IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 25, 2017 Session

CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC v. JO ANN STREET

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-004089-10 Gina C. Higgins, Judge

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No. W2016-01026-COA-R3-CV

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Appellant appeals from the trial court’s decision granting a judgment of 

possession to the Appellee bank. Because of profound deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, 

we hold that her arguments are waived. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is 

affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which RICHARD H.

DINKINS, and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Jo Ann Street, Memphis, Tennessee, Pro se.

Jerry Morgan, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Chase Home Finance, LLC.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Background

 

1

Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, 

reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal 

opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum 

opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and 

shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10

05/11/2017
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This is the second appeal of this case and a full recitation of the facts may be 

found in Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Street, No. W2007-02553-COA-R3-CV, 

2010 WL 1462544 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2010) (“Chase I”). The issue in both cases 

concerns property purchased by Ida B. Street (“Ms. Street”) and secured by a deed of 

trust. The deed of trust was eventually acquired by Chase Manhattan Mortgage 

Corporation (“Chase Manhattan”). Id. at *1. Ms. Street participated in two bankruptcy 

actions after her purchase of the property, one finalized in 1998 and another finalized in 

2003. At the conclusion of the 2003 bankruptcy, Ms. Street’s debts were discharged. Id. 

Despite these discharges, Ms. Street’s debt owed under the deed of trust had not been 

paid. Id. at *2. On December 24, 2003, a prior owner of the deed of trust erroneously 

“recorded releases of the deed of trust with the Office of the Register of Shelby County, 

Tennessee.” Id. at *1.

On August 4, 2004, Chase Manhattan filed suit against Ms. Street to set aside the 

releases, for the releases to be rescinded, and for the deed of trust to be reinstated. In 

support, Chase Manhattan alleged that the bank that recorded the releases was not the 

current owner of the deed of trust and, in fact, had not actually owned the deed of trust in 

over twelve years. Id. at *1–2. The trial court thereafter granted summary judgment to 

Chase Manhattan, set aside the releases, and reinstated the deed of trust. While Ms. 

Street’s appeal was pending, she passed away and Defendant/Appellant Jo Ann Street 

(“Appellant”) was substituted.2 Id. at *1. This Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s 

grant of summary judgment allowing the releases to be rescinded. Id. at *2–4. Among 

other issues, the Court of Appeals specifically ruled that Chase Manhattan was the proper 

owner of the deed of trust and that Ms. Street’s debt under the note had not been paid. Id. 

at *2. Finally, the Court noted that Ms. Street’s bankruptcy did not prevent Chase 

Manhattan from foreclosing on the subject property. Id.

In the meantime, on March 28, 2008, a foreclosure sale of the property took place 

and the property was sold to Defendant/Appellee Chase Home Finance, LLC (“Chase”). 

Immediately following the issuance of Chase I, Chase filed a detainer warrant action 

against Appellant on April 30, 2010. Judgment of possession was eventually awarded to 

Chase on August 10, 2010. Appellant thereafter appealed to the Shelby County Circuit 

Court (“the trial court”).

The proceedings in the trial court spanned numerous filings and several years. At 

some point, Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the 

trial court on January 7, 2013, after the trial court ruled that issues of material fact 

remained in dispute. A trial on this cause occurred in April 2014.3 During the hearing, the 

trial court granted the parties a continuance to allow Appellant to present proof that the 

 

2 Appellant is Ms. Street’s daughter.

3 No transcript or statement of the evidence from the trial or any of the other hearings conducted 

in this case is included in the record on appeal. 
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loan had been fully paid. After multiple continuances to give Appellant an opportunity to 

file an affidavit in support of her allegations, the trial court set the matter for a final 

hearing on November 20, 2015. On November 19, 2015, Appellant, by and through her 

counsel, filed a document entitled “Affidavit of Accounting.” The document, however, 

was not an affidavit, but merely a pleading that contained no proof. At the November 20, 

2015 hearing, the trial court gave Appellant and her counsel until November 30, 2015 to 

provide the proffered proof. Another hearing was therefore set for December 2, 2015. On 

December 1, 2015, and again at the December 2, 2015 hearing, Appellant’s counsel 

notified the trial court that there were no documents to support Appellant’s contention 

regarding the additional payments made on the property after the 2003 bankruptcy. 

The trial court therefore eventually ruled in favor of Chase by final order of 

January 8, 2016. The trial court held that Chase had standing to foreclose the loan, that 

Ms. Street’s bankruptcy did not discharge her debt, and that despite multiple 

opportunities and continuances, there was no evidence of payments made on the loan 

after the 2003 bankruptcy. As a result, the trial court ruled that Appellant was in 

unlawful possession of the property and therefore granted possession of the property to 

Chase. Appellant filed several unsuccessful post-trial motions and now appeals to this 

Court.4

Issues Presented

Appellant raises a number of issues in her brief, which we restate largely verbatim 

here: 

1. Whether the trial court did err in GRANTING a judgment in favor of 

Chase Home Finance and giving them possession of [Appellant’s] primary 

residence that she shared with the heirs of the late Ida B. Street, who died 

intestate, Probate Case No.: D-6489, as a matter of law?

Can Chase claim to have foreclosed, but present no record of 

foreclosure after none was found in the county record; and present to the 

trial court an affidavit of debt from Beth Cottrell, an admitted robo-signer, 

and an unrecorded trustee’s deed stating that [Ms.] Street was the grantor 

and that the Secretary of Housing of Urban Development (“HUD”) was the 

grantee. HUD submitted a statement that the unpaid balance was $0.00 and 

the maturity date of the loan was March 2011. The preponderance of the 

evidence does not support the assertion by Chase they are the owner of the 

residence.

2. Did the court err when it failed to rule on the Motion for Summary 

Judgment, pursuant to rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 

52.01 in stating the reason for her decision? In addition the plaintiff 

 

4 Appellant’s trial counsel was suspended by the Board of Professional Responsibility as of 

December 6, 2015. As such, Appellant appeared pro se after this date and in this appeal. 
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refused and failed to respond to discovery requests as stated in defendant’s 

Response by Defendant, [Appellant], to Motion to Withdraw filed by 

Kenneth Besser, Esq. As a matter of law, [Appellant] was entitled to a 

ruling on her Motion for Summary Judgment.

3. Did the trial court err in entertaining testimony concerning payment 

of the loan made and entered into by and between the late [Ms.] Street, 

borrower and National Bank of Commerce, N.A., the lender, accounting; 

and, did the trial court err in denying [Appellant] a continuance when 

Attorney Michael Leon Harris faced an impending suspension of his 

license? The trial court rather decided against [Appellant] when Attorney 

Harris announced he had lost the file at the hearing on December 2, 201[5]. 

[Appellant] is alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

4. Did the trial court err in causing the writ of possession to be issued 

when the issue was being decided in the Court of Appeals in Jackson and 

did the trial court have jurisdiction to dissolve the stay that the Court of 

Appeals, a higher court, was determining the outcome?[ ] Were the actions 

of the trial court and/or the attorneys for plaintiff in contempt by not 

waiting for the decision of the appeals court?

Could the trial impose a rent without their first being an agreement and 

there first being finality and proof of ownership as in T.C.A. 66-28-101-105 

of the Uniform Residential and Tenant Act?

A person must be the bonafide purchaser and have the title to the 

property to be able to rent the property, collect rent and evict tenants. 

Without papers we do not know who they are nor what they are: servicers, I 

think but there is no transfer from Troy & Nichols; not the holders of the 

Note, not the investor. They are possibly volunteers. They do not have 

standing until they say in writing their role.

5. Did the trial court err when it certified the judgment as a final judgment 

under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02? 

Until the findings and conclusions, as well as, other facts are litigated and 

made clear, this is not a final judgment and can be appealed.

In the posture of appellee, Chase argues that this appeal should be dismissed for 

Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements of this Court. 

Discussion

At the outset, we note that Appellant appears before this Court pro se, as she did in 

the trial court post-remand of this case. The law is well-settled in Tennessee that pro se 

litigants must comply with the same standards to which lawyers must adhere. Watson v. 

City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). As explained by this 

Court:
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Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal 

treatment by the courts. The courts should take into account that many pro 

se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the judicial 

system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between 

fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. 

Thus, the courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the 

same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties are expected 

to observe.

Jackson v. Lanphere, No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011) (quoting Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2003)). We keep these principles in mind in considering this appeal, specifically 

with regard to the deficiencies in Appellant’s appellate brief.

On appeal, Chase argues that this Court should dismiss Appellant’s appeal due to 

her failure to comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 

27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in relevant part:

(a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 

appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:

* * *

(2) A table of authorities, including cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes 

and other authorities cited, with references to the pages in the brief where 

they are cited;

* * *

(5) A statement of the case, indicating briefly the nature of the case, the 

course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below;

(6) A statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the issues 

presented for review with appropriate references to the record;

(7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument, 

setting forth:

(A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 

and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require 

appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references 

to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on; and

(B) for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of review 

(which may appear in the discussion of the issue or under a separate 

heading placed before the discussion of the issues);
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(8) A short conclusion, stating the precise relief sought.

Tenn. R. App. P. 27. Further, Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee 

provides, in relevant part:

(a) Written argument in regard to each issue on appeal shall contain:

(1) A statement by the appellant of the alleged erroneous action of the trial 

court which raises the issue and a statement by the appellee of any action of 

the trial court which is relied upon to correct the alleged error, with citation 

to the record where the erroneous or corrective action is recorded.

(2) A statement showing how such alleged error was seasonably called to 

the attention of the trial judge with citation to that part of the record where 

appellant’s challenge of the alleged error is recorded.

R. Tenn. Ct. App. 6. 

Despite the explicit mandates of Rule 27 and Rule 6, Appellant’s brief is rife with 

deficiencies. Prominent among the deficiencies include the following: (1) a very minimal 

table of authorities with no references to the page in the brief where the authorities are 

cited; and (2) statements of the case and the facts containing no citations to the 

voluminous record on appeal. However, the most glaring deficiency in Appellant’s brief 

is the fact that Appellant provides nothing more than a skeletal argument concerning the 

issues she has raised on appeal. 

“Parties must thoroughly brief the issues they expect the appellate court to 

consider.” Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 919 (Tenn. 2009). “It is not the role of the 

courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or 

her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or 

merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l 

Responsibility of Sup.Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). “An issue may be deemed 

waived, even when it has been specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails to 

include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7).” Hodge v. 

Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 381 

(Tenn. 2011); Sneed, 301 S.W.3d at 615). “‘Courts have routinely held that the failure . . 

. to cite relevant authority in the argument section of the brief as required by Rule 

27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue.’” Forbess v. Forbess, 370 S.W.3d 347, 355 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 55–56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2000)); see also Tellico Village Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Health Solutions, LLC, No. 

E2012-00101-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 362815, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2013) 

(quoting Hawkins v. Hart, 86 S.W.3d 522, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)) (“‘Where a party 

makes no legal argument and cites no authority in support of a position, such issue is 

deemed to be waived and will not be considered on appeal.’”). 
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Here, Appellant’s statement of the issues raises various questions regarding the 

substantive merits of the action, including Chase’s ability to foreclose on the property, 

the trial court’s denial of a summary judgment motion and alleged failure to make proper 

findings, the trial court’s rulings with regard to the admissibility of testimony, the trial 

court’s denial of continuances, ineffective assistance of counsel, contempt, rent, and 

issues regarding bona fide purchasers. Only one of these issues, however, is actually 

argued in the body of Appellants’ brief with citations to relevant authority—the argument 

that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and in not 

making appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The other issues presented 

are either not argued by Appellant in the body of her brief or argued without any citation 

to the authority. Additionally, even those issues addressed in the body of Appellant’s 

brief are completely unsupported by references to the record on appeal. Finally, we note 

that this matter was concluded after a trial and numerous hearings. The record on appeal, 

however, contains no transcript or statement of the evidence heard by the trial court. 

When no transcript or statement of the evidence is included in the record on appeal, we 

conclusively presume that the findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by the 

evidence and are correct. J.C. Bradford & Co. v. Martin Constr. Co., 576 S.W.2d 586, 

587 (Tenn. 1979). Consequently, the issues raised by Appellant in her brief are waived. 

Despite the profound deficiencies in Appellants’ brief, in an abundance of caution, 

we will address the issues addressed by Appellant in the body of her brief and supported 

by relevant authority, namely, whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment 

and whether the trial court erred in makings findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Here, Appellant asserts that the trial court “erred when it failed to rule on the 

motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure, filed by [Appellant]; and failed to comply with . . . Rule . . . 52.01 in stating 

the reason for her decision.” This decision, however, is not reviewable in this appeal. 

Here, the trial court denied the motion for summary judgment after ruling that disputed 

issues of material fact remained; the case therefore proceeded to trial. “Since the trial 

court’s denial of the summary judgment was predicated upon the existence of a genuine 

issue of fact, that decision is not reviewable where there has been a judgment rendered 

after a trial on the merits of the case.” Mullins v. Precision Rubber Prod. Corp., 671 

S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Tate v. Monroe Cnty., 578 S.W.2d 642, 

644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)); see also Bradford v. City of Clarksville, 885 S.W.2d 78, 80 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Hobson v. First State Bank, 777 S.W.2d 24, 32 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1989)) (“A trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment, predicated upon 

the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, is not reviewable on appeal when a 

judgment is subsequently rendered after a trial on the merits.”). As such, we will not 

review any issues concerning the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for summary 

judgment. 
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Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in not making findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, citing Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Procedure. Although 

Appellant asserts this failure in connection with the trial court’s denial of her summary 

judgment motion, Rule 52.01 is applicable only in “bench trials.” See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 

52.01 (“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts 

specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the 

appropriate judgment.”). Indeed, the case cited by Appellant as support for her argument 

involves a bench trial. See In re Estate of Oakley, No. M2014-00341-COA-R3-CV, 2015 

WL 572747, at *10 & n.9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2015) (expressly noting that the trial 

court’s responsibility to make findings and conclusions in bench trials is “distinguished” 

from its responsibilities when ruling on a motion for summary judgment). As such, we 

will construe Appellant’s argument as arguing that the trial court failed to make

appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law in its final order following the bench 

trial. 

As an initial matter, we agree with Appellant that Rule 52.01 “clearly mandates 

that the trial court shall find the facts and shall state separately its conclusions of law in 

all actions tried upon the facts without a jury.” Estate of Oakley, 2015 WL 572747, at 

*10 (citing Lovelace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 34 (Tenn. 2013)). The Tennessee 

Supreme Court has held that its purpose is to facilitate appellate review by “affording a 

reviewing court a clear understanding of the basis of a trial court’s decision.” Lovelace, 

418 S.W. at 34 (internal citations omitted). “In the absence of written findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, ‘this court is left to wonder on what basis the court reached its 

ultimate decision.’” Estate of Oakley, 2015 WL 572747, at *10 (quoting In re Christian 

G., No. W2013-02269-COA-R3-JV, 2014 WL 3896003, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 

2014)). “When the trial court fails to make the requisite findings of fact, we can conduct a 

de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies 

or, in the alternative, remand the case to the trial court with instructions to make the 

requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment accordingly.” Estate 

of Oakley, 2015 WL 572747, at *12 (citing Lovelace, 418 S.W. at 36). We cannot agree, 

however, that the trial court’s order is deficient in this case. 

Here, the trial court’s final order disposing of this case spans nine pages. Therein, 

the trial court details the multiple continuances that were offered to Appellant to allow 

her to present evidence supporting her contentions. In addition, the trial court’s order 

recounts the factual history in detail that led to both Chase I and the underlying action. 

The trial court further noted that Appellant had been unable to produce any evidence to 

show that payments had been made on the loan after the 2003 bankruptcy. Additionally, 

the trial court found that the deed of trust conveying the property to Chase was valid and 

enforceable against Appellant. Finally, the trial court noted:

This is a simple detainer action. The Court of Appeals has already 

concluded that the loan was not fully satisfied by the two bankruptcies, and 
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this [c]ourt cannot overturn that holding. Questions of whether Chase 

[Manhattan] had the ability to foreclose and take the property were raised in 

the Chancery Case, and based upon the ruling from the Court of Appeals, 

Chase [Manhattan] is the owner, and had the ability to proceed with 

foreclosure. 

* * *

As the foreclosure was proper in all respects, title to the [p]roperty 

was properly vested into [Chase]. [Appellant] is unlawfully detaining the 

[p]roperty.

Appellant’s brief does not explain specifically how the trial court’s order fails to 

comply with Rule 52.01. As such, we hold that the trial court’s detailed and thorough 

order fully complies with Rule 52.01. This issue is therefore, respectfully, without merit. 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Costs of this 

appeal are taxed to Appellant, for which execution may issue if necessary. 

_________________________________

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE