Assessment of Community Planning for

Mass Transit: Volume 9—Seattle Case

Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253687
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. Bierwagen

Amalgamated Transit Union

Robert A. Burco

Oregon DOT

Jeanne J. Fox

Joint Center for

Political Studies

Lawrence A. Goldmuntz

Economics and Science Planning

Dorn McGrath

George Washington University

Bernard M. Oliver

Hew/e/f-Packard Corporation

Simon Reich

Gibbs and Hill

Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.

Princeton University

Frederick P. Salvucci

Massachusetts DOT

Stewart F. Taylor

Sanders and Thomas, inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. Jenney

V. Rodger Digilio Bev Johnson

Thomas E. Hirsch, III Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

111
PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Seattle,

Washington metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the

Office of Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an

overall assessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary

document, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, which forms the

first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of

the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of its

Transportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’s

Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the

OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings

and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the

study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points

of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.
INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine major

United States metropolitan areas made its decisions

about the development or modernization of rail

transit.

The assessment of the nine cities attempts to

identify the factors that help communities, facing

critical technological choices, make wise decisions

that are consistent with local and national goals for

transit. The study investigates the following issues:

● Are there major barriers to communication

and cooperation among governmental

agencies involved in transit planning and

operating? Do these barriers interfere with

making sound decisions?

● Do transit decisions reflect the combined

interests of all major public groups, including citizen organizations, trade unions,

the business community, and others?

● Does the planning process provide enough

information about the advantages and

disadvantages of alternative courses of

action to provide a solid basis for making

decisions ?

• Does the availability or lack of financing, or

the conditions under which financing has

been provided, unnecessarily limit the

range of options that are considered?

The ultimate purpose of the work has been to

cast light on those prospective changes in national

transit policy and administrative programs which

might improve, in different ways and to different

extents, the way communities plan mass transit

systems. The nine cities were selected to represent

the full range of issues that arise at different stages

in the overall process of planning and developing a

transit system.

San Francisco, for example, has the first regional

rail system built in decades, while Denver is

planning an automated system, and voters in

Seattle have twice said “no” to rail transit funding

proposals.

The assessment of transit planning in each of the

nine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into an

evolving social process. Consequently, the study

results more closely resemble historical analysis

than classical technology assessment.

This study employs a set of evaluation guidelines

to orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan

areas and to provide the basis for comparative

judgments about them. The guidelines were

derived from issues identified during preliminary

visits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federal

requirements for transit planning, and an investigation via the literature into the state-of-theart in the field.

The evaluation guidelines cover major topics

which were investigated during the case assessment process. They deal with the character of the

institutional arrangements and the conduct of the

technical planning process.

GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Some of the most significant influences on

transit planning are exerted by the organizations

responsible for conducting the planning and

making the decisions. Three guidelines were used

to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the

nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

Agencies responsible for various aspects of

transit decisionmaking should cooperate

effectively in a clearly designated “forum”.

The participants in this forum should have

properly designated decisionmaking

authority, and the public should have

formal channels for holding decisionmakers accountable for their actions.

Citizens should participate in the transit

planning process from its beginning and

should have open lines of communication

with decisionmakers.

vii
GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The technical planning process provides the

information that public officials and their constituents draw upon in making plans and decisions.

Four guidelines were used to assess the technical

planning process in the nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

●

Broad, explicit goals and objectives should

guide technical planning and decisionmaking.

A range of realistic

should be developed.

alternative solutions

The evaluation of these alternatives should

give balanced consideration to a full range

of goals and objectives.

A practical and flexible plan for financing

and implementation should be developed.

During visits to each of the nine metropolitan

areas, the study team interviewed the principal

representative of the transportation planning

institution and other main participants in the local

planning process. The visits were supplemented by

interviews with UMTA officials in Washington.

Pertinent documents—official plans, reports,

studies, and other material—were reviewed in each

case.

The information thus collected was used in

compiling a history of the transit planning process

in each case area, organized around key decisions

such as the decision to study transit, the selection of

a particular transit system, and public ratification

of the decision to pay for and build the system. The

main political, institutional, financial and technical

characteristics affecting the conduct of the planning process were then assessed in light of the

evaluation guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing each

case metropolitan area was employed in making a

generalized evaluation of the metropolitan experience. The results of the generalized evaluation are

summarized in the report, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report, issued by

the Office of Technology Assessment in February

1976.

VIII
CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Characteristics . . . . . . 0 . . . 00 . 0 . . . . . . 0000 . . 0 . . 0 ...0...0.

Existing Passenger Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Planning Institutions ● ..00.00.00...0........000 .

CRITICAL HISTORY OF RAPID TRANSIT PLANNING AND

DECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early History of Transit in Seattle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Planning in the 1950’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Efforts to Achieve Metropolitan Government

in the 1950’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Planning Between 1960 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Creation of Forward Thrust . . . . . . . ● *..**** ..*...** . . . . . .

The Forward Thrust Program and Voter Rejection

of Transit Bonding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Second Defeat of the Forward Thrust Transit

Program in 1970 . . . . . . .

1972 Voter Acceptance of a

Current Controversy Over

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING

PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . .

Technical Planning Process . . . . .

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . .

● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

Short-Range Bus Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . .

the Long-Range Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PLANNING PROCESS . . . . . . .

AND DECISIONMAKING

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

3

3

3

5

1 1

1 1

11

1 2

1 3

1 6

1 7

2 0

2 3

2 4

2 5

2 9

2 9

3 2

3 5

68-768 0- 76 -2 ix
Summary and Highlights

Bond Issues to build rail transit in Seattle failed twice before a short-term

bus improvement program gained voter approval in 1972

● Proposals for rail transit systems in

Seattle initially were conceived during a

period of economic gain (1965-68). The

optimistic growth estimates of this era,

combined with the expectation of large

amounts of Federal funds and the

perceived political necessity of providing

rail transit service in several corridors,

encouraged the design of extensive

transit systems.

● Rapid rail transit advocates in SeattIe

emerged from two groups. Antifreeway

forces joined the downtown business

interests that had been principally

responsible for creating a metropolitan

umbrella organization called Municipality

of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro). Although

Metro was established in 1957, it was not

empowered to plan transit until 1967.

● Forward Thrust was the most important of

a series of extra governmental committees of businessmen and civic leaders

that dominated transit decisionmaking

until 1970. Forward Thrust advocated rail

transit as part of a plan to revitalize Seattle

through a coordinated program of capital

improvements that included parks,

arterial highway improvements, a major

league stadium, community facilities, and

urban redevelopment proposals. The

organization guided the preparation of

the two rail transit plans taken to voters in

1968 and 1970.

● The 1968 proposal for a 47-mile, $385

million system received 51 percent of the

vote in referendum that year but failed to

gain the 60 percent margin needed for

passage, partly because of its high cost

1
with no assurance that the full Federal

share would be available.

●

. In 1970, a dismal economic situation

caused by massive layoffs at Boeing led to

the defeat of the second and even more

expensive rail proposal (49 miles, $440

million).

● Critics of Forward Thrust complained that ●

it was an elite organization not accountable to the voters and that its transit

proposals favored downtown business

interests.

● Since Forward Thrust disbanded in 1970,

the forum for transit planning has been

dominated by Metro and the Puget Sound

Council of Governments (PSCOG). However, the city of Seattle continues to exert

an important influence.

In 1972, under the threat of complete

collapse of Seattle’s bus system, a tax to

support an all-bus transit plan was

passed. This plan has received one of the

largest capital grants in UMTA’s history

for an all-bus transit development

program.

Since 1972, Metro and PSCOG have

competed for major responsibilities in

area transit planning. Metro, more

oriented to the central city and directly

responsible for transit operations, is most

concerned with choice of technology.

PSCOG, whose jurisdiction is a broader,

four-county region, is concerned with the

relationship of a transit system to

regionwide land use.
Metropolitan Setting1

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Seattle is the largest metropolitan area in

Pacific Northwest. Its SMSA population

1,421,869 in 1970 represents 41.7 percent of

the

of

the

total State population. The SMSA’s population

increased 28 percent from 1960 to 1970. The

suburban ring increased by 39 percent to 894,038,

and of the city of Seattle decreased 4.7 percent to a

population of 530,830 during the same period (see

Figure 2).

Seattle is a relatively low-density city comprised

largely of single-family houses. Seattle’s more than

half-million population comprised some 37.3

percent of the total SMSA population in 1970, in

comparison to its SMSA share of 50.3 percent in

1960. In 1970, with a center city density of 6,350

people per square mile, Seattle ranked sixth among

the case study areas in density. Employment in the

central business district in 1970 was estimated to be

60,000, constituting only 11 percent of the total

SMSA work force.

Although the Seattle CBD is the focal point of

the region, several other centers to the south,

north, and east have developed into significant

employment areas. The Duwamish Valley industrial area, several miles to the south, has almost as

many jobs as the CBD. To the north, the University

District is the third largest employment center in

the Seattle area. To the east, across Lake

Washington, the Bellevue CBD is developing into a

sizable employment center that is expected to

increase in significance as the area to the east of the

lake continues to attract much of the Seattle

region’s population growth.

Seattle is the retail trade and office center of the

Northwest and a trading center serving Alaska and

the Orient. Although shipbuilding and forest

products are important industries in the area, the

leading employer is the Boeing Corporation, the

world’s largest producer of commercial jets. The

economy of Seattle has been heavily dependent on

Boeing, and it is sensitive to shifts in Boeing’s

employment. Boeing’s work force totaled 60,000 in

1966, a figure equal to the entire 1970 CBD

employment. It increased to 93,000 in 1967, and

then to a high of 101,000 in 1969 before

plummeting to 46,800 by January 1971.2

The fluctuation in the aircraft manufacturing

industry accounts for the wide variations in

population forecasts for the area in the past 7 years.

In 1967, when Boeing was experiencing very

impressive growth, the population of King County

alone was expected to reach 1,415,000 by 1975. In

current forecasts a 9 percent average growth in

King County is anticipated to project a population

of 1,522,100 in 1980, and 1,690,000 by 1990.

EXISTING PASSENGER

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Existing growth patterns and transportation

routes have been strongly influenced by the

region’s geographic features. Central Seattle is

located on a series of hills rising from Elliott Bay,

one of the metropolitan area’s three main water

bodies. For a long time, because Seattle was

constrained on the east and west by water barriers,

it grew primarily to the north and south. Expansion

of the city to the east followed the construction of

two floating bridges across Lake Washington. Upon

completion of the first four-lane bridge in 1940,

Mercer Island’s population increased to 21,000.

Bellevue’s population grew in 10 years from 12,809

to 61,102 after the Evergreen Point Floating Toll

Bridge was completed in 1960.

Four major highway routes run north-south and

two run east-west. The heaviest traffic volumes are

on the north-south interstate highway routes, I-5

and I-405. Running from Portland, Oreg., to the

Canadian border, I-5 links Seattle to Washington’s

most important western cities, including Olympia,

Tacoma, Everett, and Bellingham. Route I-405

branches off I-5 south of Seattle, runs parallel to I-5

I See Figure I, pages 14 and 15.

z Frank Colcord, Urban Transportation Decision-Making, Seattle Case

Study, DOT-OS-30036, October 1974, pp. 11-12.

3
LAND AREA (1970)

(square miles }

Center City 83. 6

Suburban Ring 4,142. 4

Entire SMSA 4,22 6

POPULATION

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 550,126 557,087

1970 894,03 8 530,831

DENSITY

(population/Square mile)

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 132 6,66 4

POPULATION

Percent Change 1960-1970

+63%

Suburban

Ring

1970 216 6,35 0

FIGURE 2: SEATTLE METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS

-4.7%

Center

City

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners, and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 501 000, plus adjacent countie s

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

4
.

on the east shore of Lake Washington, then links

back up with I-5 north of Seattle. The other two

north-south routes are State Highway 99, an

elevated freeway along the western edge of the

CBD, and State Highway 513, which serves the

area around the University of Washington. The

two major east-west routes which cross Lake

Washington, the two floating bridges, are I-90 and

State Highway 520. Proposals to increase the

capacity of the I-90 corridor, part of the original

interstate program, are still embroiled in controversy. Several schemes are still under consideration for providing transitways for bus or rail on one

of the bridges, which would be reconstructed for

this purpose.

Seattle’s transit system dates from 1884, when

construction began on the first horse-drawn street

railway. By 1900, Seattle had over 70 miles of

interurban railway. The system had become

dilapidated by 1939, had a brief upsurge during

World War 11 as a result of gas rationing, but

spiraled down after that through the 1970’s. The

Seattle Transit Commission reduced services and

raised fares to avoid losses, but by the 1960’s the

system required local and State subsidies. As a

result of the 1972 transit tax referendum, the

operation and planning of both the city and

suburban transit services were turned over to

Metro in 1973. At that time, the city’s equipment

consisted of 370 motor buses, about 19 years old on

the average, and 53 electric trolley buses averaging

29.6 years old. Seattle is now buying modern

equipment and is expanding its bus system to serve

areas that recently have gained in population. Table

1 shows total Federal grants to support Seattle

transit prior to May 1975. Figure 3 shows transit

ridership and revenue patterns since 1960.

TABLE I.—Federal Assistance to

Seattle Transit Programs From

F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975

Type of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs

Capital Grants . . . . . . . . . . . $56,700,000 $139,137,000

Technical Studies . . . . . . . . 3,562,000 6,521,000

TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . 60,262,000 145,658,000

park called Seattle Center. The monorail provides a

shuttle service between the two termini but,

because of its technological limitations, has received little attention in the rapid transit planning

process. Two additional transit demonstration

programs, which have been highly successful,

should be noted. In 1970, the “Blue Streak” express

bus service was initiated, in which passengers from

local bus routes are collected and then given

express bus service on the center lanes of I-5 with

exclusive bus ramps into the CBD. In 1973, a freefare system was instituted whereby passengers

could ride anywhere in the CBD free of charge.

Ferry service is provided across Elliott Bay and

Puget Sound at Bremerton, Winslow, Vashon

Island, and Kitsap County. In 1965, UMTA

financial assistance was obtained to purchase four

new ferry boats.

In 1970,14.6 percent of the employed center city

residents used the bus system, as compared to 2.9

percent of the employed suburban ring residents.

Also in 1970, 56 percent of the work trips by all

modes were to center city destinations, while 44

percent were to suburban destinations (see Figure

4).

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

INSTITUTIONS

The principal institutions involved in transit

planning in the Seattle region are the Municipality

of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro), now the transit

operator, and the Puget Sound Council of

Governments (PSCOG), until recently called the

Puget Sound Governmental Conference (PSGC).

The city and county governments and the State

Highway Commission also are active participants

in the planning process,

TABLE 2.—Federally Recognized

Regional Agencies

Designation Agency

A-95 Puget Sound Council of Governments

MPO Puget Sound Council of Governments

Source Urban Mass Transportation Adminstration

Municipality of Metropolitan

Seattle (Metro)

A monorail system, built as part of the Seattle

World’s Fair of 1962, links the CBD with the

World’s Fair site, now an amusement and cultural

State legislation enacted in 1957 permitted

Washington cities and counties in urban areas to

5
VEHICLE MILES OPERATED 15. 1 13. 5 14.1 14. 0

(millions of miles)

Peak Year =1960 (15.1 million miles)

L0w Year= 1966 (13.5 million miles)

REVENUE PASSENGERS

(millions of passengers)

Peak Year =1962 (43.6 million riders)

Low Year =1972 (29.2 million riders)

NET OPERATING REVENUE

(millions of dollars )

Peak Year =1962 ($873,000)

Low Year =1974(-$17,643,000 )

1974

FIGURE 3: SEATTLE-TRANSIT OPERATIONS 1960-1974

N O data on Seattle transit operations were reported in 1973; no vehicle miles

data have been reported since 1972. The 1974 operating deficit was estimated

by an official of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle in March 1975.

Source: American Public Transit Association records for the Seattle Transit

Commission and the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro).

6
WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

Center City to Suburban Ring

Suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Center City

Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring

WORK TRIP MODE

1960 1970

.,., . . .

:; :”..: , .,::,:,:::,: . . . . . . . . . . . .......:,, . .......:...::::.:.: ... ,:. ....0.?; Employed Residents Using Public Transportation ,,. ., ,,.,., : ;.,:.:,::.: ;: ”.;.., ,:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Employed Residents Using Autos

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Suburban Ring

Remaining workers either walked to work,

stayed at home or did not report mode. Center City

FIGURE4: SEATTLE SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS 1

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners, and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assocaition of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

68-768 0 - 76 - 3

7
establish metropolitan municipal corporations,

modeled after Toronto’s, with authority over solid

waste disposal, parks and recreation, metropolitan

planning, water supply, and transportation

matters—subject to specific local approvals. In a

referendum in 1958, Metro was established as a

single-function agency responsible for sewage

control and water-related functions. It is governed

by a 36-member council comprised of key elected

officials of Seattle and King County, as well as

representatives of may of the other cities and

unincorporated areas of King County.

Metro received approval from the State

legislature to plan for transit in spring 1967. On

June 12, 1967, it entered into an agreement with

DeLeuw, Cather & Company for the provision of

consulting services to supplement the transit study

already underway for the Puget Sound

Governmental Conference. The October 1967

study report recommended the rail plan that was

defeated by the voters on February 13, 1968. The

very similar plan that was defeated in 1970 was

prepared under the auspices of both Metro and the

city of Seattle. Not until 1972 did voters empower

Metro to levy a .3 percent sales tax to finance the

purchase of the city-owned transit system and a

private suburban company, making Metro the sole

transit operator in the area.

Puget Sound Council of

Governments (PSCOG)

Originally created in 1957 as the Puget Sound

Governmental Conference (PSGC), PSCOG is a

loose association of the local governments in the

Seattle metropolitan region. PSCOG’s jurisdiction

is much broader than Metro’s, encompassing the

four counties of King, Kitsap, Pierce, Snohomish,

and both the Seattle-Everett and the Tacoma

SMSA’s. It was established to undertake studies

and make recommendations to its member counties

and cities on a range of areawide concerns.

Since it shares the weakness of most COG’s of

not having the power to tax, PSCOG depends on

voluntary contributions of local membe r

governments and upon State and Federal grants. Its

limited strength has derived from a series of

Federal acts that have given it various review and

coordination responsibilities. In 1963, it became the

regional 3-C agency with responsibility for carrying out the planning requirements of the FederalAid Highway Act of 1962; and it recently was

designated the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO). 3 PSCOG also is the region’s A-95

review agency.4

King County

In 1970, King county’s population of 1,156,633

represented 81.3 percent of the SMSA population.

The county encompasses all of the city of Seattle

and most of the urbanized portion of the region.

In 1969, a new charter that concentrated

authority in the chief executive substantially

increased the county’s powers. Responsibility for

county transportation planning is within the LongRange Planning Division of the Department of

Budget and Program Planning. The county’s

Transportation Planning Section is working with

PSGC to update its highway plan, expanding it in

accordance with the PSGC 1990 plan. However,

the county government has limited power in

municipal parts of the county and has delegated

certain powers to Metro.

City of Seattle

Although the city’s population declined only 4.7

percent between 1960 and 1970, its position in

relation to the rest of the SMSA dropped

significantly due to the large amount of growth

elsewhere in the SMSA. Seattle is structurally a

“weak mayor” form of city government with most

powers resting in the nine-member City Council.

3 The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the

Federal Highway Administration require Governors to

designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) in each

area to carry out the “continuing, comprehensive transportation

planning process . . . carried out cooperatively . . .“ (the “3-C”

process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and

the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.

According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published in

September 1975, MPO’s must prepare or endorse (1) a longrange general transportation plan, including a separate plan for

improvements in management of the existing transportation

system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the

Transportation Improvement Program (TIP), to implement

portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planning

prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work

programs.

4 The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95

requires one agency in each region to be empowered to review

all proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region.

Circular A-95 replaced Circular A-82, which was created to

implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301).

8
The position of the chief executive has strengthened in recent years due to Mayor James D. Braman’s

skill in dealing with the Council during his term of

office in 1964-69, and due to 1967 State legislation

removing the budget-making power from the

Council and placing it in the mayor’s office.

The city has responsibility for traffic, parking,

and for developing and maintaining city streets. It

also has been involved in highway planning in

cooperation with the State. Starting in 1914, the

city had become increasingly involved in regulating

and later subsidizing services until 1973, when the

Seattle transit system was turned over to Metro.

Washington State Highway

Department (WSHD)

The WSHD was established in 1951 under a

highway commission of five members who are

appointed by the Governor for overlapping terms.

The Commissioners, in turn, appoint the director

of the Washington State Highway Department.

The WSHD has minimal responsibilities for public

transit, although its Seattle area studies have

included transit elements in major interstate

projects, notably I-5 and I-90. There has been

considerable pressure for some years to establish a

State department of transportation.

9
Critical History of Rapid Transit

Planning and Decisionmaking

Attempts by the city of Seattle to incorporate rail

rapid transit into pending highway plans began in

the 1950’s. But the concept of a regionwide rail

system developed in another forum as a component

part of the business-led movement to regionalize

municipal services and improve the physical

infrastructure of the city.

Transit plans for the Seattle area were proposed

in 1967, 1970, and 1972. The first two plans, which

were financed by property tax bond issues, failed in

1968 and 1970 to gain the 60 percent voter approval

required for adoption. The financing for a shortrange bus plan involved the use of a new State

excise tax on automobiles matched by a local sales

tax. This plan, which required only a simple

majority approval, was adopted in 1972.

While this short-range plan for an all-bus system

is now being implemented, debate continues over

the appropriate technology for the long-term

development of transit in the Seattle region.

EARLY HISTORY OF TRANSIT

IN SEATTLE

Seattle is a relatively young city; the first settlers

arrived in Seattle in 1852. By 1884, a horse-drawn

street railway had been constructed, and the first

electric cable car began operating in 1889. In the

decade that followed, Stone and Webster, a Boston

engineering firm and owner of the largest electric

power company in the Seattle area, began to

integrate the nearly 70 miles of track owned by

several transit companies into a consolidated

interurban rail system.

The city of Seattle became involved in transit in

1914 when it began construction of two streetcar

lines. During the First World War, problems with

transit operations led the city to initiate

negotiations to purchase the system, and in 1918

the voters approved city purchase of all portions of

the system within its border. The railway system

continued to have financial difficulties. A 1926

proposal by the City Planning Commission to build

a rail transit system was ignored.

In 1939, the three-member Seattle Transit

Commission was created to operate and improve

the system, which had fallen into dilapidated

condition and financial distress. As happened

elsewhere in the country, transit ridership increased during the World War II years but then fell

off again.

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN

THE 1950’s

The city made a number of unsuccessful

attempts during the 1950’s to incorporate

provisions for rail rapid transit into pending

highway plans. To resolve the ensuing controversy, the city, county, and State agreed to conduct a

comprehensive transportation study; and by the

end of the decade they established the Puget Sound

Regional Transportation Committee to define the

scope of the study.

The subject of the first major debate in the early

1950’s was the configuration of Seattle’s Central

Freeway, which the Washington State Toll Bridge

Authority was authorized to construct as a toll

facility in 1953. During the preliminary design

stages, the Seattle Transit Commission suggested

incorporating a 50-foot median in the design to

allow for the future development of rail rapid

transits This request was denied by the Toll Bridge

Authority in’ 1955.

In 1956, when the responsibility for the construction of the Central Freeway was transferred

to the Washington State Highway Commission,

the Transit Commission renewed its efforts to

have rail transit facilities incorporated in the

Central Freeway design, this time with the support

of the City of Seattle Planning Commission. Both

the transit commission and planning commission

issued reports in 1957 recommending that the

s Clifford Kurtzweg, Rapid Trnmft Dmdopmmt in Seat//e,

unpublished paper prepared for the University of Washington,

June 1966, p. 5.

11
freeway design should provide space for rail that

could be used by express buses until the rail system

was constructed.

In early 1957, because of the controversy over

rapid transit on the Central Freeway, the Mayor of

Seattle appointed a committee to consider the

problem. The committee—consisting of the Seattle

City Engineer, the Director of Planning, the Seattle

Transit General Manager, and representatives of

the Chamber of Commerce, the Municipal League

of Seattle, and King County—concluded that

evidence of the need for rail transit was insufficient

to merit a delay in freeway construction. b

Although rapid transit had lost the battle to gain

a place in the freeway proposal, the controversy

mobilized public interest in a comprehensive

transportation study. In October 1957, the Puget

Sound Regional Transportation Committee was

formed, with representatives from the State

Highway Commission, the city of Seattle, King

County, and the Seattle Transit Commission. One

year later, the committee employed Parsons,

Brinckerhoff, Hall and MacDonald to conduct a

survey to determine the scope and procedures for

the comprehensive transportation study. In 1960,

as an outcome of this work, the Puget Sound

Regional Transportation Study was formed.

EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE

METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT

IN THE 1950’s

Advocates of rail transit in Seattle emerged in

two different forums. Transit advocates were

involved with the antihighway forces during the

freeway debates. In addition, mass transit was a

central concern of those who worked to create an

umbrella organization with authority throughout

the Seattle metropolitan region. The momentum

behind this effort was led by James Ellis, a young

lawyer who worked through the Municipal League

of Seattle in the early 1950’s. Ellis’ concern focused

on the inadequacy of weak and fragmented local

governments to solve transportation problems

along with other areawide problems involving

sewage disposal, air quality, and the adequacy of

recreational and cultural facilities. Ellis gave up his

attempt to update the King County government

after unsuccessful efforts at reform. 7 The solution

Ellis proposed was a countywide metropolitan

council modeled after Toronto’s Metro.

In 1956, the mayor of Seattle and the Board of

King County Commissioners appointed the

Metropolitan Problems Advisory Committee,

chaired by Jim Ellis. This group recommended to

the State legislature that it pass enabling legislation

to permit cities and counties in urban areas to

establish metropolitan councils. In 1957, the

legislature passed the Metropolitan Municipal

Corporation Act. The act stated that:

The people of the populous areas in the

State . . . need to obtain . . . essential services not adequately provided by existing

agencies of local government. The growth

of urban populations and the movement of

people into suburban areas has created

problems of sewage and garbage disposal,

water supply, transportation, planning,

parks and parkways which extend beyond

the boundaries of cities, counties, and

special districts. For reasons of topography,

location and movement of population, and

land conditions and development, one or

more of these problems cannot be adequately met by the individual cities,

counties, and districts of any metropolitan

areas.

It is the purpose of this act to enable cities

and counties to act jointly to meet these

common problems in order that the proper

growth and development may be assured

and the health and welfare of the people

residing therein may be secured. 8

Pursuant to the State legislation, a major

promotional campaign presenting the Metro

concept to the people was directed by a new

citizens’ organization, the Metropolitan Council

Action Committee, again organized by Jim Ellis.

The measure lost by only 16,000 votes (out of an

187,000 vote total in the election of March 1958).9

Although it had gained voter approval within the

city of Seattle, the measure was defeated because it

failed to pass outside the city.

Finally, later in the same year, the voters

approved a stripped-down Metro as a special

purpose agency responsible for sewage treatment

and water supply. Thus, the Municipality of

0 Ibid., p. 6.

P Robert Gogerty and David Whitlow, An Analysis of Fonuard

Tkrust, unpublished paper, 1967, p. 5.

8 Colcord, op. cit., pp. 70, 71.

Q Gogerty and Whitlow, op. cit., p. 6,

12
Metropolitan Seattle was created which, with voter

approval, had the potential to take on other critical

areawide problems. This potential was reinforced

when Metro gained national as well as local

recognition for cleaning up Lake Washington.

While Metro was being created in 1957, so also

was the Puget Sound Governmental Conference

(PSGC). The PSGC was created by the elected

officials of King, Kitsap, Pierce, and Snohomish

counties to serve as a purely advisory organization

charged with coordinating land use planning,

undertaking studies of areawide problems, and

making recommendations to member counties and

cities.

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

BETWEEN 1960 and 1966

While the genesis of rail transit plans and the

movement toward metropolitan-scale improvements occurred in the 1950’s, it was during

the 1960’s that a regionwide rail transit system was

first planned, designed, and taken to the voters.

As noted previously, the principal metropolitan

transportation planning agency in Seattle at the

beginning of this period was the Puget Sound

Regional Transportation Study (PSRTS). Founded

in 1960 by the Washington State Highway Commission in cooperation with local governments in

the four-county Seattle metropolitan area, PSRTS

was one of the Nation’s first large-scale

metropolitan transportation and land use planning

agencies; most large urban regions subsequently

established such programs as a result of the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and the comprehensive planning assistance program administered by HUD (then HHFA). PSRTS was

responsible for an examination of the existing

transit system to determine potential rail rapid

transit corridors and to estimate potential

patronage and construction costs.10

John Mladinov became the director of the Puget

Sound Study in 1960. In an interview, he reported

that immediately after his appointment a delegation of the Municipal League called upon him to

request that a rail rapid transit system be studied,

and that it be considered a part of any basic

transportation network. The League further

requested that any rail system be limited to the

boundaries established for Metro, which included

King County and Seattle only. Mladinov refused

both requests, insisting that the form and extent of

any rail proposal would have to be justified by

PSRTS’ analysis.

In October 1961, another citizens’ committee,

the Metropolitan Transportation Committee, was

appointed to determine the best means for

providing rapid transit in the metropolitan area.11

The committee, which included James Ellis, concluded that Metro was the appropriate agency to

perform the transit function. As a result, in

February 1962 a promotional committee was

formed called the Citizens’ Committee for Metro

Transit. The Citizens’ Committee sought to get

approval from Metro to prepare a rapid transit plan

and financial program to present to the voters. In

September 1962, despite an intense campaign, the

effort failed. This time the proposal was supported

by the suburbs but failed to get a majority of the

city’s votes.

City leaders, who were dissatisfied with PSRTS’

automobile-oriented approach to transportation

planning, began a parallel planning activity for rail

rapid transit, initially through the auspices of the

Seattle Transit Commission. The city strongly

favored the engineering firm of parsons,

Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas (PBQD), one of

the principal firms involved in planning the BART

system, However, the Puget Sound Governmental

Conference, which was to put up the money,

decided it would select a consultant by competition.

Although PBQD was among the four finalists, it

lost its lead position, and DeLeuw, Cather &

Company was selected. When DeLeuw, Cather was

authorized to begin its study in June 1964, the area

it considered was the same as that being considered

by PSRTS. Much of the data gathered by PSRTS

was used in the DeLeuw, Cather transit study.

During this period, the leading force for rail

transit within City Hall was Ed Divine, an

administrative assistant to Mayor Gordon Clinton

and then to Mayor James D. Braman, who

succeeded Clinton in 1964. Prior to becoming

mayor, as a member of the City Council and

chairman of its Finance Committee, Braman was

reported to oppose rail transit on the grounds that

it was too expensive. Ed Divine is given credit for

persuading Braman to change his position radically

IO Kurtzweg, op. cit., p. 11. I I Colcord, op. cit., p. 83.

13

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after he became mayor. Braman became a strong,

open, and ardent advocate for rail transit.

Another event changed the national context for

mass transit. The Urban Mass Transportation Act

of 1964 allowed two-thirds of capital financing of

transit projects to be allocated from Federal funds.

(Prior to this, Federal grants had been available only

for transit demonstration projects.)

In November 1964, the first of DeLeuw, Cather’s

two interim reports was issued. The report

recommended that the new I-90 Lake Washington

bridge be designed to provide for future rail transit

facilities. This recommendation was adopted by the

PSGC and transmitted to the Washington State

Highway Department.12 DeLeuw, Cather’s second

report, the Interim Report to the Puget Sound Governmental

Conference on Feasibility of Rapid Transit Operation within

the Seattle Area, was submitted in November 1965.

The report strongly recommended the construction of a two-line rail rapid transit facility connecting the central business district to the northeast

portion of the city and to Bellevue. The plan

included a regional area transit plan to meet the

Seattle area’s transit needs until 1985 and a staged

construction program.

A 13-member Rapid Transit Advisory Committee headed by James Ellis, which was appointed by

Mayor Braman on October 18, 1965, endorsed the

DeLeuw, Cather recommendations in a statement

transmitted to the Mayor on November 1, 1965.13

Several months after the publication of DeLeuw,

Cather’s reports, the Puget Sound Regional

Transportation Study summary report was released. This report concluded that no strong recommendation could be made for rapid transit. An

analysis of the reasons for the difference in the

study findings was summarized by Clifford

Kurtzweg in a paper submitted to the University of

Washington in June 1966:

Several basic concepts account for the

failure of PSRTS to find rapid transit

feasible in the Seattle area. First the PSRTS

analysis assumes that the development of

rapid transit corridors does not significantly change land use patterns or densities.

Second, the PSRTS study assumes that

increasing the amenities of transit service

would not greatly increase patronage.

IZ KUrtZWe~, op. cit., p. 12.

IJ Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

16

Third, the PSRTS study shows no definite

economic advantage to a rail transit

system. DeLeuw, Cather and Company in

their analysis of rail transit feasibility

assumes that the improved system will

attract 8 percent more passengers than the

present bus system and that development

within the rail transit corridor would

increase patronage by an additional 15.0

percent. Further, DeLeuw, Cather, and

Company lists decreases in traffic congestion, reduction of air pollution, reduction

of parking demand in the CBD, more

efficient use of right-of-way, and increases

in land values along the transit corridors as

being benefits of rail transit instead of

depending on strictly dollar-cost economics

for justification. Basically the conflict of

the two studies reduces to a conflict

between highway-oriented values and

transit-oriented values.14

Seattle newspapers carried a number of articles

expressing the views of PSRTS Director John

Mladinov. He criticized the DeLeuw, Cather plan

and charged that the study director, Israel Gilboa,

was prejudiced in favor of rail transit and that

DeLeuw, Cather’s analyses and benefit-cost

evaluations were skewed to favor a rail plan. The

disagreement between the two factions resulted in

Mladinov’s leaving the area, largely due to political

pressure from the city government.

THE CREATION OF

FORWARD THRUST

In the same month that the DeLeuw, Cather

interim report was published, James Ellis called for

the creation of “Forward Thrust.” Ellis, the force

behind Metro and other metropolitan improvement organizations, called for a coordinated

program to finance areawide capital improvements

in a speech on November 3, 1965, to the Seattle

Rotary Club.15

Ellis suggested that there were three physical

conditions necessary for the center city to perform

its functions successfully: (1) it must have a high

density of activities, (2) it must be attractive, with

14 Ibid., pp. 14, 1s.

15 James R. Ellis, “Transportation and the Shape of the City,”

November 3, 1965, Selected Speeches on Forward Thrust and February

13, 196$ ~iertion ~esults, 1965-68, p. 2 .
open plazas and easy pedestrian access to all

facilities, and (3) there must be the capacity to move

large numbers of commuters during peak hours.16

Ellis predicted that “on-street” transportation

would not be able to meet the requirement of

Seattle’s core area:

The only pattern now known which

permits both open space and dense

development while moving large peakhour loads is the use of high-rise structures

and some form of grade separated public

transportation to supplement streets and

highways. Rapid transit is the essential link

in a balanced transportation system which

is missing in Seattle. 17

Ellis stressed that rapid transit is only part of a

bigger picture:

Transportation is only one of the physical

elements which shape a city. To achieve a

satisfactory total design the relationship

between all of the shaping forces must be

recognized. Transportation facilities

become a more useful tool for urban design

if they are integrated into the planning of

other public facilities and private

developments.

By reducing parking requirements public

transportation may free downtown space

for a plaza and this plaza in turn may be

additionally enjoyable if designed in conjunction with a transit station. The

relationship between public transit and

arterial street requirements is both causal

and complementary. Just as a system of

sewage disposal is necessary to the enjoyment of beaches or waterfront parks so

each of the basic sinews of the city has a

direct relation to the more familiar projects

for city beautification and human fulfillment. By the same token, the location of

other public facilities should complement

and support the transportation system. A

big league stadium should be served by

both public transit and freeways. All public

capital purposes in a city are closely interdependent. 18

To achieve these interdependent needs, Ellis

called for a joint effort, a forward thrust, by the

area’s several governments and all interested

private groups. He envisioned coordinating a series

of capital improvements that had been contemplated by various groups and local governments

into a unified 10-year capital program including:

●

●

●

●

●

●

A basic rapid transit system;

A major league sports stadium;

Major arterial street improvements;

Sufficient parks, plazas, and greenbelts to

satisfy metropolitan needs and to permanently eliminate urban sprawl;

A world trade center; and

Matching funds for urban redevelopment. 19

Ellis’ speech reflected a new approach to the goal

of coordinating area wide improvement, with which

he had been concerned for well over a decade. The

concept gained the support of community leaders,

and in March 1966, Seattle Mayor Braman and

King County Commissioner Scott Wallace appointed a group to select the Forward Thrust

Committee.

The organizations represented by the members

of the committee covered a broad range of local

government and business interests. Senior officials

of large businesses formed the predominant

element; academics comprised about 10 percent of

the committee, and the only “public interest”

figures in the present sense of the word were

several conservationists. The composition of the

committee was to influence its policies as well as

public reactions as its work progressed.

THE FORWARD THRUST PROGRAM

AND VOTER REJECTION OF TRANSIT

BONDING

Once the Committee of 200 was selected, the

Forward Thrust program began its work. The

process was organized into three phases. The first,

which lasted from September to December 1966,

was a factfinding period for developing a broad

consensus on areawide needs. It sought to identify

the total capital improvement needs for King

1~ Ibid., p. 5.

IT Ibid., p. 6.

18 Ibid., p. 7. IQ Ibid., p. 8.

17
County by pulling together all existing local studies

and proposals.

During the second phase, Forward Thrust

subcommittees examined financing methods and

local agency authority for fulfilling Seattle’s needs,

and presented 18 bills to the State legislature to

create funding and the authority to administer the

necessary programs. One such bill, passed in 1967,

permitted Metro to plan for a comprehensive public

transportation system.

Next, from April through October 1967, a

system of priorities was established relating the

urgency of the various needs to financial capabilities. The legislative package, which both doubled

the county’s indebtedness limit and established

State funding for various measures, enabled

Forward Thrust’s Economic Analysis Committee to

determine how much each of the other subcommittees could “spend” for their various proposals.

Once a set of programs was recommended to local

governments and agreed upon by them, Forward

Thrust’s third-phase promotional campaign was

begun.

In November 1967, Forward Thrust announced

its final recommendations. The program totaled

some $2 billion of improvements, with $819 million

to be raised locally by general obligation bonds. Of

this local share, $385 million was for rapid transit—

nearly half of the entire program.

Transit planning was going on simultaneously

under the auspices of PSGC. During November

1965, the same month Jim Ellis introduced the

concept of Forward Thrust, PSGC adopted a

regional transit plan as an element of a total

regional transportation system. The adopted

transit plan, based on the DeLeuw, Cather study,

recommended a two-line grade-separated rail

transit system with local and express bus feeder

services. In July 1966, the same month of the first

meeting of the Forward Thrust Committee, a

second contract was signed between PSGC and

DeLeuw, Cather to refine the transit plan.

The new study had two goals. First, the study

was to reexamine the 1965 two-line plan in the light

of the very large increase in population projected

due to industrial expansion. These increased

growth projections suggested that the region’s

population would grow from 1.6 to 3.1 million

between 1965 and 1990. The study’s other task was

to do detailed engineering design and to take into

consideration architecture, urban design, and

18

economics as a basis for more detailed cost estimates.

During this study, under contract first with the

PSGC and then with Metro but under the guidance

of the Forward Thrust Transportation Committee,

DeLeuw, Cather extended the transit plan to a 47-

mile system with two new legs. One of the new legs

headed south to Renton and the other went

northwest to Ballard, supplementing the earlier

plan’s northeast route and east route across Lake

Washington to Bellevue. All four routes combined

into a single line through the CBD. The 1985 plan

included the following major elements:

●

●

●

●

●

The

47 miles of dual-track, grade-separated rail

rapid transit routes with 32 stations.

Automobile and bus-to-rail transfer

facilities and parking were to be provided at

appropriate stations;

A 3-mile, grade-separated busway to west

Seattle. To be converted in the future to

rail rapid transit;

24 miles of grade-separated right-of-way

for future rail rapid transit;

90 miles of express bus routes, which

would operate on highways;

500 miles of local bus routes, which would

operate on major arterials and serve rapid

transit stations.

total capital cost required to acquire and

construct the system was estimated at $1.155

billion over a 17-year period (assuming an inflation

rate of 4.5 percent per year). Annual operating

costs of $29 million were to be covered by revenues

by 1990. One-third of capital costs, or $385 million,

was to be raised through a general obligation bond

requiring 60 percent voter approval for authorization as part of the Forward Thrust program. The

remaining two thirds of the cost was to come from

UMTA.

In October 1967, the plan was reviewed by a

blue-ribbon board of consultants: an architect,

Pietro Belluschi; an engineer from Toronto, W.E.P.

Duncan; and a planner/urban designer, Henry

Fagin. The board met in Seattle to review DeLeuw,

Cather’s work and to receive presentations from

Mayor Braman, Forward Thrust President Jim

Ellis, and C. Carey Donworth, Chairman of the

Metro Council, as well as key members of the

design consultant team. A letter of endorsement
prepared by this board was included in the October

report documenting the plan.

With the transit plan fully detailed, the next step

was to achieve public support prior to the bond

election. Forward Thrust’s promotional campaign

lasted 4 months and involved the work of more

than 3,000 volunteers.

In addition to having representatives of the

media on its Committee of 200, Forward Thrust

employed a professional advertising firm with

political campaign experience to carry out the

promotional effort. The effort involved the writing

of editorials, a mass mailing, paid advertisements in

television and the press, and “an army of thrust

boosters”20 who canvassed the final weekend of the

campaign. The theme of the campaign was to

promise a better “way of life” for Seattle citizens.

In a survey conducted by Forward Thrust in

September, the first of the two done during the

campaign, transit ranked second in popularity with

64 percent of the respondents in favor, 19 percent

opposed, and 16 percent undecided. During followup telephone surveys in January, support for

transit had dropped to 49 percent of the

respondents, with 23 percent opposed and 28

percent undecided.

Opposition to the Forward Thrust program and

to the rapid transit proposal in particular came from

several sources. The first formal opposition was

voiced in the King County Democrat, the official organ

of the King County Democratic Party. An antagonistic editorial entitled “Government by the

Elite ??? ? ?“ questioned the methods employed by

Forward Thrust and called for more time to allow

the communities involved to study the desirability

of the proposals. The editorial also raised questions

about a possible conflict of interest involving Ellis,

whose law firm specializes in handling bonding’ and

is legal counsel to Metro. The editorial was the

responsibility of Jeanette K. Williams, who at the

time was the official spokesperson for the King

County Democratic Party and who currently is the

chairperson of the PSGC Transportation Policy

Advisory Committee. Three weeks after publication of her editorial, she publicly apologized to

Ellis. 21

zo Robert E. Gogerty, Attitudes Affecting the Forward Thrust

Campaign, unpublished paper, March 14, 1968, pp. 6, 7 o f

unnumbered pages.

ZI Gogerty and Whitlow, op. cit., pp. M, 45. Gogerty and

Whitlow speculate that Williams’ apology may have been due to

pressure from Senators Magnuson and Jackson.

The Association of Teamsters in Washington

also opposed Forward Thrust. Through its official

paper, The Washington Teamster, with a circulation of

33,000 in King County and 50,000 statewide, it

voiced strong criticism of Forward Thrust.22 Ed

Donohoe, the managing editor, ran a series of

cartoons and editorials attacking Forward Thrust

for causing unnecessary increased taxation, personally attacking Jim Ellis for his alleged conflict of

interest, and attacking the rapid transit proposal

which, said Donohoe, “won’t be rapid, won’t haul

the people they claim . . . (these rail systems) won’t

pay their way and they’re no damned good for the

north end, south end, or east end,”23

A third opposition group was called Citizens for

Sensible Transit. It criticized the support given by

Pacific Northwest Bell, which had given Forward

Thrust its billing lists as source material for

canvassing. This group claimed that the company

was not a private organization and therefore could

not discriminate in its giving. 24 They contacted the

Federal Communications Commission and asked

for equal time to televise their answer to the proForward Thrust editorials, which they were

granted by the three major stations. Gogerty states

that:

(T)he time authorized was based on all proThrust editorials, even though opposition

was primarily concerned with the transit

proposal. The last week of the campaign,

the opponents were in possession of

extensive media time, and used it effectively. The major theme, ironically, was that

Forward Thrust through rapid transit was

trying to take away or alter the “way of

life” in the Pacific Northwest.25

The special election was held on February 13,

1968. Twelve tax propositions were placed before

the voters of Seattle and King County. Under State

law, each proposition required a 60 percent “yes”

vote to pass as well as a 40 percent turnout of those

who had voted in the past general election in the

State. The Forward Thrust campaign elicited a

much larger turnout than the 160,000 voters

expected for the special election. A record-breaking

267,597 people voted, some 48 percent of the

registered King County voters and a greater

number than the 214,690 voter turnout of the

zz Ibid., p. 46.

23 Ibid., pp. 46, 47.

ZJ Gogerty, op. cit., p. 20.

~~ Ibid., p. 20.

19
previous general election. Seven of the

propositions, totaling $333.9 million, received the

necessary 60 percent or more support. While the

other five failed, they each received at least a 50

percent majority approval. The transit proposal,

which was the most costly item, won support from

approximately 51 percent of the voters, but this

margin was not enough for approval. Since transit

was considered by Forward Thrust to be the key to

its effort, there was a feeling of defeat among the

leaders of the campaign.

Robert Gogerty forwards several reasons for the

defeat that involve the way the campaign was run.

He points out that the campaign was not geared to

show the low-income voter how the transit project

would benefit him. In addition, Robert Gogerty

indicated that many of the voters perceived the

proposed arterial highway improvements as a less

expensive and more desirable alternative to the

transit proposal as a solution to the county’s

transportation problem. This involved a misunderstanding of Forward Thrust’s concept that

the arterial improvements were a part of an overall

balanced transportation plan.

But in the last analysis, Gogerty attributes the

defeat to a policy decision taken by Forward Thrust

campaign officials:

Campaign officials admit that the

September survey lulled them into thinking transit was safe and that by the time

they realized that there was trouble it was

questionable whether it could be saved.

(The decision to give the stadium priority

at that time pretty well settled the

matter. ) 26

SECOND DEFEAT OF THE FORWARD

THRUST TRANSIT PROGRAM IN 1970

In March 1968, with the support of the mayor of

Seattle, the chairman of the Board of King County

Commissioners, and several civic organizations,

the Forward Thrust Committee began a second

effort to secure approval of the entire capital

improvement program. Although the original

intention had been that Forward Thrust should

disperse after the February election, the results

were sufficiently encouraging to keep the program

alive. Starting in

20 Gogerty, Op. cit.

20

April 1968, more than 100 new

members were added to the Forward Thrust

Committee and additional private financing was

obtained.

During September through December of 1969,

background surveys were again conducted; the

legislative program lasted from January 1968 to

February 1970. The only bill relating to the transit

proposal in the 1968 session allowed any

municipality which operated a public transportation system to levy a 1 percent motor vehicle excise

tax.27 The tax would replace one-half of the already

existing 2 percent State motor vehicle excise tax.

The tax proceeds so designated for transit would

have to be matched by other locally levied tax funds

also to be spent on transit. The bill also gave Metro

authority (which local governments already had) to

levy household utility excise taxes.

Once again, DeLeuw, Cather was retained for

the transit studies, this time under a joint contract

signed by the city of Seattle and Metro. Again, a

team of engineers, architects, urban designers, and

economists was assembled. By March 1969, the

team had completed a comparative analysis of

alternative transportation systems and concluded

that a bus-rail concept was best for the Seattle

metropolitan area.

The analysis examined four alternative transit

systems: buses in mixed traffic, all-bus systems

with metered freeways, all-bus systems with

busways, and the bus-rail plan as modified from the

1967 plan. The first alternative was discarded as a

long-range solution because it caused serious

traffic congestion and minimal travel time improvement. 28 For the two remaining all-bus

alternatives, it was assumed that grade-separated

right-of-way would have to be provided to serve

five major activity centers—downtown Seattle, the

University District, Bellevue, the Duwamish

industrial area, and Renton—in order to avoid

serious conflicts with other transportation modes.

As a result, the capital costs

. . . were quite comparable, but the

operating deficit of each of the two all-bus

systems was four times greater than the

bus-rail system, on an annual basis. This

can be explained largely by the fact that,

with automatic train operation, a rapid

transit train with a single attendant can

carry more than 600 passengers, while

ZT f-lB 641, Chapter 255, Laws of 1969.

25 DeLeuw, Cather & Co., op. cit., p. 40.

.
each bus with driver carries only about 47

passengers, fully loaded. This total payload

factor is significant because about 80

percent of the total operating cost of a bus

transit system is in the wages paid to

vehicle operators. 29

With equal or better patronage forecast for the busrail system, the consultants concluded that it was a

superior alternative, considering the higher

operating costs of the all-bus system. This finding

was supported by the Technical Advisory Committee of key agency personnel from Metro, PSGC,

and the State Highway Department.

An additional analysis of alternatives was

conducted by a voluntary group from Boeing. A

Boeing executive who chaired the Forward Thrust

Transit Committee got together a group of

technicians to review DeLeuw, Cather’s study of

alternatives during the 1970 program. This group

worked on a voluntary off-hours basis, investigating alternative types of technology to

answer a concern that the system had been

overdesigned and was more costly than necessary.

They suggested the use of smaller vehicles and

correspondingly less expensive track and supporting structures. Their studies showed a possibility

for reducing the costs by as much as 25 percent,

even if the number of miles to be tunneled,

depressed, or elevated were kept constant. The

technicians presented their findings to the

Technical Advisory Committee and to the consultant. DeLeuw, Cather took a stand against

considering unconventional technologies. Forward

Thrust was opposed to public discussion of these

alternatives before the election for political

reasons, although it indicated analysis of lowercost technologies could be resurrected after the

bond issue.

During the autum of 1969, a series of community

meetings was held to broaden the citizen participation effort.

Meanwhile, alinement studies and patronage

projections had been conducted, estimates of

capital cost were updated, and an initial bus system

developed in more detail than had been done in the

1967 plan.

On February 19,1970, a report was published by

DeLeuw, Cather documenting the “new” plan (see

Figure 5). It included a letter of endorsement from a

new blue-ribbon review board, this time consisting

ZO Ibid., p. SO.

of William Boucher III, Executive Director, Greater

Baltimore Commission; Guy Blain, Director of the

Transportation Department of the Montreal

Transportation Commission; Charles E. Shumate,

Chief Engineer of the State of Colorado Department of Highways; F. Norman Hill, General

Manager of the San Antonio Transit System; and

Boris Pushkarev, Planning Director of the Regional

Plan Association of New York City.

The 1970 plan differed from its 1967 predecessor

in the following ways:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

There were 49 miles of rail this time

instead of 47, still grade-separated. There

were alinement shifts on all lines, a cutback

of the northwest line, an extension of the

northeast line, and a short extension of the

east line.

The mileage of local bus routes was

expanded to 740 miles in comparison to the

500 miles included in the previous system.

A plan for immediate improvement of the

existing bus system was this time

developed in greater detail than it had been

in the first plan, with descriptions of

service improvements to each of the

community areas throughout the region.

Instead of the 32 rail stations suggested

previously, the new plan called for 34

stations, a number of them in new or

modified locations.

In addition to those in the earlier plan, 800

local bus shelters were to be provided, 32

community and neighborhood b u s

stations, and 9 park-and-ride bus stations.

There were only 8 miles of right-of-way

reserved for future rail route extensions as

compared to 24 miles reserved in the

previous system.

The total cost had risen from $1.155 billion

to $1.321 billion, primarily due to inflation.

The increase in total cost increased the

local share from $385 to $440 million. 30

On may 19, 1970, 3 months after the February

publication of the Metro transit plan, another

special election was held. This time only four

propositions were presented to the voters. The

total cost was $615.5 million: as in 1968, the transit

plan, costing $440 million, was the most expensive

JO De Leuw, Cather & CO., The Rapid Transit Plan for fhc

Mcfropolitan Sea/t/e Area, February 19, 1970, p. 39.

21
\

Renton 1

I \

: 1

-*---- -

FIGURE 5: SEATTLE-RECOMMENDED PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEM FOR 1985

Rail Rapid Transit Express Bus

n

Reserved for Future Rapid /////

1-90 Corridor

Transit

Bus Rapid Transit .-*\

Local Bus Network Not Shown

SOURCE: Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, Seattle Metropolitan

Are a Recommended Public Transportation Plan, February 1970.

22
single item by far. Again a 60 percent majority of

referendum voters was necessary. A worsening

local economic situation, whose decline picked up

momentum in late spring and did not bottom out

until 1971, may have been the key factor in the

defeat of the second transit proposal. This time the

transit plan was supported by only 46 percent of the

voters, and, in keeping with its original mandate,

this time the Forward Thrust organization was

disbanded.

1972 VOTER ACCEPTANCE OF

A SHORT-RANGE BUS PLAN

After the second transit bond issue was rejected

in 1970, transit advocates turned from a regional

bus-rail system to a short-range bus plan for

several reasons. Economic conditions in the Seattle

area continued to be poor, which would make

voters wary of an expensive transit system. A bus

system would require no bonded indebtedness and

therefore only a 50 percent voter approval for its

financing. And, given UMTA’s warm reception of

bus approaches, Federal funding seemed likely.

By far the most important element in the decision

to formulate a bus system in 1972 was the threat of

a complete collapse of the Seattle Transit System

and suburban private bus operators. During this

period the Puget Sound Government Conference

(PSGO, with Metro’s concurrence, hired a new

consultant with bus transit planning experience to

prepare a short-term bus plan. Daniel, Mann,

Johnson & Mendenhall in 1972 proposed a 650-mile

system of express bus routes serving four activity

centers (the Seattle and Bellevue CBD’s, the

Duwamish industrial area, and the University

District) from a series of transfer points

throughout the region. The transfer points were to

be served by local buses and many would have parkand-ride facilities.

The new system was estimated to cost $95.19

million, with new buses, park-and-ride facilities,

and freeway bus stops being the largest budget

items. Fares would be low to encourage patronage,

and revenues were not expected to meet operating

costs. Fare box revenues were to be supplemented

by a 0.3 percent local retail sales tax plus matching

State funds from a motor vehicle excise tax as

provided for by the 1969 legislation. In addition,

Federal and State gas tax funds were to be used for

highway-related facilities in the plan, and UMTA

capital grants were to be a source for buses and

other facilities not covered by the highway-related

funds.

PSGC took a more active role in leading this third

round of the transit planning process. For the 1972

plan, PSGC supplied population, employment, and

land use forecasts, and calculated the trip generation and distribution data. The data developed by

PSGC indicate a much slower growth in the region.

Two alternative bus systems were tested, one

CBD-focused and one multicentered. The multicentered alternative that was chosen, although it

Seattle’s transit system includes priority treatment for buses

23
does not give the highest quality service to the

CBD, achieves the highest ridership overall. In

comparison, previous plans sought to achieve the

political goal serving the CBD.

This time, with only a 50 percent vote required,

the transit scheme won approval. Financing

required to implement the short-term bus transit

improvement program was approved in public

referendum, and Metro was authorized to develop

and operate the region’s public transit system.

CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER

THE LONG-RANGE PLAN

Since 1972, differences in opinion have resulted

in rivalries between PSGC and Metro over the

future of rail transit in the Seattle region. The

Metro leaders still consider the bus plan to be an

interim measure, designed to take advantage of

UMTA’s willingness to finance bus systems. The

PSGC, which has an advantage over Metro in that

it is charged with receiving and dispersing DOT

funds, neither recommends nor specifically excludes rail transit.

Since 1972, Metro and PSGC have competed for

major roles in mass transit planning. The agencies

agree that the Seattle region can best be served by a

range of technologies to be implemented

incrementally and designed to meet specific transit

needs in specific parts of the region. But their

different orientations have led them to focus on

different issues in their attempts to define their

respective roles.

Metro, as the present transit operator, believes

the main issue concerns the types of transit

technology most appropriate for Seattle’s longterm transit needs. Metro leaders consider the 1972

bus plan to be an interim measure designed to take

advantage of UMTA’s willingness to finance bus

systems. They argue that in the long run some

form of automated transit technology will be

needed to diminish the bus system’s high operating

costs. Metro favors the provision of a range of

technologies to meet different service needs

throughout the region. It now has a study of transit

technology systems underway whose goal is to

develop a general plan, with strategies on how to

achieve it incrementally.

The Puget Sound Council of Governments

(PSCOG) 31 is most concerned with the broader

JI The puget Sound Government] Conference recently came

to be known as the Puget Sound Conference of Governments.

2 4

issues such as how the capacity, speed, and location

of a transit system are linked to land development

intensity and timing issues. PSCOG’s current longrange transportation plan calls for exclusive bus

lanes on both highways and arteries, although it

does not rule out fixed-guideway systems. The

long-range plan is basically an extension of the

policies in the adopted short-range transportation

plan, which deals with the 1972-80 period. In

addition to this conventional system, PSCOG staff

have given serious attention to such new

technology concepts as an automated small-vehicle

CBD distribution network that would move people

and goods and perhaps double as the solid waste

collection system.

In the past year, this jurisdictional dispute has

been overridden by the issue of how to use the

funds allocated for the construction of Interstate

Highway 90. The decision to include some kind of

exclusive transitway in the proposed I-90 freeway

is several years old, PSCOG initiated accelerated

studies on several options, including variations on

the Highway Department’s transit-freeway

scheme. One proposal endorsed by Seattle’s Mayor

Wes Uhlman involves electrified buses operating in

tunnels under a pedestrian mall on either Third of

Fourth Street in the CBD. The downtown tunnel

would be linked by a busway to I-90. Other options

that include constructing I-90 call for including rail

in the freeway design and for including transit

lanes in both Lake Washington bridges, with only a

modest expansion of highway capacity compared to

the original WSHD scheme done in the early

1950’s. Options that include no highway or busway

improvements in the I-90 corridor stress fixedguideway transit alternatives such as trolley or rail.

The amount of money at stake—$500 million—

means that the decision on what to do with I-90

funds will be very important in shaping the longrun future of transit in Seattle. It seems unlikely

that a decision not to build I-90 in any form will be

taken.

Since the potential of massive amounts of

funding was infused into the transit debate, the

situation in the Seattle region has become very

fluid. At best, this new potential has catalyzed fresh

thought and has returned rail transit to the front of

people’s minds. At worst, the pressure to come up

with a plan quickly could mean that the region will

commit itself to a plan or a technology that has not

been adequately thought through.
Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1884

1889

1892

1901

1918

1939

1952

1953

1955

1956

The first horse-drawn street railway

was constructed.

The first cable car line was placed in

operation and electrification of transit

begun.

By this year over 70 miles of track in

Seattle and West Seattle were operating

under management of over a dozen

different companies.

Stone and Webster, a Boston engineering firm and owner of the largest electric

power company in Seattle area, received

permission to acquire all transit companies in the area and create a monopoly.

The city of Seattle purchased the

portions of the transit system within its

borders from Stone and Webster.

Seattle’s three-man Transit Commission was established to operate the

Seattle system.

James Ellis led a campaign to restructure

King County to provide for home rule

and authority for metropolitanwide

improvements. The proposal was

defeated.

The Washington State Toll Bridge

Authority was authorized to construct

the Central Freeway as a toll facility.

The Seattle Transit Commission’s request for inclusion of rapid transit

facilities in the median of the proposed

Central Freeway was denied by the Toll

Authority.

Following passage of the Federal-Aid

Highway Act, responsibility for construction of the Central Freeway was

transferred to the Washington State

Highway Department.

The Metropolitan Problems Advisory

Committee, chaired by Jim Ellis, was

appointed by the mayor of Seattle and

the Board of King County Commissioners.

1957 In January, the Seattle Planning Commission issued a report recommending

transit on the Central Freeway.

In February, Seattle Mayor Gordon

Clinton appointed a committee to consider rapid transit operation on the

Central Freeway.

In April, the Transit Commission

published a report recommending

future rail provisions on the Central

Freeway with interim use by express

bus.

In June, in response to recommendations

of the Metropolitan Problems Advisory

Committee, the State legislature passed

the Metropolitan Municipal Corporation Act, which enabled the establishment of corporations for solving

metropolitanwide problems.

In October, the Puget Sound Regional

Transportation Committee was formed

to determine the scope and procedures

for a regional comprehensive transportation study.

In November, pursuant to the State

enabling legislation, a new citizens’

organization chaired by Jim Ellis, the

Metropolitan Council Action Committee, began a major promotional campaign supporting creation of a municipal

corporation for the Seattle area.

The Puget Sound Governmental Conference was created by the elected

officials of King, Kitsap, Pierce, and

Snohomish Counties to serve as the

area’s Voluntary Council o f

Governments.

1958 In March, the Metro concept, covering

sewage disposal, public transportation,

and comprehensive planning, was

25
presented to the voters. It failed to pass

by a small margin of 16,000 votes out of

187,000 votes cast.

In September, voters approved a

stripped-down Metro as a singlefunction agency responsible for sewage

disposal.

In October, the Puget Sound Regional

Transportation Committee employed

Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Hall and MacDonald to determine the scope and

procedures of the proposed comprehensive transportation study.

1959 In April, the final report of Parsons,

Brinkerhoff, Hall and MacDonald was

submitted.

1960 In July, the prospectus of the proposed

study was approved by the Technical

Committee of the Puget Sound Regional

Transportation Committee.

Later that year, John Mladinov became

director of the Puget Sound Regional

Transportation Study (PSRTS). A

delegation of civic groups requested that

Mladinov consider rail rapid transit as

part of the basic transportation

network, Mladinov was not cooperative.

1961 In October, the Metropolitan Transportation Committee, including Jim Ellis,

was created to determine the best means

to provide rapid transit for the Seattle

area.

1962 In February, in response to the

Metropolitan Transportation Committee’s recommendation that Metro

should perform the transit function, a

promotional committee was formed

called Citizens’ Committee for Metro

Transit.

In September, despite an intensive

campaign, a measure to include public

transportation as a function of Metro

was again defeated by the voters.

1964 In June, after the city leaders’ dissatisfaction with the PSRTS transit efforts,

PSGC authorized DeLeuw, Cather &

Company to undertake a transit study

and recommend a regional transit plan.

In November, DeLeuw issued its first

interim report, recommending that

rapid transit facilities be incorporated

into a Lake Washington bridge (the I-90

Bridge).

1965 In November, DeLeuw, Cather issued

its second interim report on the feasibility of rapid transit operation in the

Seattle area. It recommended a two-line

transit system connecting the CBD to

the northeast portion of the city and to

Bellevue. A Rapid Transit Advisory

Committee, appointed by , Mayor

Braman and headed by Jim Ellis, endorsed the plan, and PSGC adopted it as

an element of a total regional transportation plan.

Also in November, Jim Ellis spoke before

the Seattle Rotary Club and called for

the creation of Forward Thrust to

coordinate the finance of needed

metropolitanwide capital im -

provements. Rapid transit, a sports

stadium, arterial street improvements,

parks and open space, and urban

redevelopment were suggested to be

considered as part of a unified 10-year

capital program.

1966 In March, Mayor James D. Braman and

King County Commissioner Scott

Wallace appointed a committee to select

a Forward Thrust Committee.

In April, the PSRTS summary report

was issued. The report concluded that

no strong recommendation could be

made for rapid transit.

In July, the newly appointed Forward

Thrust Committee of 200 was called

together for its first meeting. During

the same month PSGC contracted with

DeLeuw, Cather to refine the transit

plan and determine if additional routes

would be required.

From September to December, meetings

of the Forward Thrust Committee were

held to conduct background surveys of

capital needs of the metropolitan area.

1967 Between January and April, Forward

Thrust sponsored legislation necessary

to carry out its programs. Eighteen bills

26
were passed, including one permitting

Metro to do planning for a comprehensive public transportation system.

From April to October, Forward Thrust

analyzed previously recommended improvement programs in relation to

funding availability and established

priorities.

In June, DeLeuw, Cather was contracted

by Metro to conduct a number of

detailed studies on the transit plan and

to broaden the scope of its study to take

into consideration architecture, urban

design, economic, and other factors not

previously covered.

In October, after an endorsement by a

blue-ribbon consultant review board,

DeLeuw, Cather published the transit

plan.

In November, Forward Thrust began its

promotional campaign for its 12 bond

issues. The rapid transit proposal was

the biggest cost-item—$385 million out

of the $819 million total.

1968 On February 13, 7 of the 12 Forward

Thrust bond issues received voter

approval. Although transit received

support of 51 percent of the voters, it

failed to get the 60 percent approval

required for it to pass.

In March, the Forward Thrust Committee began a second effort to secure

approval of the entire program.

From September through December,

background surveys were again conducted to reassess capital improvements

needs.

1969 Between January and March, eight State

bills sponsored by Forward Thrust were

passed. One provided Metro and State

financial assistance for mass transit.

In March, DeLeuw, Cather & Company,

this time retained under a contract

signed by the city of Seattle and Metro,

completed a comparative analysis of

alternative transportation systems and

again recommended the bus-rail concept.

1970 Between January and February,

Forward Thrust successfully sponsored

five pieces of State legislation.

On February 19, a report was published

by DeLeuw, Cather documenting the

modified 1967 transit plan.

On May 19, four Forward Thrust

propositions totaling $615.5 million

were presented to the voters, with

transit at a cost of $440 million being the

largest. All four proposals were defeated

due largely to poor local economic

conditions resulting from huge layoffs

at Boeing. Transit received a supporting

vote of only 46 percent. After the

election, the Forward Thrust organization was disbanded.

On September 8, the “Blue-Streak”

demonstration express bus service went

into service. It utilized priority freeway

access and was well received.

1971 In September, UMTA approved a $447, -

000 study requested by the PSGC.

PSGC employed Daniel, Mann, Johnson

& Mendenhall to prepare a short-term

bus plan that would not require bonded

indebtedness.

1972 On September 19, voters approved an

0.3 percent sales tax that provided funds

for Metro to take over the Seattle

Transit System, to buy out the suburban

Metropolitan Transit Corporation, and

to provide improvements in service and

equipment as spelled out in the PSGC

plan.

1973 On January 1, Metro began operating

the transit system.

In September, Metro introduced a free

downtown area zone stimulating intraCBD travel.

1974 PSGC and Metro signed a cooperation

agreement spelling out their respective

● roles. However, rivalries and competition between the two agencies continued.

Metro put out a request for proposals to

develop an incremental approach to

long-term transit planning.

27
1975 After much difficulty in trying to obtain planning in the Seattle area. Still at issue

PSGC approval, Metro initiated its long- is whether or not to build the highway

term transit planning approach. facility and whether or not to provide

new transit service across the lake. Also

Controversy over the I-90 Lake at issue is what kind of transit is to be

Washington crossing continued to provided (if any), and how its entrance

highlight the battles over transportation into the CBD is to be handled.

28
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Until the past several years, the transit decisionmaking process in Seattle was unique among the

nine cases because it took place outside the official

channels of government. The preeminent role of

Forward Thrust, an organization composed of civic

and business leaders, raised questions of accountability even though the participants represented a

broad range of Seattle’s interest groups and public

spokesmen. With the disbandment of Forward

Thrust in 1970 and the successful short-range bus

proposal in 1972, transit planning responsibilities

passed to the more conventional forum provided by

the transit agency Metro and the regional council of

governments. However, that forum has been

troubled by conflict over decisionmaking

prerogatives. Recent events demonstrate that the

city still exerts a major influence over regional

decisionmaking, and that the Governor may be

becoming a more important participant.

Forum for Decisionmaking

The history of transit planning and decisionmaking in Seattle has been played out within the

context of movements for civic improvements,

primarily due to the influence of Jim Ellis. Ellis,

although he has never held office in any major

official position, was the creative force behind two

of the three organizations that have provided the

forum for transit decisionmaking in Seattle. (He

was involved with Metro and Forward Thrust; less

so with the Puget Sound Governmental Conference.)

Improved public transportation was one of Ellis’

original goals by the time of the first referendum

vote on Metro in 1957. Although voters gave

Metro power over water treatment, they refused to

grant transit authority. Subsequently, as the State

Highway Commission and the Puget Sound

Regional Transportation Study continued to stress

auto transportation, a series of citizens’ committees

was developed to provide more suitable forums for

transit advocacy. After another attempt to empower Metro to deal with transit failed in 1962,

Assessment of the Planning and

Decisionmaking Process

transit advocates turned to the city of Seattle and

PSGC. The new transit forces flexed their muscles

when the DeLeuw, Cather transit plan they had

influenced the city to commission, met the

highway-oriented Puget Sound Regiona l

Transportation Study (PSRTS) with the result that

the head of the PSRTS left the Seattle area under

city pressure.

In calling for the establishment of Forward

Thrust in 1965, Ellis once again surfaced as a

moving force in creating a new institutional

mechanism (as he had done in Metro). Although

these two institutions differed vastly in form,

purpose, and authority, they were alike in that they

both were designed to achieve the momentum

necessary to effect Ellis’ goals (although neither

actually has the authority to do so directly). By

1968, Forward Thrust, which considered transit

the key to its effort, was making the basic transit

decisions in the Seattle area.

Over a period of time the Puget Sound

Governmental Conference (PSGC) began to seek a

stronger role. There were several structural

problems with the PSGC. Its four-county jurisdiction was too broad and contained too many diverse

interests to reflect any concrete power base, and it

lacked the ability to tax. Its strength was derived

from Federal acts that gave it the responsibility for

review, regionwide coordination, preparation of a

comprehensive plan, 3-C transportation planning

responsibilities, and A-95 responsibility for reviewing funding applications.

Although PSGC (now PSCOG) has been gaining

recognition as a forum, it was Metro that gained

the support of Seattle’s political leadership as the

key transit organization after the termination of

Forward Thrust. Metro has certain structural

advantages over PSCOG. It has the means to carry

out plans, once approved, and a membershi p more

cohesive than PSCOG’s because it is limited to the

more immediate Seattle metropolitan area (King

County). As of 1973, it became the sole transit

operator in the Seattle area, with the power and the

tax base to implement transit improvements.

29
Although the PSGC and Metro signed a

cooperative agreement that attempted to spell out

their respective roles in 1974, rivalry between the

two agencies continues, especially in the area of

long-range transit system planning. PSCOG claims

a lead role in long-range planning because it wants

to strengthen the relationship between transit and

land use planning (which is its responsibility);

Metro claims a lead role because it wants longrange plans to reflect technological considerations

(because they affect transit operations and cost,

which are at the center of Metro’s concerns).

Evidence that PSGC is not an agreed-upon forum

is provided by the fact that it became necessary to

establish a new mechanism for allocation of Federal

Urban Systems highway funds. PSGC wanted a

major role in the allocation of these funds. Metro

did not seek the basic role but proposed a special

board. The Urban Systems Board, for which PSGC

provided the staff, was accepted by the Highway

Commission on the condition that it be advisory.

The mayor, the King County executive, and other

major elected officials participate on the board, and

it seems to be working well: about 50 percent of the

Urban Systems money for the area is now being

allocated to transit projects.

The recent proposal to package a downtown bus

subway in a revised plan for Interstate 90 reflects

another level of conflict, this one involving the

center city interests on the one hand, and the rural

and suburban interests on the other hand. The

conflict had been implicit in the earlier

developments in Seattle’s transit planning. The two

plans developed under the leadership of Forward

Thrust emphasized the importance of downtown

revitalization, and they were strongly backed by

Seattle’s political leadership. In contrast, the plan

approved in 1972 was developed under the

guidance from the Puget Sound Governmental

Conference and proposed relatively higher levels of

service to rural and suburban areas (and less than

maximum service to the CBD). The I-90 plan

differs from these earlier plans because it is more

limited and CBD-oriented in scope. Inasmuch as

the plan would directly affect regional transportation, however, it can be considered a regional issue.

Nevertheless, the plan was shaped behind closed

doors by the mayor and the Governor. PSCOG, the

federally designated forum for transportation

planning, was not informed of the project until the

proposal had been developed.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

For a long time, Seattle businessmen and

community leaders dominated transit planning

through quasi-governmental channels. There was

little direct accountability to voters. Accountability

to decisionmakers increased when Metro and

PSGC became the dominant forces in transit

planning after 1970, although the city has continued to exert an important influence.

Forward Thrust, the most long-lived of the

quasi-governmental groups of civic activists and

businessmen, has been termed a vigilante

government—a perhaps overly pejorative term

considering that it worked largely in the open,

made attempts to include all major opinion-shapers

and established interest groups and generally

carried on its work through high minded

volunteers who saw themselves as working in the

public interest. Nonetheless, Forward Thrust was

basically an elite group performing functions and

making decisions that are normally considered the

responsibility of government.

One question of accountability arose over the

issue of whom Forward Thrust represented. An

examination of the membership of the Forward

Thrust Committee of 200 shows that a majority of

the participants were from the downtown business

community. Labor, the university community, and

various conservative groups all at some time

opposed what some considered “an organization of

organization men.” Forward Thrust’s proposals

tended to give priority to CBD routes most vital to

downtown business.

Today the two organizations that compete for

decisionmaking authority (Metro and PSCOG) are

more accountable to the voter because they are

governed primarily by elected officials, because

their meetings are open and publicized, and because

their decisionmaking processes are governed by

rules that assure a formal opportunity for public

involvement (e.g., public hearings). Metro is

governed by a 37-member council, composed of the

King County executive and the nine county

commissioners, the mayor of Seattle and the nine

city councilmen, another official of the city, six

representatives of cities over 15,000 in population,

six persons from unincorporated areas of King

County, one representative from cities in the

county with populations of less than 15,000, one

delegate from Metro’s component sewer districts,

and a chairman elected by other members of the

30
Metro council.32 The PSCOG has an executive

board comprised of the conference chairman, the

vice chairman, and not fewer than one representative from each member county, one from each

member central city, and two representatives from

the combined membership. 33

Metro is more representative, more closely

approximating the one-man one-vote concept,

while PSCOG’s votes are distributed fairly evenly

to each member unit of government. Metro is

dominated by the city, and, because its concern has

always been with the city, it tends to support

transit plans that provide greater service to the core

area.

The PSCOG board, also composed of elected

officials, gives more voice to areas outside the city.

Therefore it is not surprising to find that it tends to

move in the direction of a bus system more suitable

for large, fairly low-density areas than a rail transit

system.

A final issue of accountability of the transit

planning process in the past has been the tendency

to enlarge proposed new systems to provide service

to all voters. The plans presented in the 1968 and

1970 referenda proposed extensive transit systems

in an attempt to lure the vote in all corridors of the

city and suburban areas. However, analysis of the

vote shows that many suburban areas did not

support the transit proposals because they felt they

were getting less than their share of service.

Public Involvement

Community participation programs have become

increasingly concerned with involving citizens

from the beginning in the early stages of the

planning process.

During the campaign before the 1968 referendum, Forward Thrust kept in touch with citizens

through telephone surveys, doorbelling, and

presentations to local groups. The strength of the

1968 program was its intensity. It was easy to get

access to information about the Thrust Proposals.

Its drawback was that it was not a true community

involvement approach but an attempt to “sell” an

idea to a passive public.

During the second (1970) campaign, Forward

Thrust held meetings in 16 separate communities.

The two important points resulting from these

32 Co]cord, op. cit., 71.

33 Ibid., p. 72.

meetings both had to do with short-term transit

improvements. Citizens stressed the need to

provide adequate transportation service in areas

that would not be served by rail. They also stressed

the importance of providing immediate bus service

improvements while the regional rail system was

under construction. While the plan presented to

voters in 1970 reflected these recommendations—

it included short-term bus improvements and more

extensive bus coverage than had been proposed in

1968—it nevertheless went too far in the opposite

direction—with a proposal for an expensive rail

system—to win the necessary votes.

The drawback of the 1970 program was that

citizen input into the planning process was

primarily limited to refining the rail plan. This

indicates a major weakness of the Forward Thrust

approach generally, when viewed from the standpoint of current standards. Forward Thrust was

not an unbiased funnel for citizen input. It was a

private organization with a well-defined goal of

providing Seattle with a rail transit system.

Following the rejections of the rail plan in 1968

and 1970, the consultants preparing the 1972 plan

carried out an extensive effort to get community

participation into the process. The Metro Transit

Liaison Committee, composed of appointed public

officials, transportation agency personnel, and

representatives of areawide citizen and civic

groups, advised policy makers at their semimonthly

public meetings. This committee, which met

throughout the study, was supplemented by

additional citizen participation through community

meetings held in each of 10 areas of the county.

These attempted to involve citizens in the planning

process from the beginning. Community input was

enlisted in five phases of the planning process: goal

formulation, alternative system selection, tentative

recommended plan, the recommended plans and

the recommended financial plan, and phasing. The

effort paid off when voters approved the plan in the

1972 referendum.

Citizen involvement in the transit planning

process today is more widespread but also more

diffuse, since each major participating agency or

unit of government—Metro, PSCOG, City of

Seattle, WSHD, and King County—has its own

citizen involvement program. However, since the

forum for transit decisionmaking is not well

defined and competition among many of these

31
agencies continues, it is difficult to say how or

when a participation program will be incorporated

into decisionmaking.

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

Goals and Objectives

Forward Thrust lent to Seattle’s transit movement a vision of the goal to be achieved through

mass transit. It sought to provide a high capacity

transit system as one of the means to improve the

region’s business and cultural center. In the words

of James Ellis, “Transportation facilities . . . (are) a

useful tool for urban design."34 Ellis was explicit

about the nature of the environment he sought to

achieve: a pattern “which permits both open space

and dense development . . . (a pattern) of high-rise

structures and . . . grade-separated . . . transportation.”35 The interest in transit Ellis gave to Forward

Thrust stemmed from a well-defined vision of the

city.

By 1970, Forward Thrust’s vision was badly in

need of repair. Huge layoffs at Boeing had turned

Seattle from a prosperous city into one of neardepression. Yet Forward Thrust’s transit program,

instead of economizing, got a little larger and more

expensive. One of the strongest arguments that

Forward Thrust’s opponents voiced during the

1970 campaign was that the transit plan was based

on overly optimistic growth projections.

Some aspects of controversy over Forward

Thrust’s goals centered on the strongly implied

assumption that what was good for the downtown

business community was good for Seattle. The two

rail plans had provided priority rail service to CBDoriented trips; public transportation for most other

trips was not to be improved. In the 1972 plan, this

bias disappeared as the goal of serving the

downtown business community lost its

preeminence.

Development and Evaluation

of Alternatives

The evaluation of alternatives in Seattle’s two

major rail transit planning studies assumed overly

optimistic population projections, especially for the

CBD. This fact, coupled with lack of serious

consideration of low-capital bus alternatives, led to

overly extensive, CBD-focused rail proposals,

The predictions of rapid growth for the Seattle

area, based on the projected employment of the

Boeing Company, were reasonable when they first

were used in 1967. However, the Boeing work

force, which grew from 60,000 in 1966 to 93,000 in

1967 and 101,000 in 1969, plummeted in January

1971 to 46,800. 36 One of the mandates of the 1970

DeLeuw, Cather plan was to take into account this

population growth. It is ironic that by the time this

contract was let, the decline had begun. The

overblown population forecasts were much berated

by critics of the 1970 transit plan. However, these

outdated projections were used to project densities

heavy enough to justify rail routes, a practice that

led to an overly extensive system designed to be

attractive to the suburbs. By 1972, the PSGC

developed data that indicated a much slower

growth in the region.

In the first two studies, the growth forecasts

favored systems that offered service to the CBD. It

was an explicit goal of the 1967 study to design a

transit system that would serve the CBD, and the

study assumed a large percentage of the region’s

trips would be oriented to the CBD. The 1970 plan,

although it proposed 240 more miles of busway, did

not substantially change this focus on the CBD.

A group of professors at the University of

Washington questioned this orientation, arguing

that the projections assumed too high a concentration of employment, particularly in the downtown,

and that the system would primarily benefit

downtown landowners and higher-income commuters from distant suburbs, who would be using

the system to get to work downtown.

Another shortcoming of the first two studies was

their failure to seriously consider low-cost bus

alternatives to the rail systems. Alternatives

analysis was in many aspects limited to a comparison of the automobile as the alternative to rail,

with no mention of a bus option. When all three

modes were compared, the bus system used for

comparison was essentially the existing system,

with no major improvements. The bus system was

judged preferable to the rail system from a cost

standpoint but was considered unacceptable in

other ways. The report pictured buses hampered by

downtown congestion unless exclusive bus lanes

were provided and then never mentioned the

possibility of bus lanes again. This stood out in

SJ Ellis, op. cit., p. 5.

35 Ibid., p. 6.

32

M Co[cord, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
sharp contrast to the optimistic estimates of riders

attracted by comfortable and fast rail service.

DeLeuw, Cather’s 1970 plan included a long

discussion of alternatives. After mentioning many

possible systems, the report settled on four for

further analysis: buses in mixed traffic, all-bus

system with metered freeways, all-bus system with

busways, and combined bus and rail rapid transit.

However, all the less costly solutions were discarded, and it was assumed, without apparent justification, that the only feasible bus solution would

require grade-separated rights-of-way in the five

major activity centers in order to avoid serious

conflicts with other transportation modes. This

skyrocketed the cost of a bus system to over $350

million more than the rail system.

The capital costs were assumed to be the same for

the busrail system and the all-busway system, but

operating costs were higher for the busway (this

was partially due to the assumption that labor costs

were expected to inflate at a greater rate than other

costs).

Other technical questions about th e

thoroughness of the 1970 analysis of rail alternatives were raised by analysis done by volunteer

technicians under guidance from a Boeing executive. Their studies showed the possibility of

reducing the costs of a rail system as much as 25

percent if alternative lighter vehicle types of

technology were used. This information would

have carried far greater weight had it been part of

the material made available by Forward Thrust; as

it was, Forward Thrust opposed public discussion

of the issue. This reluctance reflects poorly on the

quality of work on evaluation of alternatives.

The 1972 study examined only bus alternatives

because it was felt that only a bus system could get

the required voter approval for its funding. The

limitation of the study to relatively low-capital

alternatives did not imply a permanent rejection of

more costly fixed-guideways alternatives—this

study was clearly defined as a short-range transit

improvement plan. But for the short-term, two bus

systems were examined: a CBD-oriented system

and a multicenter concept. The first system was

able to generate more transit trips to the CBD

(52,891 versus 52,164) but the multicenter system

generated more transit trips to almost every other

location and generated a much larger total number

of transit trips (190,376 versus 245,250). The CBDfocused system generated much more revenue and

had a much smaller operating deficit but cost

almost $29 million more in capital costs (parking

spaces, freeway stops, more bus lanes, and an

additional CBD terminal). The multicenter concept

was chosen as a result of this thoroughly competent analysis.

A final characteristic of each of the alternatives

analyses in Seattle was their lack of breadth. As was

customary for analysis in its time, there was no

evaluation of environmental impacts and little of

the economic impact of the proposed transit

systems. The bulk of the analysis concerned transit

ridership figures or costs.

Financing and Implementation

The expection of Federal funds probably has

influenced Seattle’s transit planners to design more

expensive systems than they would have

otherwise. The necessity of providing local

matching funds through bond issues on sales tax

also has influenced the transit system design.

Seattle’s two proposals for rail systems (in 1968

and 1970) were formulated in the expectation that

UMTA would provide two-thirds of the cost, with

local funding providing the other third. A number

of critics, among them the group of professors from

the University of Washington who had opposed the

1970 rail system proposal, claimed that the promise

of UMTA money encouraged planners to design

overly expensive transit systems. The expectation

of Federal money has also been a dominant factor in

the design of rapid transit systems since 1970. In

1972, it was a conscious policy to propose a bus

system instead of a rail system because UMTA was

enthusiastic about bus systems. (This strategy was

proven effective when UMTA reacted by approving the largest bus system improvement grant

in its history. ) The availability of Federal money

continues to be a dominant influence on mass

transit in the Seattle region: the current flurry of

alternative transit schemes is a direct result of the

potential of using Federal highway money (from I90) for transit purposes.

In Seattle, the issue of Federal funds has until

1972 been academic because of the planners’

inability to raise local matching funds through

bonding. Local financing considerations have had

as much or more influence on the extent and mode

of proposed transit systems as has Federal action.

The need for 60 percent of the voters to approve

bonding to finance the local matching funds for the

rapid rail transit proposals of 1968 and 1970

33
influenced the design of the proposals. One of the The proposed bus improvement plan of 1972

reasons for enlarging the two-line system original- won nearly 60 percent of the voters (although only

ly proposed in 1965 was to attract voters who 50 percent was needed). The vote showed that a

otherwise would not have been served. This plan short-term plan designed to meet an immediate

backfired when the extensive system presented to need was more effective in attracting support than

voters was opposed because it was too expensive. an extensive long-term system had been.

34
Summary Case Assessment

The purpose of this section is to summarize the

transit planning decisionmaking process in the

Seattle region in light of the guidelines listed in the

Introduction to the case assessments. The summary, therefore, divided into two parts: (1)

Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2)

Assessment of the Technical Planning Work.

1. ASSESSMENT OF THE

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

. Forum for Decisionmaking.—During the

late 1960’s, Forward Thrust made the basic

policy decisions in mass transit planning

for Seattle. Since 1970, Metro and the

Puget Sound Council of Governments

(PSCOG) have competed for major responsibilities in transit planning. However, the

city of Seattle continues to exert a strong

influence.

. Accountability of Decisionmakers.—In

the late 1960’s transit planning was

dominated by a quasi-governmental elite of

businessmen and civic leaders who,

although they attempted to involve all

public interests, were not directly accountable to the public. Today, the two dominant forces in transit planning—Metro and

PSCOG—are composed of officials who

are elected for local positions. They can be

held accountable to the public for their

actions as they affect each locality, but they

are not accountable for regional decisions.

Metro, whose board reflects the one-man,

one-vote principle, is more representative

of the region’s interests than PSCOG,

whose board gives equal representation to

lightly populated rural towns as to the city

of Seattle.

. Public Involvement.—The public has been

involved in Seattle transit decisions

throughout the 15-year period of recent

history, at least in the sense that financing

depended on voter approval. There has

been less public involvement in the ongoing planning process. While Forward

Thrust conducted community meetings,

many basic decisions had already been fixed

by an elite leadership group of downtown

interests. The 1972 planning process,

following a broader citizen participation

effort, achieved support for the idea of

improving the rapidly deteriorating existing transit system. Although agencies

have improved avenues for citizen involvement today, the confusion over planning

responsibilities makes it difficult to know

which channels for participation will be

most effective.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE

TECHNICAL PROCESS

● Goals and Objectives.—Transit proposals

in Seattle have been part of a comprehensive program of municipal improvements

based on explicit goals for the city. The

program’s goals were based on very

optimistic estimates of Seattle’s growth,

estimates that began to divorce goals from

reality as layoffs at Boeing created a neardepression in the Seattle area.

. Development and Evaluation of

Alternatives.— A rail rapid transit concept

had been chosen as a matter of policy by

downtown-oriented civic leaders in the

early 1960’s. Subsequent planning was

carried out to prove the feasibility of CBDoriented rail transit and show its superiority in relation to other alternatives. After

defeat of the rail plans in 1968 and 1970, a

bus scheme was sought and rail was not

considered an alternative, since bonded

indebtedness was to be avoided. Currently,

a variety of technological alternatives are

under consideration as part of a flexible,

incremental planning approach.

. Financing and Implementation.—Transit

planning was strongly influenced by the

35
nature of the available financing, which interest in transit, a plan that backfired

was dependent on UMTA support and when voters rejected the expensive

voter approval. The early transit systems proposals. More recent proposals have

were made large in order to provide a stressed immediate short-term transit

maximum number of voters with a direct needs, with more success.

o

36