PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 22-4221

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JONG WHAN KIM, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:18-cr-00200-FL-1) 

Argued: May 5, 2023 Decided: June 20, 2023 

Before AGEE, Circuit Judge, TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge, and Henry E. HUDSON, 

Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by 

designation. 

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Traxler wrote in the opinion, in which Judge 

Agee and Judge Hudson joined. 

ARGUED: Michelle Ann Liguori, ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Andrew Kasper, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Scottie F. Lee, ELLIS & WINTERS 

LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States 

Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant 

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellee. 

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TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge:

Federal law prohibits the knowing or intentional distribution of a controlled 

substance “[e]xcept as authorized.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Jong Whan Kim, a medical doctor, 

pleaded guilty to multiple charges under § 841 for prescribing oxycodone and other

controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and without a 

legitimate medical need. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (“A prescription for a controlled 

substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual 

practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. . . .”). After Kim was 

sentenced, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 

(2022), which held that the statutory knowing-or-intentional mens rea applies not only to 

the distribution-related elements of the crime, but also to the question of authorization.

Accordingly, if a defendant charged under § 841 “produces evidence that he or she was 

authorized to dispense controlled substances, the Government must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he or she was acting in an unauthorized 

manner, or intended to do so.” Id. at 2375.

Before Ruan was decided, this circuit (and others) had held that whether a doctor’s 

actions were authorized was an objective inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 

F.3d 463, 479 (4th Cir. 2006). Because Ruan changed the law in this circuit, Kim contends 

that his guilty plea must be set aside because the district court did not inform him that the 

government would be required to prove that he knew he was acting in an unauthorized 

manner when issuing the challenged prescriptions. Kim also contends that the district court 

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failed to afford him an adequate opportunity to allocute before imposing sentence. Finding 

no reversible error, we affirm.

I.

Kim was born in South Korea in 1949. He joined the Korean military and fought

alongside American forces in the Vietnam war. He immigrated to the United States when 

he was 27. In Wisconsin, Kim got married and had three children. He worked in a factory 

and as a gardener to support his family. Kim obtained a bachelor’s degree from the 

University of Wisconsin in 1991 and received his medical degree in 1995.

After working for several years in a hospital in Pennsylvania, Kim was hired in 2002 

as a hospitalist in Elizabethtown, North Carolina. The hospital eventually became 

concerned about Kim’s practices for prescribing controlled substances. Hospital officials

met with Kim in December 2016 and informed him that his treatment notes did not justify 

the prescriptions he was issuing. Kim was given the option of complying with the hospital’s 

requirements or resigning; he chose to resign in March 2017.

After leaving the hospital, Kim began seeing patients at his home in Bladenboro, 

North Carolina. In the summer of 2017, the still-married Kim started dating Tammy 

Thompson, who then began helping Kim run his home-based medical practice.1 In 

1 Kim met Thompson in the early 2000s, when he was the primary care 

physician for Thompson’s then-husband. Thompson’s husband had been in an accident, 

and Kim prescribed him opiates in such large quantities that Thompson’s son became 

concerned.

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September 2017, Kim opened a medical clinic in Tabor City, North Carolina. Thompson 

was Kim’s business partner and served as the clinic’s office manager. 

The information in the record shows that the clinic operated as a classic pill mill. 

Beyond a scale, blood-pressure cuffs, and a stethoscope, there was no medical equipment 

at the clinic. Kim issued prescriptions for strong pain medication without reviewing the 

patient’s prior medical records and without performing a proper examination to determine 

if medication was required. Although the clinic did perform drug tests on new patients, 

the results were not properly documented in the patients’ files, and Kim issued 

prescriptions even if the patient failed the drug test.

The clinic saw between 35 and 40 patients a day, and those patients frequently 

reeked of marijuana. Thompson and her daughter, who also worked at the clinic, would 

sometimes let a particular person (who was not a patient) bring a group of prospective 

patients to the clinic, and Kim would issue prescriptions to the group. Patients who brought 

other prospective patients would be seen more quickly. All patients paid in cash (usually 

$200), regardless of insurance status, and clinic employees were also paid in cash. The cash 

paid by the patients was placed by clinic employees in one of two lock boxes. At the end 

of each day, Thompson would gather the money from the lock boxes and deposit it at one 

of two banks. An employee of one of the banks told law enforcement that Thompson 

usually made deposits ranging between $5,000 and $8,000 twice a week. 

The clinic was located next to Tabor City Elementary School. The clinic parking lot 

was often filled with patients waiting to be seen, which created safety concerns for the 

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school. The school frequently cancelled recess because of activity at the clinic, and it was 

forced to lock down more than once.

In 2018, law enforcement had a confidential informant pose as a clinic patient. The 

CI saw Kim twelve times. Kim conducted a drug screen on the first visit, but not thereafter. 

At each appointment, the CI paid $200 in cash and Kim issued prescriptions after minimal 

or no medical examination. At several appointments, the CI also purchased marijuana from 

Thompson. On one occasion when the CI was in the examination room with Kim, 

Thompson brought the marijuana into the room and sold it to the CI in front of Kim. In 

Kim’s presence, she told the CI that Kim was willing to trade work for prescriptions.

In May 2018, the CI asked Kim to prescribe stronger medication, and Kim complied 

with no examination and no questions asked. At the CI’s last clinic visit in June 2018, the 

CI asked Kim for a higher dosage of the medication so he could sell more pills on the street.

The CI and Kim also discussed which pharmacy the CI should use to ensure that the 

prescription would not be recorded. At the CI’s request, Kim also issued a prescription for 

the CI’s father, who was not present at the appointment and had never been seen by Kim. 

The CI paid Kim $200 for the prescription issued in his name and $300 for the prescription 

issued in his father’s name.

The day after his last clinic visit, the CI conducted a final controlled purchase from 

Kim and Thompson at Kim’s residence, paying $700 for 81 hydrocodone pills and a 

quantity of marijuana. At this visit, Kim and the CI discussed the possibility of the CI 

lending Kim money to buy a house. Kim offered to pay the interest through prescriptions 

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to the CI. The next day, law enforcement officials arrested Kim and Thompson on state 

charges and executed search warrants for the clinic and Kim’s residence.

In December 2018, Kim and Thompson were indicted on federal charges, including 

a charge of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and multiple individual counts 

of drug distribution. The case proceeded slowly through the system, as dates for trial were 

set and then later extended. In July 2020, the government filed a superseding indictment 

including additional counts against Kim and Thompson. A 34-count second superseding 

indictment was filed on July 7, 2021. In addition to the conspiracy charge asserted against 

Kim and Thompson, the second superseding indictment included twenty-five substantive 

counts involving Kim alone; six substantive counts involving Thompson alone2

; and two

substantive counts involving both Kim and Thompson. Less than a week after the second 

superseding indictment was filed, Thompson pleaded guilty to conspiracy and five of the 

individual counts. 

In November 2021, Kim signed a written agreement whereby he agreed to plead 

guilty to conspiracy and eight substantive counts in exchange for the dismissal of the 

remaining counts. At the plea hearing conducted on November 30, 2021, Kim testified that 

he had read the second superseding indictment, understood the charges, and was prepared 

to plead guilty. When the court listed the relevant counts and asked Kim how he pleaded, 

Kim responded, “I plead guilty to those charges, Your Honor.” J.A. 68.

2 The individual counts against Thompson were based on her selling 

marijuana to patients.

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After the government spelled out the penalties Kim faced on each charge, Kim 

repeated that he was pleading guilty to the charges outlined in the plea agreement. The 

court explained the elements of each offense, asked the government to present the factual 

basis, and then asked Kim if he committed the offenses listed in the plea agreement. Kim 

responded, “Your Honor, nothing I was doing willfully. I’m not guilty of any of this, Your 

Honor. I was just advised by my counsel that this is the only way I can alleviate – mitigate 

my sentence.” J.A. 86. After speaking with his client, counsel for Kim informed the court 

that he was “not in a position today to enter a guilty plea,” J.A. 87, and requested a 

continuance “to give me some more time with Dr. Kim to try to answer and clarify 

questions he’s raised.” J.A. 87. The court granted the continuance and struck the existing 

plea agreement from the record.

The parties returned to court on December 28, 2021, with a freshly executed plea 

agreement.

3 The court explained that the hearing was a continuation of the prior hearing, 

and Kim declined the court’s offer to repeat any of the information from the first hearing 

about the charges, penalties, and the rights he was giving up. After the government spelled 

out the factual bases for the charges, the court reiterated to Kim that if the court accepted 

the plea agreement, “you can’t take it back. You’re bound by it.” J.A. 104. Kim stated that 

he understood. The district court then asked Kim if he was in fact guilty of the charges 

spelled out in the plea agreement, to which he responded, “Yes, your Honor.” J.A. 104.

3 Under the revised agreement, the government agreed to dismiss Count 34, 

one of the counts to which Kim had originally agreed to plead guilty.

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The court determined that Kim knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty, and the court 

accepted the plea agreement. At a subsequent hearing, the court sentenced Kim to a total 

term of 78 months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.4

II.

We turn first to the Ruan question. “A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to 

the extent it is voluntary and intelligent. We have long held that a plea does not qualify as 

intelligent unless a criminal defendant first receives real notice of the true nature of the 

charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.”

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (cleaned up). To ensure that defendants 

plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a 

district court, before accepting a guilty plea, to “inform the defendant of, and determine 

that the defendant understands, . . . the nature of each charge to which the defendant is 

pleading.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G).

Kim contends his plea was not valid because the district court did not inform him 

that, if he went to trial, the government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Kim subjectively knew or intended that his conduct was unauthorized, as 

required by Ruan. Because Kim raised no objections below, we review for plain error only. 

Under plain error review, Kim is entitled to relief only if he can

4 Although Kim’s plea agreement includes an appeal waiver, we nevertheless 

proceed because the government has not sought to enforce the waiver. See United States v. 

Jones, 667 F.3d 477, 486 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he government does not seek to enforce the 

waiver, and we will not sua sponte enforce it.”).

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satisfy three threshold requirements. First, there must be an error. Second, 

the error must be plain. Third, the error must affect substantial rights, which 

generally means that there must be a reasonable probability that, but for the 

error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. If those three 

requirements are met, an appellate court may grant relief if it concludes that 

the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.

Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021) (cleaned up). Kim bears the burden 

of persuasion at each step of the inquiry; “[s]atisfying all four prongs of the plain-error test 

is difficult.” Id. at 2097 (cleaned up).

Kim contends that the district court plainly erred because it never expressly 

informed Kim that the government at trial would be required to prove that Kim knew or 

intended that his prescriptions were not authorized and that he would not have pleaded

guilty if he had understood the government’s burden of proof. While the government 

acknowledges that Ruan changed the law in this circuit, it disagrees with Kim at every 

step of the plain-error path. In the government’s view, there was no error at all, let alone 

plain error. In any event, the government contends that Kim cannot show his substantial 

rights were affected.

A.

We first consider whether there was error, and, if so, whether the error was plain. 

“Deviation from a legal rule is ‘error’ unless the rule has been waived.” United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–33 (1993). An error is “plain” if the error is “clear” or “obvious.”

Id. at 733.

In the plea colloquy, the district court explained that for the conspiracy count, the 

government was required to prove that Kim “formed an agreement to distribute, prescribe, 

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and dispense and possess with the intent to distribute [specified controlled substances], and 

that you knew the purpose of this agreement or conspiracy, and that you knowingly and 

willfully participated in or became a part of it.” J.A. 72-73. As to the substantive counts, 

the court explained that the government bore “the burden of showing beyond a reasonable 

doubt that you prescribed, dispensed, or distributed [a specified controlled substance]; you 

acted knowingly, intentionally; and you did that outside the usual course of professional 

practice and for other than a legitimate medical purpose.” J.A. 73.

Kim argues that because the district court did not expressly state that the government 

would be required to prove that he knew or intended that his prescriptions were 

unauthorized, as required by Ruan, the court failed to inform him of the true nature of the 

charges against him and therefore committed plain error. See Johnson v. United States, 520 

U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (“[W]here the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary 

to the law at the time of appeal[,] it is sufficient that the error be plain at the time of 

appellate consideration.”).

The government, however, insists that the district court’s explanation was entirely 

consistent with Ruan. The government contends that when the district court stated “‘you 

did that outside the usual course of professional practice,’ the court incorporated the mens 

rea requirement that it had just read.” Br. of Appellee at 21.

We need not decide whether the district court’s explanations should be understood 

in the manner suggested by the government. While the Constitution requires that the 

defendant understand the true nature of the charges he faces, that does not mean that a 

recitation of all elements is always required in a Rule 11 proceeding. This court “has 

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repeatedly refused to script the Rule 11 colloquy . . . to require the district courts to recite 

the elements of the offense in every circumstance.” United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 

1307 (4th Cir. 1996). Moreover, there is no requirement that the defendant receive all of 

the information about the nature of the charges from the court “at the plea hearing itself.”

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1991) (cleaned up). Instead, the 

district court may rely on “detailed information received [by the defendant] on occasions 

before the plea hearing” when determining whether a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. 

Id. (cleaned up).

In this case, even if the district court’s explanation of the charges alone did not

properly reflect the mens rea required by Ruan, the language of the indictment does reflect 

Ruan’s holding. This court has made it clear that when explaining the nature of the charges, 

a district court may rely on the defendant’s sworn statement that he has read the indictment 

and discussed it with his attorney. See Wilson, 81 F.3d at 1307 (“We again refuse to require 

the district courts to recite the elements of the offense in every circumstance. In many cases, 

such a procedure would be a formality and a needless repetition of the indictment, which 

often tracks the essential elements of the offense.”) (emphasis added). 

In each count of the second superseding indictment that involved Kim, the 

government, apparently anticipating what Ruan would hold, alleged that Kim conspired 

and issued the challenged prescriptions “while acting and intending to act outside the usual 

course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose.” J.A. 39, 40, 41, 

43 (emphasis added). Ruan requires the government to prove that the defendant knew or 

intended to issue unauthorized prescriptions. Because a prescription issued outside the 

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usual course of medical practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose is an unauthorized 

prescription, see 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a), the indictment is consistent with the requirements 

of Ruan.

Kim argues that the language of the second superseding indictment is irrelevant 

because governing Fourth Circuit law at the time of his plea was not consistent with Ruan, 

which, in Kim’s view, means that he did not plead guilty to any Ruan-compliant offense. 

We disagree. Kim did not plead guilty to generic charges under § 841; he pleaded guilty to 

the offenses spelled out in the second superseding indictment. In every count of that 

indictment, the government alleged that Kim intended to act outside the usual course of 

professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose. While Fourth Circuit 

precedent did not then require the government to prove the defendant’s subjective intent, 

the government nonetheless would have been bound by those allegations at trial. See

United States v. Pinson, 860 F.3d 152, 171 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Importantly, 

the government is bound by the phrasing it uses in the indictment, even if it chooses to use 

more specific language than necessary.”). 

Kim also contends that the language of the indictment is not sufficient under Ruan

because it does not make clear that the government bears the burden of proving that Kim 

intended to issue unauthorized prescriptions. While the indictment does not mention (and 

would not be expected to mention) the burden of proof, the district court in the plea 

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colloquy repeatedly informed Kim that the government bore the burden of proof at trial.5

We believe that those repeated explanations, combined with the mens rea allegations 

actually contained in the indictment, were sufficient. 

As we explained in DeFusco, the question is not simply whether the court recited 

each element of each charge at the plea hearing, but whether the district court ensured that 

Kim understood the true nature of the charges. See DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 117 (“[T]he

defendant must receive notice of the true nature of the charge rather than a rote recitation 

of the elements of the offense. . . .”). When determining whether a plea hearing complies 

with the requirements of Rule 11, we are obligated to “accord deference to the trial court’s 

decision as to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant. The manner 

of ensuring that the defendant is properly informed is committed to the good judgment of 

the district court, to its calculation of the relative difficulty of comprehension of the charges 

and of the defendant’s sophistication and intelligence.” Id. at 116 (cleaned up).

In this case, the district court was presented with a mature, well-educated, 

financially successful defendant who had no mental health conditions or substance abuse 

5 See J.A. 63 (explaining to Kim that if he went to trial, “there would be no 

burden on you. The burden rests on the shoulders of the government to prove you guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.”); J.A. 64 (“[Y]ou are and would be presumed innocent. Again, 

you don’t have to prove anything.”); J.A. 72 (After Kim stated that he was pleading guilty, 

the district court explained, “Dr. Kim, you still have the right to plead not guilty. . . . The 

government still has the burden on its back to prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

You are presumed innocent. You remain presumed innocent. And the government’s 

burden, as I said, remains with it.”); J.A. 91 (explaining at the beginning of the second plea 

hearing that “[t]he burden remains on the government to prove you guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. And you are presumed innocent.”).

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problems. See id. at 117 (“In explaining the nature of the charges to the defendant, . . . the 

trial court is given a wide degree of discretion in deciding the best method to inform and 

ensure the defendant’s understanding. The trial court may look at the availability of 

counsel, and the defendant’s personal characteristics, such as age, education, and 

intelligence.”) (cleaned up). Kim told the district court during the first plea colloquy that 

he understood and could communicate with his attorney and that he was satisfied with his 

attorney. He confirmed that he had read the second superseding indictment and that his 

attorney had explained it to him. As noted, the indictment’s mens rea allegations were 

consistent with the requirement of Ruan, and the district court repeatedly informed Kim 

that the burden of proof was on the government. When the parties reconvened a month 

after the aborted plea hearing, Kim informed the court that he did not need the indictment 

to be read to him. He confirmed that he had read and signed the revised plea agreement, 

which spelled out the facts underlying the charges against him, and he confirmed that he 

was in fact guilty of the charges listed in the plea agreement. Under these circumstances, 

we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the manner in which the district court ensured Kim’s 

understanding of the true nature of the charges he faced. 

B.

Moreover, even if we could find error in the district court’s approach, we agree with 

the government that Kim cannot show that his substantial rights were affected. 

Because Kim pleaded guilty, the substantial-rights inquiry requires him to “show[]

that, if the District Court had correctly advised him of the mens rea element of the offense, 

there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty.” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 

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2097 (cleaned up). “Although the reasonable probability standard is a demanding one, a 

defendant need not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would 

have been different.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 192–93 (4th Cir. 2020) (en 

banc) (cleaned up). “Instead, a defendant must satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, 

informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. (cleaned up).

In support of his claim that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had understood 

that the government would be required to prove that he knew he was issuing prescriptions 

outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose, 

Kim points to his initial hesitancy to plead guilty and his assertion in the first hearing that 

he did nothing willfully and was “not guilty of any of this.” J.A. 86. He also points to the 

government’s statements of the factual bases for the charges, which Kim contends did not 

include evidence of Kim’s subjective intent for each prescription at issue. We are not 

persuaded.

Although Kim expressed hesitancy in the first plea hearing, an isolated hiccup in 

the course of a plea proceeding does not automatically satisfy the substantial-rights prong 

of the plain-error inquiry. Kim expressed no further hesitancy when court reconvened 

several weeks after the initial hearing. He responded in the negative when the district court 

asked if he needed any other information from the court or had questions for his attorney, 

and he confirmed that he was in fact guilty of the charges listed in the plea agreement.

Under these circumstances, the mere fact that Kim was briefly hesitant to plead guilty is 

insufficient to carry Kim’s burden under plain-error review. 

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When determining whether a plain-error defendant has established that he would 

have gone to trial but for the error, we are entitled to consider the strength of the 

government’s evidence and to ask “what [the defendant] might ever have thought he could 

gain by going to trial.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85 (2004). 

The point of the question is not to second-guess a defendant’s actual 

decision; if it is reasonably probable he would have gone to trial absent the 

error, it is no matter that the choice may have been foolish. The point, rather, 

is to enquire whether the omitted [explanation] would have made the 

difference required by the standard of reasonable probability. . . .

Id.

Although the record reveals no statement from Kim directly stating his subjective 

intention to violate the law, the mountain of circumstantial evidence leaves little doubt. For 

example, the record shows that Kim complied when the CI asked Kim to prescribe a higher 

strength of medication so he could sell more pills on the street. Kim likewise complied 

when the CI asked for a prescription for his father, who was not a patient of Kim’s and was 

not present at the appointment. Kim did not correct Thompson when she told the CI, in 

Kim’s presence, that Kim would trade work for prescriptions, and Kim asked the CI about 

a possible loan and offered to write prescriptions to pay the interest. In the face of this 

evidence, a jury would be highly unlikely to conclude that Kim subjectively believed he 

was issuing authorized, medically necessary prescriptions, which in turn makes it unlikely 

that Kim’s plead-or-trial calculation would turn on the precise contours of the statutory 

mens rea requirements.

Moreover, counsel for Kim told the court at sentencing that once he got involved in 

the case and explained the government’s evidence, Kim and his children “pretty quickly 

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acknowledged that he, in fact, was guilty.” J.A. 120-21. Counsel explained that Kim’s 

difficulty came from “his deep shame for this conduct” for bringing “dishonor to his 

family.” J.A. 121.

[I]t was very difficult for Dr. Kim to overcome that sense of absolute shame 

and dishonoring in his family. Part of what helped us in that are his own 

children telling him that he’s a grandfather, and their father, and they didn’t 

want him to die in prison, Your Honor. They wanted him to have time with 

his family.

And so ultimately he came before the Court and pled guilty.

J.A. 121.

In our view, these statements undermine Kim’s claim that he would not have 

pleaded guilty if he had understood the government’s obligation to prove he knew his 

prescriptions were not authorized. While pleading guilty would not eliminate the dishonor 

that Kim perceived, proceeding to trial would invite even more public attention on the 

specifics of Kim’s actions, including details about his extra-marital relationship with 

Thompson. Given the slim likelihood that a jury would agree that Kim believed he was 

writing proper prescriptions, we have difficulty seeing how a more fulsome explanation of 

the government’s burden to prove mens rea “could have had an effect on [Kim’s] 

assessment of his strategic position.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 85.

After reviewing the record as a whole, we agree with the government that Kim has 

not established a reasonable possibility that he would not have pleaded guilty if the charges 

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against him had been more fully explained. Because Kim cannot show that his substantial 

rights were affected, he is not entitled to relief under plain-error review.6

III.

Finally, we turn briefly to Kim’s claim that the district court violated his right to 

address the court before sentence is imposed. Because Kim did not object below, this issue 

is likewise reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 

(4th Cir. 2007). 

The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that, “[b]efore imposing sentence, the 

[district] court must . . . address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant 

to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(i)(4)(A)(ii). “This rule is not satisfied by merely affording the Defendant’s counsel the 

opportunity to speak.” Muhammad, 478 F.3d at 249 (cleaned up).

Kim concedes that while the district court did “eventually” give him an opportunity 

to speak, that opportunity was insufficient because the district court by then had already 

“express[ed] its views on the extent of Mr. Kim’s moral culpability.” Br. of Appellant at 

40. 

6 Because conspiracy involves “an agreement with the specific intent that the 

underlying crime be committed by some member of the conspiracy,” Ocasio v. United 

States, 578 U.S. 282, 288 (2016) (cleaned up), the government also contends that Kim’s 

admission of guilt to the conspiracy count renders harmless any error in the explanation of 

the substantive counts. Given our conclusion that Kim failed to establish a reasonable 

probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if the charges had been properly 

described, we need not consider this argument. 

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Kim’s argument is functionally identical to an argument this court has already 

rejected. In United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2012), the defendant argued that 

his opportunity to allocute was meaningless because it came after the district court had 

announced its intention to impose an upward variance. We disagreed:

Rule 32 only requires the district court to address the defendant 

personally and permit him to speak or present any information to mitigate 

the sentence before sentence is imposed; apart from that requirement, the rule 

does not create a right of allocution at any specific point in the sentencing 

proceeding. Moreover, when a judge announces a sentence before hearing 

an allocution, it is fair to assume that such a sentence is tentative and that the 

judge will consider the defendant’s statements before imposing a final 

sentence.

Id. at 425 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). 

There was nothing improper in Engle about the court expressing preliminary views 

as to the appropriate sentence before hearing from the defendant, and there was nothing 

improper here about the court expressing its views about the costs and societal harms of 

Kim’s conduct before hearing from him. Because the district court afforded Kim the 

opportunity to address the court before the court imposed sentence, Kim cannot establish 

the existence of error, much less plain error.

IV.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm Kim’s conviction and 

sentence.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4221 Doc: 49 Filed: 06/20/2023 Pg: 19 of 19