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85–889 PDF 2003

S. HRG. 107–893

DOMINANCE ON THE GROUND: CABLE

COMPETITION AND THE AT&T-COMCAST MERGER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, 

BUSINESS RIGHTS, AND COMPETITION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 23, 2002

Serial No. J–107–75

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SHARON PROST, Minority Chief Counsel 

MAKAN DELRAHIM, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, BUSINESS RIGHTS, AND COMPETITION

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin, Chairman 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

STROM THURMOND, South Carolina 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

VICTORIA BASSETTI, Majority Chief Counsel 

PETER LEVITAS, Minority Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Brownback, Hon. Sam, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas ....................... 10

DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ................................ 3

Hatch, Hon. Orrin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah ................................. 6

Kohl, Hon. Herb, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin ............................ 1

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 9

Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina ........ 91

WITNESSES 

Armstrong, C. Michael, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, AT&T Corp., 

Basking Ridge, New Jersey ................................................................................. 15

Betty, Garry, Chief Executive Officer, Earthlink, Atlanta, Georgia ................... 25

Green, Richard R., President and Chief Executive Officer, Cable Television 

Laboratories, Inc., Louisville, Colorado .............................................................. 30

Haverkate, Mark, President and Chief Executive Officer, WideOpenWest, 

Castle Rock, Colorado, on behalf of the Broadband Service Providers

Association ............................................................................................................ 34

Perry, Robert A., Vice President, Marketing, Mitsubishi Digital Electronics 

America, Irvine, California .................................................................................. 42

Roberts, Brian L. President, Comcast Corporation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, accompanied by Ralph Roberts ................................................................ 12

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

RCN Corporation, statement .................................................................................. 69

Writers Guild of America, west, Inc., Los Angeles, CA ........................................ 94

(1)

DOMINANCE ON THE GROUND: 

CABLE COMPETITION AND THE 

AT&T-COMCAST MERGER 

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 2002

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, BUSINESS RIGHTS

AND COMPETITION, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Herb Kohl,

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Kohl, DeWine, Hatch, Specter, and Brownback. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HERBERT KOHL, A U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN 

Chairman KOHL. This subcommittee will come to order. 

Today, we examine the merger between Comcast and AT&T 

Broadband. This is the end of AT&T as we know it, but a new 

AT&T, a wide-ranging, powerful cable monopoly, is emerging. Just 

as the pre-1984 AT&T controlled the phone line, the equipment, 

and the content, this new cable giant has the potential to wield 

similar control over the cable line, the equipment, and the content 

sent to more than 22 million American homes. The creation of this 

new and even broader communications conglomerate may pose the 

same dangers to consumers and to innovation that led to the 

break-up of the old AT&T monopoly. 

As this merger indicates, big changes are coming to the cable industry, but one thing remains the same: cable rates continue to 

rise, about triple the rate of inflation since the passage of the 1996 

Telecommunications Act, and more than 7 percent last year. 

Make no mistake, if this merger is approved, AT&T-Comcast will 

become the Nation’s largest cable company, providing television 

signals to about 30 percent of the Nation’s homes. Since this merger was announced, we have been asking ourselves over and over 

again, how is this good for consumers. We know it is good for the 

companies, but what does it do for the average consumer? 

Ten years from now, if trends like this merger continue, consumers may find almost all of their personal communications and 

information dominated by a very few large media companies. Their 

phones, their movies, their Internet, their cable, their link to the 

outside world will be priced, processed and packaged by one company that faces virtually no competition. 

2

While the Echostar-DirecTV deal has faced a barrage of antitrust 

questions, this deal has not. In fact, it appears there are few, if 

any, traditional antitrust concerns raised by it. Nevertheless, there 

are some serious issues that need to be looked at. 

Big is not necessarily bad, but we cannot ignore the potential for 

a cable company as big as AT&T-Comcast to throw its weight 

around. We should be frightened about this future, and we need to 

be thinking about imposing meaningful conditions on this merger 

to make it tolerable for consumers. Therefore, before we can fully 

understand the impact of this merger on consumers, we need answers to five key questions. 

First, the parties have promised that they will aggressively continue efforts to offer cable telephone service in more markets. This 

competition to the local telephone monopoly is sorely needed, so 

how can we be sure that they will keep their promise? 

Two, we cannot ignore that such a large company will affect and 

perhaps control programming. Small, independent media voices 

will have even a harder time gaining access to the video airwaves. 

For the last 10 years, we have had rules to guard against cable 

companies leveraging their monopolies and blocking access to programming to competitors. 

These program access rules are expiring this year. Now more 

then ever, in the face of all of this consolidation, these rules need 

to be extended. Why do the parties oppose extending these rules? 

Three, the parties have promised that they will let consumers 

choose who will provide them their Internet, but they have been 

unwilling to make the promise binding. AOL-Time Warner made 

the promise binding as a condition of their merger. Why shouldn’t 

these parties? 

Four, after recent court decisions, the long-established cable ownership caps are currently under review by the FCC. With a seemingly unrelenting wave of media mergers underway, reasonable 

ownership limits are the last line of defense against excessive concentration in this industry. Will the FCC live up to responsibilities 

as guardians of diversity of expression in our video marketplace? 

Finally, 6 years ago we passed a law mandating a competitive 

market for the so-called set-top box, the device that delivers the 

cable signal to the consumer. In the digital age, controlling technology and software is the ultimate power. All of us remember the 

time when there was only one type of telephone, a clunky and rudimentary device. But when we broke up that monopoly, innovation 

then flourished. Only a truly competitive set-top box market can 

unlock the type of innovation that brought us cell phones, faxes, 

and the Internet itself. We required a competitive set-top box market 6 years ago. So what is going on here? 

The answers to these questions and others are essential. We 

thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for testifying today and 

we look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kohl follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. HERB KOHL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF WISCONSIN

Big changes are coming to the cable industry. Consolidation is picking up. Court 

rulings are reconfiguring the laws that govern the industry. New technology is blossoming. But one thing remains the same: cable rates continue to rise—about triple 

3

the rate of inflation since the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, and 

more than 7 percent last year. 

Today we examine the merger between Comcast and AT&T Cable. If this merger 

is approved, AT&T and Comcast will become the Nation’s largest cable company, 

providing television signals to about 30 percent of the Nation’s homes. Three companies—AOL-Time Warner, Charter Communications and the new ATT-Comcast—will 

control 65 percent of the Nation’s cable market. And, if this wasn’t already enough, 

the only head-to-head competitors to cable in most areas—the satellite television 

companies Echostar and DirectTV—are also planning to merge, further reducing 

consumer choice. 

While the Echostar-DirectTV deal has faced a barrage of antitrust questions, this 

deal has not. In fact, it appears that there are few if any traditional antitrust concerns raised by it. Nevertheless, there are some serious issues that need to be 

looked at. Big is not bad, but we can’t ignore the potential for dominance in a cable 

company as big as ATT-Comcast will be. 

Since this merger was announced, we have been asking ourselves over and over: 

how is this good for consumers? We know it’s good for the companies—but what 

does it do for the average consumer? Ten years from now, if trends like this merger 

continue, consumers may find almost all of their personal communications and information dominated by a very few, large media conglomerates. Their phone, their 

movies, their Internet, their cable, their link to the outside world will be priced, 

processed and packaged for them by one company that faces virtually no competition. 

Before we can fully understand the impact of this merger on consumers, we need 

answers to five key questions: 

One, the parties have promised that they will aggressively continue efforts to offer 

cable telephone service in more markets. This competition to the local telephone monopoly is sorely needed. How can we be sure they will keep their promises? 

Two, the parties have promised that they will let consumers choose who will provide them their Internet—but they have been unwilling to make the promise binding. AOL-Time Warner made the promise binding as a condition of their merger, 

why shouldn’t these parties? 

Three, we cannot ignore that such a large company will affect and maybe control 

programming. Small, independent media voices will have even a harder time gaining access to the video airwaves. For the last 10 years, we’ve had rules to guard 

against cable companies leveraging their monopolies and blocking access to programming to competitors. These program access rules are expiring this year. Now 

more than ever, in the face of all this consolidation, these rules need to be extended. 

Why do the parties oppose renewing these rules? 

Four, 6 years ago we passed a law mandating a competitive market for the so 

called set-top box—the device that delivers the cable signal to the consumer. In the 

digital age, controlling the technology and software is the ultimate power. All of us 

remember the time when there was only one type of phone—a clunky and rudimentary device. But when we broke that monopoly, innovation flourished. Only a 

truly competitive set-top box market can unlock the type of innovation that brought 

us cell phones, faxes, and the Internet itself. We required a competitive set-top box 

market 6 years ago—what’s going on here? 

Finally, after recent court decisions, the long-established cable ownership caps are 

currently under review by the FCC. With a seeming unrelenting wave of media 

mergers under way, reasonable ownership limits are the last line of defense against 

excessive concentration in this industry. Will the FCC live up to responsibilities as 

guardians of diversity of expression in our video marketplace? 

The answers to these questions are essential. I thank our distinguished panel of 

witnesses for testifying today and I look forward to their views.

Chairman KOHL. Senator DeWine. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DeWINE,

A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for holding this hearing on this very important issue. 

This afternoon, we will examine the proposed merger between 

two of the leading cable providers in the country, AT&T Broadband 

and Comcast Corporation. This merger would create an industry 

giant, as you have pointed out, serving over 27 million subscribers, 

more than double the size of the next largest cable company. 

4

But, Mr. Chairman, despite its resulting size, this deal appears 

to avoid many of the traditional antitrust concerns raised by horizontal mergers because the companies in this case do not currently 

compete with each other in the delivery of video services. Accordingly, in regard to the delivery of video services, a merger between 

the two is probably not a violation of the Clayton Act test of the 

‘‘substantial lessening of competition.’’

But the effects of this deal are not limited only to the video delivery market, and it cannot be examined in isolation. It occurs at the 

same time that the courts and to some extent the Federal Communications Commission are acting to significantly roll back restrictions on media consolidation. 

This trend toward further media consolidation is troubling. 

Frankly, the regulators must pay close attention to the impact of 

consolidation, beyond just the standard antitrust analysis. Obviously, preserving vigorous competition is always important and will 

ensure that consumers receive affordable, high-quality products. 

However, it is also important that we ensure that information outlets in communities or regions of the country are not controlled by 

just a few players. 

If one company were to own the cable franchise, several broadcast stations, and newspaper outlets in any one given community, 

the people of that community would suffer not only from a lack of 

competition, but in all likelihood they also would be exposed to a 

smaller range of opinions. This would be unacceptable in an era 

that has been dubbed as the ‘‘information age.’’

Mr. Chairman, in light of recent court decisions, the Federal 

Communications Commission needs to develop reasonable rules to 

protect this marketplace of ideas, and it must do so in a coherent 

fashion that will pass the scrutiny of the courts. 

One such rule that they may need to reexamine that is particularly relevant to our hearing today is the cable ownership limit. 

The FCC must thoroughly examine cable ownership limits and establish an appropriate limit that would ensure healthy competition 

and a diverse marketplace. If they can’t do it, then Congress will 

need to take a look at it. 

Now, focusing again on the specifics of the deal we have before 

us today, there are competitive implications of this merger that I 

believe deserve examination. Perhaps the most important is the effect of the merger on the programming market. 

As I have said, a combined AT&T-Comcast would control access 

to over 27 million customers. This customer base would become an 

extremely important outlet for programmers, increasing the pressure to obtain a spot on the AT&T-Comcast cable system. This 

would impose a challenge for those who offer new, independent programming. 

These independent producers may not have the leverage of linking their product with more established programs. An independent 

programmer also may not have the financial backing to offer very 

low initial prices. This creates an obvious problem. The programmer more than ever needs the customer base of AT&TComcast, but does not necessarily have the leverage to strike a 

worthwhile deal. Thus, the increased size of the combined AT&TVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
5

Comcast may make it more difficult for independent programmers, 

and this, I believe, we should be concerned about. 

This increase in the market power of AT&T-Comcast also raises 

concerns in situations where the cable companies own programming. For example, Comcast owns the Outdoor Life Network. The 

combined company, with an expanded presence across more media 

markets, would likely be less willing to carry a similar network 

from an independent producer. This incentive to exclude independent programming, coupled with fewer programming outlets, 

might harm the ability of new programs to develop and then to survive. 

However, we should acknowledge that these two companies have 

limited programming ownership. Along those lines, it is important 

that AT&T has confirmed publicly that it will divest its ownership 

interest in Time Warner Entertainment programming. I applaud 

them for that decision and look forward to the completion of that 

transaction. 

The increased market power of AT&T-Comcast also could have 

an effect on the ability of competitors to gain access to programming. Depending on the competitive circumstances in a local market, the combined AT&T-Comcast might have enough negotiating 

power to demand exclusive rights to programming, therefore harming the ability of a satellite system or cable over-builder to compete. This obviously would be a very serious concern for consumers, 

since there is significant evidence that the existence of viable cable 

over-builders helps to lower prices. 

Of course, increased purchasing power also might have a positive 

effect on prices. If AT&T-Comcast were able to drive down programming costs, it might be able to limit the seemingly endless rise 

of cable rates. This obviously would be of great benefit to consumers if, in fact, it happened. 

One additional area of concern involved broadband, specifically 

the ability of consumers to choose an Internet service provider 

when they obtain broadband service from their cable company. 

When AOL and Time Warner merged, the Federal Trade Commission required the combined company to allow a range of competitive ISPs to provide service on their broadband network. 

While the competitive dynamics of this deal differ from those in 

the AOL merger, this remains an important issue, and I look forward to hearing what plans the company has to ensure that their 

27 million consumers will have a choice of ISP providers. 

In addition, I look forward to hearing the parties’ plans for rolling out broadband and voice services to consumers, and how this 

merger will help them speed this process. I am particularly interested in their plans for cable telephone service. 

Mr. Chairman, I think it is fair to say that we have all been very 

disappointed in the amount of competition in the local phone service market since the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 

If this merger can speed competition in that area, it would be a big 

plus for consumers. 

The AT&T-Comcast merger is an important one and it has the 

potential to reshape the competitive landscape of cable service in 

a number of significant ways. We have a very excellent panel 

today, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to our discussion. 

6

I thank the Chair. 

Chairman KOHL. Thank you, Senator DeWine. 

Now, we call on Senator Orrin Hatch from Utah. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN HATCH,

A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH 

Senator HATCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I commend you 

and Senator Dewine for your work on this committee and for holding this hearing to discuss the AT&T-Comcast merger. 

This merger before us today follows a series of consolidation activities in the communications sector since the passage of the 1996 

Telecommunications Act. Careful antitrust scrutiny is necessary 

where two of the five largest cable companies in the Nation plan 

to merge, and our inquiry should include the possible effects of this 

merger on related businesses and markets. 

These include areas such as the deployment of broadband Internet service; the manufacture and design of cable set-top boxes, 

which could be the access point for all communications in the future; and the continued vitality of the video programming and 

Internet content markets. 

Overall, this merger by itself does not appear to present the 

types of competitive concerns that have led me to be skeptical or 

critical of some other recent major media mergers. 

For example, unlike the AOL-Time Warner merger, this transaction does not involve the aggregation of the enormous ownership 

of content with an online service provider and the cable pipes to 

deliver that content, creating powerful incentives to favor one’s own 

content over competing content. Nor does the proposed AT&TComcast transaction involve the elimination of a direct competitor 

as does the pending Echostar-DirecTV merger. 

It appears that this merger is largely free from these types of 

traditional antitrust concerns, and I would hope that this merger 

would not raise issues regarding content discrimination that leads 

to fewer choices of diverse content which I have found to be of 

great concern in past media mergers. 

I should note that this merger does raise several broader policy 

questions for us to consider as policymakers. These largely center 

around potential limitations on consumers’ access to rich and diverse content resulting from changes in the competitive landscape 

as divergence of technologies continues. 

By means of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress succeeded in creating a shift in policy in key high-tech industries toward increased deregulation and a concomitantly increased reliance on antitrust principles and enforcement to protect competition. 

Now, 6 years later, consumers are really beginning to see some 

of the benefits of these actions in the form of increased competition 

and increased choice. Much of this choice is the result of convergence in the types of services provided by the varied companies 

that form the new information economy. I believe that this convergence will continue to the point where services provided by telecommunications and cable companies will be indistinguishable to 

consumers. This technology-driven convergence should increase 

competition, and therefore hopefully consumer choice. 

7

Along with convergence, however, consumers have at the same 

time witnessed increasing consolidation in the cable, media, and 

telecommunications markets. In contrast to convergence, this consolidation tends to reduce the number of competitors, and consequently threatens to reduce competition and choice. 

As these two forces, consolidation and convergence, work to reshape the competitive landscape of the new economy, I strongly believe that we must not merely protect but, where possible, seek 

choices that allow the marketplace to expand consumer choice to 

ensure that as many Americans as possible have full and free access to rich and diverse entertainment and information content. 

Accordingly, as the competitive landscape changes, we must ensure that legislation and regulation do not inadvertently hinder 

consumer choice. In light of these ongoing changes, it is perhaps 

appropriate to continue to examine existing regulations and their 

effects on competition in new and evolving marketplaces to protect 

and strengthen consumer choice. 

I have frequently expressed my concerns regarding competition 

in digital entertainment services and the harms that may befall 

consumers when information ‘‘gatekeepers’’ limit consumers’ 

choices or access to content and information for anticompetitive 

purposes. These concerns have arisen in contexts ranging from the 

Microsoft case to the AOL-Time Warner merger. These concerns 

apply equally to cable programming and broadband Internet content. 

Because the proposed merger would create the largest cable provider in the Nation, a merged AT&T-Comcast would have significant power as a major purchaser of content. A merged AT&TComcast would have similar power in determining which and how 

many Internet service providers will have access to consumers over 

its cables. Any merged entity with such power must exercise carefully its powers to ensure that consumer choice and marketplace 

competition are not unfairly hindered. 

In the digital age, a cable merger involves much more than simply which company will deliver video programming to consumers. 

Rather, a merger within the cable industry today is likely to affect 

other services, products, technology, and business relationships between very large cable companies and providers of content and 

communications services. 

Finally, I have some basic concerns about implementation of the 

proposed merger. We need to take into account the practical effects 

of the proposed merger on consumers. More specifically, I note that 

AT&T currently provides cable broadband and telephone services 

in my own home State of Utah. I would like to hear today, and 

hopefully get some types of assurances regarding how the merger 

has been structured to avoid difficulties such as loss or disruption 

of these services, degradation of the quality of these services, and 

unexpected rate hikes. 

Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to 

hearing from all of our witnesses here today. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Hatch follows:]

8

STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN HATCH, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH

This merger before us today follows a series of consolidation activities in the communications sector since the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Careful 

antitrust scrutiny is necessary where two of the five largest cable companies in the 

Nation plan to merge, and our inquiry should include the possible effects of this 

merger on related businesses and markets. These include areas such as the deployment of broadband Internet service, the manufacture and design of cable set-top 

boxes, which could be the access point for all communications in the future, and the 

continued vitality of the video programming and Internet content markets. 

Overall, this merger by itself does not appear to present the types of competitive 

concerns that have led me to be skeptical or critical of some other recent major 

media mergers. For example, unlike the AOL-Time Warner merger, this transaction 

does not involve the aggregation of the enormous ownership of content with an online service provider and the cable pipes to deliver that content, creating powerful 

incentives to favor one’s own content over competing content. Nor does the proposed 

AT&T-Comcast transaction involve the elimination of a direct competitor as does the 

pending Echostar-DirecTV merger. It appears that this merger is largely free from 

these types of traditional antitrust concerns, and I would hope that this merger will 

not raise issues regarding content discrimination that leads to fewer choices of diverse content which I have found to be of great concern in past media mergers. 

I should note that this merger does raise several broader policy questions for us 

to consider as policymakers. These largely center around potential limitations on 

consumers’ access to rich and diverse content resulting from changes in the competitive landscape as divergence of technologies continues. 

By means of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress succeeded in creating a 

shift in policy in key high-tech industries toward increased deregulation and a concomitantly increased reliance on antitrust principles and enforcement to protect 

competition. Now, 6 years later, consumers are really beginning to see some of the 

benefits of these actions in the form of increased competition—and increased choice. 

Much of this choice is the result of convergence in the types of services provided 

by the varied companies that form the new information economy. I believe that this 

convergence will continue to the point where services provided by telecommunications and cable companies will be indistinguishable to consumers. This technology-driven convergence should increase competition and, therefore—hopefully—

consumer choice. 

Along with convergence, however, consumers have at the same time witnessed increasing consolidation in the cable, media, and telecommunications markets. In contrast to convergence, this consolidation tends to reduce the number of competitors, 

and, consequently, threatens to reduce competition and choice. 

As these two forces—consolidation and convergence—work to reshape the competitive landscape of the new economy, I strongly believe that we must not merely protect, but—where possible—seek choices that allow the marketplace to expand consumer choice to ensure that as many Americans as possible have full and free access 

to rich and diverse entertainment and information content. Accordingly, as the competitive landscape changes, we must ensure that legislation and regulation do not 

inadvertently hinder consumer choice. In light of these ongoing changes, it is perhaps appropriate to continue to examine existing regulations and their effects on 

competition in new and evolving marketplaces to protect and strengthen consumer 

choice. 

I have frequently expressed my concerns regarding competition in digital entertainment services and the harms that may befall consumers when information 

‘‘gatekeepers’’ limit consumers’ choices or access to content and information for anticompetitive purposes. These concerns have arisen in contexts ranging from the 

Microsoft case to the AOL-Time Warner merger. These concerns apply equally to 

cable programming and broadband Internet content. Because the proposed merger 

would create the largest cable provider in the Nation, a merged AT&T Comcast 

could have significant power as a major purchaser of content. A merged AT&T 

Comcast would have similar power in determining which and how many Internet 

Service Providers will have access to consumers over its cables. Any merged entity 

with such power must exercise carefully its powers to ensure that consumer choice 

and marketplace competition are not unfairly hindered. 

In the digital age, a cable merger involves much more than simply what company 

will deliver video programming to consumers. Rather, a merger within the cable industry today is likely to affect other services, products, technology, business relationships between very large cable companies and providers of content, and communications services. 

9

Finally, I have some basic concerns about implementation of the proposed merger. 

We need to take into account the practical effects of the proposed merger on consumers. More specifically, I note that AT&T currently provides cable, broadband, 

and telephone services in my home State of Utah. I would like to hear today and 

hopefully get some type of assurances regarding how the merger has been structured to avoid difficulties such as loss or disruption of these services, degradation 

of the quality of these services, and unexpected rate hikes.

Chairman KOHL. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch. 

Now, we call on Senator Specter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER,

A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I 

note at the outset that there is parity between the parties? We 

have four Republicans and you, Mr. Chairman, a Democrat. So the 

odds are about even at this point. 

Chairman KOHL. You are right on that. 

Senator SPECTER. There is a practice of a fair amount of testifying on this side of the podium as on that side. I think the issues 

have been delineated so that I will await for further comment on 

the substance for the witnesses. 

I would like to take just a moment or two to introduce Mr. Brian 

Roberts from Comcast. The cable company was founded by his father, Ralph Roberts, 35 years ago, just about the time I became 

District Attorney of Philadelphia, and I am in a position to say unequivocally that there was never an investigation of Ralph Roberts 

or his company. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SPECTER. In my capacity as a United States Senator, I 

am obviously concerned about the serious issues which have been 

discussed, but as a Pennsylvania Senator and as a Philadelphian 

there is a great deal of pride in what the Roberts family has done 

and what Comcast has done. 

Mr. Brian Roberts, at the age of 42, brings an extraordinary 

record as a leader of this company. He has had the osmosis advantage of being associated with his father for 42 years, and having 

a son about the same age I know what osmosis can do. 

His educational background is sterling—Wharton School. His 

public service activities are extensive. He serves on the Simon 

Weisenthal Board, taking up the important issues of the Holocaust. 

He took on a very big job several years ago on being co-chairman 

of the committee which brought the Republican National Convention to Philadelphia, a much-heralded event, with agreement by 

our mayor, who was a Democrat, and the Republicans who came 

and enjoyed the hospitality of the city. 

He has received very distinguished awards, the Powell Police 

Athletic Award and the William Penn Award, and those go to people who have done some significant amount on public service. Last 

October, he had Comcast’s 35,000 employees nationwide engage in 

a day of public service. His persuasion brought me for a day of public service as well. I was commandeered to join the enormous 

throng that he had in Fairmont Park that day. 

It is a matter of great economic concern to my city and State to 

have a company which has 35,000 employees and $40 billion. I took 

another look at the figure to be sure. I have watched Comcast 

10

grow. I visited them several years ago when they were downtown, 

and I had just noted that they took on a $7 billion operation and 

I said to the Roberts, Ralph, Brian, are you sure, $7 billion in debt? 

And now they have moved ahead as giants. 

I visited a very high-tech operation in northeast Philadelphia 

and saw what consumer service can be. This line of activity is very 

complicated and it requires a lot of capital, a lot of know-how and 

a lot of technology on speed of transmission and availability of 

services for the consumer. While there are important questions we 

have to answer in our duties on the Antitrust Subcommittee, we 

should also note what this kind of a merger can do for the consumer. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KOHL. I thank you, Senator Specter. 

Before we hear from Senator Brownback, I would ask unanimous 

consent that the statement of Senator Thurmond be made part of 

the record. 

Senator Brownback. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,

A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS 

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I 

want to associate myself with the comments already made and just 

would note that the convergence issue that Senator Hatch had 

talked about, I think, is an important one, and we are wrestling 

with it both here and in the Commerce Committee. 

It affects different areas of legislation that are coming up now, 

along with this hearing and the proposed merger that is here 

today. So I see, as well, some convergence of issues coming together, and I look forward to hearing the panel’s thoughts of how 

that impacts us in bringing these various technologies together in 

one place in the home as it comes out the other end of the pipe. 

Thanks for holding the hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS

WASHINGTON.—U.S. Sen. Sam Brownback today addressed the issue of broadband 

and the AT&T-Comcast merger at a Senate Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee hearing. Portions of Brownback’s statement follow: 

‘‘Broadband connections are having a powerful impact on the underlying service 

industries providing them to consumers,’’ Brownback said. ‘‘Cable TV, wireless, satellite, and telephone companies are converging, with each deploying new technologies that will permit them to offer the same voice, video, and data services over 

their respective platforms. These developments are ushering in a new era of interplatform competition in telecommunications. 

‘‘While today’s broadband services provide us with a window into the future converged and borderless market, we can still clearly recognize traditionally distinct 

communications industry sectors. For this reason, distinct regulatory regimes continue to be applied to each, and we tend to understand market power within each 

sector as we always have. 

‘‘Convergence requires something more. Congress is currently searching out answers to the question of how regulations should be balanced between the old and 

the new, as reflected in the Tauzin-Dingell bill and legislation I have introduced, 

S. 1126, the Broadband Deployment and Competition Enhancement Act. Likewise, 

the merger of AT&T and Comcast, as with Echostar and DirecTV, requires us to 

balance our traditional understanding of market power with the development of a 

converged market where the pool of potential competitors is greatly increased. 

‘‘AT&T has vigorously opposed regulatory parity for all broadband service providers, specifically incumbent local telephone companies, rejecting the importance of 

11

convergence in the broadband regulatory debate. Yet, today AT&T comes before this 

subcommittee hoping that we recognize the advent of convergence-and-inter-platform competition in the broadband-and multichannel- video markets as reason to 

rubber stamp this merger. 

‘‘If AT&T’s opposition to broadband parity is correct, then I cannot imagine how 

convergence justifies this merger. Cable rates continue to rise, the cable industry 

controls two-thirds of the broadband market, and cable modem subscribers have little choice in ISPs. 

‘‘I prefer to embrace the future, and not be mired in the past. I have had the opportunity to meet with Mr. Roberts, and I think he understand the changes that 

are underway in the marketplace. I appreciate the impressive investments made by 

the cable industry—including both Comcast and AT&T Broadband—to compete in 

a converging market. 

‘‘While I might not be overly enthusiastic about mergers in general, I am prepared 

to recognize a validity to consolidation that, traditionally, has never existed as it 

does in a converging market. 

‘‘The Federal Communications Commission, in classifying cable modem service as 

an information service, has similarly moved forward with an eye toward our future. 

I commend the commission for this action, and look forward to similarly enlightened 

treatment of all broadband service providers in the commission’s ongoing proceedings,’’ Brownback said. 

Sen. Brownback is author of the Broadband Deployment and Competition Enhancement Act of 2001 (S. 1126).

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one note? I left 

out perhaps Brian Roberts’ most important qualification. He won 

the silver medal in squash at the Macabbean squash tournament. 

When I found that out, I almost revoked my agreement to introduce him today. I am a squash player, but not that kind. 

Chairman KOHL. Well, we thank you very much and we will 

start with our panelists. I will introduce them. I would like to bring 

this information to you briefly: We will have to recess at about 

2:30, maybe at 2:40. There is a vote, and then we will come back 

immediately after that vote and we will continue this hearing. 

Our first witness today will be Mr. Brian Roberts, who is president of his family’s Comcast Corporation. Before becoming president in 1990, Mr. Roberts held a number of senior management positions within the company. 

Next, we will hear from Mr. Michael Armstrong, who is chairman and CEO of AT&T. Mr. Armstrong joined AT&T in 1997, after 

6 years as the chairman and CEO of Hughes Electronics. Prior to 

that, he was with IBM for three decades. 

Joining us from EarthLink is its CEO, Mr. Garry Betty. Before 

joining EarthLink in 1996, Mr. Betty was president and CEO of 

Digital Communications Associates, and senior vice president of 

sales, marketing and international operations at Hayes Microcomputer. 

Next, we will hear from Dr. Richard Green, who is CEO of 

CableLabs, a non-profit research and development consortium of 

the cable television industry. Mr. Green has been involved in this 

industry in a variety of capacities, from television broadcasting and 

engineering to managing key industry technology projects. 

From WideOpenWest, also known as WOW, we have Mr. Mark 

Haverkate, who is founder, president and CEO of that company. 

Prior to the launch of WOW in 1999, Mr. Haverkate was executive 

vice president of RCN Corporation and president of Cable Michigan. 

Finally, we will be hearing from Mr. Robert Perry, who is vice 

president of marketing at Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America. 

12

Mr. Perry joined Mitsubishi after a 7-year tenure with Sharpe 

Electronics, where he served most recently as the head of the Consumer LCD Products Division. 

In addition, Consumers Union, RCN, and the Writers Guild have 

submitted testimony for the record today. 

Following conclusion of this hearing, the record will remain open 

for 1 week for any additional statements to be included. 

So now we would like to call upon Mr. Brian Roberts for your 

statement. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN L. ROBERTS, PRESIDENT, COMCAST 

CORPORATION, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, ACCOMPANIED BY RALPH ROBERTS 

Mr. ROBERTS. Chairman Kohl, Senator DeWine, members of the 

subcommittee, on behalf of my father, Ralph, who is seated just behind me, and myself, we are honored to be here today to talk about 

our vision and our excitement about what the merger of Comcast 

and AT&T Broadband will mean for American consumers. I hope 

we will get to all the issues you laid out, but obviously in questions 

we can go into specifics. Let me also thank Senator Specter for that 

gracious introduction, and particularly my squash attributes. 

Because this is my first time before this subcommittee, I would 

like to just take a brief moment to tell you about Comcast and our 

roots and the kind of company we are. 

As Senator Specter mentioned, my dad founded the company in 

1963, and I think we represent what is truly great about family 

business in America, the opportunity to chase your dream. My dad 

is a true entrepreneur and he is always forward-looking; evidence 

the name he coined for his new company back in 1963, Comcast, 

which means communications and broadcasting. Today, I can’t 

think of a more concise summary of our vision than communications and broadcasting. 

I went to work for my father right out of college and have been 

with Comcast in many different jobs ever since. We both love the 

cable business; it is in our blood. Having the chance to work together side by side during this great era that we have seen in cable 

and to have been part of the terrific things that cable has brought 

this Nation—the creation of CNN, HBO, C–SPAN I, II and III, Fox 

News, and hundreds of new channels that today we all take for 

granted—we have always been enthusiastic about the ability of 

cable technology to do even more. That is why we keep rebuilding 

and reinvesting. 

Our company was one of the first to experiment with the highspeed cable modem, delivering lightning-fast Internet over cable, 

and one of the first to deploy it. We set the pace in rolling out digital cable, which gives you over 250 channels of TV and audio programming. Now, we are introducing high-definition television right 

here in Washington, and video-on-demand, another product that 

lets viewers watch what they want when they want it. 

We think there are going to be more and more other great services that broadband cable can deliver. This is why I am so excited 

about the proposed merger with AT&T Broadband. In all the decades that we have been in this industry, we have never seen anVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
13

other business opportunity that is as exciting for our customers, 

our employees, and our shareholders. 

There is a lot of interest in making sure that the benefits of 

broadband reach all Americans, and much discussion of what the 

Government can do. This merger presents a private sector response 

to that question. It will bring more digital services and features to 

more Americans more quickly. Let me explain why. 

Comcast has substantially completed the upgrade to our cable 

systems necessary to offer broadband. Nearly 95 percent of our systems are now built to current industry standards. Comcast also has 

a strong balance sheet, among the very best in our industry, and 

our business first and foremost has been and will remain cable television. 

By contrast, a greater number of AT&T Broadband systems still 

require additional investment to get them up to current standards. 

Of course, AT&T has been in a number of different businesses up 

until now, all of them competing for scarce capital dollars. In the 

face of external financial pressures, they haven’t completed system 

upgrades as quickly as Comcast did. 

This merger will give the combined company a clear focus, a solid 

balance sheet, and strong borrowing capacity. It will find cost savings in several key areas which will help to finance system upgrades and speed up the introduction of new services, including 

video, Internet, and cable telephone. 

Now, I haven’t mentioned phone yet. Frankly, we at Comcast 

have been a little slow to introduce cable-based phone service. We 

have been excited and always have said we have been excited 

about the prospect of cable telephony, but we haven’t been focused 

on circuit-based, but rather the so-called next generation Internet 

protocol or IP phone, which we believe offers more features at 

lower cost. 

However, the more I spoke with Mike about AT&T Broadband’s 

business and phone business, the better the opportunity looks. 

Comcast can now take advantage of AT&T’s considerable expertise 

and experience in providing circuit-switched phone over cable, and 

that will let us give millions more customers a true choice between 

facilities-based telephone providers. Mike will speak more about 

these opportunities and their experience in a moment. 

I have used the term ‘‘facilities-based’’ a couple of times. Promoting facilities-based competition—telephone against cable, cable 

against satellite, satellite against wireless—was a cornerstone of 

our Nation’s pro-competitive communications policies of the 1990s. 

As a result, satellite alone has captured nearly 20 percent of the 

video marketplace. 

Our industry certainly got the competitive message. In the past 

6 years, we have invested over $55 billion as an industry to prepare our systems and our companies for the digital era. Comcast 

alone has invested over $5 billion. This merger is completely consistent with these pro-competitive policies. It will accelerate 

broadband, promote more investment in facilities, and let us keep 

with the rapidly changing, hotly competitive communications 

world. 

So let me summarize the fundamental case for this merger. What 

specifically will it mean for consumers? It will mean that more 

14

Americans will have broadband sooner. It will speed up the introduction of digital cable, high-speed cable, and other innovative 

services still on the drawing board. 

It will bring facilities-based phone competition to millions more 

homes, it will allow us to expand investment in improved local and 

regional programming, and it will permit us to expand our strong 

commitment to our local communities using the latest technology. 

This merger will make all these things possible, as you have said, 

while not reducing competition in any relevant market. 

Chairman Kohl and other Senators, I could not be more proud 

of what the cable industry and Comcast have brought to America 

in the past. With our new company, joining Comcast and AT&T 

Broadband, we have the chance to do so much more. We want to 

make our new company a true 21st century leader in every sense. 

We are committed to serve our customers and our local communities both as quality communication service providers and as good 

corporate citizens. 

I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roberts follows:]

STATEMENT OF BRIAN L. ROBERTS, PRESIDENT, COMCAST CORPORATION

Comcast’s merger with AT&T Broadband will accelerate the growth and availability of broadband services. Combining these two companies, and drawing on the 

special strengths and capabilities and resources of each, will ensure that more 

Americans have access to more digital services and features, sooner. The transaction 

will yield demonstrable benefits in investment, innovation, facilities-based competition, and new and improved video, data, and voice services, with no offsetting detriments. The merger will therefore serve the public interest. 

The merger of Comcast and AT&T Broadband will accelerate the deployment of 

facilities-based high-speed Internet service and other broadband services. Speeding 

the deployment of these advanced services not only will benefit consumers by offering them innovative video and other services, but also will benefit the Nation at 

large by stimulating productivity gains and economic growth. Although Comcast has 

substantially finished the upgrades to its cable plant necessary to offer broadband 

services, AT&T Broadband’s systems require significant additional investment in 

order to complete needed upgrades. Due to economies of scale and scope and cost 

savings resulting from the merger, those upgrades can and will be implemented 

faster, bringing more benefits to more consumers sooner, than would be possible 

without the merger. Scale and scope efficiencies and cost savings generated by this 

merger will also increase the incentive and ability of the merged firm to invest in, 

and assume the risks associated with, developing and deploying a variety of innovative services and features, such as high definition television (‘‘HDTV’’), video-on-demand, and other interactive television (‘‘interactive TV’’) services. 

The proposed merger will also bring benefits in the form of long-awaited local telephone competition, particularly for residential customers. AT&T Broadband brings 

to this merger its considerable expertise and experience in the provision of circuitswitched telephony over cable plant. It currently markets cable telephony to more 

than 7 million households and serves more than 1.5 million lines. Significantly, 

Comcast has no comparable offerings, and the merger will thus permit Comcast to 

accelerate its entry into this market. Although providing local telephone service in 

competition with incumbent carriers involves substantial business risk, AT&T 

Comcast will be better equipped to confront that risk than either company could 

alone, because of the complementary assets and expertise of Comcast and AT&T 

Broadband. Importantly, this competition will be facilities-based, thus allowing the 

merged company to offer residential customers a broader range of differentiated 

services and features that are far less dependent on access to the incumbent telephone companies’ facilities on economically-viable terms and conditions. 

The proposed merger also will deliver benefits to consumers by stimulating the 

production and delivery of local and regional programming. Comcast is widely recognized as an industry leader in the development of successful, high-quality programming geared to regional and local markets. The merger will enable AT&T Comcast 

15

to extend this expertise to areas in which AT&T Broadband has significant clusters. 

The merger will also allow the two companies to draw on their respective expertise 

in community outreach efforts, including initiatives to connect classrooms to the 

Internet. 

The proposed merger is consistent with all applicable laws, including the antitrust 

laws. The proposed merger will have no anticompetitive effects in any relevant market. Comcast and AT&T Broadband provide services to consumers in different local 

markets and, therefore, their union will not affect horizontal concentration in any 

relevant market. Further, the combined entity will not have either the ability or incentive to exercise buyer or seller market power in any relevant market. 

It will not result in any violations of the Communications Act or the Federal Communication Commission’s rules. In particular, it bears emphasis that AT&T 

Comcast will serve less than 30 percent of the Nation’s multichannel video programming distribution (‘‘MVPD’’) customers, the national limit that was reversed and remanded in Time Warner II. That calculation does not include the customers served 

by the Time Warner Entertainment (‘‘TWE’’) and Time Warner Inc. (‘‘TWI’’) cable 

systems. AT&T, with the full support of Comcast, is firmly committed to completing 

the sale of its limited partnership interest in TWE. If that divestiture is not completed prior to closing, the applicants are prepared to take the steps that may be 

necessary to insulate the interest (and thus render it non-attributable) under the 

Commission’s rules, as well as such additional steps as may be appropriate to ensure that AT&T Comcast would not be able to influence TWE prior to its ultimate 

sale. 

In addition, AT&T Comcast is fully committed to negotiating mutually beneficial 

service agreements with Internet service providers (‘‘ISPs’’) so that its cable customers will have a choice of ISPs. Both AT&T Broadband and Comcast have conducted trials to explore the issues associated with multiple ISP arrangements. Now, 

each applicant is actively (and independently) negotiating to reach commercial 

agreements with unaffiliated ISPs. Indeed, Comcast recently announced that it has 

executed an agreement with United Online that will provide Comcast’s customers 

in Indianapolis and Nashville with access to United’s ISP service, with the potential 

to roll-out this offering to other Comcast cable systems with the concurrence of both 

Comcast and United Online. In addition, AT&T recently announced that it has 

reached an agreement with Earthlink. 

In summary, the proposed merger of Comcast and AT&T Broadband offers real 

and substantial benefits to consumers. It will enable AT&T Comcast to accelerate 

costly investments required to equip cable systems with the capability to deliver and 

improve high-speed Internet and other broadband services. The proposed combination will also promote facilities-based local telephone competition, particularly for 

residential customers, and will hasten the development and deployment of other advanced competitive services. The merger will not have any adverse competitive effects in any relevant market. Thus, the merger will be pro-competition, pro-consumer, and consistent with the public interest.

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Roberts. 

Mr. Armstrong. 

STATEMENT OF C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG, CHAIRMAN AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AT&T CORP., BASKING RIDGE, 

NEW JERSEY 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Chairman Kohl and Senators, for 

inviting me to testify about this proposed merger of AT&T and 

Comcast. 

This merger is a unique opportunity, I think, to achieve two of 

Congress’ longstanding goals: first, the widespread deployment of 

facilities-based local telephone competition, and, second, the more 

rapid provision of advanced broadband services. By uniting two 

companies with complementary assets, this merger will bring more 

voice, data, and digital video services to more Americans more 

quickly than would be possible without this merger. 

When I testified before the Judiciary Committee almost 3 years 

ago, I offered that AT&T’s cable investments would give more 

American consumers a choice of local telephone providers. Just 2 

16

years after closing that merger, we are over-achieving on that commitment. We now serve more than 1 million residential telephone 

subscribers. This is a fivefold increase over the number of cable telephony customers we served at the time of the MediaOne merger. 

As a result of this progress, in just these 2 years AT&T 

Broadband has become one of the ten largest local telephone companies in the Nation. Today, in 55 communities, our telephone penetration is already 25 percent or higher, and this includes several 

cities such as Salt Lake, Pittsburgh, and Seattle. We enable customers to pay one charge for local intraLATA toll and long distance, and savings are some 39 percent when compared to incumbent telephone companies. 

In our original 5-year plan, we thought we would break even financially on telephony in the last quarter of this year and we are 

on track, because we are over-achieving, to beat that goal. But despite this rapid success, there is still much more to be done. Incumbent local exchange carriers still serve nearly 95 percent of the 

market for residential telephone service. 

We are confident that AT&T-Comcast will take our success to the 

next level. Comcast cable systems today provide telephone service 

on a very small scale. AT&T’s broadband telephony expertise will 

strengthen Comcast’s ability to offer telephony. 

First, Comcast can take advantage of AT&T Broadband’s technical and operational capability in launching and providing cable 

telephony. We have already deployed the systems for the design, 

for the installation, and for the operation of the complex fiber-coaxial systems that it takes to support digital voice. 

Second, Comcast will gain access to AT&T Broadband’s back office and customer care systems. Third, our marketing success will 

help Comcast face the difficult challenge of competing with local 

monopolies. 

Importantly, because AT&T Broadband’s cable telephony approach is so highly scalable, it will allow us to expand the availability of telephony over Comcast’s systems much more quickly, at 

least capital expense, and in a more customer-friendly manner. In 

fact, Brian and I have already announced that shortly after closing 

the merger we will begin deploying telephone service in Comcast’s 

Philadelphia and Detroit systems. This will bring facilities-based 

local telephone choice to about 1 million more consumers. 

But local telephony competition is not the only important benefit 

of our merger. The merger will also enhance our ability to offer 

new broadband services such as HDTV, video-on-demand, and expanded Internet services to virtually millions of additional Americans. In particular, the combined company will have greater financial strength than either one of us would have to do this alone. As 

a result, we will have far greater access to the capital required to 

upgrade our cable systems to deploy broadband services. 

In addition, the scale economies created by the merger will allow 

us to more efficiently use the combined resources. For example, we 

can combine the call centers, centralize repair and maintenance facilities, and more efficiently manage broadband research and development costs. All of this means that we will be in a much better 

position to bring new broadband services to many, many more customers. 

17

This was our experience in our merger with MediaOne. When I 

testified before you about that merger, I noted that we would give 

many more American consumers access to high-speed Internet and 

other broadband services. In the 2 years since the merger closed, 

our high-speed data customers have nearly doubled to 1.5 million, 

and our digital video customers have jumped from 2.2 million to 3.5 

million. We are just as confident that the combination of our two 

companies will continue these benefits. 

I also want to address the issue of ISP choice which I know is 

of interest. Given the competition we have in the marketplace with 

DSL, we are interested in being as competitive in our offerings to 

consumers as possible. We concluded a 20-million trial in Boulder, 

Colorado, with 4 ISPs. We learned a great deal about what we had 

to do to implement a multiple ISP network. 

In fact, we have negotiated and now have in the process of planning an EarthLink implementation in Boston and Seattle, and we 

announced just this morning another ISP in the Boston area, a 

local, regional ISP, Net One Plus, so that there will be three ISPs 

on the network, and we are currently in negotiation with others. 

Finally, I want to stress that we will achieve all of the benefits 

of our merger without violating any FCC rule or antitrust policy. 

As I described in the written testimony, our merger will not reduce 

competition in any market. 

I look forward to answering any specific questions you may have, 

Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong follows:]

STATEMENT OF C. MICHAEL ARMSTRONG CHAIRMAN AND CEO, AT&T CORP. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for inviting me 

here today to testify about the proposed merger between AT&T Broadband and 

Comcast Corp. 

The merger creates a unique opportunity to accelerate the development and widespread deployment of facilities-based local telephony and broadband services. By 

uniting two companies with remarkably complementary assets, this merger will 

bring more digital video, data, and voice services and features, to more Americans, 

more quickly than would be possible without the merger. In short, the merger will 

benefit American consumers and enhance competition, without violating any FCC 

or antitrust rule or policy. 

I will focus today on two of the principal public interest benefits that will be made 

possible by the merger. Specifically, I will discuss how the merger will: (1) promote 

facilities-based local telephone competition; and (2) accelerate the deployment of facilities-based high-speed Internet service (as well as ISP choice), digital video, and 

other broadband services. I then will explain that the merger will not violate any 

law or regulation (including any horizontal ownership limit) and will cause no competitive harm in any relevant market. 

I. THE MERGER WILL PROMOTE FACILITIES-BASED LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION, 

PARTICULARLY TO RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS

The proposed merger will create substantial benefits in the form of long-awaited 

local telephone competition, particularly for residential customers. Six years after 

passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (‘‘1996 Act’’), virtually all local exchange traffic—and particularly residential traffic—continues to be carried by the 

incumbent local exchange companies (‘‘ILECs’’). While we are making tremendous 

strides, the ILECs still provide local exchange service to 95 percent of the customers 

in their territories. Although our merger obviously cannot be a full solution to producing local competition, it will accelerate the availability of local telephone choice 

to millions of additional consumers. 

The deployment of cable telephony in new markets continues to involve considerable business risks. Cable systems entering the telephony business must underwrite 

large, upfront investments in new plant and develop and implement order procVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
18

essing, customer care, and other complex support systems, in order to overcome the 

substantial advantages of incumbent providers. An ILEC’s installed infrastructure 

allows it to serve customers at a lower incremental cost than a new facilities-based 

entrant and to realize scale efficiencies provided by heavily concentrated customer 

bases. The magnitude of the risks facing new entrants is underscored by the numerous telecommunications companies that have filed for bankruptcy in recent years. 

AT&T Comcast will be on a stronger footing in dealing with these substantial 

business risks because of the complementary assets and expertise of AT&T 

Broadband and Comcast and the scale economies created by the merged entity. 

AT&T Broadband brings to the merged entity extensive experience and expertise in 

the design, roll-out, provisioning, operations, and marketing of cable telephony in 

a customer-friendly manner. AT&T Broadband currently offers cable telephony in 

16 markets to more than 7 million households and has approximately 1.1 million 

customers. We offer special ‘‘Block of Time’’ plans that allow customers to pay one 

charge for local, intraLATA toll, and long distance telephone services, with savings 

in some markets of over 39 percent when compared to incumbent LEC calling plans. 

Savings for customers buying more than one line can be even higher. 

Our experience has been quite positive. For example, in the Salt Lake City market, we have had consumer take rates of 25 percent or higher in Ogden, Provo, and 

Salt Lake. We have had a similar consumer response in several Pittsburgh-area 

communities, including McKeesport, Aliquippa, East Hills, South Hills, Beaver 

Falls, Carnegie, McKees Rocks, Ross, and Midland, as well as Bellingham in the Seattle market. 

In the past year alone, AT&T Broadband added almost one-half million new cable 

telephony customers, increasing its customer base by over 100 percent. As illustrated below, AT&T Broadband is by far the leading provider of cable telephony in 

the U.S. today:

By contrast, Comcast’s cable systems currently provide cable-delivered telephone 

services on only a very small scale, mostly in cable systems Comcast acquired from 

third parties which had already launched telephone service. 

Fortunately, AT&T Broadband’s cable telephony expertise is highly scaleable and 

can be applied to Comcast’s existing cable systems. As a result, AT&T Comcast will 


85889.029
19

be better able to expand the availability of telephony over the Comcast systems 

more quickly, at less expense, and in a more customer-friendly manner. In light of 

these synergies, Comcast has announced that, after closing, the merged company intends to begin to deploy telephone service in the Philadelphia and Detroit markets 

currently served by Comcast, bringing facilities-based local telephone choice to about 

one million additional homes. 

AT&T Broadband’s cable telephony expertise will enhance the ability of Comcast’s 

cable systems to offer telephony services in three important respects: technical and 

operational expertise, back office systems, and marketing. 

A. TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL EXPERTISE

Comcast will acquire AT&T Broadband’s technical and operational expertise in 

launching and providing cable telephony. AT&T Broadband has already deployed 

centralized systems to support the design, installation, maintenance, and operation 

of the complex, two-way hybrid fiber-coaxial systems that support digital voice and 

data applications and that interconnect with both copper twisted-pair and fiber optic 

technologies used by the ILECs. 

AT&T Broadband has several business units that have developed—at significant 

cost—the technical and operational know-how to provide cable telephony in an efficient and consumer-friendly manner. For example, the AT&T Broadband National 

Operations team provides support on a wide range of planning, engineering, technical, and operational issues that are faced when deploying complex cable telephony 

service. AT&T Broadband’s Technical Operations Organization has already developed operational performance metrics to ensure quality cable telephony services, effective training of technicians and field fulfillment personnel, and cost-effective investigation and resolution of field performance issues. AT&T Broadband’s National 

Service Assurance Center provides the means for our cable systems to ensure not 

only that calls are completed successfully and billed correctly, but also that all of 

the necessary number portability, emergency service, and other databases are managed correctly. And, cable telephony providers must be interconnected to, and coordinate with, ILECs (and other competitive LECs) and interact effectively with a 

variety of third parties to rate, record, and bill traffic for purposes of reciprocal compensation—all functions that AT&T Broadband already performs for its systems. 

Upon closing of the merger, the same organizations at AT&T Broadband that now 

act as the points of interface for these issues will be available to support cable telephony operations over the Comcast systems. Comcast will also be able to take advantage of certain interconnection agreements that AT&T Broadband has with the 

incumbent LECs serving Comcast’s territories. 

B. BACK OFFICE SYSTEMS

Comcast will also gain access to AT&T Broadband’s existing back office systems 

that support cable telephony. These systems allow AT&T Broadband to take customer orders and to serve as the point of contact for customer care inquiries. Having 

in place these ‘‘nuts and bolts’’ back office capabilities and employees is essential 

to offering local telephone service in competition with incumbent LECs. Not only are 

AT&T Broadband’s back office systems highly robust and efficient, but they employ 

technologies and processes that will allow AT&T Comcast to use them to support 

offerings in Comcast territories without incurring substantial additional cost. 

The combination with AT&T Broadband will also enhance Comcast’s telephone 

billing capabilities. AT&T Broadband has in place specialized billing software processes, developed over several years, that are sufficiently flexible to handle a service 

area’s unique billing parameters and sufficiently robust to handle substantial increases in volume. These back office billing systems can be used to support telephone entry in Comcast territories at a mass market level. 

C. MARKETING. 

AT&T Broadband’s substantial marketing expertise will also help Comcast face 

the considerable challenge of competing for local telephony customers against formidable incumbents in Comcast’s service areas. AT&T Broadband has already conducted primary market research on topics such as pricing and offer design—

benchmarked against the competition—to assist it in developing successful product 

offers, programs, and marketing campaigns. And AT&T Broadband has learned a 

tremendous amount about customer preferences (including the types of marketing 

that customers like and dislike) as a result of its market experience over the past 

several years. 

Finally, the technical, operational, back office, marketing, and customer care experience AT&T Broadband has gained from its cable-based, circuit-switched telephony 

20

operations should be applicable in an IP telephony environment. Comcast and 

AT&T Broadband have taken leadership roles in developing cable-delivered IP telephony. IP telephony may result in significantly lower roll-out costs and increased 

flexibility and may also provide a common infrastructure that supports multiple advanced services. AT&T Broadband is committed to the continued development of IP 

telephony. 

I want to emphasize that the synergies detailed above are not merely theoretical. 

AT&T Broadband’s experience in deploying cable telephony after the MediaOne 

merger has proven that combining new cable assets will result in just such consumer benefits. Indeed, as illustrated below, the number of telephony customers 

served by AT&T Broadband today is five times greater than the number served by 

the two separate companies before their merger:

We are confident that AT&T Comcast can build on this successful record, and that 

the combination of our complementary assets and expertise will further accelerate 

the pace, broad deployment, and effectiveness of facilities-based local telephone competition, creating substantial benefits for consumers. It is also worth emphasizing, 

however, that while the promise of facilities-based local telephone competition is a 

major benefit of this merger, realizing this promise will require a substantial investment of time and money by AT&T Comcast, as well as other cable operators, to deploy the necessary technology and gain the necessary market presence. AT&T 

Broadband and Comcast are strongly committed to making these investments, but 

nothing about cable telephony or this merger diminishes the independent need to 

facilitate the other means of creating local telephone competition that Congress 

specified in the 1996 Act. 

II. THE MERGER ALSO WILL ENHANCE THE DEPLOYMENT OF FACILITIES-BASED HIGHSPEED INTERNET SERVICE, DIGITAL VIDEO, AND OTHER BROADBAND SERVICES, PARTICULARLY TO RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS

Comcast and AT&T Broadband both offer high-speed Internet services, serving a 

combined 2.5 million customers. By combining complementary assets and experience 

and creating economies of scale and scope, the merger will allow us to more efficiently develop and deploy new, innovative broadband applications over the AT&T 

and Comcast cable facilities, providing substantial benefits to consumers and stimulating productivity gains and growth in the U.S. economy. Moreover, AT&T 

Comcast’s efforts will provide a competitive spur to other entities, including incumbent telephone companies, nationwide direct broadcast satellite (‘‘DBS’’) providers, 

and others. The existence of a strong and credible broadband alternative on cable 

has already generated competitive responses in the form of accelerated DSL deployVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC

85889.030
21

ment by incumbent telephone companies, and this proposed merger will further advance this trend. 

A. Capital Improvements And Other Merger Benefits 

AT&T Broadband’s merger with Comcast will enhance significantly its access to 

the capital required to underwrite an aggressive plan for deploying new broadband 

services such as HDTV, video-on-demand, and expanded Internet offerings to residential consumers over existing AT&T Broadband systems. It is estimated that 

AT&T Broadband and Comcast collectively will spend approximately $5.5 billion in 

2002 on capital expenditure items and, following the merger, AT&T Comcast will 

continue to make substantial capital expenditures. AT&T Comcast should be able 

to obtain lower prices for many of these capital items as a result of the increased 

scale of its purchases. 

More generally, the scale economies created by the merger will foster more efficient use of infrastructure (e.g., by allowing for more efficient use of call centers), 

and provisioning, repair, and maintenance (e.g., by providing local/regional scale to 

support efficient, centralized truck rolls). The merger will also provide national scale 

that will allow the merged firm to defray more efficiently the enormous research, 

development, and testing costs associated with new services and features. This increased scale is particularly important to accelerating the development and testing 

of new interactive TV services, voice-enhanced data services, home networking and 

security, and other new, and as yet untested, broadband services. 

B. ISP Choice 

I want to address in particular the issue of ISP choice, which I know is of interest 

to members of the Subcommittee. AT&T Broadband and Comcast share a strong 

commitment to providing multiple ISP access on their broadband networks. Indeed, 

both companies have ample market incentives to make commercially reasonable, 

customer-friendly arrangements with unaffiliated ISPs in order to maximize the 

attractiveness of their Internet offerings to customers and potential customers. 

Given the need to compete with DSL and other comparable high-speed data providers, AT&T Comcast will continue to have such incentives to offer its customers 

a choice of ISPs post-merger. 

AT&T Broadband has made real progress in its efforts to provide ISP choice. In 

particular, in 2000 and 2001, AT&T Broadband conducted a $20 million 6-month 

trial in Boulder with four ISPs (Excite@Home, EarthLink, Juno, and WorldNet) 

which provided significant experience on the technical and operational requirements 

needed to support a multiple ISP environment. The Boulder trial enabled us to test 

our technical infrastructure and assess our key business assumptions. For example, 

we learned a great deal in Boulder about routing architecture, consumer self-help 

and diagnostic tools, business-to-business interfaces, and how consumers value ease 

of ISP selection. 

The lessons learned in Boulder will be valuable as we roll out ISP choice in Boston and Seattle this year. The first step in commencing implementation of ISP 

choice is the agreement we recently entered into with an unaffiliated ISP, 

EarthLink. Under the agreement, EarthLink will offer high-speed cable Internet 

service via AT&T Broadband’s network. Initially, EarthLink will launch service in 

Seattle followed by greater Boston. The companies anticipate launching EarthLink’s 

service in additional AT&T Broadband markets in 2003. The planning discussions 

are underway with EarthLink regarding, for example, the interconnection of our two 

networks, the deployment of efficient operational interfaces between the companies, 

and the schedule for rolling out the service in particular communities. In addition, 

we are actively reaching out to a number of regional ISPs in an effort to provide 

our customers with even greater ISP choice. We are also migrating to a more robust 

high-speed data provisioning system across all of our markets to provide more effective support for our high-speed data customers, both those we serve directly and 

those receiving ISP services from unaffiliated ISPs. 

Comcast also has conducted trials of ISP choice, which have provided it with valuable experience and insight into how best to roll out this new offering. The merger 

will enable our two companies to share the unique experiences we have had and 

the important knowledge we have gained in our respective ISP choice trials. This 

sharing of ‘‘best practices’’ will enable AT&T Comcast to overcome the substantial 

technical and operational complexities involved in implementing ISP choice, so that 

this important new service offering can be rolled out on a more efficient and widespread basis than the two companies could hope to achieve independently. 

22

III. THE MERGER WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY VIOLATION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS

ACT OR THE FCC’S RULES

The proposed merger will not result in the violation of any provisions of the Communications Act, other applicable statutes, or the FCC’s rules. In particular, I will 

address today the reasons why the proposed merger will not violate the FCC’s cable 

horizontal ownership limit. 

In October 1999, the FCC adopted a rule prohibiting a cable operator from having 

an attributable interest in cable systems that account for more than 30 percent of 

all MVPD subscribers nationwide. However, as the Subcommittee knows, last year 

the D.C. Circuit in Time Warner II reversed the 30 percent limit and remanded the 

rule to the FCC for further consideration. The FCC has initiated a proceeding to 

consider the cable horizontal issue in light of Time Warner II. The FCC has not yet 

reached a decision in that proceeding. 

Of course, AT&T Comcast will take all steps necessary to comply with any new 

cable horizontal ownership limit that the FCC adopts. But, it is especially noteworthy that the merger would not violate even the 30 percent limit that was set 

aside in Time Warner II. AT&T Comcast will serve approximately 27.3 million subscribers, or about 29.7 percent of the Nation’s MVPD subscribers. Because this percentage is below the horizontal limit in effect before the ruling in Time Warner II, 

there can be no reasonable basis for concern that the proposed merger would violate 

any horizontal ownership rule. 

This calculation does not include the subscribers served by the cable systems 

owned by Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. (‘‘TWE’’). When AT&T merged with 

MediaOne, AT&T Broadband acquired a minority, limited partnership interest representing about 25 percent of TWE. Subsidiaries of AOL Time Warner hold the remaining majority interest in TWE. Under the terms of the TWE Limited Partnership Agreement (‘‘LPA’’), AT&T Broadband has no role in or ability to influence the 

management or operations of TWE, nor does it have the right to communicate with 

TWE, or AOL Time Warner, the general partner of TWE, on matters pertaining to 

the day-to-day operations of TWE. The TWE Cable Management Committee (all 

members of which are appointed by and from AOL Time Warner) has full discretion 

and final authority over TWE’s cable operations. All of MediaOne’s rights with regard to the TWE Cable Management Committee were terminated before AT&T 

merged with MediaOne and acquired the TWE interest. Thus, we believe that the 

interest in TWE would qualify for insulation from attribution to AT&T Broadband 

under the FCC’s attribution rules today, and to AT&T Comcast post-merger. 

In any event, AT&T Broadband and Comcast do not view the TWE interest as 

a long-term investment and are firmly committed to divesting the interest for a fair 

price as quickly and efficiently as possible. In fact, the process of attempting to sell 

the TWE interest is already underway. AT&T Broadband has pursued with AOL 

Time Warner various options for the sale of its TWE interest to AOL Time Warner 

in an efficient and expeditious manner. AT&T Broadband also is pursuing the sale 

of its TWE interest via a public offering pursuant to the registration rights provisions of the TWE LPA. Although AT&T Broadband is pursuing diligently all possible avenues to dispose of its TWE interest, the simple fact is that our ability to 

sell promptly the interest at a fair price depends almost entirely on the cooperation 

of AOL Time Warner and its subsidiaries, who do not have the same interests or 

incentives as AT&T Broadband in this regard. 

IV. THE MERGER WILL HAVE NO ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS IN ANY RELEVANT

MARKET

AT&T Broadband and Comcast provide services to consumers in different local 

markets and therefore the proposed merger will have no measurable impact on horizontal concentration in any relevant market. Additionally, the combined entity will 

not have either the ability or incentive to exercise buyer market power in any relevant market. 

A. MULTICHANNEL VIDEO PROGRAMMING DISTRIBUTION

The merger will not have any adverse effect on competition in the business of 

multichannel video programming distribution. AT&T Broadband and Comcast cable 

systems reach different residences and businesses and compete in different local 

markets, so the proposed merger will not reduce actual competition in any relevant 

local distribution market. 

Further, the merged company will face intense competition from DBS providers. 

DirecTV and EchoStar, two DBS providers, distribute video programming throughout the United States and compete directly in all local markets served by AT&T 

23

Broadband, Comcast, and other cable operators. In less than 10 years, DBS has 

grown from serving no multichannel video subscribers to serving nearly 18 million 

subscribers, over 19 percent of all MVPD subscribers nationwide. Last year alone, 

DBS grew 12 times faster than cable, with both DirecTV and EchoStar experiencing 

tremendous subscriber growth. Indeed, four out of five new customers now are 

choosing DBS over cable, and almost one-half of existing DBS subscribers are 

former cable customers. In addition, AT&T Comcast will face retail competition in 

many localities from cable ‘‘overbuilders’’ (including RCN and Knology), electric utilities (including Starpower and Seren), and MMDS and SMATV providers. 

B. VIDEO PROGRAMMING PRODUCTION AND PACKAGING

The merger will not adversely affect competition in the production and packaging 

of video programming for sale to MVPDs. As explained below, AT&T Comcast will 

have neither: (1) ‘‘seller power’’ that would allow it to raise prices for, or discriminate in the distribution of, video programming; nor (2) ‘‘buyer power’’ that would 

allow it to insist on anticompetitive terms and conditions for programming that it 

purchases from others. 

As the members of the Subcommittee know, a critical element of any competition 

analysis is the definition of the relevant geographic market. The relevant geographic 

market for the purchase and sale of video programming is quite broad and, for 

many types of programming, international in scope. There are no significant limitations on transporting programming and, as a result, video programming can be sent 

to virtually any distribution outlet in the world for roughly equivalent costs. Moreover, the only limiting factor on the international distribution of U.S.-produced content is whether there is foreign demand for that content. Foreign demand is quite 

strong; international sales now account for a very substantial portion of video programmers’ businesses. By way of example, MTV reaches more than 340 million 

households in 140 countries. 

1. Seller Power 

The merger will not reduce competition or create market power in the sale of 

video programming by AT&T Comcast. The combined company will have only very 

modest programming interests and no enhanced ability to control the pricing of 

video programming to MVPDs. AT&T Comcast will have ownership interests in a 

total of 24 video programming networks, or 6.4 percent of the current 374 programming networks. This very limited set of post-merger interests (many of which are 

minority interests) presents no concentration problem or threat of competitive harm, 

particularly when viewed against the backdrop of the highly competitive video programming marketplace, and the far more significant program holdings of other 

media entities. 

2. Buyer Power 

AT&T Broadband and Comcast are, of course, buyers of video programming. 

There are two theories of competitive harm that could be raised by an assertion that 

the merger creates buyer ‘‘market power’’: first, that the merger would reduce horizontal competition in the purchasing of programming and thereby create buyer monopsony power; and second, that the merger would increase the incentive and ability 

of the merged firm to engage in distribution foreclosure in the purchase of video programming from video programming producers. As explained below, the merger will 

not create any anticompetitive consequences under either of these theories. 

Monopsony Power. Traditional monopsony theory holds that a firm buying a sufficiently high percentage of the output of a group of sellers may have the ability to 

set unilaterally the price it pays for goods or services produced by the sellers. This 

theory has no applicability in the present case for several reasons. 

First, companies can only exercise monopsony power over goods that, when sold 

to one buyer, cannot be sold to another buyer. However, video programming can be 

consumed by an unlimited number of buyers. This negates the normal intuition that 

a very large purchaser may be able to exercise monopsony power over sellers. 

Second, a programmer’s distribution alternatives will largely determine whether 

the programmer is vulnerable to an attempt to exercise monopsony power. As noted, 

AT&T Comcast will account for less than 30 percent of total purchases, and that 

is not remotely enough to give it buyer market power, since the alternative distribution channels and revenue sources available to video programmers are significant 

(i.e., over 70 percent of the U.S. distribution market, as well as substantial international distribution markets). 

Third, a cable operator’s appetite for quality programming is driven by consumer 

demand and retail competition. As a cable operator gets bigger, there is no change 

in its incentives to buy the programming that is likely to produce the greatest numVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
24

ber of viewers relative to the cost of the programming. For these reasons, and given 

the intense competition from DBS and others at the retail level, even if a cable operator was large enough to exercise monopsony power—and AT&T Comcast clearly 

will not be large enough—it would choose the same quantity and quality of programming as a competitive, ‘‘non-monopsonist’’ purchaser. 

Distribution Foreclosure. Nor could the combination of AT&T Broadband and 

Comcast trigger any foreclosure concerns. Such concerns could arise if the merged 

entity would have sufficient market power in the distribution of programming such 

that it would have the incentive and ability to foreclose access to its cable systems 

by refusing to buy programming that viewers desire from unaffiliated program packagers or producers. 

As an initial matter, AT&T Comcast will not have the incentive to foreclose unaffiliated video program packagers or producers because AT&T Comcast will have 

only modest video programming interests, and the damage caused by distribution 

foreclosure to its core cable distribution business could be substantial. It is clear 

that consumers view DBS and cable as substitutes and have demonstrated that they 

would readily switch from cable to DBS if they viewed AT&T Comcast’s offering as 

inferior. As a result, any action by AT&T Comcast that degraded the quality of its 

programming—by foreclosing competitively priced unaffiliated programming that 

consumers want—would cause AT&T Comcast to lose customers to DBS or other 

distributors. Moreover, given the modest programming interests of AT&T Comcast, 

the potential benefits of such a strategy would be essentially non-existent. 

AT&T Comcast will also have no ability to foreclose. In order to engage in foreclosure successfully, AT&T Comcast would have to control such a substantial percentage of all distribution channels to which rival video programmers could turn as 

to be able to drive them out of business or substantially raise their costs. However, 

even focusing solely on U.S. MVPD distribution channels, AT&T Comcast will purchase programming for systems that serve less than 30 percent of subscribers. Video 

programmers, of course, understand marketplace dynamics and would recognize 

that, even without AT&T Comcast, they still have access to more than 70 percent 

of U.S. MVPD subscribers. 

C. SET-TOP BOXES, CABLE MODEMS, AND OTHER MVPD CONSUMER EQUIPMENT

Likewise, the merger will have no adverse effect on any equipment market. The 

relevant geographic market for MVPD customer equipment is global. Set-top boxes, 

modems, and other navigation devices are purchased by MVPDs and MVPD customers in the U.S., as well as by MVPDs, consumers, and other buyers worldwide. 

With fewer than 30 million subscribers, AT&T Comcast will represent less than 10 

percent of the 317 million worldwide cable and DBS subscribers. Accordingly, AT&T 

Comcast cannot be considered to have the power to do anything to harm the production or supply of such equipment. 

Even if one were to focus on the domestic equipment market, AT&T Comcast 

would purchase equipment for less than 30 percent of U.S. multichannel video customers—a level too low to raise any concerns about anticompetitive harm. 

Moreover, given the ubiquitous availability of DBS and DSL alternatives, AT&T 

Comcast will have no incentive to exercise market power against set-top box or 

modem manufacturers. Any action by a cable operator that has the effect of restricting the supply of high-quality equipment that enables consumers to access operatorprovided services would cause the operator to lose cable customers to the DBS competitors and Internet customers to DSL or other competing providers. Thus, AT&T 

Comcast will be compelled by market forces to deal fairly with equipment manufacturers and to ensure that it and its customers have access to the best quality stateof-the-art equipment at the best possible price. 

D. INTERACTIVE TV SERVICES

The merger will not harm consumers or competition with respect to the provision 

of interactive TV services. As with MVPD and other services discussed above, AT&T 

Broadband and Comcast do not compete with each other in the provision of interactive TV services, so the merger will have no adverse effect on competition in this 

business. Moreover, the interactive TV business is in the very early stages of its development and many questions remain about the technology and consumers’ demand for it. Indeed, there has not yet emerged a clear definition of what interactive 

TV is or how the market should be defined. So, it is entirely premature to even speculate on how the merger might affect this business. 

Moreover, notwithstanding the nascent stage of the interactive TV business, numerous companies (including DBS providers) are investing substantial resources in 

developing, deploying, and distributing interactive TV content, equipment, and servVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
25

ices. In this highly dynamic environment, AT&T Comcast will have no market 

power in the provision of interactive TV services. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the proposed merger.

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Armstrong. 

As I noted, there is a vote, so we will have now a 10-minute recess and then we will be back. 

[The subcommittee stood in recess from 2:44 p.m. to 3:02 p.m.] 

Chairman KOHL. This hearing will resume, and we will commence with testimony by Mr. Betty. 

STATEMENT OF GARRY BETTY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

EARTHLINK, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 

Mr. BETTY. Thank you, Chairman Kohl, Senators, and thank you 

for inviting me to testify today about the proposed merger between 

AT&T and Comcast and its potential impact on competition and 

consumer choice in the broadband Internet access arena. 

My name is Garry Betty. I am the CEO of EarthLink. EarthLink 

is the Nation’s third largest Internet service provider and we are 

the largest independent ISP. We currently serve 4.9 million customers with dial-up, broadband, and Web-hosting services. In 

broadband, EarthLink is platform-agnostic, providing high-speed 

Internet access to over 530,000 customers through digital subscriber line, cable, and satellite connections. The majority of 

EarthLink’s broadband customers today have DSL connections, as 

most major cable companies do not offer cable modem customers a 

choice of ISPs. 

All of us here today want to encourage broadband deployment. 

Broadband deployment is a term that is frequently used about almost anything these days. Unfortunately, it is also misused as an 

excuse for activities that benefit network owners at the expense of 

consumers. 

It has been said that you can do just about anything you want 

in Washington these days as long as you say it is to promote 

broadband deployment. One example of this has been the refusal 

of most major cable companies to allow consumers who want to 

connect to the broadband Internet through high-speed cable 

modems to choose their ISP. Rather, these cable companies have 

forced customers to use just their cable company’s in-house Internet service. 

This ‘‘take or leave it’’ choice has resulted in higher prices and 

lower adoption rates than would be the case if consumers had competitive choice in their Internet provider over cable. We are therefore here today to ask that AT&T and Comcast commit to providing 

customers in all their markets a choice in broadband ISPs over 

cable by signing commercially reasonable contracts with independent ISPs prior to the merger being approved. 

AT&T and Comcast have argued since 1998 to Congress, the 

FCC, Federal courts, and local authorities that they should not be 

required to offer their subscribers a choice in Internet providers 

over broadband cable. Rather, they have proposed that open access 

should be voluntary, and have promised that they would open their 

26

networks by this year. They have couched these arguments in very 

appealing calls for market-based solutions for broadband Internet 

access over cable. 

Unfortunately, while ISPs have always existed in a competitive 

marketplace, cable companies have not. Just as most consumers 

have no competitive choice in their cable television provider, so too 

most consumers have no choice in their Internet provider over 

broadband cable. 

This is a significant problem, since cable is and will remain the 

primary platform through which consumers get broadband Internet 

access. In 2001, cable provided about two-thirds, or 6.5 million out 

of 9.7 million, of all broadband connections. By the end of 2002, 

cable will still be 60 percent, and by 2005 it is estimated that cable 

will provide more than half of the connections for broadband customers. 

Notwithstanding calls for ubiquitous competition in platforms, 

the fact remains that cable will remain the only broadband connection for millions of Americans for years to come. This many consumers should not be denied meaningful choice in their Internet 

provider over these cable connections. 

Furthermore, broadband is the future of the Internet. While the 

market for dial-up Internet access has matured and reached a platform of about 55 million households, broadband continues to grow 

and it has grown from about 1 million households at the end of 

1999 to an estimated 30 million households by the end of 2005. 

There have been a lot of promises made over the years. During 

1999, in AT&T’s merger with TCI, AT&T told the Commission that 

it was committed to an open broadband platform and that it would 

favor the unbundling of the modem in order to provide consumers 

with choice at the lowest prices. 

Later that year, at the urging of then-FCC Chairman Kennard, 

AT&T signed a statement of principles with MindSpring Enterprises, now part of EarthLink, in which AT&T committed to offer 

broadband consumers a choice of ISPs when its exclusive contract 

with its own affiliated ISP, Excite@Home, expired in June 2002. 

In June 2000, AT&T signed an agreement with the Massachusetts Coalition for Consumer Choice and Competition, which was 

seeking an open access referendum on the November 2000 ballot. 

In exchange for removing the ballot initiative, AT&T committed to 

conduct a multiple ISP trial no later than October 2001 and to implement ISP choice statewide by July 1, 2002. 

As part of their acquisition of TCI, AT&T also made a commitment in the year 2000 to the local franchising authority in King 

County, Washington, to provide multiple ISP choices to consumers 

once their contract expired. On March 12, we announced an agreement with AT&T to offer broadband service to AT&T Broadband 

cable customers in Boston and Seattle later this year. They have 

also suggested that they will open additional markets during 2003, 

although they are under no obligation to do so. 

While we are pleased to have reached the agreements we have 

and look forward to signing others like them, there are still millions of AT&T and Comcast cable customers who have no competitive choice in broadband Internet service over cable. 

27

Similarly, Comcast recently signed an agreement with United 

Online to provide Indianapolis and Nashville customers with a 

choice of ISPs. Again, these limited agreements raise a question as 

to whether this is a slow trend toward long-promised open access 

or merely an effort to forestall an open access requirement in the 

context of this merger review. 

As I am running out of time, I will say that we have been very 

satisfied with the arrangement that we have been able to negotiate 

with AOL Time Warner. I think it is an example of how it does 

provide consumer choice. Their business and adoption rates have 

increased 20 to 25 percent only 6 months after the introduction of 

that and has been a big part of their growth story prospectively. 

What I urge today is to have support from the Senate to support 

concepts of customer choice on open access over AT&T and 

Comcast systems, look for standards of effective open access consistent with what was set forth in the AOL Time Warner agreement that we signed, and perhaps push for getting more than just 

a promise and actually implement contractual arrangements between independent third parties prior to the merger being concluded. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Betty follows:]

STATEMENT OF GARRY BETTY, CEO, EARTHLINK

Good afternoon and thank you for inviting me to testify today about the proposed 

merger between AT&T and Comcast and its potential impact on competition and 

consumer choice in broadband internet access. 

I am Garry Betty, CEO of EarthLink. EarthLink is the Nation’s third largest 

Internet Service Provider (ISP) and is the largest independent ISP. EarthLink 

serves 4.9 million customers with dial-up, broadband and web hosting services. In 

broadband, EarthLink is ‘‘platform agnostic’’ providing high-speed internet access to 

over 530,000 customers through Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), cable, and satellite 

connections. The majority of EarthLink’s broadband subscribers today have DSL 

connections as most major cable companies do not offer cable modem customers a 

choice of ISPs. 

All of us here today want to encourage broadband deployment. ‘‘Broadband deployment’’ is a term that is frequently used these days. Unfortunately, it is also 

sometimes misused as an excuse for activities that benefit network owners at the 

expense of consumers. It has been said that you can do just about anything you 

want in Washington these days as long as you say it is to promote broadband deployment. 

One example of this has been the refusal of most major cable companies to allow 

consumers who want to connect to the broadband internet through a high-speed 

cable modem to choose their internet provider. Rather, these cable companies have 

forced consumers to use just their cable company’s in-house internet service. This 

take-it-or-leave-it choice has resulted in higher prices and lower adoption rates than 

would be the case if consumers had competitive choice in their internet provider 

over cable. 

We are therefore here today to ask that AT&T and Comcast commit to providing 

customers in all their markets a choice in broadband ISPs over cable by signing 

commercially reasonable contracts with independent ISPs prior to their merger 

being approved. 

AT&T AND COMCAST MUST OFFER CABLE MODEM CUSTOMERS A CHOICE OF ISPS

ATT and Comcast have argued since 1998 to Congress, the FCC, Federal courts 

and local authorities that they should not be required to offer their subscribers a 

choice in internet providers over broadband cable. Rather, they have proposed that 

open access should be voluntary and have promised that they would open their networks by this year. They have couched these arguments in very appealing calls for 

market-based solutions for broadband internet access over cable. 

28

Unfortunately, while ISPs have always existed in a competitive marketplace, 

cable companies have not. Just as most consumers have no competitive choice in 

their cable television provider, so too most consumers have no choice in their internet provider over broadband cable. 

This is a significant problem since cable is and will remain the primary platform 

through which consumers get broadband internet access. In 2001, Cable provided 

about 2⁄3 (6.5 million out of 9.7 million) of all broadband connections. By year-end 

2002, cable will still provide 60 percent (8.0 million out of 13.8 million) of all 

broadband connections. By 2005, cable will still provide more than half (est. 17.0 

million out of 30.7 million) broadband connections. 

Notwithstanding calls for ubiquitous competition in platforms (i.e. cable vs. DSL 

vs. satellite) the fact remains that cable will remain the only broadband connection 

for millions of Americans for years to come. This many consumers should not be denied meaningful choice in their internet provider over those cable connections. 

Furthermore, broadband is the future of the internet. While the market for dialup internet access has matured and reached a plateau at about 55 million households, broadband continues to grow from about 1 million households at year-end 

1999 to an estimated 30 million or more households by 2005. 

PROMISES MADE

In 1999, during the FCC’s review of AT&T’s merger with TCI (even then the Nation’s largest cable company), AT&T told the Commission that it was committed to 

an open broadband platform and that it ‘‘would favor the unbundling of the modem 

in order to provide consumers with choice and lowest prices.’’

Later that year, at the urging of then FCC Chairman Kennard, AT&T signed a 

statement of principles with MindSpring Enterprises (now part of EarthLink) in 

which AT&T committed to offer its broadband consumers a choice of ISPs when its 

exclusive contract with its own affiliated ISP, Excite@Home, expired in June 2002. 

(Letter to FCC Chairman William E. Kennard from James W. Cicconi, David N. 

Baker and Kenneth S. Fellman, December 6, 1999). 

BOSTON AND SEATTLE: LOCAL COMMITMENTS

In June 2000, AT&T signed an agreement with the Massachusetts Coalition for 

Consumer Choice and Competition which was seeking an open access referendum 

from the November 2000 ballot. In exchange for removing the ballot initiative, 

AT&T committed to conduct a multiple ISP trial no later than October 2001, and 

to implement ISP choice statewide by July 1, 2002. (Memorandum of Agreement between AT&T Corp. and the Massachusetts Coalition, June 27, 2000). 

As part of their acquisition of TCI, AT&T also made a commitment in year 2000 

to the local franchising authority in King County, Washington to provide multiple 

ISP choice to consumers once their contract with Excite@Home expired on June 4, 

2002. As Excite@Home expired before their contract did, King County demanded in 

February 2002 that open access should immediately be implemented. (Letter to 

Janet Turpen, AT&T, from Kevin Kearns, King Co. Washington, February 19, 2002). 

SMALL STEPS FORWARD

On March 12, 2002, EarthLink announced an agreement with AT&T to offer 

broadband internet service to AT&T Broadband cable customers in Boston and Seattle later this year. AT&T has also suggested that they will open additional markets in 2003. While we are pleased to have reached the agreements we have, and 

look forward to signing others like them, there are still millions of AT&T and 

Comcast cable customers who still have no competitive choice in broadband internet 

service providers over cable. 

Similarly, Comcast recently signed an agreement with United Online to provide 

Indianapolis and Nashville customers with a choice of ISPs. Again, these limited 

agreements raise the question as to whether this is a slow trend toward long-promised open access or merely an effort to forestall open access requirements in the context of a merger review. 

While we would like to believe that AT&T, Comcast and other cable companies 

will voluntarily open their systems, promises may no longer be enough. This merger 

would combine the Nation’s first and third largest cable companies into super-size 

company controlling cable TV and internet access to over 40 percent of American 

homes. We would prefer to be able to sign business contracts on commercially reasonable terms. But barring such commitments, open access requirements would be 

necessary to ensure consumer choice in access. 

29

AOL-TIME WARNER EXAMPLE

As part of its’ antitrust review of the AOL Time Warner merger, the FTC required 

open access as a condition of approving that merger. In order to offer cable internet 

access through its affiliate AOL, Time Warner Cable must allow subscribers on its 

cable systems to choose from among AOL, Roadrunner (another in-house service), 

EarthLink, or other two other unaffiliated ISPs. 

While it is still early in our relationship with Time Warner, we are glad to report 

significant progress. Beginning in September 2001, EarthLink now offers broadband 

internet access to Time Warner Cable customers in 30 of their top 40 markets, with 

the remainder to come online by the end of this year. 

This open access relationship benefits all involved. Not only can EarthLink offer 

broadband service to customers formerly foreclosed to us, but we have helped drive 

overall broadband subscriber growth on the Time Warner systems. Time Warner executives have noted a 20 percent to 25 percent increase in overall broadband take 

rates. (Chris Bogart, Pres./CEO of Time Warner Cable Ventures, at Goldman Sachs 

Communacopia 2002, April 9, 2002). Consumers also benefit as they now have competitive choice in their internet provider over cable, with price differentiation and 

EarthLink service offered at a market-leading $41.95 a month. 

I urge you today to support the same basic conditions of open access on the AT&T 

and Comcast systems that apply to the AOL Time Warner systems. 

The minimum standards for effective open access are: 

• Consumers of broadband cable services should have a choice among multiple 

ISPs. • Cable broadband providers must negotiate at arms-length nondiscriminatory 

commercial arrangements with both affiliated and non-affiliated ISPs (including 

‘‘first screen’’ placement). • ISPs should have the choice of operating on a national, regional, or local basis. • Both the ISP and the cable operator should have the opportunity for a direct 

relationship with the customer. • ISPs should be allowed to provide video streaming and there should be no discriminatory restrictions on provision of content. 

These are the basic standards that shaped the FTC’s requirement for open access 

on the AOL Time Warner systems. These same requirements should be met by 

AT&T and Comcast as a condition of their merger. 

NOT REGULATING THE INTERNET

There’s been a lot of rhetoric by cable companies and their surrogates that open 

access is ‘‘regulatory.’’ But stop for a moment and consider what’s being regulated. 

Throughout the country, cable companies have had exclusive local franchises to operate the cable system in any given area. These franchises were created by government regulations. Actions that seek to limit cable monopoly power created by these 

regulations, and to give consumers increased choices in broadband services are, by 

definition, de-regulatory. 

This is also not ‘‘regulating the internet.’’ The open unregulated competitive internet we enjoy today exists because of regulations on the underlying largely non-competitive infrastructure over which it travels. That’s why even though consumers 

until recently had no choice in local phone service (and may only have limited choice 

today), they have never been required to buy the local phone company’s ISP. For 

example, Verizon’s ISP is available as a competitive choice, but you’re not required 

to buy or use their ISP just because you get your local phone service from them. 

Compare this to most cable companies (which are also regulated, just under different rules) where if you want internet access through a cable modem, you have 

no choice but to purchase the cable company’s affiliated ISP. 

By comparison, internet access has always been competitive. There are over 6,000 

ISPs across the country. Consumers in major cities can choose from hundreds of 

ISPs that serve their local area. And over 96 percent of internet users throughout 

the country, even in the smallest towns and rural areas, can choose from among at 

least 4 Internet Service Providers. Compare this to cable, where over 96 percent of 

customers throughout the country have NO choice in who their cable company is. 

As high speed internet access becomes available over cable, we are at a crossroads. 

Will we follow the open consumer choice path of the internet, or the closed no choice 

model of cable? 

Cable folks will say that open access isn’t necessary because there are other 

means of high-speed access to the internet, such as Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) 

technology over phone lines. But DSL has distance limitations. Once you get more 

than a mile and a half from a telephone central office, DSL service starts to degrade. Once you get beyond three miles, it is essentially unavailable. And techVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
30

nologies such as satellite, wireless and electric lines will not be widely available for 

many years to come. The upshot is that for as many as a third of consumers across 

the country, particularly in rural areas, if they get any broadband access at all in 

the next 5 years, it will only be through a cable line. These customers deserve choice 

in broadband internet access as well. 

It has been consistent policy in this country for over 20 years to give consumers 

greater choice in their telecommunications services. The Federal court decision that 

broke up the old Ma Bell AT&T in 1984 and allowed competition in long distance 

has resulted in rates that are more than 2⁄3 lower today than they were then. In 

passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress established the framework 

to bring these same benefits of competition to local phone service and to wireless. 

Legislation such as the Satellite Home Viewer Act and the program access provisions of the 1992 Cable Act sought to end cable’s longstanding monopoly over multichannel video programming. And consumers have always had competitive choice in 

Internet Service Providers in large part because FCC decisions beginning in the 70s, 

and 80s and continuing today that allowed such information services to travel unfettered over phone lines. At every turn, policymakers have sought to give consumers 

greater choice in their communications services. Broadband internet access over 

cable should be no exception. 

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward 

to any questions you may have.

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Betty. 

Mr. Green. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD R. GREEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CABLE TELEVISION LABORATORIES, 

INC., LOUISVILLE, COLORADO 

Mr. GREEN. Good afternoon, Chairman Kohl and Senators. I am 

Richard Green, President and CEO of CableLabs. I appreciate this 

opportunity to testify before this subcommittee and look forward to 

answering any of your questions that you have concerning the role 

of the cable industry in developing and deploying new technology. 

CableLabs is a research and development consortium of the cable 

television system operators serving North and South America. 

CableLabs conducts and funds research and development projects 

to help cable companies plan for the future and apply technology 

to meet customers’ needs. 

We have been working to promote development of new services 

over cable systems and to introduce competition among suppliers to 

increase innovation and reduce prices to consumers. Our tremendously successful effort with cable modems is an example of this 

work. 

Today, 7 million American homes enjoy cable high-speed data 

service. The cable modems used in those homes were developed at 

CableLabs. The cable industry recognizes that to make cable 

modems broadly available, it would be necessary for these modems 

to use a common interface. Interoperability of the modems was 

achieved through the cooperation of the cable industry, equipment 

manufacturers, retailers, and others working with CableLabs on 

the DOCSIS project. 

As a result, a highly competitive environment has developed, to 

the benefit of consumers. CableLabs has certified over 200 different 

modem models from dozens of vendors. Cable modem retail prices 

have dropped from $300 to $50. 

In a similar and parallel effort, CableLabs has worked hard to 

encourage the commercial availability of cable set-top boxes and 

other equipment that work with cable systems. CableLabs members have been very clear in their instructions to us. These memVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
31

bers supported the DOCSIS effort that successfully created a retail 

market in cable modems. They want the same thing to happen 

with cable set-top boxes and integrated digital television sets. 

But first and perhaps foremost, it is important for you to understand that cable systems can deliver and today are delivering 

broadcaster digital signals. High-definition digital cable set-top 

boxes which allow cable operators to provide digital and high-definition broadcast to consumers exist and they are being deployed 

today. 

Therefore, in those areas where cable companies have reached 

agreement with broadcasters to carry their digital signals, there 

are no technical compatibility problems. 

A number of cable companies, including Comcast, AT&T, AOL 

Time Warner, Cox, and Charter are currently providing such services or have announced plans to do so in the near future. The cable 

industry has worked with the consumer electronics industry to develop an integrated DTV set which would allow the cable set-top 

box to be incorporated within the DTV. 

To this end, the National Cable and Telecommunications Association and the Consumer Electronics Association reached a voluntary agreement in February of 2000, and that agreement would 

allow consumer digital television sets to be connected directly to 

digital cable systems. 

In a related area, the FCC has implemented the provision in the 

1996 Telecommunications Act calling for the commercial availability of navigation devices such as set-top boxes. Consistent with 

the congressional direction that the security of the cable operator’s 

signal not be jeopardized, the FCC rules require that separable security modules must be available from cable operators. These modules support integrated television receivers, as well as set-top 

boxes, in the retail market. 

These removable point-of-deployment, or POD, security cards foster the portability of set-top boxes and other point-of-deploymentenabled devices. Leading cable operators, including the two companies here today, have publicly affirmed that these systems will support set-top boxes and integrated TV equipment built to these specifications. 

Moreover, to further promote retail sales of set-top boxes, in October of 2001 the cable industry launched an initiative that provides customers with the option of purchasing from participating 

retailers the exact same set-top box that they lease from the cable 

operator. 

In addition to the open cable hardware specification mentioned 

above, the Open Cable project has recently published an open specification for middleware, a voluntary initiative called OCAP, that 

will promote the commercial availability of fully portable digital 

set-top boxes and integrated TVs that will function seamlessly on 

cable systems. Once again, Comcast, AT&T and other cable operators have committed that their systems will support OCAP-enabled 

devices. 

The CableLabs process is open, cooperative, and efficient. We 

modeled our Open Cable effort on our successful DOCSIS effort. As 

we did with DOCSIS, we worked with equipment designers and 

manufacturers, over 500 companies in all, to cooperatively prepare 

32

and approve specifications. We are convinced that by attracting additional manufacturers, competition will add features to and reduce 

the price of set-top boxes for consumers as well as cable operators. 

Our goals are to issue specifications that will unleash market 

forces to promote innovation and competitive offerings. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify this afternoon, 

and I will be pleased to answer the subcommittee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

STATEMENT OF RICHARD R. GREEN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CABLE TELEVISION LABORATORIES, INC. 

Good afternoon. I am Dr. Richard Green, President & CEO of CableLabs. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this Committee, with particular emphasis on 

the development of the retail market for cable set-top boxes. I also look forward to 

answering any technical questions you may have concerning the role of the cable 

industry in developing and deploying new technology. 

I speak to you today as a scientist who has devoted a great deal of his professional 

career to questions involving the application of digital technology. The experience 

I gained during 4 years as Director of the CBS Advanced Television Technology Laboratory, 5 years as Senior Vice President of Operations and Engineering of PBS, and 

14 years as CEO of CableLabs gives me a special appreciation for the technical perspectives of manufacturers, cable operators, and broadcasters. 

CableLabs is a research and development consortium of cable television system 

operators serving North and South America. CableLabs conducts and funds research 

and development projects to help cable companies plan for the future and apply 

technology to meet consumers’ needs. I know this hearing is focused on the pending 

merger between Comcast and AT&T Broadband, and I would be remiss if I did not 

note that both of those companies are important participants in the work of our laboratory. Brian Roberts has recently served as Chairman of the CableLabs Board of 

Directors. 

CableLabs was incorporated under the Cooperative Research Act. The Act, which 

this committee played a key role in developing, encourages research and development among companies within industries like the cable industry. I believe that we 

have been able to realize the potential of that Act by, among other things, contributing to the development of a burgeoning broadband industry and helping spur the 

digital transition. 

For example, over ten million American homes now enjoy high-speed Internet access connections and over seven million of those homes are served by cable highspeed data service. The cable modems used in those homes were developed at 

CableLabs. In the past, computer users knew that they could buy a modem that 

would work on any phone line. Cable industry leaders wanted their customers to 

be able to buy their own cable modem at retail and be confident that it would work 

on any cable system in North America. hrough CableLabs’ DOCSIS (Data Over 

Cable Service Interface Specification) project, that goal has been achieved. Cable’s 

broadband service is providing an important new and competitive, high-speed data 

highway into American homes. 

A word about the CableLabs’ cable modem or DOCSIS effort is instructive because 

it is a model for our OpenCable project which aims to address similar interoperability and retail availability issues for cable set-top boxes and digital television 

sets. 

The cable industry recognized that to make cable modems broadly available and 

take advantage of the economies of scale to get the lowest possible price for consumers, it would be necessary for cable modems to use a common interface. Interoperability of DOCSIS cable modems was achieved through the cooperation of the 

cable industry, equipment manufacturers, retailers and others working with the 

CableLabs DOCSIS project. With 3 years of careful development of the specification, 

relying upon input from CableLabs’ member companies and the consumer electronics and software industries (including many who were not traditional suppliers 

for the cable industry), the DOCSIS modem specification became an international 

standard at the International Telecommunications Union. Then, CableLabs, again 

with input from its members and industry vendors, invited vendors to bring their 

equipment to CableLabs to test its interoperability with other vendors’ DOCSIS 

modems. CableLabs developed a series of tests to measure conformance with the 

standard and, in so doing, insure product interoperability. We do this by ‘‘certifying’’ 

cable modem compliance with the DOCSIS standard. 

33

The certification process gives retail purchasers confidence that a certified cable 

modem will interoperate with other DOCSIS products made by other manufacturers. 

As of today, a highly competitive environment has developed to the benefit of consumers as CableLabs has certified over 200 different modem models from dozens of 

vendors. 

In a similar and parallel effort, CableLabs has worked hard to reduce the technical barriers to the delivery of digital and HDTV television and to encourage the 

commercial availability of cable set-top boxes and other equipment that works with 

cable systems. CableLabs’ members, the leading companies in the cable industry, 

have been very clear in their instruction to us. These members supported the 

DOCSIS effort that successfully created a retail market in cable modems. They want 

the same thing to happen with cable set-top boxes and integrated DTVs. 

The process of developing the digital set-top box standards has proved immensely 

more complicated, as we have attempted to reconcile the often competing interests 

of hundreds of parties from outside our industry. But with a lot of give and take 

among the players, we’ve now done it. 

I would like to give you a sense of how complex an undertaking this is, and of 

just how much progress has nevertheless been made. 

First and perhaps foremost, it is important for you to understand that cable systems can deliver—and today are delivering—broadcasters’ digital signals (including 

high definition signals) to DTV sets owned by cable customers. In short, there is no 

technical impediment to current generation DTVs working with cable. ‘‘High-definition’’ digital cable set-top boxes which allow cable operators to provide digital broadcast signals (including high definition signals) to consumers exist and are being deployed today. Therefore, in those areas where cable companies have reached agreements with broadcasters to carry their digital signals over the cable plant, there is 

no technical ‘‘compatibility’’ problem with the delivery of those signals. A number 

of cable companies including Comcast, AT&T, AOL Time Warner, Cox and Charter 

are currently providing such services or have announced plans to do so in the near 

future. 

The cable industry has also worked with the consumer electronics industry to develop an ‘‘integrated’’ DTV set which would allow the cable set-top box to be incorporated within the DTV—so that no external cable set-top box is needed. To this 

end, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA) and the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA)-representing all major manufacturers-reached 

voluntary agreements in February 2000, that will allow consumer digital television 

sets to be connected directly to digital cable systems. The features agreed to by CEA 

and NCTA for these types of DTV models are specifically spelled out in the agreement. The agreements detail the technical specifications that will enable these sets 

to work with cable systems. Those specifications, developed by CableLabs, were 

adopted as U.S. standards in November 2001, although manufacturers could develop 

products based on the specifications even before the standards were adopted as 

some did. 

In fact, these specifications have been available to manufacturers for over 2 years 

and some manufacturers have developed prototype integrated DTV receivers. One 

such device was on display at the January 2001 Consumer Electronics Show, connected to and working with the local Cox cable system in Las Vegas. In short, just 

as there is no technical barrier to a consumer receiving digital signals over the cable 

plant, there are no technical barriers for a manufacturer to build an ‘‘integrated 

DTV’’ model with the features described in the CEA-NCTA technical agreement. 

In a related area, the FCC has implemented the provision in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 calling for the commercial availability of navigation devices such 

as set-top boxes. Consistent with the congressional direction that the security of the 

cable operator’s signals not be jeopardized while fostering the commercial availability of set-tops and other devices, the FCC rules require that separable security 

modules for set-top boxes must be available from cable operators to support ‘‘integrated television receivers’’ as well as set-top boxes in the retail market. These removable ‘‘point-of-deployment’’ or ‘‘POD’’ security cards handle conditional access 

and encryption of premium cable channels. They foster the portability of digital settop boxes and other POD-enabled devices since the devices may be sold nationwide 

and will work with POD modules supplied by various cable operators to accommodate their particular conditional access systems. Leading cable operators—including 

the two companies here today—have publicly affirmed that their systems will support set-top boxes and integrated DTV equipment built to these specifications, including integrated DTV sets contemplated by the February 2000 NCTA-CEA agreement. 

CableLabs developed the removable security modules as part of its OpenCable 

project. The cable industry has invested millions of dollars to develop specifications 

34

and support for the ‘‘POD module’’ for one reason—to facilitate the retail availability 

of digital set-top boxes and integrated digital television receivers. The specifications 

needed to produce devices accommodating the separate security POD modules were 

also adopted as U.S. standards last year, although they have been available since 

1999. Moreover, to further promote retail sales of set-top boxes, in October 2001, 

the cable industry launched an initiative that provides customers with the option 

of purchasing from participating retailers the exact same set-top boxes they can 

lease from their cable operator. 

In addition to the OpenCable hardware specifications mentioned above, the 

OpenCable project has recently published an open specification for middleware (software)—the OpenCable Application Platform (‘‘OCAP’’) specification—that will promote the retail availability of fully portable digital set-top boxes and integrated DTV 

sets that will support a wide range of applications. For example, OCAP will permit 

the downloading and execution of applications, such as program guides, to any 

OCAP-enabled devices by any cable system supporting OCAP. This will enhance the 

portability of set-top boxes and DTV sets which the OpenCable POD modules already foster. Because OCAP is based upon an existing European specification, tremendous economies of scale and scope can be achieved. Once again, Comcast, AT&T 

and other cable operators have committed that their systems will support CableLabs 

certified, OCAP enabled devices. 

The CableLabs process is open, cooperative, and as efficient as possible. We work 

to keep equipment development time to a minimum. To fulfill this goal we modeled 

our OpenCable effort on our successful DOCSIS effort. As we did with DOCSIS, we 

work with equipment designers and manufacturers—over 500 companies in all—to 

cooperatively prepare and approve the specifications. Over the last 3 years, the 

OpenCable project has released specifications which provide the details necessary to 

build set-top boxes and integrated DTV sets that will function seamlessly on cable 

systems. 

We are convinced that by attracting additional manufacturers, competition will 

add features to, and reduce prices of, set-top boxes for consumers as well as cable 

operators. Our goals are to issue specifications that will unleash market forces to 

promote innovation and competitive offerings. (In fact, our License Agreements explicitly assure manufacturers that our specifications are not a ceiling on innovation, 

and invite them to add other features and functionalities.) 

Finally, I would like to briefly mention that we are also pursuing a similar approach to remove technical barriers for the deployment of telephone services over 

cable networks. The PacketCable project at CableLabs has issued specifications, now 

worldwide standards, supporting telephone services using advanced voice over the 

Internet technologies. Thus, in the near future, we believe consumers will benefit 

greatly from lower cost equipment and competitive telephone services delivered over 

cable networks in an even wider fashion than currently is the case. 

In closing, CableLabs has been working to remove technical barriers inhibiting 

the deployment of innovative new services over cable systems. Through the efforts 

I described above, we are assisting the cable industry in developing a new wave of 

innovative products that we hope will keep cable services attractive to consumers 

in an increasingly competitive environment. I hope that this has helped to clarify 

some issues of interest to the Committee. Thank you again for this opportunity to 

testify this afternoon. I’d be pleased to answer the Committee’s questions.

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Green. 

Now, we turn to Mr. Haverkate. 

STATEMENT OF MARK HAVERKATE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WIDEOPENWEST, CASTLE ROCK, COLORADO, ON BEHALF OF THE BROADBAND SERVICE PROVIDERS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. HAVERKATE. Mr. Chairman, Senator DeWine, thank you very 

much for allowing me to participate in this important hearing 

today. I am the President of WideOpenWest and I represent today 

my company, as well as the Broadband Services Providers Association, which is a group of 13 entrepreneurial companies across the 

country that have been out building brand new high-speed residential broadband networks for the last several years. 

35

In effect, when the Congress passed the 1996 Cable Act, they 

passed us the ball. We caught it and we ran with it. Since that 

time, we have been working as hard as we can to build new networks and provide competition to the local incumbent cable and 

telephone companies in as many markets as possible. 

Since that time, we have invested collectively over $5 billion in 

building these new high-speed networks. We are up to about 1 million customers together, so we feel like we have made substantial 

progress from a ground-zero start back in 1996. But even with that 

tremendous progress, we are still only about 5 percent the size of 

an AT&T-Comcast, just to put things in perspective. 

A few months ago, my company, WideOpenWest, stepped up to 

the plate to preserve competition when no one else would and we 

acquired the properties that Ameritech built in the Midwest, the 

competitive cable TV properties that were built in the States of 

Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan. 

Since acquiring those properties, we have been aggressively adding digital services, aggressively rolling out high-speed Internet, 

and now are providing competitive choice for all those products to 

over 1.3 million households in those three States, much to the delight of the municipalities, because now they have a competitive 

choice today and going forward, hopefully. 

I am pleased to report not only from WOW but also from the 

other Broadband Service Providers Association members that, in 

fact, the demand for broadband is very strong. We have tremendous support for the services that we offer. The penetrations that 

we are getting are generally on target with our business plan. In 

fact, our business model is a good business model. 

One example of innovation I would like to bring up is on the 

Internet side. A lot of people consider us more on the cable TV or 

phone side, but not only WOW but the other companies have put 

a lot of attention on the roll-out of high-speed Internet service, and 

we are doing it in a different way than the cable industry has done 

it so far. 

In WOW, for example, we have three different options for the 

customer on price and speed. So depending on whether the residential user is a high-bandwidth user or a home telecommuter and 

they need the highest possible speed and performance, we have 

that option available. We also have an option as low as $19.95 a 

month for ‘‘always on’’ high-speed Internet for the customer who 

just wants to have an ‘‘always on’’ connection to the Net. So we actually have broadband services available for prices less than a dialup connection. 

Before I move into talking about our concerns with the AT&TComcast merger, I would just like to point out that I personally, 

and I am sure many other members of the BSPA, have tremendous 

respect for the Roberts family. Just like Mr. Roberts, Sr., who was 

an entrepreneur years ago and built a great communications company, that is what we aspire to do today, so in many ways we look 

up to that. But we do have issues with the conduct of the corporation and I would like to use the rest of my time to point out some 

of those things. It is not just Comcast, but AT&T as well, as well 

as some of the other MSOs. 

36

We think that there has been a decision made that the best time 

to try to eliminate the local broadband competitors from the market is right now. Everyone knows that the capital markets are a 

little bit weak. There are big companies combining together. There 

is talk about competition between the cable industry and the telephone industry. It is a good time now to look around and say we 

have 13 entrepreneurial companies out there that really pose a serious competitive threat to us on the Internet side, on the digital 

services side, on the video-on-demand side coming up. Maybe now 

is the time to really put the pressure on and see what we can do. 

So two things are happening. One is on the program exclusivity 

side. Everyone knows that Comcast and AT&T have control and 

ownership interests in a lot of different channels, not only the basic 

cable channels but sports teams and the channels that distribute 

those sports teams, video-on-demand programming. They are moving into control over all sorts of programming. 

Even one possibility is the purchase of broadcast stations. If they 

end up owning broadcast stations, and all this clout combined, the 

risk that we have, all 13 of our companies, is if we can’t have equal 

access to all the programming that is available on fair, economic 

terms, that is a trump card that they automatically win. We cannot 

possibly compete with a company that has all this programming 

and control of it and doesn’t make it available to us, or if they do 

make it available, they make it on harsh terms, and expect to be 

able to hold on to our customer base. 

The second issue that I would like to point out before I close is 

a current practice that should cause concern for the subcommittee 

because it is certainly a concern for the competition, and that is 

that there are now two rates that are being used in the market. 

Historically, in the cable television business, ever since Mr. Roberts, Sr., was in it in 1963, the common practice is to have one 

rate. You notify the municipality, you notify the customers, and everybody in that municipality pays the same rate. It is not like a 

flea market or an eBAY where everybody gets a different rate. 

But now there is a strategy that is being deployed, we feel, directly targeting us, and that is to have two rates in the same municipality for the same service, one rate that their customers pay, 

their big, large base of customers pay, and then a second rate that 

is 35 percent less, or sometimes more, that is directed at our customers or any of their customers that consider switching over to 

Comcast. 

So now you have two rates in the same market for the same 

services, next-door neighbors getting the exact same services paying different rates. And you ask, well, why is that? Is that good 

competition? Well, it is not. It is clearly designed by a big corporation to try to squeeze out the competition, and we are here to object 

to that and to bring it to the subcommittee’s attention. 

So are we in favor of the merger or not? For us, it is not an issue 

about size. For us, it is an issue about corporate behavior and 

whether it is in the best interests of this country, after all the work 

that was done by Congress, by the municipalities, and by all these 

entrepreneurial companies to build these networks and really have 

local competition be at its height. Is it really in our best interests 

to allow some of this bad behavior to jeopardize that whole process? 

37

1The member companies of the BSPA are Altrio Communications, Carolina Broadband, 

ClearSource, Everest Connections, Gemini Networks, Grande Communications, Knology, RCN, 

Seren Innovations, Starpower Communications, Utilicom Networks, WideOpenWest, and 

WinFirst. 

We suggest that it isn’t and we ask for some attention to be put 

to this so that our entrepreneurial dreams can come true. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Haverkate follows:]

STATEMENT OF MARK HAVERKATE, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WIDEOPENWEST, ON BEHALF OF THE BROADBAND SERVICE PROVIDERS ASSOCIATION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my name is Mark Haverkate, and I 

am the Chief Executive Officer of WideOpenWest, a broadband communications 

company providing residents and small businesses in 5 States with cable television, 

high speed internet, and telephone services. 

I appear today on behalf of my company, and also on behalf of the Broadband 

Service Providers Association (‘‘BSPA’’), an organization founded in October 2001, 

and consisting of 13 pioneering companies committed to building competitive 

broadband networks in communities across the country.1

We appreciate your invitation to participate in this hearing. We have great concerns about the proposed merger between AT&T and Comcast, and look forward to 

discussing them with you today. 

INTRODUCTION

Ten years ago, neither my company, nor any of the members of the BSPA, existed 

in the form they do today. Their creation was in direct response to the Telecommunications Act of 1996—which brought down barriers to competition among 

telephone, cable, and data service providers—and to advances in fiber optic and 

other technologies that made it possible to provide all of these services through ‘‘one 

wire.’’

Through this marriage of law and technology, the means has been borne to bring 

the great benefits of competition to consumers everywhere: as the FCC has proved, 

where consumers have a choice between providers of communications services, they 

pay lower prices, get better service, and have a greater range of more advanced offerings to choose from. 

For example, WideOpenWest—or WOW as most of our customers call us—began 

operations in March of 2000, connecting our first customers in the Denver metropolitan market, where we continue to operate a digital cable and high speed Internet system in direct competition with AT&T Broadband. We are proud of the innovation we brought to the residential communications market, being the first cable 

television operator to champion the cause of open access for ISPs, the first company 

to offer flat rate unlimited long distance telephone service, and the first company 

to offer residential Internet customers a choice of three speed and price options. 

In November of last year, WOW stepped forward when no one else would to acquire Ameritech’s extensive competitive cable television systems in the Midwest 

markets of Chicago, Columbus, Cleveland, and Detroit. We are now adding digital 

and Internet services to those networks in order to bring residents there unprecedented—and much appreciated—consumer choice. 

My company, and all the members of the BSPA, are bringing these benefits to 

consumers in dozens of communities around the country today. 

Yet we are far from satisfied. Our goal is to expand much further, bringing the 

benefits of competition to every community that wants it. 

To do so, however, we face significant challenges. As we build our systems it is 

imperative that we: • Can count on vigorous enforcement of the Nation’s antitrust and communications laws, to ensure that incumbents do not use their vast market power to stifle 

competition before it can become fully established. • Have fair access to video programming that customers want to watch. • Have fair access to utility poles and conduits. • Have fair access to residents of multiple dwelling units—often the first toehold 

for competitors entering a market. • Are not discriminated against in the application of franchising, tax and other 

laws. 

The proposed merger between AT&T and Comcast has significant implications 

with respect to each of these areas. Whether that merger occurs, and under what 

38

2 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video 

Programming, § 158, CS Dkt No. 01-129 (rel. Jan. 14, 2002)(‘‘Eighth Annual Report.’’) 3 In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, Comcast Corporation 

and AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Applications and Public Interest Statement, at 14 (filed Feb. 28, 2002)(‘‘Applications and Public Interest Statement.’’) 4 Applications and Public Interest Statement, at 15. 

5 Applications and Public Interest Statement, at 25. AT&T spun off its Liberty Media subsidiary last summer, and with it AT&T’s attributable interest in numerous additional programming services formerly owned by Tele-Communications Inc. Whether and the extent to which 

AT&T has exclusive or preferential terms for carriage of these services today is unknown. 

conditions, will therefore have a major impact on whether the promise of the 

broadband industry is met, and consumers in other parts of the country have real 

choice in the purchase of cable television and other communications services in the 

future. 

THE PROPOSED MERGER WOULD REDUCE COMPETITION

In many of our markets, the incumbent we face is either Comcast or AT&T 

Broadband. As a group, the members of the BSPA today have franchises to build 

systems in communities with more than 15 million households—nearly half which 

are now being provided service by either Comcast or AT&T. For some companies 

this number is much higher. In the case of WideOpenWest, for example, more than 

75 percent of our territory is now being served by systems owned by either Comcast 

or AT&T. For other members of the BSPA, that percentage is even higher. 

The members of the BSPA are highly concerned about the adverse effects of the 

proposed merger between Comcast and AT&T. I want to discuss two of the reasons 

for our position with you today. 

First, the merger parties now control several key programming channels that all 

residential customers want access to. In the future, they will control more, including 

many sources of interactive and ‘‘on demand’’ programming. Yet they have already 

shown themselves willing to use their control over that programming for anticompetitive purposes. We fear the merger only will make this situation worse. 

Second, the merger parties have shown that they are willing to resort to unfair 

and anticompetitive pricing tactics to prevent us from doing business in their communities. We fear that the merger would lead to even greater use of these tactics, 

in a targeted and coordinated way, with even more damaging results. 

MERGER WOULD REDUCE COMPETITORS’ ACCESS TO KEY PROGRAMMING SERVICES

As the Chairman of the FCC has recognized, ‘‘content is king’’ in the broadband 

world. Unless a competitor carries what subscribers want to watch, it cannot survive. 

Comcast and AT&T today own numerous national and regional programming 

services that BSPA members need in order to compete. The merger parties have 

also announced their intention to use their combined resources to gain control over 

additional programming services. They have also shown that they will use their control over programming as a sword against competitors, and to undermine efforts to 

enter the merged entity’s markets. 

For example, Comcast owns, either in whole or in part, seventeen programming 

services carried by it and other cable television systems. These services comprise 6 

percent of all those distributed nationally. Some of these services are extremely popular with certain segments of the population.2

These services include three regional sports networks: Comcast SportsNet, which 

is carried on Comcast systems in the Philadelphia market; Comcast SportsNet Mid 

Atlantic, which is carried on Comcast systems in the Washington and Baltimore 

markets; and Comcast Sports Southeast, which is carried on Comcast Systems in 

various markets in the Southeast. All three networks feature real-time sporting 

events played by local professional and collegiate teams, as well as sports news and 

discussion shows. Comcast has exclusive rights to much of the programming carried 

on these networks.3

Comcast also owns two other regional programming services, the Comcast Network and the Sunshine Network. Its other programming interests include QVC, E! 

Entertainment, Golf Channel, Discovery Health Channel, iN DEMAND, Outdoor 

Life, and style.4

AT&T holds positions in three national programming services: E! Entertainment, 

style, and iN DEMAND. It also has equity in three regional ones: Fox Sports New 

England, New England Cable News, and Pittsburgh Cable News Channel.5 By virtue of its approximately 25 percent interest in Time Warner Entertainment, it has 

39

6 Applications and Public Interest Statement, at 25, 53. AT&T also has a slightly less than 

5 percent ownership interest in Cablevision Systems Corp., which owns numerous important 

programming services, including American Movie Classics, Bravo, Fox Sports Net, and the MSG 

Network. See id at 20 & n.27. 7 Eighth Report, §§ 171-74; See also In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in 

Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, § 183 (‘‘Seventh Annual Report’’); Impact of 

Sports Programming Costs on Cable Television Rates, GAO/RCED-99-136, at 3 (June 1999.) 8 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video 

Programming, § 184 n.650 (‘‘Sixth Annual Report.’’) 9QVC is carried to over 77 million homes. See Eighth Annual Report, App. D, Table D-6. Systems that carry QVC are paid a portion of the gross revenue generated from sales to buyers 

within their franchise areas. Where more than one system serves a particular area, these payments are divided in proportion to each system’s number of subscribers as a percentage of the 

total number of subscribers within the franchise area. 10The Golf Channel is reportedly of immense importance to golf enthusiasts. The Outdoor Life 

Channel also appeals to core groups of sports enthusiasts; for example, several years ago it obtained exclusive rights to cover the Tour de France bicycle race in the United States. 11See Statement of Brian Roberts, President, Comcast Corporation; (Golf Channel), ‘‘People 

thought nobody would ever want to watch a golf channel. Golf Channel is probably one of the 

best brands in television if you happen to like golf.’’) (Joint analyst meeting)(Dec. 21, 2001.) 

ownership interests in several more: Home Box Office, Cinemax, Comedy Central, 

and CourtTV.6

BSPA members must have equal access to the programming services controlled 

by Comcast and AT&T if they are to compete effectively in their markets, and provide the benefits of that competition to consumers. 

This is particularly true with respect to the regional sports programming networks, which have long been recognized as ‘‘must have’’ programming. Many potential customers care deeply about sports, and will not subscribe to the service of any 

competitor that does not carry the sports programming they want to watch.7 This 

fact has been borne out by hard data by BSPA member RCN: according to a survey 

it conducted, 40-58 percent of cable subscribers indicated that they would be less 

likely to subscribe to cable service if it lacked local sports programming.8

For the same reason, iN DEMAND is considered an essential offering, since it features not only films and other entertainment programs, but sports packages as well. 

HBO, too, is considered a ‘‘marquee’’ programming service, and one that competitors 

must be able to offer their customers. 

The other programming services owned by the merger parties are also of great 

importance to the competitiveness of BSPA members. QVC, in particular, is key because it is the most popular home shopping service on cable television today, and 

is also a source of revenue for systems that carry it.9 Others are as well—at least 

to certain segments of the population. To individuals in these groups, the ability to 

watch certain golf tournaments, or more extensive coverage of the Tour de France, 

is important enough to control their choice of broadband or cable service provider.10

While the number of such subscribers would vary among service areas, the experience of the BSPA members is that some number of customers in each would cancel 

their service if they could no longer watch this programming.11 If access to several 

such services were denied, the total number of customers lost could be highly significant. 

MERGER PARTIES HAVE WITHHELD PROGRAMMING TO DEFEAT COMPETITION

The merger parties have previously shown they are willing to use their control 

over programming to suppress competition in the market for multichannel video distribution services. 

For example, it is well known that access to sports programming is crucial for any 

new entrant to this market. Comcast knows that, too, so in the late 1990s, when 

it was establishing Comcast SportsNet, it assiduously refused to allow RCN (or 

DirecTV or EchoStar) to carry that service on any of its systems in the Philadelphia 

area. The DBS providers both filed complaints against Comcast with the FCC, but 

because the programming service is not distributed by satellite, and is instead distributed by terrestrial means, neither was able to persuade the FCC to order 

Comcast to grant it access to this programming. RCN was able to avoid this fate 

but just barely—it now has access to SportsNet programming, but only for 3 months 

at a time. 

AT&T, too, has not been above using its own exclusive access to programming as 

a sword against competition. For example, in Kansas City the incumbent cable operator—a joint venture between AT&T and AOL Time Warner called Kansas City 

Cable Partners (‘‘KCCP’’)—has refused to allow BSPA member Everest Connections 

40

12 AT&T and Time Warner are both 50 percent owners of KCCP. In addition, Time Warner’s 

interest is mainly held through its subsidiary, Time Warner Entertainment, in which AT&T 

owns about 25 percent. See Applications and Public Interest Statement, App. 7. 13The FCC’s program access rules protect—to some extent—competitors’ access to satellite delivered programming owned by vertically-integrated cable programming vendors. It does not extend to programming delivered by terrestrial means. 14Some of the sports programming that appears on Metro Sports is produced by Mizzou 

Sports Properties (‘‘Mizzou.’’) Because KCCP has refused to allow Everest to carry Metro Sports, 

Everest has tried to obtain this programming directly from Mizzou so Everest could produce its 

own sports programming channel for its systems. Yet, KCCP, anticipating this response, has 

locked up this programming by means of an exclusive contract with Mizzou. 15The communities in the Kansas City metropolitan area served by Comcast include Olathe 

in Kansas, and Raytown, Independence and other communities in Missouri. 16 Applications and Public Interest Statement, at 42, 44. 17Texas Cable Partners owns cable systems across Texas, and is 50 percent owned by AT&T. 

The remainder of the partnership is owned by a partnership controlled by and AOL Time Warner subsidiary, Time Warner Entertainment. 

to carry Metro Sports, a local sports network KCCP has established.12 This service 

has exclusive rights to certain popular sports programming, such as the basketball 

games played by the University of Missouri, other college basketball and football 

games, professional soccer matches, high school sporting events, and more. Everest’s 

efforts to gain access to this programming service have been stymied by the fact 

that KCCP distributes it by microwave transmission, not satellite.13

Since Everest is not allowed to carry Metro Sports, it is effectively prevented from 

signing up residents for whom watching sports is a priority. This is true, as Everest’s marketing staff has found out, even for residents who are otherwise dissatisfied 

with service from KCCP.14 To add insult to injury, KCCP allows Comcast—which 

provides service in several adjacent suburbs, but which does not compete with 

KCCP—to carry this programming.15

The proposed merger could lead to an expansion of the programming tactics 

Comcast and, to a lesser extent, AT&T have used to impede competition in their 

markets, and increase the adverse impact of these tactics on both BSPA members 

and consumers. It would provide an incentive for both Comcast and AT&T to discriminate in the sale of their programming not only to benefit their own systems, 

but those of their new partner as well. It would also provide additional leverage to 

obtain exclusive access to programming owned by third parties, which the merged 

entity could use to pressure its competitors in multiple markets. 

The merger parties have also expressed their intention to develop new programming services, which they have strongly implied they do not intend to share with 

competitors. As the parties have recently stated to the FCC, ‘‘Comcast’s established 

expertise in producing local and regional programming will enhance the ability of 

the merged entity to offer AT&T Broadband customers the kinds of community-oriented coverage that Comcast already provides today to many of its customers. [This 

programming] offers potential customers a reason to sign up for Comcast’s services, 

and offers existing customers one more reason to continue to subscribe.’’ 16

To the extent such services were the sole source for regional sporting events and 

other highly popular programming, new entrants could be denied access to the ingredients that are most critical to their success as competitors. 

SECRET, SELECTIVE DISCOUNTING

Over the past year many members of the BSPA have been subjected to extreme, 

targeted discounting by Comcast and AT&T in order to drive us out of business. 

These discounts are huge, and they are only offered to our customers or residents 

in our communities that want to switch to us from the incumbent. They are not advertised or made available generally—they are granted secretively over the telephone or in the doorways of our customers’ homes. For example: 

• Throughout southeastern Michigan, in markets where WideOpenWest competes 

with Comcast, residents we sign up for service are being offered rate discounts of 

between 33 and 50 percent to switch back to Comcast. They are also being offered 

free digital service, free pay per view, and other giveaways. Existing Comcast customers that try to cancel their service to sign up with us are being offered similar 

benefits not to do so. Importantly, these offers are not publicized, nor are they made 

available to anyone other than our existing customers and those Comcast customers 

who have asked to be disconnected in order to switch over to us. 

• In Austin, Corpus Christi, and other markets in Texas, both Grande and 

ClearSource are being subjected to deep discounting by AT&T, through its joint venture with AOL Time Warner, Texas Cable Partners.17 In Austin, for example, TCP 

41

18See, e.g. Time Warner Cable Discounts Draw Fire From City, Competitor, Austin AmericanStatesman (Feb. 19, 2002.) 19 Eighth Annual Report, § 209. 20For example, the merged company could use these predatory tactics simultaneously in multiple markets served by a particular competitor, thereby forcing that competitor to fight battles, 

and expend scarce resources, in each of these markets at the same time. 

is offering discounts of between $16 to $28 per month to customers of these competitors in order to lure them back to the incumbents’ own service.18

• In Kansas City, Everest is being subjected to comparable tactics by AT&T, 

through its joint venture with AOL Time Warner, Kansas City Cable Partners. In 

that market, however, KCCP has gone even further than its Texas affiliate—promising Everest customers additional payments of $200 if they switch back to KCCP, 

and even more if they agree to write testimonials in favor of KCCP’s service. KCCP 

has also made so-called customer ‘‘loyalty test’’ offers to residents in areas where 

Everest is building out its system, through which customers in these neighborhoods 

are guaranteed discounts on service prices if they agree to stay with KCCP or 12 

months. To fund these discounts, KCCP has raised the price of service for other 

neighborhoods served by its system. 

• In Augusta, Georgia, Comcast is offering discounts in excess of 50 percent for 

basic and digital cable, high speed data, and other services—but only in areas where 

Knology offers competitive services. These offers are not made generally throughout 

Comcast’s service area, but are instead mailed directly to Knology customers and 

new residents in competitive neighborhoods. 

Secret, selective discounting like this will destroy competition if it is allowed to 

continue. Giving big discounts to a chosen few is a cheap way for incumbents to 

exact the greatest possible toll on new entrants. And while that relative handful of 

customers gets a big financial benefit, once the competitor is forced from the market 

they—with the rest of their neighbors—will resume paying the pre-competition, monopoly rate: just like customers do in the communities where competitors have not 

yet entered. 

In truth, the merger parties are waging a behind-the-scenes hostile take-over of 

our company and the entire competitive broadband industry—one customer at a 

time. It is a clever strategy, and one that is likely to work if it is allowed to continue. Moreover, once they achieve this goal, they will also have complete control 

over the huge market for cable modem Internet access, and again know no restraint 

in what they charge for it. 

The Federal Communications Commission recognizes these facts, and publicly 

stated that secret and selective discounting threatens to destroy broadband competition. In its recent report on the state of competition in the cable television industry, 

the Commission reviewed these actions and concluded: 

The vast resources of a large MSO may simply prove too much if brought to bear 

in a targeted fashion against a single system entrant. Moreover, we are concerned 

about the signal such targeting may send to others who would compete in the 

MVPD market, and particularly to the financial markets to which a new entrant 

may well be dependent for resources. [S]uch practices. . .tend to limit competition 

and discourage new entry.19

These tactics will only get worse if the merger is approved. Combining the resources of both AT&T and Comcast, without preventing the merged entity from targeting BSPA members in this manner, will allow the new company to coordinate 

and intensify these actions—with lethal effect on competitors. If this is allowed to 

happen, it will be too much for many of our companies to endure.20 The result would 

undermine competition in the market for broadband services across the country. 

MERGER PARTIES ENGAGE IN OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT

The selective discounting programs now being used by the merger parties against 

BSPA members are not the only means they are using to prevent entry, impede 

competition, and deny consumers choice. Numerous other tactics are also being employed, and are producing comparable results. 

These tactics include efforts to prevent competitors from getting franchises, or to 

saddle them with onerous or unrealistic terms. They include securing exclusive contracts for certain programming services that they do not own—and that are not 

owned by other MSOs, or are not delivered by satellite, thereby making it impossible for the competitor to gain access through use of the FCC’s program access 

rules. They include taking action to impede or slow competitors’ ability to build their 

systems, get access to utility poles, and serve multiple dwelling units. 

42

21See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996)(Congress seeks to accelerate the ‘‘deployment of 

advanced telecommunications services to all Americans [and open[] all telecommunications markets to competition’’)(conference report for Telecommunications Act of 1996.) 

All of these tactics impose substantial financial burdens on BSPA members, and 

directly reduce the level of competition they are able to provide. The merger parties 

plainly pursue them to eliminate from the market the only competitor they have 

that can match them for quality and value, and can provide consumers with a more 

complete range of communication services than they themselves can. 

BSPA members believe that, given the track record of the merger parties, combining their assets and management would lead to coordinated campaigns in multiple markets targeting one or more of them to achieve this goal. If that were to 

happen, competition would suffer—if not disappear altogether. Entry would be prevented, expansion would be delayed, consumers would be denied choice, prices 

would rise, and the market would be denied all the other benefits that competitive 

communications providers provide. 

CONCLUSION

I want to be very plain that our company is ready for competition. So are all the 

members of the BSPA. That competition may well be bare-knuckled, and we expect 

that. But the tactics we are seeing today go well beyond a fair fight. They are the 

equivalent of a bully slipping on brass knuckles before the fight begins. No competitor can long stay in the ring under these circumstances. 

Six years ago Congress adopted as Federal policy the goal of bringing facilitiesbased competition to the national markets for multichannel video, telephony, and 

data services.21 WOW and the other members of the BSPA have answered this call, 

and are now in the process of bringing all of its benefits to consumers around the 

country. But we are now at a crossroads: If we cannot put a stop to the tactics 

Comcast, AT&T and other incumbents are using against us, and if we cannot get 

fair access to the programming customers want to watch, then this goal will either 

be long delayed in its achievement, or undermined altogether. 

If this happens, then all your hard work, and of the FCC, and of the many, many 

local franchising authorities around the country with which we have worked to 

bring competition to their communities, will have been for nothing. 

Thank you again for inviting me here today. We stand ready to work with this 

Committee in any way we can to ensure that the fruits of competition are within 

the reach of consumers everywhere.

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Haverkate. 

Now, we ask Mr. Perry to make his statement. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. PERRY, VICE PRESIDENT, MARKETING, MITSUBISHI DIGITAL ELECTRONICS AMERICA, 

IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Chairman Kohl and Senator DeWine, for 

having me here this afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to address you. I would also like to thank you, Chairman Kohl, for your 

fifth point, which is in the 1996 Telecommunications Act the FCC 

was to promote the availability of retail set-top boxes to create this 

vast competitive environment for new products and innovation. So 

I appreciate you bringing that up; it was obviously lacking in some 

of the statements that have been made here today. 

First and foremost, my name is Robert Perry. I am the Vice 

President of Marketing of Mitsubishi Digital Electronics America. 

My responsibilities include produce development, government affairs, and dealing with the retailers who sell our products across 

the country. 

My goal in life is quite simple. It is to sell large volumes of advanced digital television receivers and other products as quickly, 

inexpensively and effectively as possible. One out of every five 

HDTVs in consumers’ homes today is a Mitsubishi. But despite the 

best efforts of the members of this committee to introduce competiVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
43

tion, my competitors and I are still unable to offer a single consumer product of any sort that connects directly to any digital cable 

system. The dominance of the AT&T-Comcast deal can either seal 

this market from competition or finally open it. This power will all 

be in the hands of one of my colleagues at this witness table. 

The prepared statements of Comcast and AT&T for today’s hearing do not even address the device market, nor does their oral testimony, but 10 years of leaving this issue to CableLabs has not enabled competitive entry. For such entry to have a chance, it must 

be actively embraced and supported by the CEOs before you today. 

For 10 years, the Congress has tried to open this market to competition. In 1991, Senator Leahy pointed out that cable systems do 

not really support the operation of television receivers. In 1996, 

Congress explicitly instructed the FCC to assure the competitive 

commercial availability of any product necessary to receive any 

service offered by a cable operator. 

In 1998, the FCC accepted an offer from CableLabs and its MSO 

owners to draft and support necessary technical specifications by 

July 1, 2000. These specifications turned out to be late, inadequate, 

incomplete, and not sufficiently tested. Mr. Green barely refers to 

them in his testimony today. 

Recently, a competitor of ours asked CableLabs to certify a prototype DTV receiver built essentially to the July 2000 specifications, 

but CableLabs refused to consider certifying it because it does not 

also rely on newer specifications that are still under development 

and revision. So CableLabs’ first try was deemed good enough for 

the FCC, but not good enough for an actual product. 

CableLabs’ newer specification, known as OCAP, may be an improvement, if and when it is complete and reliable. But today it is 

untested, far from ready, and even farther from being relied upon. 

In fact, in recent public statements they have commented that 

OCAP may not even be ready in time to support the digital television transition. 

In addition, at present we have no assurance that the products 

built to this specification would actually work when connected to 

cable systems. The cable MSOs themselves, such as Mr. Roberts 

and Mr. Armstrong, have been unwilling to say that they will rely 

on this specification in the devices that they themselves lease to 

customers. 

Moreover, both OCAP 1.0 and OCAP 2.0 provide that competitive 

product features such as recording, games, program guides, telephony, and home networking might not work or could be disabled at 

will by the MSO. CableLabs has referred to this issue as ‘‘tools, not 

rules.’’ As we all know, no one orders tools without intending to use 

them. 

We face another show-stopper in the so-called POD-host interface, or PHILA license, which any entrant must sign in order to 

compete with MSOs in the device market. Elements of this license 

are anti-competitive and profoundly anti-consumer. Such provisions 

include turning off home network interfaces by remote control, reducing the resolution of high-definition content, turning off consumer home recording via technical means, and requiring 

CableLabs certification prior to sale at an unlimited per-product 

certification fee. 

44

While we try to fight through this obstacle course, cable MSOs 

say they distribute about 135,000 digital set-top boxes per week, 

about 25 million to date, all proprietary, and none which conform 

to the standards set for competitors or are bound by this license. 

Not a single competitive product has been sold or even certified for 

manufacture by CableLabs. The competitive score to date is cable 

MSOs $10 billion in commerce, competitive entrants zero. 

AT&T-Comcast will be CableLabs’ largest owner and Motorola’s 

biggest customer. I believe this committee can and should insist on 

a commitment here and now that the enormous power resulting 

from this merger be used to deconstruct monopoly, not consolidate 

and perpetuate it. 

Here are the minimum commitments that I urge this subcommittee to demand from my colleagues at this witness table. As 

to standards and specifications, a simple and authoritative pledge 

from AT&T-Comcast that by a date certain their devices will live 

by the same rules and specifications they set for competitors, and 

that specifications will not discriminate against competitive entrants. This would go an enormous way to build confidence in manufacturers, retailers, and consumers to enter this marketplace. 

As to product certification, while my colleagues and I like and respect Mr. Green, MSO policies and resource constraints on 

CableLabs have led to certification practices that in many cases are 

discriminatory, under-funded, over-priced, non-transparent, inefficient, and unpredictable. It is up to AT&T-Comcast as the dominant cable MSO to build confidence that CableLabs will drop any 

requirement that they approve competitive products for sale. 

As to the PHILA license, the POD-host interface license, this license is a public trust originating in the Congress. A reasonable license would not threaten the 2.5 million HD displays now owned 

by consumers with degraded resolution or with interfaces being 

shut off and screens going dark, or with the unconstrained ability 

to stop home recording by technical means. 

AT&T-Comcast will have the power to insist on reasonable license terms that a manufacturer could sign without having to 

apologize to its past, present, and future customers. Accomplishing 

this would fulfill Mr. Armstrong’s commitment here today not to 

violate any FCC regulation, as well as complying with the will of 

Congress. 

On behalf of my company, I thank you very much for having invited me today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perry follows:]

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. PERRY, VICE PRESIDENT, MARKETING, MITSUBISHI DIGITAL

ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. 

My name is Robert Perry. I am Vice President, Marketing, of Mitsubishi Digital 

Electronics America. My professional goal is to sell large volumes of advanced digital television receivers, as quickly, inexpensively, and effectively as is possible. 

While I have enjoyed some success in doing this, I face a massive and frustrating 

competitive obstacle that also afflicts 70 percent of my customers. Despite the efforts 

and instructions of the Congress and the FCC, my competitors and I are still unable 

to offer a consumer product, of any sort, that connects directly to any digital cable 

system. The power to be conveyed by the merger of Comcast and AT&T Broadband 

can be used to make this obstacle insurmountable, or finally to clear it away. If the 

merger goes through, this power will all be in the hands of my colleagues at this 

witness table. 

45

One out of every five HDTVs in consumers’ homes today is a Mitsubishi. But even 

with this leadership, we are unable to make headway in offering products that connect to digital cable systems. And I see competition from others repressed as well. 

Although I appear today on behalf of my company, I am also the chairman of the 

Video Board of Directors of the Consumer Electronics Association, a Board member 

of the Home Recording Rights Coalition, and a Board member of HAVI, a corporation devoted to digital home networking software systems. In each capacity I have 

learned how and why consumers are still denied the benefits of competition mandated by the Congress 6 years ago. 

A little history: 

• In 1991, Senator Leahy complained that cable systems do not adequately support the operation of TV receivers. His attention to this issue led to legislation in 

1992, telling the FCC to ‘‘promote’’ the availability of competitive remote controls 

and set-top boxes. • In 1996, Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act more explicitly instructed 

the FCC to assure the competitive commercial availability of any product necessary 

to receive a service offered by a cable operator—not just set-top boxes, but also DTV 

receivers and other new products that consumers want and expect, such as digital 

video recorders. • In 1998, FCC regulations gave the cable industry until July 1, 2000, to support 

the operation of competitive devices bought by consumers from independent manufacturers and retailers. CableLabs, the research consortium of the cable industry, 

offered to draft the necessary technical specifications, and the FCC accepted this 

offer. • Today, in the second quarter of 2002, there is no competitive entry on the horizon. The July 1, 2000 standards were late, inadequate, incomplete, and not sufficiently tested. Recently a competitor of ours did ask CableLabs to certify a prototype 

DTV receiver built to this specification, as subsequently modified and improved. But 

CableLabs refused to consider certification of such a product, because it does not incorporate newer specifications that are still under development and revision. • The newer specification—the ‘‘Open Cable Access Platform,’’ or OCAP, is software-based and may be an improvement if and when it is complete and reliable. 

But it is untested, far from ready, and even farther from being relied upon. Why? 

Because at present we have no assurance that products built to this specification 

would actually work when connected to cable systems. The cable operators themselves 

have been unwilling to say that they will rely on this specification in the devices that 

they, themselves, lease to customers. Moreover, as now written, this specification enables cable operators and program suppliers to remotely and unilaterally suppress 

competitive features of multi-purpose products. Product features such as recording, 

games, program guides, telephony, and home networking, might not work or could 

be disabled at will if they are provided in a consumer electronics device connected 

to digital cable. 

• In 2000, a new and persistent legal barrier emerged—a license offered by the 

consortium of major cable MSOs, take it or leave it. Due to copy protection considerations advanced by the motion picture industry, any competitive entrant must sign 

this license, offered by CableLabs. Elements of this license are not only anticompetitive, they are also profoundly anti-consumer. It includes provisions for: 

• Turning off home network interfaces by remote control. 

• Reducing the resolution of high definition content by three-fourths on designated programs. 

• Allowing consumer home recording to be turned off via technical means on an 

unrestricted basis. 

• Requiring ‘‘certification’’ of these products by CableLabs prior to their sale, at 

an unlimited per-product ‘‘certification’’ fee. 

The only companies that have signed this license are Motorola, Scientific Atlanta, 

and Pace—all entrenched suppliers of set-top boxes to cable operators themselves, 

who are not bound by its terms. 

So, Mr. Chairman, as Comcast and AT&T Broadband appear today to defend their 

proposed aggregation of power in all markets, you should be aware that their industry thus far has used its concentrated power to frustrate the competitive entry legislation launched a decade ago by the chairman of your own parent committee: 

• Cable operators distribute about 135,000 digital set-top boxes per week; they 

own about 25 million proprietary set-top boxes, none of which conforms to or relies 

on competitive standards, or the proposed CableLabs standards for attachment to 

cable systems. 

• Not a single competitive product has been sold to any consumer, nor has any 

yet been manufactured or even certified by CableLabs for manufacture. The fox does 

not simply rule the henhouse; it is owner and sole tenant. 

46

A merged AT&T and Comcast will be by far the biggest, most powerful, and most 

influential cable operator in the markets for both cable services and cable devices. 

Today, both companies procure their set-top boxes from the same supplier, which 

already dominates its market. The merged AT&T and Comcast will be CableLabs’ 

largest owner, and Motorola’s biggest customer. Its combined intentions and single 

checkbook will determine whether this product market remains closed to viable competition, or finally becomes the open and competitive market that Chairman Leahy 

envisioned in 1992, and that the Congress demanded in 1996. 

You could, of course, simply approve this aggregation, and rely on the FCC to insist on compliance through closer regulation. There are proposals pending at the 

FCC for it to demand compliance with existing regulations, and I support them. But 

in the face of the concentrated cable industry power that already exists, the FCC 

has been pushing a string. In my view this Committee can and should insist on a 

commitment, here and now, that the enormous power resulting from this merger be 

used to deconstruct monopoly, rather than to consolidate and perpetuate it. 

Here are the minimum commitments I believe this Subcommittee should demand 

of my colleagues at this witness table: 

As to standards and specifications: I don’t see how I can ask my company to invest 

millions of dollars in a new product line, or my customers to invest over three thousand dollars in an HDTV receiver, if the cable operators who wrote the software and 

specifications governing the product’s operation are unwilling to rely on them in the 

products that they distribute themselves. A simple and authoritative pledge, from 

the individual who will run the combined AT&T-Comcast, that by a date certain 

(preferably 2003) their devices will live by the same rules and specifications they 

set for competitors, and that these will not discriminate against competitive features, would go an enormous way to build confidence that those who buy products 

from competitive entrants will not be disappointed or abandoned in their investment. 

As to product certification: I don’t understand how the July 1, 2000 CableLabs 

specification could be adequate to satisfy FCC regulations, but not adequate for 

CableLabs certification of an actual product. The CableLabs certification practice is 

in many cases discriminatory, underfunded, overpriced, nontransparent, inefficient, 

and unpredictable—at least as it is encountered by those who would compete with 

CableLabs’ MSO owners. A pledge from the merged Comcast-AT&T to look very seriously into these complaints, and to work expeditiously toward self-certification, as 

we enjoy in other standards areas, would go a long way. 

As to the ‘‘PHILA’’ license that competitive entrants must sign: The ability to license competitors is a public trust that the FCC has granted to CableLabs, albeit 

perhaps in error, and that CableLabs continues to abuse. How can CableLabs be 

shielded from antitrust scrutiny, but not public accountability, in exercising it? A 

reasonable license would be one that did not threaten the 2.5 million displays now 

owned by consumers with degraded resolution, or with interfaces being shut off and 

screens going dark, or with the unconstrained ability to stop home recording by 

technical means. Even the motion picture industry has disavowed so-called ‘‘selectable output control,’’ by which high-definition outputs, home network connections 

and recordable interfaces can be shut off in this manner. But in April 8 letters to 

Senators Leahy and Hatch, the President of CableLabs refused to disavow selectable 

output control. I call upon the prospective head of the merged AT&T-Comcast, here 

and now, to disavow selectable output control, and to pledge to sit down and work 

out, expeditiously, a license that manufacturers could sign without having to apologize to their past, present, and future customers. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that this subcommittee has been looking into the competitive issues that I’ve discussed today for quite some time, and that it has inquired 

of Chairman Powell of the FCC about them on more than one occasion. I believe 

you have performed a great public service in doing so. We are fortunate that this 

merger transaction, which would further aggregate monopoly power in the distribution of devices and in the setting of technical standards for their procurement, is 

within the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee, as are the regulators who must rule 

on it. On behalf of my company, I thank you very much for having invited me today.

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Perry, and we will begin 

asking a few questions. 

Mr. Roberts, your statement was very well written and very well 

delivered. We appreciate it very much, but I was disappointed that 

you didn’t seem to have answered any of the points and questions 

that I felt were most pertinent and that I noticed as I spoke you 

were at least to some extent marking down. 

47

So, first of all, will this merger offer consumers any relief from 

continually rising cable rates—the first question, if you would 

mark that down. 

The second question: Won’t, Mr. Roberts, this merger make it 

more difficult for small, competitive cable operators like our witness here today, WideOpenWest, to compete with you and other 

giant cable companies, as Mr. Haverkate has attested? 

Third, Mr. Roberts, how can independent programmers ever hope 

to distribute their programs over cable lines? Won’t large cable 

companies like yours prefer to get their content from their own affiliated companies? Specifically, shouldn’t the program access rule 

be extended past this October? 

Fourth, why won’t you agree in a legally binding manner to allow 

access to your high-speed Internet connections by competing companies, as AOL-Time Warner did as a condition of their merger? 

Fifth, how do you respond to Mr. Perry, and what assurances can 

you give us that the law with regard to the set-top boxes will actually be implemented soon with your full approval? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned in the 

opening statement, I look forward to the chance to address specifically all five of those issues. 

So, taking it from the beginning, cable rates: As you know, twothirds of our cost comes from the programming cost that we pay 

to the programming channels, the 100 channels that we carry, or 

more. Last year, in Comcast, and the year before, our programming 

costs went up about 15 percent per year, and you see today in New 

York City, with the New York Yankees’ dispute with Cable Vision, 

a real-live example of the terrible dilemma facing a cable operator. 

It is a product that clearly many people want, and at the same 

time a new cost above and beyond all your existing costs have been 

reported of around $2.00 a month for one channel. So in our case 

and in AT&T’s case, we launched that channel and we have recently announced a rate increase, and that rate increase is substantially more than inflation. 

Another cable company has chosen not to carry the new product 

and they have significant competitive problems with full-page ads 

being run by dish competitors saying switch your cable over and 

you can get the Yankees. So this is a competitive business today 

and your principal competitor is the satellite industry, who also 

has many of the same channels, and in many cases their programming costs have gone up as well and they have raised rates. 

So the complexity of what happens to the consumer from their 

cable company has to be looked at at a couple of levels. One, what 

are your programming costs? Two, we have been able to rebuild all 

of our systems and offer new products like digital and modems, as 

you have heard here today. All of those products are optional, so 

all consumers get a better cable system, but many have chosen to 

take incrementally more services. 

Finally, the issue of how do you put a package together to compete with your satellite brethren or companies like WideOpenWest? 

In our case, our rate increases have been about 5 percent each of 

the last several years, and our programming costs have gone up 

double digits. If it wasn’t for the new services, our business would 

be going backward. So that is No. 1. 

48

Chairman KOHL. How will this merger affect your rates? How 

will this bring down rates to your customers who are listening to 

you today? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I think that the ability to accelerate the new products so we can get more of the incremental revenues takes pressure 

off the basic rate. If it had not been for digital and modems, I don’t 

believe you could pay 15 percent more for programming, which is 

two-thirds of your costs, and only have a 5-percent increase, which 

we acknowledge is higher than the inflation rate as it is already. 

So the first problem is can you get more new products to consumers to not have to raise basic rates? 

No. 1, will there be an ability between the two companies to reduce costs and be able to then pass some of that or all of that 

through in some form of consumer benefit, whether that is an acceleration of new products or directly in rates or in giving better 

service and competing as a better competitor. So that is hopefully 

responsive to question No. 1, and Mr. Armstrong may want to add 

to that. 

No. 2, will it be more difficult for small companies or small entrants to compete with us? I don’t believe the merger affects that 

question because the markets are different markets. So AT&T is 

Boston and Comcast is in Michigan, where we compete with 

WideOpenWest. The reality is that this is a very different cable 

business than your father’s cable business, if I can steal the line 

from the commercial. 

Since 1992, with the cable law of 1992, there was the creation 

of the satellite industry. Today, we have two competitors in satellite and many local competitors such as WideOpenWest, and in 

other cities we have wireless competitors. But nationwide, everywhere, there are two competitors from satellite. There is price competition. They run specials and marketing promotions. It is the customary practice in a competitive business, very different than pre1992, where the only way to get ESPN or HBO was through cable. 

That is not the case today. You can get a free satellite dish and 

in many cases 6 months of very discounted service at $9 a month. 

So we have to match that new marketing offer on the ground. In 

those cases, three out of four new sign-ups appear to be going to 

satellite, and their growth rate has been faster the last several 

years than cable. So I don’t believe the merger in any way changes 

the competitiveness today in each of the local cities where we compete. 

We have a national competitor in every one of our markets, and 

in many of the markets where WideOpenWest is, and other facilities-based competitors, we are competing and I think all of our behavior is customary and we basically meet their price. We have to 

build an entire franchise. In many cases, they do not or have not, 

and we have sometimes additional burdens put on us by the local 

municipality that they may or may not have. 

On the question about independent programmers and won’t you 

discriminate against small, independent programmers, I actually 

think this deal has the potential to be an enabler for the content 

and technology community to galvanize and incubate new development. Why do I say that? 

49

We have paid a lot of money in this merger. There is pressure 

for us to innovate and to create new services. Now, not all those 

ideas are going to come from Comcast employees, and so we have 

gone out and will go out and try to say to any new entrepreneur, 

especially given our roots, can you come and with one contract with 

this company really make your business plan come alive and become real? 

Some of the examples like the Outdoor Life Network that you 

mentioned—there was a group of entrepreneurs that founded that 

channel and they were able to make deals. There is a competitive 

channel; we carry that competitor. You mention QVC. We carry the 

Home Shopping Network, which we do not have any financial interest in. 

We have a competitor in satellite, just using that for the moment, in every one of our markets. If we don’t carry the best programming, we are going to lose our customers, and therein lies the 

debate in New York City right now. So as people have new ideas, 

whether it is things like cable modems, there is a pressure on us 

to make sure we are innovating and finding new revenues that are 

optional to the consumer and something that causes them to want 

to stay with Comcast. 

You asked about Internet service providers and whether we 

should have a condition like AOL. I would submit that we are not 

AOL. AOL has a huge market force in narrow-band Internet. More 

than 50-percent penetration of all the people who get Internet connections do so through AOL. Comcast has a total of 1 million Internet connections. AOL has 30 million. So we are an innovator in the 

space of high-speed broadband. 

Dr. Green, who helped us innovate cable modems—I can remember many times when people said cable modems will never work. 

And even though it may sound harmless to put a condition on, it 

chills the financial capital that went into a brand new service like 

cable modems, where we have less than a 10-percent market share 

of homes. But of total Internet connections, it is a much lower 

number. This is an early entrant. 

Now, to the specific of EarthLink and other multiple ISPs, we 

have said for some time we want to do business with as many connective points as possible so that consumers have the choice that 

they want because if they don’t take it from us, they are going to 

take it from DSL, our competitor. Every one of our products is competitive today, including high-speed modems, with DSL and wireless. 

So we were in an exclusive arrangement with Excite@Home 

when we invented cable modems. The contract terminated when 

Excite@Home went bankrupt in December. In January, we 

transitioned, with great pain, 1 million customers off of 

Excite@Home in a hurry-up way onto the Comcast high-speed network, and in February announced that we wanted to get started on 

our commitment to do multiple ISPs. 

The first arrangement we made was with United Online, who I 

believe has sent you a letter, and that is Net Zero and Juno. AT&T 

announced an arrangement with EarthLink. The reason we begin 

in two cities is we want to get it right for our customers and make 

this work. But you have my commitment, and I reaffirm what I 

50

have said before, which is it is absolutely our intention, because we 

think it is good business, to get multiple ISPs in commercially reasonable ways throughout our company. We want to get it done. We 

just transitioned 1 million customers. 

I don’t think it should be a condition of this deal because we 

don’t have a gatekeeping service today. We have a brand new competitor and we don’t want to get the financial community concerned 

that there are going to be regulations on something we just invented. 

On Mr. Perry’s concerns, he is technically knowledgeable and Dr. 

Green is technically knowledgeable, so I would like to defer some 

of that. But let me specifically address the big picture of set-top 

boxes which was on your list in the beginning. 

I went to the consumer electronics show with a number of cable 

operators this January and I was amazed at what I saw. Everywhere is high-definition sets, as Mr. Perry is talking about, and 

that is clearly a very real possibility that that is what Americans 

want. Every one of those sets was connected to satellite. 

I walk into Circuit City and I see all they want to do is sell you 

a satellite dish and sell you a high-definition or flat-screen monitor. 

It is critical to the cable industry that we have a competitive offering. So I came away from that saying we have to accelerate our relationships with the set-top manufacturers and get these set-top 

boxes available at retail so that our competitor’s product, who does 

offer some of these functions and features, isn’t the only place. 

I met with the CEO of Circuit City last week, the first time we 

had ever met. In cable modems, we have all the Circuit City stores 

carrying our cable modems. In cellular telephone, a previous business Comcast has been in, and AT&T as well, we offered all of our 

products at retail. Cable television has traditionally not done that. 

That has to change for business reasons because our competitor 

has an advantage over us and if the consumer, as they replace 

these sets, is being told by the consumer electronics industry and 

by the retail industry to switch to satellite, I am the loser and 

Comcast is the loser. 

So we are going to try to fix that, and Dr. Green will tell you 

all the steps that the cable industry came home from that consumer electronics show and said let’s accelerate our activities 

there. So hopefully that addresses some of your issues. 

Chairman KOHL. You have, and I appreciate your frankness. My 

sense in listening to your testimony and to your response is that 

you are doing an outstanding job in representing your company’s 

best interests, and I think that is what you should do and I appreciate that. 

Whether nor not that is in the best interests of the consumers 

of America is, of course, open to debate, I am sure, as you would 

agree, and open to question. I am always concerned, as I was, as 

you know, in the case of the satellite television companies who 

wanted to merge. I am against it, and when you appeared in our 

office we discussed it and I made it very clear that I thought that 

that was not in the best interests of consumers to take the two biggest satellite companies and merge them. 

51

I have forgotten your specific response, but I thought you understood what I was saying and were somewhere sympathetic to some 

of the arguments that I made about consolidation. 

I am going to pass it on to Senator DeWine. Before I do, I would 

just like to ask Mr. Green, Mr. Haverkate, and Mr. Perry to respond briefly, but respond to some of the things that Mr. Roberts 

has said. 

I will start with you, Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to respond. 

Specifically on set-top boxes, we are disappointed, as you are, 

that the retail market has developed so slowly. We have worked 

very, very hard to try to solve the technical problems that may 

have been part of this issue. Specifically, I want to set the record 

straight with respect to the performance of cable in producing the 

POD modules. 

In other words, there were a series of agreements. First, in February of 2000 there was an agreement between the Consumer Electronics Association and the National Telecommunications Association in which we agreed on the specifications for interconnection. 

In July of 2000, the FCC required that we prepare a module that 

could be inserted in a television set or a set-top box to provide 

interoperability, the separation of the security module. 

We were on time. We delivered that product. It works and it was 

certified. Mr. Perry is incorrect in saying late, inadequate, and not 

complete. Those modules are available and as proof of that, at the 

consumer electronics show there were two manufacturers that 

showed television sets that accepted the POD module, were connected to the Cox Cable television system in Las Vegas and they 

worked. So it is not true that these specifications were not complete. 

In addition to that, we worked with Mr. Perry’s group to define 

the interfaces for a digital television receiver. We published those 

specifications. These specifications are American national standards. They are not just CableLabs specifications. They are standards. 

Following that, we worked within the cable industry and working 

with manufacturers to develop the next generation of specifications, 

which are software. We are very interested in developing an attractive retail product, so that the software and the applications that 

need to run on a set-top box or a television set are very important. 

The Open Cable specification, OCAP, provides that software. It 

is a fair and open specification which provides a set of interfaces 

that anyone can write to. It is available to anyone for development. 

We have issued two sets of the specifications Mr. Perry referred to, 

and we hope that this will also help to provide an attractive retail 

product moving forward in the set-top box. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KOHL. Mr. Haverkate. 

Mr. HAVERKATE. Mr. Chairman, Brian Roberts made one comment on the programming issue. I think I got the quote down exactly right. He said if we don’t carry the best programming, we will 

lose our customers. I think that is exactly the point that I am trying to make relative to our relationship and our ability to compete 

52

with Comcast-AT&T, where they have control over what programming is available and have the ability to restrict access to that programming to us. 

So I couldn’t agree more on that point with Mr. Roberts that if 

we don’t carry the best programming, we will lose all of our customers. But if it is their programming and they get our customers, 

then they have certainly an incentive to withhold that programming, and they have shown in the past that they will. 

The second point on the issue of this rate discrimination and improper practices in the markets themselves—Brian referred to it as 

customary promotions, I think was the term that he used. That is 

not the case. A promotion is something designed to try something 

new, but at least it is a public promotion. I have never once seen 

an ad, and I don’t expect I will see an ad that says please call 

Comcast and say that you are interested in switching your service 

to WOW and we will reduce your rate by 35 percent. 

This price strategy is being done undercover; it is being done in 

secret. It is not a promotion. It is designed to restrict the ability 

of a competitor like us to succeed. They can call it a promotion if 

they want. Look it up in the dictionary. It is not a promotion and 

the intent is clear. 

In fact, I think basically what is happening here, Mr. Chairman, 

is they are conducting a hostile takeover of our industry one customer at a time. They probably wouldn’t be allowed to buy our companies, so they have decided to buy it one customer at a time by 

going out to our customers and offering whatever price they have 

to to take it over. And if it is allowed to continue, I think it is going 

to be successful. 

With the company of the size that they have and the resources 

that they have, and the young stage of development that our industry is in, there is no way—no matter how good we are, no matter 

what products we offer, no matter how good our Internet service 

is, going up against that kinds of odds is impossible. So I would 

certainly appreciate any advice or attention to this matter that 

could be given. 

Thank you. 

Chairman KOHL. Thank you. 

Mr. Perry, do you have a comment? 

Mr. PERRY. Yes, sir, and thank you for giving me an opportunity 

to respond. 

In addition to my duties at Mitsubishi, I am also the Chair of 

the Video Division of the Consumer Electronics Association, as well 

as a member of the executive board of directors. I also am pleased 

to serve on the Home Recording Rights Coalition, which is a grassroots organization that is dedicated to preserving consumers’ normal and customary recording practices. We happen to believe, in 

this transition from analog to digital, that you didn’t give up any 

of your rights. 

That being said, I would like to respond to some of these points 

very specifically, but still not get into an engineering discussion. I 

am not one, and I don’t even play one on TV. 

Having said all that, Mr. Green’s response about the specification—he is referring to the POD specification. The POD is essentially an access card that slides into the front of some kind of a setVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:51 Apr 10, 2003 Jkt 085986 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\HEARINGS\85889.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
53

top box. That specification is essentially complete. The other specifications that are required to build a complete product are not. 

They are not, and we cannot build to them, and this belies kind 

of a central underpinning of what we are in the business of doing. 

What we do in the consumer electronics business everyday, myself and all of my competitors, is we try to develop the latest, 

coolest products that consumers want, and they get to vote in the 

stores. What we do as manufacturers is quite literally bash each 

other’s heads in lowering prices and increasing ingenuity and new 

features. 

In fact, if you were to look at the projection television business 

as an example, in 1997, just as we were starting the digital transition of our country’s infrastructure, a 50-inch projection television, 

a big-screen TV, sold for a little more than $2,000. Today, the HD 

version of that television sells for under $2,000. We do that everyday in our business. 

So it is a little bit disingenuous to assume that there is a specification out there that we can build products to, but we simply 

don’t. What we want to make are products that connect directly to 

the wall, don’t require set-top boxes, or we want to make set-top 

boxes for those consumers who may need one for secondary televisions and other televisions in the home. 

Those specifications and the license agreements that go with 

them—the specs are not complete and the license terms are egregious. Let me explain how egregious one of those license terms is. 

In this PHILA license, we are being asked to agree to allow the 

content provider, by encoding their digital content before they sell 

it to an MSO, or to allow the MSO to send a signal to turn off outputs of those products. There are two kinds of outputs on products. 

There are those outputs that I can record at home and enjoy my 

customary home recording rights, and then there are the other outputs that I can’t record. 

The specification and its associated license agreement specifically 

require us to relinquish that right to the MSO. If they want to keep 

all the recording capability in a set-top box so they can charge—

in other words, pay every time you press ‘‘play’’—they can do it 

under these specifications. These are some of the issues in a very, 

very complex document which frankly have to be addressed before 

manufacturers will risk capital. 

Another key point which has not been spoken about is there are 

two sets of specifications. There is this very complex specification 

that requires paying tribute to CableLabs in the form of licensing 

fees and certification fees. It is very complex. It makes a very expensive consumer product. 

Then there is another specification which the cable MSOs themselves can use which is simple. No cable MSO has appeared and 

said we will abide by the specifications issued by our scientific organization, CableLabs. None of them have agreed to follow their 

own specification. That should be a pretty clear indicator of really 

what is going on here. 

I applaud the fact that Comcast is a good supporter of HDTV. 

They have had a number of great announcements recently and it 

is wonderful. Our country is trying to transition to a digital infrastructure. The unfortunate part is, as we transition, we need to 

54

make sure that the set-top box issued by the cable company is not 

a gatekeeper that is designed to abridge normal consumer recording rights, the ability to network, and all these kinds of new technologies that can happen in the home and benefit consumers. 

We haven’t heard any conversations about how does the cable 

MSO unlock their monopoly for set-top boxes. If a specification 

truly existed that didn’t come with egregious licensing terms that 

required us to effectively pay a competitor, you can bet we would 

be making those products today. Those are truly the issues. 

Thank you. 

Chairman KOHL. We thank you, Mr. Perry. 

I am going to turn this over to Senator DeWine right now. I need 

to go to another meeting, a conference committee on the bankruptcy reform bill. So I want to thank you all for coming and I will 

turn this over to the ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Mike DeWine. 

Senator DEWINE [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The FCC’s recent report on cable prices indicated that when consumers have effective competition in cable, they enjoy lower prices. 

That certainly shouldn’t come as a shock to anybody. The competition from over-builders, though, has come from new entrants and 

relatively small providers of cable services. 

Let me ask you all, and we will start with Mr. Roberts, why is 

it that the larger cable companies have not moved into other large 

companies’ markets to bring consumers the benefits of head-tohead competition? We really haven’t seen that. Why? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, in our case——

Senator DEWINE. And let me just say, is this merger going to 

make that any more likely? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, heretofore, because you served the entire 

community and because you have now two national competitors in 

satellite, it has not proven to make a lot of money. Ameritech, as 

was mentioned earlier, went into the business, and before them 

Florida Power and Light and others, large, substantial companies 

who wanted to go into other markets where you have to wire up 

the entire community or some substantial amount of homes and 

then see how many customers you get. 

Satellite and wireless have proved to be a quicker and easier way 

to get a large footprint. So in our case, when that happened, satellite occurred, we put $5 billion, as I mentioned in my testimony, 

in the last 5 years into upgrading our existing facility to try to sell 

new products and to have a more competitive offering so that customers would retain with us. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Senator, I think that having pursued, first, the 

acquisition of TCI and then MediaOne, and now putting together 

AT&T-Comcast, we are probably the most aggressive in believing 

in and committing to enormous amounts of capital to deploy 

broadband services. 

Second, this is a very, very high fixed-cost business, whether you 

are an entrepreneur starting it up or whether you are transforming 

what is already there. I have been in three forms of networking in 

my career—data communications with the IBM Company for 3 decades, then 6 years with Hughes in satellite communications and 

55

wireless communications, and now wire line and cable communications—and there are some common denominators to those businesses. 

One is that they are very capital-intensive and have an extremely high fixed-cost nature to them, and you have got to get as 

much content going over those infrastructures that you spent all 

that money to make go fast and connect to customers as you can. 

So we have been concentrating on clustering our assets so that we 

can leverage our capital so that we can bring more services to more 

people sooner. 

In that respect, we hope we can converge the interests of the consumer, as was spoken to before, with the interests of the cable company, because if we can bring more services at better prices in better bundles sooner to the consumers because we have clustered 

these properties, we will be as competitive as we can possibly be. 

Senator DEWINE. Anyone else on the panel? 

Mr. HAVERKATE. Senator, there are, I think, two references now 

that implied that the new broadband companies are not building 

entire communities. Generally speaking, that is not the case at all. 

The franchises that we have in the Midwest have been completely 

built out. We are providing services to 100 percent of the communities there, and we are providing similar franchise requirements 

as the incumbent MSO and we certainly don’t believe that we are 

getting any special treatment in that respect. 

There has also been an implication that our business is not a viable business, but it certainly is. While we are still young, we still 

have several members of the Broadband Service Providers Association that are turning into a positive cash-flow situation. We are 

right on the edge of becoming successful companies, and I think if 

we can prove that this is a viable business model and that there 

is room for a second local network in these markets, considering 

the explosion of Internet and digital services, I think that will lead 

to more competition, including the possibility of big companies competing with each other. 

So I would certainly not give up on the goals of the Cable Act 

in having this local competition, because we are not, and we think 

we have an excellent opportunity as long as there are some ground 

rules that are established now going forward. 

Senator DEWINE. How are things going for you, Mr. Haverkate, 

in Columbus and in Cleveland? 

Mr. HAVERKATE. We have about 21 to 22 percent penetration in 

those markets, so 1 in 5 households is connected to our network. 

When Ameritech built it, they built an excellent analog cable network, but they were slow to introduce digital services and they 

didn’t introduce Internet at all because they had a DSL strategy. 

When we took over, we accelerated the roll-out of digital cable 

and Internet services, so now we have a comparable suite of services as Comcast or Time Warner does, or Adelphia Cable does. So 

we are doing very well on increasing the range of services that we 

are providing to our existing customers, but we are having some serious difficulty in fighting this issue on rate discrimination that I 

mentioned before, where our customers are being targeted and 

asked to switch for a big payoff. 

56

Senator DEWINE. Let me ask Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Roberts and 

Mr. Haverkate the following question. Cable franchise agreements 

often require cable providers to have uniform pricing for consumers 

in their franchise area, at least for basic cable services. Many cable 

over-builders have noted that when they enter into a specific neighborhood that the incumbent cable provider will offer free programming, discount prices, and cash rebates in that area to prevent 

their customers from switching to competing services. Obviously, 

the customers who receive these benefits and this competition have 

benefited from the competition. 

Let me ask you, do these types of discounts and promotions violate the franchise agreements, and also will the ability to offer 

these types of discounts harm consumers in the long run if new entrants are unable to establish a sufficient customer base and remain viable? 

Mr. Armstrong, do you want to start? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. First, Senator, I don’t think it will harm consumers. I think competition is pretty darn good. We spend a lot of 

time competing with dish. 

Senator DEWINE. Long run, as well as short run, they will be 

better off? Clearly, in the short run they are going to be better off. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Sure, and I think in the long run they are going 

to be better off, also. We spent a lot of time competing with dish 

in my old outfit, DirecTV, as well as over-builders, as well as Bell 

companies, and as Brian mentioned, in some cases some wireless 

outfits. I don’t think it violates, to my knowledge, being competitive. 

I do think it is wrong if people start to price below cost in order 

to keep them long term. That is very bad and that is not the right 

thing to do at all. I know at least in our company’s case, we have 

never, never approached that. 

So the bottom line, Senator, is I think it is good to have competition. I think we have got a lot of competition, and over-builders 

aren’t the only ones we are reacting to day by day. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Haverkate, any comment? 

Mr. HAVERKATE. Yes. I don’t believe I responded to the question 

about franchise requirements, but for them most part the franchises do address the issue of discriminatory pricing and charging 

uniform rates and publicly disclosed rates across the entire customer base. So in most cases, this practice that I have been talking 

about today certainly appears to be in violation of the franchise 

agreements that municipalities have. 

Senator DEWINE. It would be? 

Mr. HAVERKATE. It would be. It is in violation, yes, because rates 

are supposed to be publicly disclosed, which they are not, and uniform, which they are not. 

The second thing is certainly it is hard to argue against a lower 

rate. Certainly, everyone wants to get a deal, but if the price of allowing this activity to happen is the elimination of competition, be 

assured that rates will go up faster in the future. Choices of Internet service will be reduced. Competition in the digital arena will 

not exist. 

We are not talking about a short term/long term like 3 years 

from now. If this issue isn’t addressed immediately and some stop 

57

isn’t put to it, companies of this size, if they have the intent, have 

the ability to put us out of business, not next year but this year. 

So it is a very serious issue. 

They keep talking about the satellite industry. Well, I want to 

talk about the local network industry that has spent so much 

money, time and effort to put themselves in place and now are at 

risk. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Roberts, any comment? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you. A couple of points. First of all, I have 

tremendous admiration for a fellow entrepreneur. The Ameritech 

Company, which is now part of SBC, built some of these markets, 

and I believe your company was able to buy them for substantially 

less than they had spent to build them. So that is the entrepreneurial model at work, and he is absolutely entitled to pursue his 

business and I wish him good luck. 

The reason we keep referring to satellite as a major competitor 

is that is where the vast—first of all, it is available everywhere in 

the country, not market by market. And, of course, in the last couple of years Congress has passed a law, the Satellite Home Viewer 

Act, to allow satellite to have all the local broadcast signals. 

I believe what has been referred to in the local franchise of one 

rate is the level of service that includes the local broadcast signal, 

the so-called B–1, and I believe if there is a certain community 

where there is some behavior, then you could complain to that community or complain to the FCC. 

So, again, I guess I would step back and say I don’t see it as a 

merger issue. The satellite industry and the over-build industry are 

competing, and we are responding, in turn, by upgrading our networks, investing, clustering, as Mike mentioned, and hopefully creating a compelling proposition to the consumer. 

Senator DEWINE. Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the concerns which I have involves the tie-ins between 

sports teams and cable. Two examples come to mind, or a number 

of examples come to mind. One example is the Braves network, another example is the Yankees network. 

I heard recently that a substantial charge was being added to the 

cable subscribers of Yankees’ games and the interrelationship of 

this arrangement is that enormous revenues go to teams like the 

New York Yankees. They are able to buy pennants and buy World 

Series championships almost at will. 

Mr. Haverkate, you are nodding in the affirmative. I think I will 

start with you. You appear to agree with me. 

Mr. HAVERKATE. Well, I agree 100 percent with your comments 

so far. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, what is the extent of major sports teams’ 

ability to control cable television to acquire more funds, which then 

in turn can be used to buy players and buy pennants? 

Mr. HAVERKATE. Well, they have an enormous ability there. The 

example that you are using in New York—while WOW doesn’t operate in New York, I know that RCN and other members do. Typically, the negotiations go something like this: We have decided to 

put this number of games on this channel and this is what the rate 

is and you have until Friday to agree to it. 

58

If you are a competitive provider like we are or like the satellite 

industry is and you have a lower market share and you are doing 

everything that you can to try to hold on to the customers that you 

have, the last thing you need is to not have programming like the 

New York Yankees. So, in effect, we agree to whatever demands 

they have, no matter what the price is. 

Generally speaking, the cable MSOs have had to do the same 

thing because if they don’t do it, then they are painted as the bad 

guys and withholding key programming from consumers. Occasionally, there is a company like Cable Vision that says no and takes 

the heat on it. But generally speaking, all the leverage in that negotiation is with the sports owners and the sports channel, and the 

cable companies have very little to do with it, in my experience. 

Senator SPECTER. Do the Yankees own a cable network? 

Mr. HAVERKATE. I believe they do. Since I don’t operate in the 

New York market anymore, I have only been following this particular issue through the trade press. So maybe Mr. Roberts or Mr. 

Armstrong would know the details more than myself. 

Senator SPECTER. Does anybody know for sure whether the 

Yankees own a network? 

Mr. ROBERTS. It is 50-50. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Armstrong, you are looking with an affirmative nod. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It is 50-50. 

Mr. ROBERTS. I think they own 50 percent of the network and 

they sold the other 50 percent to some investors recently in the last 

year. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Perry, what do you think Congress ought 

to try to do about that, if anything? 

Mr. PERRY. Well, sir, I think that concentrations of power, as 

commented very early, I think, in some of the opening comments, 

are not necessarily bad if, in fact, there is oversight and if an environment is created where this power can be put to tremendous use 

of allowing for competition and allowing for equal access and allowing for lots of entrants to innovate and bring technology to the 

party, which is something that we do in our business. 

Senator SPECTER. How can you have oversight, or how can you 

have competition? It is a full circle. The Yankees own the system 

or 50 percent of it. They must have had a good reason for bringing 

in investors. That produces revenues because people like to watch 

the Yankees because they are good, and that enables them to acquire a lot of money to buy more players who are good. What happens to competition in the American League? 

I am frankly more worried about Atlanta because they are in our 

division, but let’s stick with the Yankees. 

Mr. PERRY. As we discussed earlier, being a Burks County boy 

and actually having taught economics at a couple of colleges in the 

Burks County area, it is a fact of like that all companies as they 

grow tend to desire to stifle competition and to exert more market 

power. 

I believe that is why the 1996 Telecommunications Act was 

passed. I believe that is why the Federal Government has a wide 

range of legislation and regulatory oversight on all of these issues, 

59

and I believe that that oversight has to be properly employed, and 

vigilantly. 

Senator SPECTER. Do you think oversight could do something 

about the Yankees’ practices? 

Mr. PERRY. I am not so sure whether there is specific legislation 

or regulatory authority to address that issue. However, this specific 

issue that you bring up, while it is not particularly an issue that 

our industry focuses on, does have an effect of being exclusionary, 

and let me explain how that works. 

Today, while we have two DBS satellite providers, one offers 

sports programming packages that are highly attractive, and the 

other cannot. They cannot because the arrangements for the provisioning of programming are exclusionary. They, in fact, are used as 

a competitive weapon, and that is market power at work which a 

lot of us would probably say is probably inappropriate use of market power. 

That is going to flip to the cable side fairly quickly. It has been 

commented on that they have a national competitor called satellite. 

Well, our country is in the middle of this digital television transition. In fact, all of the local broadcasters in the Philadelphia market have transitioned. 

This transition allows the local broadcasters to deliver high-definition, very high-quality pictures, and broadcasters like CBS and 

ABC deliver their prime-time schedules in high-definition. Well, 

one of the things that is not being brought up here today is that 

cable has a very natural advantage in this marketplace. Even if 

Echostar purchases DirecTV, they cannot offer HD programming in 

all their markets. They will relegated to 12 channels of HD and 

then lower-resolution programming across the rest of the country, 

where cable, because they are a wired, on-the-ground system, will 

be able to deliver, if they wish, high-definition programming in 

every market of the country. So while, in fact, they are competitors, 

they don’t necessarily compete on equal footing. 

So I went a little bit over the answer to your question, sir, but 

these are part of the intricacies that affect how these business 

models work and whether they are really fair to the consumer. Our 

company, and frankly our industry, really doesn’t have a position 

for or against this merger. Our position is that the regulatory and 

legislative authorities that are already there should be enforced to 

ensure that if this goes forward that the consumer is treated fairly 

and they have all this access and they have the right to get this 

variety of programming and services without the set-top box or contracts creating exclusionary environments to control them. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Betty, do you agree that cable has that 

kind of an advantage over satellite? 

Mr. BETTY. I really don’t have an opinion on the subject. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, that is refreshing. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Senator, could I take a shot? And I find myself 

very uncomfortable doing this, but I was 6 years in the satellite industry and we started DirecTV. The satellite industry can provide 

more capacity by advanced satellite technology, better use of frequency on the transponders, and reuse of the spectrum. It is called 

60

a spot beam technology that will enable them to, in fact, implement 

the same frequency in different geographies from a geosynchronous 

satellite system. So while I think that we in the cable industry 

have some advantages over satellite, I just don’t buy into that is 

one of them. 

Mr. PERRY. I would point out, sir, if I could, that the people who 

are promoting the deal between Echostar and DirecTV, I believe, 

when they have come to the Hill have talked specifically about a 

commitment to deliver, I believe, local-to-local broadcasts in standard definition in all TV markets and 12 channels of HD. If it was 

part of their business plan to deliver HD in every market, I am 

sure that would have been offered up. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Perry, let me just interrupt Senator Specter for a moment and let me just say that we will be certainly interested in getting the answer to that question. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, I am concerned about the impact on 

sports which is readily apparent. There are a lot of other questions 

which are on the table which defy analysis and are very hard to 

figure out. 

There is a sense of unease in the Congress, or at least in this 

member, on mergers and acquisitions, but unless there is a violation of the antitrust laws, lessening of competition—and, candidly, 

there does not appear to be that here—there is no legislative reach 

to object. 

A number of us have wrestled with what has happened not just 

here, but everywhere, on gigantic concentration. There is a sense, 

as Jefferson said, about a feeling of discomfort with the size, with 

the gigantic nature in so many, many of the lines. We see the import in a number of ways. We see it in sports, where America has 

a love affair with sports, and I have seen this cable operation work 

to the disadvantage of most of the teams. 

We have a franchise in western Pennsylvania, in Pittsburgh, 

doing very well right now, but a small-market team has a very, 

very tough time surviving, and the big-market teams, where they 

tie into cable, really have it made. We wrestled on this subcommittee with the problem of franchise changes, and while this 

does not directly affect the issues here, it does in an indirect way 

as to cable’s import on helping teams like the Braves or the 

Yankees, where the franchises are extracting enormous sums of 

money—$1 billion in public money for stadiums in Pennsylvania. 

I introduced legislation which would require Major League Baseball or the NFL to pay for three-quarters of the cost of stadium 

construction. The NFL has a $17.6 billion, multi-year television 

contract. It doesn’t go over cable, but the extortion of the big cities 

is just overwhelming and we are trying to put our hand around the 

issue. 

Does anybody have any ideas as to what we might do on the examples we have on the table, the Yankees or the Braves? 

Mr. Armstrong, you have been in this business a long time. What 

do you think? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I don’t think that qualifies me, but I do think 

that there is a very natural market tug between the love affair, as 

you have rightly put it, with sports teams and American consumers. We love our sports, we idolize our heroes, and we do a 

61

pretty good job, whether it is from the sky on the ground, of bringing that action to everybody, almost too much of it some weekends. 

But right now, we have a difficult tug. 

By the way, Senator, it is not just the NFL and the NHL and 

the NBA. Also, you have things like ESPN who have rate increases 

every year that are very high, double-digit rate increases for what 

they bring, as well. And what we are trying to do, to the best of 

our ability, is to tier them so we can price them to the people who 

want to watch them, and to try to mitigate the impact on the basic 

service that many people take as their fundamental service. 

So I hope over time that market forces lead us to, if people are 

going to want to watch it that much and the teams are going to 

charge that much for people to watch it, we can evolve to the ability to tier it so that the people who do watch it pay for it and not 

all the other people. I hope the market will enable that to happen 

over time. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, I didn’t get any part of your answer to 

the issue of how to break up the Yankees. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Or beat them. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Roberts, I know that there is an element 

with Comcast and the sports teams with which you have an interest. Would you comment on the ways you see your practices evolving with the Flyers or the other sports teams and I think some activities in Washington, too, to ameliorate this kind of an issue? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I think you put your finger on the pulse of 

a quagmire, and I don’t know that anybody has the answer or we 

all would be chasing it right today. We recognize that love affair 

and want to be associated with it, but at the same time it is a cost 

and there is an unevenness, as you point out. I think you probably 

need to talk league by league on that unevenness, because in some 

leagues there is a cap or some sort of less extreme disparity between teams. 

At the same time, our behavior in the sports business is pretty 

consistent with the norm of the industry. It is not a market leader 

the way the Yankees are right now, or the Braves on a national 

basis with having their games available everywhere, and that creates extra revenue. You are right; for years, they have done better, 

so there is a cause and effect. 

I think the point you made about stadiums—we know from 

Philadelphia that that is exactly the tough problem for what to do, 

and if we didn’t have it, then the teams may have moved. I don’t 

know, but I think it is worthy, and going back to the earlier discussion on cable rates, at least that there is an understanding that 

this is a complicated, multi-layered problem, not just somebody desiring to raise rates 5 percent and, gee, that is great. In fact, the 

cost of sports is going up way greater than that amount of money, 

as you know. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Armstrong, I am advised that you are to 

be the chairman of the board of AT&T-Comcast. There is a provision that the chairman cannot be removed without the approval of 

75 percent of the board before the year 2010 that is more job security than Senator DeWine and I have. We have to run and can be 

defeated more often at a lower figure. 

62

Is it true that you will be the chairman of the board, or that is 

the plan, and can’t be retired without a vote of 75 percent of the 

board? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That provision is currently in there, Senator. It 

does not apply to me, however, until 2010. It applies to me until 

the spring of 2005, and it applies so that I will be able to help with 

this transition to assure the success of this company in coming together deliver on the synergies that we promised the shareholders. 

So for me, it is a transitional vehicle. 

Senator DEWINE. Just until 2005? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, why is the provision in there, then? Is it 

only applicable to whoever takes over after you, until the year 

2010? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I think it applies to, in all probability, myself. As 

you may know, the Roberts family has 88 percent, approximately, 

of the votes in Comcast. In the merger discussions between ourselves and AT&T, it was negotiated that we would reduce that voting percentage from hard control, if you will, north of 51, to 331⁄3. 

So it was a balanced package of governance to say, since we are 

now below, it would require three-fourths of the board so that there 

would be stability that the vision that we painted out, which is 

going to take many years to fulfill, could happen; that our investment had been with a number of years since we went public for 29 

years. 

My father has had hard control of the company, and in giving 

that up, which was a huge line to cross, but in order to help create 

this company this was a negotiated balance and will be put before 

all the AT&T shareholders to see whether they like this deal or 

whether they don’t, and we will live with that outcome. 

Senator SPECTER. Are you saying, in effect, because you have so 

many obligations under this arrangement, you want to be sure that 

you are in a position to operate the company to make sure that the 

company and you can fulfill your commitments? 

Mr. ROBERTS. That was the basis of us wanting to go forward 

with making this large investment in this new company for our 

family’s investment. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much. My time has expired 

long since, actually. 

There is a letter which has been written by the AFL-CIO to the 

Securities and Exchange Commission raising quite a number of 

issues, and you have probably already responded to it. I would like 

to have this made a part of the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DEWINE. Without objection, it will be made part of the 

record. 

Senator SPECTER. And also to have your responses to the issues 

which were raised here. To repeat, I believe you have already responded to them, but I think that our record here ought to have 

those responses as well. 

Senator DEWINE. I would advise all the members of the panel 

that members of the subcommittee have the opportunity to submit 

written questions and those can be submitted. 

Senator Specter, anything else? 

Senator SPECTER. That concludes my questioning. 

63

Senator DEWINE. I am going to jump around a little bit with a 

few additional questions. I want to get back to the issue about exclusive contracts in regard to programming and maybe get some 

comments about that. 

The ability of any program distributor to get access to programming is obviously a key element of being a valid competitor in this 

business. Let me ask you what you believe would be appropriate 

concerning the program access rules in regard to the exclusive 

deals for programming. A good example, of course, would be 

DirecTV’s deal with the NFL, the Sunday package, the NFL Sunday Ticket, where if you want to watch any football game in the 

country, about the only way you can really do that is to buy that 

package. You can’t buy it from cable, you can’t buy it from anybody 

else but DirecTV. 

Mr. Armstrong, you are smiling. Let’s get your comment. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I am smiling, Senator, because when I was at 

DirecTV we negotiated the arrangement with the NFL. 

Senator DEWINE. So you are responsible for that? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I used the word ‘‘we.’’ They own it now. The 

company at the time paid quite a premium to put that package together and at the time we were betting a lot on would we have the 

kind of package that would differentiate us in the marketplace. 

The NFL felt they were clearly within the rules of the road in 

program access to cut such a deal with a satellite carrier. On the 

same token, after coming to AT&T and getting in the broadband 

cable business, I realized how outrageous this was. 

Senator DEWINE. You saw it from a little different perspective? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Absolutely, and so I can only say that I think 

the program access rules, as interpreted by the FCC, have held up 

that transaction. I think now Chairman Powell and the Commission are taking that under review and we have yet to learn their 

direction. 

Senator DEWINE. Although that has been in effect, though, since 

when? 

Mr. ROBERTS. 1992. 

Senator DEWINE. What year? 

Mr. ROBERTS. 1992, so basically it has been in effect for 10 years 

and it said that the FCC at the end of that period would review 

it and that is the process we are in. 

Senator DEWINE. That is where we are now. 

Mr. ROBERTS. And I think that that is an appropriate point, because it doesn’t apply to the satellite industry and it does apply to 

cable and it has, I think, worked in today having 16 million customers who now have satellite dishes. The question is is it still appropriate or does it need to be modified, and that process is ongoing. 

Senator DEWINE. Staying with you, Mr. Roberts, the D.C. Circuit 

Court recently ruled that the 30-percent cable ownership cap was 

not valid and needs to be revisited by the FCC. What do you think 

about that? Do you think a cable ownership cap is important, and 

what would be the level? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I don’t know that I have an answer as a 

number. I would defer to what is going on in other industries. 

Senator DEWINE. You all would not be violating that, right? 

64

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, that was what I was going to say. 

Senator DEWINE. You are close. 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, we would be right at about 30 percent if you 

assume that we are able successfully, and we plan to—and I want 

to confirm what Mike had said earlier about the Time Warner interest that we are going to dispose of that partnership. The remaining company, based on the old rules, would be right around 30 percent, I think slightly under. That has, as you said, been remanded. 

I think one of the reasons that I think this transaction hopefully 

doesn’t present difficulties—somebody mentioned earlier, well, 

what about broadcast stations, what about newspapers? Today, in 

Comcast-AT&T, none of that is there, and I think you have to do 

all these rules in their totality. 

What is the number of TV stations that can be owned? What is 

the number of networks? So I think you have to look in the totality, 

and the same in the phone industry. But I don’t think this transaction, even if the old rules were in place, would be violative. So 

we are hopeful to participate in that process with the FCC to help 

them set kind of a set of rules that both the courts uphold and 

apply uniformly. 

Diversity of voices which somebody mentioned earlier—I think 

that is a critical thing to safeguard. I would submit that cable television has added more to the diversity of news and information 

over the last 25 years in this country than almost any single industry contribution. 

Senator DEWINE. So the summary of your answer is what? 

Mr. ROBERTS. The summary of the answer is I think something 

higher than 30. 

Senator DEWINE. I guess so. 

Mr. ROBERTS. At least 30. 

Senator DEWINE. At least 30, OK. Forty? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I really don’t know, honestly. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Armstrong, a comment at all? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I think it ought to have a minimum of 4 in 

front of it. I wouldn’t even think that 3 was appropriate. No. 2, I 

hope they do away with the attribution rules which lend to the 

counting of subs when they set this thing. That would be a good 

step forward. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Haverkate. 

Mr. HAVERKATE. While size isn’t a factor for the broadband services providers, generally speaking, either one of these companies in 

their current size are already large enough to take actions to trample our business. So we are concerned more about the rules of the 

game and the actions and behaviors that are permitted than we 

are about the size of the company. 

Senator DEWINE. Senator Specter, anything else? 

Senator SPECTER. No, thank you. 

Senator DEWINE. Well, I have got a couple more here. 

Both AT&T and Comcast own programming, not as much as 

some other cable systems, but nonetheless this merger will increase 

vertical integration. There are a number of concerns associated 

with this type of consolidation. 

For example—and I mentioned this in my opening statement—

independent programmers may find it more difficult to gain access 

65

to cable systems as cable companies own more programming. In addition, competitors may have difficulty gaining access to programming owned by the incumbent cable system. 

Concerned with issues such as these, the Department of Justice 

imposed conditions on the Liberty-TCI transaction, requiring that 

the company not discriminate against independent programmers or 

competing program distributors. 

Let me ask the panel, would similar non-discrimination provisions relating to programming be appropriate in this merger? 

Mr. Haverkate. 

Mr. HAVERKATE. Well, I would certainly think that would be a 

good idea. But in addition to that, if you were an independent programmer and you were trying to get access on the AT&T-Comcast 

network and they said to you one of the terms and conditions of 

you getting on our system is that you are an exclusive on our system and you are not allowed to sign an agreement for carriage on 

our competitor, believe me, that is what they will do because getting on that large of a network is key to their business. Getting on 

our network is not key to their business. 

So this issue of kind of collecting these programming assets and 

holding them in tight control is a key issue on whether this competition is going to last in the marketplace or not. Especially going 

back to Senator Specter’s point where a company actually owns the 

sports teams in the same market where they can say we are going 

to carry these only on our network and we are not going to sell 

them to our competition in the network, that basically locks out all 

competitors in that market. 

Mr. BETTY. Senator DeWine, I think similarly, when you look at 

the opportunity to provide customer choice of ISPs, having non-discriminatory access to things like video streaming or restrictions on 

provisioning that content over the pipe coming into the home also 

will be important in order to maintain competition in an open-access environment. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Roberts. 

Mr. ROBERTS. Thank you. Between the two companies, I think 

we have about 6 percent or less of the cable networks. As you mentioned, it is not very many. I think we pride ourselves on the good 

relationships we have with both large content companies, but also 

small and medium-size companies. We have a relationship with 

News Channel 8 right here in the District, with the Weather Channel, Word Network, with, as I mentioned earlier, Outdoor Life 

Channel, and many others. 

I really think if you are on a pro-competitive path, any regulatory restrictions have consequences, and I think today there are 

safeguards in place and we are in a competitive business. We have 

very few exclusive agreements with independent programmers such 

as you are referring to, and virtually none that I can think of 

against WideOpenWest. So I do think the marketplace is working. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Roberts, last year it 

was reported that at least one cable company attempted to require 

a popular programmer to agree not to permit its programming to 

be delivered over the Internet. As high-speed Internet access becomes available to more consumers either through cable companies, 

phone companies or other providers, many people believe that video 

66

streaming over the Internet could bring competition into the multichannel video market in coming years. Yet, established distributors 

of video programming such as cable companies may have an incentive to prevent this emerging competition. 

Let me ask you, will a merger such as the one that you propose 

that increases the market power of individual cable firms enable 

the ability to block or delay video distribution from these emerging 

competitors? Do either of your companies have agreements in place 

today that prevent or limit distribution of content over the Internet, and will you commit not to enter into such agreements? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Senator, let me try that. The answer is yes, 

video streaming indeed will be enabled by Web sites. There are a 

couple of billion Web sites out there, everything from maybe you 

and I doing some video streaming with full motion pictures of family, to people who have servers that, in fact, charge, pay-per-view 

kinds of services that come from video streaming. 

It is very difficult to monitor those bit streams as they come 

through in terms of the content that they are carrying. On the 

other hand, we can now monitor with our networks how much consumption people are using. You might be interested to know that 

in the Excite@Home days when we did an analysis with over 3 million subscribers to a broadband service Excite@Home offered, 5,700 

consumed 30 percent of the network. We tended to call them the 

Net Hogs, and they are obviously using a lot of capacity that we 

are spending a lot of capital on. 

So what the industry is going to have to migrate to, and the technology is there to do it, is to understand what the consumption is 

that is causing us to spend so much capital to keep the performance levels up, the reliability there, and the service levels appropriate, and charge for it. 

I look at it as a business opportunity. If Web sites want to videostream, if ISPs want to video-stream, if portals want to videostream, terrific. I would just like to get paid for that consumption 

and the capital I have got to put forward to let that happen. 

Mr. ROBERTS. I totally want to just agree on that point that as 

a business model we are trying to take 10 percent of consumers 

and give them more than 10 percent, a reason to buy a cable 

modem. This hearing, I believe, is being streamed on C-SPAN III, 

and that is a practice now that is very common and that is one of 

the benefits of cable modems. So we absolutely want to encourage 

it. Mike’s point about finding a way to charge for different consumption models is very logical. 

I think the second point you raised is sort of akin to a broadcaster if they were streaming one of the big networks, and yet the 

local broadcaster said what about the integrity of what I have purchased or my business relationship? So I think what you are referring to is probably if we are being asked to pay for a channel that 

is then given for free over the Internet, is that a good business 

model? 

So we are not ever blocking any Web sites. We have never done 

that. Excite@Home never did that, to my knowledge. What I think 

you are referring to is just—and there have not been any contracts 

where this has been a dispute with our company or that any programmers ever raised with me. I think we are going to try to, as 

67

this becomes more prevalent, find an acceptable business model so 

that they can begin to stream the content, if that is what the consumer wants, and find a secure way for them to get paid and to 

make sure that there is an integrity to the product. 

Senator DEWINE. Well, Mr. Roberts, I know that your company 

started as a family-owned business and remains a family-owned 

business. It was started by your dad and your dad has been seated 

very quietly behind you during this whole hearing. I just, before we 

close, want to see if he might have any brief comment before we 

close this down. 

Mr. ROBERTS. It is my honor to turn it over to the elder statesman. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Roberts. 

Mr. RALPH ROBERTS. Thank you very much, and I am slightly 

prepared. I want to thank you for giving me this chance to say a 

few words. Pardon my throat. 

Senator DEWINE. Well, my throat, as you can tell, Mr. Roberts, 

has been bad throughout the hearing. So you are doing very well, 

sir. 

Mr. RALPH ROBERTS. Thank you. I have had a lot of experiences 

in my life, but this is the first time I have had an opportunity to 

talk to a congressional committee. 

Senator DEWINE. They are to be avoided, Mr. Roberts. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. RALPH ROBERTS. I learned how to avoid them for 60 years. 

I am really quite thrilled to be here today, and I know you have 

heard from Brian and Mike what an incredible vision we really 

have for what Comcast and AT&T Broadband can become. What is 

especially wonderful for me personally is that I have had the opportunity to work side by side with my son, Brian, and seeing him sort 

of taking a family business that I founded over 30 years ago and 

seeing it grow into a leader in the cable and broadcast community 

industry—a long distance from Tupelo, Mississippi, where we started. 

Brian and I think of ourselves as entrepreneurs. We think that 

that is the spirit that makes American business the best in the 

world. Being an entrepreneur means understanding your customer, 

being willing to take risks, but to do it intelligently so that you can 

build and grow something that customers really want. We will keep 

that spirit in this new company and we will deliver the quality and 

the value that Comcast customers have come to expect. We will 

continue to create the kind of competition that you in Congress 

want to see. 

I was very interested in the many questions you asked and I 

hope you received clear answers. I also hope that you share our belief that this merger is really a good thing for America’s consumers. 

Thanks again for giving me this few moments. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment, I am glad 

I stayed until the very end. 

You should have been the lead witness. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SPECTER. This would have been a much shorter hearing 

had you said that at the outset. I complimented you at the start, 

Mr. Roberts, and I would compliment you at the conclusion for 

68

what you have done and your comments on entrepreneurship. You 

are certainly Exhibit A, and Brian is Exhibit A-plus. 

Mr. RALPH ROBERTS. Well, thank you very much. 

Senator SPECTER. You have done a great job on your own and a 

great job in producing your successor. 

Mr. RALPH ROBERTS. Thank you. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Roberts, thank you very much. Senator 

Specter, thank you. Let me thank all of our witnesses for their testimony today. 

There are clearly some points of disagreement about specific 

issues related to this merger. The Department of Justice and the 

FCC must look closely at program access issues and consumer 

choice regarding ISPs. They should do what is necessary to protect 

consumer choice. 

I encourage the agencies to look closely at media consolidation, 

in general, and put in place rules to protect the marketplace of 

ideas that is so vitally important to this democracy of ours. Should 

this merger be approved, we expect AT&T-Comcast to live up to 

the promises that they have made today in terms of new services 

and faster deployment. 

I again thank the members of the panel, I thank our audience, 

and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Submissions for the record follow.] 

[Additional material is being retained in the Committee files.]

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