and ideas. But our educational institutions for

kindergarten through twelfth grade, as well as our institutions for higher education,

also have a crucial role to play.

Kindergarten Through Twelfth Grade

Education for sustainability at the primary, middle school, and high school level

builds on environmental education by helping students understand and address the

relationship between natural systems and the effect of human social and economic

activities on those systems. Agenda 21 seeks to reform educational systems and

practices accordingly. Happily, U.S. resources-tangible and intangible, financial and

human-could be instrumental in solving these problems. Kindergarten through

twelfth grade (K–12) education is a major shaper of the truths, attitudes, ethics,

concepts, and behaviors of American society. By reshaping K–12 education in the

United States so that it systematically and effectively fosters sustainability, we will

be able to make greater progress toward the achievement of a sustainable world.

Groundwork has been laid in the 10 years since Rio for sustainability education.

Some recent changes in educational practices, e.g., service learning, a focus on literacies and skills, standards that support interdisciplinary understanding and complex thinking, and growing recognition of the importance of systems thinking, help

to prepare our youth to understand and implement sustainable development. Several organizations, and a network for those organizations, now exist that attempt

to define and develop skills and dispositions in youth that will enable them to create

a more sustainable world as future workers and citizens.

In the past decade, an understanding of what sustainability education should

mean has also been developed in the United States. A broad consensus can be seen

among the goals of sustainability education theoreticians and practitioners on some

key student outcomes and some essential knowledge, skills, and dispositions. These

include ecological literacy, including human-environment relationships; system dynamics and ‘‘systems thinking’’; the ability to truly value and learn from others; an

understanding of the importance of place; sustainable economics; citizenship; and

creativity and visioning. Each of these is being taught, to some degree, in some

classrooms.

Overall, however, education for sustainability has only a toe-hold in mainstream

K–12 education in the United States. The United States has not adopted sustainability education as a clearly stated, broadly applied, national goal. Very few K–12

educators in the United States have ever heard of sustainability education; few educators have worked explicitly to implement education for sustainability in their

classrooms. While our educational system works to develop many of the discrete

skills that future problem solvers will need to diagnose and solve our global problems, as a Nation we lack the systematic understanding that explains these complex

threats to sustainability. Our educational system, moreover, is often inappropriately

focused on basic literacy and easily testable knowledge, which does not adequately

prepare future voters and decisionmakers to understand current problems and to

craft solutions for them. We do not prepare teachers to create experiences for students that help them engage with the rich, complex, interdisciplinary world in

which they live. We do not fund the infrastructure needed to support a sustained

and nationwide implementation of an educational program for sustainability. Only

a single State, Vermont, has educational standards that explicitly address sustainability. Even environmental education, an important and well-established component of sustainability education, is increasingly eclipsed in importance and increasingly slighted in funding.

To make significant progress on sustainability education, schools of education

need to ensure that teachers understand sustainability, and can apply this knowledge and skill in the work they do with students. State education organizations

should approve standards for sustainability education. Statewide assessments of

student learning should be modified to reflect this goal. These efforts should also

connect students with work being done in the community to foster sustainability.

While some first-rate work has been done to create and distribute curriculum units,

much remains to be done. Of course, public and private funding is needed to support

this effort. A change in the knowledge and skills that colleges and universities expect from entering students could also help move K–12 education for sustainability

forward.

Higher Education

Higher education for sustainability is like environmental education because it

draws on an environmental foundation. But it is different from much environmental

education because it includes the social and economic dimensions of sustainability,

and is designed to help students think about problems in an integrated manner.

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Since higher education to date largely fails to expose students to issues and considerations outside the narrow confines of their disciplines, it consequently fails to

produce integrated decisionmakers. Higher education for sustainable development

primarily involves teaching students to understand ecological, social, and economic

problems through the many lenses of an interdisciplinary framework. It assumes

that integrated decisionmaking is not possible without integrated thinking. Effective

and rigorous teaching of integrated thinking-without becoming soft and watering

down the disciplines-is both a powerful intellectual challenge and a profound necessity.

A genuine commitment to creating a sustainable future would be evidenced in

most of the following seven critical dimensions of institutional life. These are based

on Agenda 21 and various national and international conferences. Disciplinary, professional, liberal arts, and general education requirements at the university would

involve interdisciplinary decisionmaking and reflect a fundamental concern for sustainability. Research at the institution would focus significantly on sustainable development. Faculty and staff development rewards would cultivate an understanding of, and contributions to, sustainable development. Campus operations

would be oriented toward reducing the institution’s ‘‘ecological footprint.’’ Student

opportunities and engagement on campus would reflect a deep commitment to sustainability through new student orientation, scholarships, internships, and job

placement counseling. The institution’s outreach and service would support local, regional, and global partnerships to enhance sustainability. The university’s mission,

structure, and planning would communicate and promote sustainability.

Since the Earth Summit, however, education for sustainable development in the

United States has been underfunded and undersupported, both within and outside

the academy. Tensions have arisen between environmental educators and sustainability educators, and no consensus has been reached on who or what institutions

should guide higher education for sustainability. The U.S. Government has shown

little interest in pursuing this agenda. For the most part, pressure on universities

and colleges to begin to embrace the challenge of sustainable development has originated from within. At a small minority of institutions, highly motivated and committed presidents, faculty members, staff members, and students have effected

change in significant ways. At a larger minority, there is evidence of increased ecoefficiency in operations or new offerings in environmental studies. Colleges and universities in America are increasingly adopting sustainability initiatives in one or

more of these seven critical dimensions of institutional life. But an authentic institutional commitment to sustainable development is rare.

A deeper commitment to sustainable development in higher education requires

three broad changes. First, higher education must commit itself to steady reform in

teaching, research, faculty and staff hiring and development, operations, student opportunities, outreach, and mission and structure. Second, sustainability must become a priority of the specialized academic organizations, disciplines, and professions that influence universities. Third, external stakeholders, including opinion

leaders, alumni, employers and funders, should pressure Federal and State governments to move the education and research agenda of higher education toward a

greater focus on sustainability. Since the Federal Government provides more than

90 percent of the funding for academic research, it influences deeply the priorities

for research and helps shape academic fields.

Institutions and Infrastructure

In a sustainable society, effective governmental and nongovernmental institutions

deliver essential services to people on an equitable basis. The built infrastructure

for necessary public services in a sustainable society should also be durable, available and affordable to all, and environmentally protective or restorative. Two key

examples are transportation and medical and public health services.

Transportation

The traditional approach to transportation planning in the United States has been

to maximize roadway capacity, travel speed, and mobility, generally within the context of large subsidies to motorized transportation. A sustainable transportation system, by contrast, seeks to maximize efficiency in overall resource use. In Agenda

21’s words, it is ‘‘more efficient, less polluting and safer.’’ Its basic components include increasing modal diversity, with more emphasis on public transit, walking,

and bicycling; paying more attention to the pattern of transportation and land use;

encouraging use of efficient transportation modes whenever practical; charging

users the true costs of transportation; and encouraging better connectivity between

modes.

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American transportation policy has become increasingly cognizant of these patterns. Just as Agenda 21 was being adopted, the United States was entering the

beginning stage of a fundamental change in Federal transportation policy. While the

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991 authorized substantial Federal funding for highway expansion, its name suggested the beginning

of a new direction-a greater emphasis on all modes of travel, not just highways, and

an emphasis on environmental and economic efficiency. In general, ISTEA eschewed

substantive regulatory requirements in favor of procedural ones intended to assure

the consideration of nationally important goals, along with appropriate funding

mechanisms to enable regions and States to put efficiency strategies into effect. The

cornerstone of this approach was (and remains) a planning process established for

metropolitan areas and States that is intended to ‘‘minimize transportation-related

fuel consumption and air pollution.’’ The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st

Century (TEA–21), adopted in 1998, reauthorized the 1991 law with only minor

changes to these key provisions.

Despite some positive trends in the past decade, however, the environmental impacts of transportation generally increased. From 1995 through 2000, transit use

grew 21 percent while driving increased by just 11 percent. The growth rate in vehicle miles traveled per capita slowed somewhat from what it had been in the 1980’s. On the other hand, a number of trends all point to increased inefficiency in travel

patterns. The number of vehicle miles traveled grew from 2 to 2.6 trillion miles between 1990 and 1998. Other negative trends include an increase in average trip

length, growth in the number of vehicle trips taken per person and per household

per year, and a decline in average vehicle occupancy. Transportation is by far the

largest consumer of petroleum products in the United States, accounting for some

two-thirds of our oil consumption. Transportation is also responsible for rising CO2

emissions and continuing unhealthy air quality. In some communities, parking lots

now constitute the largest single category of land use. Increased driving also means

increased congestion; Americans now spend roughly one of every eight waking hours

in cars.

The United States is moving toward sustainability in transportation in some respects; there have been measurable improvements in process, in mode shifts, and

even in some environmental indicators. But with long-term trends foretelling a dramatically growing population and a growing economy, mere motion toward the goal

is not enough, because the goal is itself moving farther and farther away, and becoming more difficult to achieve.

To move the United States to an effective course for sustainability in transportation, Congress and the Federal agencies must buildupon the policy reforms of the

1990’s through a suite of measures. The first step is to recognize clearly that travel

choices available to most Americans have been sharply curtailed by past policies,

from high subsidies to housing to tax polices and zoning laws, that have made it

unattractive or impossible to choose more sustainable options such as walking, cycling, riding transit, living close to our jobs, and driving smaller, more efficient

motor vehicles. Another step is to establish and work toward specific transportation

goals, such as increased energy efficiency, equal access to jobs, and a safe walking

route to school for each child. The United States should also adopt policy measures

that would reduce demand for motorized transportation; encourage the use of alternative transportation modes; and reduce the environmental, social, and economic

costs of transportation.

Medical and Public Health Services

The U.S. health system works very well, compared to the developing world. But

the comparison to the remainder of the developed world, especially to the wealthier

European countries, is not as favorable. The health provisions of Agenda 21 focus

not only on environmental pollution but also on basic medical care, preventive medicine, and improving mental as well as physical health. Equality in access to basic

goods and services is part of sustainable development, both as an issue of fairness

and because sustained inequalities impede development and destabilize society.

Thus, basic medical and public health services are critical to a more just and economically sound nation.

While no bright line separates public health services from personal medical services, medical services are those that treat diseases and injuries in the individual.

Public health is concerned with the community. Public health services are not a substitute for personal medical services, but they can prevent the need for medical services, and they are less expensive and more widely available than medical services.

The U.S. sanitation system works well, with outbreaks of water and foodborne illnesses happening infrequently enough to be front page news. Yet the public health

system has suffered from decades of neglect, a lack of national standards, fragVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:04 Apr 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00370 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 83718 SENENV1 PsN: SENENV1
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mentation of staffing and resources among thousands of legal jurisdictions, and a

general lack of public support and funding. As a result, the system is vulnerable

to breakdowns and has a limited ability to cope with new threats, including terrorism and climate change.

The level of communicable diseases in the United States, especially human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), is high for

a developed country, and affects sustainable development. Communicable diseases

are transmitted by people to other people, and are thus different from sanitation

or environmental diseases. The poor suffer disproportionately from such diseases,

both because access to medical care services is limited for the poor, and because environmental factors increase the spread of communicable diseases among the poor.

Ironically, past success in eradicating smallpox and polio, and in dramatically reducing measles and tuberculosis, has undermined public support for communicable disease control spending and programs.

Over the last 10 years, there has been no progress in improving access to medical

care in the United States. Indeed, there are some indications that the quality of

available care has diminished due to economic pressures. The United States does

not guarantee universal access to medical care. Instead, it relies on a combination

of voluntary, employer-paid health insurance, government entitlement through

Medicare for the elderly, and a limited program for indigent persons not covered by

employer-paid health insurance. Approximately 40 million persons are not covered

by any of these plans, and many persons with some coverage still do not have adequate access to medical care. Congress has been unwilling to assume the burden of

universal access or of increasing employer mandates, and the States do not have the

economic resources to bridge the gap. This results in a less healthy work force and

distorts economic development because it disproportionately harms low wage earners.

To move closer to sustainability, the United States should retain local enforcement for public health, but provide standards, funding, and oversight at the Federal

level. There should be a national civil service system for public health professionals,

especially those who manage health departments. The United States also needs to

fund proper postmortem examination procedures to diagnose every death from a

communicable disease. In addition, the United States should set standards on antibiotic usage to identify patterns of disease spread and to limit the development of

antibiotic-resistant organisms. Universal health insurance would improve individual

health and the health of the population, which would be good for development and

might reduce projected incremental costs as preventive services improve. If the

United States is not prepared to do that, it should at least make routine care and

preventive services universally available. This would include providing education

and support to improve health habits, such as better nutrition, exercise, and the cessation of dangerous habits such as smoking. By doing so, the United States would

improve health and productivity, serve distributive justice, and bring the country

closer to sustainability for basic medical services.

Governance

The national government, as well as State and local governments, needs to play

an important role in sustainable development. Perhaps the most important thing

they can do, Agenda 21 says, is integrate their decisionmaking on environmental,

social, economic, and security issues. National governments are also urged to delegate ‘‘responsibilities to the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective

action.’’ In the past 10 years, no level of government in the United States has provided strong support for sustainable development. State and local efforts, though,

have been more widespread and effective than national ones.

Local Governance

Integrated decisionmaking should, at least in principle, be easier at the local

level, because the connections between economic, social, and environmental issues

are easier to understand and most of the relevant stakeholders live or work nearby.

Agenda 21 calls on localities to consult with key stakeholders to arrive at a consensus on local strategies for sustainable development, and States that by 1996

most local authorities in each country should have developed ‘‘a local Agenda 21’’

for their community. However, Agenda 21 does not generally address the reality of

multiple municipalities within a specific metropolitan region. Fragmented decisionmaking among municipalities in the same region causes sprawling growth patterns

that increase traffic, cause air and water pollution, increase water consumption, and

destroy wetlands. Communities and regions across the country also continue to be

largely divided along economic and racial lines, both physically and socially.

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National policies to foster community sustainability did not change significantly

in the past decade. Significant progress was made in promoting the redevelopment

of brownfields and providing alternatives to highway transportation, but many Federal laws continue to be obstacles to local sustainability. The Federal mortgage interest deduction, for instance, favors wealthier home buyers over those who are less

wealthy, renters, multifamily property owners, and people who rehabilitate existing

structures.

Many States enacted ‘‘smart growth’’ laws to control some of the environmental

effects of sprawl. But all too often, these laws leave untouched a framework of State

laws that encourage the creation of largely autonomous municipalities, and require

that these municipalities raise revenue by property taxes to support services within

their boundaries. Such laws encourage municipalities to compete for property wealth

and exclude less expensive housing, a tactic that fosters sprawl and impedes intermunicipal cooperation. The lack of laws requiring coordination in housing, education, regional revenue sharing, and land use remains a major obstacle to local sustainable development efforts.

At the local level, a few communities adopted ‘‘local Agenda 21s’’ through broad

participation, but municipalities in the United States are beginning to show great

creativity and innovation on local sustainability. Municipal sustainable development

efforts-in locations such as Burlington, Chicago, and Santa Monica-were encouraged

by the PCSD. Those municipalities and others employed techniques such as

inclusionary zoning, providing incentives to developers to use existing sewer and

water infrastructure, and reducing water usage. But most municipalities have a

long way to go. For example, although mixed use zoning promotes walkable, pedestrian-friendly neighborhoods, most municipalities still require single use zoning.

Achieving local sustainability will require more than local efforts. Congress and

the Federal Government should use conditional funding mechanisms to provide incentives for municipalities to cooperate and grow smartly. The Federal mortgage interest deduction should be changed so that it does not encourage single-family housing. States need to move toward a system that better promotes regional governance

and shares taxes within a region. States should also create regional planning commissions and empower them to use various regulatory and fiscal incentives and disincentives to encourage cooperation among municipalities and channel growth in

particular ways. States, in addition, should modify their zoning laws to encourage

more mixed-use zoning. Municipalities should charge, and be empowered to charge,

fees requiring developers to pay the full cost of new services and infrastructure. As

municipalities move toward a regional approach, each municipality in a region

should also accept its ‘‘fair share’’ of affordable housing units. And at all levels, more

must be done to provide incentives for the establishment of public/private partnerships and broad-based consensus-building efforts.

State Governance

The goals of sustainable development-simultaneously achieving economic, social,

environmental, and security goals while maintaining the ability of future generations to attain such goals-are the goals of State governments. Except for the national security element of the security goal, States have great responsibility for

achieving those goals in the United States. The decentralized decisionmaking recommended by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 is also consistent with the constitutional structure of U.S. governance, which gives substantial authority to States.

Before the Earth Summit, many States promoted integrated decisionmaking

through laws requiring environmental impact statements for major projects, constitutional provisions concerning the environment, planning laws, and statutes encouraging pollution prevention. They did not necessarily result in the type of integrated decisionmaking envisioned by the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, but they

did substantially increase the level of consideration of environmental issues in economic development decisions. Many State constitutional provisions and statutes also

contained aspirational language concerning intergenerational equity. Federal pollution control statutes adopted in the 1970’s and 1980’s used a Federal-State partnership model that strongly encouraged States to improve their environmental programs and allowed them to continue exercising authority in areas where there is

no Federal regulation.

Since the Earth Summit, a number of States have made substantial progress in

creating and implementing policies aimed at achieving sustainable development. As

a group, States are fulfilling their role as laboratories for experimenting with programs and are, to an extent, leading policy development in the United States. Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon have established or expanded planning, decisionmaking, and goal-setting efforts for sustainable development. Maryland enacted a

series of programs intended to reform land development practices by encouraging

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development in existing centers and discouraging development of greenfields. Many

States have undertaken supportive policy-specific initiatives that are consistent with

sustainable development, including laws and policies to foster smart growth, recycling, energy efficiency, renewable energy, watershed protection, pollution prevention, and redevelopment of brownfields. A report by the Resource Renewal Institute

evaluating the ‘‘shifting emphasis toward sustainability’’ in all 50 States, however,

shows a substantial gap between the leading and lagging States.

Devolution, or transferring power to States to deal with environmental issues,

also dominated discussions of environmental law in the 1990’s. The National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS) was established in 1995 to

provide States the opportunity to negotiate greater flexibility within the context of

existing Federal pollution control laws.

Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Oregon have also established indicators

to track progress toward sustainability. Minnesota’s Progress Indicator suggests

that the State’s gross domestic product may overstate that State’s actual progress

toward environmental, economic, and social goals. In 2000, the State reported that,

according to the Progress Indicator, the State’s performance peaked in the mid1980’s, and had declined to a point where by 1995 the levels were similar to the

indicator’s values for the early 1960’s. In the next 5 to 10 years, States need to make sustainable development an explicit goal. More States need to follow the examples set by leading jurisdictions and

adopt and implement strategies and policies promoting sustainable development and

holding themselves accountable (through the use of indicators) for achieving sustainability. Governors must ensure adequate and effective interagency cooperation by

designating a cabinet-level person who will be responsible for fostering sustainable

development, including sustainable land development. States should also make

greater use of environmental impact assessment, particularly to bring

intergenerational equity into their development and policy decisions. Finally, States

should work with EPA and other Federal agencies to use NEPPS to improve Federal-State environmental governance for achieving goals, and for monitoring and reporting progress.

National Governance

In a world of sovereign nations, sustainable development cannot be achieved unless it is actively supported by national governments. In a basic sense, the requirements for good governance for sustainable development are the same as those for

good governance in general. These include effective governmental institutions, national laws, a favorable investment climate, public access to information, public participation in governmental decisionmaking, and access to justice. But sustainable

development requires more than that. Most basically, it requires that national governments integrate the environment into national decisionmaking in broader and

deeper ways over time. Agenda 21 recommends that they do so through national

strategies. At the 5-year review of Earth Summit commitments in 1997, nations

agreed to have such strategies in place by 2002. National strategies would guide

governmental decisionmaking on a range on issues, include priorities and timetables, change in response to changing conditions, and harness the energy and creativity of nongovernmental actors, including the private sector.

The United States has no such strategy. Sustainable development is not actively

supported by the president or congressional leaders. There is no strategic thinking

or action on behalf of the Federal Government. There is no governmental coordinating or implementing mechanism for a national strategy, and little public education.

The PCSD (1993–1999), an advisory council established by President Clinton,

might have provided (and, if resurrected, could still provide) the basis for a national

strategy. The PCSD brought together diverse stakeholders from around the country

and fashioned a detailed set of recommendations for sustainable development in the

United States. But it had no authority to implement its own recommendations, and

neither President Clinton nor Vice President Al Gore showed interest in seeking implementation. Nor was there much interest in Congress during the same period.

The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which until 1995 was required to

issue national reports on the state of the nation’s environment, has not issued such

reviews on a regular basis for years. On the other hand, a 1993 statute, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), requires Federal agencies to engage in

a strategic planning process, and some agencies have used sustainable development

to guide that process.

The United States should adopt and implement a national strategy for sustainable development. It should include meaningful goals, indicators of progress toward

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cation. The strategy should be built on existing laws and legal authority, and thus

should ensure wider use of the GPRA to move agency planning toward sustainable

development. It should prioritize those issues that are of greatest importance. Some

executive level entity, perhaps the CEQ, should be responsible for coordinating its

development and implementation. But CEQ’s now-extinguished annual reporting

function should be transferred to an independent and properly funded entity, either

in or out of the Federal Government. That would help ensure that a long-term perspective is brought to bear in national decisionmaking-one of the most important

prerequisites for sustainable development.

The international community would add significant value to the national sustainable development strategy process if countries were to agree that implementation

of national sustainable development strategies should begin no later than 2005. It

would also help if countries would agree that national trends for the degradation

and loss of natural resources should be reversed by 2015. Such goals would give

more specific content to the national strategy process, and would also incorporate

a specific and easily understood goal into the meaning of sustainable development.

This goal would help focus national and international efforts, and would help galvanize citizens, NGO’s, and corporations in countries around the world.

Looking Ahead

A defining characteristic of a sustainable society is that it can successfully adapt

to new and different conditions. We have grown and prospered as a Nation because

we have been able to take advantage of opportunities and respond to threats that

our founders could not have imagined. The challenges of growing global environmental degradation, and the growing gap between rich and poor are quite obvious.

But the opportunity is equally real-to build an ecologically sustainable framework

that provides greater freedom, opportunity, and quality of life for all. Law and policies are not the only means of achieving a sustainable society, but they will play

an important role.

The essential missing ingredient thus far, and which needs to be supplied in the

coming decade, is commitment-commitment by government at all levels, educational

institutions, business and industry, NGO’s, and individuals. We know what we need

to do, and we also know why. As Americans, we are called to face these challenges,

and to seize this opportunity.

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