alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER OF

UNIVERSAL CITY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LTD.

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the quarterly report of Universal City Development Partners, Ltd. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending April 1, 2007 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, Tracey L. Stockwell, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: November 13, 2007



By:

/s/ TRACEY L. STOCKWELLTracey L. Stockwell Principal Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and

is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-60397

VLADIMIR KRAVCHUK, Petitioner,

versus

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

Petition for Review; Board of Immigration Appeals

(A16-080-998)

July 14, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WISDOM and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Vladimir Kravchuk petitions for review of the ruling by the Board of

Immigration Appeals affirming the deportation order of the Im migration Judge. Having

considered the briefs and oral arguments of counsel, and pertinent parts of the record,

and finding that there should be no application of the Lautenberg Amendment to the

facts as presented herein and finding no other basis for granting the relief sought, the

petition for review is DENIED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-2080

ROSE TCHAKOUNTE, Petitioner, versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A95-397-773) Submitted: February 23, 2005 Decided: March 8, 2005 Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Assistant Director, Daniel E. Goldman, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Rose Tchakounte, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying her motion to reopen or reconsider its denial of her motion to reconsider, construed by the Board as a motion to reopen. We review the denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider for an abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2004); INS v. Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992); Stewart v. INS , 181 F.3d 587, 595 (4th Cir. 1999). Such motions are especially disfavored “in a deportation proceeding, where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.” Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323. Tchakounte argues the Board should have reopened her proceeding under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)-(iii) (2004). We have reviewed the administrative record and the Board’s order and find that the Board did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We also deny the Government’s motion to dismiss. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. PETITION DENIED
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    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2015-05-08T15:54:25-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 50910 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v. ISRAEL SANCHEZ

- ENSALDO , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:13

- CR

- 1074

- 1

Before KING, JOLLY, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Israel Sanchez

- Ensaldo appeals his 18

- month sentence following his conviction for importation of and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. He argues that the district court erred in denying a U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 reduction for his minor role in the offense. Sanchez

- Ensa ldo contends that he was entitled to the reduction because he acted merely as a courier.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 17, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-50910 Document: 00512806830 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/17/2014No. 13

- 50910 The district court’s refusal to grant Sanchez

- Ensaldo a two

- level reduction for being a minor participant was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Villanuev a , 408 F.3d 193, 203 n.9 (5th Cir. 2005). Sanchez

- Ensaldo ’s courier status did not entitle him to a role adjustment because a defendant may be a courier without being “substantially less culpable than the average participant.” See United States v. Brown , 54 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nevarez

- Arreola , 885 F.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1989). Sanchez

Ensaldo’s attempt to import a gross weight of 66.92 kilograms of marijuana provided an indispensable service to the drug

- trafficking offense and was essential to its success

. See Brown , 54 F.3d at 241; see also United States v. Buenrostro , 868 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1989). Moreover, Sanchez

- Ensaldo was to be paid a large sum of money for his role in the activity and was solely responsible for t ransporting the marijuana to its final destination in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that Sanchez

- Ensaldo was peripheral to the advan cement of the criminal activity and thus a minor participant. See Villanuev a , 408 F.3d at 204. AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 13-50910 Document: 00512806830 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/17/2014
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT
TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Medley
Capital Corporation, (the “Company”) for the annual period ended September 30, 2016, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, Brook Taube and Richard T. Allorto, Jr., Chief Executive
Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively, of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to our knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: December 8, 2016



| | By | /s/ Brook Taube            
| | -- | ---------------------------
| |    | Brook Taube                
| |    | Chief Executive Officer    
| |    |                            
| | By | /s/ Richard T. Allorto, Jr.
| |    | Richard T. Allorto, Jr.    
| |    | Chief Financial Officer
No. 47992.

#### Protests 603146-G, etc., of Ira G. Katz (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

Certain of the items in question were stipulated to be similar to those the subject of *Caradine*v. *United States*(9 Cust. Ct. 69, C. D. 664). In accordance therewith some were held dutiable at 25 percent ad valorem under paragraph 1504 (b) (5), and those entered or withdrawn for consumption subsequent to the effective date of the said trade agreement were held dutiable at 12)4 percent under paragraph 1504 (b) (5) as claimed.
No. 52726.

protests 139708-K and 140185-K (New York).

#### Best & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Rao, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise covered by entries 755965 and 745520 is the same in all material respects as the gloves which were the subject of *United States*v. *Julius Kayser & Co.*(33 C. C. P. A. 179, C. A. D. 333). The claim at 50 percent ad valorem under paragraph 915, plus any additional duty applicable under paragraph 924, was therefore sustained.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8823 

To amend title 23, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Transportation to withhold from States certain apportionments if the States 

do not make reasonable efforts to prohibit certain roadway obstruction, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 25, 2024 

Mr. HUIZENGA (for himself, Mr. WEBER of Texas, and Mr. MILLS) introduced 

the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend title 23, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Transportation to withhold from States certain 

apportionments if the States do not make reasonable 

efforts to prohibit certain roadway obstruction, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Clear the Reckless Ob5 structions And Dangers on Streets Act of 2024’’ or the 

6 ‘‘Clear the ROADS Act of 2024’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8823 IH

1 SEC. 2. ROADWAY OBSTRUCTION. 

2 (a) WITHHOLDING OF APPORTIONMENTS FOR NON3 COMPLIANCE.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 1 of title 23, United 

5 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 

6 following: 

7 ‘‘§ 180. Roadway obstruction 

8 ‘‘(a) WITHHOLDING OF APPORTIONMENTS FOR NON9 COMPLIANCE.—Beginning not later than the first October 

10 1 after the Secretary of Transportation has issued such 

11 regulations as are necessary to carry out this section or 

12 the first October 1 after a State has held a legislative ses13 sion, whichever is later, and each October 1 thereafter, 

14 the Secretary shall withhold an amount equal to 10 per15 cent of the funds to be apportioned to a State on that 

16 date under each of paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 

17 104(b), unless the Secretary has certified on or before that 

18 date that the State has met the requirement described in 

19 subsection (b). 

20 ‘‘(b) REQUIREMENT.—A State meets the requirement 

21 of this subsection if the Secretary determines the State 

22 has made reasonable efforts to prohibit individuals who 

23 are not performing work on behalf of a Federal, State, 

24 or local government from knowingly and recklessly ob25 structing lawful vehicle transportation on Federal-aid 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 8823 IH

1 highways in the State in a manner that endangers the 

2 safety or health of the public.’’. 

3 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for 

4 chapter 1 of title 23, United States Code, is amend5 ed by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘180. Roadway obstruction.’’. 

6 (b) RULEMAKING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

7 date of enactment of this section, the Secretary of Trans8 portation shall issue such regulations as are necessary to 

9 carry out section 180 of title 23, United States Code (as 

10 added by this section). 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
#### Harmon C. Schultz, Resp’t, *v.*George W. Mead, App’lt.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,*

*Filed February 10, 1890.)*

1. Leave to sue—Code Oiv. Pbo., § 1628.

Section 1628, Code Civ. Pro., has reference to the original debt the mortgage was given to secure, and does not require leave to sue on a judgment for deficiency.

2, Fobeclosube—Deficiency judgment—Defense.

It is no defense to an action on a deficiency judgment that the mortgagor made a profit upon his purchase of the mortgaged premises.

Appeal from judgment in favor of. plaintiff after trial by the court without a jury.

*204One Oole foreclosed a mortgage on premises owned by defendant, and purchased on the sale for $3,200, leaving an apparent deficiency of $1,123.21, for which judgment was entered. This judgment was afterwards assigned to plaintiff.

Oole subsequently sold the premises for $5,000.

Defendant claimed that the action on the judgment could not be maintained, because leave to sue had not been obtained pursuant to § 1628 of the Code; and that the mortgagor had been fully paid, he having bought at such a price that he afterwards made enough by its sale to cover the deficiency judgment.

*SewaTl*Sergeant, for app’lt; *James & Thomas M. Troy,*for resp’t.

Pratt, J.

The principle laid down in the case of *Mead*v. *Spink,*15 N. Y. State Rep., 881, is decisive of this case.

This case does not fall within § 1628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as that section has reference to the original debt the mortgage was given to secure. One purpose of the section is to prevent more than one suit and one bill of costs upon the bond of original indebtedness.

The defendant is concluded by the deficiency, and the plaintiff has the right to sue upon'that judgment

The judgment became a new obligation upon its being docketed, and the fact that plaintiff’s assignor made a profit upon his purchase of the mortgaged premises was entirely immaterial. The dissenting opinion in the case of *Mead*v. *Spink*may be what the law ought to be, but it was overruled by this general term, and such decision is conclusive in this contention.

Judgment must be affirmed, with costs.

Barnard, P. J., and Dykman, J., concur.
Before the First Division,

May 18, 1955

No. 59077.

petition 6924-R (Pembina).

#### Railway Express Agency, Inc. *v.*United States,

Oliver, Chief Judge:

The provisions of section 489 of the Tariff Act of 1930 are invoked in this case to obtain remission of additional duties accruing by reason of the final appraised value exceeding the entered value of certain electrotype plates exported from Winnipeg, Canada, and entered at the port of Noyes, Minn.

The case was heard at Minneapolis, Minn., where petitioner introduced the testimony of its employee who prepared and filed the entry involving the merchandise in question. The witness’ uncontradicted testimony shows that, in entering this merchandise at its invoice value, petitioner followed its practice of 5 years involving the same kind of goods. Throughout that period, the customs officials always accepted the invoice value as the dutiable value. After entering the present merchandise at its invoice value, petitioner learned that the appraiser “had reason to believe” that there was a higher value for the articles. Petitioner thereupon requested that appraisement be withheld so that it could conduct an investigation with the view of obtaining additional information concerning the proper value of these electrotype plates. Correspondence admitted in evidence (petitioner’s collective exhibit 1) shows that petitioner sought such information from the Canadian manufacturer of the merchandise in question, from the foreign shipper of the merchandise, from the ultimate consignee, and from its Canadian agent. Based upon replies from its inquiries, petitioner worked out a formula showing cost of production that was higher than the invoice value. Petitioner then filed an amended entry at the higher value. Throughout the entire period— between the time of petitioner’s original entry and when the merchandise was appraised — petitioner not only supplied customs officials with all available information, but also allowed them complete access to its files.

From an examination of the record and a consideration of all of the facts in the case, we are satisfied that the entry of the merchandise at a less value than that found by the appraiser was without intention to defraud the revenue of the United States or to conceal or misrepresent the facts of the case or to deceive the appraiser as to the value of the merchandise.

^ We have examined all of the cases cited in defendant’s brief and find that each of them was based on a set of facts that distinguishes them from the present case. “Each case of remission of necessity must be determined upon the record presented in such case,” *United States*v. *D. Lisner & Co., Inc.,*38 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 79, C. A. D. 443.

The petition is granted and judgment will be rendered accordingly.
#### Wm. Freeland, Resp’t, v. Rich’d S. Bacon, App’lt.

Appeal from judgment of the city court.

*Ordered,*that the judgment he affirmed, with costs.
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 10.4


                             CERTIFICATE OF LOCATION
                            NEVADA-LODE MINING CLAIM

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that DESERT PACIFIC EXPLORATION INC.,
Incorporate in Nevada, whose address is 12475 Overbrook Drive, Reno, Nevada
89511, has located and claimed the Hound Dog #9 Lode Mining Claim in the
following quarter sections(s):

NE   1/4,    Section    1      Township 1N,        Range 32E,       MDB7M
NW   1/4,    Section           Township 1N,        Range 32E,       MDB&M
SE   1/4,    Section           Township 1N,        Range 32E,       MDB&M
SW   1/4,    Section           Township 1N,        Range 32E,       MDB&M

In Mineral County, Nevada, on the 8th day of November, 1996.

SAID CLAIM IS A LODE CLAIM, it being situated in the above mentioned County and
State, and is approximately 1500 feet long and 600 feet wide, such that 1475
feet is claimed in an East direction and 25 feet in a West direction from the
point of discovery (monument of location), at which the Notice of Location was
posted, together with 300 feet on each side of the monument of location and
center line of the Claim. The general course of the lode or vein is from the
East to the West.

THE NUMBER, LOCATION, AND MARKINGS On each monument are as follows:

         LOCATION          MARKINGS                  DESCRIPTION

No. 1 Northeast corner     diagram, metal tag        2"x2"xz4' wooden post
No. 2 Southeast corner     diagram, metal tag        2"x2"xz4' wooden post
No. 3 Southwest corner     diagram, metal tag        2"x2"xz4' wooden post
No. 4 Northwest corner     diagram, metal tag        2"x2"xz4' wooden post

A CLAIM MAP as required by NRS 517.040 is included as part of the work of
location.

Dated:  January 11, 1997

               RECEIVED                     DESERT PACIFIC EXPLORATION INC.
        Bur. Of Land Management
         9:00 A.M.  JAN 24 97               BY: /s/ Herb Duerr
          NEVADA STATE OFFICE                   Herb Duerr, President
            RENO, NEVADA
#### Harold Lightbourn v. State.

175 So. 857.

Opinion Filed July 31, 1937.

*44
      *Roger Edward Davis,*for.Plaintiff in Error;

*Cary D. Landis,*Attorney General, and *Roy Campbell,*Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Buford, J.

The writ of error brings for review judgment of conviction of manslaughter.

The defendant interposed the defense of self-defense.

During the course of giving instructions to the jury the court instructed the jury as follows:

“Before a person can avail himself of the defense that he used a deadly weapon in defense of his life, he must satisfy the jury beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt that it was necessary to protect his.own life and protect himself from great bodily harm.”

' The court gave the jury other instructions which were in conflict with the enunciation included in this instruction.

The charge of the court was excepted to as a whole. In the motion for a new trial there was. included ground 11 as .follows: “The instructions to the .court were insufficient and inapplicable to the evidence of the case.” This is the only reference in the motion for new trial to the instructions of the court to the jury.-

•' Assignment of error No. 6 is: “Defendant contends that the court erred in- overruling and denying defendant’s motion for new trial because the court’s charge to the jury had a tendency to mislead and confuse the jury and did mislead and confuse the jury.” .

. -Assignment of error No. 4 is: “Defendant contends that the corut erred in overruling and denying defendant’s¡ motion for a riéw trial because' the charge of the court as *45given the jury 'was an erroneous statement of the law as applied to the evidence adduced at the trial.”

It is apparent that a strict enforcement of the rules of Practice and Procedure by us would prevent our consideration of the merits of the matter complained of and, therefore, in the interest of justice we shall not apply the rules strictly to this case because the error was patent and. the language used in the instruction complained of so contrary to the law in that regard as to cause us to feel that the judgment must be reversed.

In Pinder v. State of Florida, 27 Fla. 370, 8 Sou. 837, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75, where this Court was discussing what is necessary to constitute excusable homicide by reason of defendant acting in self-defense, it was said:

“All that can be required of the prisoner in such cases would be to show that he was surrounded by such condition of affairs as made it, from his standpoint, *reasonable*for a cautious and prudent man to *believe*that it was necessary to fire the fatal shot, or strike the fatal blow, in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm.”.

The instruction given and complained of in the instant case violates that enunciation. So, the judgment should be. reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

Terrell, Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur. ;