alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1

Exhibit 10.36

March 28, 2000

Dr. Wolfram Weinsheimer
Kuerzlengraben 15A
D-89275 Elchingen, Germany

Dear Wolfram:

         I hope all is well. In preparation for our public offering, we will be
operating as a business development corporation, which has its own legal
requirements. Accordingly, we will no longer be able to compensate regional
representatives with shares of stock in companies who acquire technologies from
us.

         Instead of the current 10% equity commission upon the consummation of
any successful technology transfer (which results from your efforts), we will
now provide you with a $20,000 cash commission upon the successful sale of a
UTEK licensed technology.

         If you agree to this new commission program, please sign below and fax
back to Carole Mason, CFO, by April 12th, 2000.

         I appreciate all of your efforts to-date and look forward to our
continued mutually beneficial relationship.

Very best regards,


/s/  Uwe Reischl


Uwe Reischl, Ph.D., M.D.
President


Cc: Sam Reiber


Agreed to:     /s/  Dr. Wolfram Weinsheimer     Date  00-04-06
          --------------------------------------     -------------
[ DO NOT PUBLISH] 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________ No. 23

- 12170 Non

- Argument Calendar

____________________ WILLIAM L. APGAR, JR., Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant

- Appellee.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No s . 5:21

- mc
- 00017

- JA

- PRL , 5:21

- mj

- 01088

- PRL

- 1 USCA11 Case: 23-12170 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023 Page: 1 of 22 Opinion of the Court 23

- 12170

____________________ Before W ILSON , B RANCH , and L UCK , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: This appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte , for lack of jurisdiction. William Apgar filed a notice of appeal to the district court from the magistrate judge’s June 28, 2023 amended criminal judgment , and the district court transmitt ed the notice to us . However,we lack jurisdiction to directly review a magistrate judge’s judgment entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401, as an appeal from such a judgment must be taken to and heard by the district court first. See 18 U.S.C. § 3402; Unit ed States v. Pilati , 627 F.3d 1360, 1363

- 64 (11th Cir. 2010) ; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Kruckenberg , 720 F.2d 653, 654 (11th Cir. 1983).
No petition for rehearing may be filed unless it complies with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir. R. 40

- 3 and all other applicable rules

. USCA11 Case: 23-12170 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023 Page: 2 of 2
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)**

In connection with the quarterly report of DayStar Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date therein specified (the “Report”), I, Peter A. Lacey, Interim Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and 18U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

1.The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and 

2. Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

Date: May 16, 2011
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JAMES MURRAY, DOC #T16031, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-4048

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

________________________________ )

Opinion filed August 7, 2019.

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 

9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Michelle Sisco, 

Judge

James Murray, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

NORTHCUTT, BADALAMENTI, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v WILLIAM R. BUTLER, Jr., Private First Class, U. S. Army, Appellant

17 USCMA 344, 38 CMR 142

No. 20,447

December 22, 1967

*Colonel Daniel T. Ghent, Lieutenant Colonel Martin S. DrucJcer,*and *Captain Kenneth J. Stuart*were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*345
      *Lieutenant Colonel David Rarick, Major John F. Webb, Jr.,*and *Captain Harvey L. Anderson*were on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

FERGUSON, Judge:

This case involves the same issue as that presented in United States v Lincoln, 17 USCMA 330, 38 CMR 128, this day decided. Here, the trial counsel also sought to impeach the accused’s trial testimony by use of his pretrial, in-custody statements without any showing of compliance with Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 16 L ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602 (1966), and United States v Tempia, 16 USCMA 629, 37 CMR 249. This was prejudicial error. United States v Lincoln, supra.

The decision of the board of review is reversed, and the record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army. A rehearing may be ordered.

Judge Kilday concurs.

Quinn, Chief Judge

(dissenting):

■ I dissent. See my opinion in United States v Lincoln, 17 USCMA 330, 38 CMR 128.
Exhibit 32.2 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of Manhattan Scientifics, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Chris Theoharis, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Date: April 9, 2010  /s/ Chris TheoharisChris TheoharisChief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Manhattan Scientifics, Inc. and will be retained by Manhattan Scientifics, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Cite as State ex rel. Jefferson v. Goulding , 2022-Ohio-344.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

State, ex rel. Tanelle Jefferson Court of Appeals No. L-21-12 25

Relator

v. Judge Michael Goulding DECISION AND JUDGMENT Respondent Decided: February 1, 2022

* * * * * Tanelle Jefferson, Pro se. Julia R. Bates, Lucas Count Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Repondent.

* * * * * OSOWIK, J. {¶ 1} This matter is before the court on respondent Hon. Judge Michae l Goulding’s January 10, 2022 motion to dismiss relator Tanelle J efferson’s petition for writ of procedendo. In his petition, relator asked this court to order respondent to rule on2. his previously-filed motion for judicial release. Relator alle ges that respondent failed to rule on his motion within time period prescribed in R.C. 2929.2 0. On December 30, 2021, we granted an alternative writ ordering respondent to eit her rule on appellant’s motion, or show cause why he has no clear duty to do so by fili ng either an answer to relator’s complaint or a motion to dismiss. {¶ 2} On January 10, 2022, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, purs uant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing that no relief could be granted becaus e he had already performed the requested action—that is, he denied relator’s mot ion. Respondent included a copy of the order resolving relator’s motion for jud icial release to his motion

to dismiss. {¶ 3} “Procedendo will not compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed.” State ex rel. Bechtel v. Cornachio, 164 Ohio St.3d 579, 2021-Ohio1121, 174 N.E.3d 744, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh, 159 Ohio St.3d 457, 2020-Ohio-1540, 151 N.E.3d 625, ¶ 6. Where respondent performs the action requested in a petition for writ of procedendo, the petition is subject t o dismissal as moot. State ex rel. Ames v. Pokorny, 164 Ohio St.3d 538, 2021-Ohio-2070, 173 N.E.3d 1208, ¶ 7. Her e, respondent’s motion to dismiss includes the order showing that the relief relator requests in his petition has been provided. As a result, this action ha s been rendered moot. {¶ 4} IT IS THEREFORE3. {¶ 5} ORDERED that respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted; it is

further {¶ 6} ORDERED that relator’s petition for writ of procedendo is hereby dismissed as moot; and it is further {¶ 7} ORDERED that the costs of this action are assessed to respondent. {¶ 8} The clerk is directed to immediately serve upon the parties, wi thin three days, a copy of this decision in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B). {¶ 9} It is so ordered.

Writ denied.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ___________________________

_ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J.

____________________________ Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE CONCUR.

____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
Before the Second Division,

November 24, 1948

No. 52697.

protests 525956-G, etc. (New York).

#### Stern & Stern Textile Impts., Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Rao., J.

The protests were dismissed.
Exhibit 32.1




CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of ChinaCast Education Corporation on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Ron Chan Tze Ngon, Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer of ChinaCast Education Corporation, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1. The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of ChinaCast Education
Corporation.




Dated:
      May 10, 2010
                /s/ Ron Chan Tze NgonRon Chan Tze NgonChairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
                  (Principal Executive
      Officer)
No. 52714.

protest 130780-K (New York).

#### Foreign Vintages, Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

At the trial it was stipulated that the merchandise, issues, and facts herein are similar in all material rsepects to those involved in *United States*v. *Browne Vintners Co., Inc.*(34 C. C. P. A. 112, C. A. D. 351), and that the quantities reported by the inspector as manifested, not found, were not in fact received by the importer. In accordance with stipulation and following the decision cited it was held that the merchandise, insofar as it pertains to the quantity reported by the inspector as manifested, not found, is subject to an allowance in duties and internal revenue taxes. The protest was sustained to this extent.
No. 47469.

#### Protests 79768-K, etc., of Geo. Borgfeldt Corp. et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed-the protests.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 00-50881

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAVIER AMAYA-FONTES,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-00-CR-630-1-DB

- - - - - - - - - -

February 15, 2001

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Javier Amaya-Fontes appeals his sentence following his

guilty plea conviction for illegal re-entry after deportation in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Amaya argues that his sentence

should not have exceeded the two-year maximum sentence under 8

U.S.C. § 1326(a). Amaya acknowledges that his argument is

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224

(1998), but he seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme Court

review in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
No. 00-50881

- 2 -

Amaya’s argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres, 523

U.S. at 235. 

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that the judgment of the district court be affirmed and that an

appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is granted.

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
#### Omar Case, *Appellant, v.*Joseph P. Davis and another, *Respondents.*

— Judgment of County Court affirmed. Opinion by Macombee, J.
#### William F. Taylor *et al.,*Resp’ts, *v.*Almon M. Hull, App’lt.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,*

*Filed February 24, 1890.)*

Attachment—Affidavit.

An affidavit upon which an attachment is granted is insufficient, under *636Code Civ. Pro., § 636, sub. *2,*where upon the questions of fraudulent assignment or departure from the state with intent to defraud, it only states that defendant has transferred his farm to his wife and has gone to one of the Western states, and that deponent has been informed by certain persons that defendant had said he was about to remove to Dakota and settle there, and had told the deponent that he intended to leave this section of the country; also, that he had written deponent that he could not pay his debts.

Appeal from order refusing to set aside and vacate a warrant of attachment against the defendant.

*Henry A.*King, for app’lt; *William*Powell, Jr., for resp’ts.

Learned, P. J.

This is an appeal from an order refusing to vacate an attachment.

The defendant is the maker and plaintiffs are accommodation endorsers of a note which had been discounted in a bank in Troy. The affidavit made on the 13th day of July, 1889, states that they paid the note the 15th of that month and then became owners. This does not appear to be a clerical mistake; the undertaking is dated and acknowledged on the 13th of July before the same officer who took the affidavit. So, also, the justifications. The summons is dated the 15th of July, and the affidavit states that it has been issued.

A more serious defect, however, is the failure to show that defendant has assigned his property fraudulently or departed from the state with intent to defraud.

The facts stated are, that defendant has transferred his farm to his wife and gone to one of the western states; that deponent was informed' by Hakes and Jones that defendant had said he was about to leave for Dakota and settle on a farm there, and that defendant had also stated to deponent that he intended to leave this section of the country. In all this there is no evidence of fraud.

Deponent also furnishes a copy of a letter from defendant to him, dated July 6, 1889. The contents of that letter show that defendant cannot pay his debts, and that is about all that it shows. There is nothing indicating any intention to defraud or afay wrongful act.

The mere fact that defendant has transferred his farm to his wife does not show a fraudulent intent. ■ Connected with other circumstances, it might have much weight, but the circumstances are not shown. Whether the farm was incumbered or what was its value are matters not shown. When he made the transfer, and what was the consideration, we are not told.

We think there was not enough to sustain the attachment.

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and printing disbursements and motion to vacate granted, with ten dollars costs. Such costs and disbursements to be offset against plaintiff’s .claim.

Landon, J., concurs.
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO S

. 02

- 11

- 0043 4

- CR

02

- 11

- 00435

- CR

JASON ADRAIN ALVAREZ APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

------------

FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------



### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 

### AND JUDGMENT

----------

We have considered “ Appellant = s Motion To Withdraw The Appeal. ” The

motion complies with rule 42.2(a) of the rules of appellate procedure. Tex. R.

App. P. 42.2(a). No decision of this court having been delivered before we

received this motion, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R.

App. P. 42.2(a), 43.2(f).

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2 PER CURIAM

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App

. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 15 , 2011
#### Marie V. P. Louis, Respondent, v Jack J. Cohen, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 594]

—In an action to recover damages for podiatric malpractice, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Scholnick, J.), dated July 21, 1994, as denied his motion to compel the plaintiff to submit to a complete physical examination including X-rays at the office of the defendant’s examining podiatrist.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the defendant’s motion is granted, and the plaintiff is directed to submit to the exam in question at the office of the defendant’s examining podiatrist.

Under the circumstances, where the defendant seeks to take X-rays in connection with the physical examination of the plaintiff, a well-established right, the examination must be conducted in a physician’s office *(see, Mealy v Deepdale Gen. Hosp.,*145 AD2d 413). This determination reflects the common sense notion that medical examinations are more properly conducted in medical offices rather than in the offices of an attorney *(see, Resnick v Seher,*198 AD2d 218). Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Ritter, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-56,013-13

EX PARTE JOHN RAY NELSON, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. C-213-W011486-0548443-M

IN THE 213 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM TARRANT COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of murder and

sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment.

Applicant contends that he has “31 years on paper and they give me no release date.” This

ground is denied. See generally Ex parte Molina, 483 S.W.3d 24, 27, 28 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

Applicant also contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that he is factually

innocent because he had alibi and mistaken identity defenses. These grounds were or should have
2

been raised in his previous writs. Therefore, these grounds are dismissed. This Court has previously

entered an abuse-of-the-writ order in this cause, and Applicant has failed to show that he could not

have presented these grounds in a previous application.

Accordingly, this application is denied in part and dismissed in part.

Filed: May 22, 2019

Do Not Publish
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v HYMAN HACKER, Specialist Five, U. S. Army, Appellant

15 USCMA 419, 35 CMR 391

No. 18,245

June 4, 1965

*Captain Clifford B. Hearn, Jr.,*argued the cause for Appellant, Accused. With him on the brief were *Colonel Joseph L. Chalk*and *Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Hagopian..*

*Captain Richard J. Andriolo*argued the cause for Appellee, United *420States. With him on the brief were *Colonel Edwin G. Schuck*and *Lieutenant Colonel Francis M. Cooper.*

Opinion of the Court

Ferguson, Judge:

Tried by general court-martial convened at Fort Eustis, Virginia, the accused was found guilty of several counts of committing indecent, lewd, and lascivious acts with children, in violation of Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 134, 10 USC § 934. He was sentenced to bad-conduct discharge and confinement at hard labor for eighteen months. Intermediate appellate authorities affirmed, and we granted accused’s petition for review upon the issue whether the law officer erred to accused’s prejudice by including in his instructions on mental responsibility a controlling reference to the so-called “policeman at the elbow” test.

There is no doubt the law officer’s instructions are erroneous, as they incorporate advice to the effect that “If the accused would not have committed the act if the circumstances were such that he could have expected immediate detection and certain apprehension, he cannot be said to have acted under an inability to adhere to the right.” We so held in United States v Jensen, 14 USCMA 353, 34 CMR 133, and have since consistently adhered to that view. See United States v Jordan, 14 USCMA 393, 34 CMR 173; United States v Moore, 14 USCMA 418, 34 CMR 198; United States v Alphin, 15 USCMA 14, 34 CMR 460; and United States v Mathis, 15 USCMA 130, 35 CMR 102. The Government, however, urges that no prej udice could result from the erroneous advice, as the evidence did not place accused’s mental responsibility in issue. Pointing to expert testimony at the trial that the accused was able to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right, it casts off lay testimony to the contrary as nothing more than unsupported assertions of mental distress.

A majority of the Court is of the view that sufficient evidence was presented on the merits of the case to place mental responsibility in issue. The error, therefore, was prejudicial. Chief Judge Quinn would hold the evidence was insufficient to raise the question and to justify the instruction. See United States v Shaw, 13 USCMA 144, 32 CMR 144.

The decision of the board of review is reversed and the record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General of the Army. A rehearing may be ordered.

Judge HildaY concurs.

Chief Judge Quinn dissents.
No. 44116.

#### Protests 784485-G, etc., of H. A. Johnson Co. et al. (Boston).

Opinion by

Evans, J.

On the authority of *Lamborn*v. *United States*(27 C. C. P. A. 46, C. A. D. 60) the protests were dismissed.
Before the First Division,

December 30, 1940

No. 45077.

#### Protest 839753-G/85823 of Swedish Produce Co. (Chicago).

Opinion by

Brown, J.

On the authority of *Lamborn*v. *United States*(27 C. C. P. A. 46, C. A. D. 60) the protest was dismissed.