NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

THOMAS G. LANDRETH,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2019-2260

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:18-cv-00476-PEC, Judge Patricia E. CampbellSmith.

______________________ 

Decided: January 10, 2020

______________________ 

THOMAS G. LANDRETH, Hoquiam, WA, pro se. 

 ISAAC B. ROSENBERG, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., LOREN 

MISHA PREHEIM. 

 ______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
2 LANDRETH v. UNITED STATES

PER CURIAM. 

Thomas Landreth appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (“the Claims Court”) 

dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Landreth v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00476, 144 

Fed. Cl. 52, 54–55 (July 24, 2019) (“Decision”). Because the 

Claims Court did not err in its dismissal of Landreth’s complaint, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The Quinault Indian Nation (“the Tribe”) is a federally 

recognized tribe in Washington state. The Quinault Reservation is located on the Olympic Peninsula and was established in 1855 by the Treaty of Olympia.

Thomas Landreth is a resident of Washington. In his 

complaint, Landreth represented that he owns private 

property within Olympic National Park that abuts Lake 

Quinault, which is also located on the Olympic Peninsula. 

Landreth alleged that “for more than a decade, the 

Quinault Indian Tribe has increasingly asserted jurisdiction and control over this navigable waterway, forcing out 

the public and non-tribal property owners,” and that since 

April 2013, the Tribe has “restricted all uses of the lake for 

non-tribal members.” See Amended Complaint, Landreth 

v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00476 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 19, 2018), 

ECF No. 12 (“Complaint”). 

After a series of dismissals from state and federal 

courts in Washington, Landreth filed a complaint in the 

Claims Court naming the United States as defendant. 

Landreth’s complaint includes several causes of action, including deprivation of Landreth’s property rights by various trespassory actions taken by the Quinault Tribe, 

conversion of parts of Lake Quinault by the Tribe, tortious 

interference with property, private nuisance, violations of 

the U.S. Constitution, and violations of various federal and 

Washington state laws. Complaint at 28–40.
LANDRETH v. UNITED STATES 3

Landreth’s complaint relies on three bases for Claims 

Court jurisdiction: the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); the 

Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505; and the Act of March 

3, 1891, ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851 (1891) (“the 1891 Act”). Complaint at 3–4. Landreth’s complaint requests various forms 

of declaratory and injunctive relief, including a declaration 

that the Tribe has no rights to the lakebed or waters of 

Lake Quinault and an injunction prohibiting the Tribe 

from restricting public access to the lake. Id. at 41–42. 

Landreth also requests “monetary damages related to the 

loss of use of legally obtained real property and the trespass by the Quinault Indian Tribe.” Id. at 42.

The government filed a motion to dismiss Landreth’s 

complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction, which the Claims Court granted. First, the 

court determined that it lacked jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act because Landreth’s 

claims are more properly against the Tribe, not the United 

States. Decision, 144 Fed. Cl. at 55. Second, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Landreth’s requests for declaratory relief because the Claims Court 

lacks authority to issue declaratory judgments. Id. Finally, with respect to the 1891 Act, the court determined 

that the Act prohibits claims “for any depredation which 

shall be committed after the passage thereof.” Id. (quoting 

26 Stat. 851, 852).

Landreth appealed. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review dismissals by the Claims Court for lack of 

jurisdiction de novo. Frazer v. United States, 288 F.3d 

1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002). While pro se plaintiffs are entitled to a liberal 
4 LANDRETH v. UNITED STATES

construction of their complaint, see Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the leniency afforded pro se litigants 

with respect to mere formalities does not relieve them of 

jurisdictional requirements, Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 

Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

The Tucker Act provides the Claims Court with jurisdiction over claims “against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 

regulation of an executive department, or upon any express 

or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in 

tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491. To pursue a claim under the 

Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify and plead a “substantive right for money damages against the United States 

separate from the Tucker Act.” Todd v. United States, 386 

F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

On appeal, Landreth argues that his claims are based 

on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that 

the Claims Court has jurisdiction over them under the 

Tucker Act. Landreth appears to argue that his claims are 

against the United States for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction because the United States is a trustee for the Tribe 

under the Treaty of Olympia. Thus, in Landreth’s view,

the government is responsible for acts taken by the Tribe.

The government responds that Landreth’s complaint 

fails to allege a taking at all, and to the extent that it may 

be interpreted to do so, the complaint fails to allege a claim 

against the United States as required by the Tucker Act. 

At most, the government argues, the complaint alleges a 

deprivation of Landreth’s property rights by the Tribe 

alone. 

We agree with the government that Landreth’s complaint fails to allege a taking by the United States sufficient to confer on the Claims Court jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act. While it is “undisputed that the Takings 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a money-mandating 
LANDRETH v. UNITED STATES 5

source for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction,” Jan’s Helicopter Service, Inc. v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 

2008), Landreth’s complaint fails to mention the Takings 

Clause or the Fifth Amendment at all. Further, every act 

described in the complaint is alleged to have been committed by the Tribe, not by the United States, and the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish 

responsibility of the United States for acts taken by the 

Tribe. While acts of third parties can sometimes give rise 

to viable takings claims against the United States, see A & 

D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1153 

(Fed. Cir. 2014), Landreth’s complaint does not allege any 

facts plausibly establishing an agency relationship between the Quinault Tribe and the United States, or that 

the United States induced the Tribe to act. And while there 

exists a “general trust relationship between the United 

States and the Indian people,” United States v. Mitchell, 

463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983), Landreth has not demonstrated 

why the United States, as trustee, should be liable for the 

alleged wrongful acts of its beneficiary.

In any event, as noted by the government, even if 

Landreth’s complaint alleges a takings claim, it cannot succeed. The complaint is predicated on alleged wrongful acts 

of the Tribe. However, “[a] takings claim cannot be found 

on the theory that the United States has taken unlawful 

action.” Moody v. United States, 931 F.3d 1136, 1142 (Fed. 

Cir. 2019). Therefore, even if the United States were responsible for the alleged wrongful acts of the Tribe as 

Landreth argues, the complaint still fails to allege a viable 

takings claim because “complaints about the wrongfulness 

of [] government action are [] not properly presented in the 

context of a takings claim.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

The Claims Court also properly determined that it 

lacks jurisdiction over Landreth’s other claims. First, to 

the extent that Landreth characterizes the Treaty of 1855 

as a contract between the United States and the Tribe, it 
6 LANDRETH v. UNITED STATES

cannot provide a basis for the Tucker Act’s contract-based

jurisdiction at least because Landreth has not alleged that 

he was a party to the alleged contract or in privity with a 

party that was. Second, Landreth argues that the Indian 

Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302, confers the Claims Court 

jurisdiction over his constitutional claims against the 

Tribe. However, the Indian Civil Rights Act “does not import duties on the federal government or its employees” 

and cannot be interpreted as money-mandating for purposes of Tucker Act jurisdiction. Wopsock v. Natchees, 454 

F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Finally, we agree with 

the government that the Claims Court correctly determined that the 1891 Act prohibits claims based on depredations occurring after passage of the Act.

Finally, after briefing, Landreth filed a motion to supplement the record. We normally do not consider material 

submitted after briefing unless it was previously unavailable. Therefore, Landreth’s motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Landreth’s remaining arguments 

but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we 

affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal of this case.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

The parties shall bear their own costs.