IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30521

MICHAEL YOUNG,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SANDY MCCAIN, WARDEN, RAYMOND LABORDE CORRECTIONAL 

CENTER, in official & individual capacity; MATTHEW GAMBLE, Treating 

Psychiatrist, in official & individual capacity; TIM CRAWFORD, Major, in 

official & individual capacity; AMY STOGNER,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:16-CV-3404

Before SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Young, Louisiana prisoner # 456140, appeals the district court’s

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

civil rights action against various prison officials. For the reasons discussed 

below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, and DENY Young’s 

motions for appointment of counsel and oral argument.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 14, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

In 2016, Young—who was housed at the Rayburn Correctional Center 

(RCC) in Angie, Louisiana—filed a pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP) § 1983 

suit against four RCC staff members, namely Warden Sandy McCain; treating 

psychiatrist Dr. Matthew Gamble; correctional officer Major Tim Crawford; 

and social worker Amy Stogner. In his second amended and superseding 

complaint, Young alleged that Stogner and Dr. Gamble, who were both aware 

of his history of mental problems, subjected him to unconstitutionally cruel 

and unusual punishment by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious 

medical needs during September 2015, when Young was suicidal due to his 

mother’s terminal illness. Specifically, Young alleged that, although he advised 

Stogner that he was suicidal, Stogner acted with “gross[] incompeten[ce]” by 

repeatedly downgrading him from extreme to standard suicide watch, which 

allowed him to harm himself by banging his head on a steel bed frame and the 

wall and by jumping from the toilet to the bed, thereby exacerbating a previous 

shoulder injury. Young further alleged that Dr. Gamble “grossly departed from 

[the] professional standard [of] treatment” by meeting with Young only briefly 

via videoconferencing before concluding that Young did not need treatment 

and was competent to participate in a September 17, 2015 disciplinary hearing 

arising from his attempts at self-harm. 

Young further asserted that Major Crawford and Warden McCain denied 

him due process because Major Crawford allowed the allegedly 

unconstitutional disciplinary hearing to proceed despite Young’s incompetence 

and because Warden McCain failed to overturn the results of those disciplinary 

proceedings. Young complained that Major Crawford and Warden McCain also 

subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment because his disciplinary 

sentence of 60 days in isolation, during which he was given only light clothing 

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and was not provided with a mattress and bedding during daytime hours, 

subjected him to conditions that aggravated his shoulder injury and intestinal 

problems. Young requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as 

compensatory and punitive damages from each defendant.

The defendants moved to dismiss Young’s action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted. The defendants also argued that they 

were entitled to qualified immunity because Young failed to allege sufficient 

facts supporting violation of a clearly established constitutional right or 

objectively unreasonable conduct in light of clearly established law. The 

defendants further asserted that Young’s § 1983 challenge to his disciplinary 

conviction, which resulted in the loss of good-time credits, was barred by Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because, if successful, it would necessarily 

imply the invalidity of a still-valid conviction. In response, Young argued that 

he had pled sufficient facts to state his claims, that the defendants were not 

entitled to qualified immunity, and that his claims were not Heck-barred 

because he was not challenging his loss of good-time credits and his success in 

this action would not affect his confinement.

The magistrate judge ordered defense counsel to furnish the court and 

Young with a copy of Young’s medical records, which total 1,478 pages in 

length. Once the records were filed and Young acknowledged receipt of them, 

the magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the defendants’ Rule 

12(b)(6) motion be granted. The magistrate judge determined that the medical 

records “f[e]ll far short of establishing the objective and subjective components 

needed to prevail on [claims] of deliberate indifference” against Stogner and 

Dr. Gamble. The magistrate judge concluded that the selection of an 

appropriate suicide precaution level is a matter of professional judgment, 

adding that neither Stogner’s alleged violation of a prison policy in 

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downgrading Young’s suicide precaution level nor Young’s disagreement with 

Dr. Gamble’s method of conducting brief evaluations by videoconference stated 

a claim of deliberate indifference. The magistrate judge further determined 

that the deprivation of an inmate’s mattress during daylight hours in 

disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that Young’s due process claims 

relating to the conduct of his disciplinary proceedings were Heck-barred 

because a favorable ruling on those claims would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his disciplinary conviction.

Young filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report, asserting, in 

pertinent part, that Stogner had acted maliciously in downgrading his suicide 

watch level and that such downgrades always happened during the work shift 

of a prison official, Lieutenant Rigdon, who (according to Young) falsely 

reported that Young had admitted to malingering to avoid a disciplinary 

hearing. Young also complained that the magistrate judge erred by resolving 

factual disputes and considering materials outside the complaint, such as his 

medical records. 

The district court overruled Young’s objections and adopted the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendation. Granting the defendants’ 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed Young’s suit with 

prejudice. Young timely appealed. The district court granted Young leave to 

proceed IFP on appeal.

II.

Young essentially raises four arguments on appeal. He contends that the 

district court erred in: (1) considering qualified immunity at the pre-answer 

stage of litigation; (2) determining that Young failed to state a claim for relief 

regarding his deliberate indifference claims against Stogner and Dr. Gamble; 

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(3) determining that Young failed to state a claim for relief regarding his cruel 

and unusual punishment claims against Major Crawford and Warden McCain; 

and (4) concluding that his entire suit is barred by Heck. Young has also filed 

motions for the appointment of counsel and oral argument.

This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss. McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2017). “To survive 

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “In reviewing the complaint, [this court] draw[s] all inferences in 

favor of the nonmoving party, and view[s] all facts and inferences in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” McLin, 866 F.3d at 688 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

A.

First, there is no merit to Young’s assertion that the district court erred 

by “prematurely” granting the defendants qualified immunity at the preanswer stage. The district court’s qualified immunity analysis focused upon 

only the first requirement for that defense—whether the plaintiff alleged a 

constitutional violation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 524 (5th 

Cir. 2004). As this court has acknowledged, if the plaintiff “has indeed failed 

to allege a [constitutional] violation, then of course there can be no violation of 

clearly established law that would overcome qualified immunity.” Id. at 530. 

Because the district court’s determination that Young failed to allege a 

constitutional violation is consistent with its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure 

to state a claim, Young has failed to show any error in this regard. 

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B.

Second, Young contends that the district court erred in dismissing his 

claims that Stogner and Dr. Gamble acted with deliberate indifference to his 

serious medical needs. In addition to renewing his factual allegations below 

against those defendants, Young asserts that the district court should have 

allowed him to conduct discovery, but instead improperly resolved factual 

disputes and failed to accept his allegations as true. Young complains that the 

district court went beyond considering whether his complaint stated a claim 

for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) and instead applied a standard more appropriate 

for summary judgment review.

“Where matters outside the pleadings are considered by the district court 

on a motion to dismiss, Rule 12[d] requires the court to treat the motion as one

for summary judgment and to dispose of it as required by [Federal] Rule [of 

Civil Procedure] 56.” Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1283-84 

(5th Cir. 1990). In the instant case, the district court did in fact rely, at least 

in part, on Young’s prison medical records in determining that his claims 

against Stogner and Dr. Gamble failed to establish deliberate indifference. 

Thus, with respect to these claims, the district court effectively converted the 

defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a summary judgment motion, thereby 

triggering the requisite procedural safeguards of notice and a reasonable time 

to respond. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); Washington, 901 F.2d at 1284.

It appears that Young received the requisite notice of the de facto 

conversion, at the latest, when the magistrate judge issued its report relying 

on the medical records. Furthermore, Young was provided a reasonable 

opportunity to respond by filing objections to the magistrate judge’s report. See

Washington, 901 F.2d at 1284. Additionally, while Young complains of an 

insufficient opportunity for discovery, he failed to properly request a 

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continuance explaining his inability to respond to the summary judgment 

motion, and his motion to compel discovery failed to show how additional 

discovery would have enabled him to rebut the movant’s summary judgment 

showing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); Washington, 901 F.2d at 1285-86 (applying 

abuse of discretion standard to the denial of a Rule 56(d) continuance request).

Consequently, we find no reversible error in the district court’s consideration 

of Young’s medical records in its ruling.

Young has likewise failed to establish that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claims that prison medical personnel acted with deliberate 

indifference in responding to his suicidal mental health condition. The Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment bars the 

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on a prisoner, and a § 1983 cause 

of action asserting an Eighth Amendment violation for a lack of proper inmate 

medical care requires “deliberate indifference” to the prisoner’s “serious 

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-05 (1976) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). The “extremely high standard” of 

deliberate indifference requires that prison officials “refused to treat [the 

prisoner], ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or 

engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard 

for any serious medical needs.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 

752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Allegations of unsuccessful medical treatment, negligence, neglect, medical 

malpractice, or a mistaken judgment do not amount to deliberate indifference 

to serious medical needs. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 

1991). “[T]he decision whether to provide additional treatment is a classic 

example of a matter for medical judgment.” Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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Young acknowledged in his complaint that his mental health condition 

was evaluated by Stogner and Dr. Gamble multiple times during his allegedly 

suicidal period in and around September 2015. Young’s allegations “address 

[more] the nature of his treatment and not the lack thereof.” Varnado, 920 F.2d 

at 321. Specifically, Young asserted that Stogner acted with gross 

incompetence and in violation of prison rules by placing him on standard, 

rather than extreme, suicide watch and that Dr. Gamble failed to exercise 

adequate professional judgment in determining via teleconference that 

Young’s problems related to his character and that he did not need mental 

health treatment. At most, Young’s complaint alleged that Stogner and 

Gamble acted with gross negligence in treating his mental health problems, 

which is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. See Doe v. United 

States, 831 F.3d 309, 320 (5th Cir. 2016). As this court has explained, “[s]uicide 

is inherently difficult . . . to predict, particularly in the depressing prison 

setting,” and an incorrect diagnosis regarding the genuineness of a suicide 

threat does not amount to deliberate indifference. Domino, 239 F.3d at 754-56 

(quote at 756). 

With respect to Young’s expanded assertions that Stogner acted with ill 

will and an injurious intent in concert with Lieutenant Rigdon, such 

allegations are conclusory and insufficient to state a claim. See Koch v. Puckett, 

907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting allegations of a collusive 

relationship as conclusory and insufficient to raise a constitutional issue). 

Additionally, as the district court found, Stogner’s alleged violation of prison 

rules in adjusting Young’s suicide threat level was not in itself a constitutional 

violation. See Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2009). Finally, 

with respect to his complaint regarding Dr. Gamble’s video-enabled evaluation, 

Young is merely expressing a disagreement with a diagnostic measure, which 

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“does not state a claim for Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs.” 

Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997). In sum, the district 

court did not err in dismissing Young’s deliberate indifference claims against 

Stogner and Dr. Gamble.

C.

Third, Young sets forth a scant argument appearing to renew his 

assertion that Major Crawford and Warden McCain subjected him to cruel and 

unusual punishment by placing him in injurious disciplinary confinement 

conditions. Specifically, Young complains that he was sentenced to “strip 

cell/isolation,” that he was deprived of a mattress, sheets, and blankets for 60 

days, and that in the fall and winter of 2015 he was given only “a very very 

light fabric material,” two undershirts, and two pairs of socks, and was not 

provided with a mattress and bedding between 5:30 a.m. and 8:30 p.m. each 

day. 

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under 

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” 

Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, the 

prisoner must demonstrate that the conditions of his confinement were “so 

serious as to deprive prisoners of the minimal . . . measure of life’s necessities, 

as when it denies the prisoner some basic human need,” and further, that the 

responsible prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s 

health or safety. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 665-66, 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1971), this 

court found no constitutional violation where the inmates in solitary 

confinement were given gowns and blankets, but were not provided mattresses 

or pillows, even during nighttime hours, for up to 15 days. Likewise, this court

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has affirmed dismissals of § 1983 challenges to isolation conditions as frivolous 

where an inmate was denied a mattress and bedding only during daytime 

hours for an unspecified number of days. See Hadwin v. Stadler, 196 F. App’x 

293, 293 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); Alex v. Stadler, 225 F. App’x 313, 314 

(5th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). Accordingly, Young has failed to show that the 

district court erred in dismissing his conditions of confinement claim based on 

his deprivation of a mattress and bedding. 

Additionally, Young has failed to allege exposure to the type of extremely 

cold conditions that have been deemed a denial of the minimal measure of life’s 

necessities. See Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding 

such a denial in light of the inmate’s “overnight outdoor confinement with no 

shelter, jacket, blanket, or source of heat as the temperature dropped and the 

wind blew along with the total lack of bathroom facilities for forty-nine inmates 

sharing a small bounded area”); Alex, 225 F. App’x at 314 (reciting prisoner’s 

nonfrivolous Eighth Amendment allegations that “he was held in very cold 

conditions, for an extended period in November and December, wearing 

nothing but a paper gown during the daytime, and that he was ordered to 

remain on the cold concrete whenever he attempted to sleep on the warmer,

metal bunk”). Young has failed to show that the district court erred in 

dismissing his conditions of confinement claim based on exposure to extreme 

cold. 

D.

Fourth and finally, Young asserts that his claims related to his 

disciplinary proceedings are not Heck-barred. However, Young expressly 

concedes in his reply brief that his due process claims relating to his 

disciplinary proceedings are not actionable (and he also clarifies that he was 

not alleging a due process claim against Dr. Gamble for certifying that he could 

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participate in the disciplinary hearing). Because Young does not challenge in 

this appeal the district court’s dismissal of his due process claims against 

Major Crawford and Warden McCain as barred by Heck, Young has abandoned 

this issue. See Davis v. Maggio, 706 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that 

“[c]laims not pressed on appeal are deemed abandoned”).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Young’s motions for 

appointment of counsel and oral argument are DENIED.

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